Playing Deep Helps and Hurts Jones

There was a lot of talk about Adam Jones' defense this past off season.  Adam Jones talked about it.  Dan Duquette talked about it.  Or, maybe like me, you were in a DC bar next to a guy who works in the Orioles front office who decided to be very vocal about his feelings about Adam Jones' defense.  Needless to say, there was a lot of talk and that talk basically boiled down to this:

1. Adam Jones plays so shallow that he allows what should be catchable balls go for doubles.
2. Those doubles are more costly than all the singles and extra bases Jones prevents by playing shallow.
3. The gist being that a baserunner on second from a double needs one hit to score while a baserunner on first needs two hits to score.

Anyway, the publicly available models on defense are a bit split on how this has gone over the first third of the season.  Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) pegs Jones as a plus one run player so far this year, which would extrapolate to about a plus two run player at season's end.  That would differ from expectation by only three runs.  UZR has him at negative five runs, which would be a negative ten run player at season's end.  It would equal his worst season according to that metric.  That other season was last year.

	IP	Plays	DRS	UZR
2014-16	1279	262 (.922)	-1	2.3
2017(x)	664.2	145 (.922)	-1	2.3
2017(a)	664.2	143 (.911)	1	-5

To varying extents, the underlying data for each metric points toward the same story.  The play value informs you that he is getting to about the same number of balls that he has gotten to in the past.  UZR underlying metrics however show a projected improvement of six runs in his range.  What you can surmise is that by moving back, Jones may be getting to just as many balls as he has in the recent past, but those balls were a higher value hit.  In other words, Jones is losing short singles to hitters, but extinguishing more damaging doubles to hitters.

However, that jump of over a half win in improvement through range in UZR is offset by an equal decrease in the value of Jones' arm.  The narrative follows that by playing deeper, Jones is killing doubles, but on those pesky short singles the baserunners are moving more freely.  Jones still has a good arm, but it is more difficult to throw guys out when you have to run an extra ten to fifteen feet get grab that groundball or Texas League fly.

Event	Single		Double	Flyout
	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
2014-16	67%	27%	34%	60%
2017(a)	66%	20%	36%	45%

The numbers play out the story that Jones' arm is not strong enough to deal with the added depth to his position.  It largely is not a role in keeping players to second on a single, but when the runner is on second, it is about 35% more difficult for Jones to prevent the runner from successfully running home.  Though more difficult to read into due to positioning differences, but Jones has also had a more difficult time preventing men on second advancing on flyouts.  Those two together would constitute a increase of three runs given up.  Obviously, that is not the whole story determined by DRS, but it sure is a major aspect of it.

With only a half of season of data to look at, this is not a comprehensive analysis.  However, it is not nothing.  One would hope that if you kick and scream and push a player out of his preferred way of playing the game that we would see pretty sizable differences in performance.  On the team scale, this outfield is considerably better defensive than last year.  The metrics would suggest an improvement of three to five runs over a whole season on defensive performance alone in the outfield.  It may well be that playing Jones deeper along with marginal improvements in corner outfield defense (pretty much just Seth Smith) has result in better play for the whole, which is lost on the individual play of Jones.

So, maybe it does work.  Right field defense is projected to be two wins better.  Left field defense is projected to be a win better.  Maybe a deeper Jones helps them fill the gaps.  Or maybe not.

Orioles Defense: Outfield Gains Countered by Infield

The Orioles have a reputation, particularly in Baltimore, of being a relatively solid defensive team.  True, discussion lingers about woeful corner outfield defense, Jones getting older, and various breakdowns here or there in the infield.  However, the club carries a reputation of being solid when out on the field.  However, most of that reputation appears to have been earned from several seasons ago and carried, by and large, by Manny Machado's inebriatingly awesome feats at third base.

Consider this simple table showing Ultimate Zone Rating by catcher, infield, and outfield.  The catcher value also includes an adjustment for Baseball Prospectus' pitch framing stat plus a projection for this season based on previous seasons pitch framing success (2017 pitch framing numbers so far are junk as MLBAM is trying to adjust to a new system).  Additionally, the 2017 numbers are extrapolated to a full season.

	C*	IF	OF	sum
2012	23.4	-9.4	-19.6	-5.6
2013	10.7	46	-6.1	50.6
2014	23.9	20.5	34.3	78.7
2015	17.9	9.9	-1.4	26.4
2016	14.5	24.1	-36.7	1.9
2017**	12.4	0.8	-13.1	0.1

 Outfield defense has always been a bit of an issue for the Orioles.  2014 was a bit of an outlier as the entire club seems energized by a healthy and spectacular David Lough and strong supporting roles from Adam Jones, Nick Markakis, and Steve Pearce.  Beyond that season though, the outfield tended to struggle with balls emerging from the infield.  Part of this reason has come from trouble when perfectly fine outfielders have to cover for other players.  Other issues arise from once fleet star defenders poorly adjusting to a loss of a step or two.  Regardless, outside of that lone season, outfield defense has not been a great strength of this club.

On the other hand, infield defense has been a strength.  This is perhaps outsized by Manny Machado's amazing 2013 season when he got to everything.  His 2014 season was utterly spectacular and he still shows solid range, exceptional hands, and stunning accuracy.  That said, while he has plus plus range, it is not what it was that 2013 season when he was simply stunning with plus^plus range.  Machado has thickened up slightly and has had some surgery, so maybe that took away some measure of that insanity.  However, a very solid +15 third baseman remains.  Much of the Orioles defensive brilliance was built on that.

That brilliance was largely a strength with plus play from JJ Hardy and good support from Jonathan Schoop and Chris Davis.  Davis still looks like Davis.  Below average skills off the bag and plus skills on the bag.  However, 2017 has seen Hardy look clunky out there.  He seems to have lingering issues with his back which makes his first step a little slow and his ability to get down on balls a bit worse.  He needs to get healthy or he needs to sit.  The annual concern about Jonathan Schoop is also coming to look like reality.  Schoop has managed to stick at second, somewhat surprisingly, due to nimble play around the bag, soft hands, and a strong arm.  The concern had been that as he ages, his lower half with thicken up.  This would decrease his low end speed and make it difficult for him to get down on grounders.  We have seen that quite a bit this year.

