Everybody Loves Manny

It's going to happen. Manny Machado will not be an Oriole by the time August 1 rolls around. We have avoided it for as long as possible, but here we are. The O's are bad, and it makes no sense to hold onto one of the most talented players in baseball with a contract that will be expiring at the end of the season.

I'm not crying! You're crying!

If you have been paying attention, you know that the rumors right now are as follows:

1. Seven teams have made offers to the Orioles.
2. All of the offers are said to be similar in value.
3. The Dodgers and Brewers seem to be the most serious, although that could change.
4. The Yankees have a stocked farm system and have re-engaged in trade talks about Machado.

Please, Orioles, do not screw this up. It's going to hurt no matter what. It's not fun to see your best player walk out the door. But they need to make this one count. It is not going to be a huge return as it would have been a year or two ago. But the front office should be able to nab a decent prospect or two during this process.

Do we really "want" Manny to be a Yankee? Of course not. But if they offer the best package, the Orioles shouldn't turn away just because of a perceived rivalry. Be selfish and get the highest return on Machado.

We get into all of that on this week's episode of the podcast in addition to some All-Star Game and Home Run Derby talk, Colby Rasmus leaving, Drake's new music, and Adam Jones's clever plan to help Baltimore win in the future.

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Jon Jay is not your Huckleberry

The off season has been a peculiar place for some and not for others.  If we use BORAS as an expectation of market value, then the top tier players have generally found the contract we thought would be offered.  However, role players discovered their market drastically undercut.

This included a player like Jon Jay.  BORAS version one saw Jay as a 1/9.2 contract player while BORAS 2.0 envisioned him more as a 2/17.6.  Instead, he signed a 1/3 deal with another 1.5 MM in potential add-ons.  That is a significant underperformance from BORAS's perspective.  However, the way this off season has gone it is not surprising to see a player who is neither loved by scouts or analytics to have a hard time finding a home.  However, you might have gotten a different impression in the press.

MASN's Roch Kubatko gently wrote about Jay as the one who got away.  He noted how the Orioles tried to sign Jay before they agreed to terms with Colby Rasmus, but at that point Jay was asking for numbers similar to BORAS's suggestion.  Roch laments:

Jay is a better contact hitter than Rasmus, offers plus speed and defense and is a popular teammate. He always made sense to me as an ideal fit. But certainly not at his initial price.

Taking it much further than Roch, Baltimore Baseball's Dan Connolly decided that Jon Jay was the hill to die on.  He noted that Jay was "a perfect fit" (though somehow not a "difference maker") and that "...the Orioles fumbled this one."

He concludes that Jay was a player the Orioles "desperately needed".

So these are Jon Jay's last three seasons:

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
30	STL	245	.210	.306	.257	-0.2	0.3
31	SDP	374	.291	.339	.389	1.1	1.2
32	CHC	433	.296	.374	.375	1.1	1.6

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

From those numbers, you get a good idea of what Jay is, a role player.  He is not a star.  At some level, it seems peculiar how much teeth gnashing there has been for him.  It reminds me of the Arrested Development joke about how mesmerizing George Michael makes his girlfriend out to be, but how everyone else is a bit confused.

I truly am confused why a fringe roster candidate like Jay is generating such adoration.  Let us go through the pieces a bit.

Plus Speed

Jay does not have plus speed.  Statcast can measure sprint speeds of players.  Generally, an average baserunner, regardless of position, can attain a speed of 27 ft/s.  Statcast has kept data for three years with MLB presenting the average data.  During that time, Jay has put up max sprint speeds of 26.9 ft/s (2015), 26.6 ft/s (2016), and 26.6 ft/s (2015).  His 2016 26.6 ft/s mark was the second slowest speed for a centerfielder out of 58 players.  A tenth faster than the slowest, Mark Canha, and three tenths slower than the next centerfielder, Joc Pederson.  At left field, he would be tied as 46th fastest with Ryan Braun.  In right field, he would be tied for 45th with Carlos Gonzalez.  Whether we are talking about all players in baseball or the considerably faster subset of outfielders, Jay does not appear to possess plus speed.

Plus Outfield Defense

Defense is a tricky thing to measure, but it basically comes with a pretty steady conclusion for Jay.  Over his career, UZR has found Jay to be a below average corner outfielder (13.4 runs/150), but an average center fielder (1.5 runs/150).  However, his last two seasons have suggested that his play in centerfeld may be a minus or at best below average (-6.9 runs/150).  DRS sees him as a poor centerfielder and an average corner outfielder.  Statcast derived metrics had him as 2% worse than average in 2016 and again in 2017, that comes out to about a -7 runs/150 (they report does not break down differences at other positions).  To balance that out, I asked a scout and his response was that Jay earned that reputation early in his career, but that he is not the same guy he was then.

