Looking At The Orioles 2016 Steamer Predictions

 Posted by Matt Perez
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Fangraphs has recently uploaded the first batch of projections via the Steamer projection system for the 2016 season. This is one of the first projection system to release a batch of projections and therefore can be used to get a basic understanding of how the 2016 Orioles look before the start of free agency.

Before starting on this task, it’s worth noting that Steamer has already stated on twitter that their playing time projections aren’t particularly sensible at the moment. Indeed, this system is even giving guys like Travis Snider, Delmon Young and David Lough playing time for the 2016 Orioles’. I believe that they have recently removed playing time from their projections.

After removing soon-to-be free agents, Steamer projects the 2016 Orioles to earn 10.8 position player and 9.5 pitching fWAR, implying that the Orioles should be expected to win 68 games. The Orioles’ free agents are worth another 10.6 fWAR total, and thus the Orioles would be a 79 win team if they didn’t lose a single free agent. All in all, this is a glum projection for the Orioles’ and sits in stark contrast to Jon’s prediction made earlier in the month. So, it’s interesting that a closer look suggests that these WAR totals don’t necessarily predict the same thing that other Steamer statistics show.

On the offensive side, there are relatively few surprises. Steamer projects Schoop will regress and end up with a .249/.288/.422 line while projecting that JJ Hardy will have a bounce back year with a .239/.280/.363 line. It isn't clear whether Steamer takes into account his labrum injury and is a potential shortcoming of the model. 

The first step to projecting offensive production is to take the plate appearances projected for each player (no longer available) and the players positions. The remaining plate appearances at each position would be taken by replacement level players who performs 10% worse than the average player at his position. For the sake of simplicity, I will presume that each position (including pitcher) has the same of plate appearances in 2016 as they did in 2015. Once that’s complete, the depth chart looks like this and the results per position are shown below.

The results show how the Orioles’ lineup is weak. Steamer projects the Orioles to be top-ten at only third base (Manny Machado) and center field (Adam Jones). They expect the Orioles to be slightly below average at catcher and second base while receiving terrible offensive performances at first, shortstop, left field, right field and DH which come as a surprise to no one. When inputting these results into the lineup simulator used by Jon in his post, the Orioles should be expected to score 661 runs. In 2015, this would have been the 20th most runs scored in MLB and would tie for 12th highest in the AL with the Angels. All in all, it seems plausible that Machado and Jones wouldn’t be enough to save the offense but would be enough to keep it from being the worst in the AL.

This is also 14 fewer runs than Jon’s method projected for the Orioles. Given that Steamer thinks that players like Reimold and Urrutia are better offensively than a replacement level corner outfielder, Walker is better than a replacement level first baseman while Joseph and Clevenger are better than replacement level catchers, it is likely that a depth chart projecting those players to play significant innings would further narrow the distance between the two projections.

The next task is to do something similar for the pitching side. Steamer released projected innings pitched and earned runs allowed by each pitcher. I presume that each pitcher pitches the amount of innings that Steamer predicts and that replacement pitchers throw the remaining innings. A replacement level starter should have an ERA of 5.76 while a replacement level reliever should have an ERA of 4.63. On average, the Orioles pitching staff pitches roughly 1450 innings per year, of which the bullpen throws 540 and the rotation throws 910 while the Orioles’ fielding allows 35 unearned runs. The chart shows the results.

The Orioles may lose O’Day and Chen but will still have a strong bullpen and good fielding. The Steamer projections suggest that the bullpen will be deep and therefore be able to throw quality innings. Even without O’Day, and with Steamer projecting significant regression, the Orioles’ bullpen is still tied for #17th in the majors. All ten of the relievers on the Orioles' depth chart are better than replacement level and therefore the Orioles' bullpen should improve as the depth chart is updated.

The rotation is still projected to be poor with the loss of Chen and ranked only 25th in the majors as they were in 2015. Steamer believes that Orioles’ starting pitching will regress to the mean and therefore make up for the loss of Chen. Overall, this method projects that the Orioles will allow 721 runs. This is good enough to for 19th in MLB and 10th in the AL.

