Taking A Look At Joey Rickard

The Orioles signed Joey Rickard in the 2016 Rule V Draft. After a 2014 in AA, Rickard had a strong 2015 in the minors with an overall .321/.427/.447 line and a .360/.437/.472 line in AAA fueled primarily by an unsustainable high .457 BABIP. Rickard has excellent plate discipline as he had a walk rate above 10% in the minors from 2013 to 2015 with a strikeout rate in the 15-20% range but minimal power with just 3 HRs in the past two seasons. Steamer projects him to have a .246/.315/.340 line in the majors this year with a respectable 9.6% BB rate and a 19.2% K rate. Joey Rickard has played at all three outfield positions in the minors but primarily is used at the corners and was named the Rays Baserunner of the Year.

Dan Duquette described Rickard (reported by Steve Melewski) as:

He has good on-base capability, good speed. Excellent contact hitter, can steal a base. And he's a good defensive player, and he played center field and left. We think he gives us some depth. He just looks like he learned how to play. Looks like a good solid, overall ballplayer. Good discipline in the strike zone and we look forward to taking a look at him in the spring.

Jon Shepherd was less than impressed with this signing as he feels that Rickard is a professional 5th outfielder and doesn’t fill any needs. He also stated that Rickard is a solid 40/45 with the bat with decent speed but isn’t considered much of a prospect. He seems to be a player with a decent chance to stick but with minimal upside and ceiling. My impression is that he seems to be slightly less regarded than Flaherty when the Orioles drafted him.

Rickard hasn’t been ranked in the top 100 in any overall prospect list based on scouting that I’m familiar with nor considered one of the Rays top 30 prospects by MLB Pipeline. But he was ranked 98th in KATOH’s Top 100 Prospects list. This metric likely overrates Rickard because it only considers one year of stats meaning that it disregards his poor 2014. Indeed, his 2015 stats project that he’ll be worth 3.8 fWAR through 28 but his 2014 statistics project that he’ll be worth 0 fWAR through 28.

Steve Melewski recently had a discussion with Dan Duquette about KATOH where Dan noted that he saw the list and that it reflects well on the Orioles’ farm system and scouting staff. Duquette argued that “these rankings speak for themselves. Five prospects in the top 71 shows that Orioles scouts are doing a good job.”

It seems possible that KATOH’s projection that Rickard would be a top player may have been a contributing factor to the Orioles selecting him. Teams typically only use their own internal analysis to actually grade players but it is known that they are familiar with outside sources such as Baseball America. It is reasonably clear that Dan Duquette was familiar with KATOHs rankings and if nothing else could give them an impetus to look at him closer especially if they were already interested.

At the moment, the Orioles are lacking starting caliber outfielders. Rickard probably isn’t good enough to be an optimal starter. Problem is that the Orioles’ current outfielders aren't particularly good either so it wouldn’t be surprising to see him in left field with Reimold in right field. In the future, if he can play center field then he’s a reasonable candidate for the fourth outfielder spot. That’s probably as high as his ceiling goes, but then again he only cost 50k. Whatever he provides is a bonus.

Reassessing the Orioles' Offseason Moves

At 29-30, the Orioles are closing in on a return to .500. Things didn't look so good last week, but the return of Matt Wieters has helped to right the ship (for now, at least).

Are the O's contenders? Buyers or sellers? At four games back in the American League East (with the first-place Yankees coming to town) and two games out of a wild card slot, they're certainly not ready to throw in the towel. But then again, nearly every AL team is in play for a playoff spot. And just about every AL team has serious flaws. It's unclear how good the O's are. But hey, the O's are on a roll. So enjoy it.

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The O's had an interesting offseason. For many fans, it was also an unpleasant one. Nelson Cruz, Nick Markakis, and Andrew Miller all departed. The Blue Jays wanted Dan Duquette to be their CEO (and they may still want him) but were rebuffed. The Orioles eventually settled on Travis Snider as their main corner outfield acquisition. They made minor moves like signing Everth Cabrera and re-signing Delmon Young. And they tendered contracts to all of their arbitration-eligible players.

So let's focus on a number of the notable moves/decisions the team made (with the reminder that hindsight is 20/20). How do they look right now?

Wei-Yin Chen's $4.75 million option exercised

No-brainer. And no issue.

Darren O'Day's $4.25 million option exercised

Same thing. Easy choice.

Wesley Wright signed for $1.7 million

Wright only threw 1 2/3 innings for the Orioles before injuring his shoulder. He hasn't pitched since April 10. Wright's signing made less sense considering the Orioles both tendered Brian Matusz a contract and also did not trade him (more on that below), but it's hard to be mad at this signing. Wright is due back in a few weeks, most likely. That could present an interesting roster showdown between Wright and Matusz.

Everth Cabrera signed for $2.4 million

The Orioles recently designated Cabrera for assignment, so no, this move did not go according to plan. The rationale at the time was that he was under team control through 2016 and he had an option left, so inking Cabrera made sense. But he surpassed the five-year service time mark early in the season, allowing him to refuse an assignment to the minor leagues. It didn't help that he posted a 31 wRC+ in 105 plate appearances.

Re-signing Delmon Young for $2.25 million

Young has essentially been a replacement-level player, posting a subpar 86 wRC+ but playing much better defense than anticipated (0.8 UZR, +4 DRS). He's also played much more in the outfield than maybe even Buck Showalter planned, thanks in part to the temporary emergence of Jimmy Paredes and also the general blah-ness of his fellow corner outfielders. His deal has been fine.

Acquired Travis Snider from Pirates for Stephen Tarpley and Steven Brault

Snider's 93 wRC+ has underwhelmed, and he was supposed to provide more power (only a .079 ISO this season). He is only making $2.1 million this year, though, and is under team control through next season. His defensive ability in the outfield doesn't look great at times, but he also has a UZR of 3 and a DRS of +6.  It's not ideal to have given up much of anything considering how he's played. But this is far from a disastrous move. Overall, he's also been pretty similar to Nick Markakis (Snider: 0.4 fWAR, 1.0 bWAR; Markakis: 1.1 fWAR, 0.8 bWAR) -- without the large contract.

Tendering Brian Matusz for $3.2 million

Overall, Matusz was not good last season. He's followed that up by being pretty terrible so far in 2015. In 18 1/3 innings, his strikeouts are down, his walks are up, and his already low groundball rate is even lower. It was questionable for the O's to tender him a contract at all, and considering he was a possible trade option before the season started, the Orioles really must not have gotten many offers at all (because they shouldn't have been seeking much in return). As a Super Two player, Matusz has a fourth arbitration year remaining. So if he's not traded this season or after, he's a pretty good bet to get non-tendered.

Tendering Tommy Hunter for $4.65 million

Paying Hunter nearly $5 million is not ideal, but it's at least somewhat better than Matusz's contract. He's been more useful than Matusz, though for such a hard thrower he doesn't get that many strikeouts (6.5 K/9). It helps that his walk rate has dropped as well (1 BB/9). It's also smart that the Orioles are using him in lower leverage situations than in years past.

Tendering Steve Pearce for $3.7 million

Pearce has not hit well at all (more on this in a potential future post by another Depot writer), yet he's still offered defensive contributions with his versatile play at first base, second base, and the outfield. Even if he's played poorly, there was nothing wrong with bringing him back after an insanely good 2014.

