Does Adam Jones want to reunite with Nick Markakis?

No matter whether it is professional or personal, breaking up is hard to do. When Nick Markakis left the Baltimore Orioles via free agency in favor of the Atlanta Braves in 2014, the Birdland faithful struggled with the move. Adam Jones, it seems, also had a tough time saying "goodbye" to the man that played next to him in the Camden Yards outfield for so many years.

When the Orioles traveled to take on the Braves this weekend, it was a reunion of sorts for Markakis and his former teammates. It's not the first time the two teams have met since Markakis signed on the dotted line for Atlanta, but with everything crumbing in Baltimore, this felt like a significant moment nonetheless.

Jones is one of the few Orioles hitters with decent numbers, and he is also one of the big four that is expected to be on the trading block this July, as his contract expires after this year. However, he has 10-and-5 rights, which give him full no-trade protection. Even still, there will likely be offers for the 32-year-old's services, but he is ultimately in control on where he lands.

Markakis is in the midst of one of the finest seasons of his career. He is on the way to his first All-Star Game and leading an unexpectedly good Braves team to a potential pennant push. However, the 34-year-old is a free agent at year's end as well, and could find himself on the move soon enough.

A vague Instagram post by Jones over the weekend further fueled speculation about where the veteran outfielder may end up this summer. Could he be headed to Atlanta? Will both he and Markakis re-sign with the O's in the winter? Are there plans to meet up somewhere else in the league? We discuss that, and more, on this week's episode of The Warehouse Podcast!

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For The Orioles, Has Corner Outfield Been A Wasteland?

The most-viewed article in the history of Camden Depot is simply titled, "How to Solve the Orioles' Corner Outfield Problem." It was a May 2015 post by Matt Perez that discussed the lack of outfield options in the O's farm system, and Matt suggested trading for Shane Victorino. Somehow, whether it's the SEO-friendly headline, some error in pageview counting, or a combination of things, that post has been viewed more than four times as much as the next-closest post on this site.

The Orioles never traded for Victorino and 2015 ended up being his final season in the major leagues, but they are still dealing with corner outfield issues. After the 2014 season, the Orioles decided to move on from Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis. I was fine with both decisions, though obviously the move not to bring back Cruz looks worse now. Somehow, Cruz has been even better than his rebound season in Baltimore, and his four-year, $57 million deal with the Mariners looks like a bargain. Maybe you wanted him back; maybe you didn't. His career turnaround his still been stunning, and no other team was willing to top that Seattle offer.

The same can't be said for Markakis's time with the Braves. He has maintained solid on-base numbers the last few years, but he still has very little power. Markakis has posted a wRC+ of 106, 98, and 95 in the last three seasons, respectively, and his fWAR has fallen each year as well, from 1.5 to 1.1 to 0.9. Considering his four-year, $44 million contract, Markakis may have helped the O's marginally, but that's it.

We don't need to rehash everything the O's have done to try and get production out of the corner outfield spots. From 2015-2017, O's right fielders have accumulated 5.5 fWAR (17th in MLB). In left field, things have been much worse: -1.8 fWAR (29th).

If you're curious, here are all the ranks for the Orioles in that span:

C: 7.7 fWAR (8th)
1B: 8.4 (7th)
2B: 6.5 (17th)
SS: 4.8 (21st)
3B: 14.4 (7th)
LF: -1.8 (29th)
CF: 5.7 (23rd)
RF: 5.5 (t-17th)
DH: 0.2 (t-13th)
SP: 40.5 (27th)
RP: 22.6 (5th)

A couple of things jump out. First, it's not surprising at all to see the starting pitching rank so poorly. Second, the center field production seems low. Adam Jones has posted a combined fWAR of 7.0 in those seasons as he's received far and away the bulk of playing time. In that period, Jones has 1,875 plate appearances when playing center field; the next closest player is Joey Rickard, with 67.

Of the 10 other center fielders who have seen time the last few years, only two have positive fWARs: Nolan Reimold (0.4) and Joey Rickard (0.1). The O's have really needed it, but they have never really had a competent backup for Jones in center field. That's one reason why the brief playing time given to Junior Lake (-0.2), Austin Hays (-0.4), David Lough (-0.5), and Gerardo Parra (-0.6) is weighing that number down a bit.

Back to the corner outfield discussion. In right field, the main contributor has been Mark Trumbo - or, to be clear, Trumbo in 2016. That year, he was a revelation (offensively). In 2017, he quickly came back to earth. Trumbo's outfield defense will always be a concern, but he has a 135 wRC+ when playing right field for the O's. When slotting in at DH, it drops to 81.

While the O's have made things respectable in right field, the same can't be said for left field. The last three years, they've used 21 different players out there. The best fWAR of the group goes to Trey Mancini, at 0.4. Thirteen of the 21 have posted a negative fWAR. Three others posted an fWAR of 0.

Maybe that's a little confusing, because Hyun Soo Kim posted a 120 wRC+ overall in 2016 and Mancini put up a 117 wRC+ overall in 2017. But when playing left field, Kim's wRC+ was 100 and Mancini's was 101. Kim's infrequent playing time and poor hitting in 2017 dropped his wRC+ significantly, while Mancini has a 157 wRC+ at first base (157 PAs) and a 148 wRC+ at DH (87 PAs). Most of Mancini's best work has come when he isn't playing in the outfield. Plus, while each looked OK at times, neither would be confused for a good defensive outfielder. Mancini seems to be an average defender, at best, while Kim was less so. Still, that Mancini is recognized as average (or close to it) shows improvement on his part.