At catcher, we have a lot of the same in years past.  Wieters made a name for himself as a defensive wiz prior to the acceptance of pitch framing metrics.  That said, he is a very solid catcher and any diminishing of those skills were replaced by Caleb Joseph's excellent pitch framing.  This season, Castillo combines very good non-pitch framing skills with terrible pitch framing skills.  Joseph is able to offset much of that, so we have a rather similar defensive outlook there behind the plate again.

In the outfield, the Orioles have seen some solid play by a risen Joey Rickard, who should actually get accolades for his defensive performance this year.  He has managed to be a bit more realistic on his chances of getting to fly balls and toning down that senseless aggressiveness has been a boon for him.  Seth Smith has also provided plus defense, which validates my thoughts of his defensive play coming into the season.  Hyun Soo Kim and Trey Mancini have also provided some solid innings in the outfield.  Beyond them, Mark Trumbo is Mark Trumbo.  He is a butcher out there.  And, Adam Jones, I hate to say it, but he is missing a lot of Texas Leaguers in front of him and is not gunning runners down.  It seems that it does not matter much whether he plays his preferred depth or sits back deeper.  My thought was that when Jones would shift back, that he would be nabbing higher value batted balls.  My thought also was with more competent corner defense that he would be able to control his playing area more effectively.  So far, those things are not happening.  He is performing, overall, the same.

Anyway, the outfield has improved.  The infield has lost some luster.  Catching is the same.  So, where is the club offensively and with pitching?  Offensive, the same level of play is coming out of the box--about league average.  However, the Orioles have put up one of the worst performances of the year on the basepaths and are in line to be worth about -3 or 4 wins through poor decision making in the field and maybe some infamously plodding baserunners.  Pitchers, things look the worse they have during Duquette's era by a smidge.  The starters look worse than last year and so do the relievers.

So far, this doom and gloom has not been devastating in the won-loss column, so hopefully that continues or, perhaps, the Orioles start performing in ways that make the win column look more explainable.

Pedro Alvarez - A Pleasant Surprise in Right Field

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When the Orioles had announced that they had re-signed free agent Pedro Alvarez to a minor-league contract, and that they were sending him to Norfolk with the intention of converting him to an outfielder, those of us who pay attention to the Norfolk Tides baseball games were dismayed. Last season, we were treated to the experiment of Christian Walker trying to play left field, and it wasn't pretty. And we had less reason to be optimistic about Pedro Alvarez' playing the outfield. Walker, at least, had been a competent first baseman; Alvarez has widely been regarded as a butcher both at third base and at first base. Walker was reasonably athletic-looking; Alvarez has a body reminiscent of Prince Fielder. There wasn't any reason to think that Pedro Alvarez would be anything less than a train wreck in right field.

It's been a month, and I've had plenty of opportunities to see Alvarez play. He's been playing right field, which is a reasonable plan. As a former third baseman, he's got at least a fairly good throwing arm, and right field in Harbor Park is the smaller of the corner fields because of a party deck jutting into the field from the right-field corner. I've seen Alvarez play eleven games in right field; a total of 100 defensive innings (one seven-inning doubleheader game and one twelve-inning game.) And he hasn't been terrible.

Actually, he's been quite a bit better than terrible. In these 100 innings, he has fielded 43 batted balls. (There's also been one home run hit onto the right-field party deck roof, but one can't expect any right fielder to field that.) Of those 43, five were ground balls through the infield and all five went for singles. Again, it's not reasonable for us to expect a right fielder to turn those ground balls into 9-3 putouts. Three of those ground ball singles occurred with no one on base; it is true that on the other two, a runner on first went to third.. However, in each case the single occurred with two outs and a very fast Syracuse Chief on first base - Rafael Bautista and Brian Goodwin. I think we can cut Alvarez some slack for not holding those runners to second base in those conditions.

Twenty-four of those batted balls were, in my judgment, fly balls (as opposed to line drives.) Alvarez was able to catch twenty-two of them for outs. Alvarez doesn't always look elegant and he doesn't run the best routes, but he has more range than I thought he would and he covers enough ground. One of the balls that fell in was hit down the right-field line and went for a double; it's possible although far from certain that the ball "should" have been caught. The other was a pop fly that fell into no-man's land between the first baseman, the second baseman, and Alvarez - and Alvarez was able to recover and force a runner out at second base. And after catching one of the other fly balls Alvarez was able to double a runner off second base.

That leaves fourteen line drives. Every one of those batted balls went for a hit; eleven for singles and three for doubles. I classified four of those line drives as "hard"; essentially, if they weren't hit right at the fielder they'd go for hits. Another one I classified as '"soft"; that was a ball that just got over the infield and rarely do outfielders catch them. The others were medium-speed line drives and it's not good that Alvarez didn't catch any of them.

But, upon further review, there were only two, maybe three, that I would have expected an outfielder to catch. Some of the line drives found a hole in the infield and landed a few feet behind the infield dirt; it's not Alvarez' fault that he couldn't catch them. Others were well-placed; Alvarez could have caught them had he been positioned differently but then he would have given up other territory.

And here too Alvarez is showing his lack of experience. On two of the line-drive singles, a runner scored from second (and on one of them, the batter took second on his throw home.) And, while on three line-drive singles he was able to hold a runner on first to a one-base advance, on another a runner on first advanced to third.

On balance, Alvarez has made 90-95 percent of the plays I would hope a good right fielder would make. Pedro Alvarez has impressed.

A Closer Look At Joey Rickard's Defense

If there's anything surprising about Joey Rickard so far, it's been that his bat has been decent but his glove has been underwhelming. At the very least, Rickard was supposed to provide a decent outfield glove as a fourth outfielder type. Instead, he's been installed as the team's everyday left fielder and leadoff hitter.

Right now, Rickard has a wRC+ of 99. The league average left fielder also has a wRC+ of 99. However, the average leadoff hitter has a wRC+ of 109. I've been critical of Rickard offensively and still don't quite understand why he's being used the way he is, but at the plate, he's been fine for now. Getting league average offensive output from Joey Rickard is perfectly acceptable. And it's not surprising or a knock on him at all that he's in the bottom half of leadoff hitters in terms of production. He has not been a disaster there by any means, but he hasn't been great. So it's a little strange that he has such a stranglehold on the leadoff spot in the lineup.