Tendering Alejandro De Aza for $5 million

De Aza took on the Orioles in arbitration and lost, and things never really got better for him in 2015. Despite playing surprisingly well for the O's after being acquired last season, he posted a 72 wRC+ and quickly fell out of favor. And then he was designated for assignment and then shipped to the Red Sox. In hindsight it was a misguided move, but it's hardly unreasonable to spend $5 million on a decent corner outfielder who's going to receive plenty of work. That is, at least, until he doesn't play well.

Other arbitration cases: Chris Davis, Matt Wieters, Bud Norris, Chris Tillman, Miguel Gonzalez, Zach Britton, Ryan Flaherty

Most of these look fine, except for maybe two: Davis ($12 million) and Norris ($8.8 million). Davis has been up and down, but he does have a 115 wRC+. He's been striking out a ton, but the power has also rebounded enough to make him useful. He certainly hasn't been a disaster like in 2014. But Norris not only has been awful (8.63 ERA, 4.84 FIP in 32 1/3 innings), but he blocked Kevin Gausman from a rotation spot to open the season. Part of Norris's struggles is illness-related, which is unfortunate; at least he seems to be healthy now. But with Gausman, Mike Wright, and Tyler Wilson behind him, the O's should consider dealing Norris if he's able to string a couple of decent starts together (whether they're in a race for a playoff spot or not).

Claimed Ryan Lavarnway from Cubs

Nope.

Two Rule 5 acquisitions: Logan Verrett and Jason Garcia

Verrett never pitched for the O's and was claimed off waivers by the Rangers before the season. But Garcia did make the O's opening day roster, and predictably the 22-year-old who had never pitched above A-ball was terrible (5.93 ERA, 7.65 FIP in 13 2/3 innings). He's currently on the disabled list with an injured shoulder, and it's unclear if he'll pitch for the Orioles again this season (or beyond). The O's like to utilize the Rule 5 draft to pick up useful players (Ryan Flaherty, T.J. McFarland), but this move hasn't worked.

Other intriguing, low-risk signings: Rey Navarro, Oliver Drake, Chaz Roe, Nolan Reimold

Duquette loves his fringe player signings.

(I think I covered most of the noteworthy signings and moves, though I know I left some things out. Feel free to chime in.)

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If you want to get upset with the O's for not re-signing Cruz, that's fine. I disagree with that stance, but sure, they could use his bat this season. Every team could. The decisions to not re-sign Markakis and Miller also frustrated fans, but they also seem like sound choices.

The Snider move, so far, hasn't worked out as planned. The Cabrera signing did not go well. Tendering contracts to all of Norris, Matusz, Hunter, and De Aza definitely doesn't look great, and perhaps the O's could have used that money to shore up the roster in other ways. Nori Aoki, for example, has been a tremendous signing for the Giants. But for the most part, the O's are still competing, and they don't have any truly horrible contracts on the books (unless you count Ubaldo Jimenez, who has two years remaining after this one, but who has looked competent this year).

Maybe the Orioles should have spent more money. It's easy to say that, though it does seem clear that they are working with a maxed out budget. They'll surely have more free-up money to work with this upcoming offseason, and it should be intriguing how they choose to spend -- and if Duquette will still be around to make those judgments. But they're around .500, and with a few breaks and a move here or there, they could reasonably return to the playoffs. But we're a long way from that point.

What a Chris Tillman Extension Would Look Like

After finally breaking through in 2012, Chris Tillman continued to excel and has been the Orioles’ ace for the past two years. And the fact that Wei-Yin Chen and Bud Norris can both become free agents after this year only increases Chris Tillman’s importance to this franchise. So, it should come as no surprise that Joel Sherman of the New York Post claims that the Orioles and Chris Tillman are trying to see if they can reach a long-term agreement. The only question is what a long-term extension for Tillman might look like and whether it makes sense for the club.

Generally speaking, the closer a pitcher is to arbitration the more money he’ll receive for his arbitration-eligible years. For example, Chris Archer is only expected to earn $13.75 million for his second, third, and fourth year of arbitration (I’m excluding his Super Two year in order to use three years of arbitration for everyone) while Jose Quintana is expected to earn over $18 million for his three years of arbitration.  This makes sense because pitchers do get hurt and the further away a pitcher is to being arbitration eligible the less likely he’ll actually get there. That means when comparing what Tillman might sign to other pitchers it’s important to keep service time in mind.

Fortunately, earlier this year both Lance Lynn and Wade Miley signed extensions. Like Tillman, both starters had just become arbitration eligible and will become free agents after three years. Lance Lynn signed a three-year, $22 million dollar contract while Wade Miley signed a three-year, $19.25 million dollar contract with a $12 million dollar club option for a fourth year. 

Chris Tillman has a worse FIP and lower WAR since 2011 than the other two. However, he’s had a similar ERA and about as many wins as the other two pitchers with considerably fewer losses. Many people argue that Chris Tillman is able to outperform his FIP due to his ability to hold runners as well as pitch differently when men are on base. If you believe that his FIP doesn’t tell the full story then one can argue that he’s nearly as good as Lynn and even better than Miley especially given that Tillman pitched in the AL East. It certainly helps Tillman’s case that he’s shown significant improvement lately while Miley has begun to regress. Given that Tillman and the Orioles agreed that Tillman should earn $4.35 million this year, it certainly seems that the Orioles believe that he’s better than his FIP. He's certainly being paid like it.

I think most people would agree that Lance Lynn has been better than Tillman both over their entire careers and in 2014. Therefore, I doubt that Tillman could earn as much as Lynn will over the next three years. But I do think it’s possible to argue that Tillman has been better than Wade Miley. If so, this suggests that Tillman should earn about $20 million for his three years of arbitration and that a potential deal could consist of his three years of arbitration as well as a possible club option for about $12.5 to $13 million dollars. 

What if the Orioles decide that a three-year extension that primarily covers Tillman’s arbitration years simply isn’t good enough? The Orioles may feel that such an extension might save them a few million dollars but simply isn’t worth the risk unless they can sign a deal that keeps Tillman under control for a few extra free agent years. How might a longer deal look?

It’s important to note that Chris Tillman will turn 27 years old at the beginning of the 2015 season which means he won’t be eligible for free agency until he’s 30 even if he doesn’t sign away any of his free agent years. It also means he probably won’t be interested in a long-term extension that considerably delays when he can become a free agent. James Shields became a free agent this year at 33 and found it hard to find a suitable contract because teams were nervous about his age. It makes sense that Chris Tillman wouldn’t want to put himself into the same position and therefore would probably be unwilling to sign a deal any longer than four guaranteed years with one club option.

That may determine the length but how much money should he receive? Julio Teheran received $16.6 million for his three arbitration years plus $11 million for one free agent year and a club option for $12 million. Chris Sale earned $18.6 million for his three arbitration years plus $12 million for one free agent year and club options for $12.5 and $13.5 million. Gio Gonzalez received $18 million for his three arbitration years plus $23 million for two free agent years and a club option for $12 million. Based on those numbers, it would be reasonable to expect Tillman to earn about $20 million for his three arbitration years, $12.5 million for a free agent year and $13.5 million for a club option. It's important to realize that the other deals listed happened in previous years and therefore we should expect some inflation.

 

If history is any guide, I would expect an extension for Tillman to range for anywhere between three years and $20 million to four years and $32.5 million with a club option for $13.5 million. 

