Player Opt-Out Clauses Could (Have) Really Help(ed) the Orioles This Offseason

The Orioles finally did something last week by signing Andrew Cashner to a 2-year, $16 million deal. According to MLB Trade Rumors, the deal also includes a $10 million vesting option if Cashner throws 340 innings over those two yers. That option turns into a player option if he pitches at least 360 innings. As the article points out, Cashner has only topped 170 innings twice over his career, and has only exceeded 180 innings once, so it’s unlikely that those options will come into play.

This article isn’t going to focus on the Cashner deal though (we covered that here and here). Don’t get me wrong, I think the deal is fine, and it certainly fills a need, though the Orioles have more roster holes to fill, even as players have reported to spring training. The semi-inclusion of the player option in Cashner’s contract actually got me thinking about player opt out clauses in contracts over the past few seasons. The Orioles front office has been pretty adamant about not wanting to include opt-out clauses in their contracts, so I definitely don’t expect them to act on this, but at this point in the off-season, handing out a few multi-year deals with opt-outs after year 1 would be a great strategy to round out the roster. In my opinion, it would be beneficial for both the team and certain players that could help them in 2018.

From the team’s perspective, 2018 is arguably the last season where the Oriole’s competitive window is open to contend. I say arguably, because it really does depend on who (if anyone) they sign to round out the starting rotation. We’ve talked about which players will most likely not be on the major league roster next season so many times that there is no need to lay it out again. And without much immediate help coming from the farm system, the post 2018 landscape doesn’t look too promising at the moment.

With that in mind, the team probably would not like to be committed to many long-term (and likely expensive) contracts during what will almost certainly be very lean years. This makes perfect sense. Not only do they not want to be spending a lot of money during multiple losing seasons, but it’s essential during those bad years to “play the kids” so the front office can get a good idea of which players should stick around for the team’s next competitive window. During the rebuilding process, available roster spot(s) can almost be more important than the veteran salary commitment. Offering players a long-term contract with an opt-out after the first year provides a path for an increased chance at 2018 contention, while also providing an opportunity for that contract to not exceed one year.

Obviously the 2017-18 offseason has been unique in that there have been a lot of players that are still not signed. Regardless of the reason, at the core, those players remain unsigned because they are not getting offers they feel are in line what they’re worth. So from the player’s perspective, a multi-year deal with an opt-out after year 1 seems like a good option, This provides them the opportunity to test the market again next year, while also providing a backup plan should they underperform in 2018. It may even be beneficial to both parties to front load the deals in the first year. In that case, the players maximize their earnings in 2018 (and make the Orioles more competitive), while incentivizing those players to opt out given that the salaries in years 2 through x would likely be lower than fair market value.

I would imagine that a contract structure such as this may be intriguing options to some of the players still left on the market who could help the Orioles, such as a Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb. The Orioles could even take this option to someone like Mike Moustakas. With Manny Machado’s move to SS confirmed, signing Moustakas would be an upgrade at 3B. This would move Tim Beckham to a super utility role, one which he is much more likely in which to succeed (I believe Matt Perez suggested signing Moustakas in his 2018 blueprint).

Of course there are downsides to handing out contracts with opt-out clauses after year one. The first is that if everyone has a down year, they all decide to stick around after 2018. This puts the Orioles on the hook for another couple of years in which they likely won’t be competitive. However, if they can be frontloaded, those out years wouldn’t hurt as badly. Additionally, players with upcoming opt-outs will have their trade values diminished in 2018, due to the acquiring team not knowing exactly how many years of that player they’re getting.

Giving out contracts with player opt-outs after year 1 is definitely not without risk, but this offseason, the Orioles and some players were/are both in unique situations where this contract structure may be mutually beneficial. If the Orioles are truly serious about contending in 2018 (and other than publicly saying so, I’m not sure that they are), then this idea should not be off the table, despite the front office’s disdain for doing such things. Maybe if someone mentioned to the front office that player opt-outs are essentially the same as player options they wouldn’t be opposed to it. I mean, they did just kind of give one of those to Andrew Cashner.

Non-Tendered Candidates for the Orioles to Consider

During our blueprint exercise, a common theme in the comments was that it would be interesting to include players who were non-tendered into our analysis, as it would be an additional way to sign players and improve the team at what would likely be a modest cost, at least in comparison to other free agents. Baltimore recently had success in taking this approach last year, when they signed Welington Castillo to a 1 year contract, with a player option (Castillo declined his player option and signed with the White Sox on Friday). The only problem with including non-tendered players in our blueprint analysis was that at the time we wrote our blueprints, the deadline to tender arbitration eligible players contracts had not yet arrived. However, as of the early hours of Saturday morning, this is no longer the case.

Nothing of note has really happened yet for the Orioles this offseason (or the rest of baseball really), so the Orioles still have the same holes to fill as they did when the 2017 season officially ended. With the infield set, the Orioles would still be focused on starting pitching and the outfield, while also maybe dabbling in the relief pitching or backup catching market to add some depth. Unfortunately, the non-tender list doesn’t really have any potential improvements other than pitching, but some of those pitchers could make sense for Baltimore.

