BORAS Blowout 2018/19: Intro and Catchers

For the past several Octobers (give or take an extended playoff appearance), the writers here at Camden Depot would put together organizational blueprints for the off season to suggest what the Orioles should do to improve the squad.  That will not happen this year.  However, a major component of that work was our contract projection model: BORAS.

Catcher | 1B | 2B | SS | 3B | LF | CF | RF | DH | SP

In case you forgot or never knew, BORAS takes into consideration several characteristics of a player (e.g., age, offensive performance, defensive performance, historical contract comparisons) and uses that information to project what the new contract will look like.  Each year, we add on another season of data and try to tinker with the model to improve upon it.  This year, the primary model improvement comes from using a batch age model to weight things differently.

Our first series of posts will consider BORAS(po), the position player contract model.  What we found was that younger players and older players were really being valued differently beyond their age.  For instance, our analysis suggests that older players are sought after for their offense with considerably less value placed on their defense.  If we look at encapsulated metrics, defense was valued about half as much on a per run basis as offense was in the 31 and older player set.  For 30 year olds and younger, the value gap shrank from 52% to 17%.  Differences like these can really impact the quality of a model.  By taking these into consideration, we improved the performance of our model internally by about 15%.

In the past, I would just drop the whole player list and then run away.  This year, we will try to be more comprehensive and cover a large swath of the player market as well as putting in some arbitration eligible Orioles because...eh, why not?  Again the caveats remain as they have in the past.  This model does not know about injuries or suspensions.  This model is based on a data set that largely ignores players who get bench level playing time.  Those can be two major blindspots at times.  Finally, our first post here deals with catchers and this model has always struggled with catchers.  In my opinion, this will probably be the worst performing projection group.

BORAS(po) 2018/19 Catcher contract projections

	Years	Total (MM)
Drew Butera		Invite
Robinson Chirinos	1	9.9
AJ Ellis	1	6
Yasmani Grandal	3	45.3
Nick Hundley	1	5.6
Jonathan Lucroy	1	4.4
Martin Maldonado	1	4.6
Jeff Mathis		Invite
Brian McCann	1	7.7
Devin Mesoraco	2	14.9
Wilson Ramos	3	26.3
Rene Rivera	1	7
Kurt Suzuki	2	20
Matt Wieters	1	4.1
Caleb Joseph	1	3.9

The adjustments made this year have resulted in a much more competent model at first look, but there are a couple peculiar projections.  I have a hard time seeing Suzuki making 2/20 even though he has experienced a bit of a late career bloom.  Second, I think the model might be a bit too hard on Wilson Ramos who has had to deal with some misfortune with respect to his health.  I also think Ramos gets dinged a bit due to his poor base running, which I think in general does not impact catchers all that much when it comes to signing a contract.

As this is an Orioles blog, I added arbitration eligible Caleb Joseph.  He should be looking at 1.5 to 2 MM in arbitration while BORAS projects Joseph to be worth slightly more in the open market.  With the Orioles organization in possession of a few decent catchers that would come in under the 1.5 MM mark, it may well make sense to non-tender Joseph even though his arbitration value might be a slight bargain.

Tomorrow, I will post first basemen.

Chance Sisco: Anatomy of a Thrown Out Runner

When Chance Sisco was drafted, he was noted as being a rather novice when it came to the defensive responsibilities of being a catcher.  His skills were uniformly seen as below average, but the potential for him to make those skills adequate was a divisive question among scouts.  Our own research found that poor defensive catchers generally do not make it to the majors, primarily because they are unable to acquire adequate defensive skill.  As Sisco rose through the minors, the common refrain was that he was improving, but he was not adequate.  More specifically, it was considered that his framing and blocking was adequate, but his movement from behind the plate was not ideal.