Still, in terms of wins above replacement, Rickard rates negatively. The driving force there by Fangraphs' and Baseball-Reference's versions of WAR (currently -0.3 in both) is his poor early defensive ratings (and a tiny slice is that he has done some bad things on the basepaths). Rickard has spent a decent amount of time in all three outfield positions, and he's amassed a UZR of -6.5 (UZR/150 of -33.9) and a DRS of -6. Now, it's tough to state definitively what exactly a full season's worth of defensive metrics actually means, let alone about 250 innings. So who's is to say that Rickard can't improve, or isn't at least close to average?

But I don't think it's unfair to say that while he's made a few nice plays in the field, Rickard has not come as advertised with the glove. In his time in the minors, Rickard logged more than 1,000 innings each in center field and right field. In left field, he logged more than 500. So he's had a lot of experience. Still, playing competent defense at the major league level is an entirely different animal.

All right, so let's get to some examples. Here's one of Rickard's first tough chances on the season. Take a look:

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You'll notice a few things. First, it was a nice effort, so that's something. The ball was just out of his grasp, and it would have looked pretty nice were he to have made the play. You'll also notice that Rickard didn't take the best route to the ball, and that also it maybe wasn't the best decision to dive and take a chance. Yes, of course it's easy to say that after the fact. But that's what happens with split-second decisions. Flashy plays always look impressive, but sometimes just keeping the ball in front and avoiding mistakes is the job of an outfielder. We'll revisit Rickard's route-taking and decision making.

A day later, Rickard had a semi-tough chance on a ball in front of him:

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I think even Rickard would tell you that he should have caught that ball. But wait, the play isn't over.

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Rickard stayed with the play, gathered the ball, and rifled it home to nab the runner. Nice throw.

Here was a pivotal play in a tie game:

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Rickard struggled with the transfer and ended up double-pumping before unleashing a throw too late to catch the runner at home. Maybe it's a bit unfair to be too harsh on this play; the weather was wet, and that didn't make things easy. But Adam Eaton was just rounding third when Rickard scooped up the ball, and it wasn't like the throw was coming from deep in the outfield.

Here was a decent play by Rickard on a line drive to right-center:

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One thing to pay attention to on hits to the outfield is how quickly a fielder reacts to a ball, particularly a line drive. When the camera shifts to the outfield after a hit, you can tell if a fielder is slow to react and/or gets a bad read. If the fielder is already off and moving -- in the right direction -- then that's a great sign. In the play above, Rickard is already moving. The ball carries a bit more than Rickard anticipates, so he has to jump at the last second to snag the ball. Maybe he got a little lucky, but that ball was also roped.

In a late-game play against the Yankees, Rickard misplayed a carom off the wall in right field:

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There's not much to say here, as it seems like he just missed the ball. But these little things add up.

Among the GIFs in this post, here is what I think is Rickard's second-best play:

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He reacts to the ball off the bat relatively quickly, though he doesn't take a direct route to the ball. Again, line drives are tricky. But even though he hasn't had a bunch of difficult chances yet, less than ideal routes to the ball will make it hard for Rickard to truly utilize his speed and run down tough chances.

But here's my favorite play from Rickard so far:

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Plays like that make me think there's still time for Rickard to show he can be a competent outfielder. Considering how he was described when the Orioles selected him in the Rule 5 draft, I expected Rickard to be a little more polished in terms of reads and routes. But he is a rookie, and he at least won't be asked to play center field unless Adam Jones gets hurt again. Besides, Rickard's arm is OK, but it plays much better in left field.

-----

I think the Orioles are still trying to figure out what they have in Rickard. If I had to guess, I would say he'll regress a bit with the bat and improve with the glove. I'm more than happy to be wrong that he shouldn't be playing every day, especially as the team's leadoff hitter. Still, at 20-12, the O's are in no position to panic or really change anything. That's probably not what Hyun Soo Kim or Nolan Reimold want to hear.

Regarding Rickard's outfield defense, it's evident that speed is not everything. Clearly being fleet of foot helps an outfielder, but reading the ball off the bat and taking an efficient route to a fly ball or line drive is more important. It's also key to pick and choose the right spots to lay out for a ball. These are things a rookie may learn, but there's no guarantee of that, either.

Is Mark Trumbo A Good Defender At First Base?

If you're going to acquire Mark Trumbo, then you're getting him for his bat. He has a career 108 wRC+, which means he's been 8 percentage points better than league average at the plate over the course of his career.

Specifically, though, you want his power in your lineup. In parts of six seasons in the majors, Trumbo has hit 131 home runs and has an isolated power of .208. I mentioned this the other day, but in the past three years, Trumbo is 24th among qualified players in isolated power. For reference, Chris Davis is first. Adam Jones ranks 23rd. Trumbo is strong, and he hits the ball far. That's valuable.

There's not much up for debate about Trumbo's offensive abilities. He's a high slugging, low on-base percentage hitter, and that's just fine. Most teams, especially American League ones, have room for Trumbo in their lineup.

But what about his defense? If we've learned anything about how to value players, it's that everything matters. And we know that Trumbo is a bad defensive outfielder, so hopefully he doesn't end up playing in left or right field often for the Orioles. His bat would make using him there tolerable, but it's not optimal strategy. Besides, Chris Davis very well may sign with another team, which would open up plenty of work for Trumbo at first base. So is he a good defensive option there? In Tuesday's trade write-up, I took a quick look at his defense both at first and in the outfield according to Ultimate Zone Rating (per 150 games) and Defensive Runs Saved. Let's break it down per season:

Year	Innings	UZR/150	DRS
2010	33	41.6	1
2011	1,257	5.2	9
2012	159	28.7	0
2013	1,030	10.5	2
2014	377	-17.3	-1
2015	152	8.9	1
Total	3,009	6.3	12

Some takeaways: First, Trumbo has only played two seasons in which he's seen more than 377 innings at first base. And in those seasons (2011 and 2013), he graded well in both metrics. Also, his only negative defensive season came in 2014, after he took over for Paul Goldschmidt, who broke his hand in August and missed the rest of the season. Earlier in 2014, Trumbo missed about two months due to a stress fracture in his left foot. He also battled plantar fasciitis.