Mike Fiers is the biggest get here, but that’s not necessarily a surprise given that he’s been mentioned as a non-tender candidate prior to the deadline, with several members of the Orioles media and blogosphere discussing him as someone the Orioles should/will target. Fiers had been projected to make $5.7 million in his second year of arbitration according to MLB Trade Rumors. He wasn’t good last year, but outside of an injury shortened 2013, he has been a quality starting pitcher since 2012.

Standard Pitching

Year	Age	W	L	ERA	G	GS	IP	ERA+	FIP	HR9	BB9	SO9
2011	26	0	0	0.00	2	0	2.0		5.53	0.0	13.5	9.0
2012	27	9	10	3.74	23	22	127.2	110	3.10	0.8	2.5	9.5
2013	28	1	4	7.25	11	3	22.1	54	7.17	3.2	2.4	6.0
2014	29	6	5	2.13	14	10	71.2	178	2.99	0.9	2.1	9.5
2015	30	7	10	3.69	31	30	180.1	107	4.03	1.2	3.2	9.0
2015	30	5	9	3.89	21	21	118.0	102	3.85	1.1	3.3	9.2
2015	30	2	1	3.32	10	9	62.1	118	4.39	1.4	3.0	8.5
2016	31	11	8	4.48	31	30	168.2	88	4.43	1.4	2.2	7.2
2017	32	8	10	5.22	29	28	153.1	76	5.43	1.9	3.6	8.6
7 Yr	7 Yr	42	47	4.15	141	123	726.0	95	4.25	1.4	2.9	8.5

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/3/2017.

 

What obviously jumps out in 2017 are the increase in walk and HR/FB rates. That’s not a good combination, especially in a park like Camden Yards. However, if you look a little closer, he also struck out more batters (resulting in a K-BB% similar to 2016) and had a lower FB% than his career rate. So he’s not giving up more fly balls, though a higher percentage of those fly balls left the yard in 2017. This could be chalked up to some bad luck. Compared to his career levels, he gave up hard contact 2% less in 2017. That remaining 2% was redistributed to a 1% increase in soft and medium contact each. A look at some of his supporting statistics show that he’s been the same pitcher he’s always been. Even his velocity hasn’t changed.

 



Still, Fiers is a bigger gamble than he otherwise would be considering this new era of increased home runs. However, he’s the best non-tendered starting pitcher available, and even with the risk that accompanies him, he definitely would make the Baltimore rotation better.

Baltimore could also look at Tom Koehler, whose situation is very similar to that of Fiers, in that he has historically been a dependable starter until he was done in by walks and home runs in 2017. According to MLB Trade Rumors, Koehler was expected to make $6.0 million in 2017. Koehler is just not as good as Fiers, and his 2017 season was pretty much a disaster.

Standard Pitching

Year	Age	W	L	ERA	G	GS	IP	ERA+	FIP	HR9	BB9	SO9
2012	26	0	1	5.40	8	1	13.1	77	5.50	2.7	1.4	8.8
2013	27	5	10	4.41	29	23	143.0	88	4.27	0.9	3.4	5.8
2014	28	10	10	3.81	32	32	191.1	97	3.84	0.8	3.3	7.2
2015	29	11	14	4.08	32	31	187.1	93	4.53	1.1	3.7	6.6
2016	30	9	13	4.33	33	33	176.2	91	4.60	1.1	4.2	7.5
2017	31	1	7	6.69	27	13	72.2	63	6.05	2.0	4.3	7.7
2017	31	1	5	7.92	12	12	55.2	51	6.91	2.4	4.7	7.1
2017	31	0	2	2.65	15	1	17.0	177	3.22	0.5	3.2	9.5
6 Yr	6 Yr	36	55	4.39	161	133	784.1	88	4.49	1.1	3.7	6.9

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/3/2017.

He’ll provide fewer strikeouts, more walks, with a similar batted ball profile as Fiers. At the right price (not $6 million), he’d be a decent depth piece for the Baltimore rotation with a small chance at a bounce back, but he shouldn’t be someone they should depend on. At the very least, he proved to be effective in the bullpen if he once again struggles in the rotation.

Pitching Role

Split	G	PA	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip	tOPS+
as Starter	13	283	32	51	.296	.393	.525	.918	.320	108
as Reliever	14	51	3	11	.250	.294	.417	.711	.306	60

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/3/2017.

Another interesting option could be Chi Chi Gonzalez. Gonzalez is a former first round pick from the 2013 draft who has struggled during his major league career. He underwent Tommy John surgery in July, so the team could take a 2 year flier on him to see if they can get any value. Combined with his injury, he wasn’t even eligible for arbitration yet, so he should come cheap. The team shouldn’t count on getting anything from him at all, but he’ll only be 26 next season, and is only 4 years removed from being a first round draft pick.