Great OBP

When Dan Duquette arrived in Baltimore, he noted how important on base percentage was and used that as a rationale behind signing Matt Antonelli to a MLB deal.  Since then, the Orioles have paid no attention to on base percentage and created one of the best teams in baseball from 2012-2016 on the back of prodigious power.  Still, this is a familiar drum that is beat whenever someone wishes to try to make a point.

In this case, that context is paired with Jay's .374 on base percentage, which was accomplished with reasonable batting average and walk rates.  That performance is not paired with what he did before or his age.  When you have more sophisticated approaches looking at what all that means with respect to future performance, the optimism should fade.  ZiPS sees Jay as a .338 OBP, which is .002 higher than what Steamer projects.  PECOTA pegs him as a .335 OBP mark.

So, is a mid to high .330s OBP a great performance? Last year's league average was .329 OBP.  That is on par with the performance by the Mets' Ruben Tejada or the Phillies' Cesar Hernandez last year.  It would have been 61st out of 141.  If Jay would have qualified with enough plate appearances, he would have been 14th in the league.  That would have placed him a point behind Yunel Escobar, who is still a free agent.  For some reason, I do not hear a lot about him.  Anyway, I think you cannot simply ignore his 2015 and 2016 seasons, so I think it would be a stretch to expect him to be able to perform similar to his 2017 season.  A lot of teams probably think this given how difficult it was for him to find a deal and how many would kill to have a .370 OBP player.

What Drawbacks?

There is an idea that in order for a player to be serviceable in the majors, he must be able to adequately do everything.  The worst contact hitters still have a high skill for contact.  The least powerful can still rap a ball over the fence.  The slowest runner can still likely beat anyone in a sprint outside of Texas Roadhouse.  What this means though is that there is a likely floor for most skills.  Chris Davis exemplifies this.  His contact rate appears to be near a threshold that renders the rest of his profile useless.  It does not matter how powerful he is or how head smart on the basepaths he is, if he does not get enough contact then he does not justify the rest of the package.

Jay is sitting there as well.  His bat profiles as a bat that is about 20% worse than league average, which means his bat projects to be worse than any positional average.  His power challenges for the worst in baseball.  He hits maybe one or two home runs a year and he shows no gap power.  He does not make up for this with savvy baserunning with only eight stolen bases over the past three years.  His walk rate is below average.  His strikeout rate is above average.  He is slow for an outfielder.  His arm is below average.  As he ages, the chances that one or more of these skills erodes further makes one truly wonder if he could still play in the majors.  It says something with scouts and analytics both go, "eh".

This is not to say he is without worth.  He can play all three outfield positions, at least adequately.  He gets on base.  Jay simply just does not do much when he does those things.  He is a frozen pizza.  He is not really what you want, but is close enough on all accounts to be palatable enough.  So, setting Jay as a hill to die on certainly feels weird.

How about Colby Rasmus?

Of course, this goes back to Colby Rasmus because the Orioles signed him as opposed to Jay.  Now, much has been made of Rasmus leaving the Rays last year.  He has been fit into the boxes of being weird, deserting his team, not getting along with others, but those have largely been overblown.  Certainly, he is a peculiar fellow in a sport where community is defined by adherence as opposed to acceptance.  Still, he is a player that teams have wanted.  Since La Russa and Rasmus fell apart, the Jays wanted him.  The Astros wanted him.  The Orioles wanted him.  The Rays wanted him.  A lot of teams have wanted him.  Time and again, he shows weird flourishes and has repeatedly chosen a better personal fit than a better contract.

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
28	HOU	485	.238	.314	.475	.2.6	3.0
29	HOU	417	.206	.286	.355	2.2	1.4
30	TBR	129	.281	.318	.579	1.2	1.1

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

Assuming his hip is OK, what we see immediately above is that Rasmus has had both an uneven last three years, but generally a much better three years than Jay.  While, Rasmus' OBP would appear to be much lower than Jay's, the other aspects of his game cover for that, such as his fringe plus plus power where Jay's is minus minus.

Speed-wise, Rasmus is faster than Jay.  Rasmus recorded a 27.6 ft/s rate last year, but was above 28 the previous two seasons.  Defensive metrics have adored Rasmus over this period.  DRS has seen him as a plus plus defender over the past three seasons (~15 runs/150).  DRS has viewed him as a plus defender (~10 runs/150).  Statcast has pegged him as average (0 runs above average).

So, the great issue is one between Jay's above average OBP against Rasmus' power and defense.  It does not look like a difficult decision for me between the two.

So what does all this mean?

