This short post will do its best to explain the new qualifying offer rules that came out with the new CBA. Previous rules were deemed as restrictive for players to find new clubs, a situation that Dan Duquette tried to take advantage of in years past to mixed results. So here we go.
Who can be designated as a Qualifying Offer player?
The player must have (1) spent the entire year in the organization and (2) has never before been designated as a Qualifying Offer player.
What is the value of the Qualifying Offer?
The offer is the average salary of the 125 highest paid players in baseball. For the 2017/18 offseason, the value is 17.4 MM, an increase of 200k over last year's average.
When are Qualifying Offer designations made?
Teams have five days (5 pm deadline) after the conclusion of the World Series.
How long does a player have to consider the offer?
The player has ten days after the Qualifying Offer deadline to make his decision to accept or not.
What is the compensation earned by the former club?
If the qualifying offer player is signed before the 2018 draft, then a couple things could happen.
(1) If the club receives revenue sharing (the Orioles do) and the player signs a contract paying over 50 MM, then the former club gets a compensatory draft pick after the first round and before the Round A Competitive Balance picks.
(2) If the club receives revenue sharing and the player signs a contract for less than 50 MM, then the former club receives a pick between the Round B Competitive Balance picks and the beginning of the third round.
(3) If a club pays into revenue sharing and the player signs a any deal, then the former club receives a pick between the Round B Competitive Balance picks and the beginning of the third round.
(4) If the club's previous (e.g., 2017) payroll exceeds the Luxury Tax threshold, then the former club gets a pick between the 4th and 5th rounds.
***note - thresholds are 2017 (195 MM), 2018 (199 MM), 2019 (206 MM), 2020 (209 MM), 2021 (210 MM)***
What is the compensation lost by the new club?
(1) Clubs, like the Orioles, who receive revenue sharing lose their third highest selection.
(2) Clubs who pay into revenue sharing lose their second highest selection and 500k of their international signing bonus pool.
(3) Clubs who have crossed the payroll tax in the previous year (e.g., 2017) lose their second and fifth highest draft selections along with 1 MM in their international signing bonus pool.
What if a club signs two Qualifying Offer Players?
(1) Clubs, like the Orioles, who receive revenue sharing lose their fourth highest draft selection. I think. It may be their 4th and 5th selection. So, it either goes third, fourth, fifth, sixth, etc. or it goes fourth and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, etc.
(2) Clubs that pay in to revenue sharing lose their third and sixth, then fourth and seventh, then fifth and eighth, then ninth and tenth, etc. They also lose an additional 500k in international bonus pool money for each signing.
(3) Clubs that have crossed the Luxury Tax threshold lose their third and sixth, then fourth and seventh, then eighth and ninth, etc. along with 1 MM in international bonus pool money for each signing.
Hope that helps.
Showing posts with label Qualifying Offer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Qualifying Offer. Show all posts
17 October 2017
17 November 2015
Why Wieters Took The QO
On Friday, Matt Wieters decided to accept the Qualifying Offer. The Orioles were extremely hesitant to make this offer and decided to do so only after determining that it was highly unlikely he would accept. A number of publications also predicted that Matt Wieters would reject the Qualifying Offer because he would receive a lucrative deal in free agency as did most of the writers in our off-season series. What I found interesting is that looking at what Wieters' free agent comparables received in free agency shows why he wasn't going to earn as large of a deal as some had thought and why his decision made sense.
One of the weaknesses of using a comparable model is that there are relatively few good players that become free agents each year and therefore there are only a few players that can be used for such an analysis. It is far easier to build a model using WAR because it ignores position and therefore has a large sample size. As such, this method requires the use of comparables that aren't necessarily similar to the player in question.
Here's a list of all the catchers since 2010 from MLBTR's Transaction Tracker that have signed a free agent contract for more than $10M total. There are only six names on the list, of which two signed deals between $10-20M and another two signed deals between $20 and $26M. It would appear that most good catchers don't make it to free agency.
The players I felt are Matt Wieters (30) comparables are Brian McCann (30), Russell Martin (32), Jarrod Saltalamacchia (29) and John Buck (30). Since Wieters has been injured so much over the past two years, I use his last four years to give a better impression of what teams may be receiving.
Matt Wieters had better defensive numbers than Brian McCann but worse offensive numbers. If one looks at the three years before McCann became a free agent, but four years before Wieters became a free agent then they have a similar amount of plate appearances. McCann clearly has more power than Wieters as McCann hit a home run over 4% of the time in each of the years in the sample while Wieters only had McCann power in 2014 when he played 26 games.