Tillman has been the Orioles’ ace for the past two years. Since the Orioles probably aren’t going to be signing any top free agent starters in the near future, it makes sense to try to keep their homegrown products for as long as possible without paying full price. So, I think that any extension would require Tillman to give the Orioles an extra year of control. 

I wouldn't recommend a three-year extension that doesn't cover any free agent years because I think that would at most save the Orioles a few million. Such an extension has limited benefits and therefore isn't really worth the risk. If the Orioles are going to extend Tillman then they need to gain a year or two of control. That's why if Tillman would be willing to sign a contract that contains a free agent year as well as give the Orioles a club option then I think I’d have to recommend it. Otherwise, I'd pass. 

Looking Beyond Bounce-Backs From Machado, Wieters, and Davis

The frequently repeated narrative surrounding the 2015 Orioles is that as long as Manny Machado, Matt Wieters, and Chris Davis remain healthy and mostly return to form, the O's can replace the lost production of Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis and have a realistic shot at another strong season and first-place AL East finish. And yes, that is absolutely reasonable. All three are very good players, and the O's could definitely use that production next season.

Even if it's unlikely, what if that doesn't happen yet again? Or what if, say, only one or two of the three produce and the other struggles or gets injured? Many predicted doom for the 2014 Orioles, and that was assuming strong seasons from Machado, Wieters, and Davis. In fact, lots went wrong with the Orioles last season, and they were still very good. Assuming they're relatively healthy and productive, some projection systems again aren't high on the 2015 Orioles. (It's worth noting that as Dave Cameron reminded readers a couple years ago, "predictions are projections, but a projection isn’t necessarily a prediction.")

Cruz was an excellent addition in 2014, but Steve Pearce shockingly performed even better. Those types of remarkable, random player seasons are one of the things that makes baseball (and sports) enjoyable. They're difficult to predict and not wise to take for granted.

If any of Machado, Wieters, or Davis underwhelms -- or perhaps even if they don't -- the O's will need other players to step up. And unless you're counting on another 161 wRC+ season from Pearce (you shouldn't), then the O's lineup, in particular, will need some help. So where is there seemingly room for growth on the O's roster?

Gausman Leap

Career: 4.19 ERA, 3.59 FIP, 7.66 K/9, 2.85 BB/9
Steamer: 4.09 ERA, 4.14 FIP, 7.47 K/9, 2.91 BB/9
ZiPS: 4.12 ERA, 4.05 FIP, 7.29 K/9, 3.12 BB/9

If there's one Orioles' starting pitcher with upside in 2015 (unless you're counting on a big Ubaldo Jimenez rebound), it's Kevin Gausman. You could include Dylan Bundy, but the hope there is that he can simply stay healthy and last an entire season heading into 2016, when he must be included on the major league roster.

It wouldn't be surprising if Gausman, 24, eventually emerges as the best starter among the O's group of six. It also wouldn't be shocking if he started the year in Triple-A Norfolk. He's young, has all the talent in the world, and still sports a pair of spiffy spectacles. But of the six, Gausman, Miguel Gonzalez, and Bud Norris have minor league options remaining, and Gausman is the youngest and least experienced.

It's possible that one of Jimenez, Gonzalez, or Gausman could pitch out of the bullpen at some point as well, and in some capacity, that could work. Buck Showalter has a tough decision to make on that front.

Hope in Schoop

Career: .211/.246/.358 (67 wRC+), 2.8 BB%, 25 K%
Steamer: .228/.271/.373 (78 wRC+), 4.5 BB%, 21.3 K%
ZiPS: .238/.275/.410 (91 wRC+), 3.4 BB%, 22.4 K%

With the addition of Everth Cabrera, the O's seem prepared to ease some of the burden on (or maybe even replace) Jonathan Schoop if he again struggles at the plate in 2015. Schoop, 23, played a lot last year and was much better than expected defensively (+10 DRS, 5.8 UZR/7.6 UZR/150) at second base, but wasn't very good offensively (65 wRC+).

Perhaps Schoop will adjust next season by using the whole field, laying off more pitches, and taking more walks. Last year, the average major league second baseman had an 88 wRC+ and a 1.5 UZR. It would take a decent amount of offensive improvement, but that type of season certainly seems possible for Schoop, with the most likely outcome being a bit better defense and a little worse offense. Schoop may possess more upside than that, but considering that he posted a .244 OBP last season, let's temper our expectations.

Snider Uncertainty

Career: .246/.310/.406 (95 wRC+), 8.3 BB%, 25 K%
Steamer: .261/.331/.446 (117 wRC+), 9.1 BB%, 21.8 K%
ZiPS: .242/.310/.410 (101 wRC+), 8.6 BB%, 24.8 K%

We've already written extensively about the Travis Snider trade. So I'll just add that there's a decent amount of upside in acquiring the 27-year-old former first-round pick. He had a career year in 2014, albeit in limited duty. But Showalter is pretty good at using platoon players, and there should be plenty of corner outfield/designated hitter at-bats to go around for Snider along with Alejandro De Aza, Steve Pearce, and Delmon Young (and maybe David Lough).

The O's would probably be happy if Snider's numbers were somewhere between the ZiPS and Steamer projections, which would be fair to expect.

Other possibilities:

- The O's starting rotation/defense combination continues to exceed expectations and outperform projections.
- Caleb Joseph sustains his excellent defensive numbers from last season, which could be valuable if he's needed in a larger role with Wieters on the mend.
- Christian Walker and Mike Wright make productive contributions (possibly stepping in for injured players).
- Lough hits well enough to go along with his superb defense to carve out more playing time.
- When does Dariel Alvarez make his major league debut, and are the O's right to be as high on him as they are? He could be more of a realistic possibility in 2016.

It's fine to be skeptical about whether the positive contributions from the players above will be enough to make up for the departures of Cruz, Markakis, and Andrew Miller, especially if Wieters, Davis, and Machado aren't all healthy and noticeably better in 2015. It's also not smart to count on a ridiculous Pearce-like season from any overlooked player on the roster. But there is some hope outside the O's main core, and there's also value in depth. It's not a bad thing right now to have an extra capable starting pitcher or to not know exactly how the corner outfield innings will be divided.

The Orioles Keep Adding Fringy Middle Infielders

Despite signing shortstops Rey Navarro (major league deal) and Paul Janish (minor league deal) in November, the Orioles have recently agreed to terms with another infielder and are close to signing yet another shortstop. A couple days ago, the Orioles agreed to terms with Jayson Nix on a minor league deal. Nix is a Ryan Flaherty type -- a utility infielder who can fill in adequately enough (at least defensively) at second base, shortstop, and third. But it was reported yesterday that the Orioles are also close to a deal with Everth Cabrera.

As Joe mentioned yesterday, the Orioles "don't have many promising infielders in the upper levels of their farm system."  So the O's are doing their best to bring in several infielders to compete for a bench spot. Joe already tackled the Navarro and Janish signings, so let's focus on Nix and Cabrera.

Nix has never been more than a fill-in type player. He can field well enough, but he can't hit. He has a career wRC+ of 67, and last year he was truly awful. In 91 combined plate appearances for three teams, he had a wRC+ of -8. FanGraphs had him at -1.0 WAR despite only appearing in 41 games. He is a real long shot to make the major league roster, but could provide some infield depth if he's stashed in Norfolk.