I have no idea.  I am unsure why anyone was so fixated on Jay.  Likewise, I am unsure why anyone would be fixated on Rasmus.  What I think is clear is that Rasmus is a better player and potentially can be a game-changing force. To a higher viewpoint, the major issue here is why did Jay become the last hurrah?  This team is situating itself as a mid-70s win team.  The addition of Jay does not shake that much.  Whether you give the team an allowance for low spending or not, Jay simply does not push the needle.  If there is a hill to die on, it might be Alex Cobb or maybe the GM position or maybe the Manny Machado extension.  Jon Jay?

Colby Rasmus is a Perfectly Average Baseball Player

"Average" gets a bad rap in sports. Saying someone is average seems to imply that, actually, they are not just not good, they are bad. Being average means you don't do anything well, you're not exciting, and a team can, and should, have someone better. Being average, though, is far from being bad. In fact, one of the hallmarks of the Orioles run since 2012 was that the team avoided having bad players. They didn't have a ton of great players, necessarily, but the team was stocked with average to good talent that avoided having several spots on the field manned by below average scrubs.

This changed in 2017, as just six position players put up more than 1 fWAR, matching 2015 as the low mark since 2012. Not only did the Orioles not have a great deal of high end performances last season, they also had more low end performances than we are used to seeing.

Enter Colby Rasmus, left handed hitting outfielder, who signed a minor league deal prior to the start of Spring Training. Rasmus made headlines after walking away from the Tampa Bay Rays (and, at the time, baseball in general) last season, despite posting an outstanding 132 WRC+ in 37 games. Rasmus has had an odd career, going from one of the most highly touted prospects in baseball to being a bust and then becoming a solid regular before growing a crazy beard and quitting the game. The idea of him being a five tool player never quite came to pass, but Rasmus has had a pretty...well, average career.

Generally, 2 WAR is considered average. Rasmus has played nine seasons in the big leagues and has generated 19.7 fWAR. That's an (wait for it) average of 2.2 fWAR per year. WRC+ normalizes production and weights it to 100, with players being sorted based on how much better or worse they are than the average. Rasmus' career WRC+? 103. wOBA, or weighted on base average, is an attempt to measure overall value and the average player will have around a .320 mark. Colby Rasmus has a .324 wOBA in his career. How about defense? I know defensive stats have issues and shouldn't necessarily be relied upon fully, but Rasmus has a 2.9 UZR/150 games played mark in his career. An average player puts up between 0 and 5 UZR.

This is, honestly, kind of remarkable. Since 2009, the only players to have similar offensive stats and basically the same WAR output as Rasmus are Austin Jackson, Russell Martin, Denard Span, Carlos Gomez, Jhonny Peralta, and Yunel Escobar. I don't know about you, but if I was asked to name some average big league baseball players that would be a pretty comprehensive list. None of those players are great, though like Rasmus some have had great seasons, but in general they have been solid, more or less every day players over the past decade.

It's not often you see a player as average as Colby Rasmus. If he's not the Platonic ideal of averageness, he's certainly up there. And this, I think, is where the problem may lie. While being an average player isn't bad, Orioles fans were almost certainly hoping for something more. Not only that, Rasmus hasn't played a full slate of games since 2012 and is an obvious platoon candidate. Given the revolving corner outfield door since Nick Markakis left after the 2014 season, it seems more than a little underwhelming that the starting right fielder on Opening Day could well be Rasmus.

It's far from a lock that Rasmus even makes the team, of course. He's competing against multiple guys with similar skill sets, Austin Hays may force his way onto the roster, and there's every indication that the O's will keep at least two Rule 5 picks counting Anthony Santander. There's also the (lessening by the day) possibility that the team goes out and signs someone like Carlos Gonzalez. If Rasmus does make the team, however, there's a good chance he puts up some pretty average numbers, and that's just fine!

Best Laid Plans Of Dan Duquette: Matt Wieters Edition

Last Friday welcomed us with the news that Matt Wieters preferred the confines of a one-year deal for 15.8 MM instead of braving the waters of free agency with a draft pick tied around his neck.  While our BORAS system projected that his contractural value would be around 2/17, I had argued differently.  My perspective was that his injuries were neither chronic nor did they appear to impact him during his limited playing time in 2016.  If we assumed that the injury was a non-issue then we would have his value around six years and 90 MM.  I had suggested that a club with money and a need should consider bidding that high for his services.  That said, I also thought that it made little sense for the Orioles to retain him because Caleb Joseph was present and performing admirably.  From that point a view, a Qualifying Offer made sense in that the Orioles did not need him and he could grab big money out in the marketplace.