Last Wednesday, Sisco was challenged and this is what happened:

That marked the 18th time someone ran on Sisco and the ninth time he was able to contribute to a caught stealing.  For players with 150 IP, here are the leaders in % Caught Stealing (as of 5/17):

Name	Team	% CS
Salvador Perez	KCR	63
Jett Bandy	MIL	57
Matt Wieters	WSN	50
Chance Sisco	BAL
Mike Zunino	SEA	43
J.T. Realmuto	MIA	42
Luke Maile	TOR	40
Jason Castro	MIN
Pedro Severino	WSN	39
Francisco Cervelli	PIT	39

That looks fairly impressive and I think it is good to break down what happened in the video above.

So what are the parts of attempting to throw out a baserunner: lead control, hand break to plate, location, pop time, throw, and catch and tag.  Of those parts, the pitcher is in control of the lead and hand break to plate.  The middle infield is responsible for the catch and tag.  The catch is responsible for his pop and throw.

When it comes to lead control, there are a mix of opinions.  Many pitching coaches despise the pickoff throw.  They think it increases pitch count, messes with mechanics, can indicate when a pitcher is actually pitching more easily, and simply does not work.  This perspective usually involves a long staredown (a la Mike Mussina) or simply never really looking over and letting the catcher call a pickoff move.  The other view is the concept on continual disruption to get the runner out of their rhythm.  The Orioles appear to be a team that does not pick off much, and even if they did, it does not appear to help catchers all that much.

In the 1980s, a revolution was afoot.  Dick Bosman, former Orioles pitching coach, was trying to figure out how to limit damage inflicted on his team by the running game.  In the 1980s, running was a major element of the game with several seasons where someone would steal over a hundred bases.  Bosman realized that as pitching coach, he had trouble encouraging catchers to get off their throws and began tinkering with a pitchers time to plate.  What he realized is that a pitcher could use a quick side step and not lose all that much velocity.  He was able to reduce the time a pitcher got the ball to the plate from his hand break from over two seconds to well under two seconds.  From all appearances, it seems the Orioles still retain that perspective.  It is a concept that is loudly preached in the organization.  This helps a catcher quite a bit.

Another thing that can help a catcher is where pitches are thrown.  Dick Bosman has another story regarding the great Ivan Rodriguez who was known as a dominant force against baserunners.  He noted that IRod would call pitches high and outside to put himself in better position to throw runners out regardless of the impact on the at bat.  Eventually, hitters wised up and began expecting those kinds of pitches.  For years, the Orioles have done this.  Pitch maps are all over the place, but when a runner is alone at first, the pitches rise with greater frequency.  From what I can tell on Sisco's successes, he often gets these pitches when runners run.

This brings us to pop time, the time it takes to receive the ball and deliver it to your middle infielder.  Here is a smattering of pop times with ranks (using Baseball Savant).

Name	Team	Pop Time	Rank (41)	MPH
JT Realmuto	MIA	1.85	1	88
Gary Sanchez	NYY	1.95	4	87
Welington Castillo	CHW	1.96	6	80
Matt Wieters	WAS	1.99	15	79
Buster Posey	SFG	2.01	21	83
Caleb Joseph	BAL	2.03	24	78
Omar Narvaez	CHW	2.06	31	80
Chance Sisco	BAL	2.08	36	78
Kurt Suzuki	ATL	2.15	42	81

Sisco has one of the weaker arms in baseball behind the plate.  Of those 41 catchers, only AJ Ellis, Brian McCann, and Tony Wolters get less velocity on their balls.  What is the difference between a Chance Sisco soft-tossed 78 mph pitch and a Jorge Alfaro 91 mph burner?  About 0.07 seconds.  In other words, about 16-21% of the pop time has to do with getting the ball in the air to second.  The rest is getting into position to throw and exchanging the ball from glove to hand.

When we look at positioning, Sisco is better.  Whereas his arm strength is 38th out of 41, his positioning into a throw was 23rd out of 41.  That is below the mean, but not off by much.  Getting the ball out of his glove and into the air?  That is 34th out of 41.  All of that is below average and paints a terrible picture for what he has control over. 

One thing is not being measured though: the placement of his throws.  I do not have the data, but Joseph does an excellent job with his accuracy and delivers the ball well for the middle infielder to use.  I am unsure where it is on purpose, but he seems to hit the lip of the infield grass so that it is delivered right for a tag.  That is what we see in the graphic above.

