As I have transitioned from the academic world to the real one, it is fairly obvious that the pace of my writing here has precipitously declined. I do not think it will rebound, but things always changed. I will certainly throw a holler out on twitter whenever something new is published. With that, I am going to issue a state of the Orioles address.
The offseason is not yet over. They picked up Derek Lee on a one year deal and may wind up with a couple of relievers. They have overturned the left side of the infield with Mark Reynolds representing a massive upgrade at third and JJ Hardy providing a sufficient increase in talent at shortstop. Cesar Izturis has been relegated to a defensive minded SS and potential pinch runner.
Back in October, I set up a range of options for the Orioles to take. They addressed the major weaknesses I saw on the team (1B, 3B, SS, and SP). At first base, I would consider Lee to be a near equivalent to Carlos Pena, which was my idea of an ideal conservative approach. Adam Dunn represented a move that would be aggressive. At shortstop, both options contained a hail mary prayer for JJ Hardy, which turned out to occur. Hardy is certainly an upgrade over Izturis. They have similar defense and Hardy provides a slight improvement in power. If Hardy can somehow get back to his production of a few years ago, this would be a massive turn around for the O's at SS. I doubt that happens. Hardy's HR/FB last year was less than half of what it was during his career year. His ISO appears to have settled in the .120 range. At third, Reynolds is a step or two below Beltre, but a better option than my conservative approach with Juan Uribe. Finally, starting pitcher was not considered an area for improvement, or at least not worth the price, by the O's front brass.
The Replacement Level Yankees Blog issued an early season projection with the Orioles winning on average of 70.1 games . . . about 12 games below .500. That value does not include what LaRoche or Lee would provide. Lee, based on James and Cairo, will see a value of about 2.5 WAR (1.5 if he is in freefall). Lee likely replaces a greater presence of Nolan Reimold who is projected to be worth about 1-1.5 WAR. So, we can assume that CAIRO projects the Orioles as a 71 or 72 win team. The offense looks remarkably improved with 110 more runs being scored, but pitching will allow 28 more runs. The pitching is so young that there is likely to be a great amount of variability in how well they will perform. 2011 will be able about the pitchers for the Orioles.
So what does all of this mean?
31 December 2010
09 October 2010
Thoughts on the 2011 Offseason
It sure has been a while since I last posted. From finishing up my doctorate, moving, starting a new job, and trying to plan a wedding . . . things have been exhausting. As evidenced in the past, baseball writing is the first thing to go. Anyway, I digress.
This past season wound up as a bit of a surprise. The logical critic in me thinks that Orioles performance over the past 50 games was just a matter of development and luck. The fan in me thinks that performance was due to development, Buck, and shear awesomeness. The truth is mist likely somewhere in between and shading more toward the logical perspective. It may indeed be part of Buck's way. Partway through the season, Nick Markakis complained to the media that batters would go up to bat without a plan. It could be that the pitchers were similarly hands off as well. Buck is known to be a manager who does his research and imparts that research on others. He seems to show a different type of teaching and it probably is by example.
That said, the question now is: what are the Orioles capable of next year?
For me, this is important to some extent because next year's draft may be the last one we are assured of a protected 1st round pick. It is an optimistic view, but I could see some free agent acquisitions to make this team mediocre. With a healthy dose of development . . . mediocre might become good. This means to me that it might be a good time to try to target a type A free agent or two. However, I will present two different approaches to the off season. One, will be aggressive with consideration of type A talent. The second will exclude type As from consideration.
All that and a little more after the jump.
This past season wound up as a bit of a surprise. The logical critic in me thinks that Orioles performance over the past 50 games was just a matter of development and luck. The fan in me thinks that performance was due to development, Buck, and shear awesomeness. The truth is mist likely somewhere in between and shading more toward the logical perspective. It may indeed be part of Buck's way. Partway through the season, Nick Markakis complained to the media that batters would go up to bat without a plan. It could be that the pitchers were similarly hands off as well. Buck is known to be a manager who does his research and imparts that research on others. He seems to show a different type of teaching and it probably is by example.
That said, the question now is: what are the Orioles capable of next year?
For me, this is important to some extent because next year's draft may be the last one we are assured of a protected 1st round pick. It is an optimistic view, but I could see some free agent acquisitions to make this team mediocre. With a healthy dose of development . . . mediocre might become good. This means to me that it might be a good time to try to target a type A free agent or two. However, I will present two different approaches to the off season. One, will be aggressive with consideration of type A talent. The second will exclude type As from consideration.
All that and a little more after the jump.
29 August 2010
Orioles Draft vs Baseball America Draft Part I 2009
This might be slightly unfair in how I set this up, but basically . . . this is a comparison of who the Orioles drafted to who Baseball America thinks they should have drafted with the knowledge of the final asking price. For the 2009 season, I could only go 5 rounds deep as I only had a top 100 prospect sheet. For the 2010 season, I could go 10 rounds deep with the 200 deep prospect sheet. First the O's:
2009
1. Matt Hobgood 4.82 ERA in 84 IP, 6 k/9, 4 bb/9
2. Mychal Givens Rk/A 213/321/255 in 56 PA, injured
3. Tyler Townsend Rk/A/A+ 315/378/536 in 185 PA, injured
4. Randy Henry A-/A 5.87 ERA in 23 IP, 11.7 k/9, 2.3 bb/9, injured
5. Ashur Tolliver A- 5.60 ERA in 35.1 IP, 7 k/9, 4 bb/9, injured
I assumed that the 2MM spent on Coffey and Ohlman were available for use.
BA Draft
1. Alex White A+/AA 2.45 ERA in 150.2 IP, 7 k/9, 3 bb/9
2. Andy Oliver AA/AAA 3.50 ERA in 118.1 IP, 8 k/9, 3 bb/9; 22 MLB innings
3. Zach Von Rosenberg A- 3.20 ERA in 59 IP, 6 k/9, 2bb/9
4. Jason Stoffel A+ 4.63 ERA in 46.2 IP, 12 k/9, 4 bb/9
5. Ryan Jackson A/A+ 268/353/349 in 490 PA, SS
I think I am leaning pretty heavily on the BA sheet. Then again, what Jordan did was bank on guys who were a little rough. It might take another year or two to figure it out. However, right now you have two pitchers in White and Oliver who can make noise on the 2011 roster. Von Rosenberg and Stoffel look like decent options are reliever in a couple years. Jackson might be a UTL guy a few years down the road. I don't know what we have yet in the Orioles draft.
2009
1. Matt Hobgood 4.82 ERA in 84 IP, 6 k/9, 4 bb/9
2. Mychal Givens Rk/A 213/321/255 in 56 PA, injured
3. Tyler Townsend Rk/A/A+ 315/378/536 in 185 PA, injured
4. Randy Henry A-/A 5.87 ERA in 23 IP, 11.7 k/9, 2.3 bb/9, injured
5. Ashur Tolliver A- 5.60 ERA in 35.1 IP, 7 k/9, 4 bb/9, injured
I assumed that the 2MM spent on Coffey and Ohlman were available for use.
BA Draft
1. Alex White A+/AA 2.45 ERA in 150.2 IP, 7 k/9, 3 bb/9
2. Andy Oliver AA/AAA 3.50 ERA in 118.1 IP, 8 k/9, 3 bb/9; 22 MLB innings
3. Zach Von Rosenberg A- 3.20 ERA in 59 IP, 6 k/9, 2bb/9
4. Jason Stoffel A+ 4.63 ERA in 46.2 IP, 12 k/9, 4 bb/9
5. Ryan Jackson A/A+ 268/353/349 in 490 PA, SS
I think I am leaning pretty heavily on the BA sheet. Then again, what Jordan did was bank on guys who were a little rough. It might take another year or two to figure it out. However, right now you have two pitchers in White and Oliver who can make noise on the 2011 roster. Von Rosenberg and Stoffel look like decent options are reliever in a couple years. Jackson might be a UTL guy a few years down the road. I don't know what we have yet in the Orioles draft.
18 August 2010
2010 Record Update
It has been a long while since our last recap. The prolonged losing and my upcoming doctoral defense has kept me pretty much isolated to twitter. 140 characters do not allow me to procrastinate too much. Anyway, I think we are getting to a monumental change in the predictions for this year in that for the first time since the third week of April the Orioles may no longer be the favorite for receiving the first overall selection in the draft. The team stands right now with a 0.5 game lead over the Pittsburgh Pirates. This translates as a 52% chance of taking the first overall selection. With about six weeks left in the season, this will be a nail biter for awfulness. Here is how we stand in general:
1. Pirates 52% chance finishing behind them (aka taking the 1st overall selection in the 2011 draft)
2. Mariners 75%
3. Diamondbacks 91%
4. Royals 93%
5. Indians 93%
6. Astros 95%
7. Cubs 97%
8. Nationals 98%
9. Brewers 99%
10. Athletics 100%
After the jump, the updated prediction graph detailing what our WAR system, PECOTA, and Pythagorean methods see for this team.
1. Pirates 52% chance finishing behind them (aka taking the 1st overall selection in the 2011 draft)
2. Mariners 75%
3. Diamondbacks 91%
4. Royals 93%
5. Indians 93%
6. Astros 95%
7. Cubs 97%
8. Nationals 98%
9. Brewers 99%
10. Athletics 100%
After the jump, the updated prediction graph detailing what our WAR system, PECOTA, and Pythagorean methods see for this team.
17 August 2010
Shadow Draft Wrap: Looking at the Official 2010 Shadow Draft Class
The Camden Shadow Draft hit our first real hiccup in its three years of running, as 1st Round selection Karsten Whitson (RHP, Chipley HS (Fla.)) opted to attend the University of Florida rather than begin his professional career. Below is a summary of each pick, their signing status as of the signing deadline, and a few thoughts on their addition to the system (or lack thereof):
Player Notes:
1:3 - Karsten Whitson, RHP, Chipley HS (Fla.) - Needless to say, the failure to ink Whitson to a pro contract is a huge disappointment. The same, having two potential top five picks in the stacked 2011 Draft Class is a nice consolation prize -- one that may even lead to a safer talent being added to the system without sacrificing ceiling. That, of course, is looking for the silver lining, as Whitson is a legit potential front-end arm with good "now" stuff and room to develop into an even more impressive arm in the near future. He heads to the University of Florida where he will join returning weekend starters Brian Johnson (rising soph., RHP), Hudson Randall (rising soph., RHP) and Alex Panteliodis (rising jr., RHP) as likely SEC and Omaha favorites. He could see action in the rotation right away or slide into high-leverage relief work to shore-up the pen.
Signing Bonus: N/A
Total Class Outlay: $0
3:3 - Josh Rutledge, SS, Univ. of Alabama - Rutledge signed for $295,000, which is right around where we valued him. His best tool is his glove, which carries a high level of value in a system light on true up-the-middle infield talent. His strong junior year at the plate helped to assuage some fears that he will not hit as a pro, While the start at Aberdeen has been unimpressive, I'd caution against reading too much into 40-some at bats.