Matt Wieters wound up with a different take.  I assume that he thought the last couple seasons lost to injury hurt his value and that he is still young enough that a resurgent 2016 would net him big money.  If that truly is his thought process then that might well be an issue because that would mean that the long term contract that he would be willing to sign right now is likely not available to him.  It may mean that his quick assessment found that the open market did not bear him riches and the Orioles seem wary to do the same.  This leaves the club with a few options with varying levels of a realistic chance at achieving those options.

Option A
Please do not steal the towels (chances at 85%)
This is the most likely option.  In this situation Wieters and that 15.8 MM chunk of payroll sticks, which means he bounces around catcher, 1B, and DH.  To me, the ideal situation would be to slot Wieters into a rotation with about 50% of games behind the plate, 20% at first base, and 30% at DH.  I assume that with payroll drying up that Wieters will be one of the better solutions at first and DH, which is a little sobering (but so was the performance of the club's DHs last year).  With a first half focus on catching, it is possible the club could turn him into prospects if out of the playoff race or a big piece trade to fill an open slot with an established starter (aka dealing from depth).

Impact on the blueprint: It was assumed that 42 MM was present to spend.  This reduces available money to 26 MM.  As such, I waive goodbye to retaining Steve Pearce or Matt Joyce.  The absence of Byung-ho Park was decided by the posting process.  Can the club fit Ben Zobrist and a pitcher under what is left?  I think they could.  It would require slightly shifting money toward the backend of contracts, but I think the club could snag Zobrist and, if they so insist, Scott Kazmir or spread it a bit on Zobrist, Ah-seop Son, and J.A. Happ.

Option B
Let's Dance (chances at 2%)
This is probably the ideal option.  In this scenario, the Orioles are stuck with excess catching along with Wieters while needing a top flight corner outfielder.  Meanwhile, the Astros are stuck with excess outfielders along with Colby Rasmus while needing a starting catcher.  If Wieters signs a contract the Astros like and Rasmus signs a contract the Orioles like, then they can be dealt under the rules of the current Qualifying Offer system.  What this requires though is that all players involved actually want to go to the other club and can be satisfied with the money being offered.

Impact on the blueprint: In this scenario, I think Rasmus gets bonus money and length, so perhaps five years and 80 MM.  I would let the Ben Zobrist train leave at this point.  This leaves 26 MM on the other parts.  Resigning Steve Pearce, acquiring Ah-Seop Son or another interesting fringe outfielder, Matt Joyce, and J.A. Happ might be the best case scenario here.  Rasmus is not an awful acquisition and it was rumored the club was hoping the QO on his head would lessen his asking price, so interest from Baltimore supposedly is there.

Option C
Ball and Chain (chances at 13%)
Sometimes you need to make lemonade out of lemons.  In this scenario, I would suggest that the Orioles go all in with Wieters and sign him to a long term deal.  My guess is that five years and 70 MM might well get the job done.  Next, deal Caleb Joseph.  Over 182 games, Joseph has a bWAR of 3.4 and an fWAR of 2.2.  Neither of these metrics consider pitch framing which credits Joseph somewhere between 17.6 (stat corner) and 22.8 (Baseball Prospectus) runs saved.  In other words, if you assume Joseph as a full time starter would play about 120 games then he would be worth about 1.8 wins according to current WAR metrics and an additional 1.3 wins with pitch framing.  In other words, he is a fringe All Star catcher.  That could be worth quite a bit to a team that values framing.

What makes Joseph particularly valuable is that the arbitration process has yet to recognize pitch framing as a skill of value.  This means that Joseph will likely be earning a salary based predominantly on his bat and the title of his position.  As such, he aims to make about 550k in 2016, 4 MM in 2017, 6 MM in 2018, and 8 MM in 2019.  These numbers, I think, might be a little flattering to him with the arbitration process, but I think it makes sense.  His true market value would be about 60 MM over this time, which is a surplus of about 42 MM.  The club should easily be able to turn Joseph into one or more useful, cost-controlled pieces.  Teams like the Astros and Cubs have pieces available for trade and could greatly benefit the Orioles.  For instance, a deal of Caleb Joseph for Jorge Soler would lockdown a corner outfield position with an average or maybe better player who has major power potential.

Impact to the blueprint: The club would still have 26 MM to improve elsewhere and could legitimately add Zobrist, Happ, and Pearce or another fringe interesting bat to the club.  It may well not be the most ideal situation, but it could vastly improve the club.

Conclusion
Wieters accepting the deal is not the best thing that could have happened to the club and it may well be quite horrible if the plan simply is to see what this season brings.  If the club takes more of a long-term approach, then I see several areas where they can make the most of a poor situation and add value.  One way would be to use some Orioles Magicks and deal for Rasmus.  He is a good outfielder with the bat and in the field.  He would pair up nicely with Adam Jones.  Or, as I would suggest, the club should sign Wieters to a lucrative long term deal and then deal Joseph for a young, controllable bat.  Just focusing on the Cubs, the target should be Kyle Schwarber, but the acceptable line should be Soler.  Simply put, there is no need for two starting catchers on a club and Wieters acceptance makes the choice for the club.  Now, it is the team's responsibility to recognize that fact and use it to their advantage.