During the season, I didn't notice that Mancini's best offensive production came at first base and DH. Because it's a small sample of plate appearances, maybe it means nothing. But since Chris Davis is locked in at first base and Trumbo is slated to get the bulk of the at-bats at DH, Mancini is scheduled to be the team's opening day starter in left field. The hope is that Mancini's overall offensive production carries over, and that he'll hit no matter where he plays without doing much harm with his glove. He's really only an outfielder due to the O's roster construction, and it would be more suitable to have him split time at first base and DH while the O's put a better outfielder in left. But unless Trumbo is traded, that's not an option.

With Austin Hays waiting in the wings, there's certainly promise in the O's system for help in right field. But the O's could clearly use more (especially defensively) given that there's no guarantee Hays is ready for a full-time role now. Hays has upside but is unproven, Trumbo will surely still see time in right field, and then behind them there's Jaycob Brugman, Joey Rickard, and Anthony Santander (who needs to spend 44 days on the active roster to fulfill his Rule 5 requirement). There's also Cedric Mullins, who could find himself in Baltimore before the season ends.

The O's current (though maybe misguided) plan is to compete in 2018, and if so, they must do better than relying on Brugman and Rickard. They maybe shouldn't even be relying on Mancini as a full-time outfielder. Brugman and Rickard are fine depth pieces, but more experienced players like Carlos Gomez, Jon Jay, Carlos Gonzalez, Jarrod Dyson, Cameron Maybin, and Melky Cabrera are still out there. Curtis Granderson would have made sense as a low-risk addition, but he just signed with the Blue Jays for $5 million. I'd prefer Dyson or Jay, but almost any of them would be preferable to relying on Rickard again. (Sorry, Rickard fans.)

Solving RF In Baltimore: Nick Markakis (Mostly)

A year ago, you might recall from the Twitters that I was slightly displeased with how the Orioles said goodbye to Nick Markakis.  With his horrific 2013 and a respectably meager 2014, the 31-year-old right fielder was not a player I considered worthwhile to extend a long-term contract.  His eroding power, loss of range in the field, and progression toward a true platoon player was a concern.  My irritation though was that I thought he was worth a Qualifying Offer.  That might look more risky now than it did then, but I thought the club let a draft pick slip through its fingers.

Now, with 2015 behind us, I could see how Markakis could be a useful addition to the 2016 club.  Yes, his power collapsed to an ugly .080 ISO, the worst of his career.  Yes, his BABIP was slightly and curiously high.  Yes, his walk rate was slightly and curiously high.  Yes, he probably needs to be convinced that he should be sitting against many starting southpaws.  Why yes, he has noticeable limitations.  I would argue though that what we see mostly in Baltimore is what Markakis is no longer as opposed to what he is.

That is, Markakis is a strong, contact oriented left-handed platoon bat who over the past two seasons has shown he is quite capable of playing right field on par or slightly below.  He appears to be a 1.5 WAR player if largely limited to right-handed starters and with his ability to put balls in play could be quite useful as a late inning replacement if a right hander follows a starting left hander.  If we consult our contract model BORAS, it suggests that a free agent Nick Markakis would be worth a two-year contract at 17 MM whereas he currently has three years and 31.5 MM remaining, which could be considered somewhat reasonable (for those interested, it thinks a 2/22 deal would have been appropriate last year).   Finally, as mentioned in a Baltimore Sun piece, the front office apparently thinks Markakis brought many intangibles that were missing during the 2015 season.

What does the comp model think?
Nick is a peculiar player who does not enjoy many high level comps when going though the numbers of corner outfielders during their age 29 through 31 seasons.  The best fits I could find were these six: Barney McCoskey, Peanuts Lowrey, Mickey Hatcher, Manny Mota, Phil Cavarretta, and Orlando Palmeiro.  It is an odd collection of players.  None of them really enjoyed the level of opportunity that Markakis did and none showed the level of power that Markakis once did.

Here is the 50th percentile projection based on this grouping:

	PA	AVG	OBP	SLG
2016	409	.278	.350	.369
2017	288	.282	.346	.375
2018	304	.286	.344	.376

There are a couple interesting items.  The grouping of players largely are individuals who were never full-time players, so that might impact the projections a bit.  The rate stats are also peculiar.  They suggest that Markakis might lean more on contact and see his walk rate deteriorate.  His power is projection to stay around an ISO of .090.

With a 3/31.5 remainder left on his contract, I wanted to see how the projection would work out money-wise with respect to performance.  Additionally, I also compared each year if Markakis would have 500 plate appearances.  Wait, are you not setting 500 plate appearances as an arbitrary given that makes your point for you?  Well, no-ish. 

Typically, I keep to the number of plate appearances because it considers injury and effectiveness.  In the case of Markakis' comp group, I think it does those things poorly.  His comp group is largely made up of part-time players with half not surpassing the 1000 PA benchmark during the 29-31 age seasons.  Contact oriented corner outfielders with no power and no effective speed are rather difficult to find and, it appears, difficult to appreciate.  That lack of appreciation may have forced players into part time roles even though they were capable of handling larger responsibilities.  Therefore, I thought it fair to a more full season Markakis in order to estimate his true value.  I did not take it out to his customary 700 plate appearances because I thought that overestimated his health.

	WAR	$	WAR500	$500
2016	1.3	8.9	1.6	10.9
2017	0.9	6.6	1.5	11.4
2018	0.9	7.1	1.5	11.6
		22.6		33.9

If we adhere to the projection model, then we will conclude that any deal would need about $9 million dollars going to the Orioles to offset the contract.  A third level player, like left hander Tim Berry who had a difficult 2015 with respect to performance and health, but who had been considered a potential back-end rotation breakout arm, would be thrown into the deal to make it palatable. However, if we focused on Markakis being a full-time player, we do not see much age in the near term.  As such, his contract is a 2 MM underpay.  This would mean a low second tier prospect like righthander David Hess or outfielder Dariel Alvarez.  The difference in cost depends largely on how the Braves view him (which is likely as a bit of a contractural albatross) and how many other clubs, like the Royals, find him valuable.