Signing Bonus: $295,000
Total Class Outlay: $295,000
4:3 - Garin Cecchini, SS/3B, Barbe HS (La.) - Cecchini elected to forgo attending LSU, opting instead to join the Boston Red Sox upon receiving around $1.3 million. Good news for us, as he helps soften the blow of losing Whitson and adds some positional depth to the lower-minors in the Shadow System. Cecchini is a potential impact bat with plenty of arm for the left side of the infield. Time will tell if the range plays at the six-spot, long term, but either way he is an excellent get in the 4th Round. On draft day I noted that I expected it to take around $1.5 million to sign the Barbe HS talent -- happy to see that again our valuation was on the mark.
Signing Bonus: $1,310,000
Total Class Outlay: $1,605,000
5:3 - Tyler Holt, OF, Florida St. University - Considering Holt lasted until the 10th Round on draft day, I was not certain that this signing was going to get done. Fortunately, the former-FSU lead-off hitter and center fielder opted to start his pro career, rather than head back to Tallahassee, signing with Cleveland for $500,000. Detractors note Holt's slap-to-gap approach at the plate and question whether he will be able to make the necessary adjustments to keep-up with increasingly talented arms. Holt is not a sure thing, but there is potential here for a future top-of-the-order bat with solid outfield defense -- a fine pop at this point in the draft.
Signing Bonus: $500,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,105,000
6:3 - Tony Thompson, 3B, Univ. of Kansas - Evaluators were generally split on Thompson, with some seeing nothing more than a potentially average first baseman that may or may not hit enough to carve out a career at the Major League level. I see a little more here, including a potential 25 HR bat with an outside chance to stick at the hot corner. Thompson was mightily slowed this spring due to a hairline fracture on his kneecap, and his pre-injury power did not return before season's end (and has yet to resurface in short-season ball). We'll see where he's at once he tackles full-season ball after a restful fall/winter.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,230,000
7:3 - Robert Aviles, RHP, Suffern HS (N.Y.) - Aviles suffered a huge disappointment at the end of his season when he became aware that he would require Tommy John surgery on his throwing elbow, undoubtedly costing him a huge sum of money (likely just over seven-figures). When healthy, Aviles can get it up to the low-90s with his fastball and possesses one of the stronger off-speed offerings in the 2010 prep ranks. His curve is inconsistent but flashes good spin and could be an above-average offering in time. He could be back in time to log some innings next summer, but 2012 will be the first year to really watch closely. With a number of arms already in place in the system, Aviles is a nice addition that will not need to be rushed (and could be more than worth the wait).
Signing Bonus: $150,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,380,000
8:3 - Mario Hollands, LHP, Univ. of California - Santa Barbara - Hollands was Jon's pick and, I think, a good one. He is a fairly safe bet to provide some value out of the pen as a lefty arm but also has the repertoire to potentially hold down a spot in the back-end of a Major League rotation. Hollands throws two fastballs and two breaking balls in addition to a solid average change-up, and can mix each offering in a multitude of situations. Hollands should log some time in the rotation as he moves through the low-minors, and will stick as a starter for as long as the results are there.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,505,000
9:3 - Jordan Cooper, RHP, Wichita St. Univ. - Cooper, like Hollands, has a shot to provide starter value with a fallback as a bullpen arm off the strength of his sinker/slider combo. He isn't a sexy pick, but rather a solid addition at the end of the single-digit rounds. Cooper signed with the Indians in this same round for $125,000 -- another very good valuation on our part, nailing the round and approximate price.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,630,000
10:3 - Matt Roberts, C, Graham HS (N.C.) - Roberts was one of the best defensive catchers in the high school class and a long shot to sign here once we saw him drop to the 38th Round on Day 3 of the actual MLB Rule 4 Draft. In hindsight, Will Swanner (C, La Costa Canyon HS (Calif.)) would have been the better choice here, as he ended-up signing for just under $500,000 and was rated much higher on our draft board -- just a miscalculation in signability on our part. As you might expect, Roberts elected to put-off pro ball and head to Chapel Hill this fall. He could see significant time next spring and could emerge as an early-round pick in three years provided his bat develops.
Signing Bonus: N/A
Total Class Outlay: $2,630,000
Final Thoughts:
The loss of a 2nd Round pick really hurt this class and magnifies the loss of not being able to sign Whitson. I touched on the fact that the Top 5 pick in the 2011 Draft Class could actually turn out a fair amount better, the preference is always to sign our guy -- particularly when drafting this high. The bigger disappointment, to me, is the fact that we overestimated the cost of signing some of the overslot guys to the point that even if Whitson had been signed for around $3.5 - 4 million, we would have left around $1 - 1.5 million on the table. An arm like Justin Grimm (RHP, Univ. of Georgia) could have been a nice addition and we had plenty of room for him.
Overall, I'm pleased but not thrilled with this year's Shadow Draft haul. There are a number of solid picks with good value, but we missed-out on ceiling by losing the best overall pick by a fair amount. The best takeaway for me is that we did manage to address the shortstop position, in addition to adding a potential power corner bat and center field/lead-off hitter. The arms are solid, and regardless of how Aviles develops he is an incredible investment at $150,000.
I'll be breaking down the actual Orioles Draft Class next week at www.DiamondScapeScouting.com and will post the piece simultaneously over here.
Player Notes:
1:3 - Karsten Whitson, RHP, Chipley HS (Fla.) - Needless to say, the failure to ink Whitson to a pro contract is a huge disappointment. The same, having two potential top five picks in the stacked 2011 Draft Class is a nice consolation prize -- one that may even lead to a safer talent being added to the system without sacrificing ceiling. That, of course, is looking for the silver lining, as Whitson is a legit potential front-end arm with good "now" stuff and room to develop into an even more impressive arm in the near future. He heads to the University of Florida where he will join returning weekend starters Brian Johnson (rising soph., RHP), Hudson Randall (rising soph., RHP) and Alex Panteliodis (rising jr., RHP) as likely SEC and Omaha favorites. He could see action in the rotation right away or slide into high-leverage relief work to shore-up the pen.
Signing Bonus: N/A
Total Class Outlay: $0
3:3 - Josh Rutledge, SS, Univ. of Alabama - Rutledge signed for $295,000, which is right around where we valued him. His best tool is his glove, which carries a high level of value in a system light on true up-the-middle infield talent. His strong junior year at the plate helped to assuage some fears that he will not hit as a pro, While the start at Aberdeen has been unimpressive, I'd caution against reading too much into 40-some at bats.
Signing Bonus: $295,000
Total Class Outlay: $295,000
4:3 - Garin Cecchini, SS/3B, Barbe HS (La.) - Cecchini elected to forgo attending LSU, opting instead to join the Boston Red Sox upon receiving around $1.3 million. Good news for us, as he helps soften the blow of losing Whitson and adds some positional depth to the lower-minors in the Shadow System. Cecchini is a potential impact bat with plenty of arm for the left side of the infield. Time will tell if the range plays at the six-spot, long term, but either way he is an excellent get in the 4th Round. On draft day I noted that I expected it to take around $1.5 million to sign the Barbe HS talent -- happy to see that again our valuation was on the mark.
Signing Bonus: $1,310,000
Total Class Outlay: $1,605,000
5:3 - Tyler Holt, OF, Florida St. University - Considering Holt lasted until the 10th Round on draft day, I was not certain that this signing was going to get done. Fortunately, the former-FSU lead-off hitter and center fielder opted to start his pro career, rather than head back to Tallahassee, signing with Cleveland for $500,000. Detractors note Holt's slap-to-gap approach at the plate and question whether he will be able to make the necessary adjustments to keep-up with increasingly talented arms. Holt is not a sure thing, but there is potential here for a future top-of-the-order bat with solid outfield defense -- a fine pop at this point in the draft.
Signing Bonus: $500,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,105,000
6:3 - Tony Thompson, 3B, Univ. of Kansas - Evaluators were generally split on Thompson, with some seeing nothing more than a potentially average first baseman that may or may not hit enough to carve out a career at the Major League level. I see a little more here, including a potential 25 HR bat with an outside chance to stick at the hot corner. Thompson was mightily slowed this spring due to a hairline fracture on his kneecap, and his pre-injury power did not return before season's end (and has yet to resurface in short-season ball). We'll see where he's at once he tackles full-season ball after a restful fall/winter.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,230,000
7:3 - Robert Aviles, RHP, Suffern HS (N.Y.) - Aviles suffered a huge disappointment at the end of his season when he became aware that he would require Tommy John surgery on his throwing elbow, undoubtedly costing him a huge sum of money (likely just over seven-figures). When healthy, Aviles can get it up to the low-90s with his fastball and possesses one of the stronger off-speed offerings in the 2010 prep ranks. His curve is inconsistent but flashes good spin and could be an above-average offering in time. He could be back in time to log some innings next summer, but 2012 will be the first year to really watch closely. With a number of arms already in place in the system, Aviles is a nice addition that will not need to be rushed (and could be more than worth the wait).
Signing Bonus: $150,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,380,000
8:3 - Mario Hollands, LHP, Univ. of California - Santa Barbara - Hollands was Jon's pick and, I think, a good one. He is a fairly safe bet to provide some value out of the pen as a lefty arm but also has the repertoire to potentially hold down a spot in the back-end of a Major League rotation. Hollands throws two fastballs and two breaking balls in addition to a solid average change-up, and can mix each offering in a multitude of situations. Hollands should log some time in the rotation as he moves through the low-minors, and will stick as a starter for as long as the results are there.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,505,000
9:3 - Jordan Cooper, RHP, Wichita St. Univ. - Cooper, like Hollands, has a shot to provide starter value with a fallback as a bullpen arm off the strength of his sinker/slider combo. He isn't a sexy pick, but rather a solid addition at the end of the single-digit rounds. Cooper signed with the Indians in this same round for $125,000 -- another very good valuation on our part, nailing the round and approximate price.
Signing Bonus: $125,000
Total Class Outlay: $2,630,000
10:3 - Matt Roberts, C, Graham HS (N.C.) - Roberts was one of the best defensive catchers in the high school class and a long shot to sign here once we saw him drop to the 38th Round on Day 3 of the actual MLB Rule 4 Draft. In hindsight, Will Swanner (C, La Costa Canyon HS (Calif.)) would have been the better choice here, as he ended-up signing for just under $500,000 and was rated much higher on our draft board -- just a miscalculation in signability on our part. As you might expect, Roberts elected to put-off pro ball and head to Chapel Hill this fall. He could see significant time next spring and could emerge as an early-round pick in three years provided his bat develops.
Signing Bonus: N/A
Total Class Outlay: $2,630,000
Final Thoughts:
The loss of a 2nd Round pick really hurt this class and magnifies the loss of not being able to sign Whitson. I touched on the fact that the Top 5 pick in the 2011 Draft Class could actually turn out a fair amount better, the preference is always to sign our guy -- particularly when drafting this high. The bigger disappointment, to me, is the fact that we overestimated the cost of signing some of the overslot guys to the point that even if Whitson had been signed for around $3.5 - 4 million, we would have left around $1 - 1.5 million on the table. An arm like Justin Grimm (RHP, Univ. of Georgia) could have been a nice addition and we had plenty of room for him.
Overall, I'm pleased but not thrilled with this year's Shadow Draft haul. There are a number of solid picks with good value, but we missed-out on ceiling by losing the best overall pick by a fair amount. The best takeaway for me is that we did manage to address the shortstop position, in addition to adding a potential power corner bat and center field/lead-off hitter. The arms are solid, and regardless of how Aviles develops he is an incredible investment at $150,000.