The Orioles don’t necessarily need to sign relievers, but they make up the bulk of the non-tender list this year, so it’s worth taking a quick look at them. The most well-known is former Cubs closer Hector Rondon. Rondon will strike out a lot of batters, but he’s been prone to giving up the home run the last two seasons, with nearly 20% of fly balls given up leaving the park. If the Orioles were to sign a reliever, they’d likely want to target Jared Hughes instead. Hughes was expected to make $2.2 million in his last year of arbitration. Hughes doesn’t exactly have the strikeout and walk rates you typically want to see out of a reliever (career 15.3% and 8.1% respectively), but he keeps the ball on the ground (career 61.2% GB rate) and owns a 2.85 ERA in 369 career innings. His peripherals don’t exactly line up with that ERA, so like everyone else here, he’s not without risk.

Admittedly, it’s tough to get excited about these options. There is definitely some potential in each of these players, and most of them have at least one season on the back of their baseball card that makes one say, “if only they could have another season like that…”. But since they’ve had several other seasons that haven’t been so good, a productive 2018 season is far from a sure thing, which is why they ended up on this list to begin with. These players were not wanted at the salary they were expected to receive. That doesn’t mean they’re bad, it just means there is a higher likelihood of them not being good. Still it wouldn’t hurt the Orioles to take a chance on one (or more) of them.

Is There a Potential Bad Contract Swap With the Giants?

Mark Trumbo (photo via Keith Allison)

A little over a week ago, Dan Connolly of Baltimore Baseball wrote an article that suggested a trade of Mark Trumbo to the San Francisco Giants could make sense for both teams. The return to the Orioles potentially centered around either Jeff Samardzija or Matt Moore, two of the Giant’s higher priced, but underperforming starters. He cited an article from the Chicago Tribune that suggested a similar “bad contract” trade in which the Cubs would send Jason Heyward. With the Giants looking to upgrade their outfield (they ranked last in fWAR in 2017 at 0.8), getting Heyward would actually improve one of San Francisco’s needs, although the likelihood that Heyward does not opt out of his current contract would complicate things. So could the Orioles do something similar with Mark Trumbo as Connolly suggests?

The better return for the Orioles here would be Samardzija, but he also comes with a heftier contract. Samardzija has 3 years and $18 million per year left on his deal. Ultimately though, a Trumbo/Samardzija trade on the basis of bad contracts doesn’t work because Samardzija’s contract isn’t bad as Connolly believes. Yes, he’s owed a lot of money over the next 3 years, but he’s a quality pitcher. Despite a 4.42 ERA in what looked like a down year, Samardzija’s 2017 season was actually very productive. His strikeout rate (24.2%) was the highest it’s been since 2012 (the year he began starting) and his walk rate (3.8%) was easily a career low.

Connolly correctly points out that home runs were certainly a problem for him in 2017, but everyone has been giving up home runs the last couple of seasons and Samardzija’s 13.8% HR/FB rate only ranked 33rd out of 58 qualified starters in 2017. Add everything up, and Samardzija was worth 3.8 wins above replacement in 2017 according to Fangraphs. Even if you prefer Baseball-Reference’s method of WAR, Samardzija was still worth 2.4 wins above replacement. While his contract isn’t a steal, Samardzija is a legitimately good pitcher, not a salary dump candidate. And with the Giants indicating their intent to contend in 2018 (it is an even year after all), I see no reason as to why they would want to part with Samardzija.

Matt Moore, similar to Samardzija, had a down 2017 season. He finished with a 5.52 ERA (a 4.75 FIP) and was worth 1.0 fWAR. At -0.3 WAR, Baseball Reference thought he was slightly below replacement level. It was easily the worst full season of his career. Still, Moore was almost a perfectly decent pitcher in 2016, throwing nearly 200 innings, with both an ERA and FIP just north of 4, and ending up at 2.3 fWAR. Moore is still young (2018 will be his age 29 season), was once a top prospect, is relatively cheap ($9 million, with another relatively cheap $10 million club option in 2019), and has previously shown electric stuff. This combination of factors makes him more desirable than one would initially think given how poorly he pitched last year. It’s why picking up his 2018 option was an easy decision for the Giants. As Connolly correctly points out, the Giants would likely want more than just Trumbo for Moore, but I disagree in that I don’t believe the Giants would want Trumbo at all.

I would assume that the Orioles would take either Samardzija or Moore in return for Trumbo (and change) any day of the week. These trade ideas don’t work is for two reasons. The first is that the contracts of Samardzija and Moore are not all that bad. Samardzija is a very good pitcher, and Moore’s contract is relatively small, especially if you take into account his pedigree and the chance that he bounces back even a little bit in 2018. The second (and most important) reason is that I don’t see how Trumbo fits anywhere on the Giant’s roster.