Bottom line, if Markakis could be protected against strong southpaws then this would appear to be a solid move.  A player like Nolan Reimold could pick up the other 200 plate appearance and deliver a 1 WAR, which would make right field fringe first division in terms of performance at a cost about 10 MM less than getting a true first division RF.  It may not be the flashiest proposed add-on, but he would provide value on the field and, supposedly, off of it as well.

Of course, taking on 10.5 MM in 2016 would bring the overall payroll to about 124.  That does not leave much room for a Justin Upton or Scott Kazmir.  In this case, it might be best to pair up Hess and Alvarez or maybe put in a more full-fledged prospect like Hunter Harvey along with international pool money in order for the Braves to kick in some money.  If the Orioles could get a 7 MM payment for 2016 in addition to giving up a million in international spending, then the club could be sitting effectively at 115 MM.  If they could slightly backload Upton's contract and then add a southpaw like Hector Santiago in a trade, then 2016's payroll should be able to snugly fit under 140 MM.  That amount, I think, is reasonable.  Plus, 2017 will see Mark Trumbo, Matt Wieters, and Brian Matusz gone with about 30 MM in salaries departing as well.

Would you welcome Nick back?

Your preferred Orioles outfield (******last 2 options would result Santiago instead of Kazmir as a LHSP*****).

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) December 14, 2015

Don't Waver: The Orioles Made The Right Move With Markakis

Not counting J.J. Hardy's struggles at the plate this season, the most obvious spot to blame for the Orioles' scattered offensive issues is corner outfield. The Orioles have been shuffling between Alejandro De Aza, Steve Pearce, Travis Snider, Delmon Young, David Lough, Nolan Reimold, Chris Parmelee, and now Chris Davis. De Aza (traded) and Young (designated for assignment) are gone, but the rest remain. It seems unlikely that the Orioles will be able to carry this many outfielders for the rest of the season, and it's also probable that they'll continue to pursue trade options.

That brings us to Wednesday's Baltimore Sun column by Dan Connolly. In it, Connolly remarks on the team's non-Adam Jones outfield issues, and he also includes intriguing quotes from Buck Showalter and Jones on dealing with the revolving door of outfielders. Read the article and see what you think.

Let's get this out of the way first, because not much has changed on the Nick Markakis/Nelson Cruz front. It's common for writers and fans alike to look back and say, hey, the Orioles should have brought back Markakis and Cruz (they won the American League East last year! etc.). Both topics have been covered at Camden Depot multiple times, the most recent being on Cruz. In his column, Connolly writes, "Besides having to replace their leadership and potential offensive production, the Orioles have missed a duo that started a combined 217 games in the corner-outfield spots last year. . . . Things, it now can be said, have not worked out as planned."

Obviously the Orioles figured most, if not all, of their corner outfielders would have performed better offensively. And it's hard to look at how Cruz hit in the first half and wonder how that would have helped this year's Orioles.

Still, there's this:

2014: 4.35 runs per game (5th in AL)
2015: 4.40 runs per game (4th)

Anyway, let's focus on Markakis. Do you think the Orioles have missed Markakis's leadership or clubhouse chemistry factor? Perhaps you're right. It's also impossible to prove, just like saying the lack of Jonathan Schoop's "easy smile and playful fun nature" in any way contributed to the O's struggles earlier in the season. The "missing leadership" rationale is frequently applied to fit a narrative when nothing otherwise will.

Instead, when focusing on tangible evidence of Markakis's play in recent years and the first portion of this season, it's more of the same. As Connolly notes, the Orioles were concerned about Markakis requiring offseason neck surgery. And maybe his recovery from that injury has played a part in his power outage.

Players with over 350 PA in 2015 with no home runs: Nick Markakis. No one else. #Braves #Orioles

— Jon Shepherd (@jsbearr) July 13, 2015

Markakis could need more time to fully recover. Watching him in his prime was a joy, and it would be wonderful if he returned to form. But his dwindling power has been a concern for a few years now. According to data from Baseball Heat Maps, here are Markakis's average fly ball distances since 2012:

2012: 284 feet
2013: 271
2014: 268
2015: 260

Now let's check out some batted ball data from FanGraphs. Markakis is not hitting the ball as hard...

2012: 32.6 Hard%
2013: 28.8
2014: 27.3
2015: 27.1

... or pulling it:

2012: 34.2 Pull%
2013: 32.9
2014: 31.4
2015: 29.9

And that's led to an increase in him hitting the ball on the ground:

2012: 41.8 GB%
2013: 46.6
2014: 45.9
2015: 51.4

If Markakis were a faster runner and able to leg out more infield hits, that might be less of an issue. But speed is not part of his game. It's probably a bit fluky that he doesn't have at least one home run, especially since he's hit 20 doubles. Regardless, his .353 slugging percentage would be the worst of his career.

Also, his .381 on-base percentage is very good, and it would be his best mark since 2008. But he's been fortunate on balls in play (.345 BABIP; .317 career mark), and it's unlikely he'll be able to carry on with a walk percentage near 12% (career around 9%), especially since he's seeing the highest percentage of pitches in the strike zone (for him) since 2010 (51.2%). He's not able to do as much damage with one swing, and pitchers are starting to go after him more.

