Joe Reisel's Archives
On April 21, the Buffalo Bisons played the Norfolk Tides at Harbor Park. The game was scoreless through seven innings, but Buffalo scored three runs in the eight off Donnie Hart (on a two-out bases-loaded walk and a flare to center field.) Norfolk bounced back with two runs in the bottom of the eighth based on a Jaycob Brugman triple into the right-field corner. Buffalo added an insurance run in the ninth via alert baserunning, and the Tides tied the game in the bottom of the ninth on a Joey Rickard double to the left-center fence. Unfortunately for the Tides, Alex Presley's sharp line drive was right at Dwight Smith in right field, so the game went to extra innings.
I attended that game, working as the scorer for Baseball Info Solutions, and this was my first game in which Minor League Baseball's apocalyptic new extra-inning rules were applied. According to players, commentators, and traditionalist fans, this wouldn't be baseball at all but some bastardization akin to a home-run derby. Sure enough, at the start of the top of the tenth, Bison Anthony Alford trotted out and took a place on second base. Joely Rodriguez stood on the mound; got the sign from Andrew Susac, and pitched to Danny Espinosa. Espinosa hit a medium-speed chopper down the third-base that bounced over Anderson Feliz' glove and went for a double; Alford scored the go-ahead run. Rodriguez walked Rowdy Tellez, then struck out Reese McGuire. Matt Wotherspoon replaced Rodriguez as the pitcher, and struck Gift Ngoepe and Jason Leblebijian.
Before I describe the rest of the game, I want to emphasize how unremarkable that inning was. Yes, Buffalo scored a run because Alford was placed on second base to start the inning. But everything else was, well, baseball. Pitchers were pitching. Batters were taking some pitches and swinging at others. Fielders were fielding balls hit into play. Baserunners were running the bases. In short, it was still baseball - and more interesting baseball than most extra innings I've had to endure.
Moving forward, Alex Presley was placed on second base. Ruben Tejeda immediately bunted and was thrown out by the pitcher, with Presley moving to third and Tejada being credited with a sacrifice. Andrew Susac followed with a single and the game was tied, 5-5. But the next two batters were retired, and the game moved on.
Buffalo's Jason Leblebijian (yes, it's fun to type "Leblebijian") was placed on second base to start the eleventh inning. Darnell Sweeney drove the second pitch he saw into the Tides' bullpen for a two-run home run. Buffalo added another run on a wild pickoff attempt that also resulted in a runner being thrown out trying to advance (that was fun for the official scorer, who might have had to reconstruct the inning had the error not occurred.) Garabez Rosa was placed on second to start the bottom of the eleventh; the Tides were eventually able to score him but no others, and the game was a Buffalo 8-6 victory.
Neither I nor anyone else will know what would have happened had the new extra-inning rules not been enacted. But it's certainly possible that the game might have gone on for four, five, or more extra innings, each of which being a litany of batters swinging for the fence and either striking out or hitting weak fly balls. Starting the extra innings with a runner on second base provides more entertainment and interest than other extra innings.
As yet, there's no discussion of using this rule in the major leagues. I'm sure that the players' union, backed up by romantic traditionalists, will prevent the rule from being implemented, at least in my lifetime. But, at least so far in my experience, it hasn't hurt the game of baseball; and, its adoption shouldn't cause anyone from watching and enjoying a baseball game.
Showing posts with label Norfolk Tides. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Norfolk Tides. Show all posts
14 May 2018
14 November 2017
Orioles Should Target These Starting Pitchers for Norfolk Depth
In years past, I noted how an important aspect of constructing a solid MLB roster is to have flexibility in the MLB roster where players can be shifted around to no negative effect and all to have a few guys on the farm who can step in without being a disaster. While it may seem like the Orioles suffered with a rotating cast of starting pitchers, they really did not come from the farm. The actual starting rotation remained fairly healthy and threw the first pitch often. Let's look back over the years at the top three contributors to the rotation from the farm.
Most impressive was the 2012 performance where more than one starting pitcher's worth of innings was needed to fill the void. That year, of course, saw the emergence of Chris Tillman and Miguel Gonzalez as legitimate rotation arms. 2015 also saw a mighty impressive performance from Kevin Gausman as the sixth arm with a 100.1 strong innings (4.00 FIP). Seen as a whole, having a reliable 6th, 7th and even 8th pitcher is important because one or two starting pitchers is bound to get hurt enough to visit the disabled list (or having a strong supporting rotation lets a pitcher go on the DL in the first place.
2017, the starting rotation was pretty much a disaster. The club flirted around with having the worst ERA- in team history, but fell short at 129 (1991 Orioles are the worst with a 132 ERA-). If you want a larger focus, then the 2017 starting rotation, since 1954, was the 24th worst starting rotation ever. What might be more interesting is that it was done with an incredibly healthy starting rotation with only 61 innings needed from the farm. While contractual obligations limited the kinds of moves the Orioles could make, it was pretty apparent that the farm offered little that was appreciably better than what the starting rotation currently employed.
The short of it is, the club needs a strong AAA pitching staff. And, well, that is not what is currently present at Norfolk. Assuming that the Orioles have Kevin Gausman, Dylan Bundy, and three external solutions to the starting rotation, then Norfolk's current rotation looks like: Alec Asher, Jordan Kipper, David Hess, John Means, and Yefry Ramirez. That is a decent collection of AAA workhorses, but not exactly a situation where you feel comfortable bringing more than one player up. Asher may be needed for a bullpen role and that really leaves you with some stretches who have not shown enough performance at AAA or, even, AA to provide much confidence.
With that in mind, if I ran the Orioles, I would want to add two more rotation talents whom I would have slightly more confidence in as not being complete losses at the MLB level who would be added to David Hess, Yefry Ramirez, and probably Alec Asher. The others would work on things down at Bowie. Existing arms like Christopher Lee and Brandon Barker would see various roles emerging from the bullpen.
Minor League Free Agents
When I sit back and think about the kinds of pitcher to target as rotation depth, I consider a couple things. I would want someone who is in the top half of starting pitchers at the MiL AAA level for swinging strikes and for DRA. Second, I want them as young as possible. That really is it.
Who is on that list who is also a MiL free agent?
DRA: 2.39
Swinging Strike %: 10.7%
Carpenter was never considered much of a prospect. He is a control guy who mixes in decent enough fastball, changeup, and curve. Carpenter shines a bit more than Hurlbut and Hutchison. While they barely made both cutoff marks, Carpenter had one of the best DRAs and a slightly higher swinging strike rate. The optimistic wrinkle is that around the mid-season mark, Carpenter added a slider to his pitches and saw his season turn around. His first half saw him pitch to a 5.15 ERA and his second half, with the slider, when down to 3.37.
That said, the Rockies apparently did not see enough of an upside and let him go. I think the ceiling on him is perhaps a better T.J. McFarland if it all works out. McFarland was a lefty who showed no handedness advantage and was just a hair away from being a useful swing man. Carpenter might be able to be a hair better than McFarland. That would be useful.
David Hurlbut. LHP (27 yo)
DRA: 3.95
Swinging Strike %: 10.3%
Hurlbut looks like a lesser Carpenter. He too had a rebirth in the second half of the season. Actually, it was really just one horrific May outing. He does not see much of an improvement against lefties and gets by on three average pitches, but he locates them well and seems to have enough deception in his delivery to make guys miss.
However, twice drafted by the Twins and in the Twins' system these past 6+ years, Hurlbut has been aggressively average. He has never exactly looked good at any level, but holds his own with some thinking that perhaps a breakout is possible. It appears that the Twins have given up on that breakout and with his inability to be a LOOGY he does not have much of a safety net.
Drew Hutchison, RHP (26 yo)
DRA: 3.97
Swinging Strike %: 10.2%
Until sometime in 2015, Hutchison was considered a future workhorse for the Toronto Blue Jays. It all came crashing down. Teams started hitting him hard; especially the teams that were able to stack up powerful lefties. The Pirates thought they could turn him around and dealt out a wobbly and expensive Francisco Liriano, past prospect Reese McGuire, and stalling prospect Harold Ramirez. There have not been any clear winners there, but the Blue Jays might get something out of McGuire and the wobbly Liriano remained wobbly, but was able to fetch the unexpectedly excellent Teoscar Hernandez from the Astros this past year.
Anyway, the Pirates could not fully right the ship. They were able to improve him from being horrendous against southpaws to acceptable, but he could not crack a non-playoff Pirates roster. That said, he would have surely appeared in Baltimore last year.
Are these guys better than the batch last year?
At the levels at which the three above performed, yes.
Kipper's 5.6% mark was the worst swinging strike rate in the International League for pitchers with 50 or more innings pitched. Asher and Wilson were not far behind. Only Aquino had an above average rate. As far as DRA is concerned, none of the Norfolk rotation appeared as average or better. Now, Ynoa is already gone--to Tampa. [Ed. note: Vidal Nuno signed a minor-league deal with the Rays. Ynoa is still with Baltimore. We regret the error.] Wilson and Aquino are minor league free agents. Wright and Asher are on the roster bubble with Asher having one more option remaining. Kipper, I believe, is Rule 5 eligible, but that kind of performance would make many teams question as to how he could get through an MLB lineup with such hittable offerings.
| IP | FIP | |
| 2012 | 239 | 4.47 |
| 2013 | 132.2 | 5.13 |
| 2014 | 118.7 | 4.43 |
| 2015 | 167 | 3.34 |
| 2016 | 157.1 | 5.53 |
| 2017 | 61 | 4.33 |
2017, the starting rotation was pretty much a disaster. The club flirted around with having the worst ERA- in team history, but fell short at 129 (1991 Orioles are the worst with a 132 ERA-). If you want a larger focus, then the 2017 starting rotation, since 1954, was the 24th worst starting rotation ever. What might be more interesting is that it was done with an incredibly healthy starting rotation with only 61 innings needed from the farm. While contractual obligations limited the kinds of moves the Orioles could make, it was pretty apparent that the farm offered little that was appreciably better than what the starting rotation currently employed.