I'll be breaking down the actual Orioles Draft Class next week at www.DiamondScapeScouting.com and will post the piece simultaneously over here.
05 August 2010
2010 Shadow Draft Update
Back in June we ran our third shadow draft for the Orioles. Here is a short recap of the prospects we drafted, whether they signed, and if they are doing anything anywhere.
03 August 2010
21 July 2010
Looking Back at the Mortgaged Future of 1996
I was reading Tony Pente's summary of the troubles the Orioles are facing and I was led to this article. It included this passage:
As you probably know, I hate overreaching statements and I zeroed in on this one. I amcertain it is true that this is a mind blowingly silly statement (especially after the writer already said the system was ignored for at least a decade prior to the deals in '96, which is very true).
So did the O's "mortgage their future?"
The Orioles further mortgaged their future by acquiring veterans such as Eddie Murray, Todd Zeile, Pete Incaviglia, Terry Mathews and Luis Polonia and successfully made their wild-card run.
As you probably know, I hate overreaching statements and I zeroed in on this one. I amcertain it is true that this is a mind blowingly silly statement (especially after the writer already said the system was ignored for at least a decade prior to the deals in '96, which is very true).
So did the O's "mortgage their future?"
09 July 2010
Orioles sign Hector Veloz, 3B
Veloz tested positive for stanozolol. It seems his price dropped a considerable amount after that. He is a pretty high profile guy this year.
A smattering of links follow . . .
Ben Badler
Video
A smattering of links follow . . .
Ben Badler
The Orioles have signed 16-year-old Dominican third baseman Hector Veloz for $300,000, according to his trainer, Victor Baez.Frankie Piliere
The bonus is a franchise record for an amateur player signed out of the Dominican Republic and is believed to be a franchise record for all of Latin America. A club official did not return calls seeking comment.
At 6-foot-2, 195 pounds, Veloz, who is from Santiago, stands out for his plus raw power from the right side, though he has been inconsistent hitting in games. He also shows an above-average arm and solid hands at third base.
Scouts have been somewhat torn on Veloz, who is one of the standouts of the Dominican Prospect League. Some have said his bat is arguably the best in the class and others have been less certain. He should be looking at seven figures from one of the clubs that is more convinced of his offensive potential.
Video
29 June 2010
Depot Retro: Koji Uehara scouting report
Tuesday, Nov 11, 2008
Scouting Report: Koji Uehara, RHP, Japan
By Nick James
Before unveiling our Fall 2008 Top 40 pitchers in the 2009 Draft Class, we take a quick look at another Japanese right-hander: Koji Uehara. The 6-1 /187 lbs. 33-year old (34 this upcoming May) is looking to sign with a Major League organization this Winter, with the Orioles apparently the only team currently looking at him as a starter.
Grading Out
Motion – 50
Tempo – 60
4S Fastball – 50
2S Fastball – 55
Slider – 50
Changeup/Forkball – 55
Mechanics
Overall Motion – Uehara’s motion is clean with some deception and an interesting thrust upwards at the end of his high-effort delivery. As he enters his leg kick, he gets great bend in his back leg allowing him to get maximum thrust in his stride. His plant is clean and he does an excellent job of keeping his momentum directed towards home. As he releases, he drives upwards with his plant foot, giving him the appearance of rising upwards as the pitch comes. On occasion, he'll enter this thrust before the ball has completely left his hand, leaving the pitch up (though this is much more the exception than the rule). While his follow-through -- both leg and arm -- can be violent at times, it's generally under control and leaves him facing forward. Overall, there is a lot of effort, but the mechanics are clean enough to have helped him avoid serious injury over a good-sized career.
Arm Action – As Uehara splits his hands and enters his stride, he cocks his wrist pulling the ball in and towards his elbow. This action places additional stress on the elbow and is generally a red flag indicating a higher probability of elbow troubles down the line. Given that Uehara has not run into serious elbow injury in his career, it's quite possible this is a non-issue. Still, if Baltimore is looking to use him as a starter, it will be something to keep in mind with regards to pitch counts and inning counts on the season. Otherwise, Uehara's arm action is clean though he throws with some effort. There is a good amount of torque on the shoulder, but his upper-half generally works well with his lower-half, helping to ease some of that tension. His follow-through is generally smooth, though as mentioned above he can get a bit violent at times leading to recoil.
Pace – Uehara keeps a terrific pace, moving cleanly through his motion and keeping all of his parts working together. His upper-half and his lower-half are on the same page, reducing stress in his shoulder (which is key considering his generally high-effort delivery).
Mechanics Grade – B
Arsenal
Fastball – Uehara comes with a low-90s 4-seam fastball that is generally flat and a 2-seamer a couple of miles-per-hour slower with good arm-side run. He commands both pitches well to all four quadrants and mixes them well so as to give the batter a different look. His 4-seamer is a below-average pitch, though it plays-up a bit due to his command. His 2-seamer is an average pitch that plays-up due to the late action and has plus-potential when he is living on the black.
Slider – Uehara's slider is a tight little offering with late bite and not great depth. Like his fastballs, his slider plays-up due to his command, and he's able to keep the pitch inside against lefties and on the low corners against righties. It's an average pitch that should play well against ML hitters provided he keeps it out of the middle-of-the-plate.
Changeup/Forkball – Uehara's other secondary offering is a changeup/forkball with good depth and fade. It's most effective as a chase pitch with two strikes, though he's comfortable throwing it inside to lefties and breaking it over their knees to the low-inside corner. This fringe-plus-offering may be the key to his success or failure as a starter, as it will help keep his pitch count down and produce ground balls if he commands it well.
“Stuff” Grade – B- – Uehara is not likely to overpower anyone at the ML-level, but he has the potential to keep hitters off-balance with three solid to above-average offerings. If he can maintain his plus-command, his three pitch mix should play towards the back-end of a ML rotation. His slider and fastball are not good enough to miss with, so leaving either over the plate will get him into trouble in a hurry. He'll need to work ahead in the count and utilize his change/forkball to get some swings-and-misses or groundouts.
Nick’s Notes
Uehara could be groomed as a reliever or a starter, though it looks like he would prefer to start and Baltimore is currently the only team looking to use him in that role. Plus-command and an adequate if unspectacular arsenal could make him a solid option at the back of a rotation, though given his arm cock (pulling the ball to his elbow) it may make sense to use him in the #5 spot where he can have a couple of starts skipped as a precaution. Were Uehara to struggle as a starter, he could be used as a situational reliever, primarily as a groundball pitcher in the Bradford mold.
Prospect Grade – C+
Scouting Report: Koji Uehara, RHP, Japan
By Nick James
Before unveiling our Fall 2008 Top 40 pitchers in the 2009 Draft Class, we take a quick look at another Japanese right-hander: Koji Uehara. The 6-1 /187 lbs. 33-year old (34 this upcoming May) is looking to sign with a Major League organization this Winter, with the Orioles apparently the only team currently looking at him as a starter.
Grading Out
Motion – 50
Tempo – 60
4S Fastball – 50
2S Fastball – 55
Slider – 50
Changeup/Forkball – 55
Mechanics
Overall Motion – Uehara’s motion is clean with some deception and an interesting thrust upwards at the end of his high-effort delivery. As he enters his leg kick, he gets great bend in his back leg allowing him to get maximum thrust in his stride. His plant is clean and he does an excellent job of keeping his momentum directed towards home. As he releases, he drives upwards with his plant foot, giving him the appearance of rising upwards as the pitch comes. On occasion, he'll enter this thrust before the ball has completely left his hand, leaving the pitch up (though this is much more the exception than the rule). While his follow-through -- both leg and arm -- can be violent at times, it's generally under control and leaves him facing forward. Overall, there is a lot of effort, but the mechanics are clean enough to have helped him avoid serious injury over a good-sized career.
Arm Action – As Uehara splits his hands and enters his stride, he cocks his wrist pulling the ball in and towards his elbow. This action places additional stress on the elbow and is generally a red flag indicating a higher probability of elbow troubles down the line. Given that Uehara has not run into serious elbow injury in his career, it's quite possible this is a non-issue. Still, if Baltimore is looking to use him as a starter, it will be something to keep in mind with regards to pitch counts and inning counts on the season. Otherwise, Uehara's arm action is clean though he throws with some effort. There is a good amount of torque on the shoulder, but his upper-half generally works well with his lower-half, helping to ease some of that tension. His follow-through is generally smooth, though as mentioned above he can get a bit violent at times leading to recoil.
Pace – Uehara keeps a terrific pace, moving cleanly through his motion and keeping all of his parts working together. His upper-half and his lower-half are on the same page, reducing stress in his shoulder (which is key considering his generally high-effort delivery).
Mechanics Grade – B
Arsenal
Fastball – Uehara comes with a low-90s 4-seam fastball that is generally flat and a 2-seamer a couple of miles-per-hour slower with good arm-side run. He commands both pitches well to all four quadrants and mixes them well so as to give the batter a different look. His 4-seamer is a below-average pitch, though it plays-up a bit due to his command. His 2-seamer is an average pitch that plays-up due to the late action and has plus-potential when he is living on the black.
Slider – Uehara's slider is a tight little offering with late bite and not great depth. Like his fastballs, his slider plays-up due to his command, and he's able to keep the pitch inside against lefties and on the low corners against righties. It's an average pitch that should play well against ML hitters provided he keeps it out of the middle-of-the-plate.
Changeup/Forkball – Uehara's other secondary offering is a changeup/forkball with good depth and fade. It's most effective as a chase pitch with two strikes, though he's comfortable throwing it inside to lefties and breaking it over their knees to the low-inside corner. This fringe-plus-offering may be the key to his success or failure as a starter, as it will help keep his pitch count down and produce ground balls if he commands it well.
“Stuff” Grade – B- – Uehara is not likely to overpower anyone at the ML-level, but he has the potential to keep hitters off-balance with three solid to above-average offerings. If he can maintain his plus-command, his three pitch mix should play towards the back-end of a ML rotation. His slider and fastball are not good enough to miss with, so leaving either over the plate will get him into trouble in a hurry. He'll need to work ahead in the count and utilize his change/forkball to get some swings-and-misses or groundouts.
Nick’s Notes
Uehara could be groomed as a reliever or a starter, though it looks like he would prefer to start and Baltimore is currently the only team looking to use him in that role. Plus-command and an adequate if unspectacular arsenal could make him a solid option at the back of a rotation, though given his arm cock (pulling the ball to his elbow) it may make sense to use him in the #5 spot where he can have a couple of starts skipped as a precaution. Were Uehara to struggle as a starter, he could be used as a situational reliever, primarily as a groundball pitcher in the Bradford mold.
Prospect Grade – C+
27 June 2010
Depot Retro: Markakis Extension
What is Nick Markakis Worth?
May 29, 2008
A point of frustration to some may be the top brass of the Orioles dragging their feet with regard to signing Nick Markakis to a long-term contract. So far this year other teams have shown a proclivity to locking in their young players for the long-term. Detroit traded for and signed Miguel Cabrera to a 7 year deal for 140 MM. The Tigers also locked up Curtis Granderson for 5 years at 30 MM.