The problem is that Wieters had great defensive value in 2012 and 2013 but limited defensive value in 2014 and 2015. If Wieters isn't able to fully recover and become an elite defensive catcher then he's clearly not as good as McCann. As a league-average batter, Wieters is valuable offensively playing catcher but has less value as a DH. If nothing else, the Yankees knew that McCann could have some value as a 1B or DH if he was no longer able to catch. The same simply isn't true for Wieters.
Russell Martin has actually signed two free agent contracts in his career. His first deal was for 2 years and $17 million after leaving the Yankees at 30 and his second deal was for 5 years and $85 million after leaving the Pirates in 2014 at 32. Martin was a rare player who didn't play up to his potential until he turned 30. Once 30, he was able to keep his offense steady while becoming elite defensively. More to the point, he was able to have his career year right before becoming a free agent in which he was elite offensively and defensively.
In the three years before Martin signed his first contract, he had inferior offensive and defensive production compared to Wieters. However, in the three years before he signed his second contract, he was superior both offensively and defensively. Part of this could be because Wieters was injured though. Wieters was elite in 2012 and 2013 and if that trend continued in 2014 and 2015 then he may have been better defensively then Martin.
The third comparable is Salty. Salty was able to sign a 3 year and $21 million deal due to a strong performance right before he hit free agency. This comparison is the worst for Wieters because Wieters has less power than Salty and worse offensive production. Wieters almost definitely has more value than Salty because of his superior defensive abilities provided that he is able to produce as he has in the past.
The fourth comparable is John Buck. Buck was a mostly mediocre catcher who happened to have a career year in 2010 and took advantage of it in order to sign a three year deal for $18M. Buck is probably worse, both offensively and defensively than Wieters, but his statistics compare reasonably favorably. The fact is that Buck had a better wOBA and a similar wRC+ in the three years prior to his deal than Wieters has had in the past four years. Both players are both huge question marks; teams were interested in Buck because they were hoping he could repeat his career year, while teams interested in Wieters were hoping he could repeat his performance in the years that he was elite. Players that can seriously be compared to John Buck will have serious issues in free agency if saddled by a qualifying offer.
This shows the challenges that Wieters would have faced if he made it to free agency. His offensive profile is good for a catcher, but isn't good enough to compare favorably with catchers that signed big deals. His 2014 is his best year offensively, while his 2015 compares reasonably well with his 2012 and 2013 offensive performance. Rather, it compares with players that signed 2 or 3 year deals at less than $10M per year which probably isn't what he's looking for.
His current free agent value rests solely on his ability to play defense, which is problematic because it isn't clear that he can catch for 100 games a season let alone 140. Even if he is able to do so, it isn't clear whether he can be elite defensively like he was in 2012 or 2013. Teams would probably be willing to offer him a short-term deal in order to find out, but he almost certainly wouldn't receive elite catcher money. It's one thing to pay a player based on past performance, but quite another to pay a player based on his performance from three seasons ago.
Wieters was probably in-line to receive a three or four year deal at $12M per year due to his average offensive profile. With a strong year offensively and defensively, he's likely to be able to earn a five or even six year deal at about $17M per year in next years' free agent market. If he's successful, then he'll make a huge sum of money. Even if he's just average next year, teams would still be more certain about what they'd receive for signing him. At the moment, he's really a huge question mark.
That said, Wieters was able to catch 55 games last year while playing 500 innings. David Ross, considered an elite backup catcher, plays a similar amount of innings per year and is far inferior offensively. Both Wieters and Ross are considered veteran leaders and are valued for their leadership presence as well as any production that they can produce.
If Ross was able to sign a 2 year and $5 million dollar contract last year, then Wieters should be able to sign a deal for 3 years and $15 million even if he can only catch 60 games a year. Combine that with the fact that he's receiving $16 million this year and even his non-injury worst case scenario will result in him losing $10-$20M over three or four years compared to entering free agency this year.
On the other hand, if he's successful this year, then he may earn an extra $40-50 million by taking a risk and signing a qualifying offer. Wieters is in a situation where the downside of taking a qualifying offer is limited.
Personally, I felt that Wieters would reject the qualifying offer because he's in a situation where he could probably receive a one year deal similar to the qualifying offer in free agency while hoping that some team gave him a lucrative long term deal. Instead he decided that he enjoys it here in Baltimore and would rather take the sure thing instead of a risk.