Connolly thinks Trumbo could fit on the Giants’ roster by mentioning that Trumbo and Brandon Belt can both play either first base or the corner outfield. While defensive metrics show Belt to be a slightly below average outfielder over his career (in about 460 innings), Trumbo is essentially unplayable in the outfield, especially if he’ll be playing most of his games in the NL West, where many of the stadiums have very large outfields.

Additionally, while the defensive metrics view Trumbo as a positive at first base, Belt is also the superior defender there, averaging 3 more defensive runs saved per 1,000 innings than Trumbo (Trumbo trails in UZR/150 by 0.9). And while Belt doesn’t have the power that Trumbo does, he’s been the much better (and more consistent) hitter over the course of his career (Belt owns a career 128 wRC+ compared to Trumbo’s 106). Mark Trumbo is simply not a fit for the San Francisco Giants roster.

Realistically, a trade involving Mark Trumbo would likely be a salary dump returning no one of significant value, and definitely not a quality major league pitcher in my opinion. There are probably teams with bad contracts that the Orioles should be talking to, but I believe they’d be wasting their time with the Giants. A couple of weeks ago, Jon tweeted the following with respect to a potential Trumbo trade.

Had a front office exec without an opening at 1B tell me that if he needed a 1B then his priority would be to see if the Orioles would get rid of Trumbo for a fringe 40 man arm.

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) November 9, 2017

Like it or not, that’s probably the best Orioles can hope for this offseason.

Orioles 2018 Blueprint Follow-Up: Why I Decided to Non-Tender Zach Britton

Zach Britton (photo via Keith Allison)

A couple of weeks ago, some of the writers here at Camden Depot went through our annual exercise of outlining our vision of how the Orioles should approach the offseason. My blueprint was the first to be published, and within it, I made the somewhat controversial decision to non-tender Baltimore closer Zach Britton. By doing so, the move saved me $12.2 million in payroll, but significantly weakened my proposed bullpen. For our fictional exercise, I thought the move was necessary to make the club as competitive as it could be for the 2018. And instead of getting into all of the reasons as to why I thought it was best to non-tender Britton within that piece (essentially inserting 1,000+ word tangent), I promised that I would post a follow up article detailing my reasons for doing so. Well, here it is.

With one more season of Manny Machado and Adam Jones, I wanted to put the best team possible on the field to compete in 2018, without much consideration as to what the team would look like in the following season. To do accomplish that, the two main things I was focused on in my blueprint was strengthening the bench with players who could play multiple positions and remaking the starting rotation. A more complete bench was the easy task, and in my view that goal was accomplished by signing Jon Jay, Howie Kendrick, and Cliff Pennington.

There is no getting around the fact that the 2017 Baltimore starting rotation was terrible. The only good thing about them was that the 3 worst performers were all going to be free agents.

2017 Baltimore Orioles SP Ranks

Like many of the other writers, I believed the lack of quality starting pitchers in the minor league system meant that it was essential to sign at least 3 starting pitchers. I believed that the only way to significantly improve the rotation was to get the best starting pitcher available, and in my mind that was Yu Darvish. With Darvish costing $17.3 million per year (and considering all the other areas this team needed to improve as well as a limited budget), my decision essentially boiled down to whether I would want Britton or Darvish. I chose Darvish.

The main reason I felt why I ad to go with Darvish was due to just how BAD the Orioles starting rotation was in 2017/could be in 2018. The Orioles have proven that they don’t need a great rotation to be successful and make the playoffs. However, the 2017 rotation was so bad (combined with the lack of internal options), I believed that anything less than Darvish would be applying a band-aid to a wound that required 40 stitches. And while he’s looked at as an injury risk, he’s coming off a sub-par season, where he was still worth 3.5 fWAR (3.9 bWAR). He’s averaged 4.1 fWAR (4.2 bWAR) per 180 IP over the course of his career. To put that into perspective, the Orioles haven’t had a starting pitcher eclipse the 3.0 fWAR mark since Erik Bedard did it in 2006 (4.6) and 2007 (5.0).

Comparing average Yu Darvish against Zach Britton at his absolute best (2.5 fWAR during the 2016 season), the Orioles get an additional 1.6 wins for the added cost of $5 million. I realize that Darvish would come with an additional 3 years of commitment according to our BORAS projection system, but as I mentioned, I was only concerned with 2018. Granted that average Darvish versus the best Britton argument doesn’t work when using bWAR bWAR (which based on run prevention instead of FIP), but what is the likelihood we see 2016 Britton again in 2018? It’s not impossible, but coming off an injury-plagued season with good (but not great) numbers, I think it’s highly unlikely.

Britton missed most of May, all of June, and the beginning of July due to a strained left forearm. He was then shut down for the rest of the season after his September 18th appearance due to an MCL sprain in his left knee, an injury that was serious enough for him to receive a stem cell injection. When he did pitch, he was effective, but certainly not his usual self, finishing with career worst strikeout and walk rates (since being transitioned to the bullpen full time).