The short of it is, the club needs a strong AAA pitching staff. And, well, that is not what is currently present at Norfolk. Assuming that the Orioles have Kevin Gausman, Dylan Bundy, and three external solutions to the starting rotation, then Norfolk's current rotation looks like: Alec Asher, Jordan Kipper, David Hess, John Means, and Yefry Ramirez. That is a decent collection of AAA workhorses, but not exactly a situation where you feel comfortable bringing more than one player up. Asher may be needed for a bullpen role and that really leaves you with some stretches who have not shown enough performance at AAA or, even, AA to provide much confidence.
With that in mind, if I ran the Orioles, I would want to add two more rotation talents whom I would have slightly more confidence in as not being complete losses at the MLB level who would be added to David Hess, Yefry Ramirez, and probably Alec Asher. The others would work on things down at Bowie. Existing arms like Christopher Lee and Brandon Barker would see various roles emerging from the bullpen.
Minor League Free Agents
When I sit back and think about the kinds of pitcher to target as rotation depth, I consider a couple things. I would want someone who is in the top half of starting pitchers at the MiL AAA level for swinging strikes and for DRA. Second, I want them as young as possible. That really is it.
Who is on that list who is also a MiL free agent?
Ryan Carpenter, LHPRyan Carpenter, LHP (26 yo)
David Hurlbut, LHP
Drew Hutchison, RHP
DRA: 2.39
Swinging Strike %: 10.7%
Carpenter was never considered much of a prospect. He is a control guy who mixes in decent enough fastball, changeup, and curve. Carpenter shines a bit more than Hurlbut and Hutchison. While they barely made both cutoff marks, Carpenter had one of the best DRAs and a slightly higher swinging strike rate. The optimistic wrinkle is that around the mid-season mark, Carpenter added a slider to his pitches and saw his season turn around. His first half saw him pitch to a 5.15 ERA and his second half, with the slider, when down to 3.37.
That said, the Rockies apparently did not see enough of an upside and let him go. I think the ceiling on him is perhaps a better T.J. McFarland if it all works out. McFarland was a lefty who showed no handedness advantage and was just a hair away from being a useful swing man. Carpenter might be able to be a hair better than McFarland. That would be useful.
David Hurlbut. LHP (27 yo)
DRA: 3.95
Swinging Strike %: 10.3%
Hurlbut looks like a lesser Carpenter. He too had a rebirth in the second half of the season. Actually, it was really just one horrific May outing. He does not see much of an improvement against lefties and gets by on three average pitches, but he locates them well and seems to have enough deception in his delivery to make guys miss.
However, twice drafted by the Twins and in the Twins' system these past 6+ years, Hurlbut has been aggressively average. He has never exactly looked good at any level, but holds his own with some thinking that perhaps a breakout is possible. It appears that the Twins have given up on that breakout and with his inability to be a LOOGY he does not have much of a safety net.
Drew Hutchison, RHP (26 yo)
DRA: 3.97
Swinging Strike %: 10.2%
Until sometime in 2015, Hutchison was considered a future workhorse for the Toronto Blue Jays. It all came crashing down. Teams started hitting him hard; especially the teams that were able to stack up powerful lefties. The Pirates thought they could turn him around and dealt out a wobbly and expensive Francisco Liriano, past prospect Reese McGuire, and stalling prospect Harold Ramirez. There have not been any clear winners there, but the Blue Jays might get something out of McGuire and the wobbly Liriano remained wobbly, but was able to fetch the unexpectedly excellent Teoscar Hernandez from the Astros this past year.
Anyway, the Pirates could not fully right the ship. They were able to improve him from being horrendous against southpaws to acceptable, but he could not crack a non-playoff Pirates roster. That said, he would have surely appeared in Baltimore last year.
Are these guys better than the batch last year?
At the levels at which the three above performed, yes.
| DRA | SwgSt% | |
| Tyler Wilson | 6.20 | 7.9% |
| Gabriel Ynoa | 5.52 | 8.3% |
| Jayson Aquino | 4.65 | 10.3% |
| Mike Wright | 4.31 | 9.5% |
| Jordan Kipper | 4.94 | 5.6% |
| Alec Asher | 5.97 | 6.9% |
I could understand bringing back Aquino, but I would prefer someone whose peripherals are slightly better. Yes, Aquino is a year or three younger then the three arms I identified, but youth is not all. There has to be another gear that can get him to perform well enough at the MLB level. Regardless, last year AAA SP performance was poor and it appears the best way to move forward is with some new blood.
27 February 2017
Developing Utility Men
Joe Reisel's Archives
As teams feel more and more obligated to devote more and more roster spots to pitchers, defensive versatility - the ability to play more and more defensive positions - has become more and more important. Major league organizations are aware of this and are at least considering trying prospects at multiple positions to increase their versatility and consequently their values. In 2016, the Orioles tried Christian Walker, who had played exclusively at first base in his minor-league career, in left field; however, that was more of a desperation move because Chris Davis was blocking Walker at first base than a real hope that Walker could learn to play left field.
Walker was not the first player the Orioles tried at an unfamiliar position. It's not unusual for a player to rise through the ranks and get blocked at AAA. Back in 2014, the Tides were playing infielder Steve Lombardozzi in left field and the story was that he was being groomed as a left fielder. In reality, he was probably being groomed as a utility player. I decided to look back at the ten years Norfolk was the Orioles' AAA affiliate to see if the Orioles were emphasizing versatility.
I chose to focus on middle infielders, because it seems that most recently teams have begun to look for middle infielders who could also play third base and the outfield.. However, the nature of AAA baseball makes it hard to determine whether a player is being groomed for multiple positions or whether he's playing multiple positions out of desperation. AAA teams almost always carry twelve pitchers (or more), which leaves teams with at most a four-man bench. And AAA teams are often playing short-handed. When a player is promoted to the major-league team, especially if the promotion is likely to be short, often the AAA roster spot isn't filled. And when a player is demoted from the big-league team, the former big-leaguer has 48 hours to report - and the player being promoted leaves immediately. Finally, if a player on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man active roster is Designated for Assignment, he cannot play for his minor-league team while Designated.. It's not unusual for teams to have ten or eleven position players able to play a given game - and that forces the manager to be creative in filling out his lineup.
At a first cut, I identified all players who played at least ten games at either second base, third base, or shortstop in each season the Norfolk Tides were the Orioles AAA affiliate (2007-2016.) There were a total of 71 player-seasons. Then, I looked for players from that group who had played ten or more games at three of the following four positions - second base, third base, shortstop, and outfield. There were nine seasons that met those criteria:
Cesar Crespo, 2007: Cesar Crespo was a 28-year-old veteran of 132 big-league games who, in the previous two seasons, had played a full season of AAA after signing with a new team as a minor league free agent. Both of those teams had used Crespo as a utility man, and he continued at Norfolk (33 games at second, 21 at short, 39 in the outfield, 7 at third base.) He became a minor-league free agent once again after the season and never played again.
Melvin Dorta, 2009: Melvin Dorta was a 27-year-old who had played 15 games with the 2006 Washington Nationals. Like Crespo, Dorta had had a career as a AAA utility player and continued that trend in 2009 (35 games at second, 33 at third, 10 at short, and 19 in the outfield.) And, like Crespo, Dorta became a minor-league free agent after the season. Unlike Crespo, Dorta played one more year (with the Phillies organization), as a utility man.
Brandon Pinckney, 2009: Brandon Pinckney was another 27-year-old. He spent his career in the Indians organization but was unable to get to AAA; the Indians released him in April 2009. After a brief stint in the Atlantic Association, the Orioles signed him to provide AAA depth and he delivered (10 games at second, 42 at third, 24 in the outfield.) He became a minor-league free agent and spent part of 2010 in the Phillies organization and part in the Athletics' organization. He never played in the major leagues.
Justin Turner, 2009: Justin Turner was a 24-year-old whom the Orioles acquired from the Reds in the Ramon Hernandez trade. And it does look like the Orioles were grooming him as a versatile utility player (80 games at second, 15 at third, 14 at short.) Turner was capable of better things, however; the Mets claimed Turner on waivers in 2010 and he eventually became the Dodgers' regular third baseman.
Blake Davis, 2010: Blake Davis may be the player most obviously developed as a utility player. He started his professional career with the Orioles' organization in 2006, and reached Norfolk in 2009. He was purely a shortstop; but he didn't hit much and the Orioles didn't think he'd be a full-time shortstop. In 2010, he played 18 games at second, 22 at third, 22 at short, and 11 in the outfield.) In 2011, he became more of a full-time outfielder at Norfolk; but then he moved back and played 98 games at shortstop in 2012. He spent the 2013 season in the Brewers organization and the 2014 season in the Pirates organization before going unsigned.
Nick Green, 2011: Nick Green was a 32-year-old veteran of 392 major-league games, mainly at second and short. But by 2010 he had begun playing all around the infield; and after signing as a minor-league free agent he played as a utility player at Norfolk (20 games at second, 3 at third, 36 at short, 22 in the outfield.) Green was traded to the Rangers in July 2011 (for Zach Phillips) and eventually got back to the majors for 25 games with the Marlins in 2012-2013.
Brendan Harris, 2011: Brendan Harris was a 30-year-old veteran of 485 major-league games, about half at shortstop, a quarter at second base, and a quarter at third base. He already had a reputation for versatility when the Orioles got him from the Twins in the J.J. Hardy trade. Harris lived up to his reputation as a versatile infielder with Norfolk in 2011 (45 games at second, 36 at third, 51 at shortstop, 2 in the outfield.) Harris wasn't happy with the Orioles and they willingly let him leave as a minor-league free agent; he played 44 games with the Angels in 2013 and his career ended in June 2015.
Cord Phelps, 2014: Cord Phelps was a 27-year-old infielder whom the Orioles claimed on waivers from the Indians in November 2013. Phelps had a reputation as a good-hit, no-field second baseman, and it was clearly the Orioles hope that he could develop into a switch-hitting bat who could play multiple positions. With Norfolk, he played 31 games at second, 28 at third, 6 at shortstop, and 31 in the outfield. Despite a memorable 7-game stretch in which he had three walk-off hits, Phelps didn't hit as well as hoped and left the organization as a minor-league free agent. He spent 2015 in the Phillies' organization and did not play in 2016.
Steve Lombardozzi, 2014: Steve Lombardozzi had been a utility infielder for the Nationals before they traded him to the Tigers in the Doug Fister trade; the Tigers sent him to the Orioles for Alex Gonzalez just before the season. Lombardozzi was sent to Norfolk in May, and the Orioles did seem to be trying to increase his versatility (38 games at second; 16 at third, 5 at short, 22 in the outfield.) Lombardozzi was sold to the White Sox in the following off-season, and ended up in the Pirates organization for 2015 and the Nationals in 2016.