Toronto handed down a 6 year, 64 MM deal to Alex Rios and a 4 year, 12 MM deal to Aaron Hill. Evan Longoria was signed long-term after a handful of games. That contract has some iffy language and can be 6 to 9 years in length and 17.5 to 44 MM in worth. The Milwaukee Brewers signed Ryan Braun to an 8 year, 45 MM contract. Rockies inked Troy Tulowitski to a 6 year, 31 MM deal. The Indians, who supposedly invented this approach of committing to young talent, sign Fausto Carmona to a 4-7 year deal for 15-48 MM. So, yeah, a lot of these contracts have been signed lately, but a major question is: Why are these deals being signed?
The Players Perspective
A baseball players entire perceived worth is related to his baseball performance. In turn, this is basically related to his physical fitness. A baseball career can be incredibly short. Many players have had an amazing rookie season and then just disappeared. Stuck in the renewal and arbitration systems, their pay is undervalued in comparison to their worth to the team. A few examples would be Angel Berroa, Ben Grieve, Bob Hamelin, Jerome Walton, Pat Listach, Marcus Giles, and even our very own Craig Worthington. The retention of physical ability is a chief concern among players and it is understandable why they would want to enter into a long-term contract because of the financial stability of such a deal.
There is a counter argument. Jayson Stark's article last week listed several players who have little interest into locking themselves into a deal. The players mentioned were the Uptons, Russell Martin, Prince Fielder, King Felix, Jeff Francoeur, and the Red Sox trio of young stars (Jonathan Papelbon, Kevin Youkilis, and Dustin Pedroia). Why would they not wish to enter into a deal? The trade off of signing a long term deal is that you may undercut your own value. The thought is that these deals cost a player about 3-5 MM per free agent year bought out. That is dependent, of course, on whether the player pans out. The players listed above are some of the best in the game, so it goes to reason that they can most likely keep their level of play. If I was Francoeur, I'd sign a deal though. Extreme contact hitters are a risky projection.
The Teams Perspective
A major concern of any organization is salary control. Money isn't free . . . it obviously has a cost. This cost often is hard to see. It will be difficult to know whether Jay "Albatross" Gibbons played in effort in courting other free agents, investing in the minor league system, or improving scouting. It is to a team's advantage to be able to identify plus talent and then secure it with a low ball offer. That is where these contracts make sense. Even teams with massive amounts of cash flow engage in this. Robinson Cano's extension is an example. The issue is though that sometimes the player you locked in is Kenny Lofton and sometimes it is Carlos Baerga. For a mid to low market teams, this strategy may be a necessity as the only way to compete long-term is taking a risk on young players and securing a few free agent years on the cheap. Richer teams do it because it gives them more money to spread around and a poor decision on this level is not going to affect them as much as a poor decision on a free agent signing when the contract carries more of a premium.
The Orioles' Perspective
It appears the Orioles are in between. Dan Connolly wrote an article a week or so back in the Sun. An anonymous source in the front office called the deal absurd and was quoted:
Cost/Benefit
From the Orioles (and, conversely, Markakis') perspective, what savings can be gained by signing Nick right now? This study will dive back into the generalized runs created equation and shifting that to wins, which I have done in the past on many occasions. Nick's performance will be used from PECOTA's 7 year forecast. Changes in the forecast by year will be incorporated into the current 25th and 75th projectile performance projections. Valuation is my own figure with each win being worth roughly 3 MM in today's market. Over the past five years, players salary has increased roughly 10% each year. Projected worth will increase at the same rate. All of this will be tied together in terms of cumulative savings or cost. It should be stated that I considered his defense to be average. The general consensus is that he has a plus arm and average range.
Nick Markakis Projection
Markakis' year has been a bit peculiar. He is on pace for 26 home runs, but is also on pace for 16 doubles. It is a peculiar line. His rates fall in at 253/374/424. His PrOPS place him at 280/396/492. His 2007 50th percentile PECOTA projection places him at 356/470, so PECOTA is right there in the middle and I am going to run with that. PECOTA's projections require a subscription, so I don't feel right publishing them here. What I will show is his 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile projections convert to runs created per 162 games. As you can see, he 25th percentile condition shows him being roughly replacement level as a right fielder (RL-RF is 348ops/413slg) for his career. The 50th percentile places him slightly above league average (Avg-RF is 360/465). His 75th percentile has have as significantly better than league average. Perhaps the strangest thing about these projections is how consistent they have Markakis' level of performance over these next 7 years.
Performance Valuation By Year
Although his performance is projected to remain relatively constant over the next seven years, salaries will climb as more cash flushes into MLB. Over the past five years, salaries have increased about 10% each season. Each win over replacement level player performance was multiplied by 3 MM in 2007, 3.3 MM in 2008, 3.6 MM in 2009, etc. Markakis' current performance is worth about 12 MM to the Baltimore Orioles, but he is being paid 0.455 MM. You can probably understand why he might be a little annoyed about the renewal system. If he was a free agent (ignoring his age and potential breakout ability), he would be worth that 12 MM. Compared with other players in that range it falls right on the nose. Jose Guillen is getting paid 13 MM and he was the 2007 league average right fielder (I'm still not sure how he did not get pay docked for the PED aura).
Cumulative Earnings Gained or Lost
This leads us to the bottom line. I think a proper correlative to Markakis would be Alex Rios. Toronto signed him to a 6 year, 64 MM contract this past offseason. That would be similar to what we would expect it would take to sign Nick this upcoming offseason. I assigned him a 6 year, 66.01 MM contract for simplicity and avoidance of numbers with dreadful connotation. The cumulative costs for the 25, 50, and 75 projections are based on three arbitration years and three years of free agency with the cost set by performance valuation of the prior season. For instance, in the 50th percentile I predicted arbitration worth as 5MM in 2009, 7MM in 2010, and 11MM in 2011. The next three years were then dictated by the valuation of his 2011 performance, which comes to 18 MM per season. That comes to a cumulative cost/earnings of 76 MM.
Out of the scenarios considered here, the Orioles would lose money only if Nick hits his 25th percentile projections. The Orioles would lose 16.5 MM over the course of 6 years. Of course, this is based on the free agent market and may overvalue his worth as there may be 0-3 year players capable of this performance. If you consider that possibility, it might be a loss of 50 MM or so over that time period. If Markakis hits his 50th percentile, the Orioles would have saved 10MM over 6 or 1.7 MM each year. The 75th percentile would be a savings of 37 MM over 6 years or about 6MM per year.
Conclusion
It is understandable why the Orioles might be reluctant to secure Markakis for the long term. If he falters it be a costly mistake (about 50 MM). If he stays the same as he is now, he basically get what he would have gotten anyway. If he breaks out . . . then he will cost a lot of money and years. That is basically what it comes down to. If you are sure that he is going to be a premium player, then you should lock him up in order to maximize your cash efficiency for other players on your roster. Ideally, the only time you pay a premium is when you bring players into your organization via free agency.
I think signing Markakis should be a priority and it will be fine to lock him in for 6 years at 66.01 MM. Perhaps a bit smarter of a contract would grant him 4 years at 40 MM and 2 team options years for 13.005 MM a piece. That way, he would still get a great deal of value for his first 4 seasons of the contract and the team would have an out if he completely crashes. I think Nick is not a high risk player. As opposed to the previous players mentioned (i.e., Craig Worthington, Ben Grieve) is not someone who relies on two tools. Markakis has plus ability in all skills and I think that makes him an easy one to bet on. Of course, this assumes Nick wants an extension. He certainly wants to be paid more, but I am not sure he wants to be lock in long-term. If he buys into the hype (Rob Neyer predicted that over the next 5 years he would be the best RF in the game), then he would be foolish to sign long term. Time will tell.
Though perhaps the biggest lesson is the savings attributed to developing young talent. Looking at Nick Markakis' 75th percentile projection, what we see is that over the next 6 years is that he could earn 103 MM if he goes the arbitration and free agency route. In turn, to get that much production off the free market, it would cost 157 MM. Even with respect to the average RF, you get a savings of 22 MM over 6 years. This is probably the lesson we have learned over the last decade or so: 0-3 year players are worth a lot of money. So, the next time you get excited by your team acquiring an established player (i.e., Bedard) for a collection of prospects (i.e. Adam Jones, Chris Tillman) . . . remember that with the extra 20-30% savings your team may be making, you can extend your own guys or pay the premium for the specific free agent talent to get you over the hump.
May 29, 2008
A point of frustration to some may be the top brass of the Orioles dragging their feet with regard to signing Nick Markakis to a long-term contract. So far this year other teams have shown a proclivity to locking in their young players for the long-term. Detroit traded for and signed Miguel Cabrera to a 7 year deal for 140 MM. The Tigers also locked up Curtis Granderson for 5 years at 30 MM.
Toronto handed down a 6 year, 64 MM deal to Alex Rios and a 4 year, 12 MM deal to Aaron Hill. Evan Longoria was signed long-term after a handful of games. That contract has some iffy language and can be 6 to 9 years in length and 17.5 to 44 MM in worth. The Milwaukee Brewers signed Ryan Braun to an 8 year, 45 MM contract. Rockies inked Troy Tulowitski to a 6 year, 31 MM deal. The Indians, who supposedly invented this approach of committing to young talent, sign Fausto Carmona to a 4-7 year deal for 15-48 MM. So, yeah, a lot of these contracts have been signed lately, but a major question is: Why are these deals being signed?
The Players Perspective A baseball players entire perceived worth is related to his baseball performance. In turn, this is basically related to his physical fitness. A baseball career can be incredibly short. Many players have had an amazing rookie season and then just disappeared. Stuck in the renewal and arbitration systems, their pay is undervalued in comparison to their worth to the team. A few examples would be Angel Berroa, Ben Grieve, Bob Hamelin, Jerome Walton, Pat Listach, Marcus Giles, and even our very own Craig Worthington. The retention of physical ability is a chief concern among players and it is understandable why they would want to enter into a long-term contract because of the financial stability of such a deal.
There is a counter argument. Jayson Stark's article last week listed several players who have little interest into locking themselves into a deal. The players mentioned were the Uptons, Russell Martin, Prince Fielder, King Felix, Jeff Francoeur, and the Red Sox trio of young stars (Jonathan Papelbon, Kevin Youkilis, and Dustin Pedroia). Why would they not wish to enter into a deal? The trade off of signing a long term deal is that you may undercut your own value. The thought is that these deals cost a player about 3-5 MM per free agent year bought out. That is dependent, of course, on whether the player pans out. The players listed above are some of the best in the game, so it goes to reason that they can most likely keep their level of play. If I was Francoeur, I'd sign a deal though. Extreme contact hitters are a risky projection.
The Teams Perspective
A major concern of any organization is salary control. Money isn't free . . . it obviously has a cost. This cost often is hard to see. It will be difficult to know whether Jay "Albatross" Gibbons played in effort in courting other free agents, investing in the minor league system, or improving scouting. It is to a team's advantage to be able to identify plus talent and then secure it with a low ball offer. That is where these contracts make sense. Even teams with massive amounts of cash flow engage in this. Robinson Cano's extension is an example. The issue is though that sometimes the player you locked in is Kenny Lofton and sometimes it is Carlos Baerga. For a mid to low market teams, this strategy may be a necessity as the only way to compete long-term is taking a risk on young players and securing a few free agent years on the cheap. Richer teams do it because it gives them more money to spread around and a poor decision on this level is not going to affect them as much as a poor decision on a free agent signing when the contract carries more of a premium.