One of the weaknesses of using a comparable model is that there are relatively few good players that become free agents each year and therefore there are only a few players that can be used for such an analysis. It is far easier to build a model using WAR because it ignores position and therefore has a large sample size. As such, this method requires the use of comparables that aren't necessarily similar to the player in question.
Here's a list of all the catchers since 2010 from MLBTR's Transaction Tracker that have signed a free agent contract for more than $10M total. There are only six names on the list, of which two signed deals between $10-20M and another two signed deals between $20 and $26M. It would appear that most good catchers don't make it to free agency.
The players I felt are Matt Wieters (30) comparables are Brian McCann (30), Russell Martin (32), Jarrod Saltalamacchia (29) and John Buck (30). Since Wieters has been injured so much over the past two years, I use his last four years to give a better impression of what teams may be receiving.
Matt Wieters had better defensive numbers than Brian McCann but worse offensive numbers. If one looks at the three years before McCann became a free agent, but four years before Wieters became a free agent then they have a similar amount of plate appearances. McCann clearly has more power than Wieters as McCann hit a home run over 4% of the time in each of the years in the sample while Wieters only had McCann power in 2014 when he played 26 games.
The problem is that Wieters had great defensive value in 2012 and 2013 but limited defensive value in 2014 and 2015. If Wieters isn't able to fully recover and become an elite defensive catcher then he's clearly not as good as McCann. As a league-average batter, Wieters is valuable offensively playing catcher but has less value as a DH. If nothing else, the Yankees knew that McCann could have some value as a 1B or DH if he was no longer able to catch. The same simply isn't true for Wieters.
Russell Martin has actually signed two free agent contracts in his career. His first deal was for 2 years and $17 million after leaving the Yankees at 30 and his second deal was for 5 years and $85 million after leaving the Pirates in 2014 at 32. Martin was a rare player who didn't play up to his potential until he turned 30. Once 30, he was able to keep his offense steady while becoming elite defensively. More to the point, he was able to have his career year right before becoming a free agent in which he was elite offensively and defensively.
In the three years before Martin signed his first contract, he had inferior offensive and defensive production compared to Wieters. However, in the three years before he signed his second contract, he was superior both offensively and defensively. Part of this could be because Wieters was injured though. Wieters was elite in 2012 and 2013 and if that trend continued in 2014 and 2015 then he may have been better defensively then Martin.
The third comparable is Salty. Salty was able to sign a 3 year and $21 million deal due to a strong performance right before he hit free agency. This comparison is the worst for Wieters because Wieters has less power than Salty and worse offensive production. Wieters almost definitely has more value than Salty because of his superior defensive abilities provided that he is able to produce as he has in the past.
The fourth comparable is John Buck. Buck was a mostly mediocre catcher who happened to have a career year in 2010 and took advantage of it in order to sign a three year deal for $18M. Buck is probably worse, both offensively and defensively than Wieters, but his statistics compare reasonably favorably. The fact is that Buck had a better wOBA and a similar wRC+ in the three years prior to his deal than Wieters has had in the past four years. Both players are both huge question marks; teams were interested in Buck because they were hoping he could repeat his career year, while teams interested in Wieters were hoping he could repeat his performance in the years that he was elite. Players that can seriously be compared to John Buck will have serious issues in free agency if saddled by a qualifying offer.
This shows the challenges that Wieters would have faced if he made it to free agency. His offensive profile is good for a catcher, but isn't good enough to compare favorably with catchers that signed big deals. His 2014 is his best year offensively, while his 2015 compares reasonably well with his 2012 and 2013 offensive performance. Rather, it compares with players that signed 2 or 3 year deals at less than $10M per year which probably isn't what he's looking for.
His current free agent value rests solely on his ability to play defense, which is problematic because it isn't clear that he can catch for 100 games a season let alone 140. Even if he is able to do so, it isn't clear whether he can be elite defensively like he was in 2012 or 2013. Teams would probably be willing to offer him a short-term deal in order to find out, but he almost certainly wouldn't receive elite catcher money. It's one thing to pay a player based on past performance, but quite another to pay a player based on his performance from three seasons ago.