That leads us to the catch and tag, which is something either the Orioles make a point to find in a player or teach in a player.  JJ Hardy, Manny Machado, Jonathan Schoop, and Ryan Flaherty.  They all were excellent at receiving a ball and putting a tag down.  I am not familiar enough with the others yet to deliver anything near decisive.

So what does this all mean? 

Name	Team	% CS	SB/9	Att/9
Russell Martin	TOR	23	0.91	1.19
Matt Wieters	WSN	50	0.51	1.02
Jonathan Lucroy	OAK	31	0.69	1.00
Jorge Alfaro	PHI	29	0.68	0.96
Chance Sisco	BAL	50	0.47	0.94
Tony Wolters	COL	33	0.58	0.88
Luke Maile	TOR	40	0.51	0.85
Caleb Joseph	BAL	21	0.67	0.84
Pedro Severino	WSN	39	0.50	0.81
Robinson Chirinos	TEX	8	0.74	0.81

Above you see the top ten catchers for whom the most stolen base attempts are made (at least 150 innings played this season).  For whatever reason, teams are running on Chance Sisco.  It may be that teams see the problems he has and are willing to send runners who have no business being sent to second.  It may be that Sisco indeed places his thrown balls well and that value of that is underrated.  It may be that his %CS will catch up to him.

Regardless, there are good reasons to doubt Sisco as being effective long term against baserunners similar to how Joseph was initially incredible at throwing out runners his first year, too, and is now fairly unimpressive.  My guess is that we will eventually see teams be slightly more selective running against Sisco and perform much better.

A Decade of Orioles AAA Catchers

Joe Reisel's Archives

Audry Perez (on defense) is one of the more prominent Norfolk Tides catchers of the Orioles' Era.
Photo courtesy of Les Treagus / Norfolk Tides.

The Norfolk Tides moved into their current stadium, Harbor Park, in 1993, so 2017 is the 25th season in which they've played there. For their first fifteen Harbor Park years, the Tides were affiliated with the New York Mets; they became an Orioles affiliate after the 2006 season. To celebrate the 25th anniversary of Harbor Park, and to remind Hampton Roads-area baseball fans that the 2017 season is approaching, the Tides' staff devised an "All-Time Harbor Park Team" promotion. As you might expect, the team selects finalists at each position from among Tides players; fans can vote on social media for their choice; the one with the most votes is named to the team. (See the Tides web site for more details.)

I will be starting my twelfth season as an milb.com datacaster for the Tides; I began during the last season of the Mets era and have continued through the entire Tides era. (I started my scoring for Baseball Info Solutions in my third season of datacasting.) In fact, I arrived in Hampton Roads in 1993, which coincidentally was the Tides' first season in Harbor Park. Before I became a datacaster, though, I only attended a few games a season; since then, and especially after I started scoring for BIS, I've attended around 45 games a season.

The first position voted upon was catcher, and the winner was, not really surprisingly, Matt Wieters. Although it wasn't surprising that Wieters would win a popular vote for All-Time Harbor Park catcher, it is noteworthy that Wieters has caught a total of 28 games as a Tide, presumably fewer than that actually at Harbor Park. When I started thinking about who would be more appropriate, I realized that although I remembered to a greater or lesser degree the Tides' catchers, especially of the Orioles' era, I didn't really know much about them. This article will look at the Tides' catchers during the Orioles' era.

Forty-two players have played catcher in at least one game for the Tides. Two of them are young players who caught a few games last season - Austin Wynns and Chance Sisco. Two others are not-so-young players who first caught Tides' games last season - Francisco Pena and Chris O'Brien. While I have a strong opinion about their probable future, my review showed me that I didn't know quire as much about players as I thought I did. So, I will not pigeonhole Pena or O'Brien.