One last thing to reiterate: I think it would have been worse if the club had not put the Qualifying Offer on Wieters.

With Aoki and Rasmus Off the Board, O's Outfielder Search Continues

With the Dan Duquette situation unresolved and causing confusion, the Orioles still are not doing anything. Not that they have to, necessarily. But if one of the Orioles' annual routines is to target value in the free agent market, then it seems odd that they were content to let Nori Aoki sign with the Giants for somewhere between 50-75 cents on the dollar, depending on who does the evaluating. Last week, Aoki signed a one-year, $4.7 million contract with the Giants. Aoki's base salary for 2015 is $4 million, and the deal comes with a $5.5 million club option for 2016 (with a $0.7 million buyout). He could also earn more with various performance bonuses. Aoki was predicted to get a two- or three-year deal worth at least $7 or $8 million per season, so the Giants clearly got a bargain.

It sure seems that Aoki provided the Giants with a sizable discount. According to Jerry Crasnick of ESPN, "A source familiar with Aoki's search said geography and the ability to play for a contender ultimately helped sway him toward San Francisco." So perhaps the Orioles never had a chance, especially if Aoki wanted to play on the West Coast for the defending World Series champions. And perhaps he wasn't willing to sign a one-year deal with any other club.

But the Orioles only seemed to have lukewarm interest in Aoki from the beginning. They were frequently linked to him because, well, it made sense. He's a corner outfielder who gets on base and would not have been overly expensive, and the Orioles just lost Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis to other teams. There was a fit.

There was also a fit with Colby Rasmus, who the O's clearly preferred, but he won't be playing in Baltimore, either. Rasmus has agreed to a one-year deal with the Astros for $8 million That's also far from unreasonable, especially for a one-year deal.

Roch Kubatko offered a reason for why the O's were fine with Rasmus signing elsewhere:

For fans asking, I keep writing that Buck didn't sour on Rasmus after his visit. #orioles thought they had deal at around $7 mil, but...
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) January 20, 2015

....Rasmus' camp decided to seek more money and got it in Houston. #orioles drew line in the sand. Didn't want to go past it
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) January 20, 2015

So does this tweet from Buster Olney:

Orioles just weren't comfortable with the idea of giving Colby Rasmus more than he made in 2014 ($7m), after his really difficult season.
— Buster Olney (@Buster_ESPN) January 20, 2015

This jibes with the notion that the O's do indeed have a plan. And maybe they do. It's obvious that the Orioles are doing what they can to eliminate much risk in free agent signings. They surely aren't happy after the poor results from the first year of Ubaldo Jimenez's contract. But you can't eliminate all risk. And you probably can't just get by signing minor league free agents and four-A players, especially when teams like the Red Sox and Blue Jays have upgraded their rosters. That's not a vote for the just do something camp, but Aoki and Rasmus both signed more-than-reasonable deals (particularly Aoki) for a single year. Not wanting to ink Markakis and Cruz for multiple years and big dollars makes sense. But drawing such rigid lines for one-year deals? That's a tougher sell. It's not as if the Astros blew that $7 million mark out of the water; an extra million on a one-year deal for a 28-year-old isn't exactly a bridge too far.

Players sign one-year deals because they have flaws. More often than not, they are not fantastic players. Everyone signing a one-year deal is not going to perform like Cruz. It's foolish to think that way. Aoki (career 106 wRC+) and Rasmus (career 103 wRC+) are far from stars or great players, though they certainly are useful. And the O's could very well be just fine with Steve Pearce, Alejandro De Aza, and David Lough playing a majority of the corner outfield innings. But Pearce's talent level is uncertain. De Aza can't hit left-handed pitching. And Lough is superb defensively, but his offensive skills appear to be limited. The O's are high on Dariel Alvarez and his name keeps being mentioned as a corner outfield possibility. But he's also routinely absent in top prospect lists and is of course unproven. It would be odd for the O's, with a talented and competitive roster, to head into the 2015 season relying on anything substantial from Alvarez.

It would be dramatic and silly to believe an Aoki or Rasmus signing would have been the key to a winning season for the O's. But each player would have helped. And with the Duquette cloud hanging over everything, it's perfectly rational at this point to be worried. Buck Showalter and Duquette probably do have a plan of action. But Duquette's future in Baltimore is uncertain, and if the Orioles are looking for value in the open market, it didn't make sense to not be more interested in Aoki.