Wieters was probably in-line to receive a three or four year deal at $12M per year due to his average offensive profile. With a strong year offensively and defensively, he's likely to be able to earn a five or even six year deal at about $17M per year in next years' free agent market. If he's successful, then he'll make a huge sum of money. Even if he's just average next year, teams would still be more certain about what they'd receive for signing him. At the moment, he's really a huge question mark.
That said, Wieters was able to catch 55 games last year while playing 500 innings. David Ross, considered an elite backup catcher, plays a similar amount of innings per year and is far inferior offensively. Both Wieters and Ross are considered veteran leaders and are valued for their leadership presence as well as any production that they can produce.
If Ross was able to sign a 2 year and $5 million dollar contract last year, then Wieters should be able to sign a deal for 3 years and $15 million even if he can only catch 60 games a year. Combine that with the fact that he's receiving $16 million this year and even his non-injury worst case scenario will result in him losing $10-$20M over three or four years compared to entering free agency this year.
On the other hand, if he's successful this year, then he may earn an extra $40-50 million by taking a risk and signing a qualifying offer. Wieters is in a situation where the downside of taking a qualifying offer is limited.
Personally, I felt that Wieters would reject the qualifying offer because he's in a situation where he could probably receive a one year deal similar to the qualifying offer in free agency while hoping that some team gave him a lucrative long term deal. Instead he decided that he enjoys it here in Baltimore and would rather take the sure thing instead of a risk.
16 November 2015
Best Laid Plans Of Dan Duquette: Matt Wieters Edition
Last Friday welcomed us with the news that Matt Wieters preferred the confines of a one-year deal for 15.8 MM instead of braving the waters of free agency with a draft pick tied around his neck. While our BORAS system projected that his contractural value would be around 2/17, I had argued differently. My perspective was that his injuries were neither chronic nor did they appear to impact him during his limited playing time in 2016. If we assumed that the injury was a non-issue then we would have his value around six years and 90 MM. I had suggested that a club with money and a need should consider bidding that high for his services. That said, I also thought that it made little sense for the Orioles to retain him because Caleb Joseph was present and performing admirably. From that point a view, a Qualifying Offer made sense in that the Orioles did not need him and he could grab big money out in the marketplace.Matt Wieters wound up with a different take. I assume that he thought the last couple seasons lost to injury hurt his value and that he is still young enough that a resurgent 2016 would net him big money. If that truly is his thought process then that might well be an issue because that would mean that the long term contract that he would be willing to sign right now is likely not available to him. It may mean that his quick assessment found that the open market did not bear him riches and the Orioles seem wary to do the same. This leaves the club with a few options with varying levels of a realistic chance at achieving those options.
Option A
Please do not steal the towels (chances at 85%)
This is the most likely option. In this situation Wieters and that 15.8 MM chunk of payroll sticks, which means he bounces around catcher, 1B, and DH. To me, the ideal situation would be to slot Wieters into a rotation with about 50% of games behind the plate, 20% at first base, and 30% at DH. I assume that with payroll drying up that Wieters will be one of the better solutions at first and DH, which is a little sobering (but so was the performance of the club's DHs last year). With a first half focus on catching, it is possible the club could turn him into prospects if out of the playoff race or a big piece trade to fill an open slot with an established starter (aka dealing from depth).
Impact on the blueprint: It was assumed that 42 MM was present to spend. This reduces available money to 26 MM. As such, I waive goodbye to retaining Steve Pearce or Matt Joyce. The absence of Byung-ho Park was decided by the posting process. Can the club fit Ben Zobrist and a pitcher under what is left? I think they could. It would require slightly shifting money toward the backend of contracts, but I think the club could snag Zobrist and, if they so insist, Scott Kazmir or spread it a bit on Zobrist, Ah-seop Son, and J.A. Happ.
Option B
Let's Dance (chances at 2%)
This is probably the ideal option. In this scenario, the Orioles are stuck with excess catching along with Wieters while needing a top flight corner outfielder. Meanwhile, the Astros are stuck with excess outfielders along with Colby Rasmus while needing a starting catcher. If Wieters signs a contract the Astros like and Rasmus signs a contract the Orioles like, then they can be dealt under the rules of the current Qualifying Offer system. What this requires though is that all players involved actually want to go to the other club and can be satisfied with the money being offered.