Before I present my observations that may be more generally applicable to every team's AAA catchers, I'll share some Norfolk-Tides-in-the-Orioles-era catcher-specific trivia:

• Audry Perez has caught the most total games, 153.
• Omir Santos holds the single-season record for most games caught, 81 in 2008.
• Besides Perez, only two other catchers have caught 100 or more games - Luis Exposito and Steve Clevenger.
• Fifteen catchers have caught games in more than one season.
• Only one game has been caught by a player on a rehabilitation assignment - Matt Wieters in 2015.

Now, for the more general observations. The catchers fall into five general categories. All of my player classifications are subjective and that I don't have any defined standards or cutoffs. So, while you might disagree about how a specific classification, I contend that there would be no dispute over 90% of the players.

The first category is players on their way up to somewhat substantial major-league careers. Surprisingly, only three players fall into that category, and two are borderline. The three are Matt Wieters, Eli Whiteside, and Caleb Joseph. As I mentioned above, Wieters also caught a game while on a rehabilitation assignment, and Joseph was sent down last season during his struggles.

The second category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but who bounced between AAA and the majors. Two players fall into that category, although Caleb Joseph might also eventually wind up here. The other two - both borderline - are Steve Clevenger and Taylor Teagarden.

The third category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but are playing AAA after their major-league careers are (mostly) finished and are hanging on. Seven players fall into that category; I won't list them all but they include Alberto Castillo, Ben Davis, Ronny Paulino, and Chris Snyder.

The fourth category is players who are fringe major-leaguers, who had insubstantial careers, or AAA players. Fourteen players fall into that category; typical examples include J.R. House, Craig Tatum, John Hester, and Brian Ward.

The fifth category might be called desperation catchers, players who either aren't really AAA players - such as Morgan Clendenin, Zach Booker, and Allen de San Miguel - or who aren't really catchers - Mike Costanzo and Brandon Snyder. These guys catch a few games - no more than ten in a single season - when injuries or callups require a promotion for the duration of the emergency or when an in-game crisis occurs. Ten catchers fall into that category.

It's obvious that very few catchers have passed through Norfolk on their way to long, successful big-league careers. I think we all sort of knew that. The Orioles aren't a player-development factory; and Matt Wieters has been entrenched in Baltimore since 2009. (Did you remember that Ramon Hernandez was the regular catcher before Wieters arrived in 2009? And that the Orioles traded Hernandez in December of 2008 for players, one of whom was current Dodger third baseman Justin Turner? I digress.)

Another noteworthy trend is that the Orioles have moved away from veteran catchers with substantial big-league experience. While they relied heavily on that type of player in 2007-2009, the last one they've had was Chris Snyder in 2013. They've relied more on the fringier types. Perhaps with Caleb Joseph on the big-league team, they've felt less of a need to have an experienced catcher stashed at AAA. Or, perhaps with Joseph around, veterans with big-league experience don't want to sign with the Orioles because they think they have a better shot at playing time elsewhere. Or perhaps there just aren't as many of those guys around.

I was surprised that only two of these catchers - J.R. House and Jake Fox - are what I call "bat-only" catchers. These are players who caught as amateurs but aren't good enough defensively to stay at the position. If their bats are good enough, they switch to another position and have a big-league career. If their bats aren't good enough - like House and Fox - they continue to catch, hoping that their combination of bat and ability to catch allows them to stay on a roster. I expected Norfolk to have had more of them.

Matt Wieters was certainly the best player to catch for the Norfolk Tides while they were an Orioles' affiliate. I still have a hard time swallowing the idea that someone who caught 28 games should be the catcher on an All-Time team. So perhaps Wieters really does deserve to be the catcher on the All-Time Orioles Era Norfolk Tides team..

How A Day Off Affects Catchers

The 2016 Orioles are cursed (blessed?) with two catchers worthy of starting roles on Major League teams. While having a deep roster at one position is always a blessing, the Orioles suffer from the employment of both Matt Wieters and Caleb Joseph thanks to their salaries complicating resource allocation and because only one can be on the field at a time.