There seem to be four cases (Turner, Davis, Phelps, and Lombardozzi) in which the Orioles were actively trying to develop players to play multiple positions. It didn't work; the Orioles got nothing out of these players. It may have worked for Justin Turner himself; it's possible that his versatility got him a shot at a major-league career which he has turned into a 64-million-dollar contract. It's also true that none of those players projected to be stars and trying them at other positions may have been the only way to get value. Either way, we should be skeptical when the Orioles emphasize making a player more versatile. They haven't gotten much out of it.
As teams feel more and more obligated to devote more and more roster spots to pitchers, defensive versatility - the ability to play more and more defensive positions - has become more and more important. Major league organizations are aware of this and are at least considering trying prospects at multiple positions to increase their versatility and consequently their values. In 2016, the Orioles tried Christian Walker, who had played exclusively at first base in his minor-league career, in left field; however, that was more of a desperation move because Chris Davis was blocking Walker at first base than a real hope that Walker could learn to play left field.
Walker was not the first player the Orioles tried at an unfamiliar position. It's not unusual for a player to rise through the ranks and get blocked at AAA. Back in 2014, the Tides were playing infielder Steve Lombardozzi in left field and the story was that he was being groomed as a left fielder. In reality, he was probably being groomed as a utility player. I decided to look back at the ten years Norfolk was the Orioles' AAA affiliate to see if the Orioles were emphasizing versatility.
I chose to focus on middle infielders, because it seems that most recently teams have begun to look for middle infielders who could also play third base and the outfield.. However, the nature of AAA baseball makes it hard to determine whether a player is being groomed for multiple positions or whether he's playing multiple positions out of desperation. AAA teams almost always carry twelve pitchers (or more), which leaves teams with at most a four-man bench. And AAA teams are often playing short-handed. When a player is promoted to the major-league team, especially if the promotion is likely to be short, often the AAA roster spot isn't filled. And when a player is demoted from the big-league team, the former big-leaguer has 48 hours to report - and the player being promoted leaves immediately. Finally, if a player on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man active roster is Designated for Assignment, he cannot play for his minor-league team while Designated.. It's not unusual for teams to have ten or eleven position players able to play a given game - and that forces the manager to be creative in filling out his lineup.
At a first cut, I identified all players who played at least ten games at either second base, third base, or shortstop in each season the Norfolk Tides were the Orioles AAA affiliate (2007-2016.) There were a total of 71 player-seasons. Then, I looked for players from that group who had played ten or more games at three of the following four positions - second base, third base, shortstop, and outfield. There were nine seasons that met those criteria:
Cesar Crespo, 2007: Cesar Crespo was a 28-year-old veteran of 132 big-league games who, in the previous two seasons, had played a full season of AAA after signing with a new team as a minor league free agent. Both of those teams had used Crespo as a utility man, and he continued at Norfolk (33 games at second, 21 at short, 39 in the outfield, 7 at third base.) He became a minor-league free agent once again after the season and never played again.
Melvin Dorta, 2009: Melvin Dorta was a 27-year-old who had played 15 games with the 2006 Washington Nationals. Like Crespo, Dorta had had a career as a AAA utility player and continued that trend in 2009 (35 games at second, 33 at third, 10 at short, and 19 in the outfield.) And, like Crespo, Dorta became a minor-league free agent after the season. Unlike Crespo, Dorta played one more year (with the Phillies organization), as a utility man.
Brandon Pinckney, 2009: Brandon Pinckney was another 27-year-old. He spent his career in the Indians organization but was unable to get to AAA; the Indians released him in April 2009. After a brief stint in the Atlantic Association, the Orioles signed him to provide AAA depth and he delivered (10 games at second, 42 at third, 24 in the outfield.) He became a minor-league free agent and spent part of 2010 in the Phillies organization and part in the Athletics' organization. He never played in the major leagues.
Justin Turner, 2009: Justin Turner was a 24-year-old whom the Orioles acquired from the Reds in the Ramon Hernandez trade. And it does look like the Orioles were grooming him as a versatile utility player (80 games at second, 15 at third, 14 at short.) Turner was capable of better things, however; the Mets claimed Turner on waivers in 2010 and he eventually became the Dodgers' regular third baseman.
Blake Davis, 2010: Blake Davis may be the player most obviously developed as a utility player. He started his professional career with the Orioles' organization in 2006, and reached Norfolk in 2009. He was purely a shortstop; but he didn't hit much and the Orioles didn't think he'd be a full-time shortstop. In 2010, he played 18 games at second, 22 at third, 22 at short, and 11 in the outfield.) In 2011, he became more of a full-time outfielder at Norfolk; but then he moved back and played 98 games at shortstop in 2012. He spent the 2013 season in the Brewers organization and the 2014 season in the Pirates organization before going unsigned.
Nick Green, 2011: Nick Green was a 32-year-old veteran of 392 major-league games, mainly at second and short. But by 2010 he had begun playing all around the infield; and after signing as a minor-league free agent he played as a utility player at Norfolk (20 games at second, 3 at third, 36 at short, 22 in the outfield.) Green was traded to the Rangers in July 2011 (for Zach Phillips) and eventually got back to the majors for 25 games with the Marlins in 2012-2013.
Brendan Harris, 2011: Brendan Harris was a 30-year-old veteran of 485 major-league games, about half at shortstop, a quarter at second base, and a quarter at third base. He already had a reputation for versatility when the Orioles got him from the Twins in the J.J. Hardy trade. Harris lived up to his reputation as a versatile infielder with Norfolk in 2011 (45 games at second, 36 at third, 51 at shortstop, 2 in the outfield.) Harris wasn't happy with the Orioles and they willingly let him leave as a minor-league free agent; he played 44 games with the Angels in 2013 and his career ended in June 2015.
Cord Phelps, 2014: Cord Phelps was a 27-year-old infielder whom the Orioles claimed on waivers from the Indians in November 2013. Phelps had a reputation as a good-hit, no-field second baseman, and it was clearly the Orioles hope that he could develop into a switch-hitting bat who could play multiple positions. With Norfolk, he played 31 games at second, 28 at third, 6 at shortstop, and 31 in the outfield. Despite a memorable 7-game stretch in which he had three walk-off hits, Phelps didn't hit as well as hoped and left the organization as a minor-league free agent. He spent 2015 in the Phillies' organization and did not play in 2016.
Steve Lombardozzi, 2014: Steve Lombardozzi had been a utility infielder for the Nationals before they traded him to the Tigers in the Doug Fister trade; the Tigers sent him to the Orioles for Alex Gonzalez just before the season. Lombardozzi was sent to Norfolk in May, and the Orioles did seem to be trying to increase his versatility (38 games at second; 16 at third, 5 at short, 22 in the outfield.) Lombardozzi was sold to the White Sox in the following off-season, and ended up in the Pirates organization for 2015 and the Nationals in 2016.
There seem to be four cases (Turner, Davis, Phelps, and Lombardozzi) in which the Orioles were actively trying to develop players to play multiple positions. It didn't work; the Orioles got nothing out of these players. It may have worked for Justin Turner himself; it's possible that his versatility got him a shot at a major-league career which he has turned into a 64-million-dollar contract. It's also true that none of those players projected to be stars and trying them at other positions may have been the only way to get value. Either way, we should be skeptical when the Orioles emphasize making a player more versatile. They haven't gotten much out of it.
13 February 2017
The Bowie Boost for First Basemen
Joe Reisel's Archives
![]() |
| Christian Walker (2013-2015 Tides), first baseman on the All-Harbor Park team. Photo courtesy of Steven Goldburg / Norfolk Tides |
Brandon Snyder, Joe Mahoney, Christian Walker, and Trey Mancini arrived in Norfolk as highly-regarded, but not uber-regarded, prospects. (Among the catchers, Matt Wieters was an uber-prospect while none of the others were well thought of.) And all four of the first basemen were coming off outstanding performance at AA Bowie.
| Brandon Snyder (facing camera) (2009-2011 Tide). Photo courtesy of Megan Morrow / Norfolk Tides. |
Age
|
G
|
PA
|
Slash
|
OPS
|
|
Snyder
|
22
|
58
|
233
|
.343/.421/.597
|
1.018
|
Mahoney
|
23-24
|
137
|
564
|
.300/.356/.518
|
.874
|
Walker
|
22-23
|
112
|
480
|
.292/.360/.488
|
.849
|
Mancini
|
23-24
|
101
|
429
|
.350/.399/.604
|
1.003
|
While Mahoney and Mancini were, perhaps, older than you'd like for AA players, all four put up some pretty impressive numbers. You might like them to take a few more walks, but these numbers are nonetheless impressive on the surface.
But when they were promoted to AAA Norfolk, all four looked a lot more ordinary, as shown in the below table.
G
|
PA
|
Slash
|
OPS
|
||
Snyder
|
22-24
|
285
|
1167
|
.256/.317/.394
|
.711
|
Mahoney
|
25
|
132
|
536
|
.265/.319/.389
|
.708
|
Walker
|
23-25
|
313
|
1332
|
.260/.324/.429
|
.754
|
Mancini
|
24
|
125
|
536
|
.280/.349/.427
|
.775
|
Yes, I know that Norfolk is a level up from Bowie and that Norfolk is a terrible hitter's park. The fact remains that there have been four first basemen who performed very well at Bowie, achieved some prospect love, and then looked much less impressive at Norfolk. And Brandon Snyder and Joe Mahoney - whose careers are essentially defined - have been what we should have expected based on their Norfolk production, not their Bowie production.
| Two years after starring at Bowie, Joe Mahoney was out of baseball. Photo courtesy of Allison Veinote / Norfolk Tides. |
As fans, we should learn this lesson - be skeptical of players in general, and first basemen specifically, who produce apparently dominant numbers at Bowie. Wait and see how they do at Norfolk before project them to be a future star. Brandon Snyder, Joe Mahoney, and (most probably) Christian Walker failed to live up to the promise of their Bowie performance.