Unlike Nix, there's plenty to note about a potential Cabrera signing. First, his deal would be for one year and about $2.4 million if he passes the O's physical (no guarantees there, obviously). He also has an option remaining, meaning he comes with some added roster flexibility (something Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette value). Cabrera is under team control as well for another year, giving the O's even more flexibility if Cabrera performs well in 2015.

Everth Cabrera

Unfortunately, Cabrera also comes with some on- and off-the-field issues, as several reporters have noted. In 2013, he was suspended 50 games as part of MLB's Biogenesis investigation. Then last November, he was arrested and charged with resisting arrest after being stopped by police for driving under the influence of marijuana. Craig Calcaterra noted that Cabrera was also charged with domestic violence in 2012 (he was accused of  “assaulting his wife by hitting her in the face with a closed fist and slamming her head against the wall”), though the charges were eventually dropped. Considering the O's were willing to take a (low-risk) chance on Delmon Young last season, it's not surprising they'd consider Cabrera.

Unlike Nix and Janish, who are both 32, and Navarro, who is 25 but has never received a major league at-bat, Cabrera, 28, is the most noteworthy move. Navarro is still young enough to improve enough to surprise some people, but Cabrera has had some actual success in the big leagues.

Besides the games missed because of the 2013 suspension, Cabrera has battled hamstring injuries the past couple seasons. He had his best offensive year in 2013, when he batted .283/.355/.381 (114 wRC+) in 435 plate appearances. But after dealing with his suspension and returning the following season, he was terrible. In 391 plate appearances, his numbers dropped -- .232/.272/.300 (65 wRC+). Career wise, Cabrera is a decent enough hitter for a shortstop (86 wRC+). (In 2014, the average major league shortstop had a wRC+ of 87.) But Cabrera is not a plus, or even average, defender. He has a career DRS of -13 at shortstop, and a career UZR of -22.6 (-7.3 UZR/150). He could be an option to play some second base, but he's only played 80 career innings there (and only 2 innings at third).

Cabrera, however, would improve the O's overall team speed on the basepaths. He has 136 career stolen bases, and he's been successful 78% of the time (above the break-even rate of 75%). He was remarkable in 2012 (44 steals in 48 attempts) but less so the last couple years (37 for 49 in 2013 and 18 for 26 in 2014). Those aren't terrible percentages, but the Orioles also don't need baserunners who are going to run into outs. It's possible he'll never approach the raw totals from 2012 and 2013 again, but he's still above average on the basepaths, which has some value.

Are any of these major signings? No. But it's smart for the Orioles to keep trying to improve the rest of the roster, especially since the O's are not interested in paying large sums of money for star free agents. Overall team depth is important, and the O's do have some players prone to injury. The O's already seem to have a decent amount of depth; one or two of these moves should help even more.

For the most part, these minor moves are about roster flexibility. Sure, maybe Cabrera could play some second base, if he proves to be adequate enough defensively. Jonathan Schoop has really struggled against left-handed pitching for some reason, while Cabrera hits better against them. There could be a fit there. But Schoop, Flaherty, Cabrera, and Navarro all have options remaining, which could mean plenty of Norfolk shuttling. As Jeff Long said last week, "Part of out-performing expectations on a regular basis, at least in the Orioles’ case, involves wringing every last bit of value out of each roster spot at the club’s disposal." Showalter and Duquette keep an open mind when looking for any way to improve the club, and roster shuffling has become one of their favorite weapons.

Photo via Keith Allison

How to Fix the MLB Draft

Fangraphs writers have recently written two articles discussing how they would fix the draft. David Cameron wrote the following:

So what if there was no draft? Instead, what if we just lumped all new players -- foreign or domestic -- into a single acquisition system where each player was free to sign with the team of his choice, only with firm spending caps in place to ensure that young talent flows more freely to clubs that can't compete on major-league payroll alone? In other words, a team's talent acquisition budget would be inversely tied to its major-league payroll; the more you spend on big leaguers, the less you get to spend on prospects, and vice versa.

This proposal has a few problems. The first problem is that it will likely convince teams not to spend more money on payroll than other teams. Carson Cistulli created a graph showing how large each team's draft pool would be in 2015 based on this proposal and determined that the Dodgers would have no money in their pool and the Yankees would only have $2.2 million. It is unlikely that teams are going to be willing to spend a lot of money on players if it means they can't afford to draft any talented prospects. In addition, teams like the Yankees are currently able to add international talent with only minimal repercussions. If this method is implemented then this loophole will be closed and it will make teams really loathe to spend more money than anyone else.

The second problem is that even if teams like the Yankees were still willing to spend a lot of money on players they would likely fail in this system.  The Yankees have one of the largest payrolls in the majors but are struggling to remain competitive because they've been unable to develop quality homegrown talent. Most production is contributed by team-controlled players. If teams like the Yankees and Dodgers are prevented from drafting any of the best players then they will struggle even with large payrolls. This will cause fans of the Yankees and Dodgers to stop attending their games and therefore a significant loss in revenue, which would be disastrous for baseball.

However, it does make sense to disassociate draft position with record. Associating draft position with record encourages the Astros to spend minimal amounts on free agents in order to pocket revenue and receive top draft picks. Does baseball want to encourage the Astros to tank? Nor is it reasonable to give the Mets or Phillies better picks than teams like the Royals, Orioles, and Pirates simply because they had a worse record. Shouldn't we want MLB to reward small-market teams for being successful? If the draft is a way to ensure parity by rewarded small market teams then it should reward small market teams. The current method rewards failure instead of supporting small market clubs.

I think Cameron's idea of a draft pool where players can be selected is a good idea but using payroll is a mistake. Rather the draft pool should be based on an obscure metric called the Revenue Sharing Performance Factor.

The Revenue Sharing Performance Factor is discussed in the CBA and one can find a chart with the factor for each team on attachment 26, page 235 in the PDF and page 222 in the paper copy. Basically, this factor is meant to ensure that each team is paying a fair amount into revenue sharing based on revenue earned and market size. You can find a more detailed description starting on page 132 in the PDF and 119 in the paper copy if you're interested.

Using the metric, the pools would look like this in 2012 and 2013 presuming that teams could spend a total of $295M in each of 2012 and 2013:

The Yankees would have a pool of less than $7 million while the Royals would have a pool of nearly $10.3 million. This would allow the Royals to sign better prospects than the Yankees but would still give the Yankees ample opportunity to add talent. In addition, the Astros no longer receive a reward for tanking as their draft pool is at $9.4M each year while the Mets and Cubs would have a draft pool of about $8.5M. This wouldn't force those clubs to spend money in free agency but it would make it harder for them to succeed if they didn't.

Implementing this method would lead to other changes. It would no longer make sense to allow teams to give qualifying offers to potential free agents because small market teams would have a built-in advantage due to the fact that they can’t sign their best players when they become free agent eligible. In addition, it would make sense to completely abolish the luxury tax. This method encourages teams in large markets to spend money on free agents if they want to be competitive. If so, it isn’t fair to penalize them for spending money. It would also make sense to eliminate the supplemental revenue sharing plan. That way, teams that have a larger revenue and market size than average but aren’t likely to spend enough money to be subject to the luxury tax would see some benefits from this deal and would be more likely to support it.