It's worth noting that after 2011, arguably Trumbo's best defensive season, the Angels explored moving him to third base. (He healed after dealing with a stress fracture in his right foot.) The Angels also signed some guy named Albert Pujols, which explains why Trumbo barely played at first in 2012. He started eight games at third base that season (and wasn't very good) while mostly playing in the outfield. Pujols then missed a chunk of the 2013 season, and that was the last time Trumbo had regular work at first base.

Looking at individual defensive seasons can be misleading and is hardly definitive. Still, Trumbo's overall defense at first base seems solid. That is, unless you place heavy weight on FanGraphs' Inside Edge fielding data. That data, which goes back to 2012 and breaks plays down into six categories of varying difficulty, does not paint Trumbo's first base defense in the best light.

From 2012-2015, among 40 first basemen who have seen more than 1,500 innings at first base, here's how Trumbo ranks in the various categories:

Almost Certain/Certain (90-100%): t-22nd (97.6%)
Likely (60-90%): 40th (60%)
About Even (40-60%): 31st (45.5%)
Unlikely (10-40%): t-37th (0%)
Remote (1-10%): t-25th (0%)
Impossible (0%): All at 0%

So that's not great! Trumbo makes the plays right at him decently enough, but he's not skilled at pulling off difficult ones. But that doesn't mean he still can't make good plays. Here's one, from 2013:



And here's another:



Trumbo is big and strong, and he sometimes makes pretty good plays. He won't often wow you. And you can say the same thing about Chris Davis, who occasionally looks solid at first base but does not impress in the two advanced defensive numbers many analysts trust the most. Trumbo has graded well in those metrics, though it's been a few seasons since he played first base regularly. It will be interesting to see what happens if he does in 2016.

What the Orioles care about most with Trumbo is how well he hits. But if he ends up being the main option at first base, it wouldn't hurt to have an above average defender there.

Did Manny Machado Deserve His Gold Glove?

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On Tuesday, the Orioles saw something good come out of 2015. Manny Machado, who had made a triumphant return from knee surgery, won his second Gold Glove for his work at third base. Anyone who has seen him make plays such as these over his time in Baltimore knows that he fields his position incredibly. But did he truly lead the entire American League? The answer to that is kind of tricky.

By the standard (for sabermetricians) fielding metrics, Machado certainly had an outstanding campaign. He racked up 14 Defensive Runs Saved, to go along with 8.4 runs by Ultimate Zone Rating. While those marks couldn't match up to the ones his sensational 2013 season, they still drew the envy of almost everyone in the Junior Circuit. Almost — but not all.

Adrian Beltre, who finished in the top three behind Machado in the final voting, has always excelled at the hot corner. For his career, his play there has netted him four Gold Gloves. He hasn't acquired one since 2012, however, and despite struggling in 2013 and 2014, he regained his superiority this year — at Machado's expense. With 18 DRS and 11.4 UZR, Beltre led all qualifying third baseman in the AL; Machado had to settle for second and third, respectively (Josh Donaldson narrowly beat him in UZR).

These statistics have error bars, so a difference of decimal points — such as the one between Donaldson and Machado — shouldn't lead to any bold proclamations. That doesn't apply to Beltre and Machado, who have a four-run gap by DRS and a three-run gap by UZR. When both of the widely used defensive systems come to an agreement like this, it's hard to argue otherwise.

With that said, Machado's case doesn't end there. In addition to the aforementioned statistics, FanGraphs puts out Inside Edge Fielding data. It relies on scouts, rather than stringers, to take a more subjective look at the plays on the field. They grade all plays into six categories, each with a rough percentage range of the player making it: "impossible" (0%*), "remote" (1-10%), "unlikely" (10-40%), "even" (40-60%), "likely" (60-90%), and "routine" (90-100%).

*In the four years for which these numbers exist, no player has made an impossible play. 

The Inside Edge data flips the script — here, Machado came out ahead of Beltre:

Name	1-10%	10-40%	40-60%	60-90%	90-100%	AL 1-10%	AL 10-40%	AL 40-60%	AL 60-90%	AL 90-100%
Manny Machado	9.1%	41.2%	57.1%	74.8%	96.9%	3.4%	25.3%	49.1%	72.9%	96.5%
Adrian Beltre	5.6%	12.9%	46.7%	74.3%	96.0%	3.4%	25.3%	49.1%	72.9%	96.5%

In the most trying times, Machado clearly reigned supreme; Beltre closed the gap a bit for the easier plays, but the disparity remains. Although both cleared the league averages in almost every regard, Machado did so to a greater extent than Beltre did.

Plus, Machado didn't receive as much help from his pitching staff, who gave him more hard-hit balls than Beltre's did:

Player	# 0%	# 1-10%	# 10-40%	# 40-60%	# 60-90%	# 90-100%	AL # 0%	AL # 1-10%	AL # 10-40%	AL # 40-60%	AL # 60-90%	AL # 90-100%
Manny Machado	2.4%	6.6%	3.4%	2.8%	9.6%	75.1%	1.7%	5.7%	3.4%	3.8%	8.4%	76.9%
Adrian Beltre	1.2%	4.4%	2.5%	3.7%	8.5%	79.7%	1.7%	5.7%	3.4%	3.8%	8.4%	76.9%

Overall, 8.1% of Machado's plays fell on the difficult side of the spectrum, compared to 12.5% for Beltre. So not only did Machado cruise through the biggest challenges, he encountered far more of them. In terms of both quantity and quality, the Inside Edge Fielding data comes down pretty firmly on Machado's side.

It would seem that this question boils down to the defining conflict of baseball's modern age: statistics versus scouts. Do we trust the systems that theoretically track every play objectively, but which don't take into account confounding variables like starting position? Or do we trust the scouts who can better gauge the nuance of a play, but who carry their own human biases? While I don't have an easy answer, I know what might mediate the discord.

Most baseball analysts (like me) use solely DRS and UZR to appraise defensive value. Those two don't act alone, though: Fielding Runs Above Average, from Baseball Prospectus, also measures players' glovework. FRAA uses a different formula, looking at plays made rather than basing its analysis on zones. Many other potentially influential factors — the ballpark and the base/out state, among others — also make their way into FRAA, whereas DRS and UZR (to my knowledge) ignore many of these.

FRAA agreed with DRS and UZR, insofar as it thinks very highly of both Machado and Beltre. However, it diverged from the narrative those two have established, in a major way. According to FRAA, Machado gave the Orioles 20.3 runs, and Beltre cost the Rangers 2.6 runs. By the (theoretically) most advanced publicly available defensive metric, Machado demolished Beltre by a 24-run margin.