But at least as compared to the others, Trey Mancini may still become a productive major-league player. Yes, his Norfolk performance dropped significantly from his probably-unsustainable high at Bowie. It's still better than the performance of the other three. While Mancini almost certainly won't be the star hinted at by his Bowie performance we can still be optimistic that he can become a useful major-league player.
23 January 2017
A Decade of Orioles AAA Catchers
Joe Reisel's Archives
The Norfolk Tides moved into their current stadium, Harbor Park, in 1993, so 2017 is the 25th season in which they've played there. For their first fifteen Harbor Park years, the Tides were affiliated with the New York Mets; they became an Orioles affiliate after the 2006 season. To celebrate the 25th anniversary of Harbor Park, and to remind Hampton Roads-area baseball fans that the 2017 season is approaching, the Tides' staff devised an "All-Time Harbor Park Team" promotion. As you might expect, the team selects finalists at each position from among Tides players; fans can vote on social media for their choice; the one with the most votes is named to the team. (See the Tides web site for more details.)
I will be starting my twelfth season as an milb.com datacaster for the Tides; I began during the last season of the Mets era and have continued through the entire Tides era. (I started my scoring for Baseball Info Solutions in my third season of datacasting.) In fact, I arrived in Hampton Roads in 1993, which coincidentally was the Tides' first season in Harbor Park. Before I became a datacaster, though, I only attended a few games a season; since then, and especially after I started scoring for BIS, I've attended around 45 games a season.
The first position voted upon was catcher, and the winner was, not really surprisingly, Matt Wieters. Although it wasn't surprising that Wieters would win a popular vote for All-Time Harbor Park catcher, it is noteworthy that Wieters has caught a total of 28 games as a Tide, presumably fewer than that actually at Harbor Park. When I started thinking about who would be more appropriate, I realized that although I remembered to a greater or lesser degree the Tides' catchers, especially of the Orioles' era, I didn't really know much about them. This article will look at the Tides' catchers during the Orioles' era.
Forty-two players have played catcher in at least one game for the Tides. Two of them are young players who caught a few games last season - Austin Wynns and Chance Sisco. Two others are not-so-young players who first caught Tides' games last season - Francisco Pena and Chris O'Brien. While I have a strong opinion about their probable future, my review showed me that I didn't know quire as much about players as I thought I did. So, I will not pigeonhole Pena or O'Brien.
Before I present my observations that may be more generally applicable to every team's AAA catchers, I'll share some Norfolk-Tides-in-the-Orioles-era catcher-specific trivia:
The first category is players on their way up to somewhat substantial major-league careers. Surprisingly, only three players fall into that category, and two are borderline. The three are Matt Wieters, Eli Whiteside, and Caleb Joseph. As I mentioned above, Wieters also caught a game while on a rehabilitation assignment, and Joseph was sent down last season during his struggles.
The second category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but who bounced between AAA and the majors. Two players fall into that category, although Caleb Joseph might also eventually wind up here. The other two - both borderline - are Steve Clevenger and Taylor Teagarden.
The third category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but are playing AAA after their major-league careers are (mostly) finished and are hanging on. Seven players fall into that category; I won't list them all but they include Alberto Castillo, Ben Davis, Ronny Paulino, and Chris Snyder.
The fourth category is players who are fringe major-leaguers, who had insubstantial careers, or AAA players. Fourteen players fall into that category; typical examples include J.R. House, Craig Tatum, John Hester, and Brian Ward.
The fifth category might be called desperation catchers, players who either aren't really AAA players - such as Morgan Clendenin, Zach Booker, and Allen de San Miguel - or who aren't really catchers - Mike Costanzo and Brandon Snyder. These guys catch a few games - no more than ten in a single season - when injuries or callups require a promotion for the duration of the emergency or when an in-game crisis occurs. Ten catchers fall into that category.
It's obvious that very few catchers have passed through Norfolk on their way to long, successful big-league careers. I think we all sort of knew that. The Orioles aren't a player-development factory; and Matt Wieters has been entrenched in Baltimore since 2009. (Did you remember that Ramon Hernandez was the regular catcher before Wieters arrived in 2009? And that the Orioles traded Hernandez in December of 2008 for players, one of whom was current Dodger third baseman Justin Turner? I digress.)
Another noteworthy trend is that the Orioles have moved away from veteran catchers with substantial big-league experience. While they relied heavily on that type of player in 2007-2009, the last one they've had was Chris Snyder in 2013. They've relied more on the fringier types. Perhaps with Caleb Joseph on the big-league team, they've felt less of a need to have an experienced catcher stashed at AAA. Or, perhaps with Joseph around, veterans with big-league experience don't want to sign with the Orioles because they think they have a better shot at playing time elsewhere. Or perhaps there just aren't as many of those guys around.
I was surprised that only two of these catchers - J.R. House and Jake Fox - are what I call "bat-only" catchers. These are players who caught as amateurs but aren't good enough defensively to stay at the position. If their bats are good enough, they switch to another position and have a big-league career. If their bats aren't good enough - like House and Fox - they continue to catch, hoping that their combination of bat and ability to catch allows them to stay on a roster. I expected Norfolk to have had more of them.
Matt Wieters was certainly the best player to catch for the Norfolk Tides while they were an Orioles' affiliate. I still have a hard time swallowing the idea that someone who caught 28 games should be the catcher on an All-Time team. So perhaps Wieters really does deserve to be the catcher on the All-Time Orioles Era Norfolk Tides team..
![]() |
| Audry Perez (on defense) is one of the more prominent Norfolk Tides catchers of the Orioles' Era. Photo courtesy of Les Treagus / Norfolk Tides. |
The Norfolk Tides moved into their current stadium, Harbor Park, in 1993, so 2017 is the 25th season in which they've played there. For their first fifteen Harbor Park years, the Tides were affiliated with the New York Mets; they became an Orioles affiliate after the 2006 season. To celebrate the 25th anniversary of Harbor Park, and to remind Hampton Roads-area baseball fans that the 2017 season is approaching, the Tides' staff devised an "All-Time Harbor Park Team" promotion. As you might expect, the team selects finalists at each position from among Tides players; fans can vote on social media for their choice; the one with the most votes is named to the team. (See the Tides web site for more details.)
I will be starting my twelfth season as an milb.com datacaster for the Tides; I began during the last season of the Mets era and have continued through the entire Tides era. (I started my scoring for Baseball Info Solutions in my third season of datacasting.) In fact, I arrived in Hampton Roads in 1993, which coincidentally was the Tides' first season in Harbor Park. Before I became a datacaster, though, I only attended a few games a season; since then, and especially after I started scoring for BIS, I've attended around 45 games a season.
The first position voted upon was catcher, and the winner was, not really surprisingly, Matt Wieters. Although it wasn't surprising that Wieters would win a popular vote for All-Time Harbor Park catcher, it is noteworthy that Wieters has caught a total of 28 games as a Tide, presumably fewer than that actually at Harbor Park. When I started thinking about who would be more appropriate, I realized that although I remembered to a greater or lesser degree the Tides' catchers, especially of the Orioles' era, I didn't really know much about them. This article will look at the Tides' catchers during the Orioles' era.
Forty-two players have played catcher in at least one game for the Tides. Two of them are young players who caught a few games last season - Austin Wynns and Chance Sisco. Two others are not-so-young players who first caught Tides' games last season - Francisco Pena and Chris O'Brien. While I have a strong opinion about their probable future, my review showed me that I didn't know quire as much about players as I thought I did. So, I will not pigeonhole Pena or O'Brien.
Before I present my observations that may be more generally applicable to every team's AAA catchers, I'll share some Norfolk-Tides-in-the-Orioles-era catcher-specific trivia:
- Audry Perez has caught the most total games, 153.
- Omir Santos holds the single-season record for most games caught, 81 in 2008.
- Besides Perez, only two other catchers have caught 100 or more games - Luis Exposito and Steve Clevenger.
- Fifteen catchers have caught games in more than one season.
- Only one game has been caught by a player on a rehabilitation assignment - Matt Wieters in 2015.
The first category is players on their way up to somewhat substantial major-league careers. Surprisingly, only three players fall into that category, and two are borderline. The three are Matt Wieters, Eli Whiteside, and Caleb Joseph. As I mentioned above, Wieters also caught a game while on a rehabilitation assignment, and Joseph was sent down last season during his struggles.
The second category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but who bounced between AAA and the majors. Two players fall into that category, although Caleb Joseph might also eventually wind up here. The other two - both borderline - are Steve Clevenger and Taylor Teagarden.
The third category is players who had somewhat substantial major-league careers, but are playing AAA after their major-league careers are (mostly) finished and are hanging on. Seven players fall into that category; I won't list them all but they include Alberto Castillo, Ben Davis, Ronny Paulino, and Chris Snyder.
The fourth category is players who are fringe major-leaguers, who had insubstantial careers, or AAA players. Fourteen players fall into that category; typical examples include J.R. House, Craig Tatum, John Hester, and Brian Ward.
The fifth category might be called desperation catchers, players who either aren't really AAA players - such as Morgan Clendenin, Zach Booker, and Allen de San Miguel - or who aren't really catchers - Mike Costanzo and Brandon Snyder. These guys catch a few games - no more than ten in a single season - when injuries or callups require a promotion for the duration of the emergency or when an in-game crisis occurs. Ten catchers fall into that category.
It's obvious that very few catchers have passed through Norfolk on their way to long, successful big-league careers. I think we all sort of knew that. The Orioles aren't a player-development factory; and Matt Wieters has been entrenched in Baltimore since 2009. (Did you remember that Ramon Hernandez was the regular catcher before Wieters arrived in 2009? And that the Orioles traded Hernandez in December of 2008 for players, one of whom was current Dodger third baseman Justin Turner? I digress.)
Another noteworthy trend is that the Orioles have moved away from veteran catchers with substantial big-league experience. While they relied heavily on that type of player in 2007-2009, the last one they've had was Chris Snyder in 2013. They've relied more on the fringier types. Perhaps with Caleb Joseph on the big-league team, they've felt less of a need to have an experienced catcher stashed at AAA. Or, perhaps with Joseph around, veterans with big-league experience don't want to sign with the Orioles because they think they have a better shot at playing time elsewhere. Or perhaps there just aren't as many of those guys around.