Impact on the blueprint: In this scenario, I think Rasmus gets bonus money and length, so perhaps five years and 80 MM. I would let the Ben Zobrist train leave at this point. This leaves 26 MM on the other parts. Resigning Steve Pearce, acquiring Ah-Seop Son or another interesting fringe outfielder, Matt Joyce, and J.A. Happ might be the best case scenario here. Rasmus is not an awful acquisition and it was rumored the club was hoping the QO on his head would lessen his asking price, so interest from Baltimore supposedly is there.
Option C
Ball and Chain (chances at 13%)
Sometimes you need to make lemonade out of lemons. In this scenario, I would suggest that the Orioles go all in with Wieters and sign him to a long term deal. My guess is that five years and 70 MM might well get the job done. Next, deal Caleb Joseph. Over 182 games, Joseph has a bWAR of 3.4 and an fWAR of 2.2. Neither of these metrics consider pitch framing which credits Joseph somewhere between 17.6 (stat corner) and 22.8 (Baseball Prospectus) runs saved. In other words, if you assume Joseph as a full time starter would play about 120 games then he would be worth about 1.8 wins according to current WAR metrics and an additional 1.3 wins with pitch framing. In other words, he is a fringe All Star catcher. That could be worth quite a bit to a team that values framing.
What makes Joseph particularly valuable is that the arbitration process has yet to recognize pitch framing as a skill of value. This means that Joseph will likely be earning a salary based predominantly on his bat and the title of his position. As such, he aims to make about 550k in 2016, 4 MM in 2017, 6 MM in 2018, and 8 MM in 2019. These numbers, I think, might be a little flattering to him with the arbitration process, but I think it makes sense. His true market value would be about 60 MM over this time, which is a surplus of about 42 MM. The club should easily be able to turn Joseph into one or more useful, cost-controlled pieces. Teams like the Astros and Cubs have pieces available for trade and could greatly benefit the Orioles. For instance, a deal of Caleb Joseph for Jorge Soler would lockdown a corner outfield position with an average or maybe better player who has major power potential.
Impact to the blueprint: The club would still have 26 MM to improve elsewhere and could legitimately add Zobrist, Happ, and Pearce or another fringe interesting bat to the club. It may well not be the most ideal situation, but it could vastly improve the club.
Conclusion
Wieters accepting the deal is not the best thing that could have happened to the club and it may well be quite horrible if the plan simply is to see what this season brings. If the club takes more of a long-term approach, then I see several areas where they can make the most of a poor situation and add value. One way would be to use some Orioles Magicks and deal for Rasmus. He is a good outfielder with the bat and in the field. He would pair up nicely with Adam Jones. Or, as I would suggest, the club should sign Wieters to a lucrative long term deal and then deal Joseph for a young, controllable bat. Just focusing on the Cubs, the target should be Kyle Schwarber, but the acceptable line should be Soler. Simply put, there is no need for two starting catchers on a club and Wieters acceptance makes the choice for the club. Now, it is the team's responsibility to recognize that fact and use it to their advantage.
One last thing to reiterate: I think it would have been worse if the club had not put the Qualifying Offer on Wieters.
12 November 2015
BORAS And Making Sense Of '16 QOs: Starting Pitchers
On Tuesday, I introduced the BORAS model for predicting free agent contract in brief as well as addressed existing Qualifying Offers along with noting that I did not identify any players who should have been handed one and did not. That focus was solely on positional players and today's will be on pitchers.
It should be noted that the BORAS model uses the same approach, but projects terms different for different player cohorts: positional, starting pitching, and relief pitchers. One of the interesting aspects from the positional version was that two seasons ago (2014 for this year's free agent class) was valued least for the most part when it came to determining what level a pay a player would wind up agreeing to. For the BORAS pitching model, this is also apparent, but to a much greater degree.
For a pitcher, 80% of his performance value comes from the previous season (2015, for this class). Three seasons ago, 16% of his performance value comes from then. Two years ago, 4%. This follows the same pattern as the batters, but with considerably more value placed on the more recent season and nearly no value placed on two seasons ago. I am still at a loss. Maybe the players who hit the market are ones with a shaky history or else they would have been secured by their former team. I am uncertain.
Anyway, we will be using the simple framework of expected income that I introduced last time.
Much of the talk about the first player to accept a QO has been placed on Marco Estrada. However, BORAS sees him as a pretty safe QO refusal. Projected as a recipient of a 3/39.9 contract, he has considerable buffer above the 32 MM point. While he is a soft tosser and may well be a one year wonder, his underlying peripherals and his actual performance in 2015 seem to back each other up. There should be several teams that believe he is as good as he was last season. Toronto seems to be one of them.