This deal is good for small market clubs by ensuring that they have a larger draft pool than large market clubs regardless of record. It would help large market clubs by ensuring that they no longer need to pay luxury tax and wouldn’t have to share as much money via revenue sharing. It would be good for all clubs because it would control spending on both foreign and domestic prospects. The richest clubs wouldn’t need to spend millions on foreign prospects and the poorest clubs would have a fair chance to convince foreign prospects to join their organization. It would be good for the players union because prospects would be able to choose their team and the elimination of the luxury tax would encourage spending by rich teams. Unlike Cameron's plan, this has benefits for all teams as well as the players union.

It seems like a win-win-win-win situation to me.

Impressions of the Orioles' (minor-league) Free Agent Signings - Part One

The Baltimore Orioles have avoided making a major splash in the 2014-2015 off-season - the big moves were the signing of well-traveled left-handed spot relief pitcher Wesley Wright, the selection of two players in the Rule 5 draft, and the trade acquisition of Travis Snider. But they haven't been completely inactive; they've signed a fair number of minor-league free agents. Most of the players signed to these contracts hope to be minor league roster filler - the lucky ones get to spend a year in Frederick or Salisbury while the unlucky ones get released in spring training. (Think Zane Chavez.) A smaller number are higher-level roster filler, who will likely help Bowie and Norfolk compete and who, if they play well, might earn a week or two in the big leagues as a bench player. (Think Cord Phelps.) And a few are players with real chances to make the Orioles out of spring training but who were signed to minor-league contracts because there just wasn't room on the 40-man roster. (Think Delmon Young, 2014.)

Most fans don't pay attention to these signings (unless the player is like Delmon Young) until the player is promoted to the Orioles. However, I think it's at least worth going through the signings to see in advance if there is anyone who might wear an Orioles' uniform or put up impressive numbers for one of their affiliates. This article won't analyze anyone in depth; it will be a very superficial look at these players. Some have played on or against Norfolk, and so I'll be mixing in some of my individual observations with a review of the stat lines. And as you read this, remember that it's very unlikely that anyone will be more than a mop-up relief pitcher or benchwarmer.

The Orioles signed three minor-league free agents to major-league contracts, putting them on the 40-man winter roster. A team will generally sign a minor-league free agent to a major-league contract if they perceive him to be in demand or that another team might take him in the Rule 5 draft. (Players newly signed to a minor-league contract can be selected in the Rule 5 draft, and occasionally such players are selected.)

It's easy to see why the Orioles signed Rey Navarro to a major-league contract. He's 25, a middle infielder, and played well in both 2013 and 2014. The Diamondbacks drafted him out of Puerto Rico in 2007 at a very young age - he didn't turn 18 until December of 2007. As a result, he was overmatched at the plate in his first seasons and was traded to the Royals in 2010. He took his time to get through the minor-leagues, and he had a promising 2013 season at age 23. However, because he signed so young, he had then completed his first six-year professional contract. The Royals didn't add him to their 40-man roster; he was granted free agency; and he signed with the Reds. He split 2014 evenly between AA and AAA and hit .282/.343/.435, playing shortstop and second base in a 60/40 split. Unfortunately, while Navarro had been a good defender early in his career, he doesn't appear to have been a good defender in 2014. Still, it's easy to see that Navarro may have been in demand and he should be a serviceable utility infielder if the Orioles need him. And, he's still young enough that it's probable that he hasn't reached his peak.

The Orioles also signed two of their own minor-league free agents to major-league contracts. Oliver Drake is an interesting story, and it's possible that he too was in demand. He was drafted out of the Naval Academy as a draft-eligible sophomore; he signed instead of returning to Navy and acquiring an armed services commitment. He has always had good control, but his stuff improved after he became a full-time relief pitcher. Over the past two seasons, he has averaged 11.7 strikeouts per nine innings; in 2014 he led the Eastern League with 31 saves. He'll pitch at age 28 in 2015, and is a good, low-cost candidate for a middle-relief role right now. He will probably start 2015 at Norfolk and might step into a twelfth-man bullpen role. At the very least he should be able to handle the Norfolk-to-Baltimore shuttle role.

Eddie Gamboa. Photo courtesy of Les Treagus / Norfolk Tides.

Eddie Gamboa is another pitcher with an interesting backstory, although it seems doubtful that he was in high demand as a minor-league free agent. His signing a major-league contract seems to be as much a vote of confidence as anything. Gamboa was a late-round college senior draftee who signed for a $1000 bonus. He started his career as a roster-filler arm and was reached Double-A in his first full season simply by pitching very well. His role changed to swingman in 2010 and he continued to pitch well, but by 2012 it was evident that he didn't have the sheer stuff to become a major-league pitcher. In the 2012-2013 offseason, he decided to become a knuckleball pitcher and pitched some excellent games in a generally solid season split between Bowie and Norfolk. He was supposed to begin 2014 as the Norfolk spot-starter/long relief pitcher, but when Kevin Gausman was hurriedly promoted to Baltimore Gamboa became the Tides' opening-day starter. When T.J. McFarland was promoted to Baltimore for good, Gamboa moved into the Norfolk rotation and pitched fairly well.

In June, however, Gamboa's season and career suffered a setback when he was suspended for testosterone use. Reading between the lines of the statements of both Gamboa and the Orioles, I conclude that Gamboa most likely was entitled to a therapeutic use exemption and failed to get one. It also would be hard to imagine the Orioles signing Gamboa - or any other ordinary minor leaguer - to a major-league contract if they felt he was unfairly using testosterone. This signing appears to be an endorsement of Gamboa's character as much as anything, and I expect him to be removed from the 40-man roster as soon as it becomes necessary.

These are the three minor-league free agents the Orioles signed to major-league contracts. In my next post, I'll look at a few free agents the Orioles signed to minor-league contracts.

What Does Travis Snider Bring to the Orioles?

Editor's note: I recently answered some questions for a 2015 team preview of the Orioles for Razzball. It doesn't include anything specific about Travis Snider, and we are still about two months away from opening day, but you might find it interesting. Look out for at least one or two more team previews as we get closer to the beginning of the season. Thanks.

It would an oversimplification to think the Orioles chose just Travis Snider over Nick Markakis. Really, the O's chose Snider, Steve Pearce, and financial flexibility over Markakis. Snider won't be filling the Markakis role. He won't be playing every game in right field, but he will be filling in more at designated hitter and if needed could see some innings in left field. But Snider will play a lot in right field, he is left handed, and he is on the Orioles, so some will inevitably compare him to Markakis, particularly those angered by Markakis's departure.

Snider is not Markakis. They are both former first-round draft picks -- Markakis (7th) in 2003; Snider in 2006 (14th) -- but each player has taken a much different career path. Clearly, Snider does not come close to Markakis's career accomplishments. One quick way to view that would be to observe their career wins above replacement totals:

Nick Markakis: 25.8 bWAR, 22.6 fWAR
Travis Snider: 4.2 bWAR, 2.7 fWAR

Markakis was arguably the Orioles' best player for about a decade (Adam Jones is right there, and did so with less playing time). Add in that Markakis was a homegrown talent -- something that's been rare for the Orioles during a period of truly awful baseball (basically 1998-2011) -- and it's not difficult to understand why so many fans latched on to Markakis and are having trouble letting him go.

Markakis has been a popular topic on Camden Depot; both his achievements and shortcomings have been analyzed frequently. So it has been noted often enough that Markakis was not a superstar. And it's not a dig to realize that the 2008 version of Markakis would have been extremely tough to replace, while the 2014 version is not.