I was surprised that only two of these catchers - J.R. House and Jake Fox - are what I call "bat-only" catchers. These are players who caught as amateurs but aren't good enough defensively to stay at the position. If their bats are good enough, they switch to another position and have a big-league career. If their bats aren't good enough - like House and Fox - they continue to catch, hoping that their combination of bat and ability to catch allows them to stay on a roster. I expected Norfolk to have had more of them.
Matt Wieters was certainly the best player to catch for the Norfolk Tides while they were an Orioles' affiliate. I still have a hard time swallowing the idea that someone who caught 28 games should be the catcher on an All-Time team. So perhaps Wieters really does deserve to be the catcher on the All-Time Orioles Era Norfolk Tides team..
24 July 2015
O's AAA Veterans Have No Trade Value
In an earlier article about the Norfolk Tides, the Orioles' AAA affiliate, I reported that many of my colleagues believed that Paul Janish was the best defensive shortstop they had seen in over 20 years of watching baseball. I didn't fully describe them in my earlier article, but those colleagues were long-time minor league executives (including the legendary Dave Rosenfield) and baseball writers.
Based on that observation, a commenter to another article suggested that another team might want Janish or Steve Clevenger, and so the Orioles might be able to get a useful player back if they trade them. In response, Matt Kremnitzer conservatively replied that he doubted that Janish or Clevenger had any trade value. It's possible that Clevenger might have value, but based on recent history, I will proclaim that Janish has no trade value whatsoever. In 2012, the Orioles had at Norfolk a player similar to Janish with a better track record of success. Indeed, as it turned out, this player proved to have significant value and has proceeded to have a highly successful career. The Orioles did trade this AAA veteran in August.
That player was Pat Neshek. I won't repeat Neshek's entire backstory, but he pitched very well for the Twins in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, he hurt his arm and underwent Tommy John surgery and spent 2010 and 2011 recovering. He signed with the Orioles in 2012 and pitched very well - in 44 innings, he had a 7-49 BB-K ratio, a 2.66 ERA, and 11 saves. He was, in many respects, the pitcher equivalent of Paul Janish - a specialist, who had had some success in the major leagues but had not experienced that major-league success for several seasons. Neshek was 31; Janish is 32.
The Oakland Athletics were engaged in a tight division race with the Rangers and felt that they needed bullpen help. They asked the Orioles about Neshek, and the teams agreed on an exchange. Of course, Neshek has gone on to pitch well since he joined the Athletics, making the 2014 National League All-Star Team and signing an eight-figure contract with Houston this past offseason.
All in all, Neshek has proven to be quite a useful player, especially for a player signed to a minor-league contract as a free agent. When the Orioles dealt Neshek to the Athletics, what did they get for him? Cash. Not a player of any stripe, cash.
The purpose of this history is not to berate the Orioles for not recognizing that Pat Neshek had more value and that they should have kept him; the Orioles had a similar pitcher in Darren O'Day and there wasn't room for Neshek in Baltimore. The purpose is to remind us of how little trade value AAA veterans have. If the Orioles are going to improve themselves for the rest of this season, it won't be by exchanging bargain-basement signings for quality major leaguers.
Based on that observation, a commenter to another article suggested that another team might want Janish or Steve Clevenger, and so the Orioles might be able to get a useful player back if they trade them. In response, Matt Kremnitzer conservatively replied that he doubted that Janish or Clevenger had any trade value. It's possible that Clevenger might have value, but based on recent history, I will proclaim that Janish has no trade value whatsoever. In 2012, the Orioles had at Norfolk a player similar to Janish with a better track record of success. Indeed, as it turned out, this player proved to have significant value and has proceeded to have a highly successful career. The Orioles did trade this AAA veteran in August.
That player was Pat Neshek. I won't repeat Neshek's entire backstory, but he pitched very well for the Twins in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, he hurt his arm and underwent Tommy John surgery and spent 2010 and 2011 recovering. He signed with the Orioles in 2012 and pitched very well - in 44 innings, he had a 7-49 BB-K ratio, a 2.66 ERA, and 11 saves. He was, in many respects, the pitcher equivalent of Paul Janish - a specialist, who had had some success in the major leagues but had not experienced that major-league success for several seasons. Neshek was 31; Janish is 32.
The Oakland Athletics were engaged in a tight division race with the Rangers and felt that they needed bullpen help. They asked the Orioles about Neshek, and the teams agreed on an exchange. Of course, Neshek has gone on to pitch well since he joined the Athletics, making the 2014 National League All-Star Team and signing an eight-figure contract with Houston this past offseason.
All in all, Neshek has proven to be quite a useful player, especially for a player signed to a minor-league contract as a free agent. When the Orioles dealt Neshek to the Athletics, what did they get for him? Cash. Not a player of any stripe, cash.
The purpose of this history is not to berate the Orioles for not recognizing that Pat Neshek had more value and that they should have kept him; the Orioles had a similar pitcher in Darren O'Day and there wasn't room for Neshek in Baltimore. The purpose is to remind us of how little trade value AAA veterans have. If the Orioles are going to improve themselves for the rest of this season, it won't be by exchanging bargain-basement signings for quality major leaguers.
10 June 2015
Bud Norris' 2nd (and Much Better) Norfolk Rehabilitation Start
Previously in Camden Depot, I reported on Bud Norris' first minor-league rehabilitation start, with the AAA Norfolk Tides. He did not achieve the results he (presumably) wanted. His second minor-league rehabilitation start was with the AA Bowie Baysox, and then he returned to Norfolk for a third start. He was originally scheduled to pitch on June 2, but that game was postponed by rain and wet grounds to a doubleheader the next day. Norris made the start in Game 1 of the doubleheader, and I was working as a BIS scorer for that doubleheader. Thus, I got to see Norris' start from the top row of lower-deck seats in Harbor Park (under the overhang of the concourse roof, avoiding the threat of rain.)
As I did in the earlier post, I will simply review every opposing Gwinnett Brave at-bat and follow up with some general observations. I will preface this by saying that after this outing, it shouldn't have been too surprising that Norris was substantially more effective in his June 7 Orioles start.
As I did in the earlier post, I will simply review every opposing Gwinnett Brave at-bat and follow up with some general observations. I will preface this by saying that after this outing, it shouldn't have been too surprising that Norris was substantially more effective in his June 7 Orioles start.
First Inning
Batter 1: Eury Perez -- Called Strike, Foul, Ball, Ball, Strikout (Swinging)
Batter 2: Jose Peraza - Foul, Called Strike, Ball, Ground Out to Shortstop
On the 1-2 pitch, Peraza hit a sharp one-hop grounder right at Paul Janish, who gloved it and made a strong throw to first base.
Batter 3: Cedric Hunter - Ball, Foul, Fly Out to Right Fielder
On the 1-1 pitch, Hunter hit a pop fly to shallow right-center, behind the second baseman. Right fielder Chris Parmelee called off Rey Navarro and made the catch, running toward the infield.
Second Inning
Batter 4: Adonis Garcia - Ball, Foul, Ground Out to Shortstop
On the 1-1 pitch, Garcia hit a ground ball into the hole between third and short. The ball wasn't hit very hard, so Janish was able to get to the ball, plant, and make an accurate throw to retire Garcia.
Batter 5: Ryan Lavarnway - Foul, Called Strike, Foul, Ground Out to Pitcher
On the 0-2 pitch, Lavarnway hit a ground ball right back to Norris on the pitcher's mound. He fielded the ball and made the easy throw to first base.
Batter 6: Sean Kazmar - Called Strike, Ball, Foul, Foul, Ball, Line Out to Third Baseman
On the 2-2 pitch, Kazmar hit a hard line drive to the left of third Michael Almanzar. Almanzar took one step to his left and caught the ball in the webbing of his glove.
Third Inning
Batter 7: Wil Nieves - Called Strike, Foul, Ball, Ball, Ball, Pop Out to Second Baseman
On the 3-2 pitch, Nieves hit a pop fly behind second baseman Navarro. Navarro took a couple of steps toward first base and camped under the fly, which he caught.
Batter 8: Daniel Castro - Called Strike, Ground Out to Second Baseman
On the 0-1 pitch, Castro hit a routine grounder one or two steps to the left of second Navarro. He was easily able to pick the ball up and throw Castro out at first.
Batter 9: Mycal Jones - Called Strike, Swinging Strike, Ball, Ball, Ball, Walk
Norris got ahead of Jones 0-2 and then missed with four straight pitches.
Batter 10: Perez - Ball, Called Strike, Ball, Foul Tip, Ball, Ground Out to Second Baseman
We were getting concerned that Norris was running out of steam when he surrendered his second three-ball count, but Perez hit a routine ground ball to Navarro. With Jones running on the pitch, Navarro had to throw to first to retire Perez.
Fourth Inning
Batter 11: Peraza - Called Strike, Foul, Ball, Foul, Ground Out to Shortstop
On the 1-2 pitch, Peraza hit a routine ground ball right at Janish, who threw Peraza out at first base.
Batter 12: Hunter - Called Strike, Ball, Ground Out First Base to Pitcher
On the 1-1 pitch, Hunter hit a slow ground ball to first baseman Christian Walker. Walker fielded it and threw to Norris covering.
Batter 13: Garcia - Swinging Strike, Called Strike, Ball, Ball, Strikeout (swinging)
Michael Bowden relieved Norris to start the fifth inning.
Observations:
- The game was played in unfavorable hitting conditions, a cool breezy evening with an occasional burst of rain. Also, Gwinnett has a team OPS of .654; while Rochester, Norris' opponent in his first start, has a team OPS of .712.
- Obviously, Norris pitched much better in this start than he did in his first start. Gwinnett hit two balls hard off him, but neither had much loft and both were hit at fielders. The most notable difference is that no balls were hit deep to the outfield, and few balls were hit in the air. There was the one hard line drive that Almanzar caught; and two pop flies that Navarro could have caught (although Parmelee called him off one.)
- It seems likely that the key to Norris' success is whether or not he can generate ground balls, or perhaps more precisely whether or not he can avoid generating fly balls. I don't know whether his success in this start was because Gwinnett has no power (17 total home runs, .337 team slugging percentage) or because Norris pitched better.
- Norris doesn't seem to be a pitcher with swing-and-miss stuff. He did generate twice as many swinging strikes in this game as he did in his first game - but that was still only four.