But have no fear. The Orioles have already moved on to... Nate Schierholtz? Is anyone else ready for this offseason to end?

Photos via Keith Allison

O's Offense Isn't as Bad as You Might Think

There's been discussion lately about who the Orioles should rely on to hit in the leadoff spot now that Nick Markakis is gone. At the moment, the most likely option, at least against right-handed pitching, is Alejandro De Aza. But against left-handed pitching? Perhaps Steve Pearce or Manny Machado. David Lough could get another shot at some point mainly because he's fast.  Or maybe the club's leadoff man (Nori Aoki?) isn't yet on the roster.

But whatever Buck Showalter decides to do lineup order wise won't have a large effect on how the O's offense performs as a whole. Lineup construction doesn't matter all that much over the course of an entire season -- at least to the extent that many fans argue about it. (I'm also guilty of this at times.) Every run counts, but lineup order doesn't affect run expectancy much. So, sure, the leadoff spot is somewhat of a question mark, but what that really means is that on-base percentage and speed, to a lesser extent, are areas of concern. Last season, the Orioles were tied for 17th in OBP (.311), and they'll obviously be without the services of Nelson Cruz and Markakis going forward. They also weren't a base-stealing team at all; in fact, they were last in the majors in steals (44), 12 behind the Giants.

Still, even without Cruz and Markakis, the Orioles have a starting lineup of mostly average to above average hitters. Assuming a healthy team, the only potentially disastrous spot could be Jonathan Schoop at second base, but Schoop is also just 23 and could take a step or two forward next season. There's no guarantee that he will improve just because he's young and has a full season under his belt, but it would also be difficult for him to perform much worse. Last year, the average major league second baseman had a 88 wRC+; it's not unreasonable for Schoop to get there.

O's hitters listed by career wRC+ (with 2014 position average in brackets):

Chris Davis (115) [109]
Steve Pearce (110) [100]
Adam Jones (109) [103]
Manny Machado (104) [100]
Alejandro De Aza (99) [103]
Delmon Young (98) [106]
Matt Wieters (98) [93]
J.J. Hardy (95) [87]
Jonathan Schoop (67) [88]

The Pearce figure is for right field. De Aza's is for left. Young's is for designated hitter.

So, to clarify, the above figures include career wRC+ vs. 2014 MLB player averages. It's far from a perfect comparison. But, except for Schoop, the O's have average or slightly above average options at every position. De Aza and Young are both lower, but they also represent platoon options for Showalter. They aren't full-time players. De Aza has a career 103 wRC+ vs. right-handed pitching, while Young has a career wRC+ of 114 against left-handers.

The O's have been linked to free agents Colby Rasmus (103 wRC+) and Aoki (106 wRC+). Either player would make sense, though Rasmus is five years younger, is in the prime of his career, is seemingly willing to sign a one-year deal, and is likely the superior defender.

The main concern for the Orioles in 2015 is health. Wieters and Machado are coming off season-ending injuries, and in all likelihood they will need both to stay healthy and contribute to have a shot at making the playoffs. The O's already didn't have superstar talent on the roster, and while they should be able to get by without Markakis, they didn't adequately replace Cruz's bat in the lineup. Showalter and Duquette are likely counting on Wieters and Machado to produce, Pearce to play a bigger role (with not necessarily the same high level of production), and a bounce-back campaign from Davis.

Considering the team's defensive talent and pitching staff that has mostly stayed intact, if the Orioles finish close to 2014's team offensively, they'll be ecstatic. That probably won't happen, but Machado and Wieters possess the ability to perform extremely well. So does Davis, as he showed in 2013. All three of those players underwhelmed or got hurt last season. If the Orioles stay in the postseason chase over the summer, they could always trade for a bat then.

Photo via Keith Allison

Can Colby Rasmus Be the New Nelson Cruz?

Entering the 2013 offseason, the Baltimore Orioles needed an outfielder. After waiting, and waiting, and waiting, they finally struck, signing Nelson Cruz to a one-year, $8 million deal. That obviously worked out very well, as he accrued 3.9 WAR and played a key role in their division title. Although they couldn't re-sign him, the deal was a success.

Entering the 2014 offseason, the Orioles once again needed an outfielder. After waiting, and waiting (albeit not as long as last year), they may soon strike:

Orioles being pushed to take Colby Rasmus on a one year deal
— Peter Gammons (@pgammo) December 14, 2014

Would this pay off? Let's look into it.

Last week, Matt Kremnitzer scrutinized Rasmus as a possible outfield option. I don't want to analyze it from that angle — I want to find the probability of a Cruz-like breakout.