If the Orioles were to allow 721 runs and score 661 runs then they should win 75 games. This is three fewer wins than the 78 that Jon projected but is considerably closer to his projection than the 68 wins that Steamer projects via WAR. Furthermore, improvements in the depth charts will help the bridge the gap.

Steamers’ WAR projections suggest that the 2016 Orioles should consider rebuilding while their other statistics suggest that a few more pieces can turn the tide. It is interesting that they each tell different stories and probably means that the Orioles are in a better situation than a first look at Steamer might indicate.

Rumor Has It...2016 Orioles Edition (10/26/15)

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This series considers briefly players who have been connected to the Orioles by the press.  You can find previous post here.

This post considers players mentioned in:
A Look at a Few Pitchers..., Steve Melewski
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The growing mantra being leaked out of the Orioles front office is that the club was to shore up its starting rotation.  It is uncertain if Melewski was fed these names or if through his own experience finds these pitchers as probable for the Orioles to focus on.  Regardless, we will address them here.

Marco Estrada, RHSP
Arbitration Eligible: No
Currently Under Contract: No
Qualifying Offer: Unlikely
Projected Contract: 4 / 44 MM
Fastball: 89 mph, Curveball: 77 mph, Changeup: 79 mph

Past Five Seasons:

Year	Age	W	L	ERA	IP	ERA+	FIP	BB9	SO9	bWAR	fWAR
2011	27	4	8	4.08	92.2	97	3.67	2.8	8.5	0.4	0.9
2012	28	5	7	3.64	138.1	113	3.35	1.9	9.3	1.5	3.3
2013	29	7	4	3.87	128.0	100	3.86	2.0	8.3	1.6	1.8
2014	30	7	6	4.36	150.2	87	4.88	2.6	7.6	0.6	-0.1
2015	31	13	8	3.13	181.0	126	4.40	2.7	6.5	3.6	1.8
8 Yrs		36	34	3.95	722.0	100	4.19	2.5	8.0

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

In our own series, it was suggested that Estrada could be had for four years around 32 MM, but the algorithm disagrees slightly.  If someone really believes Estrada is responsible for the poor contact off of him this year, then you will likely see this deal and maybe something richer.  As it stands, the word percolating throughout baseball is that Estrada is a fringe QO case.  The Blue Jays do not want him back at 15.8 MM, but Estrada could make serious money declining the option.

For the Orioles, he is another non-traditional pitcher for Camden Yards.  He has extreme fly ball percentages and actually led the National League in home runs allowed in 2014 even though he only threw 150.2 IP.  I would argue that a pitcher like Estrada is someone you would like to possess as an arbitration year player as opposed to a free agent where you must commit multiyear money.  To be blunt, I have no idea why anyone would prefer Estrada over Miguel Gonzalez or Chris Tillman.

Doug Fister, RHSP
Arbitration Eligible: No
Currently Under Contract: No
Qualifying Offer: Highly Unlikely
Projected Contract: 1 / 12 MM
Fastball (2S): 86 mph, Cutter: 82 mph, Curveball: 71 mph, Changeup: 79 mph

Past Five Seasons:

Year	Age	W	L	ERA	IP	ERA+	FIP	BB9	SO9	bWAR	fWAR
2011	27	11	13	2.83	216.1	138	3.02	1.5	6.1	2.5	5.1
2012	28	10	10	3.45	161.2	123	3.42	2.1	7.6	3.3	3.4
2013	29	14	9	3.67	208.2	113	3.26	1.9	6.9	4.1	4.2
2014	30	16	6	2.41	164.0	155	3.93	1.3	5.4	4.5	1.4
2015	31	5	7	4.19	103.0	96	4.55	2.1	5.5	0.2	0.2
7 Yrs		65	63	3.42	1085.2	117	3.62	1.8	6.1

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

Fister is another player whose recent struggles, lost velocity, and injury has taken what was once considered an easy payday into needing to reestablish value.  2014 saw the beginning of Fister losing velocity and seeking out a cutter a la Dan Haren.  This past season has seen Fister lose further velocity and rely a little bit more with a mix that includes the cutter.  The 2015 hiccup may simply be Fister learning to adapt or it may well be that he is no longer an elitish pitcher.