So why is Snider the better fit for the Orioles? He's four years younger, and he possesses something that Markakis doesn't: some upside. Markakis hasn't been a great player for a while, and even though he's only 31, he does seem to have more wear on him than most. He has played in at least 155 games in every season but two: in 2006 (147), his rookie season; and in 2012 (104), when he missed part of the season after breaking his wrist and then missed the rest of the season after a CC Sabathia fastball broke his left thumb in September. Of course it's not a bad thing to be a durable, everyday player, but there's at least some health concern, as Markakis's recent neck surgery apparently worried the O's enough to back off a longer-term deal. The Orioles aren't always right about these things, but they are right often enough.

It's tough to ignore Snider's early career struggles. He showed a good amount of promise in his rookie season, posting a .301/.338/.466 (110 wRC+) line in a limited sample. The next couple seasons he hovered around a wRC+ of 100 while struggling to carve out consistent playing time. His production then fell off a cliff in 2011 (63 wRC+ in 202 plate appearances), and the Blue Jays traded him in the summer of 2012 to the Pirates for Brad Lincoln, another underwhelming 2006 first-round draft pick.

For the rest of 2012, Snider wasn't good (84 wRC+). And he certainly wasn't good in 2013 (71 wRC+) while playing through a nagging left foot injury. Snider eventually had surgery in the offseason to fix the issue. But in 2014, Snider was healthy and posted a career best 121 wRC+ while setting career highs in games (140) and plate appearances (359). Snider wasn't fortunate on balls in play (.298 BABIP), though he did have a modest uptick in his HR/FB rate (16.5% vs. career 13.3%). He also cut down on his strikeouts (18.7%) -- he never struck out less than 24.8% of the time in any other season -- walked more than he had in any season since 2009, and chased fewer pitches outside the zone than in any other season while making contact on 81.3% of his pitches (previous high of 79.1%). Still, one season of improved offensive performance shouldn't convince anyone that Snider is going to be fantastic or that he'll definitely hit a ton of home runs in a ballpark more suited to left-handed power than PNC Park.

Steamer projects Markakis to finish with a 101 wRC+ in 2015. It projects Snider to have a 116 wRC+ in 101 plate appearances. Certainly Snider is going to play much more than that, but it wouldn't be surprising if he outperformed Markakis. Much of Markakis's career is behind him, almost certainly including his best work. That might not be the case for Snider. And while Markakis does possess some on-base skills (Snider is close or maybe a little worse in that department), he doesn't currently have the same level of power that Snider does.

Even including his up-and-down, disappointing earlier seasons, Snider still has a greater career isolated power (.160) than Markakis (.145). He has fared better in hitting for power against all three types of pitches -- hard, breaking, and offspeed:

Player	Hard ISO	Breaking ISO	Offspeed ISO
Markakis	.129	.157	.139
Snider	.163	.160	.145

The breaking and offspeed categories are close, but Snider is better at hammering fastballs. And in 2014, Snider's ISO was double Markakis's when facing hard pitches (.189 vs. .095). He was also better against breaking pitches, though he did struggle against offspeed (Markakis wasn't great in this area, either).

Snider, who as noted above was much better plate discipline wise in 2014, did a better job of making pitchers pay when they threw him pitches in the middle of the plate or inside. Here's his ISO zone profile in 2014:

... vs. his career ISO zone profile:

He also swung and missed less on pitches in the zone, which is key since he was already chasing fewer pitches outside of it. Pitchers want to attack Snider away (and down), so swinging and missing at fewer of those pitches obviously helped.

Maybe you view what Snider accomplished last season as a fluke. It might be. But it may also be an example of a hitter refining his approach at the plate. Not every player improves or matures at the same rate.

Markakis's body of work is much larger, so there's more to analyze and predict what he will do. That's not the case for Snider, who has the upside advantage or unknown variable, whatever you want to call it. Mike Petriello of FanGraphs even referred to Snider as a "lottery ticket." That seems more than fair.

Shifting gears quickly to discuss defense, Markakis has won two Gold Gloves. Snider hasn't won any. But, as a reminder, Gold Gloves aren't a great indicator of outstanding defensive performance. I've always thought of Markakis as a decent to good defender who has a strong, accurate arm and makes most of the routine plays, but lacks range. But I'm not a scout. The advanced metrics differ on how good Markakis is in right field:

UZR: -2.5 (UZR/150: -0.3)
DRS: +6

While Markakis has mostly played right field, Snider has split his time between left and right field. Oddly enough, he's been much better in left field, according to the metrics:

LF UZR: 5.8 (UZR/150: 5.3)
RF UZR: -5.9 (UZR/150: -5.5)
LF DRS:  +16
RF DRS: -4

Maybe Snider is more comfortable in left field. Or maybe it doesn't mean a whole lot, since Snider still hasn't played a ton of innings overall in his career. He still seems like, at worst, an average outfielder. Maybe he's a little worse than Markakis, but either way, it's close.

Snider will make $2.1 million in 2015, and he has one arbitration-eligible year remaining after that. So he'll most likely see another modest raise in 2016. So the O's could end up paying, for example, around $5 or $6 million for Snider's age 27 and 28 seasons. Meanwhile, the Braves are locked in to a four-year, $44 million deal with Markakis for his age 31-34 seasons. Maybe Markakis will end up proving many analysts and fans wrong who think the Braves unnecessarily overpaid for his services. But the O's could end up getting similar production, both offensively and defensively, from Snider for a couple seasons at a fraction of the cost. Snider has not yet demonstrated that he can be a full-time player, and maybe he can't. But the O's will already have decisions to make beyond this season with so many impending free agents (including outfielders Steve Pearce and Alejandro De Aza). So Snider will get plenty of opportunities.

Not only did the O's minimize risk by not matching or exceeding Atlanta's offer for Markakis, but they also picked up a seemingly improving player with power who will be able to fill multiple roles. It's all right to be sad that Markakis is gone but to also realize that a Pearce/Snider combination in right field could and probably should outperform Markakis.

Photo via Keith Allison

Should Teams Focus on Run Prevention?

In my previous article, I argued that the Orioles should avoid spending money on any pitching free agents in order to spend resources on position players that can provide offense and defense. My argument was that excellent fielders can turn good pitchers into excellent pitchers and so on and so forth.  But it’s also possible that excellent fielders combined with excellent pitchers can prevent enough runs that even a mediocre offense can score enough to win. Does it make sense for teams to primarily focus on run prevention?

In order to answer this question I looked at all starting pitchers that threw at least 100 innings for a given team from 1935-2014 and put them into quartiles based on FIP. Then I looked at all teams from 1935-2014 and put them into quartiles based on their Fangraphs fielding metric. 

The first chart shows fielder and pitcher performance order by fielding ratings. E/F stands for ERA/FIP while RA9/F stands for RA9/FIP. I include these stats to measure the impact of defense based on a proportion rather than just a total. Here it is below.

This chart shows that the value of having a good defense decreases when you have good starters. For good fielding teams the difference between ERA and FIP is greatest for the worst pitchers. For poor fielding teams this is still the case but the difference is minimal. It is still better to have excellent pitching than having average pitching but teams have limited resources and may not be able to easily afford top pitching.

The second chart shows pitcher and fielder performance ordered by pitcher ratings.