It's important to establish that Rasmus is a very different type of player than Cruz, in many regards: While the latter predicates most of his performance on hitting ability, the former takes a more balanced approach. Rasmus is also much younger (28, to Cruz's 34) and has a more recent history of excellence — a year ago, he accumulated 4.8 WAR in only 458 plate appearances.

With that said, they do share one trait: volatility. Their performance could reasonably vacillate from star- to replacement-level, depending on several factors. Basically, I'd like to make the case for the first extreme out of Rasmus in 2015. It's not as unrealistic as you might think.

OFFENSE

Offensive production generally boils down to three things: walk rate, strikeout rate, batting average on balls in play, and isolated power. In 2013, Rasmus smacked a 129 wRC+ on the power of the latter two, as his .225 ISO and .356 BABIP made up for a 8.1% BB% and 29.5% K%. This year, the clout and free passes stayed the same, but the fans and hits on balls in play took turns for the worse, resulting in offense a mere 3% better than average.

For 2015, Steamer projects an analogous base on balls clip, with which I can't argue; its modest BABIP projection also seems logical, seeing as how Rasmus hits a lot of fly balls (and popups). The strikeout rate should come down to earth as well, mainly because of regression to the mean. But Steamer sees a significant drop in ISO, to .185, meaning his wRC+ will remain at 2014 levels. And I don't really see why this will happen.

Rasmus had a lot of power coming up in the minors — as a 20-year-old, he abused AA pitchers for a .275 ISO in 556 trips to the dish — so the past two seasons weren't unprecedented for him. Moreover, his batted balls support such a rise. According to Baseball Heat Maps, he's hit fly balls an average of 289.4 feet since 2013 began. For comparison, Edwin Encarnacion and Anthony Rizzo had 288-foot marks this year. So, yeah, that's pretty powerful.

If he does keep up the brawn, his wRC+ will stay in the 110-120 range, which represents a 5- to 10-run upgrade over Steamer's projections. Even that. though, won't make him a breakout. No, for that to happen, he'll need improvement on the other side of the ball.

DEFENSE

Fielding is where things get weird. For his career, Rasmus has put up mediocre defense: His career UZR/150 sits at an uninspired -0.6. However, that number comes as the result of a lot of uneven outputs. His UZR/150 has ranged from the very good (13.7 in 2009, 15.2 in 2013), to the average (exactly 0 in 2012), to the very bad (-8.3 in 2010, -10.4 in 2011, and -15.3 in 2014). Indeed, the tale of Rasmus's work in the field deftly illustrates the problem with contemporary defensive metrics.

So what'll happen in 2015? Nothing noteworthy, according to Steamer: It projects him for -5.7 defensive runs per 600 plate appearances. We're not here to focus on that, though — we want to see if he could explode, as he did in 2013.

Let's again look at 2013 and 2014, in which his defense matched his offense (for better or for worse). In that glorious campaign, he made plays on 227 of the 237 balls in his zone, for a revised zone rating of .958. That didn't decrease that much in 2014; at .944, it still easily beat the MLB-wide average of .919 for center fielders.

The routine plays didn't drive the 30-run discrepancy between the campaigns. Rather, he simply had many fewer out-of-zone plays made — 81 in 2013, 48 in 2014. If he receives more opportunities, which can always happen in the crazy world of baseball, he would have more chances to provide value, pumping up his UZR and his WAR.

This comes down to true talent level, and Rasmus's consistently high RZR leads me to believe that he has the ability to field well. That he hasn't done so particularly often probably testifies to his injury woes; assuming they disappear in 2015 (as happened to Cruz, albeit to a lesser extent, in 2014), his defense could take a turn for the better.

Realistically, this could happen. Probably, it won't (hence the projection). Regardless, as a team without much payroll and with a shrinking window for contention, the Orioles need to take risks, and Rasmus certainly has the upside to make a one-year deal pay off.

Baltimore will need some incredible performances in 2015 if it wants to replicate its 2014 division crown. Cruz can't do what he did in 2014, so maybe Rasmus can step in. It's unlikely, but so was Cruz's breakout. You never know.

Corner Outfield Option: Colby Rasmus

The Orioles lost Nelson Cruz to the Mariners, and Nick Markakis will be playing for the Braves next season. So the O's are currently exploring all corner outfield possibilities. Last week, according to Ken Rosenthal, the O's were considered as a potential landing spot for Colby Rasmus:

Another option the #Orioles may consider if they lose Markakis in addition to Cruz - Colby Rasmus on a short deal.
— Ken Rosenthal (@Ken_Rosenthal) December 2, 2014

And yesterday, Jon Heyman shared similar information. Heyman also mentioned Norichika Aoki as an option for the Orioles; Matt Perez covered that topic several weeks ago.