Maybe you want to split the difference: Since Beltre wins in DRS and UZR and Machado wins in FRAA, they should tie in the end. But the duo didn't have a wide gap in the former two, and they certainly had one for the latter. As August Fagerstrom observed at FanGraphs, a weighted average here still puts Machado ahead.

Even if Beltre had taken home the Gold Glove, few people outside of Maryland would disagree with it. At age 36, he succeeded as much as ever; even if he decided to retire right now, his resume would surely transport him to the Hall of Fame. Machado nevertheless warranted the award, providing the best third base defense in the AL for the second time in three seasons. Keeping this up for several more years could earn him a ticket to Cooperstown as well.

Microtrends: Adam Jones's Defense

I've recently covered some noteworthy facets of Baltimore's 2015 season — focusing on Brian Matusz, among others. These posts have looked at the more minute fluctuations that occur within a season; they don't carry the sample size necessary for an ironclad case, but I've argued that they'll probably stick.

The thing about sample size, though, is the standards for a reliable one differ by statistic. For, say, a pitcher's strikeout and walk rates, we only need a few hundred batters faced, which typically takes a month or two. On the flipside, defensive metrics require much more time to stabilize — about 3,000 innings in the field, generally acquired over three-plus seasons. For someone like Adam Jones, whose play with the glove has spiked going back to last year, this means that we can't fully believe in what he's done yet; nevertheless, there's a lot here to suggest that he'll keep it up.

Let's go back to Jones in the minors. Drafted by Seattle in 2003, he came up as a shortstop, only switching to the outfield in 2006. He adjusted pretty well to the position, or so scouts observed; the 2008 BP Annual called him "one of the best defensive outfielders in the minors". His first season on the East Coast saw him live up to that reputation, as he gained 6 DRS and 5.9 UZR for the Orioles, ranking a respective fourth and sixth in the majors. Only 22 at the time, Jones looked like an elite defender for years to come.

That didn't exactly come to pass, it seemed. Over the next five years, Jones cost the Orioles an unacceptable number of runs in the field — 28 by DRS (second-worst in baseball), and 33 by UZR (third-worst in baseball). The takeaway from that*: Jones didn't make his keep on the field. Such a sizable sample as that didn't leave much room for doubt, nor did it endorse Jones's abilities going forward.

*Aside from noting that, good Lord, Matt Kemp cannot play defense.

After that, 2014 came, then 2015. (That whole passage-of-time thing — it's crazy how that works.) In these years, Jones has turned over a new leaf; he's earned 13.5 runs by UZR, which places him fifth in baseball, and 9 runs by DRS, which places him sixth in baseball. After a long period in the relative cellar, he has, possibly, come back to reclaim his throne.

As discussed above, defensive metrics take some time to stabilize. These results should therefore inspire some skepticism, and further scrutiny. Let's look at his Inside Edge fielding numbers — they only go back to 2012, but his output from 2012 to 2013 (-18 DRS, -13.4 UZR) effectively represents his play over the aforementioned five-year span.

Inside Edge breaks down fielding into six types of plays: 0% (the impossible plays), 1-10% (the remote plays), 10-40% (the unlikely plays), 40-60% (the even plays), 60-90% (the likely plays), and 90-100% (the routine plays). Each percentage range signifies the theoretical chance that a defender can successfully field the ball. Because scouts gauge these manually, they're subjective, but they tend to properly evaluate most defenders. And for Jones, they show a clear change:

Years	1-10%	Rank	10-40%	Rank	40-60%	Rank	60-90%	Rank	90-100%	Rank
2012-2013	0.0%	11th	45.5%	4th	28.6%	16th	76.0%	12th	99.4%	11th
2014-2015	4.8%	9th	16.7%	13th	20.0%	18th	100.0%	1st	99.7%	8th

While the tougher plays haven't shifted much for Jones, their easier counterparts have. This syncs up with the narrative surrounding him as well: Quite notoriously, Jones used to botch more than his fair share of simple plays in a season. For me, this error against the Yankees sticks out, on account of its most prominent feature:

Yes, Jones blew the controversial bubble on this routine (per IE) play, and paid a heavy price for it. In his darker times, Jones would treat Oriole fans to a few of these a year, the gum only compounding the subsequent frustration. Since then, however, he's managed to avoid this ignominy, even making a superb play while blowing a bubble.

This kind of defensive improvement is likely the most sustainable. Had Jones simply reeled in a few highlight catches, they may have pumped up his metrics, but they wouldn't testify to any true change in his performance — despite the low probability of converting one, every player lucks into a few sooner or later. By contrast, the capacity to convert easy balls (the most common variety) into outs will build up a player's numbers gradually, in a hopefully non-fluky manner. Plus, fielders who derive their value from easy plays will presumably age better; as their athleticism and speed deteriorates, they can still rely on solid fundamentals to give them a lift.

Perhaps this step forward will vanish in the final months of the season, a statistical mirage among the desert of subpar defense. Jones's track record certainly contradicts what he's accomplished over the last year-and-a-half, and in this area, the past often predicts the future. But this improvement has some legitimacy to it — the scouts, always more trusted with these cases, back up the numbers. If Jones does sustain his better play in the field, he might live up to the high standards he set for himself way back in the minors. While fielding metrics are fickle, here they appear to have stumbled onto an actual trend.

The Orioles Are Still Excellent Defensively

The Orioles have not done much this offseason, though they still reportedly plan to sign or trade for an outfielder and maybe bring in another reliever. That's not the type of offseason that many fans are clamoring for. But as currently constructed, the Orioles still have a solid core of players and figure to be competitive in an improved American League East.

Regardless of this offseason's moves, Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette know that defense matters. They are proponents of defensive shifting; the O's are one of the most frequent shifting teams in the majors. The Orioles are projected to be a top defensive team again in 2015, along with the Royals and Rays. Last season, the O's ranked second in Ultimate Zone Rating and third in Defensive Runs Saved. In 2013, they finished third and 11th, respectively.