For the Orioles, the hope is more realistically attached to Fister learning how to use his current skill set as opposed to him regaining form, which would seem like a deus ex machina event at the moment.  The shadow of his former excellence is likely to push his value up an extra million or so, but it seems that other pitchers look a bit more promising as reclamations (read: Mat Latos).

Ian Kennedy, RHSP
Arbitration Eligible: No
Currently Under Contract: No
Qualifying Offer: Likely
Projected Contract: 1 / 7 MM
Fastball: 91 mph, Slider: 85 mph, Knuckle-Curve: 77 mph, Changeup: 83 mph

Past Five Seasons:

Year	Age	W	L	ERA	IP	ERA+	FIP	BB9	SO9	bWAR	fWAR
2011	26	21	4	2.88	222.0	137	3.22	2.2	8.0	4.8	4.8
2012	27	15	12	4.02	208.1	101	4.04	2.4	8.1	2.3	2.5
2013	28	7	10	4.91	181.1	76	4.59	3.6	8.1	-1.5	0.6
2014	29	13	13	3.63	201.0	93	3.21	3.1	9.3	1.4	3.5
2015	30	9	15	4.28	168.1	85	4.51	2.8	9.3	-0.4	0.8
9 Yrs		75	68	3.98	1234.2	97	3.99	3.0	8.3

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

The algorithm suggests Kennedy is a poor pitcher and it is based on how awful 2013 and 2015.  That said, some clubs are interested in him as a result of the poor catching the Padres provided their staff this year.  The thought is that with a more competent catcher framing pitches that Kennedy would excel.  That may well be what the Padres are thinking to be willing to put a QO on him as has been reported.  To that end, could Kennedy get 30+MM out of it?  Maybe.  If not, then he might well be the first player to accept a QO.  It is a difficult decision on his part because he could be worth 80+ MM if he had another catcher.

Would the Orioles be willing to cough up a draft pick to get Kennedy?  Maybe.  It would probably mean putting four years and 56 MM on the table.  It would make no sense to lose a pick on a one year deal.  A club will need to believe in Kennedy enough to go long term on him.  It requires a level of faith the Orioles showed with Jimenez, which has not quite worked out.

Conclusion

Put me down as a firm no on Estrada.  Again, maybe he has figured out how to skillfully defy FIP.  He has not shown this ability for a long period of time and his pitching style appears to not leave a great deal of wiggle room to maintain success.  As such, I would be fine with him on a one year deal and not expect much, but a multiyear commitment for someone on the fringe is a risk I would be uncomfortable with.  Fister better represents a risk worth the discomfort, but he contracts with Estrada in that he has not had recent success.

Kennedy would certainly be a more interesting arm.  Unfortunately, it comes with a probable loss of a draft pick.  At that point, one has to look at whether his inclusion from 2016 through 2019 or 2020 would be worth the lost pick.  Eventually, excluding yourself from the first round of the draft pool on a complete or partial basis eventually will impact a club's ability to sufficiently provide enough cost-controlled talent coming up through the farm.  Eventually, a club has to pay for that.  Is the team an Ian Kennedy away from the playoffs, I am not sure of that.  I certainly am not sure that the club would fail making the playoffs with a commodity like Fister in his place.

What To Know About Vance Worley

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The Orioles enter the 2015 offseason with a lot of questions, notably about their pitching staff. The Depot has already released its plans for the winter, but the Orioles didn't hesitate before making their first move. On Wednesday, the team snatched up Vance Worley from the Pirates, who had placed him on waivers. A 28-year-old swingman of sorts with three years of team control left, Worley has a few notable characteristics — many of which, for better or for worse, make him a perfect fit for Baltimore.

He didn't see much interest from other teams.

Players on waivers generally don't have the highest stock. After posting a 4.02 ERA across 71.2 innings in 2015, Worley fits that bill. Still, he pitched his way to a 2.85 ERA the year before, so he certainly has prospered in the past. It unnerves me, then, that so many competitors didn't want to bring him in.