The Orioles' Perspective
It appears the Orioles are in between. Dan Connolly wrote an article a week or so back in the Sun. An anonymous source in the front office called the deal absurd and was quoted:
"To give a guy a contract like that who has never done it in the big leagues, that is what I call high-risk," the official said. "This game isn't that easy to predict."The source of those comments may have emerged from someone who thought signing Gibbons and Mora to extension was a good idea. Andy MacPhail's comments (mentioned in the story) were more general and even-handed, which is what one would want from an official statement. It seems to be more clear that the team sees themselves as having not much to gain if Markakis does become the best right fielder in the game, but much to lose if he does not. It looks to me they will wait and let the free agent market determine his value. Is this a good move if it is indeed what they are doing?
Cost/Benefit
From the Orioles (and, conversely, Markakis') perspective, what savings can be gained by signing Nick right now? This study will dive back into the generalized runs created equation and shifting that to wins, which I have done in the past on many occasions. Nick's performance will be used from PECOTA's 7 year forecast. Changes in the forecast by year will be incorporated into the current 25th and 75th projectile performance projections. Valuation is my own figure with each win being worth roughly 3 MM in today's market. Over the past five years, players salary has increased roughly 10% each year. Projected worth will increase at the same rate. All of this will be tied together in terms of cumulative savings or cost. It should be stated that I considered his defense to be average. The general consensus is that he has a plus arm and average range.
Nick Markakis Projection
Markakis' year has been a bit peculiar. He is on pace for 26 home runs, but is also on pace for 16 doubles. It is a peculiar line. His rates fall in at 253/374/424. His PrOPS place him at 280/396/492. His 2007 50th percentile PECOTA projection places him at 356/470, so PECOTA is right there in the middle and I am going to run with that. PECOTA's projections require a subscription, so I don't feel right publishing them here. What I will show is his 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile projections convert to runs created per 162 games. As you can see, he 25th percentile condition shows him being roughly replacement level as a right fielder (RL-RF is 348ops/413slg) for his career. The 50th percentile places him slightly above league average (Avg-RF is 360/465). His 75th percentile has have as significantly better than league average. Perhaps the strangest thing about these projections is how consistent they have Markakis' level of performance over these next 7 years.
Performance Valuation By Year
Although his performance is projected to remain relatively constant over the next seven years, salaries will climb as more cash flushes into MLB. Over the past five years, salaries have increased about 10% each season. Each win over replacement level player performance was multiplied by 3 MM in 2007, 3.3 MM in 2008, 3.6 MM in 2009, etc. Markakis' current performance is worth about 12 MM to the Baltimore Orioles, but he is being paid 0.455 MM. You can probably understand why he might be a little annoyed about the renewal system. If he was a free agent (ignoring his age and potential breakout ability), he would be worth that 12 MM. Compared with other players in that range it falls right on the nose. Jose Guillen is getting paid 13 MM and he was the 2007 league average right fielder (I'm still not sure how he did not get pay docked for the PED aura).Cumulative Earnings Gained or Lost
This leads us to the bottom line. I think a proper correlative to Markakis would be Alex Rios. Toronto signed him to a 6 year, 64 MM contract this past offseason. That would be similar to what we would expect it would take to sign Nick this upcoming offseason. I assigned him a 6 year, 66.01 MM contract for simplicity and avoidance of numbers with dreadful connotation. The cumulative costs for the 25, 50, and 75 projections are based on three arbitration years and three years of free agency with the cost set by performance valuation of the prior season. For instance, in the 50th percentile I predicted arbitration worth as 5MM in 2009, 7MM in 2010, and 11MM in 2011. The next three years were then dictated by the valuation of his 2011 performance, which comes to 18 MM per season. That comes to a cumulative cost/earnings of 76 MM.
Out of the scenarios considered here, the Orioles would lose money only if Nick hits his 25th percentile projections. The Orioles would lose 16.5 MM over the course of 6 years. Of course, this is based on the free agent market and may overvalue his worth as there may be 0-3 year players capable of this performance. If you consider that possibility, it might be a loss of 50 MM or so over that time period. If Markakis hits his 50th percentile, the Orioles would have saved 10MM over 6 or 1.7 MM each year. The 75th percentile would be a savings of 37 MM over 6 years or about 6MM per year. Conclusion
It is understandable why the Orioles might be reluctant to secure Markakis for the long term. If he falters it be a costly mistake (about 50 MM). If he stays the same as he is now, he basically get what he would have gotten anyway. If he breaks out . . . then he will cost a lot of money and years. That is basically what it comes down to. If you are sure that he is going to be a premium player, then you should lock him up in order to maximize your cash efficiency for other players on your roster. Ideally, the only time you pay a premium is when you bring players into your organization via free agency.
I think signing Markakis should be a priority and it will be fine to lock him in for 6 years at 66.01 MM. Perhaps a bit smarter of a contract would grant him 4 years at 40 MM and 2 team options years for 13.005 MM a piece. That way, he would still get a great deal of value for his first 4 seasons of the contract and the team would have an out if he completely crashes. I think Nick is not a high risk player. As opposed to the previous players mentioned (i.e., Craig Worthington, Ben Grieve) is not someone who relies on two tools. Markakis has plus ability in all skills and I think that makes him an easy one to bet on. Of course, this assumes Nick wants an extension. He certainly wants to be paid more, but I am not sure he wants to be lock in long-term. If he buys into the hype (Rob Neyer predicted that over the next 5 years he would be the best RF in the game), then he would be foolish to sign long term. Time will tell.
Though perhaps the biggest lesson is the savings attributed to developing young talent. Looking at Nick Markakis' 75th percentile projection, what we see is that over the next 6 years is that he could earn 103 MM if he goes the arbitration and free agency route. In turn, to get that much production off the free market, it would cost 157 MM. Even with respect to the average RF, you get a savings of 22 MM over 6 years. This is probably the lesson we have learned over the last decade or so: 0-3 year players are worth a lot of money. So, the next time you get excited by your team acquiring an established player (i.e., Bedard) for a collection of prospects (i.e. Adam Jones, Chris Tillman) . . . remember that with the extra 20-30% savings your team may be making, you can extend your own guys or pay the premium for the specific free agent talent to get you over the hump.
26 June 2010
Depot Retro: Infield Age Curves
Infield Defensive Age Curves
A major consideration for any team when it comes to offering a player an extension or signing a free agent is often boiled down to his offensive production over the length of the new contract. Another consideration that is often overlooked is where the bat will play. For instance, signing a 28 year old Miguel Tejada to a 6 year contract to play shortstop is actually a very smart move. His bat played well over expectations for a SS and would become league average by about his final year of the deal. Likewise, Tejada's defense was astounding and very much under-rated. A typical age progression would have showed him to be an average to slightly below average defensive SS in his final year.
In hindsight, we now know he was two years older than admitted. This shifts the projection in the wrong way. His 5th year is now as an average offensive SS and an average defensive SS (very good hands, but no range outside of his zone). Next year should result in a precipitous decline in defense, but you cannot shift him to third base or first base. Why? You can easily find bats that provide more offensive output than Tejada for the same defense. For the Orioles, thankfully they shipped him off and at least got a serviceable left fielder and some potential arms. They also helped add to Ed Wade's long list of bad, but not life threatening trades.
Here we will try to quantify typical infield age curves for fielding. When it comes to fielding there are two main considerations when it comes to generating outs: the ability to field "cleanly" and range. Fielding cleanly or fielding efficiency is a skill that maximizes when the player has had experience at the MLB level. Aging will affect efficiency, but not to a great extent. Range on the other hand is heavily affected by aging, or that is what I would assume. As a player ages, he should experience decreased ability to cover the same territory or have his reaction time slow.
How will fielding be measured?
Revised Zone Rating (RZR) will be used as a surrogate for fielding efficiency. This metric assumes there is a given territory that a defender should be expected to cover. Of all the balls that pass through this zone, outs are recorded and compared to the number of chances. This is not ideal as RZR will be effected eventually by decreased range, but it should be rather representative because players are typically moved off positions if they are so unable to defend this standardized area.
Out of Zone (OOZ) Plays will be used to represent range. These plays are those that are made outside of the zone designated to the position. Again, there are potential issues. If a defender is playing next to a player who has great range then the number of OOZ plays he can accrue will probably be reduced. The resulting effect may not be great because several players seasons will be used to determine the aging curve line.
The data was collected from the Hardball Times fielding statistics. Fielding performance was recorded from 2004-2007. Out of Zone plays for each player was divided by the number of innings played and normalized over 162 9 inning games. Ages were then determined and applied to the seasons. Ages with less than three data points were removed from consideration. Only full time players were considered.
First Base
The curves depicted to the right show the effect of age on fielding efficiency (orange) and range (black). Each horizontal mark represents one run for both y axes. For instance, if a player moves upward ten lines then he has prevented ten runs from scoring in comparison to the year before. Ten runs is roughly worth one win. For first basemen, each play is worth about 0.798 runs.
Based on the age classes we have on hand (at least three data points had to be available for each age included), we see absolutely no acclimation for range from 24 onward. Range basically plateaus between age 30 and 31 seasons. For first basemen, fielding range is maximized in the early 20s and immediately declines until about age 30. First base is not considered a defensive position, so when a 1B ages it is typically met with a shrug. Fielding efficiency maxes out at 26 or 27 years of age and then goes into decline. It could be argued that the decline is fueled largely by the decline in range. It should be noted that efficiency, for a short period, does increase as range decreases. The reduced ability to field effectively is most likely due to age and range. A simple regression found correlation between range and RZR to be an order of magnitude greater than age and RZR.
Second Base
Just like the previous graph, the curves depicted to the right show the effect of age on fielding efficiency (orange) and range (black). A single play is worth about 0.754 runs for a second baseman. Fielding efficiency maxes out around age 28 or 29. Range is maximized at age 26 or 27. Ages 27 to 29 are when fielding ability is greatest for second basemen as their efficiency rises and their range has not been greatly compromised. Most second basemen fall completely apart in their early to mid thirties, so I did not have enough data to cover that time period.
Second base appears to be a position suffers a great amount of physical degradation, but also is one of the later ones in terms of reaching a high point for efficiency. It takes several years before fielding efficiency is optimized. Taking this data into consideration, defensive second basemen are hurt by free agency for the most part (or the organizations who sign them). After the renewal system and arbitration cycles take their turns, defensive minded second basemen hit free agency with their better days behind them. It is more likely that the dropoff is far more severe than depicted on these curves due to older 2B neutralizing the aging effect.
Third Base
For third basemen, a single play is worth about 0.8 runs. This position has the most costly plays barely nudging out first base. It should be noted that the reason why the corners are so costly as because those fair balls slicing down the first or third base line often result in extra bases or a difficult throw to nail an advancing runner. Plays at these corner positions are about 7% more valuable than those in the interior. Balancing that is that there are far more plays in the interior than on the corners.