Markakis has a wRC+ of 108, and that would have helped the Orioles somewhat. It's higher than Snider (94), Pearce (89), De Aza (70), and Lough (70). Parmelee and Reimold have hit better, though in much smaller samples. But both UZR and DRS have the O's group of right fielders better defensively than Braves' right fielders (nearly all defensive innings belonging to Markakis):

Orioles RF: +0.6 UZR, +4 DRS
Braves RF: -0.1 UZR, -2 DRS

And remember, the Braves still owe Markakis $31.5 million over the next three seasons.

This team has flaws, but it's still in the playoff race. And yes, the corner outfield plan hasn't worked out so far. The Chris Davis in right field experiment is in full swing, and if he somehow manages to be a mediocre defender, it could work. But thanks to improvements from other players (Manny Machado and Jimmy Paredes, in particular), the O's offense has been just fine (frustrating at times, but fine). Meanwhile, the team's offseason indecision on the starting rotation has probably hurt the team more (not opening a spot for Kevin Gausman) than not bringing Markakis back. But sometimes it's hard to let go.

What Does Travis Snider Bring to the Orioles?

Editor's note: I recently answered some questions for a 2015 team preview of the Orioles for Razzball. It doesn't include anything specific about Travis Snider, and we are still about two months away from opening day, but you might find it interesting. Look out for at least one or two more team previews as we get closer to the beginning of the season. Thanks.

It would an oversimplification to think the Orioles chose just Travis Snider over Nick Markakis. Really, the O's chose Snider, Steve Pearce, and financial flexibility over Markakis. Snider won't be filling the Markakis role. He won't be playing every game in right field, but he will be filling in more at designated hitter and if needed could see some innings in left field. But Snider will play a lot in right field, he is left handed, and he is on the Orioles, so some will inevitably compare him to Markakis, particularly those angered by Markakis's departure.

Snider is not Markakis. They are both former first-round draft picks -- Markakis (7th) in 2003; Snider in 2006 (14th) -- but each player has taken a much different career path. Clearly, Snider does not come close to Markakis's career accomplishments. One quick way to view that would be to observe their career wins above replacement totals:

Nick Markakis: 25.8 bWAR, 22.6 fWAR
Travis Snider: 4.2 bWAR, 2.7 fWAR

Markakis was arguably the Orioles' best player for about a decade (Adam Jones is right there, and did so with less playing time). Add in that Markakis was a homegrown talent -- something that's been rare for the Orioles during a period of truly awful baseball (basically 1998-2011) -- and it's not difficult to understand why so many fans latched on to Markakis and are having trouble letting him go.

Markakis has been a popular topic on Camden Depot; both his achievements and shortcomings have been analyzed frequently. So it has been noted often enough that Markakis was not a superstar. And it's not a dig to realize that the 2008 version of Markakis would have been extremely tough to replace, while the 2014 version is not.

So why is Snider the better fit for the Orioles? He's four years younger, and he possesses something that Markakis doesn't: some upside. Markakis hasn't been a great player for a while, and even though he's only 31, he does seem to have more wear on him than most. He has played in at least 155 games in every season but two: in 2006 (147), his rookie season; and in 2012 (104), when he missed part of the season after breaking his wrist and then missed the rest of the season after a CC Sabathia fastball broke his left thumb in September. Of course it's not a bad thing to be a durable, everyday player, but there's at least some health concern, as Markakis's recent neck surgery apparently worried the O's enough to back off a longer-term deal. The Orioles aren't always right about these things, but they are right often enough.

It's tough to ignore Snider's early career struggles. He showed a good amount of promise in his rookie season, posting a .301/.338/.466 (110 wRC+) line in a limited sample. The next couple seasons he hovered around a wRC+ of 100 while struggling to carve out consistent playing time. His production then fell off a cliff in 2011 (63 wRC+ in 202 plate appearances), and the Blue Jays traded him in the summer of 2012 to the Pirates for Brad Lincoln, another underwhelming 2006 first-round draft pick.

For the rest of 2012, Snider wasn't good (84 wRC+). And he certainly wasn't good in 2013 (71 wRC+) while playing through a nagging left foot injury. Snider eventually had surgery in the offseason to fix the issue. But in 2014, Snider was healthy and posted a career best 121 wRC+ while setting career highs in games (140) and plate appearances (359). Snider wasn't fortunate on balls in play (.298 BABIP), though he did have a modest uptick in his HR/FB rate (16.5% vs. career 13.3%). He also cut down on his strikeouts (18.7%) -- he never struck out less than 24.8% of the time in any other season -- walked more than he had in any season since 2009, and chased fewer pitches outside the zone than in any other season while making contact on 81.3% of his pitches (previous high of 79.1%). Still, one season of improved offensive performance shouldn't convince anyone that Snider is going to be fantastic or that he'll definitely hit a ton of home runs in a ballpark more suited to left-handed power than PNC Park.

Steamer projects Markakis to finish with a 101 wRC+ in 2015. It projects Snider to have a 116 wRC+ in 101 plate appearances. Certainly Snider is going to play much more than that, but it wouldn't be surprising if he outperformed Markakis. Much of Markakis's career is behind him, almost certainly including his best work. That might not be the case for Snider. And while Markakis does possess some on-base skills (Snider is close or maybe a little worse in that department), he doesn't currently have the same level of power that Snider does.

Even including his up-and-down, disappointing earlier seasons, Snider still has a greater career isolated power (.160) than Markakis (.145). He has fared better in hitting for power against all three types of pitches -- hard, breaking, and offspeed:

Player	Hard ISO	Breaking ISO	Offspeed ISO
Markakis	.129	.157	.139
Snider	.163	.160	.145

The breaking and offspeed categories are close, but Snider is better at hammering fastballs. And in 2014, Snider's ISO was double Markakis's when facing hard pitches (.189 vs. .095). He was also better against breaking pitches, though he did struggle against offspeed (Markakis wasn't great in this area, either).