Obviously I don’t know exactly how bad either of those injuries are, but that forearm injury (combined with his performance) was a big reason why teams weren’t offering a trade package the Orioles liked at the deadline. Along with the knee injury, he didn’t do anything the last two months of the season to bring his trade value back up. When you combine the injuries, the performance, and the assumption that he’ll make $12.2 million in his 4th and final year of arbitration, I don’t believe that he has much trade value. This kind of torpedoes the idea of tendering him a contract and trading him later in the offseason. If the Orioles couldn’t find an attractive offer at the 2017 trade deadline, they’re certainly not going to find a better one this offseason. Furthermore, I don’t think his value will be that high at the 2018 trade deadline if the Orioles are out of it. The only way the Orioles get a good package for him is if he pitches like he did in 2016 again and there’s a desperate contender who needs a closer. Again, that scenario is possible, just not probable.

The need to greatly improve the starting rotation, combined with the injury questions and decreased trade value of Zach Britton, led to my decision to non-tender him. I ultimately thought the $12.2 million saved could be better spent to make the team better in 2018. So if I were actually sitting in the GM chair in real life, would I still take the same course of action? Probably not (actually, almost definitely not).

For the purposes of our blueprint exercise, I stand by my decision. But I don’t think it’s a smart one to make in real life. And that’s not because the fans would probably be pissed about non-tendering a favorite (although that should be given consideration as well). The real reason you don’t non-tender Zach Britton is because it’s not guaranteed that you’ll be able to reinvest those savings into players that will improve the team. The readers who commented on my blueprint started to hit on this topic a bit. Yu Darvish, Alex Cobb, and all of the other players we proposed to sign are human beings. They have a choice of where they want to play. If they don’t want to play in Baltimore, they’re not going to sign with Baltimore. The blueprint exercise takes that choice away from them. Non-tendering Britton in real life could very possibly yield a team without Zach Britton and an extra $12.2 million. That may be ok for the owners of the team, but from the perspective of being competitive, the Orioles would be decidedly worse off.

Blueprint For The 2018 Orioles (Option #1): So Yu Think Yu Can Pitch

Well, we’re finally here. The 2018 season has long been considered the likely last year that the Orioles will have a legitimate chance at competing for a playoff spot with their core players for the foreseeable future. Maybe “core players” casts too large of a net. This idea largely centers around the fact that, as of now, Manny Machado and Adam Jones will be free agents at this time next year, and those are two players that are difficult to replace. Though with several players in the minors taking big steps forward this past season, the post 2018 landscape may not be as bleak as it once seemed.

With that being said, having a (mostly) consistent 6+ WAR third baseman and an All-Star centerfielder on your roster doesn’t happen very often. So with the two of them possibly departing after the upcoming season, it’s extremely important to pull out all of the stops and make the 2018 Orioles as competitive as possible. And that’s what the Camden Depot writers (and some of our readers) will be trying to accomplish over the next week or two in our annual “Orioles Blueprint” series. I’m up first, but before we get to my proposal, let’s go over a couple of things.

Jon laid out the rules last week (along with Camden Depot's BORAS salary projections for pitchers and hitters). Here’s a quick recap:

1. No trades
2. Camden Depot’s BORAS salary projection model will be used to sign free agents
3. MLB Trade Rumor arbitration projections are used for arbitration eligible players
4. All team-controlled non-arbitration eligible players are assumed to have a salary $550,000

Budget: $155 million

Between Adam Jones, Chris Davis, Mark Trumbo, and Darren O’Day, the Orioles have a total of $53.33 million in salary committed for the 2018 season.

Remaining Funds: $101.67 million

Team Options

First thing is first; there are some decisions to be made on a couple of options. One of the assumptions we made was that Welington Castillo would decline his player option, making him a free agent. If anyone wants him on the 2018 Orioles, they’ll need to pay him market price.

J.J. Hardy has a $14 million team option that would have vested if he received 600 PA’s in 2017 or 1,150 PA’s combined between 2016 and 2017. He reached neither. Hardy has had a great career in Baltimore, but there is no chance I’m picking up that option. Declining the option means I buy him out for $2 million.

Wade Miley also has a team option for $12 million. With the free agent market for starters the way it is, I did not think Miley would have to perform all that well for me to pick up his option. He ended up not even meeting the low bar I set. Fortunately, his buy out of $500,000 is cheap, so declining his option was a relatively easy decision for me.

Remaining Funds: $99.17 million

Arbitration Eligible Players

Seven Orioles players are eligible for arbitration. I’ll be tendering contracts to all of them in 2018 except…Zach Britton. I know, it sounds crazy, and I actually can’t believe that I am typing these words right now. Don’t get me wrong, I still think Zach Britton is a good pitcher, but there are a lot of reasons why I decided to not tender him a contract this offseason. I am planning to explain this decision in more detail in a follow up post. In short, it boiled down to my opinion that his trade value has been greatly diminished coupled with the thought that the extra $12.2 million saved can be put to better use.