There was a longshot opportunity for Wieters to play first while Caleb Joseph served as the primary backstop, but that was eliminated when Chris Davis signed a long term deal to stay in Baltimore. Wieters and Joseph may each get some DH duties, but neither is ideal for the role - I'm sure most people would like to see better pure hitters playing the only position for pure hitters. Most often, I would expect to see one playing while one gets a day of rest, typically assumed to be a good thing, particularly for catchers.

For health, regular days off may be ideal for players in arguably the sport's most demanding position. At the plate, rest may be ineffective at best and detrimental at worst.

To test this (actually, with the thought that rest was good for plate performance),  I gathered all events from 2003 to midyear 2013 that featured a catcher holding a bat. I got rid of any player that didn't meet a very generous 100 at bat threshold so that emergency catchers and September call-ups wouldn't affect the final results. Then, according to the date of the event, I determined which happened in a game following at least one day of rest and which happened in a game following a game in the immediately preceding day. This reflects the fact that catchers can get rest from normal days out of the lineup, days in which the team is not playing, the entire offseason, and - unfortunately - injury.

Rehabbing injuries, while technically time away from baseball, are a special kind of rest because they aren't really rest at all. Rehab is a ton of work, often painful, and many players are affected by injury in the first few games that they come back and recapture their routine. Injuries have the ability to adversely affect offensive productivity when the player returns to action, so it's worth noting that the final results of my analysis could, but are not necessarily, affected by the circumstances surrounding them.

The following chart shows how catchers have batted in a game following a day of work plotted against how catchers have batted in a game following a day of rest:

There's a pretty solid correlation between batting average and batting average after a day of rest; good hitters are always good hitters, and rest doesn't make a bad hitter a good one. But we're interested in whether a day of rest adds a boost to a hitter regardless of given quality.

One thing to keep in mind regarding the Orioles' situation is that having a significant timeshare is very unusual. The vast majority of games played after a day of rest were played after a day of rest:

That's generally consistent with the thought that most teams don't have two catchers worth significant time. Really, it's hard enough to find one player who is competent at both the plate and behind it, or is competent enough in one area to make up for deficiencies in the other. It seems most catchers have one day off, whether a scheduled day off or a simple day of rest, and then get back to action. If Wieters and Joseph split the season, say 100/60, they'll both be seeing more than one day of rest at a time fairly often.

And therein lies another potential pitfall with the final results of this analysis: good catchers rarely get rest, so the offensive productivity of catchers after time off is driven equally or possibly mostly by second-tier catchers who either back someone up or aren't good enough to take the job full time.

In five statistical tests with a random sampling of catchers (21 catchers in each sample) with at least 100 at bats, the difference between their batting averages after rest and their batting averages overall is generally too small to be statistically significant. In the roughly 15% of samples that the difference is found to be statistically significant, it's because the catchers are batting so poorly after a day of rest.

When testing is applied to the population of catchers, the batting average of catchers on days of rest is so far below the rest-independent average of the same population, it is statistically significant at the alpha=0.95 level.

These tests indicate that catchers tend to do worse after days of rest, but that their performance in many cases may be a result of random variance - that they could just as easily be getting hits as they are getting out. Other catchers are really hampered by a day off, possibly breaking a rhythm, coincidentally (or not, if managers elect to play backups against a weak starter in favor of rested regulars against aces the following day) seeing great pitchers after a day of rest, or catchers regularly getting rest simply being worse players in general.

The same effect is seen in on base percentage, and is possibly even more pronounced. Players more frequently post high rates of getting on base when playing without rest. Perhaps better players play without rest more often, but also consider that a player might need a few days to get a good sense of the strike zone, or get into a rhythm at the plate:

As with batting average, I conducted statistical tests on the on-base percentages of five separate 21-observation samples of catchers. The difference between catchers' ability to get on base after a day of rest was found to be statistically significant at the alpha=0.95 level in roughly 30% of samples. Again, the difference in OBP between players' averages and their performance after days of rest was found to be significant negatively; catchers do worse (if they do worse) after a day of rest.