Baltimore's infield defense could be outstanding in 2015, if Manny Machado is able to stay on the field. The O's already have a very good combination up the middle in J.J. Hardy at shortstop and Jonathan Schoop at second base. Chris Davis is adequate at first base. Steve Pearce fares better statistically at first, though the O's may rely on him to log more outfield innings (where he is also decent). Matt Wieters, who is recovering from Tommy John surgery, may not be ready for opening day (though Machado, recovering from knee surgery, should be). Fortunately, the Orioles have a pretty good defensive backup in Caleb Joseph. Wieters is the superior offensive option and is strong defensively, though he does not grade well as a pitch framer. Joseph's data sample is much smaller, but he appears to be a better pitch framer. He also controlled the running game well in his 78 games behind the plate last season. The hope is that Wieters rounds into form both offensively and defensively, but there's no guarantee of that. He also could serve as the designated hitter more often, especially in April and May.



Moving to the outfield, Adam Jones posted positive UZR and DRS numbers for the first time since 2008 and 2010, respectively, so it's possible that last season was a fluke of sorts. But even having him improve overall to the level of an average center fielder would be a nice upgrade. On the corners, the combination of Alejandro De Aza and Pearce could be an improvement on the Nelson Cruz/Nick Markakis duo. Markakis and particularly Cruz performed better in the field than expected last season, but they are both on downward trends and expecting anything better than average defense from them going forward would be a mistake. Bringing in a Colby Rasmus/Nori Aoki type would certainly help, as would an increase in playing time for David Lough, a superb corner outfielder. But the addition of Rasmus or Aoki would obviously make for a more crowded outfield.

Strong team defense the last couple seasons has been a tremendous help to O's pitching staffs. That's likely a large reason why O's starters have been so effective at stranding runners. A strong defense doesn't lead to great pitching, but it doesn't hurt. It certainly is one reason (along with good fortune, etc.) why a starting staff can pitch effectively while not striking out many batters or getting a bunch of grounders. The same goes for the Royals, another excellent defensive team (as the Orioles are well aware).

The O's offense will almost assuredly take a step back. They finished eighth in the majors in runs last season and sixth in wRC+. And a big bat addition is not likely. But outstanding defense, decent pitching, and a good but not great offense still may amount to a pretty good team. It's not a terrible formula, and the O's also haven't locked themselves into any potentially disastrous contracts this offseason. That doesn't mean they are done spending money, and they shouldn't be. But there does appear to be a method behind this team's relatively quiet offseason.

Photo via Keith Allison

Defensive Makeup of Catchers in the Draft

I forgot to post this earlier, but, based on the study I had posted last week showing the difficulty defensively poor amateurs had at sticking behind the plate, here is a run down of catchers for those who I think will go in the first five rounds.  The defensive marks are based on Baseball America's scouting reports.

First Round
C/OF Alex Johnson
C Max Pentecost
C/1B Kyle Scwarber

None of these guys are currently proficient behind the plate, putting them all in the 18% group.  They all have solid bats, so that will also be a pressure to push them in front and lower their chances at keeping their catching mitts.

Second Round
C J.J. Schwartz
C/1B Chase Vallot
C Aramis Garcia
C Evan Skoug
C Greyson Grainor

Of these, only Swartz and Grainor get good grades for their defense.  They have a solid chance of seeing time in the Majors.

Third Round
C Jackson Reetz
C Taylor Gushoe
C Mark Zagunis

Reetz and Gushoe are the bets to make here if your goal is to develop an MLB catcher.

Fourth Round
C Brett Austin
C KJ Harrison
C Matt Morgan
C Riley Adams

Harrison is the defensive blue chip.  Morgan and Adams are very inexperienced and might be good flyers.

Fifth Round
C Simon Lucas
C/1B Michael Cantu
C Shane Zeile
C/1B Skyler Ewing
C Roy Morales 
C Nathan Rodriguez
C Devon Fisher 

Rodriguez and Fisher are the only ones here with acceptable defense.

Receivers in Name Only

You may have never heard of the baseball term RINO (Receivers in Name Only).  The likely cause of this is that I think I just made it up.  What it is trying to make clear is to communicate what is a popular perspective in several front offices throughout baseball: catchers without sufficient defensive skills when drafted are highly unlikely to acquire those skills during their career.  Maybe the term sticks, maybe it does not, but hopefully this article addresses whether or not this sentiment is true.

The way I decided to test this was pretty simple.  I took all draftees listed as a catcher from 2004 through 2008.  I decided to ignore any position switches because what we are interested in are catchers at the MLB level.  Whether or not they hit well enough to assume another position (e.g., Gaby Sanchez) does not resolve the issue of catching depth in a system.  I gave them credit for service at a level (e.g., MLB, AAA, AA, A, Hi A, A, Short A, Rookie) if they had over 100 games played at that level or accumulated at that level and a above.  For instance, if a player had 70 games caught at AA and 40 at AAA, that player would be credited with having reached AA with 110 games at or above that level.  All this was how the study measured performance, nothing more.

To determine how a catcher's ability was viewed at the time of being drafted, I consulted Baseball America's draft database scouting reports.  I decided to be conservative in what I labeled as a defensive catcher.  The following are several of the terms used that would result in a player being classified as such:

best defender in the class, pure catch and throw, solid average, at worst fringe average, best defensive catcher seen since Charles Johnson (a label that adorned Matt Wieters' scouting report, which is contrary to my memory)

Draftees labelled as poor defenders included labels like these:

needs improvement behind the plate to stick, defense remains his nemesis, passable, adequate, no scouts see him at catcher, deserves a look behind the plate, will move to third

These designations left us with 37 catchers labeled as defensive drafted in the first five rounds and 28 labeled as non defensive.  This may not be the most robust data set, but it might be able to yield some answers if the differences between these two groups are large.

How well do defensive catchers advance through the levels?

 If you simply count each level attained as a single point, sum them up for each player individually, and group them by their defense, then defensive catchers significantly (p=0.001) rack up levels played as a catcher in professional baseball.  The table below shows the total number of players in each group that are credited with time spent (100 games or more at that level and above) and the percent of that group that made it to that level.