Of all of the positions, we have the most information for this one in terms of different ages. Third base and second base have some similarities in terms of how long players take to develop peak efficiency at these positions. Third basemen take a little bit longer as they peak around 30 or 31. The reason for both of these might be due to learning a new position. A significant number of second basemen and third basemen are often shifted off of shortstop. This switch may take years for a player to develop properly and achieve his highest level of performance.
Shortstop
For shortstops, a single play is worth about 0.753 runs.
Based on the age classes we have on hand (at least three data points had to be available for each age included), we were only able to include ages 22 to 32 on this graph. As opposed to the 2B curves, these have similar apexes, but differ with where they end up. Shortstop appears to take more skill and athletic ability to play effectively. This comes as no surprise. Also, range deteriorates much more quickly than efficiency, which agrees with the 2B study. Fielding lifespan is much shorter for a SS than a 2B though. Range for a SS seems to peak around 26/27 and fielding efficiency peaks 27/28. A quick check on Google and I find that Tom Tango did something similar in February. His findings basically agree with my own even though we calculated these in different ways. His calculations predict a decline twice as rapidly as my own. For instance, we both find the same peak, but he finds a decrease of -35 plays from peak to age 32. I find it to be -18 plays. I am not sure which is more appropriate. Perhaps considering my findings and Tango's as a range would be a good idea. That range is worth about one win. Regardless, this trend seems more unmistakable.
Points to Take Home
If these curves are accurate depictions of player ability it should be noted that there are some immediate declines for all positions at the time for extensions or free agency. A typical first baseman will lose 1.3 more games in his age 32 season than his age 28 season. Third base is more resilient as only 0.3 games lost in that transition. This retention has a lot to do with the fact that players with the ability to stick at third base will stay there while those who lose range or skill will be shifted to first base. Looking at the middle infield, A second baseman and shortstop will lose 1.5 and 1.4 more games using that same comparison, respectively.
As can be seen, a major issue with free agency is that it is rarely a source of middle infielders. This is something that most teams have figured out as you will rarely see anyone sign a middle infielder for much money these days. Your typical second baseman and shortstop will be quite useful at their natural positions until they reach about age 32, then that bat that was so useful there pales with a position change.
25 June 2010
Depot Retro: Brian Roberts Interview and Brian's Bracelets
Interview: Brian Roberts, 2b, Baltimore Orioles
Brian Roberts answered some of our questions about his "Brian's Bracelets Program", baseball and what Orioles fans can do to help with this worthy cause. Brian's Bracelets are available exclusively online only at www.briansbracelet.com ($10.00).
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CamdenDepot.com: When you were five, you underwent surgery to alleviate a heart condition. How has that experience affected your desire to impact social issues?
CD: It’s certainly an exciting time to be an Orioles fan. Any final thoughts you would like to share with the fanbase?
Brian Roberts answered some of our questions about his "Brian's Bracelets Program", baseball and what Orioles fans can do to help with this worthy cause. Brian's Bracelets are available exclusively online only at www.briansbracelet.com ($10.00).
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CamdenDepot.com: When you were five, you underwent surgery to alleviate a heart condition. How has that experience affected your desire to impact social issues?Brian Roberts: I spent a lot of time in the hospital after my heart surgery. I was little but I remember missing the normalcy I had at home. With Brian's Bracelet Program, and with the help of GameWear, we're helping ensure that kids at the University of Maryland Hospital for Children (UMHC) feel a little more at home. Even at such a young age, the surgery instilled in me the importance of helping others.
I'm really proud to have partnered with GameWear for this important Program. I wear my bracelet all of the time - look for it on my wrist at our next game.
CD: When people purchase Brian's Bracelets, the money goes toward University of Maryland
BR: The money from Brian's Bracelets will help fund children's programs that will make kids' stays a little more comfortable. Funds support programs like the Pet Visitation Program, where specially trained animals visit young patients to cheer them up, and Reach Out and Read, a pediatric practice-based program that gives children access to books early in their lives. So when you buy a bracelet, you're money is directly impacting how children play and cope during their hospital stays.
CD: Are there any specific stories you would like to share from your charity work?
BR: There are so many stories really. Every encounter at the Children’s Hospital touches you in a way that’s hard to explain. I’ve been inspired by so many kids and what they’re going through that I honestly can’t single out one story. I guess if I had to give one story, I would say last year when I got together with a bunch of teammates, Baltimore City Police and Fire Departments and the Orioles to give a shopping spree to several needy Baltimore
CD: That sounds like a wonderful experience - being able to see your impact on the community up close. One fascinating aspect about Brian's Bracelets (and other charities such as Lance Armstrong's "Live Strong" campaign (Lance Armstrong Foundation) or Coach Weis's "Hannah & Friends") is you see physical proof that a community is taking up a cause. How does it feel to see people walking around with the Bracelets, knowing that you've encouraged others to take up this worthy cause?
BR: It's so amazing to see people wearing Brian's Bracelet. For fans, the Bracelets are a perfect way to stay connected to the game and connected to an important cause at the same time. Seeing a group of kids wearing the Bracelets makes me proud and happy that the community is coming together to help put smiles on the kids’ faces.
CD: In the future, what plans do you have with University of Maryland Hospital
BR: Right now, I'm focused on helping the kids at UMHC. I will continue to be dedicated to improving the quality of life of seriously ill children through helping provide and fund hospital programs that distract them from their pain and keep their head in the game. In the future, I’ll always be looking out for organizations and charities that I can help in any way. I’ll always enjoy working with kids and promoting the sport of baseball, and I’m sure I’ll continue to come across and be approached by various organizations that I can get involved with.
CD: Well, the "Brian's Bracelets Program" is a wonderful charity and we have no doubt that our readers will join you in supporting the kids at 
UMCH, if they aren't already. On to baseball -- many of our readers are interested in the progression of a player from draftee to Major Leaguer. Tell us a little about your path from draft day to your first Major League game. What were some of the more difficult hurdles in adjusting to professional ball and developing as player?
UMCH, if they aren't already. On to baseball -- many of our readers are interested in the progression of a player from draftee to Major Leaguer. Tell us a little about your path from draft day to your first Major League game. What were some of the more difficult hurdles in adjusting to professional ball and developing as player?BR: Let’s see. 1999 I got drafted. I played about half a season in [LoA Delmarva] in ‘99 and then went to [HiA Frederick]. I began the season in 2000 in [Frederick Frederick Rochester Rochester
CD: In 2001 you began making the switch from shortstop to second base. You have obviously embraced the switch, but did you question the move at first? What did you have to work on by switching to the other side of the infield and how difficult of a transition was it?
BR: Yea, it was hard at first. I didn’t like it since I played SS my whole life really. I questioned it and was upset at first, but I knew it was best for the team. Turning double plays from other side was one of the most difficult things to learn.
CD: Despite a few hiccups recently, this 2008 Orioles team has been a pleasant surprise and a lot of fun to watch. Can you feel a change in the clubhouse? In the organization?
BR: Yea, I think we can all feel like we’re headed in the right direction. We made some moves for the future and I think we exceeded a lot of expectations this year, while we are still in what some consider a rebuilding stage. I think there’s a positive energy in the clubhouse and that leads to winning games and the fans have been really supportive overall.
CD: It seems like Baltimore
BR: If we can convince the right people at the right position, I definitely think there are some areas we can improve. We could probably use another starting pitcher or two, but for the most part we have a great team for next year and we have to remember [former closer] Chris Ray and [set-up man Danys] Baez will be back from injury and our bullpen is already solid. Offensively, we’ve been able to produce and [Nick] Markakis and [Adam] Jones are only going to continue to develop into All-Star caliber players. I guess I would sell the team on the direction we’re headed, the city itself and the incredible fans. Realistically though, it is a business and some free agents might make financial decisions based on what’s best for them and their families, but I’ll always do what I can to help promote and sell the organization to the players that can help us win games and provide leadership.
CD: It’s certainly an exciting time to be an Orioles fan. Any final thoughts you would like to share with the fanbase?BR: I can't stress enough how important it is to help others in need. The kids at UMHC are really great and by purchasing Brian's Bracelet, you know that you're helping give them the comforts of a normal, healthy lifestyle. All you have to do is visit www.briansbracelet.com to purchase a bracelet. Such a simple act really makes a huge impact.
Depot Retro: Effect of Defense on Run Production to Maintain Average Performance (Part 2 of 2: catcher and OF)
Effect of Defense on Run Production to Maintain Average Performance
(Part 2 of 2: Catcher and Outfield)
January 21, 2009by Jon Shepherd
In Part 1, we generated several illustrations to indicate how much offensive production is required to wind up with an average infield player given certain levels of defensive aptitude. Part 2 continues with the previous analysis, but focuses on the outfield and catcher.
Method
The methods have been set forth in part 1. The average OBP and SLG used in this Part 2 are listed in the table to the right. Examples of players are given for the outfield positions, but not for the catchers. It is uncertain to the author how exactly to quantify catching defensive worth. I would also like to explicitly mention something again that some found confusing in Part 1. All I am doing here is providing a connection between offensive production and defensive production using OBP and SLG. What someone needs to do to use these graphs is figure out how many runs on defense a player saves or costs. The examples I use in this article are based on last year's offensive numbers and a qualitative approximation of defensive value based on a consensus of UZR/150, Dewan, my system using RZR, and scouting reports.
Results
Catcher
Catcher is probably the position with the most difficult scenario to determine defensive worth. The ability to throw out ball players, prevent chances being taken for stolen bases, prevent wild pitches and passed balls, calling a game, and technique around the plate on throws home. I'm not aware of a useable format to collapse all of these variables. It probably exists somewhere. Some form may be available to the public. I am not aware of it though. So, in light of that . . . to the left is a chart depicting what type of production would be needed with respect to defensive prowess.
Left Field
This corner outfield position has lately become a slot where teams stick poor fielders not relegated to 1B/DH due to footspeed or further defensive ineptitude. One such outfielder is Adam Dunn. He is one of the worst left fielders in baseball and costs his team about 20 runs. His bat though has been solid enough to result in a total player who is slightly above average. If he is able to continue hitting like he has been and not have his fielding degrade anymore . . . he is probably worth about 12-14MM a year. Of course, if he suffers any degradation of talent, his value will collapse. Baltimore's Luke Scott is being used here as representative of an average fielding left fielder. His season last year was also quite average offensively. His overall value will take a slight hit as it appears he is headed toward being a DH with Baltimore's recent acquisition of Feliz Pie. Finally, Jacoby Elsbury played a stellar left field as he saved over 20 runs last year if you project his left field performance over the course of the year. With that level of defense, even if he maintains a 720ops, he rates as an above average left fielder. If Jason Bay reverts to a -10 run defense, he is more valuable than Elsbury as a left fielder. If his -15 run defense degrades more, the Red Sox may think twice about extending him. Although, his bat probably will sustain 4 or 5 years at DH.