- As bad a Norris was in his first rehab start (2.2 12 9 9 0 1, game score -1), his opponent on June 2, Chien-Ming Wang, was worse (3 11 10 10 4 0, game score -7).
02 June 2015
Bud Norris' Norfolk Rehabilitation Start
Tonight, weather permitting, Bud Norris will make his second rehabilitation start with the Norfolk Tides. It will be his third overall rehabilitation start; his second game with the Bowie Baysox. His first rehabilitation start was in game one of the Tides' May 22 doubleheader against the Rochester Red Wings. The Orioles planned for Norris to make about ninety pitches to get himself into condition to rejoin the major-league team.
I was the milb.com Gameday datacaster for that doubleheader and thus saw Norris' performance from the press box. Like most Orioles' fans, I was disappointed in Norris' ineffective performance, in which he gave up nine earned runs and twelve hits in 2 2/3 innings. The Tides' radio broadcasters, trying to find something positive to say about his start, repeatedly emphasized that several of the hits Norris allowed were ground balls that found a hole between infielders. Is that true? Did he also surrender some hard-hit balls that were turned into outs? Just how well did Bud Norris pitch in his first rehabilitation start?
I don't have access to sophisticated video analysis tools to determine how much Norris' pitches broke. I don't even have radar-gun readings from the in-house pitch-speed display, which I can't consistently track because of my datacasting responsibilities. I did, however, record every pitch and the result of every pitch put into play. This article will review every Red Wing at-bat against Norris in more detail than the Gameday recap or the game stories. I will then follow with some general observations about his performance.
On the 1-1 pitch, Farris hit a medium-speed ground ball between third baseman Michael Almanzar and the foul line. Almanzar dove for the ball but missed it; left fielder Nolan Reimold retrieved the ball in foul territory and was unable to prevent Farris from coasting into second.
Batter 2: James Beresford - Ball, Ball, Called Strike, Called Strike, Error by second baseman
With a 2-2 count, Beresford hit a chopper to second baseman Derrik Gibson. Gibson got to the ball and fielded it, but dropped it before he could throw to first. Farris moved to third; he would have advanced even if Gibson had made the play. There was no controversy about the error; and as it turned out it didn't matter.
Batter 3: Josmil Pinto - Ball, Called Strike, Foul, Ball, Ball, 6-4-3 Double Play
On the full count, Pinto hit a tailor-made double-play ball to shortstop Paul Janish, who threw to Gibson to force Beresford. Gibson threw to first to retire the slow-moving Pinto. Farris scored on the play. Some people thought that if not for Gibson's error on the previous play, Janish might have been able to hold Farris at third before throwing out Pinto (which might have made Farris' run unearned); but that too didn't become an issue.
Batter 4: Kennys Vargas - Called Strike, Ball, Ball, Home Run to Left-Center
Vargas went the other way on the 2-1 pitch and hit a towering fly ball into the Rochester bullpen, about 385 feet or so from home plate. Although there was a wind blowing out, the home run was no fluke.
Batter 5: Danny Ortiz - Ball, Foul, Ball, Foul, Single to Center
On a 2-2 pitch, Ortiz hit a fairly hard ground ball back up the middle, just to the right of the pitcher's rubber. Norris was unable to catch it and neither Gibson nor Janish could get to it before it reached the outfield.
Batter 6: Wilkin Ramirez - Ball, Ground out to Second
With a 1-1 count, Ramirez hit a soft ground ball to the right side. Gibson charged the ball and threw Ramirez out at first.
I was the milb.com Gameday datacaster for that doubleheader and thus saw Norris' performance from the press box. Like most Orioles' fans, I was disappointed in Norris' ineffective performance, in which he gave up nine earned runs and twelve hits in 2 2/3 innings. The Tides' radio broadcasters, trying to find something positive to say about his start, repeatedly emphasized that several of the hits Norris allowed were ground balls that found a hole between infielders. Is that true? Did he also surrender some hard-hit balls that were turned into outs? Just how well did Bud Norris pitch in his first rehabilitation start?
I don't have access to sophisticated video analysis tools to determine how much Norris' pitches broke. I don't even have radar-gun readings from the in-house pitch-speed display, which I can't consistently track because of my datacasting responsibilities. I did, however, record every pitch and the result of every pitch put into play. This article will review every Red Wing at-bat against Norris in more detail than the Gameday recap or the game stories. I will then follow with some general observations about his performance.
First Inning
Batter 1: Eric Farris -- Ball, Foul, Double to leftOn the 1-1 pitch, Farris hit a medium-speed ground ball between third baseman Michael Almanzar and the foul line. Almanzar dove for the ball but missed it; left fielder Nolan Reimold retrieved the ball in foul territory and was unable to prevent Farris from coasting into second.
Batter 2: James Beresford - Ball, Ball, Called Strike, Called Strike, Error by second baseman
With a 2-2 count, Beresford hit a chopper to second baseman Derrik Gibson. Gibson got to the ball and fielded it, but dropped it before he could throw to first. Farris moved to third; he would have advanced even if Gibson had made the play. There was no controversy about the error; and as it turned out it didn't matter.
Batter 3: Josmil Pinto - Ball, Called Strike, Foul, Ball, Ball, 6-4-3 Double Play
On the full count, Pinto hit a tailor-made double-play ball to shortstop Paul Janish, who threw to Gibson to force Beresford. Gibson threw to first to retire the slow-moving Pinto. Farris scored on the play. Some people thought that if not for Gibson's error on the previous play, Janish might have been able to hold Farris at third before throwing out Pinto (which might have made Farris' run unearned); but that too didn't become an issue.
Batter 4: Kennys Vargas - Called Strike, Ball, Ball, Home Run to Left-Center
Vargas went the other way on the 2-1 pitch and hit a towering fly ball into the Rochester bullpen, about 385 feet or so from home plate. Although there was a wind blowing out, the home run was no fluke.
Batter 5: Danny Ortiz - Ball, Foul, Ball, Foul, Single to Center
On a 2-2 pitch, Ortiz hit a fairly hard ground ball back up the middle, just to the right of the pitcher's rubber. Norris was unable to catch it and neither Gibson nor Janish could get to it before it reached the outfield.
Batter 6: Wilkin Ramirez - Ball, Ground out to Second
With a 1-1 count, Ramirez hit a soft ground ball to the right side. Gibson charged the ball and threw Ramirez out at first.
Second Inning
Batter 7: Ryan Wheeler - Ball, Called Strike, Automatic Double to Right-Center
On a 1-1 pitch, Wheeler hit a deep fly ball between center fielder Julio Borbon and right field Dariel Alvarez. The ball hit the warning track on the fly and bounced over the outfield wall. The ball was crushed and traveled well over 380 feet on the fly.
Batter 8: Jose Martinez - Ball, Called Strike, Foul, Foul, Ball, Ground out to Second
On a 2-2 pitch, Martinez hit a routine grounder to the right side. Gibson fielded it and threw Martinez out at first, with Wheeler advancing to third.
Batter 9: Doug Bernier - Called Strike, Ball, Foul, Strikeout (Called)
Batter 10: Farris - Called Strike, Single to Right
On an 0-1 pitch, Farris hit a low line drive/ground ball that got past a diving Chris Parmelee on one bounce. Wheeler scored from third base.
Batter 11: Beresford - Ball, Ball (Stolen Base), Foul, Foul, Ball, Foul, Foul, Foul, Single to Center
On the second pitch, Farris broke for second and easily stole the base; the pitch was low and outside and catcher Steve Clevenger had no real chance to throw him out. After Beresford worked the count full and fouled off several 3-2 pitches, he hit a ground ball up the middle that neither Norris, Gibson, nor Janish could field. Farris scored as the ball wasn't hit hard enough to give Borbon a chance to throw him out at the plate.
Batter 12: Pinto - Single to Left
Pinto hit a hard ground ball to Janish's left. It wasn't that far from Janish but it was hit hard enough so that Janish's dive couldn't stop it. Beresford stopped at second.
Batter 13: Vargas - Called Strike, Ball, Home Run to Right Center
On a 1-1 pitch, Kennys Vargas hit his second home run of the game - a fly ball that sailed over the bullpen and eventually rolled / bounced into the Elizabeth River, 480+ feet from home plate. Press-box workers who have been working ever since Harbor Park opened in 1993 could remember only two other balls hit into the river - one by Jim Thome and one by Sam Horn.
Batter 14: Ortiz - Foul, Ball, Fly out to Right Field
On a 1-1 pitch, Ortiz lifted a routine fly ball to right field that Alvarez caught easily.
Third Inning
Batter 15: Ramirez - Fly out to Right Field
Ramirez hit the first pitch into right center field. Alvarez came in a few steps and caught the routine fly ball.
Batter 16: Wheeler - Ball, Called Strike, Single to Center
On the 1-1 pitch, Wheeler hit a line drive over the infield that fell in front of Borbon.
Batter 17: Martinez - Ball, Swinging Strike, Ball, Line Out to Left
On the 2-1 pitch, Martinez hit a hard line drive to left center field. Nolan Reimold raced into the gap and made a snow-cone catch. Wheeler was able to get back to first without a throw.
Batter 18: Bernier - Foul, Single to Left
On an 0-1 pitch, Bernier hit a ground ball between Almanzar and Janish. Janish wasn't able to get to it and it got through into left field. Wheeler stopped at second.
Batter 19: Farris - Ball, Swinging Strike, Single to Left
On the 1-1 pitch, Farris hit another ground ball between Almanzar and Janish that neither one could quite get to. Wheeler scored and Bernier stopped at second.
Batter 20: Beresford - Called Strike, Ball, Double to Left
Beresford drove the 1-1 pitch down the left-field line. Reimold was able to cut the ball off before it got to the wall, and was able to hold Farris at third, but Bernier scored easily from second.
Norris relieved by Steve Johnson
Observations:
- While a few of the hits off Norris could be said to be "lucky", most of them were well-hit balls that would have required extraordinarily good or extraordinarily lucky defense to turn into outs.
- Norris accumulated only two swing-and-miss strikes. When Red Wing batters swung at his pitches, they either hit them into play or fouled them off.
- Some of the hits were by hitters who are major-league quality hitters - Josmil Pinto and Kennys Vargas. But others were by non-major-league quality hitters - Eric Farris, James Beresford, and Ryan Wheeler.
05 May 2015
The Camden Highball (Episode 9): Greetings From Norfolk!