And sure, Rasmus should be an option. The Orioles may have to piece their outfield together, especially if they don't end up trading for Matt Kemp or Justin Upton or signing Melky Cabrera. (We've previously written about the Kemp and Cabrera options.) A trade for Upton seems unlikely as well, as the O's are hesitant to meet the Braves' lofty asking price for a single year of Upton's services. Acquiring Upton for the entire 2015 season would give the O's an opportunity to extend him the qualifying offer, which he would surely decline, netting the team another draft pick. But to do so in exchange for, say, Dylan Bundy does not seem wise.

Rasmus, 28, took a step back after a strong 2013 (129 wRC+) and hit more in line with his career average in 2014 (103 wRC+). MLB Trade Rumors predicts that Rasmus will get a one-year, $12 million deal, which would provide him with an opportunity to reestablish his value and seek a more lucrative offer for 2016. However, last season does seem to provide a more accurate representation of his overall talent level, so he may be wise to take a multiyear deal if he's presented with one.

Year	Age	Tm	G	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+
2009	22	STL	147	520	.251	.307	.407	89
2010	23	STL	144	534	.276	.361	.498	132
2011	24	TOT	129	526	.225	.298	.391	88
2011	24	STL	94	386	.246	.332	.420	108
2011	24	TOR	35	140	.173	.201	.316	37
2012	25	TOR	151	625	.223	.289	.400	86
2013	26	TOR	118	458	.276	.338	.501	127
2014	27	TOR	104	376	.225	.287	.448	104
6 Yrs			793	3039	.246	.313	.438	103

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/8/2014.

In 2013, Rasmus had a BABIP of .356 (career .298) that boosted his stat line. His BABIP plummeted to .294 in 2014. Oddly enough, after a career high 17.3% HR/FB rate in 2013, that number jumped again to 2014 (19.4%). But he also hit fewer fly balls overall, walked less, and struck out more. Rasmus didn't help himself plate discipline wise, either. He chased more pitches outside the strikezone (33.9%) than his career low 2013 season (29.7%; career 31.4%). He swung more overall than in any season since 2011, and he had career worst contact rates on pitches inside and outside of the strikezone. Opposing pitchers also didn't find it necessary to throw him as many pitches inside the zone (career low 44.1 Zone%).

As a left-handed batter, Rasmus does not hit lefties well at all (77 wRC+). He has been somewhat better the last two seasons (2013: 91 wRC+; 2014: 92 wRC+), but that still isn't very good. Meanwhile, he's a career 112 wRC+ hitter against right-handed pitching. That is useful but not great.

Fortunately for Rasmus, he can play center field, where some offensive deficiencies can be excused if the defensive results are there. In more than 6,000 career innings in center field, Rasmus has a -2.8 UZR but a +9 DRS. So at worst he's been about average in center field, and maybe he's a bit better than that. He's only played about 90 combined innings in left and right field, so there's really no sample size to work with, but decent center fielders typically project as at least above average corner outfielders. And with Adam Jones manning center field and Markakis gone, Rasmus would likely be slotted in right field.

Realistically, Rasmus is a slightly better version of De Aza (production wise):

De Aza overall: 99 wRC+ (Rasmus: 103)
vs. RHP: 103 wRC+ (Rasmus: 112)
vs. LHP: 85 wRC+ (Rasmus: 77)

Both are near or at the major league average 103 wRC+ that outfielders posted in 2014. And against right-handed pitching, De Aza in left and Rasmus in right, with Steve Pearce at designated hitter, would be decent. It's certainly preferable to a four-year deal for Markakis. Markakis had a 106 wRC+ last season, and Steamer projects him to have a 105 wRC+ in 2015. (And he's also likely going to have neck surgery.) Meanwhile, Rasmus is projected by Steamer to have a wRC+ of 101. The key to that comparison is probably how you view each player's defensive abilities.  They are at least close value wise moving forward. And Rasmus is also three years younger, more likely to have a breakout season, and could possibly be signed to a low-risk, high-reward deal for a single year.

Aoki could be a better option than Rasmus, and he does bring better on-base skills to the table. But it's not as if Markakis was some insane on-base machine who the O's need to replace at any cost. Dan Duquette is focused on value, as he should be. Markakis's production can be replaced, though it won't be easy to replicate, in any makeshift sort of way, the kind of production Cruz offered last season. But it's a step-by-step process to replace missing pieces, and there are available players out there who could help the O's, even if they aren't splashy names. Rasmus wouldn't be the ideal free agent signing, but he could help, and I'd favor Aoki and Rasmus over other options like Cabrera and Michael Morse. If the O's surprisingly decide to target multiple restricted free agents, though, like they did last season, then Cabrera would start to make more sense.

Photo via Keith Allison