Hisashi Iwakuma has been a bit of a mystery in terms of what he is looking for in a contract. He has signed several short term deals and is rumored to only have interest on the West Coast, perhaps only Seattle. On a one year deal, Iwakuma basically is looking at getting exactly what the QO is offering. BORAS thinks a 2/26 deal is fare, but Iwakuma might have no interest in securing himself for a commitment any longer than a year. I think all this does is ensure that Iwakuma is a Mariner or heading back to Japan.
Ian Kennedy is the QO that BORAS thinks is a mistake. That said, I am aware that several teams saw him as a commodity that was largely misused by the Padres. Without a QO on him, he was sure to have garnered the attention of several clubs, but that QO murks up the water a bit. Kennedy has had a tough few years, which has hurt his stock. Grabbing the sure money with the Padres makes a lot of sense, but it could also make a great deal of sense for Kennedy to seek out a club who has a better receiver. If he takes a low market deal for 2016, he could make a killing next off season. With the Padres, he could simply be misused again. Of all of the QOs, Kennedy is the one who I think might do best seeing what lies for him in Free Agency or even waiting until after the draft to sign with another club and reestablish his value.
Finally, Jeff Samardzija coming in at 3/32.7 is another decision sitting on a fence. If a club thinks highly of his predictive peripherals instead of his actual performance, then he should be in line for a 4/60. His peripherals are strong enough that one has to think a club would be willing to give him a lot more than what BORAS suggests.
Personally, I think the only person in the entire 2016 QO class (position players and pitchers) who should accept the offer is Brett Anderson and that decision to accept would be a close one. You can lump Ian Kennedy in there with Anderson, but only if you think the Padres have to personnel in place to improve Kennedy's performance. I am doubtful.
Below is a longer list of pitchers and their BORAS projections. If you want to know the projections for a pitcher who is not listed, post in the comments and I shall abide.
It should be noted that the BORAS model uses the same approach, but projects terms different for different player cohorts: positional, starting pitching, and relief pitchers. One of the interesting aspects from the positional version was that two seasons ago (2014 for this year's free agent class) was valued least for the most part when it came to determining what level a pay a player would wind up agreeing to. For the BORAS pitching model, this is also apparent, but to a much greater degree.
For a pitcher, 80% of his performance value comes from the previous season (2015, for this class). Three seasons ago, 16% of his performance value comes from then. Two years ago, 4%. This follows the same pattern as the batters, but with considerably more value placed on the more recent season and nearly no value placed on two seasons ago. I am still at a loss. Maybe the players who hit the market are ones with a shaky history or else they would have been secured by their former team. I am uncertain.
Anyway, we will be using the simple framework of expected income that I introduced last time.
Below is the list of pitchers who received QOs:
YR $ Total 1 16 16 2 10 26 3 6 32 4 2 34 5 1 35
This group contains several interesting names who were able to receive QOs and may well do best to accept them. Brett Anderson is a pitcher who is on the margin. I had a 3/32 contract be his cutoff point while BORAS thinks he will wind up with a 3/32.7 deal. If I was Anderson, I would be somewhat concerned because if I am a fringe QO pitcher then how will teams value the draft pick they have to give up for signing me. He may well see something a bit more south of 32.7 MM. Further complicating the decision for Anderson is that he has had difficulty pitching a full season recently and that may encourage him to grab dedicated money.
AGE Yrs AAV Total Brett Anderson 28 3 10.9 32.7 Wei-Yin Chen 30 4 16 64 Marco Estrada 32 3 13.3 39.9 Yovanni Gallardo 30 4 15.9 63.6 Zack Greinke 32 7 28.6 200.2 Hisashi Iwakuma 35 2 13 26 Ian Kennedy 31 2 5.9 11.8 John Lackey 37 3 17.4 52.2 Jeff Samardzija 31 3 10.9 32.7 Jordan Zimmermann 30 5 17.5 87.5
Much of the talk about the first player to accept a QO has been placed on Marco Estrada. However, BORAS sees him as a pretty safe QO refusal. Projected as a recipient of a 3/39.9 contract, he has considerable buffer above the 32 MM point. While he is a soft tosser and may well be a one year wonder, his underlying peripherals and his actual performance in 2015 seem to back each other up. There should be several teams that believe he is as good as he was last season. Toronto seems to be one of them.