Center FieldOffensive production from center field is similar to what is expected from second base. Of course, this position is typically more difficult to play. Aaron Rowand signed a nice contract last year after a surprising year in Philly. His offense in 2007 over-compensated for his defensive deficiencies. In 2008, his offensive numbers dropped more in line with his career average, exposing him as a below-average center fielder. There are 4 years and 48MM left on that deal. Ichiro rates as an average center fielder these days and his bat also rates as average. Finally, Carlos Gomez played a great center field last season for the Twins. His bat was pretty dreadful and he rated out as below average as a player. He was only 22 last year, so his hitting should get a little better and his defense should maintain this high level for a few seasons.
Right FieldThe last position in this series is the position with the second most run production, trailing only first base. An example of a great outfielder is Randy Winn who has been performing well the past two seasons in the Giants's right field. His offensive numbers are rather average for a right fielder, but his defense is so good it makes Winn two wins better than average and one of the better right fielders in the game last year. Another player who is worth about two wins more than average is Nick Markakis. His defense rates as about average, although with his arm he probably saves about 8-10 more runs a season. Assuming he is just average in the field, he still rates out as one of the best right fielders in the game. Finally, Bobby Abreu is our example of a defenisvely inept right fielder. The Yankees just might have known what they were doing when they decided not to offer arbitration as he is almost 10 runs worse than average based on this metric system.
ConclusionAlthough not explicitly discussed in this section, the numbers here in general agree with the valuations over at FanGraphs. The method developed here is a bit more simplistic than what is done over there. The purpose here was to provide a quick set of illustrations to determine how a player rates with respect to his fielding and offense. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of this study is recognizing that defensively adept center fielders may be utilized as a left fielder and deliver above average performance by buffering his bat with his glove.
(Part 2 of 2: Catcher and Outfield)
January 21, 2009by Jon Shepherd
In Part 1, we generated several illustrations to indicate how much offensive production is required to wind up with an average infield player given certain levels of defensive aptitude. Part 2 continues with the previous analysis, but focuses on the outfield and catcher.
Method
The methods have been set forth in part 1. The average OBP and SLG used in this Part 2 are listed in the table to the right. Examples of players are given for the outfield positions, but not for the catchers. It is uncertain to the author how exactly to quantify catching defensive worth. I would also like to explicitly mention something again that some found confusing in Part 1. All I am doing here is providing a connection between offensive production and defensive production using OBP and SLG. What someone needs to do to use these graphs is figure out how many runs on defense a player saves or costs. The examples I use in this article are based on last year's offensive numbers and a qualitative approximation of defensive value based on a consensus of UZR/150, Dewan, my system using RZR, and scouting reports.
Results
Catcher
Catcher is probably the position with the most difficult scenario to determine defensive worth. The ability to throw out ball players, prevent chances being taken for stolen bases, prevent wild pitches and passed balls, calling a game, and technique around the plate on throws home. I'm not aware of a useable format to collapse all of these variables. It probably exists somewhere. Some form may be available to the public. I am not aware of it though. So, in light of that . . . to the left is a chart depicting what type of production would be needed with respect to defensive prowess.
Left Field
This corner outfield position has lately become a slot where teams stick poor fielders not relegated to 1B/DH due to footspeed or further defensive ineptitude. One such outfielder is Adam Dunn. He is one of the worst left fielders in baseball and costs his team about 20 runs. His bat though has been solid enough to result in a total player who is slightly above average. If he is able to continue hitting like he has been and not have his fielding degrade anymore . . . he is probably worth about 12-14MM a year. Of course, if he suffers any degradation of talent, his value will collapse. Baltimore's Luke Scott is being used here as representative of an average fielding left fielder. His season last year was also quite average offensively. His overall value will take a slight hit as it appears he is headed toward being a DH with Baltimore's recent acquisition of Feliz Pie. Finally, Jacoby Elsbury played a stellar left field as he saved over 20 runs last year if you project his left field performance over the course of the year. With that level of defense, even if he maintains a 720ops, he rates as an above average left fielder. If Jason Bay reverts to a -10 run defense, he is more valuable than Elsbury as a left fielder. If his -15 run defense degrades more, the Red Sox may think twice about extending him. Although, his bat probably will sustain 4 or 5 years at DH.
Center FieldOffensive production from center field is similar to what is expected from second base. Of course, this position is typically more difficult to play. Aaron Rowand signed a nice contract last year after a surprising year in Philly. His offense in 2007 over-compensated for his defensive deficiencies. In 2008, his offensive numbers dropped more in line with his career average, exposing him as a below-average center fielder. There are 4 years and 48MM left on that deal. Ichiro rates as an average center fielder these days and his bat also rates as average. Finally, Carlos Gomez played a great center field last season for the Twins. His bat was pretty dreadful and he rated out as below average as a player. He was only 22 last year, so his hitting should get a little better and his defense should maintain this high level for a few seasons.
Right FieldThe last position in this series is the position with the second most run production, trailing only first base. An example of a great outfielder is Randy Winn who has been performing well the past two seasons in the Giants's right field. His offensive numbers are rather average for a right fielder, but his defense is so good it makes Winn two wins better than average and one of the better right fielders in the game last year. Another player who is worth about two wins more than average is Nick Markakis. His defense rates as about average, although with his arm he probably saves about 8-10 more runs a season. Assuming he is just average in the field, he still rates out as one of the best right fielders in the game. Finally, Bobby Abreu is our example of a defenisvely inept right fielder. The Yankees just might have known what they were doing when they decided not to offer arbitration as he is almost 10 runs worse than average based on this metric system.
ConclusionAlthough not explicitly discussed in this section, the numbers here in general agree with the valuations over at FanGraphs. The method developed here is a bit more simplistic than what is done over there. The purpose here was to provide a quick set of illustrations to determine how a player rates with respect to his fielding and offense. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of this study is recognizing that defensively adept center fielders may be utilized as a left fielder and deliver above average performance by buffering his bat with his glove.
21 June 2010
BORT Chat Monday at 8pm: Leaving it all open
Today's chat has no specific topic at the moment. Feel free to show up tonight and give us structure . . . or, perhaps, I'll figure out some things to talk about. I always seem to have an opinion.
20 June 2010
Trade Market Options: AL East Edition
This is a continuation of a series exploring options in the trade market for the Orioles. The Orioles most useful available talent (i.e. Millwood, Guthrie, Wigginton, Scott) could probably net a return of one B level prospect and some C level secondary prospect. This series will review the teams arguably in contention and how well they match up with what the Orioles have and what the Orioles would want.
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
AL East after the jump...
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
AL East after the jump...
19 June 2010
Depot Retro: Effect of Defense on Run Production to Maintain Average Performance (Part 1 of 2: Infield)
The following article is a piece we published in January of last year at one of our old web addresses. As we settle back into our old home here, occasionally we will reintroduce some of those pieces that still have some degree of relevance. The first I want to post is a study I did assessing what would be average value for each position based on 2008 levels of offensive and defensive performance.
January 19, 2009
A player's worth can be defined as the sum of offensive and defensive production. In other words, a player adds to his value by contributing to put runs on the scoreboard and to prevent the other team from scoring. Most work has been accomplished on the offensive side of this equation. This is primarily due to the majority of offense being well characterized by single events, such as a home run or a walk. Defense has been more difficult to analyze as a simple single event requires a good deal of qualification. For instance, a play in the outfield needs to be qualified as to the type of hit (fly ball, line drive, ground ball), where the ball fell, where the fielder started, what is the accepted range for that position, and the resulting effects (as in did a runner tag up or was the batter able to stretch the hit into a double). This requires meticulous analysis and, therefore, most of these methods are proprietary metrics that are often not shared with the general public. The ones that are shared are typically well encapsulated, so the whole process is a black box where you have to trust the statistician. My own transparent method uses the Hardball Times's "balls in zone" data, which entrusts them as knowing what is considered in a fielder's zone.
Recent events have made it obvious that teams are changing the way they evaluate a player's worth. This current offseason, many of have been surprised at how few players were offered arbitration. Pat Burrell made a shade over 14MM last season and now will be earning 16MM total over two seasons in Tampa. This is a bit shocking in that in years past, Burrell would be expected to receive a deal worth about 48MM over 4 years. Now, it seems teams are more strongly considering defense (though the current recession cannot be ignored as a possible contributing factor in the decreasing free agent salaries). An interesting side note in Burrell's worth is that FanGraphs pegs his worth as 11.6MM last year as the Phillies's left fielder. If you shift his position to a full time DH, he was worth 12.5MM, which may show that DHs are currently undervalued in this market. Now, understanding that defense is probably more of a quantifiable contribution toward characterizing the worth of a player, this work aims to determine what levels of offense are required to achieve average production and to present in a quick and easy-to-digest format. For instance, if a left fielder makes 24 less plays than the average left fielder (~20 runs), how well does he have to hit to rate as an average player? How much must his offense compensate for his inability to field relative to his peers? This article will be broken down into two parts. This first segment will focus on the infield and the second will concern itself with the outfield and catcher.
January 19, 2009
A player's worth can be defined as the sum of offensive and defensive production. In other words, a player adds to his value by contributing to put runs on the scoreboard and to prevent the other team from scoring. Most work has been accomplished on the offensive side of this equation. This is primarily due to the majority of offense being well characterized by single events, such as a home run or a walk. Defense has been more difficult to analyze as a simple single event requires a good deal of qualification. For instance, a play in the outfield needs to be qualified as to the type of hit (fly ball, line drive, ground ball), where the ball fell, where the fielder started, what is the accepted range for that position, and the resulting effects (as in did a runner tag up or was the batter able to stretch the hit into a double). This requires meticulous analysis and, therefore, most of these methods are proprietary metrics that are often not shared with the general public. The ones that are shared are typically well encapsulated, so the whole process is a black box where you have to trust the statistician. My own transparent method uses the Hardball Times's "balls in zone" data, which entrusts them as knowing what is considered in a fielder's zone.
Recent events have made it obvious that teams are changing the way they evaluate a player's worth. This current offseason, many of have been surprised at how few players were offered arbitration. Pat Burrell made a shade over 14MM last season and now will be earning 16MM total over two seasons in Tampa. This is a bit shocking in that in years past, Burrell would be expected to receive a deal worth about 48MM over 4 years. Now, it seems teams are more strongly considering defense (though the current recession cannot be ignored as a possible contributing factor in the decreasing free agent salaries). An interesting side note in Burrell's worth is that FanGraphs pegs his worth as 11.6MM last year as the Phillies's left fielder. If you shift his position to a full time DH, he was worth 12.5MM, which may show that DHs are currently undervalued in this market. Now, understanding that defense is probably more of a quantifiable contribution toward characterizing the worth of a player, this work aims to determine what levels of offense are required to achieve average production and to present in a quick and easy-to-digest format. For instance, if a left fielder makes 24 less plays than the average left fielder (~20 runs), how well does he have to hit to rate as an average player? How much must his offense compensate for his inability to field relative to his peers? This article will be broken down into two parts. This first segment will focus on the infield and the second will concern itself with the outfield and catcher.
18 June 2010
Expansion Draft Side Project
As you may have remember, I have been toying around with an expansion team concept that I began two years ago. Prior to the draft, here is the shadow expansion team's minor league system.