Snider, who as noted above was much better plate discipline wise in 2014, did a better job of making pitchers pay when they threw him pitches in the middle of the plate or inside. Here's his ISO zone profile in 2014:

... vs. his career ISO zone profile:

He also swung and missed less on pitches in the zone, which is key since he was already chasing fewer pitches outside of it. Pitchers want to attack Snider away (and down), so swinging and missing at fewer of those pitches obviously helped.

Maybe you view what Snider accomplished last season as a fluke. It might be. But it may also be an example of a hitter refining his approach at the plate. Not every player improves or matures at the same rate.

Markakis's body of work is much larger, so there's more to analyze and predict what he will do. That's not the case for Snider, who has the upside advantage or unknown variable, whatever you want to call it. Mike Petriello of FanGraphs even referred to Snider as a "lottery ticket." That seems more than fair.

Shifting gears quickly to discuss defense, Markakis has won two Gold Gloves. Snider hasn't won any. But, as a reminder, Gold Gloves aren't a great indicator of outstanding defensive performance. I've always thought of Markakis as a decent to good defender who has a strong, accurate arm and makes most of the routine plays, but lacks range. But I'm not a scout. The advanced metrics differ on how good Markakis is in right field:

UZR: -2.5 (UZR/150: -0.3)
DRS: +6

While Markakis has mostly played right field, Snider has split his time between left and right field. Oddly enough, he's been much better in left field, according to the metrics:

LF UZR: 5.8 (UZR/150: 5.3)
RF UZR: -5.9 (UZR/150: -5.5)
LF DRS:  +16
RF DRS: -4

Maybe Snider is more comfortable in left field. Or maybe it doesn't mean a whole lot, since Snider still hasn't played a ton of innings overall in his career. He still seems like, at worst, an average outfielder. Maybe he's a little worse than Markakis, but either way, it's close.

Snider will make $2.1 million in 2015, and he has one arbitration-eligible year remaining after that. So he'll most likely see another modest raise in 2016. So the O's could end up paying, for example, around $5 or $6 million for Snider's age 27 and 28 seasons. Meanwhile, the Braves are locked in to a four-year, $44 million deal with Markakis for his age 31-34 seasons. Maybe Markakis will end up proving many analysts and fans wrong who think the Braves unnecessarily overpaid for his services. But the O's could end up getting similar production, both offensively and defensively, from Snider for a couple seasons at a fraction of the cost. Snider has not yet demonstrated that he can be a full-time player, and maybe he can't. But the O's will already have decisions to make beyond this season with so many impending free agents (including outfielders Steve Pearce and Alejandro De Aza). So Snider will get plenty of opportunities.

Not only did the O's minimize risk by not matching or exceeding Atlanta's offer for Markakis, but they also picked up a seemingly improving player with power who will be able to fill multiple roles. It's all right to be sad that Markakis is gone but to also realize that a Pearce/Snider combination in right field could and probably should outperform Markakis.

Photo via Keith Allison

O's Logically Decide to Let Nick Markakis Walk

Remember in 2011 when the Orioles couldn't find a general manager? Jerry Dipoto didn't want the job. Neither did Tony LaCava. Or Allard Baird. Or DeJon Watson. I'm sure there were others. Dan Duquette was an afterthought, and the whole thing was a circus. But thanks to Duquette and Buck Showalter, the Orioles have averaged about 91 wins the past three seasons and made the playoffs twice.

Duquette is clearly in charge now, and that the Orioles would be willing to let a fan and owner favorite walk speaks to his influence on the direction of the franchise. It's about results, and value, and who can help the Orioles win more games.

A few weeks ago, the Atlanta Braves traded away Jason Heyward. And last night, they inked his replacement:

Source: OF Nick Markakis agrees to four-year deal with Atlanta Braves. Dollars unclear, but sides discussed a deal in neighborhood of $44M.
— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) December 3, 2014

Nick Markakis wanted a four-year deal, and he got it. The Orioles seem to have underestimated Markakis's popularity on the open market. I'm sure they wish they could go back and extend him the qualifying offer. Not only would that have limited some teams' interest in signing him, but it would have netted the O's another draft pick (after Nelson Cruz left) if he still decided to leave.

Early in the process, the Orioles seemed willing to offer Markakis four years. But at some point that changed, and the O's eventually were no longer the favorite to sign Markakis. Roch Kubatko discussed the situation on Tuesday:

The Orioles and Markakis' agent, Jamie Murphy, were working on a four-year deal, but talks stalled and there's been limited contact beyond the general managers' meetings last month in Phoenix. Duquette stated earlier today that the Orioles are "still in discussions with Nick." He wouldn't place odds on a deal getting done.

According to multiple sources, the Orioles are trying to iron out any misgivings they may have concerning the length of the contract. Though Markakis played in 155 games this season, they're doing a thorough check on him physically and may be more comfortable offering three years.

Ken Rosenthal also mentioned last night that health reasons may have been what scared the O's away from offering that fourth year. That's nothing new for the Orioles. Just ask Grant Balfour. Perhaps it's a frustrating way of conducting business, but it sure seems as if the Orioles are interested in being as thorough as possible before handing out millions of dollars.

So now the Orioles will be without the services of Cruz and Markakis going forward. Predictably, some fans are panicking. To many, it's one thing to lose Cruz, who was fantastic last season but had only been in Baltimore for one season, but it's another to watch Markakis leave. He was drafted by the O's in 2003, made his debut in 2006, and showed flashes of brilliance before settling in as a decent but not great player.