Remaining Funds: $56.27 million

Qualifying Offers

None of the impending free agents are even close to being in consideration for a qualifying offer. This is the easiest decision of this entire exercise.

2018 Roster

The figure below will be the starting point for my Orioles blueprint.

As you can see, there are quite a lot of positions to fill (3 SP’s, 5 RP’s, 2 corner OF’s, 1 catcher, and 3 bench spots). Of course, some of them will be filled with players who are under team control and are not yet eligible for arbitration. I’ll outline that in the upcoming sections.

Before moving on, let's factor in Dylan Bundy's assumed $1.50 million salary for 2018.

Remaining Funds: $54.77 million

Infield

With the (pretty great) acquisition of Tim Beckham before the 2017 trade deadline, the 2018 infield was pretty much set. While I think Chance Sisco (probably) showed enough to make the opening day roster as the second catcher, I wouldn’t be opposed to sending him down to AAA to start the season. In the event of that, I would sign a strong framer/defender (someone like Rene Rivera) on a non-roster invite to spring training for a low base salary (< $1 million) if they make the major league club. For now, though, we’ll pencil in Caleb Joseph as the starting catcher to begin the season, with Sisco ($550,000) getting semi-regular playing time as the backup until at some point their roles hopefully reverse.

You can swap Davis and Trumbo between 1B and DH. While Davis grades out as the better defender there over his career, Jon will occasionally mention on Twitter that Trumbo hits much better when he’s playing the field (Matt K. also posted about it).

Remaining Funds: $54.22 million

Outfield

Trey Mancini had a great year offensively and did not embarrass himself out in left field. At an assumed cost of $550,000, he’s going to be the starting left-fielder.

Austin Hays had a much better 2017 season than anyone probably thought he would have. Putting aside his small sample size struggles during his brief cup of coffee in the majors last year, I think it would be asking too much for him to come up and be the team’s everyday right fielder. I think he needs to spend a little bit of time in AAA before he’s ready to be in Baltimore full time. With that in mind, I would fill the right field position with Jon Jay. I actually advocated for the Orioles to sign Jay in my blueprint for 2017. Here’s what I said:

“…Jay is essentially your league average hitter (career 106 wRC+) and fielder (career -1 Defensive Run Saved), can play all 3 outfield positions adequately…”

Jay ended up signing a 1-year deal with the Cubs last offseason and put up another average season (this is a reminder that average is good). Jay’s going to play the 2018 season at age 33, so his defense is going to start trending slightly below average, but BORAS only sees a 1-year deal for $9.2 million for him, so there is limited risk in signing him. And if Hays plays well enough to get called up early in the season, Jay can easily shift into a supporting role, where his league average bat can adequately fill in at any outfield position.

Remaining Funds: $44.47 million

Pitching Staff

I may be publishing my blueprint first, but I think it’s safe to say that everyone’s blueprint will be focusing mainly on starting pitching. And that’s not just a coincidence, as the Baltimore rotation was absolutely dismal in 2017, ranking 27th in fWAR (29th in bWAR), 30th in ERA, 28th in FIP, 28th in innings pitched, etc, etc, etc. After declining Miley’s option, I’m left with Kevin Gausman and Dylan Bundy as my only 2 starters. There are (in my opinion, very questionable) internal options to fill those slots, and while at least one of them may emerge as a decent end of the rotation starter, I don’t want to go into the 2017 season depending on any of them. I’m ideally looking for an ace, a mid-rotation starter, and a flyer on a high risk starter.

Yu Darvish (photo via Keith Allison)

There are 2 pitchers on the free agent market that come close to being called an ace. One is Jake Arrieta, who is in no way coming back to Baltimore. The other is Yu Darvish, and he is my main target. BORAS projects Darvish to land a contract of 4 years and $69.26 million ($17.31 million per year)*. Darvish had a rough second half of 2017, which (as Jon noted in the BORAS projection for pitchers), significantly hurt his free agent standing in our projection system’s eyes. Other than a spike in his BABIP and HR rate in July and August, the rest of his peripherals appear to be in line with the more successful months of his season, so I’m not too worried.

For a mid-rotation starter, I would target Alex Cobb, who, according to BORAS, can be signed for 3 years and $31.14 million ($10.38 million per year)*. Performance wise, Cobb has been a really dependable middle of the rotation starter since coming into the big leagues in 2011. Outside of an injury shortened 2016 where he pitched only 22 innings (he also missed all of 2015 due to a torn UCL requiring Tommy John surgery), Cobb has averaged 2.8 fWAR per 180 innings pitched. The problem is, Cobb’s never reached 180 innings in a season, so there is some risk in this signing (he had a career high of 179.1 IP in 2017). Cobb is not a high strikeout pitcher, but he doesn’t walk many either and for the most part keeps the ball on the ground, which is good when one pitches half their games at Camden Yards.