Because the results were not particularly conclusive, I conducted the same tests on the population of catchers as I did with batting average. And again, the likelihood that the difference in rest OBP and overall OBP in the population was minuscule; as a whole, catchers are worse after rest.

Whether these results are directly applicable to the anticipated Wieters/Joseph timeshare is up for debate. Arguably they are both better catchers than the majority of catchers seeing days off often throughout the season. However, catchers generally tend not to do well after a day of rest - surprising, considering the possibility of healing, relaxing, and studying on a day off.

For what it's worth, I accept the proposition that catchers are marginally worse after a day of rest, perhaps not as noticeably as the full population suggests. That leaves me either hoping that Joseph and Wieters are possibly unusual cases that see no detrimental effects from rest, or, as has been my position since Wieters accepted the Orioles' qualifying offer, that the Orioles would use their depth at the position to allow for trading one of the two in exchange for filling other areas of need. In addition to filling roster holes, moving forward with one true primary catcher may generate better performance from the catcher position over the course of the 2016 season.

Defensive Makeup of Catchers in the Draft

I forgot to post this earlier, but, based on the study I had posted last week showing the difficulty defensively poor amateurs had at sticking behind the plate, here is a run down of catchers for those who I think will go in the first five rounds.  The defensive marks are based on Baseball America's scouting reports.

First Round
C/OF Alex Johnson
C Max Pentecost
C/1B Kyle Scwarber

None of these guys are currently proficient behind the plate, putting them all in the 18% group.  They all have solid bats, so that will also be a pressure to push them in front and lower their chances at keeping their catching mitts.

Second Round
C J.J. Schwartz
C/1B Chase Vallot
C Aramis Garcia
C Evan Skoug
C Greyson Grainor

Of these, only Swartz and Grainor get good grades for their defense.  They have a solid chance of seeing time in the Majors.

Third Round
C Jackson Reetz
C Taylor Gushoe
C Mark Zagunis

Reetz and Gushoe are the bets to make here if your goal is to develop an MLB catcher.

Fourth Round
C Brett Austin
C KJ Harrison
C Matt Morgan
C Riley Adams

Harrison is the defensive blue chip.  Morgan and Adams are very inexperienced and might be good flyers.

Fifth Round
C Simon Lucas
C/1B Michael Cantu
C Shane Zeile
C/1B Skyler Ewing
C Roy Morales 
C Nathan Rodriguez
C Devon Fisher 

Rodriguez and Fisher are the only ones here with acceptable defense.

Receivers in Name Only

You may have never heard of the baseball term RINO (Receivers in Name Only).  The likely cause of this is that I think I just made it up.  What it is trying to make clear is to communicate what is a popular perspective in several front offices throughout baseball: catchers without sufficient defensive skills when drafted are highly unlikely to acquire those skills during their career.  Maybe the term sticks, maybe it does not, but hopefully this article addresses whether or not this sentiment is true.

The way I decided to test this was pretty simple.  I took all draftees listed as a catcher from 2004 through 2008.  I decided to ignore any position switches because what we are interested in are catchers at the MLB level.  Whether or not they hit well enough to assume another position (e.g., Gaby Sanchez) does not resolve the issue of catching depth in a system.  I gave them credit for service at a level (e.g., MLB, AAA, AA, A, Hi A, A, Short A, Rookie) if they had over 100 games played at that level or accumulated at that level and a above.  For instance, if a player had 70 games caught at AA and 40 at AAA, that player would be credited with having reached AA with 110 games at or above that level.  All this was how the study measured performance, nothing more.

To determine how a catcher's ability was viewed at the time of being drafted, I consulted Baseball America's draft database scouting reports.  I decided to be conservative in what I labeled as a defensive catcher.  The following are several of the terms used that would result in a player being classified as such:

best defender in the class, pure catch and throw, solid average, at worst fringe average, best defensive catcher seen since Charles Johnson (a label that adorned Matt Wieters' scouting report, which is contrary to my memory)

Draftees labelled as poor defenders included labels like these:

needs improvement behind the plate to stick, defense remains his nemesis, passable, adequate, no scouts see him at catcher, deserves a look behind the plate, will move to third

These designations left us with 37 catchers labeled as defensive drafted in the first five rounds and 28 labeled as non defensive.  This may not be the most robust data set, but it might be able to yield some answers if the differences between these two groups are large.