Hisashi Iwakuma has been a bit of a mystery in terms of what he is looking for in a contract. He has signed several short term deals and is rumored to only have interest on the West Coast, perhaps only Seattle. On a one year deal, Iwakuma basically is looking at getting exactly what the QO is offering. BORAS thinks a 2/26 deal is fare, but Iwakuma might have no interest in securing himself for a commitment any longer than a year. I think all this does is ensure that Iwakuma is a Mariner or heading back to Japan.
Ian Kennedy is the QO that BORAS thinks is a mistake. That said, I am aware that several teams saw him as a commodity that was largely misused by the Padres. Without a QO on him, he was sure to have garnered the attention of several clubs, but that QO murks up the water a bit. Kennedy has had a tough few years, which has hurt his stock. Grabbing the sure money with the Padres makes a lot of sense, but it could also make a great deal of sense for Kennedy to seek out a club who has a better receiver. If he takes a low market deal for 2016, he could make a killing next off season. With the Padres, he could simply be misused again. Of all of the QOs, Kennedy is the one who I think might do best seeing what lies for him in Free Agency or even waiting until after the draft to sign with another club and reestablish his value.
Finally, Jeff Samardzija coming in at 3/32.7 is another decision sitting on a fence. If a club thinks highly of his predictive peripherals instead of his actual performance, then he should be in line for a 4/60. His peripherals are strong enough that one has to think a club would be willing to give him a lot more than what BORAS suggests.
Personally, I think the only person in the entire 2016 QO class (position players and pitchers) who should accept the offer is Brett Anderson and that decision to accept would be a close one. You can lump Ian Kennedy in there with Anderson, but only if you think the Padres have to personnel in place to improve Kennedy's performance. I am doubtful.
Below is a longer list of pitchers and their BORAS projections. If you want to know the projections for a pitcher who is not listed, post in the comments and I shall abide.
| AGE | Yrs | AAV | Total | |
| Wei-Yin Chen | 30 | 4 | 16 | 64 |
| Jeff Samardzija | 31 | 3 | 10.9 | 32.7 |
| Tim Lincecum | 32 | 1 | 6 | 6 |
| Johnny Cueto | 30 | 5 | 15.4 | 77 |
| Hisashi Iwakuma | 35 | 2 | 13 | 26 |
| Scott Kazmir | 32 | 4 | 14.1 | 56.4 |
| Mike Leake | 28 | 4 | 14.6 | 58.4 |
| Doug Fister | 32 | 1 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| Zack Greinke | 32 | 7 | 28.6 | 200.2 |
| David Price | 30 | 7 | 25.5 | 178.5 |
| Jordan Zimmermann | 30 | 5 | 17.5 | 87.5 |
| Ian Kennedy | 31 | 2 | 5.9 | 11.8 |
| John Lackey | 37 | 3 | 17.4 | 52.2 |
| Marco Estrada | 32 | 3 | 13.3 | 39.9 |
| JA Happ | 33 | 3 | 13.6 | 40.8 |
| Yovanni Gallardo | 30 | 4 | 15.9 | 63.6 |
| Brett Anderson | 28 | 3 | 10.9 | 32.7 |
10 November 2015
Introducing BORAS And Making Sense Of '16 QOs: Positional Players
For position players capable of earning a Qualifying Offer, I think a likely baseline is the best way to determine if it makes sense to accept an offer. Below is the baseline assumptions I make:
The idea behind that table is that if you are an elite player, what happens to your salary if you become a fringe MLBer. After a big pay day in year 1, you might find someone willing to big hard to have you reclaim your performance level. Year 3 shows a slight reduction in hopes of a turn around. Years 4 and 5 peg said player as a fringe roster spot.
YR $ Total 1 16 16 2 10 26 3 6 32 4 2 34 5 1 35
Over the past week, I have compiled information from all players who signed contracts in the 2013 through 2015 off seasons. The information I collected was age of first season under contract, AAV, age, and a variety of performance metrics. I ran a regression to determine what aspects of a player relates to the number of years he receives as well as the annual salary. In honor of my wretched KANG acronym on Monday, I call them on Ballplayer Observation-based Renumeration Assumption System (BORAS). You are welcome.