I’m going to fill out the starting rotation by taking a flyer on Derek Holland for a BORAS projected 1 year deal for $1.5 million. Holland has been both injured and mostly ineffective since 2014. A spike in his home run rate and an inability to find the striekzone (leading to a 2017 walk rate of 12%) led to a 2017 where he was nearly an entire win worse than replacement level. However, I’m hoping I can get a little bit of productiveness out of the 32-year-old left-hander. I’m not expecting him to return to his 2013 form, but it’s not crazy to think he could provide some production as a 5th starter. During the 2016 season, he was worth 0.9 fWAR in 107.1 innings pitched when his walk and home run rates were more in line with his career levels. He doesn’t have to be great, and even if he’s terrible, the $1.5 million guaranteed will easily allow the team to cut their losses if needed. In that event, Baltimore can use one of Gabriel Ynoa, Jayson Aquino, Alec Asher, or Miguel Castro to fill the 5th spot in the rotation.

In the bullpen, I’ve got Brad Brach closing and Darren O’Day setting up. As in years past, I’m filling in the remainder of the relief corps with internal options making the league minimum. Mychal Givens, Miguel Castro, and Richard Bleier have certainly earned spots in the bullpen based on their 2017 performance (although Castro and Bleier’s peripherals do worry me). I’ll go with Donnie Hart as my second left-handed pitcher. Gabriel Ynoa is out of options, so he’ll likely get the last spot in the bullpen as a long man (I’d rather keep him as starting pitching depth than risk losing him to waivers). Other internal options such as Tanner Scott, Alec Asher, and Chris Lee can be in the mix as well. I’ll admit, that group does not inspire a lot of confidence, but bullpens can be fickle and it’s the one place where you can find something that sticks if you throw enough at the wall. With that in mind, I’m also handing out a bunch of non-roster invites to spring training to flawed relievers.

Remaining Funds: $12.53 million

Bench

We need 3 players to round out the bench. There is no real infield depth, so finding an infielder will be a priority. Furthermore, unless you want to count Mark Trumbo, there isn’t really much outfield depth either. I’m going to use the bulk of my remaining dollars to sign Howie Kendrick, who BORAS projects can be acquired for 1 year and $10.6 million. Kendrick solves some of the depth problem by being able to adequately play both infield and outfield corner positions, as well as his natural position of second base. Additionally, he’s a career 107 wRC+ hitter, who just finished up a very productive season at the plate, hitting .315/.368/.475. Of course, that came in only 334 plate appearances, as Kendrick has been somewhat of injury prone the last couple of seasons. Hopefully playing the role of part-time super utility player (something he’s done the last 2 year) will help keep him healthy.

The next bench spot goes to Anthony Santander over Joey Rickard. While I think Rickard can be a useful player, I think Santander has more promise, and I’d be interested to see if he can fulfill some of that. Plus, as a Rule 5 draft pick who spent most of the 2017 season on the 60-day DL, Santander needs to be on the active roster in 2018 for 44 days before he can be optioned to the minor leagues. The Orioles have stuck with him this long, I think it makes sense to get to the finish line.

The last bench spot should go to someone who can play shortstop, as currently, the backup shortstop options are moving Manny Machado or Jonathan Schoop off of their positions. I don’t think there is an internal option here, and without much money left, I’ll need to take the cheap route. I’ll sign Cliff Pennington, who will get a 1 year contract for $800,000 if he makes the team out of spring training. Pennington isn’t much of a hitter (career 79 wRC+), but not only can he play an average shortstop (career +3 DRS in nearly 5,000 innings), but can also play an average or better 3B and 2B as well, giving Buck Showalter a little more flexibility when giving guys some extra rest.

Remaining Funds: $580,000

Conclusion

Here’s the final tally:
OF Jon Jay – 1 year, $9.20 million
SP Yu Darvish – 4 years, $69.26 million
SP Alex Cobb – 3 years, $31.14 million
SP Derek Holland – 1 year, $1.50 million
UTIL Howie Kendrick – 1 year, $10.60 million
INF Cliff Pennington – NRI (1 year, $800,000 if makes team)

I always love doing this exercise because it demonstrates just how difficult it can be to try and build a winning team while sticking to a realistic budget. Sometimes tough decisions need to be made. It was a difficult decision to non-tender Zach Britton, but with the starting pitching being as bad as it was, I felt that reallocating the $12.2 million owed to Britton was needed in order for me to adequately address the holes in the starting rotation and outfield/bench.

*Author's Note: The original version of this post used incorrect/outdated BORAS projected contracts for Yu Darvish and Alex Cobb. Their projected salaries have been updated. As a result of this change,  there was not enough money remaining to sign SP Francisco Liriano. Instead, Derek Holland was signed as the starting pitcher characterized as a high risk flyer. The paragraph on Liriano has been replaced by one discussing Holland.

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Postscript: I realize that my blueprint this year is not as realistic as some of the blueprints I have completed prior to previous seasons. I am under no sort of impression that the Orioles would even dream of non-tendering Zach Britton this offseason. I also think that Darvish may get more than what BORAS projects for him (possibly Cobb as well), which likely puts him out of range for the Orioles, considering the other holes they need to fill.