How well do defensive catchers advance through the levels?

 If you simply count each level attained as a single point, sum them up for each player individually, and group them by their defense, then defensive catchers significantly (p=0.001) rack up levels played as a catcher in professional baseball.  The table below shows the total number of players in each group that are credited with time spent (100 games or more at that level and above) and the percent of that group that made it to that level.

	Defensive		Non Defensive
	n		n
Total	37		28
MLB	16	43%	5	18%
AAA	24	65%	9	32%
AA	29	78%	13	46%
Hi A	31	84%	15	54%
A	36	97%	20	71%
Short A	36	97%	21	75%
Rookie	36	97%	22	79%

As you can see, defensive catchers are likely to make it to the Majors 2.4 times more likely than non-defensive catchers.  Keep in mind that this success rate does not include defensive catchers Kyle Skipworth, Austin Romine, and Travis D'Arnaud who all stand a very reasonable chance of achieving that 100 game MLB mark in the next year or two.  That would raise the success rate to 51% and increase of probability to 2.8 times more likely to make the big show than non-defensive catchers.  In other words, if you are an organization looking to improve catching depth within your system then you should stick to the amateurs who already show proficiency in the position.  However, if you really love a bat and the player just happens to be listed as a catcher then feel free to select him knowing that it is highly likely that he has to exchange his catching mitt for a fielding one.

One question that may be asked would be whether or not non-defensive catchers are more likely to be selected in the later portions of the five round database of drafted catcher that I put together.  In fact, the average round players were drafted in was higher for the non-defensive catchers (2.5) than the defensive catchers (2.8).  For the most part, defensive and non-defensive catchers drafted in the first two rounds were in similar proportion in their groups.  The non-defensive catchers attained a higher average draft round because teams drafted few of them in the fifth round in comparison to defensive catchers.

Below is a table parsing out the round data for each group as well as the MLB attainment rates for those groups.

	Defensive		Non Defensive
Round	Success	n	Success	n
1st	64%	11	14%	7
2nd	57%	7	0%	5
3rd	33%	6	14%	7
4th	33%	6	29%	7
5th	14%	7	50%	2

A first round catcher with existing professional defensive skills is 4.5 times more likely than a non-defensive catcher.  If you add Skipworth and D'Arnaud in that then the percent goes up to 82%, 5.9 times more likely than a non-defensive first round catcher.  Romine's addition would put the second round at 71%.  Keep in mind that these are small sample sizes, but these are rather impressive differences that suggest that there is a trend here.

Conclusion

The conclusion is this: if you want a catcher, then draft an individual who has already displayed professional catching skills.  If you really like a bat and the player just happens to have played catcher in high school or college, then do not talk yourself into dreaming about him as a catcher and respect him simply for his bat.  Otherwise, an organization may just find itself a few years down the road with no internal solutions behind the plate.

Caleb Joeph Is 28.

Last Wednesday, Caleb Joseph started at catcher for the Orioles at the age of 27 (though his June birthday has him in the age 28 class cohort which means more than half the season this year he will be 28).  He had been left open for a few years in the Rule 5 draft, but no other team in baseball considered him as having a good shot to make their club and stay on the roster all year long.  That left him back in the Orioles organization where he moved up to Norfolk for his age 28 year, which is pretty old to be making a firm move up to AAA.  With Matt Wieters' misfortune, Joesph found his opportunity.