The Camden Highball is back after taking a brief hiatus last week. On this week's episode, Pat and Nate answer a couple of your questions from Twitter and talk about the (slightly) alarming walk rate of the entire Orioles pitching staff. We also talk to Camden Depot's Joe Reisel about the things he's seen in Norfolk during the first month of the minor league season, and he tells us who he thinks is the most impressive Orioles player he's ever seen play at Harbor Park. His answer may surprise you.
Camden Highball (Episode 9): Greetings from Norfolk!
Camden Highball (Episode 9): Greetings from Norfolk!
0:16 - Making an excuse for no podcast last week
1:24 - Orioles pitchers are walking everyone
6:07 - Adam Jones is REALLY good at baseball
11:47 - Concerned about Manny's defense?
12:33 - Our weekly Steve Pearce, Alejandro De Aza, and Ryan Webb segment
13:08 - Matt Wieters, Caleb Joseph, and 2016
15:36 - Nate's cat is hungry
15:57 - Camden Depot's Joe Reisel joins the podcast
18:30 - The effects of Harbor Park
20:50 - Joe weighs in on some AAA players
28:03 - Most impressive player Joe has seen play at Norfolk
1:24 - Orioles pitchers are walking everyone
6:07 - Adam Jones is REALLY good at baseball
11:47 - Concerned about Manny's defense?
12:33 - Our weekly Steve Pearce, Alejandro De Aza, and Ryan Webb segment
13:08 - Matt Wieters, Caleb Joseph, and 2016
15:36 - Nate's cat is hungry
15:57 - Camden Depot's Joe Reisel joins the podcast
18:30 - The effects of Harbor Park
20:50 - Joe weighs in on some AAA players
28:03 - Most impressive player Joe has seen play at Norfolk
Labels:
Adam Jones,
Caleb Joseph,
Camden Highball,
DeLong,
Holden,
Matt Wieters,
Norfolk Tides,
Reisel
14 September 2014
Orioles Renew With Full-Season Affiliates
To the surprise of almost no one, the Orioles announced that they have renewed affiliations with AAA Norfolk, AA Bowie, High-A Frederick, and Low-A Delmarva. From the Orioles perspective, Bowie, Frederick, and Delmarva are an ideal set; they're close to each other and close to Baltimore. And Bowie, Frederick, and Delmarva have a long history with the Orioles. Bowie has been an Orioles affiliate since its creation; Frederick has been an Orioles affiliate since its creation; Delmarva has been an Orioles affiliate since its second season (it was an Expos affiliate for one season after it moved from Albany, GA.) There's no obvious advantage to either the Orioles or the teams separating.
In contrast, Norfolk entered into its first affiliation with the Orioles in 2007, eight years ago. Norfolk had been an affiliate of the New York Mets for thirty-eight years, ever since it had become an AAA team in 1969. Many observers and local fans were stunned when the Tides left the Mets. These past eight seasons - two four-year affiliation agreements - were a test; would the Orioles and Tides prove to be mutually-beneficial partners?
It may be hard to remember, but nine seasons ago the Orioles were not considered a desirable partner for an AAA team. After the 2002 season, their long-time AAA affiliate, Rochester, informed the Orioles that Rochester no longer wanted to affiliate with the Orioles. The Orioles ended up settling for the lame-duck Ottawa Lynx, considered at the time to be the least-desirable AAA affiliate. When Norfolk became so frustrated with their affiliation with the Mets that they made themselves available, the Orioles put the all-out press to become the Tides' partner. Three franchises vied for the Norfolk affiliation - the Orioles, the Mets, and the Nationals. The Mets had completely alienated the Tides; the Nationals then had an uncertain ownership; so the Tides agreed to affiliate with the Orioles. It's safe to say that if the Orioles had blown this opportunity, they'd now be affiliated with Las Vegas. And in a positive sign for the Orioles front office, they haven't blown it. Both the Tides and the Orioles were eager to continue their affiliation because it's mutually beneficial.
The biggest advantage to the Orioles is that Norfolk is currently the third-closest AAA team, behind Lehigh Valley and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre. Lehigh Valley is so closely tied to the Phillies that they won't become available, and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre until recently had ownership and facility issues made it a less-desirable affiliation. Keeping Norfolk as their AAA affiliate is important because the alternatives are much worse. MASN, on which Orioles games are televised, is available on Hampton Roads-area cable systems. This helps the Orioles as well because fans attending Tides games are reminded that they can see former Tides playing for the Orioles on MASN. Finally, Norfolk has a good reputation among minor-league teams; owner Ken Young (who also owns Bowie and Frederick) is very well-respected and the front office is experienced and skilled.
From the Tides' standpoint, while there have been some negatives with the Orioles' affiliation, there have been more positives. The biggest negative is that the Tides have been generally uncompetitive with the players the Orioles provide; they have not qualified for the postseason in any of the seasons of their affiliation. The Orioles, especially in the Showalter Era, have called up players from Norfolk for even the smallest possible potential advantage. While this may mean that the Tides may get an attendance boost if a temporarily-optioned major leaguer plays for them (Miguel Gonzalez made a start around the all-star break when he was sent down briefly), it also means that a key player may be unavailable when he's held back for a potential callup. Second, when signing minor league free agents, the Orioles have preferred potential role players to players with more diversified skills. Third, the Orioles have been willing to give chances to once-good major league veterans such as Miguel Tejada, Jamie Moyer, Randy Wolf, and Joe Saunders. Those players are assigned to Norfolk, which forces Norfolk to adjust its roster. And those players must play, which is fine if they have something left but not so good if they don't. And, perhaps most significantly, the Orioles minor-league system hasn't been very deep, especially in position players.
On the other hand, the Orioles have communicated well with the Tides; gone are the days (as with the tail end of the Mets' affiliation) when the Tides' staff found out about player moves by reading about them in the newspaper. Orioles telecasts on MASN gives the team some indirect publicity and occasional mentions by the broadcasters. By far the biggest advantage is that the Orioles have played four exhibition games in Norfolk in the eight years. These games are a bonus for season-ticket holders and are a good payday for the team. And the Orioles showed their appreciation for Norfolk in 2014, playing the exhibition game even though the weather wasn't good.
There are still some Hampton Roads residents who want Norfolk to re-affiliate with the Mets. Some prefer ational League (no DH) rules; others are native New Yorkers; Still others became Mets fans while the Tides were the Mets AAA affiliate. When the Tides' affiliation became open, I personally was hoping they'd affiliate with the Nationals, because I thought it would be interesting to watch the Nationals organization develop from the beginning and because, frankly, I thought the Orioles were a badly-run team. However, in these eight years, I've watched the Orioles improve and even grown to appreciate the DH.
And, if the Tides hadn't affiliated with the Orioles, I wouldn't be writing here now.
In contrast, Norfolk entered into its first affiliation with the Orioles in 2007, eight years ago. Norfolk had been an affiliate of the New York Mets for thirty-eight years, ever since it had become an AAA team in 1969. Many observers and local fans were stunned when the Tides left the Mets. These past eight seasons - two four-year affiliation agreements - were a test; would the Orioles and Tides prove to be mutually-beneficial partners?
It may be hard to remember, but nine seasons ago the Orioles were not considered a desirable partner for an AAA team. After the 2002 season, their long-time AAA affiliate, Rochester, informed the Orioles that Rochester no longer wanted to affiliate with the Orioles. The Orioles ended up settling for the lame-duck Ottawa Lynx, considered at the time to be the least-desirable AAA affiliate. When Norfolk became so frustrated with their affiliation with the Mets that they made themselves available, the Orioles put the all-out press to become the Tides' partner. Three franchises vied for the Norfolk affiliation - the Orioles, the Mets, and the Nationals. The Mets had completely alienated the Tides; the Nationals then had an uncertain ownership; so the Tides agreed to affiliate with the Orioles. It's safe to say that if the Orioles had blown this opportunity, they'd now be affiliated with Las Vegas. And in a positive sign for the Orioles front office, they haven't blown it. Both the Tides and the Orioles were eager to continue their affiliation because it's mutually beneficial.
The biggest advantage to the Orioles is that Norfolk is currently the third-closest AAA team, behind Lehigh Valley and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre. Lehigh Valley is so closely tied to the Phillies that they won't become available, and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre until recently had ownership and facility issues made it a less-desirable affiliation. Keeping Norfolk as their AAA affiliate is important because the alternatives are much worse. MASN, on which Orioles games are televised, is available on Hampton Roads-area cable systems. This helps the Orioles as well because fans attending Tides games are reminded that they can see former Tides playing for the Orioles on MASN. Finally, Norfolk has a good reputation among minor-league teams; owner Ken Young (who also owns Bowie and Frederick) is very well-respected and the front office is experienced and skilled.
From the Tides' standpoint, while there have been some negatives with the Orioles' affiliation, there have been more positives. The biggest negative is that the Tides have been generally uncompetitive with the players the Orioles provide; they have not qualified for the postseason in any of the seasons of their affiliation. The Orioles, especially in the Showalter Era, have called up players from Norfolk for even the smallest possible potential advantage. While this may mean that the Tides may get an attendance boost if a temporarily-optioned major leaguer plays for them (Miguel Gonzalez made a start around the all-star break when he was sent down briefly), it also means that a key player may be unavailable when he's held back for a potential callup. Second, when signing minor league free agents, the Orioles have preferred potential role players to players with more diversified skills. Third, the Orioles have been willing to give chances to once-good major league veterans such as Miguel Tejada, Jamie Moyer, Randy Wolf, and Joe Saunders. Those players are assigned to Norfolk, which forces Norfolk to adjust its roster. And those players must play, which is fine if they have something left but not so good if they don't. And, perhaps most significantly, the Orioles minor-league system hasn't been very deep, especially in position players.
On the other hand, the Orioles have communicated well with the Tides; gone are the days (as with the tail end of the Mets' affiliation) when the Tides' staff found out about player moves by reading about them in the newspaper. Orioles telecasts on MASN gives the team some indirect publicity and occasional mentions by the broadcasters. By far the biggest advantage is that the Orioles have played four exhibition games in Norfolk in the eight years. These games are a bonus for season-ticket holders and are a good payday for the team. And the Orioles showed their appreciation for Norfolk in 2014, playing the exhibition game even though the weather wasn't good.