One of the interesting aspects of the BORAS model is that while the last year prior to free agency (2015 for this class of free agents) accounts for nearly half of the eventual salary, performance three years ago (2013) accounts for about a third of the final value. In other words, two years ago (2014) is the least important year for performance consideration in how contracts have been doted out the past few seasons. That seems somewhat counter-intuitive, but quite interesting. The BORAS model for pitchers (which will be discussed later this week) follows a similar pattern, but to a much greater extent. At the moment, I cannot seem to figure out a decent hypothesis to explain why second year prior performance is correlates less to AAV than first or third.
Anyway, I am using this model to gain a more objective standard for expected salary for free agents. The system this year expects an increase in cost per WAR of about 6%. Still, some of the values appear a bit low. This can be do to injury plagued seasons that may not impact salary greatly or maybe that the edges of the model do not adequately predict how highly desirable players may well be overpaid.
Below is a list of player with Qualifying Offers and what the BORAS(po) projects.
Based on those numbers, those all seem like no brainers except for Matt Wieters. However, Wieters' last two years have been derailed by an arm injury that does not appear to be a long term concern given his performance last year (albeit never on consecutive days behind the plate). Wieters is also the only catcher this offseason who is a free agent and projects as a starting catcher. He will find a reasonable payday from someone.
Age Yrs AAV Total Chris Davis 30 5 20.8 104 Ian Desmond 30 3 14.5 43.5 Dexter Fowler 30 3 12.1 36.3 Alex Gordon 32 4 17.2 68.8 Jason Heyward 26 7 22 154 Howie Kendrick 32 3 13.4 40.2 Daniel Murphy 31 3 11.7 35.1 Colby Rasmus 29 4 15 60 Justin Upton 28 5 16.5 82.5 Matt Wieters 30 2 8.5 17
What is also interesting to note is that the projection model did not find a single player who should have received a QO, but did not. Denard Span came close with a projected deal of 2/23.8, which makes sense due to a lot of talk surrounding him about whether he will or will not receive an offer.
Regardless, all of the QOs make sense and there does not appear to be any misses either. Below is a list of some of the more interesting free agents on the market. Feel free to ask me for numbers on any other players in the comment section and I shall abide.
| Age | Yrs | AAV | Total | |
| Alex Avila | 29 | 2 | 7.4 | 14.8 |
| Matt Wieters | 30 | 2 | 8.5 | 17 |
| Kyle Blanks | 29 | 2 | 6.9 | 13.8 |
| Chris Davis | 30 | 5 | 20.8 | 104 |
| Justin Morneau | 35 | 1 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
| Mike Napoli | 34 | 2 | 12 | 24 |
| Steve Pearce | 33 | 1 | 8.7 | 8.7 |
| Stephen Drew | 33 | 1 | 8 | 8 |
| Howie Kendrick | 32 | 3 | 13.4 | 40.2 |
| Daniel Murphy | 31 | 3 | 11.7 | 35.1 |
| Chase Utley | 37 | 1 | 10.8 | 10.8 |
| Ben Zobrist | 35 | 3 | 15.8 | 47.4 |
| Gordon Beckham | 29 | 2 | 7.1 | 14.2 |
| Juan Uribe | 37 | 2 | 14 | 28 |
| Asdrubal Cabrera | 30 | 2 | 9.3 | 18.6 |
| Alexei Ramirez | 34 | 1 | 9.9 | 9.9 |
| Yoenis Cespedes | 30 | 6 | 18.8 | 112.8 |
| Rajai Davis | 35 | 2 | 9.1 | 18.2 |
| A De Aza | 32 | 2 | 8.3 | 16.6 |
| Alex Gordon | 32 | 4 | 17.2 | 68.8 |
| Gerardo Parra | 29 | 2 | 11.8 | 23.6 |
| Colby Rasmus | 29 | 4 | 15 | 60 |
| Justin Upton | 28 | 5 | 16.5 | 82.5 |
| Chris Young | 32 | 1 | 7 | 7 |
| Dexter Fowler | 30 | 3 | 12.1 | 36.3 |
| Austin Jackson | 29 | 3 | 12.4 | 37.2 |
| Denard Span | 32 | 2 | 11.8 | 23.6 |
| Drew Stubbs | 31 | 1 | 7 | 7 |
| Marlon Byrd | 38 | 1 | 12 | 12 |
| Jason Heyward | 26 | 7 | 22 | 154 |
| Will Venable | 33 | 2 | 9.5 | 19 |
| Shane Victorino | 35 | 1 | 11 | 11 |
| John Jaso | 32 | 2 | 8 | 16 |
| Ian Desmond | 30 | 3 | 14.5 | 43.5 |
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