In doing so, Joseph managed to do something that only 10 Oriole position players had done before him: debut at age 28 or older.  Below is the full list:

Rk		Year	Age	G	PA	BA	OBP	SLG
1	Alejandro Freire	2005	30	25	72	.246	.319	.338
2	P.J. Forbes	1998	30	9	10	.100	.100	.100
3	Chico Garcia	1954	29	39	71	.113	.211	.177
4	Carlos Mendez	2003	29	26	46	.222	.217	.267
5	Chico Fernandez	1968	29	24	19	.111	.158	.111
6	Carl Powis	1957	29	15	52	.195	.314	.317
7	Howie Clark	2002	28	14	58	.302	.362	.396
8	Napoleon Calzado	2005	28	4	5	.200	.200	.200
9	Mike Moriarty	2002	28	8	16	.188	.188	.250
10	Ricky Jones	1986	28	16	39	.182	.308	.242

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used
Generated 5/7/2014.

That is not exactly the greatest list one would wish to be on.  Of those players, well, none of them wound up doing anything much of importance.  The most renowned among them would be Howie Clark because he was the recipient of an Alex Rodriguez shout out while Clark was camped out under a fly ball at third base.

Though, maybe the list above is unfair.  Catchers sometimes need a lot of time to hone their craft and be capable at a MLB level.  Let us look at catcher debuts over the past 20 years for players in their age 28 seasons and above.

	Year	Age	Tm	G	PA	BA	OBP	SLG
Chris Coste	2006	33	PHI	65	213	.328	.376	.505
Clemente Alvarez	2000	32	PHI	2	5	.200	.200	.200
Darron Cox	1999	31	MON	15	27	.240	.296	.400
Cody Clark	2013	31	HOU	16	40	.105	.128	.132
Frank Charles	2000	31	HOU	4	7	.429	.429	.571
Tom Wilson	2001	30	OAK	9	24	.190	.250	.476
Max St. Pierre	2010	30	DET	6	9	.222	.222	.333
Erik Kratz	2010	30	PIT	9	36	.118	.167	.118
Ken Huckaby	2001	30	ARI	1	1	.000	.000	.000
Chris Heintz	2005	30	MIN	8	26	.200	.231	.320
Brandon Harper	2006	30	WSN	18	47	.293	.362	.512
J.C. Boscan	2010	30	ATL	1	1		1.000
B.J. Waszgis	2000	29	TEX	24	51	.222	.294	.244
Mark Strittmatter	1998	29	COL	4	4	.000	.000	.000
Mandy Romero	1997	29	SDP	21	50	.208	.240	.333
Guillermo Rodriguez	2007	29	SFG	39	98	.253	.327	.356
Chris Robinson	2013	29	SDP	8	12	.167	.167	.417
Blake Lalli	2012	29	CHC	6	16	.133	.188	.133
Tuffy Gosewisch	2013	29	ARI	14	47	.178	.174	.222
Joe Depastino	2003	29	NYM	2	2	.000	.000	.000
Jamie Burke	2001	29	ANA	9	5	.200	.200	.200
Jorge Brito	1995	29	COL	18	55	.216	.259	.275
Dusty Wathan	2002	28	KCR	3	6	.600	.667	.800
Matt Tupman	2008	28	KCR	1	1	1.000	1.000	1.000
Matt Treanor	2004	28	FLA	29	61	.236	.311	.273
Kevin Richardson	2009	28	TEX	4	6	.500	.500	.500
Hector Ortiz	1998	28	KCR	4	4	.000	.000	.000
Miguel Ojeda	2003	28	SDP	61	163	.234	.331	.362
Cody McKay	2002	28	OAK	2	4	.667	.500	.667
Steve Holm	2008	28	SFG	49	98	.262	.357	.405
Brian Esposito	2007	28	STL	1	0

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used
Generated 5/7/2014.

Thirty-one players make the list.  Of those players, Matt Treanor (468 games), Chris Coste (299 games), Tom Wilson (214 games), Miguel Ojeda (212 games), Jamie Burke (191 games), Ken Huckaby (161 games), and Erik Kratz (138 games) saw significant time in the Majors.  That is about one fifth of the names listed and those seven all had better defensive assessments than Joseph.

In other words, all hope is not lost.  Based on historical evidence, we should not expect Joseph to be a starting caliber catcher, but he does stand a 20% chance or so for being a guy who might see one or two seasons as a backup for someone else.  Or maybe, just maybe, he changes the script.