There are still some Hampton Roads residents who want Norfolk to re-affiliate with the Mets. Some prefer ational League (no DH) rules; others are native New Yorkers; Still others became Mets fans while the Tides were the Mets AAA affiliate. When the Tides' affiliation became open, I personally was hoping they'd affiliate with the Nationals, because I thought it would be interesting to watch the Nationals organization develop from the beginning and because, frankly, I thought the Orioles were a badly-run team. However, in these eight years, I've watched the Orioles improve and even grown to appreciate the DH.
And, if the Tides hadn't affiliated with the Orioles, I wouldn't be writing here now.
03 May 2014
Anatomy of a Scoring Decision
In the top of the eighth inning of the April 27 game between the visiting Columbus Clippers and the host Norfolk Tides, Ryan Rohlinger hit a medium-speed chopper to the left side of the infield. Norfolk's third baseman Cord Phelps broke toward the ball, and shortstop Ivan DeJesus took a looping route to the ball. DeJesus intended to field the ball while moving toward home plate so that his momentum would be making his throw shorter. DeJesus did field the ball in his glove but, unfortunately for the Tides, DeJesus and Phelps collided DeJesus dropped the ball. He was unable to pick the ball up and the batter Rohlinger reached first base safely. After a period of time, an error charged to Phelps was posted on the scoreboard; however, the post-game box score did not include the Phelps error.
That's what you would have seen if you had been one of the 4,094 fans in attendance on that Sunday. It wasn't a memorable or important play; the next two Clipper batters were retired on fly balls and the game ended after another inning and a half with the same Columbus lead of 6-2. However, I was the milb.com datacaster for that game, and as such was both a witness to and a minor participant in the process of scoring that play. It's a typical example of how official scorers arrive at their decisions.
First, and indeed most obviously, this was a play about which there was some doubt. The Tides did not play the ball cleanly, and it was clear that the Tides might have retired Rohlinger if they had played it cleanly. It was also clear that Rohlinger had not hit the ball so hard, nor had he placed it so well, that he would have reached first safely even if the Tides had played the ball cleanly. On the other hand, it also wasn't obvious that the Tides would definitely retired Rohlinger had they not misplayed the ball. The call of base hit or error would be left to Mike Holtzclaw, the official scorer.
There were four questions that had to be answered: (1) Did DeJesus make an extraordinary effort to get to the ball to field it? (2) Would DeJesus have had to make an extraordinary effort to complete the play; (3) Would Phelps have been able to avoid DeJesus without extraordinary effort; and (4) Would Rohlinger have been retired had the play been continued without incident?
If Mike had determined that DeJesus had made an extraordinary effort just to get to the ball in the first place, then Rohlinger should have been credited with a base hit. However, this was a play that, while not routine, is regularly made at the AAA level by most competent shortstops. Mike saw nothing extraordinary about the play before the collision.
Similarly, had Mike determined that DeJesus would have needed an extraordinary effort to complete the play, Rohlinger should have been credited with a base hit. Again, this was not the case. DeJesus had maintained his balance; he was moving in the general direction toward which he was throwing; the ball was securely in his glove. AAA shortstops complete this play regularly.
Third, Mike had to determine whether or not Phelps' colliding with DeJesus caused him to drop the ball, and whether Phelps could have avoided colliding with DeJesus. If so, then Phelps should be charged with an error, per Section 10.12(a)(1) of the Official Baseball Rules:
The official scorer shall charge an error to a fielder who causes another fielder to misplay a ball - for example, by knocking the ball out of the other fielder's glove.
It was clear that Phelps' colliding with DeJesus caused DeJesus to drop the ball. It was less clear that Phelps could have avoided DeJesus. Phelps probably shouldn't have tried to field the ball; he had a long way to go and would not have been in a good position to make a throw had he fielded the ball. But that's irrelevant; again per section 10.12(a)(1):
The official scorer shall not score mental mistakes or misjudgments as errors ...
I was unclear whether or not Phelps could have avoided DeJesus, but Mike decided that he could have.
So now we move to question 4 - would Rohlinger have been retired had the play been made properly? The problem here is that the fielding play was made at the shortstop position while the baserunner was hustling down the first-base line, out of Mike's vision. Mike decided to review the video of the play so that he could make a better-informed judgment. However, AAA video is not nearly as sophisticated as major-league video. There is only one camera being recorded at any one time, and as expected the cameraman was focused on the fielder.
So, he asked other people in the press box for their opinion - specifically myself, the milb.com datacaster, and Ian Locke, the Norfolk Tides media relations director. Both of us had over eight years of experience watching games in an official capacity, and Mike trusts our opinions. As it happened, shortly after the collision, I had glanced at Rohlinger as he ran to first; he was less than halfway down the line. I told Mike that; after some more discussion he decided that Rohlinger would have been retired. Based on all these factors, he decided to charge Phelps with an error.
However, he realized that this would probably be a controversial decision in the eyes of both managers. Among Mike's attributes as an official scorer is that he realizes that his view from the press box isn't necessarily perfect; the view from a lower vantage (either from the dugout or the stands) is quite different. And, while managers are naturally biased - they want the calls to go in their favor - Mike has told me that with very few exceptions they are also reasonable and will accept it - even most often graciously - if he gives them a well-reasoned explanation.
While normally Mike and I will head to the parking lot together, on that Sunday he decided to wait in case a manager wanted to question the call. When that happens, before he agrees to change his call, he'll confirm with the other manager that he saw it the same way. In this case, both managers agreed that the play was a base hit. Because the decision didn't affect the earned status of any runs, calling it a hit worked to the advantage of both managers - Phelps wasn't charged with an error and Rohlinger got a base hit. Mike had no problem changing his decision - it was a close call and he was willing to accept the judgment of those who had a different view.
This is a typical example of how good official scorers make their decisions. As you can see, they try not to be overly swayed by the home team; they try not to be arbitrary, and they are concerned about making the best decision possible. I'm sure that Mike Holtzclaw hopes that Ryan Rohlinger doesn't win the International League batting title by the margin of one hit. But that's another story.
First, and indeed most obviously, this was a play about which there was some doubt. The Tides did not play the ball cleanly, and it was clear that the Tides might have retired Rohlinger if they had played it cleanly. It was also clear that Rohlinger had not hit the ball so hard, nor had he placed it so well, that he would have reached first safely even if the Tides had played the ball cleanly. On the other hand, it also wasn't obvious that the Tides would definitely retired Rohlinger had they not misplayed the ball. The call of base hit or error would be left to Mike Holtzclaw, the official scorer.
There were four questions that had to be answered: (1) Did DeJesus make an extraordinary effort to get to the ball to field it? (2) Would DeJesus have had to make an extraordinary effort to complete the play; (3) Would Phelps have been able to avoid DeJesus without extraordinary effort; and (4) Would Rohlinger have been retired had the play been continued without incident?
If Mike had determined that DeJesus had made an extraordinary effort just to get to the ball in the first place, then Rohlinger should have been credited with a base hit. However, this was a play that, while not routine, is regularly made at the AAA level by most competent shortstops. Mike saw nothing extraordinary about the play before the collision.
Similarly, had Mike determined that DeJesus would have needed an extraordinary effort to complete the play, Rohlinger should have been credited with a base hit. Again, this was not the case. DeJesus had maintained his balance; he was moving in the general direction toward which he was throwing; the ball was securely in his glove. AAA shortstops complete this play regularly.
Third, Mike had to determine whether or not Phelps' colliding with DeJesus caused him to drop the ball, and whether Phelps could have avoided colliding with DeJesus. If so, then Phelps should be charged with an error, per Section 10.12(a)(1) of the Official Baseball Rules:
The official scorer shall charge an error to a fielder who causes another fielder to misplay a ball - for example, by knocking the ball out of the other fielder's glove.
It was clear that Phelps' colliding with DeJesus caused DeJesus to drop the ball. It was less clear that Phelps could have avoided DeJesus. Phelps probably shouldn't have tried to field the ball; he had a long way to go and would not have been in a good position to make a throw had he fielded the ball. But that's irrelevant; again per section 10.12(a)(1):
The official scorer shall not score mental mistakes or misjudgments as errors ...
I was unclear whether or not Phelps could have avoided DeJesus, but Mike decided that he could have.
So now we move to question 4 - would Rohlinger have been retired had the play been made properly? The problem here is that the fielding play was made at the shortstop position while the baserunner was hustling down the first-base line, out of Mike's vision. Mike decided to review the video of the play so that he could make a better-informed judgment. However, AAA video is not nearly as sophisticated as major-league video. There is only one camera being recorded at any one time, and as expected the cameraman was focused on the fielder.
So, he asked other people in the press box for their opinion - specifically myself, the milb.com datacaster, and Ian Locke, the Norfolk Tides media relations director. Both of us had over eight years of experience watching games in an official capacity, and Mike trusts our opinions. As it happened, shortly after the collision, I had glanced at Rohlinger as he ran to first; he was less than halfway down the line. I told Mike that; after some more discussion he decided that Rohlinger would have been retired. Based on all these factors, he decided to charge Phelps with an error.
However, he realized that this would probably be a controversial decision in the eyes of both managers. Among Mike's attributes as an official scorer is that he realizes that his view from the press box isn't necessarily perfect; the view from a lower vantage (either from the dugout or the stands) is quite different. And, while managers are naturally biased - they want the calls to go in their favor - Mike has told me that with very few exceptions they are also reasonable and will accept it - even most often graciously - if he gives them a well-reasoned explanation.
While normally Mike and I will head to the parking lot together, on that Sunday he decided to wait in case a manager wanted to question the call. When that happens, before he agrees to change his call, he'll confirm with the other manager that he saw it the same way. In this case, both managers agreed that the play was a base hit. Because the decision didn't affect the earned status of any runs, calling it a hit worked to the advantage of both managers - Phelps wasn't charged with an error and Rohlinger got a base hit. Mike had no problem changing his decision - it was a close call and he was willing to accept the judgment of those who had a different view.
This is a typical example of how good official scorers make their decisions. As you can see, they try not to be overly swayed by the home team; they try not to be arbitrary, and they are concerned about making the best decision possible. I'm sure that Mike Holtzclaw hopes that Ryan Rohlinger doesn't win the International League batting title by the margin of one hit. But that's another story.
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