When a team places a player on waivers, any other club can claim him. The priority goes in an inverse relationship to record, and the waiving team's league goes first. In other words, before the Orioles could touch Worley, 21 other teams — everyone in the National League, plus the six teams trailing Baltimore in the American League — had an opportunity to grab him. None of them did so; maybe that means they have other places to spend $2.7 million (his projected salary in arbitration), or maybe the Orioles have overlooked something.

This has happened to Worley before. This July, the Pirates brought Joe Blanton in from Kansas City. To clear a spot for him on the 40-man roster, they designated Worley for assignment and eventually placed him on waivers. At that point, any team in baseball could have picked him up; instead, all suitors declined, and he went to Triple-A. He actually had a better ERA then (3.78) than he did at the end of the season, but he still didn't garner any attention.

After 2011, the Rangers gave up on a little-known sidearmer, whom the Orioles promptly picked up. Darren O'Day rewarded the club's decision, giving them four incredible campaigns. As far as successful pitcher waiver claims go, however, that's about it for Baltimore. Josh Stinson amounted to nothing, as did Alex Burnett and Jorge Rondon (whom the team just designated for assignment to make room for Worley). The fact that Worley has gone under everyone else's radar leads me to believe he could fall into the latter group.

He's a serious overperformer.

At first glance, Worley looks like a typical pitcher — i.e., one whose results match his peripherals. Across 508.2 career innings, he's posted a 3.79 ERA to go along with a 3.76 FIP; taking into account park and league factors yields an ERA- of 99 and a FIP- of 98. With an inflated BABIP (.319) and a typical strand rate (73.6%) to his name, Worley doesn't seem to have benefited from good fortune.

Deserved Run Average, or DRA, begs to differ. Created earlier this year at Baseball Prospectus, DRA gauges a pitcher's performance much more accurately than ERA or FIP can. In DRA's eyes, Worley's been exceptionally lucky: While he's allowed 4.25 runs per nine innings over his career, he should have allowed 5.15 runs.

How does this stack up to the rest of the majors? This scatter plot shows the 169 active pitchers with at least 500 innings. As indicated by the red arrow, Worley sticks out a bit:

More concretely, Worley's RA-DRA differential tops every other hurler in the aforementioned sample:

Rank	Name	IP	RA	DRA	Diff
1	Vance Worley	508.2	4.25	5.15	-0.90
2	Joe Beimel	680.0	4.38	5.17	-0.79
3	Tim Stauffer	595.2	4.17	4.90	-0.73
4	Brad Ziegler	528.2	2.84	3.49	-0.65
5	Kris Medlen	571.0	3.39	4.02	-0.63
6	Chad Billingsley	1,212.1	4.05	4.61	-0.56
7	Madison Bumgarner	1,171.0	3.33	3.87	-0.54
8	Francisco Rodriguez	892.1	2.92	3.39	-0.47
9	Adam Wainwright	1,569.2	3.25	3.71	-0.46
10	Mike Minor	652.2	4.29	4.75	-0.46

A lone flukish season didn't cause this — Worley's consistently beaten his peripherals. In every year with at least 70 innings, he's allowed about a run fewer than we'd think:

Year	Team	IP	RA	DRA	Diff
2011	Phillies	131.2	3.21	4.16	-0.95
2012	Phillies	133.0	4.67	5.64	-0.97
2014	Pirates	110.2	3.50	4.43	-0.93
2015	Pirates	71.2	4.52	5.54	-1.02

When Worley's had an above-average RA, he's had an average DRA; when he's had an average RA, he's had a below-average DRA. (Of course, both his RA and his DRA sucked in 2013, but the sample there wasn't too large.) Through good times and bad, Worley has exceeded expectations.

DRA adjusts for a number of external factors that can impact a pitcher, including pitch framing, defense, quality of opponents, and ballparks. Worley hasn't seen any huge gains in this area — for his career, he's received a total of 3.1 Adjusted Runs. Rather, his overperformance simply seems like something baked into his profile. Like Miguel Gonzalez or Wei-Yin Chen (who rank 36th and 41st, respectively, in the aforementioned sample), he's spat in the face of his peripherals.