This chart shows that good pitchers (those in the second quartile) that have the best fielders prevent more runs than the best pitchers with the worst fielders. Bad pitchers that have the best fielders prevent as many runs as good pitchers with bad fielders. Bad pitchers with the best fielders behind them give up only 3 more runs per 200 innings than good pitchers with good fielding. The best pitchers do prevent more runs on average than worse pitchers but good fielding is able to significantly limit the gap.

The chart also shows that even the best fielders are unable to do much for the worst pitchers. It is true that the worst pitchers with the best fielders have an RA9 nearly .7 points lower than the worst pitchers with the worst fielders. It’s also the case that teams with the worst pitchers and best fielders give up 4.7 runs on average per 9 innings and are still ineffective.

This next chart shows how it worked in practice for the 2014 Orioles.

The chart shows that the Orioles have seen this happen first hand. The only starter we had that had an above average FIP was Gausman and he was the only starter who underperformed his FIP. The other starters had an FIP that was either in the third of fourth quartile and mostly outperformed what their FIP suggested. One could argue that the Orioles actually did have a rotation of below-average starters and were able to succeed due to superior fielding. It’s not that Chris Tillman or Wei-Yin Chen are good necessarily but that they have an excellent defense supporting them.

Miguel Gonzalez outperformed his FIP by a substantial amount. There have been 8,487 starters that have thrown 100 innings for one team in a given year from 1935 to 2014. In 2014, Miguel Gonzalez has the tenth highest E-F and the fifth highest RA9-F. Players with similar seasons include Jorge Sosa in 2005 and J.A Happ in 2009. It seems likely that Miguel Gonzalez should expect significant regression if used as a starter next year.

It appears reasonable to argue that the Orioles have been able to prevent runs because they have a large number of decent starters that are able to succeed because they have a strong defense behind them. They may not have the best pitchers in MLB but good defense can fix a lot of problems.

In order to continue being successful, the Orioles need to consider pulling a trick out of the Rays playbook. The Rays typically offer pitching prospects long term deals before they are proven in order to save money and then trade them a few years before they become free agents. Of the Rays 10 starters that have thrown the most innings for the Rays from 2005-2014, they traded seven, had two get injured and currently control only Alex Cobb.  In contrast, the Rays only traded four of their ten offensive players with the most PAs from 2005 to 2014. Three of those four were traded this offseason in order to save money.

The Rays were able to do this because their fielding has been ranked #1 by Fangraphs from 2008 to 2014. Having good fielders supporting their pitchers allows them to risk giving guaranteed money to unproven pitchers and risk trading their proven pitchers to other teams.  They weren’t that aggressive when it came to position players because they needed to focus on offense and fielding in order to win.

The Orioles should consider a similar strategy.  Signing Gausman and especially Bundy to long-term contracts later this year will save the club money if they are successful. Trading a starter like Wei-Yin Chen or Chris Tillman could potentially net a reasonable return while solving our rotation questions.

Excellent fielding is more helpful for decent pitching than excellent pitching. That means that teams shouldn’t focus on trying to find the best fielders and starters at the cost of offense. Spending money in free agency to improve pitching is a luxury that a team with limited resources simply can’t afford. The best plan is to use most available resources for offense and fielding.

With Aoki and Rasmus Off the Board, O's Outfielder Search Continues

With the Dan Duquette situation unresolved and causing confusion, the Orioles still are not doing anything. Not that they have to, necessarily. But if one of the Orioles' annual routines is to target value in the free agent market, then it seems odd that they were content to let Nori Aoki sign with the Giants for somewhere between 50-75 cents on the dollar, depending on who does the evaluating. Last week, Aoki signed a one-year, $4.7 million contract with the Giants. Aoki's base salary for 2015 is $4 million, and the deal comes with a $5.5 million club option for 2016 (with a $0.7 million buyout). He could also earn more with various performance bonuses. Aoki was predicted to get a two- or three-year deal worth at least $7 or $8 million per season, so the Giants clearly got a bargain.

It sure seems that Aoki provided the Giants with a sizable discount. According to Jerry Crasnick of ESPN, "A source familiar with Aoki's search said geography and the ability to play for a contender ultimately helped sway him toward San Francisco." So perhaps the Orioles never had a chance, especially if Aoki wanted to play on the West Coast for the defending World Series champions. And perhaps he wasn't willing to sign a one-year deal with any other club.

But the Orioles only seemed to have lukewarm interest in Aoki from the beginning. They were frequently linked to him because, well, it made sense. He's a corner outfielder who gets on base and would not have been overly expensive, and the Orioles just lost Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis to other teams. There was a fit.

There was also a fit with Colby Rasmus, who the O's clearly preferred, but he won't be playing in Baltimore, either. Rasmus has agreed to a one-year deal with the Astros for $8 million That's also far from unreasonable, especially for a one-year deal.

Roch Kubatko offered a reason for why the O's were fine with Rasmus signing elsewhere:

For fans asking, I keep writing that Buck didn't sour on Rasmus after his visit. #orioles thought they had deal at around $7 mil, but...
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) January 20, 2015

....Rasmus' camp decided to seek more money and got it in Houston. #orioles drew line in the sand. Didn't want to go past it
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) January 20, 2015

So does this tweet from Buster Olney:

Orioles just weren't comfortable with the idea of giving Colby Rasmus more than he made in 2014 ($7m), after his really difficult season.
— Buster Olney (@Buster_ESPN) January 20, 2015

This jibes with the notion that the O's do indeed have a plan. And maybe they do. It's obvious that the Orioles are doing what they can to eliminate much risk in free agent signings. They surely aren't happy after the poor results from the first year of Ubaldo Jimenez's contract. But you can't eliminate all risk. And you probably can't just get by signing minor league free agents and four-A players, especially when teams like the Red Sox and Blue Jays have upgraded their rosters. That's not a vote for the just do something camp, but Aoki and Rasmus both signed more-than-reasonable deals (particularly Aoki) for a single year. Not wanting to ink Markakis and Cruz for multiple years and big dollars makes sense. But drawing such rigid lines for one-year deals? That's a tougher sell. It's not as if the Astros blew that $7 million mark out of the water; an extra million on a one-year deal for a 28-year-old isn't exactly a bridge too far.

Players sign one-year deals because they have flaws. More often than not, they are not fantastic players. Everyone signing a one-year deal is not going to perform like Cruz. It's foolish to think that way. Aoki (career 106 wRC+) and Rasmus (career 103 wRC+) are far from stars or great players, though they certainly are useful. And the O's could very well be just fine with Steve Pearce, Alejandro De Aza, and David Lough playing a majority of the corner outfield innings. But Pearce's talent level is uncertain. De Aza can't hit left-handed pitching. And Lough is superb defensively, but his offensive skills appear to be limited. The O's are high on Dariel Alvarez and his name keeps being mentioned as a corner outfield possibility. But he's also routinely absent in top prospect lists and is of course unproven. It would be odd for the O's, with a talented and competitive roster, to head into the 2015 season relying on anything substantial from Alvarez.

It would be dramatic and silly to believe an Aoki or Rasmus signing would have been the key to a winning season for the O's. But each player would have helped. And with the Duquette cloud hanging over everything, it's perfectly rational at this point to be worried. Buck Showalter and Duquette probably do have a plan of action. But Duquette's future in Baltimore is uncertain, and if the Orioles are looking for value in the open market, it didn't make sense to not be more interested in Aoki.