	Defensive		Non Defensive
	n		n
Total	37		28
MLB	16	43%	5	18%
AAA	24	65%	9	32%
AA	29	78%	13	46%
Hi A	31	84%	15	54%
A	36	97%	20	71%
Short A	36	97%	21	75%
Rookie	36	97%	22	79%

As you can see, defensive catchers are likely to make it to the Majors 2.4 times more likely than non-defensive catchers.  Keep in mind that this success rate does not include defensive catchers Kyle Skipworth, Austin Romine, and Travis D'Arnaud who all stand a very reasonable chance of achieving that 100 game MLB mark in the next year or two.  That would raise the success rate to 51% and increase of probability to 2.8 times more likely to make the big show than non-defensive catchers.  In other words, if you are an organization looking to improve catching depth within your system then you should stick to the amateurs who already show proficiency in the position.  However, if you really love a bat and the player just happens to be listed as a catcher then feel free to select him knowing that it is highly likely that he has to exchange his catching mitt for a fielding one.

One question that may be asked would be whether or not non-defensive catchers are more likely to be selected in the later portions of the five round database of drafted catcher that I put together.  In fact, the average round players were drafted in was higher for the non-defensive catchers (2.5) than the defensive catchers (2.8).  For the most part, defensive and non-defensive catchers drafted in the first two rounds were in similar proportion in their groups.  The non-defensive catchers attained a higher average draft round because teams drafted few of them in the fifth round in comparison to defensive catchers.

Below is a table parsing out the round data for each group as well as the MLB attainment rates for those groups.

	Defensive		Non Defensive
Round	Success	n	Success	n
1st	64%	11	14%	7
2nd	57%	7	0%	5
3rd	33%	6	14%	7
4th	33%	6	29%	7
5th	14%	7	50%	2

A first round catcher with existing professional defensive skills is 4.5 times more likely than a non-defensive catcher.  If you add Skipworth and D'Arnaud in that then the percent goes up to 82%, 5.9 times more likely than a non-defensive first round catcher.  Romine's addition would put the second round at 71%.  Keep in mind that these are small sample sizes, but these are rather impressive differences that suggest that there is a trend here.

Conclusion

The conclusion is this: if you want a catcher, then draft an individual who has already displayed professional catching skills.  If you really like a bat and the player just happens to have played catcher in high school or college, then do not talk yourself into dreaming about him as a catcher and respect him simply for his bat.  Otherwise, an organization may just find itself a few years down the road with no internal solutions behind the plate.

Are Defensive 4th Outfielders Scarce? or: Will We Miss Xavier Avery?

Xavier Avery is Running to Second | Photo by Keith Allison

On August 30th last year the Orioles were seven and a half games behind the Boston Red Sox in the race for the American League East Division Crown.  That race was effectively though not mathematically over.  Three years prior, the Red Sox made a show of squandering an eight game September lead when Robert Andino sent Nolan Reimold home as Carl Crawford floundered for a sinking liner in left.  However, that kind of collapse is incredibly rare and not exactly what one plans for.  A more realistic collapse was placing a bet against the Tampa Bay Rays or Oakland Athletics.  Both teams were four games up (a rather far distance to climb in four weeks), but the odds were are least playable that one of those clubs could come across some hard times.

Earlier in the summer, the Orioles addressed weaknesses in their starting rotation by acquiring the solid, but not particularly inspiring, Scott Feldman and Bud Norris.  The Feldman acquisition included catcher Steve Clevenger who is a favorite for the backup catcher position this season and who plated the first run of Spring Training.  The Orioles sent out eternally promising Jake Arrieta and the wildly chaotic Pedro Strop along with their third and fourth international amateur bonus slot money.  Bud Norris came over with the third Astros international amateur bonus slot money in exchange for L.J. Hoes, Josh Hader, and the Orioles' first round competitive balance pick.  All in all, it does not cost much in terms of value.

The Orioles were largely unwilling to send over anything of value in trades last summer.  Perhaps the most value could be found in the international and domestic money slots they sent out as well as L.J. Hoes, if you are one of the few who still think something could come from that swing.  In another deal, the Orioles acquired Francisco Rodriguez for Nicky Delmonico, who would be hard pressed to make anyone's top 10 list due to him not exactly having a position and not exactly being able to square up on a lot of pitches from low minors pitchers.

What the team had not addressed was their designated hitter situation.  Up to that point, the only life they saw from the position was a few games from Danny Valencia pounding left handers.  Beyond him, the club was challenging the record for the fewest runs created in a non-strike season from the DH position.  The Orioles tried hard for two players in the August waiver trade window: Josh Willingham and Michael Morse.  The Twins refused to discuss anything less than Eduardo Rodriguez, so that option faded.  The Mariners were open to dealing the unproductive and often injured Morse to the Orioles for an upper minor leaguer by the name of Xavier Avery.

The complaint we had about this deal was that Morse was not an improvement on anything the team had.  Against left handed pitching, that was certainly true.  Against right handers, Morse from previous seasons would have been pretty useful.  In other words, the bet on Morse was to invest a low value prospect on a chance that Morse was not as injured as he seemed.  Unfortunately, an undisclosed wrist injury (and perhaps his existing injuries) had that bet go bust.  Morse did nothing for the Orioles and actually hurt them in his 30 plate appearances and producing a -35 OPS+.

Which leaves us to wonder, what did the Orioles actually lose in Xavier Avery.  He should not be much of an unknown to those who follow the team.  He was selected in the previous regime as a raw toolsy outfielder with great speed, but poor baseball skills.  He surely progressed through the minors, performing ably but not exceptionally.  At the major league level, he was a poor route runner in the outfield, but made up for that with his speed.  His arm was weak as was his bat.  All that said, he was a capable defender in left field and could play center field for a bit.  His offense was poor, but there was a very slim chance that the 23 year old might be able to do more with his package.  Avery also had an option for the 2015 season, meaning that he could serve as a team's fifth or sixth outfielder without the club being concerned about whether or not he would pass through waivers.

It is difficult to quantify Avery's chances of breaking out.  We could argue quite a while with mathematically derived comps.  I see no point in that.  Instead, let us simply think about current value.  In doing so, I asked ZiPS founder Dan Szymborski for a list of outfielders from which we might be able to figure out who might be comparable base talents to Avery.  I took Dan's projected values for fielding and weighted out to 120 games in the outfield.  I marked Avery as the lowest talent and considered everyone above him as a replacement for him.  In left field, Avery was marked as being a +3.5 run saved defender.  I counted all available left fielders with that defensive rating and above.  I also counted all centerfielders who scored 10 runs worse (-6.5) and better.  I removed all in that group whose bat was projected to be less than Avery's 71 OPS+.  I then also removed all players who were protected by their team this past off season.