But that's really the key to looking at the loss of Markakis: The Orioles did not lose the 2007 or 2008 versions of Markakis. They lost the current player, who is entering his decline years.

Yesterday, Mike Petriello of FanGraphs attempted to answer a basic question: What are we missing about Nick Markakis? He wanted to see if there was something we had been overlooking about Markakis, and why a few teams were in a bidding war for him. After some terrific analysis, Petriello concluded:

Let’s say you disagree with Markakis’ defensive ratings, that you prefer to think of him as a 2 WAR player, which isn’t unfair. That’s a league-average player. Markakis seems like a league-average player. . . . Markakis is a steady player, nothing more, with little upside remaining and age squarely against him, one who could look worse outside of Camden depending on where he winds up. Some team is going to pay heavily for that. Some team is going to regret doing so.

That's not exactly a glowing review. And, more or less, it reflects much of the analysis of Markakis over the years from various Camden Depot writers. When many fans look at Markakis, they see that 2008 player; they cherish that homegrown talent. They expect line drives all over the field, a rifle arm, and a right fielder who rarely makes an error. He does still possess those qualities, to some degree, but they don't add up to the level of player you would expect.

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Let's also tackle a couple of other overused and unoriginal thoughts when it comes to the O's front office and free agents. The first is the notion that the Orioles are cheap. Apparently the O's, and especially Peter Angelos, are being cheap by not bringing back Cruz and Markakis. This is also something that gets brought up any time a significant percentage of fans want the O's to spend money on a certain player and it doesn't happen. Remember, there were complaints about the O's being cheap when they shipped Jim Johnson to Oakland.

I want the owners of my favorite teams to spend money. I want them to work to create the best possible team. But the "it's not my money" argument has always been silly, as Jeff Sullivan recently discussed on Twitter:

it's *someone's* money, and the less money that someone has available, the less they can afford to make your sports team better than it is
— Jeff Sullivan (@based_ball) December 2, 2014

And, of course, spending the most money does not equal guaranteed success. It's also foolish to suggest the Orioles aren't spending much money on players. A couple years ago, Adam Jones signed a six-year, $85.5 million contract -- the largest in Orioles' history. Does that not count? They spent $50 million to bring in Ubaldo Jimenez (oops!) last offseason. They recently re-signed J.J. Hardy. Markakis previously had a lucrative contract. Last year, the O's were 15th in the majors in team payroll. They were near teams in similar market sizes. And with arbitration raises and plenty of freed-up money left to spend in free agency or on players acquired via potential trades, the O's could certainly move a few spots ahead.

If the O's don't end up spending a chunk of that money they saved from not inking Cruz and Markakis, then they deserve to be ridiculed. But there's plenty of offseason time left for things to happen. The O's may end up getting creative, but that doesn't mean they won't be spending money.

The second point is that with players like Matt Wieters and Chris Davis entering their final year of arbitration, the O's aren't taking their position of being in win-now mode seriously. To that, I say, we have different ideas of what it takes to win now. If the Orioles really wanted to win now and money was no issue, they'd target the top free agents. We advocated for doing that last year, to go along with a very strong core of established players.

How much better would the Orioles have been with Robinson Cano at second base? Jacoby Ellsbury in the outfield? Masahiro Tanaka in the starting rotation? We'll never know. Signing Jimenez was viewed as a win-now move, and he currently has the worst contract on the team. Would it have been worth weighing down the chances of future O's teams to bring back, on four-year deals, two players on the downside of their careers? Maybe some would have taken that chance, but I don't agree with it. The Orioles are not the Dodgers or Yankees; they don't have seemingly endless money to spend. They will spend money, but signing someone like Jimenez hurts them more than a team like the Yankees. It's not surprising that the O's have at least been trying to free themselves of Jimenez and the remaining three years on his deal.

It's not a bad strategy to refuse to overpay for a player, even if it doesn't look great in the short term. And considering the team's current core and the low-risk, high-reward moves that Duquette and Showalter have been able to cook up, I'm not sure I'd count the O's out of anything just yet.

It's going to be strange to watch Markakis play in a different jersey. He was a bright spot on several awful Orioles teams. We wish him well.

Photo via Keith Allison

O's Corner Outfield Situation Up in the Air

Over the last few months at Camden Depot, we've had plenty of discussions about free agents Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis. We've been preparing for the eventual departure of Cruz, since the Orioles seemed reluctant to offer him a four-year contract, which he desperately wanted. And yesterday, the Mariners agreed to a four-year, $57 million deal with Cruz (pending a physical, of course).

It's not surprising that Cruz took the best offer available. And while it doesn't seem like the Mariners signed Cruz to a terrible contract, it is certainly risky enough and is a deal the Orioles didn't feel comfortable offering. It's also odd that the Mariners ownership apparently torpedoed a reasonable deal for Cruz last offseason, but now they are all on board with a four-year deal because Cruz had a monster 2014?

The Orioles were very good last season, and Cruz was a big part of that. But their stance all along had been a maximum length of three years for Cruz; they stuck with it. That type of logical restraint, which seemingly removed the emotional high of last year's playoff run from the equation, is something many fans have wanted from the Orioles' front office for a long time. It's never fun to lose a popular, talented player, but it's even less fun to cheer for a losing team that is anchored down by an expensive, aging ballplayer. The key is to explore every avenue, which Dan Duquette appears to be doing. And again, they did want Cruz back, but they were willing to keep that desire in check.