But have no fear. The Orioles have already moved on to... Nate Schierholtz? Is anyone else ready for this offseason to end?

Photos via Keith Allison

O's Offense Isn't as Bad as You Might Think

There's been discussion lately about who the Orioles should rely on to hit in the leadoff spot now that Nick Markakis is gone. At the moment, the most likely option, at least against right-handed pitching, is Alejandro De Aza. But against left-handed pitching? Perhaps Steve Pearce or Manny Machado. David Lough could get another shot at some point mainly because he's fast.  Or maybe the club's leadoff man (Nori Aoki?) isn't yet on the roster.

But whatever Buck Showalter decides to do lineup order wise won't have a large effect on how the O's offense performs as a whole. Lineup construction doesn't matter all that much over the course of an entire season -- at least to the extent that many fans argue about it. (I'm also guilty of this at times.) Every run counts, but lineup order doesn't affect run expectancy much. So, sure, the leadoff spot is somewhat of a question mark, but what that really means is that on-base percentage and speed, to a lesser extent, are areas of concern. Last season, the Orioles were tied for 17th in OBP (.311), and they'll obviously be without the services of Nelson Cruz and Markakis going forward. They also weren't a base-stealing team at all; in fact, they were last in the majors in steals (44), 12 behind the Giants.

Still, even without Cruz and Markakis, the Orioles have a starting lineup of mostly average to above average hitters. Assuming a healthy team, the only potentially disastrous spot could be Jonathan Schoop at second base, but Schoop is also just 23 and could take a step or two forward next season. There's no guarantee that he will improve just because he's young and has a full season under his belt, but it would also be difficult for him to perform much worse. Last year, the average major league second baseman had a 88 wRC+; it's not unreasonable for Schoop to get there.

O's hitters listed by career wRC+ (with 2014 position average in brackets):

Chris Davis (115) [109]
Steve Pearce (110) [100]
Adam Jones (109) [103]
Manny Machado (104) [100]
Alejandro De Aza (99) [103]
Delmon Young (98) [106]
Matt Wieters (98) [93]
J.J. Hardy (95) [87]
Jonathan Schoop (67) [88]

The Pearce figure is for right field. De Aza's is for left. Young's is for designated hitter.

So, to clarify, the above figures include career wRC+ vs. 2014 MLB player averages. It's far from a perfect comparison. But, except for Schoop, the O's have average or slightly above average options at every position. De Aza and Young are both lower, but they also represent platoon options for Showalter. They aren't full-time players. De Aza has a career 103 wRC+ vs. right-handed pitching, while Young has a career wRC+ of 114 against left-handers.

The O's have been linked to free agents Colby Rasmus (103 wRC+) and Aoki (106 wRC+). Either player would make sense, though Rasmus is five years younger, is in the prime of his career, is seemingly willing to sign a one-year deal, and is likely the superior defender.

The main concern for the Orioles in 2015 is health. Wieters and Machado are coming off season-ending injuries, and in all likelihood they will need both to stay healthy and contribute to have a shot at making the playoffs. The O's already didn't have superstar talent on the roster, and while they should be able to get by without Markakis, they didn't adequately replace Cruz's bat in the lineup. Showalter and Duquette are likely counting on Wieters and Machado to produce, Pearce to play a bigger role (with not necessarily the same high level of production), and a bounce-back campaign from Davis.

Considering the team's defensive talent and pitching staff that has mostly stayed intact, if the Orioles finish close to 2014's team offensively, they'll be ecstatic. That probably won't happen, but Machado and Wieters possess the ability to perform extremely well. So does Davis, as he showed in 2013. All three of those players underwhelmed or got hurt last season. If the Orioles stay in the postseason chase over the summer, they could always trade for a bat then.

Photo via Keith Allison

Delmon Young Returns to Orioles, Makes Blogger Sad

Delmon Young (photo via Keith Allison)

While you were hanging your stockings from the chimney with care last week, the Baltimore Orioles re-signed OF/DH Delmon Young to a 1-year, $2.25 million contract.  The contract includes incentives that could increase the overall value to $3 million.  Young had arguably the most productive season of his career, hitting .302/.337/.442 (AVG/OBP/SLG) in 255 PA’s, which was good for 120 wRC+.  He was worth 0.9 fWAR, which is outstanding production for someone who was signed to a minor league contract.  In fact, if you pro-rate Young’s performance out to 600 PA’s, he would have been worth 2.1 wins, making it his best season ever by half a win.  For someone who had been worth -1.3 fWAR over 3,936 career plate appearances prior to last season, it’s an understatement to say that the Orioles got great value.

Of course in the real world, giving Young a full 600 PA’s wouldn’t have resulted in production that high mainly because Young’s 2014 season was based largely on luck. This isn’t a shocking thing to say.  After a great 2014 season (for both Young and the Orioles), I don’t want to be a “Debbie-Downer”, but I want to temper expectations of what to expect from Young in 2015.

One of the reasons the Orioles were able to extract so much value out of Young is because they didn’t let him play much defense (only 159.1 innings in the outfield).  In fact, the main reason Young has been an unproductive player is because of his defense, where he’s been worth -53 DRS in almost 7,000 innings.  The Orioles, a team who is known to value defense, were wise enough to limit his time in the outfield, preventing him from taking away too many of the runs he produced with his bat.  Since 159.1 of those innings Young played in the field were approximately 159.1 innings too many, the Orioles would be wise to employ the same tactic in 2015 to further maximize Young’s value.

As for Young’s 2014 success with the bat, let’s start with his BABIP.  Overall, Young’s BABIP in 2014 was .359, higher (but not extraordinarily higher) than his career level of .324.  Even though it’s not a huge difference, there are two reasons to be skeptical of his inflated 2014 BABIP.  First is the fact Delmon Young is not a fast runner, and his 2014 GB% of 50.3% won’t help him in sustaining that BABIP.  Out of all hitters in 2014 with at least 250 PA’s, Young was tied with Adam Eaton for the third highest BABIP for players with a GB% of at least 50%.  The players ahead of them were Jon Jay (.363) and Lorenzo Cain (.380).  It’s safe to say that Young doesn’t have much else in common with any of those players and I’ll give one guess as to which of the four is most likely to see a significant decrease in their BABIP next year.

The other reason for skepticism deals with the fact that while Young has historically had trouble against RHP, his BABIP against them shot up to .379 in 2014 (career .317).  In fact, he was a much better hitter against RHP altogether.  For his career (including 2014), Young has had a 91 wRC+ hitter against RHP, while producing a 114 wRC+ against LHP.  The 2014 season showed the opposite, with a 130 wRC+ against RHP against a 101 wRC+ against LHP.  His splits from 2014 are obviously small samples, so it’s probable that he’ll again hit better against LHP in 2015.  However, since hitting against left-handers doesn’t happen as often as right-handers, his production will likely be muted if his good luck doesn’t carry over to next season.

This post isn’t meant to bash the signing of Delmon Young.  It’s to remind the reader not to expect a repeat from him in 2015.  At only one year in length, it’s not a bad signing, especially since Young was reportedly looking for two years.  And if Young can somehow repeat his 2014, the Orioles will again get their money’s worth out of him.  However, it’s not an inspiring acquisition, and that leaves at least one Orioles blogger a little sad, especially considering that there still are much better (and/or more versatile) options available this offseason.