That leaves us with this list:

Player	B	Age	PO	OPS+	D/550	Role
Jacoby Ellsbury	L	30	CF	110	7.0	MLB-S
Chris Young	R	30	CF	104	5.5	MLB-S
Ryan Sweeney	L	29	CF	98	-2.2	MLB-B
Andres Torres	B	35	CF	95	5.4	MiL
Casper Wells	R	29	LF	90	10.6	MiL
Jordany Valdespin	L	26	CF	85	-4.0	MiL
Grady Sizemore	L	31	CF	81	-4.6	MLB-B
Sam Fuld	L	32	LF	81	11.9	MiL
Franklin Gutierrez	R	31	CF	78	3.3	MLB-B
Jason Pridie	L	30	CF	76	4.1	MiL
Jake Smolinski	R	25	LF	76	4.5	MiL
Trayvon Robinson	B	26	CF	73	-1.1	MiL
Clete Thomas	L	30	CF	73	1.0	MiL
Laynce Nix	L	33	RF	71	14.2	MiL
Xavier Avery	L	24	LF	71	3.5	MiL

Of those available this off season, Andres Torres and Laynce Nix, to my knowledge, are the only players without teams.  Torres is apparently still suffering from an injury suffered last year.  I am not sure about Nix's reasons.  Ellsbury, Young, Sweeney, Sizemore, and Gutierrez do not adequately fit the role being discussed here because they are quality enough players to be rewarded with MLB contracts.  That leaves eight players that are equal or better than Avery according to this projection.  Two of those eight, Pridie and Robinson, actually played in the Orioles organization last year.  Eight options amongst thirty teams sounds a bit scarce to me.

The above though is not a complete list.  The Orioles wound up finding a backup centerfielder in the Rule 5 draft.  So, who is the giant list of players would have been eligible in the Rule 5?

Player	B	Age	PO	OPS+	D/550	Roster
Julio Borbon	L	28	CF	71	1.4	AA
Thomas Pham	R	26	CF	83	2.7	AAA

That list really is only Borbon.  Pham, being on the AAA roster, would have needed to stay on the active roster for the entire season.  Pham, who we have covered before, has an interesting tool kit, but has suffered from a wide range of unfortunate injuries.  Borbon, placed on the Cubs AA roster, could be had and placed in Norfolk.  Again, though, neither of these players have the luxury of an option assigned to them. 

This should lead us to wonder just how many centerfielders does a team need?  Well, last year, Adam Jones was not injured.  As such, the team employed Nate McLouth, Chris Dickerson, and Jason Pridie in centerfield.  The year before, Adam Jones played every game, but McLouth, Endy Chavez (who was replaced by McLouth), Robert Andino, and Xavier Avery logged innings there.  In 2011, a slightly banged up Adam Jones played 148 games with Matt Angle, Felix Pie, and Kyle Hudson filling in.  In other words, if your center fielder is healthy then it does not matter much who you have in AAA.  That said, a healthy Jones still needed two to three players each year that had to be exposed to waivers.  This suggests that it is important to have a couple players capable of playing centerfield in Norfolk if you do not have a player like Avery that you can shuttle.

All said and done, I think the above illustrates, at least, that Xavier Avery does have value beyond his age.  That he is useful to an organization.  His skill set is not exactly hard to find, nor is it easy to find.  The Orioles wound up replacing him with Julio Borbon, but Borbon was not exactly expected to be present in the Rule 5 draft and the team does not have the luxury of putting him safely on a Norfolk to Baltimore shuttle that Avery's option year would have provided.  But, yeah, this value is slim.  Yes, the value is there and it is real, it just is not a great value.  Seattle though seems to see it.

In the end, that minimal value (and ignoring his slim breakout potential) was considered a value worth lost in exchanged for the potential that Mike Morse had beyond the similar pieces the club already employed.  Yes, we could sit and argue the value of slivers of hair between Morse and Avery probably just as well as we could argue Francisco Rodriguez and Delmonico or, perhaps, we simply could enjoy the sun and some hot chocolate.  The latter is likely a better expenditure of time.

Decrease in Run Production Might Be Due to Defense

This is just a short little post today, but I think it raises a decent question in light of comments made my Mark Cuban about how there is no evidence that shows human growth hormone improves athletic performance.  In fact, evidence shows that it has no significant effect on performance and there is also some information developing that shows that therapies using this hormone are unlikely to produce tissue that is functional for an athlete.  In other words, hGH therapies are probably ideal for individuals who simply need to heal as opposed to those who need to heal for athletic competition as well as not for those who used it to reduce down time between cycling of other chemicals.  This really is not much of a surprise because gym rats and athletes have rarely been on the cutting edge for any therapeutical chemical use.  Conventional wisdom tends to think that everything that successful players do must work because the players are successful.  We should recognize this as being absurd.  However, we tend to believe, as a population, in fantastically simple explanations, such as magic pills and treatments devised by non-science majors who have no practical skills beyond taste testing performance supplements.

With this in mind, shouldn't we also consider the possibility that something that has been shown to increase muscle mass and improvement in some forms of athletic events, such as anabolic steroids, might also not have been all that impacting?  A few years back, I noted how we have all of a sudden been treated to an amazing improvement in fastball velocity since around 2007.  Additionally, there also appears to be a relationship between velocity and run environments.  I think that makes sense and should be readily acceptable.

Another consideration I wish to make is this: run environment and appreciation of defensive ability are also linked.

Consider the graph below showing numbers from the American League over the past decade and a half:



How does that relationship work with the run environment?



It actually fits pretty well, which is an impressive thing because errors are a very limited measurement of defensive ability.  In fact, errors are a pretty poor way to measure defensive ability as evidenced by our infamous Rubbermaid Trashcan notion.  That is, such a trashcan would have a 1.000 fielding percentage while also being the worst defender in baseball.

Anyway, I think that it is plausible to think that along with increased pitcher velocity that a greater appreciation (or measurement) of defense probably also contributed to the decline in the run environment.  This more and more marginalizes the conventional wisdom of drug testing impacting the game in a very significant way.  As teams began to realize the importance of preventing runs then they began to move away from the pure mashers who produced runs at a significant cost to defense.  At least, that would be the narrative explanation to carry forth this hypothesis.