Nelson Cruz will be 34 next year. In 2014, just three 34-year-olds were worth at least 1.5 bWAR (Pujols, Holliday, LaRoche).
— Joe Sheehan (@joe_sheehan) December 1, 2014

The O's were unwilling to offer Nate McLouth a two-year deal last year, so they let him walk. They weren't willing to pay a closer, Jim Johnson, $10 million in his last year of arbitration. They've been fortunate with many of these moves, though the Ubaldo Jimenez contract certainly sticks out right now as one they wish they could have back. But they have been able to establish guidelines about the amount of risk they are able to shoulder. That stance is not always popular with fans who become attached to certain players.

That strategy is going to be tested with Markakis. Like with Cruz, we've provided lots of analysis lately on if the O's should re-sign Markakis and what they should do if he departs, but I doubt most fans actually believe he would leave Baltimore. But after the latest report from The Baltimore Sun's Dan Connolly, Markakis leaving finally seems like a real possibility. According to Connolly:

Although the specific holdup is not known, there has been some talk within the Orioles organization that the club is no longer comfortable with a four-year deal for Markakis. If that’s the case it would explain why the negotiations have halted, since it is believed the sides had agreed to the length of the contract early on in discussions.

A four-year contract again seems to be a sticking point, though that's more surprising considering Markakis recently turned 31, while Cruz is 34. But it's not unreasonable thinking, either, with some analysts like Keith Law recently wondering how good Markakis really is.

I'll admit that it would hurt a bit to see Markakis in a Blue Jays or Yankees uniform. It was strange to see Brian Roberts donning the pinstripes last season. But he wasn't all that good; then he was gone. It would be hard to get used to Markakis wearing another team's jersey, but it would be even tougher if he manages to play well for a few years. That's the gamble, and it's what makes the allure of free agency hard to resist.

Still, this approach to free agency is not about being cheap, which some can't help but bring up any time the Orioles and money are discussed. It's amusing to go back and read Peter Schmuck's column last year on how Peter Angelos and his minions were behind the Johnson-to-Oakland trade last year, as if that was some gross injustice instead of a smart baseball decision. If anything, Angelos, who apparently loves Markakis, would want to bring him back at nearly any price. That Markakis's exit seems possible should strengthen O's fans' trust that Duquette is running the show and focused on building a consistent winner. Duquette is far from a perfect general manager, if one even exists, but he does seem to have an overall game plan every offseason, and it's hard to argue against the team's success these past few years.

If you're looking for more on what the O's should do without Cruz and potentially Markakis, here's some Depot coverage from the last month-plus:

On Nick Markakis and Why the Orioles Should Pick Up His Option

Why Alejandro De Aza Will Be More Valuable Than Nelson Cruz in 2015

Why the Orioles Don't Need Nick Markakis

Davis Could Provide Cruz-like Production in 2015

Is Nick Markakis an Everyday Player?

Orioles Trade Target: Michael Saunders

The 2015 Orioles Outfield Will Be Fine Without Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis

Should Melky Cabrera Be the O's 'Fallback Option'?

Are the Orioles a Fit for Matt Kemp?

Photo via Keith Allison

The 2015 Orioles Outfield Will Be Fine Without Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis

Photo by Keith Allison

Two key members of the Orioles' 2014 outfield, Nelson Cruz and Nick Markakis, are free agents. Cruz, as expected, rejected the club's qualifying offer, which means the Orioles will get a draft pick as compensation if he signs with another club. The club declined Markakis' mutual option and did not extend him a qualifying offer, so there is no compensation if he signs elsewhere.

Many people still think the Orioles are the favorite for Cruz, and he has made it clear that his first choice is to return to Baltimore. While most people around the team still expect Markakis to return to the club, that outcome seems less likely than it did a week ago.

Losing both of these players would mean a loss of 6.4 fWAR from the Orioles outfield (For the sake of simplicity, I'm considering Cruz, Jones, Markakis, and Lough the Orioles 2014 OF. Yes, Cruz did DH. And Pearce played some OF, but Lough played a lot more innings in the OF than him). This is obviously a noticeable loss and it would be understandable to start scouring the list of free agents and potential trade candidates to replace this loss of production. Here and elsewhere, the name Nori Aoki has been thrown around as a possible replacement.

But, the Orioles outfield will be perfectly fine in 2015 as it stands right now. This isn't to say that they won't or shouldn't make any moves, but there's no need to panic if they don't.

Player	‘14 wRC+	Player	‘15 Projected wRC+
Jones	117	Jones	115
Cruz	137	Pearce	129
Markakis	106	De Aza	104
Lough	95	Lough	92
wRC+ weighted by PA	118	wRC+ weighted by PA	113

While the loss of both Cruz and Markakis feels significant, the drop in offensive production would not be too significant. The Orioles outfield was 18% above league average last season, offensively speaking. In 2015, they are projected to be 13% above average,

The main issue would be the fact that De Aza and Lough both struggle against LHP, but the impact of this could be softened by bringing in a Delmon Young-type player for some AB's against LHP. Those concerned that Pearce will fall harder back to earth than projected raise a fair point, but a spot in the everyday lineup is his to lose entering 2015.

And this says nothing of the defensive improvements this potential 2015 outfield could bring. The positive impact of giving Lough more innings in the outfield has been touched on here before. Swapping out Markakis (career -0.6 UZR/150) for De Aza (3.6) would also provide an upgrade defensively. On top of that, Pearce is an adequate outfielder (career +5.0 UZR/150), while Cruz (+ 2.9) has okay numbers, but he's 34 and not getting any more agile. On top of that, Cruz sure looked a lot worse than +2.9 UZR/150 outfielder last season.

It's still entirely possible that the Orioles will bring back both Cruz and Markakis. If both players leave, I'd expect the team to do something to address the outfield position through trade or free agency. But the need to do so isn't urgent and there's no reason to panic if they enter 2015 with the outfield currently on the roster.