This doesn't necessarily matter for 2016. DRA does well to describe a pitcher's production, but it doesn't give much predictive value. Nevertheless, it does show that Worley fits a certain mold, which the Orioles have prioritized in recent years. Gonzalez demonstrated in 2015 why that approach doesn't always work, as his output regressed to fit his background statistics; while it's not a sure thing, Worley could do the same.

He's done a great job of holding runners.

But enough of the doom and gloom. Let's look at an area where Worley dominates: preventing stolen bases. Out of the 873 possible stolen-base opportunities in his career, only 26 have led to an attempt. Compared to an average pitcher — against whom runners will take off in about 5% of their chances — this 3.0% clip sets Worley apart.

How does this translate to runs? According to rSB, the stolen-base component of DRS, Worley's netted his clubs three runs via holding runners. Among pitchers with 500 innings since his 2010 debut, that places him 47th — a solid ranking, out of 146 names. He fares even better when we adjust for his lack of innings: By rSB/180, he comes in 30th. This obviously doesn't have a huge sway on his performance, but it's still an asset.

Worley has never thrown to first all that often. His high in pickoff attempts came in 2012, when he notched 43, and he's yet to catch a runner in this manner. He also doesn't have the advantage of a southpaw, who can stare down any advancement threats. Like Chris Tillman, Worley simply manages to make the opposition stay put. Continuing to do so would certainly help him keep a job on the team.

He did much better out of the bullpen.

Before 2015, Worley had started 73 of his 81 career appearances. That changed in 2015, as he entered in relief 15 times while making only eight starts. The latter went pretty poorly for him — he allowed a 4.81 ERA in 43.0 innings —  but the former allowed him to excel, to the tune of a 2.83 ERA. With a 19.1% strikeout rate and 5.2% walk rate, to accompany a 22.1% soft-hit rate and 24.4% hard-hit rate, the relief version of Worley certainly held his own.

This resembles the stories of several other Orioles — to differing extents, Zach Britton, Tommy Hunter, and Brian Matusz have done well out of the bullpen after coming up as starters. Unlike those three, Worley has no platoon split, so Buck Showalter won't have to worry as much about matchups if he decides to use Worley in this role. Plus, Worley averaged nearly two innings per relief outing in 2015, so he could fill multiple frames late in games.

Among the many ups and downs of Dan Duquette's tenure atop the Orioles, the bullpen has generally remained sound. Duquette always digs up solid relievers, often crafting them out of one-time starters. (In this way, the Orioles are sort of the anti-Reds, who often try to force their relief pitchers into a starting role.) Although he clearly lacks a lengthy résumé in this role, Worley could certainly become the next out-of-nowhere, respectable Baltimore reliever.

He's shifted his location as of late.

In terms of runs allowed, Worley did better with the Pirates than he did with any other club: His two years with Pittsburgh saw him put up a 3.31 ERA over 182.2 innings. He only struck out 16.7% of the batters he faced, a downgrade from the 18.4% mark he posted prior, so he didn't blow batters away. His play with the Bucs came down to free passes and ground balls: His rate of the latter fell from 7.8% to 5.6%, while his rate of the former increased from 43.7% to 48.1%.

Worley relied on the same repertoire as a Pirate, without any significant changes in usage or velocity. He did alter something, though — his location:

Worley's lower pitches have always gone for ground balls (as they tend to do). He also managed to induce more swings on these offerings, which increased his O-Swing% to 29.7% from 25.6% and helped him limit bases on balls. A downward move may not seem like much, but it can make a massive difference if the pitcher pulls it off capably.

By his batted-ball outcomes, Worley diverges from many current Orioles, most of whom primarily accrue fly balls. He does match up insofar as strikeouts and walks are concerned (both stay low), and pairing that with an ability to keep the ball in the yard would work to his favor. Worley has evolved to a decent pitcher, whose low-balling ability should keep him that way.

***

In the end, you have an overlooked, overperforming, runner-scaring, bullpen-loving, all-around solid pitcher. The Orioles will clearly import more than just Worley in the months to come, but this looks like a solid first move, albeit one with some downside. After a 2015 season that didn't live up to the standard set in 2014, both Worley and the Orioles will look to improve in 2016.