Having said that, a more realistic option of my blueprint would be to tender Britton a contract ($12.2 million) and not sign Darvish. The extra $5+ million would then be used to sign someone more dependable than Holland, possibly Clayton Richard (2 years, $17.50 million) or Jason Vargas (2 years, $17.20 million)...or it can be used for a more attractive offer for Alex Cobb. In this scenario, the 5th spot in the rotation is open for someone in the Asher, Aquino, Ynoa, Castro group to win out of spring training.

Wade Miley Couldn't Finish Off Hitters in 2017

The Orioles finished the 2017 season with a record of 75-87, the team’s first losing season since 2011. The end of the season was almost spectacularly disappointing, as the Orioles went 7-21 over the month of September (and October). While the bad month finally torpedoed what little chances the team had of making the playoffs, losing 19 of the last 23 games probably doesn’t leave fans with to much hope for the 2018 season, at least in the first few days following the end of the season. And while the 2017 season was extremely frustrating at times (especially on the pitching side of the ball), there are definitely some positives that can be taken into next year. As our own Jon Shepherd tweeted following yesterday’s game…

2018 looks exciting.

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) October 1, 2017

And it’s true! The 2018 season looks like it’s going to be extremely exciting! Unfortunately, this post won’t be looking at the positives of the 2017 season or what to look forward to in the 2018 season. I’m sure someone will do that post either here or somewhere else in the coming days (and if no one does, I promise I will write one in two weeks).

No, this post brings us back to the worst part of the 2017 season, the starting pitching. Now that the season is finished, I feel like it’s a good time to make a confession: I don’t watch many Orioles baseball games. For that matter, I don’t watch many other baseball games either. I wish I could watch more, but other life responsibilities (mainly kids) take up a lot of my free time these days. Fortunately, I am able to keep up with what is going on from the local beat writers, twitter, other Camden Depot bloggers, and the many excellent Orioles blogs out there on the internet.

Despite not getting to sit down and watch too many games, I do catch snippets here and there. And I happened to catch Wade Miley’s 5th inning against the Tampa Bay Rays on Friday. Like much of Wade Miley’s 2017 season, it didn’t go well. He faced two batters, giving up a solo home run to Evan Longoria on an 0-2 fastball, and giving up a double to Logan Morrison on…an 0-2 fastball.

Wade Miley vs Evan Longoria

Wade Miley vs Logan Morrison

I thought it odd (or at least unusual) that Miley not only gave up back to back hits on 0-2 pitches, but that those hits were smoked. I decided to look into it a little further, and as a result, I found that it appeared that Miley had a lot of trouble finishing off hitters in 2017.

Other than his Zone% and F-Strike%, Miley’s Plate Discipline numbers at Fangraphs don’t look all that different than his career levels. Miley’s never been a strikeout pitcher, so the fact that he had an 8.1% swinging strike rate (and that it was the 9th lowest in all of baseball for pitchers with a minimum of 150 IP) didn’t strike me as all that surprising. However, generally when a pitcher gets to an 0-2 count, the odds shift greatly in his favor. While Miley has been a better pitcher when he gets the count to 0-2 (as he should), he’s been well worse than the league average in 2017.

Wade Miley in 2017 in 0-2 counts vs the league average

I don’t how necessary it is, but let’s take a look at some slightly different numbers for the same situation.

Wade Miley in 2017 in 0-2 counts vs the league average

That’s really not good. It’s also the worst Miley has ever done in those situations throughout his career. Is some of it luck based? Possibly. The sample size is obviously pretty small, and Miley’s BABIP in those situations is decidedly on the wrong side of the luck scale. At the same time, Miley hasn’t been doing himself any favors either. The figure below shows the location of his pitches against right-handed batters and left-handed batters in 0-2 counts.

As you can see, there are some pitches that catch way too much of the plate. At the same time, Miley is all over the place. And that’s really been one of the main reasons for Miley’s struggles in the 2017 season overall. It’s difficult to be effective if you’re walking nearly 13% of the batters you face. Major League hitters are really good. And if you don’t have the stuff to get swinging strikes, you need to do a good job locating your pitches, even when you’re ahead in the count 0-2. Miley did not locate his pitches well in 2017*, and that hurt him even if he had the batter at a huge advantage.

I realize that this post isn’t probably what most people would want to read about the first day after the end of a disappointing season, and if you’ve made it this far, then congratulations. Since it appears that Wade Miley will not be back in Baltimore for the 2018 season, so you can probably just file this post under either the “depressing, yet somewhat interesting” or “who cares, the season is over” folder. Regardless of Miley’s status with the team next year (or lack thereof), the Orioles can begin to look forward to the 2018 season, which (I’ll repeat), is going to be exciting.

*To his credit, Miley located the fastball almost exactly where Welington Castillo asked for it in the Longoria plate appearance.