Orioles Trade Target: Michael Saunders

Michael Saunders (photo via Keith Allison)

Now that the Orioles have decided to officially not take my advice by declining the $17.5 million team option on Nick Markakis, they should probably take our own Matt Perez’s advice and not bring him back for the 2015 season at all.  Yesterday, while discussing whether Markakis is even an everyday player at this point in his career, Matt Kremnitzer touched on the rumors that the Orioles free agent right fielder is looking at contract offers going for 4 years, at anywhere from $40-48 million.  If that’s the case, the team should probably let Markakis walk, and either replace him or go into the 2015 season with an outfield of Adam Jones, Steve Pearce, Alejandro De Aza, and David Lough.

Whether or not the Orioles will have suitable outfield depth without Nelson Cruz and Markakis is debatable, but personally, I’m a little uncomfortable with the non-Cruz, non-Markakis outfield situation, and would lean towards acquiring a replacement for one of them.  As I mentioned in my previous post on Markakis, the free agent market for outfielders this offseason isn’t inspiring, so the best option is likely through a trade.  And one of the best values on the outfield trade market appears to be Seattle outfielder Michael Saunders.

If you take a look at Michael Saunders’ career numbers, they are a little underwhelming.  In 553 career games (almost 3.5 seasons worth of plate appearances), Saunders has produced a triple slash line of .231/.301/.384, which equates to a 92 wRC+.  In other words, he’s been 8% worse than your average major league hitter since he debuted in 2009.  Combined with above average baserunning and below average defense, and he’s been worth 5.0 wins above replacement according to Fangraphs.  However, if you take a look at his seasons individually, you start to see that he may be much more valuable than his career line shows.

Michael Saunders career numbers by year

As you can see from the table, Saunders has been an average or above average hitter in each season since 2012, and he’s produced nearly all of his positive career fWAR during those 3 seasons.  However, if you look a little closer at the 2012 and 2013 seasons, you can see that his overall value has been held back by his defense, when he played the majority of his games in centerfield.  Needless to say, advanced defensive metrics don’t approve of Saunders’ play in centerfield, as he’s accumulated -9.8 UZR (-6.0 UZR/150) and has been worth -25 defensive runs saved in 2,161 innings.  Obviously, that’s not good.  But the good news is that the Orioles wouldn’t need Saunders to roam centerfield since that position is currently occupied by one of the best in the game.  They won’t even need him as a backup centerfielder either, as long as David Lough is on the roster.  If the Orioles were to trade for Saunders, he would be in one of the corners (most likely right field), where he grades out as a much better defender.

Michael Saunders career defensive stats in LF and RF

Saunders had his best year offensively by far in 2014, getting on base, and hitting for much more power in previous years, finishing the season with a 126 wRC+.  He also spent the majority of his time in right field, which helped put him on the overall positive side of defensive statistics for the first time since 2010 (a year mostly spent in CF that now looks like an outlier).  It may be a little too optimistic (more on that in a second), but if you prorate Saunders’ 2014 season out to a full 600 PA’s, he would have produced just over 4.3 fWAR, which is great, especially for someone who made just $2.3 million in 2014, his first year of arbitration. That’s another reason to trade for Saunders: he has two more years of team control before becoming a free agent.  And since he hasn’t put up big numbers in his career to date, his final two years in arbitration shouldn’t break the bank.  In fact, Tim Dierkes is projecting Saunders to receive $2.9 million in 2015, only a modest raise from last year’s salary.

The knock on Saunders is that he hasn’t been able to stay on the field, and his injury table at Baseball Prospectus is a little bit intimidating, as it initially appears to be longer than one would like.  However, he was listed as day to day for the majority of those injuries, and has only been on the disabled list 3 times during his career, missing a total of 82 games, most of which was the result of a left oblique strain.  Unfortunately, 2 of those DL stints occurred in 2014, while the other was in 2013, and it’s the primary reason he didn’t get more plate appearances last year.

The other concern with a Saunders acquisition would be the potential (or more rather likely) platoon issues.  While Saunders hit well against southpaws last year (100 wRC+), he’s typically been a much weaker hitter when facing left-handed pitching.  Over the course of his career, his 78 wRC+ against left-handers pales in comparison to his 99 wRC+ against right-handers.  It’s possible that his ability to hit left-handed pitching improved last year, but I wouldn’t necessarily bet on it, since he only faced left-handers in 61 PA’s, and despite a 30% line drive rate against them, his BABIP of .372 seems unsustainable.  If his platoon issues persist, the addition of Saunders would appear to be redundant, as he would be the 3^rd “good defense, can’t hit left-handed pitching” outfielder on the roster.  However, adding Saunders would allow the Orioles to shop and/or non-tender Alejandro De Aza, which would likely save them approximately $3 million (MLB Trade Rumors projects De Aza’s 2015 salary at $5.9 million), while also adding a player with an extra year of team control.

The acquisition of Michael Saunders allows the Orioles to replace the production they would have received by keeping Nick Markakis, at a lower cost and without a 4-year commitment.  In fact, there’s a good argument to be made that Saunders could be at least twice as productive as Markakis in 2015 and beyond.  Saunders shouldn’t cost too much in terms of a return either, since the Mariners basically announced to the league earlier this month that they were looking to deal him (with some comments from Mariners GM Jack Zduriencik questioning Saunders’ conditioning sprinkled in for good measure).  The Mariners are looking to win now and could use another starter, so maybe offering Miguel Gonzalez would get the job done.  Although, depending on how sour the relationship between Saunders and the Mariners has gotten, it may not even take that much.