Here is the minor league system top 20 prospects so far:
1. Aroldis Chapman P A-
2. Roger Keischnick OF B-
3. Ryan Flaherty INF B-
4. Max Stassi C B-
5. Jordan Danks OF C+
6. Matt Davidson 3B C+
7. Madison Younginer P C+
8. Miguel Jean OF C+
9. Todd Glaessman OF C+
10. DJ Mitchell P C+
11. Ian Krol P C
12. Clayton Cook P C
13. Scott Gorgen P C
14. Chris Herrman C/1B/OF C
15. Adrian Nieto C C
16. Kyle Jenson OF C
17. Graham Stoneburner P C
18. Kendall Volz P C
19. Luis Domoromo RF C
20. Carlos Perez P C
As you can see the system lacks middle infield and some polished pitching. With these ideas I entered the draft. Since this is the first year the team plays, the pick remains as the final selection in each round. The picks after the jump.
Here is the minor league system top 20 prospects so far:
1. Aroldis Chapman P A-
2. Roger Keischnick OF B-
3. Ryan Flaherty INF B-
4. Max Stassi C B-
5. Jordan Danks OF C+
6. Matt Davidson 3B C+
7. Madison Younginer P C+
8. Miguel Jean OF C+
9. Todd Glaessman OF C+
10. DJ Mitchell P C+
11. Ian Krol P C
12. Clayton Cook P C
13. Scott Gorgen P C
14. Chris Herrman C/1B/OF C
15. Adrian Nieto C C
16. Kyle Jenson OF C
17. Graham Stoneburner P C
18. Kendall Volz P C
19. Luis Domoromo RF C
20. Carlos Perez P C
As you can see the system lacks middle infield and some polished pitching. With these ideas I entered the draft. Since this is the first year the team plays, the pick remains as the final selection in each round. The picks after the jump.
16 June 2010
2010 Orioles Elias Update
The graph below shows how each of our veterans are doing with respect to their estimated Elias Free Agent Classification as determined by MLB Trade Rumors. As you can see, both Miguel Tejada and Kevin Millwood have decreased from their initial value this season. That said, neither are doing well enough to offer arbitration.
15 June 2010
Most managers in a single season for baseball: Part I - AL
With Juan Samuel reaching his 10th game and managerial veterans like Bobby Valentine and Eric Wedge casting their shadow over Camden Yards, the Orioles might do something that has been done fewer times in Major League Baseball than perfect games pitched. In fact, it is something the franchise has done before, but as the St. Louis Browns. This feat? To have at least three managers rack up 10 decisions or more in a single season.
Today is the first part of a two part series looking at the oddity of single seasons with multi-manager teams. Some of these events were caused by illnesses, extended interim managers, unique ideas, or an impatient front office.
After the jump, we will start of with the Baltimore Orioles history . . .
Today is the first part of a two part series looking at the oddity of single seasons with multi-manager teams. Some of these events were caused by illnesses, extended interim managers, unique ideas, or an impatient front office.
After the jump, we will start of with the Baltimore Orioles history . . .
14 June 2010
Case for claiming Jake Fox
Susan Slusser tweeted last night that the Oakland Athletics can no longer afford to be patient with Jake Fox and are designating him for assignment. This is a move to take him off the 40 man roster, so every other team in baseball will have a shot at him. The Orioles have the first right of claim. The Athletics need to do this because Fox is out of options. His has been somewhat miserable at the plate this year with a 591 OPS. He has played left field, catcher, and backed up a few games at third base. In the minors he has also had some experience with first base.What I am suggesting is pretty simple . . . the Orioles need to claim Fox and designate Garrett Atkins. At this point, Atkins has not shown any improvement at the plate and looks stiff over at first base. Taken along with his three year precipitous decline, I see absolutely no upside to keeping him. He cannot hit and he cannot take the field. Jake Fox is actually hitting better than Atkins. He has also shown good power as well. He has shown some ability to play catcher and first base, which would be very valuable to the Orioles. Fox is also right handed just like Atkins, so he fills that role as well. At 27, Fox is not an up and coming prospect, but he could, maybe, just maybe, have some upside in either his bat or his ability to catch. These are unknowns to explore. Everything about Atkins we know and none of it has been very useful.
Now, I am not going to kick and scream if the Orioles pass on Fox, but it would be disappointing. Why? Because I think it will be a sign of embracing a player, Atkins, not because of his abilities, but because of his salary. The cost is sunk and no one is going to take him off the Orioles' hands. It should be time to own up to that and take chances on the waiver wire.
12 June 2010
Trade Market Options: NL West Edition
This is a continuation of a series exploring options in the trade market for the Orioles. The Orioles most useful available talent (i.e. Millwood, Guthrie, Wigginton, Scott) could probably net a return of one B level prospect and some C level secondary prospect. This series will review the teams arguably in contention and how well they match up with what the Orioles have and what the Orioles would want.
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
NL West after the jump...
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
NL West after the jump...
Trade Market Options: NL Central Edition
This is a continuation of a series exploring options in the trade market for the Orioles. The Orioles most useful available talent (i.e. Millwood, Guthrie, Wigginton, Scott) could probably net a return of one B level prospect and some C level secondary prospect. This series will review the teams arguably in contention and how well they match up with what the Orioles have and what the Orioles would want.
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
NL Central after the jump...
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
NL Central after the jump...
Trade Market Options: NL East Edition
NL East
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
After the jump, a list of B level prospects for each team in the NL who PECOTA projects as having at least a 10% chance to make the playoffs.
NL Central
NL West
AL East
AL Central
AL West
After the jump, a list of B level prospects for each team in the NL who PECOTA projects as having at least a 10% chance to make the playoffs.
10 June 2010
Orioles and the 2011 1st overall selection . . .
Just a graph today, looking on to next year.
This is based on the PECOTA updated season projections and then apply a binomial distribution to the resulting data.
Onward and upward.
This is based on the PECOTA updated season projections and then apply a binomial distribution to the resulting data.
Onward and upward.
09 June 2010
Thoughts on the Orioles 2010 draft.
I doubt I am going to hear I name I recognize today, which is sad for me. Yesterday was full of moving into a new apartment. After figuring it all together, I climbed 164 flights of stairs. That is more vertical distance than the Sears tower while carrying things all greater than a 30lb rucksack. Anyway, I digress.
What does the draft, so far, mean to me? After the jump, I go pick to pick and have a short write up for each that I am aware of . . . I'm somewhat limited in my knowledge.
What does the draft, so far, mean to me? After the jump, I go pick to pick and have a short write up for each that I am aware of . . . I'm somewhat limited in my knowledge.
08 June 2010
Shadow Draft: Round 3 through Round 10
Camden Shadow Draft only had one pick yesterday, Chipley HS (Fla.) RHP Karsten Whitson.
Today we get eight picks, one in each round from 3 - 10:
3:3 - Josh Rutledge, SS, Univ. of Alabama
4:3 - Garin Cecchini, SS/3B, Barbe HS (La.)
5:3 - Tyler Holt, OF, Florida St. University
6:3 - Tony Thompson, 3B, Univ. of Kansas
7:3 - Robert Aviles, RHP, Suffern HS (N.Y.)
8:3 - Mario Hollands, LHP, Univ. of California - Santa Barbara
9:3 - Jordan Cooper, RHP, Wichita St. Univ.
10:3 - Matt Roberts, C, Graham HS (N.C.)
We'll do a full recap, but some quick thoughts:
1:3 - Love Whitson up top; expect him to be signable in the Zack Wheeler range
3:3 - Rutledge is the advanced middle-infielder we were hoping for at 3:3
4:3 - Couldn't pass on Cecchini here; will take around $1.5 million to sign, but legit Top 2 Round talent (may be shifting to 3B)
5:3 - In hindsight now a little nervous about signability giving how far down he went in the real draft, but we have some extra jingle in the budget
6:3 - I (Stotle) had a "big corner bat" on my list and Thompson certainly qualifies; might shift to 1B but potential for plus power
7:3 - "Dream Draft" was Aviles in the 9th, but couldn't risk him dropping futher (good thing because he was picked in this round in the actual draft!)
8:3 - Needed to get back to signable picks and Hollands was a favorite of Craw's
9:3 - Another college arm that could fit in the pen or slot in as a back-ender
10:3 - Tough sign, but wanted to take a stab at a prep catcher; likely headed to UNC
Today we get eight picks, one in each round from 3 - 10:
3:3 - Josh Rutledge, SS, Univ. of Alabama
4:3 - Garin Cecchini, SS/3B, Barbe HS (La.)
5:3 - Tyler Holt, OF, Florida St. University
6:3 - Tony Thompson, 3B, Univ. of Kansas
7:3 - Robert Aviles, RHP, Suffern HS (N.Y.)
8:3 - Mario Hollands, LHP, Univ. of California - Santa Barbara
9:3 - Jordan Cooper, RHP, Wichita St. Univ.
10:3 - Matt Roberts, C, Graham HS (N.C.)
We'll do a full recap, but some quick thoughts:
1:3 - Love Whitson up top; expect him to be signable in the Zack Wheeler range
3:3 - Rutledge is the advanced middle-infielder we were hoping for at 3:3
4:3 - Couldn't pass on Cecchini here; will take around $1.5 million to sign, but legit Top 2 Round talent (may be shifting to 3B)
5:3 - In hindsight now a little nervous about signability giving how far down he went in the real draft, but we have some extra jingle in the budget
6:3 - I (Stotle) had a "big corner bat" on my list and Thompson certainly qualifies; might shift to 1B but potential for plus power
7:3 - "Dream Draft" was Aviles in the 9th, but couldn't risk him dropping futher (good thing because he was picked in this round in the actual draft!)
8:3 - Needed to get back to signable picks and Hollands was a favorite of Craw's
9:3 - Another college arm that could fit in the pen or slot in as a back-ender
10:3 - Tough sign, but wanted to take a stab at a prep catcher; likely headed to UNC
07 June 2010
After Day 1: Crawdaddy's top 35
Orioles have the 35th pick tomorrow. After the jump, my top 35.
1. Stetson Allie, rhp, St. Edward HS, Lakewood, Ohio
2. A.J. Cole, rhp, Oviedo (Fla.) HS
3. Brandon Workman, rhp, Texas
4. Austin Wilson, of, Harvard-Westlake School, Los Angeles
5. Brett Eibner, rhp/of, Arkansas
6. Chad Bettis, rhp, Texas Tech
7. Yordy Cabrera, ss/rhp, Lakeland (Fla.) HS
8. Jesse Hahn, rhp, Virginia Tech
9. James Paxton, lhp, Grand Prairie (American Assoc.)
10. Ryan LaMarre, of, Michigan
11. A.J. Vanegas, rhp, Redwood Christian HS, San Lorenzo, Calif.
12. Micah Gibbs, c, Louisiana State
13. Kevin Gausman, rhp, Grandview HS, Centennial, Colo.
14. LeVon Washington, of, Chipola (Fla.) JC
15. Jarrett Parker, of, Virginia
16. Jedd Gyorko, ss, West Virginia
17. DeAndre Smelter, rhp, Tattnall Square Academy, Macon, Ga.
18. Sammy Solis, lhp, San Diego
19. Ryne Stanek, rhp, Blue Valley HS, Stilwell, Kan.
20. Jordan Swagerty, rhp, Arizona State
21. Aaron Shipman, of, Brooks County HS, Quitman, Ga.
22. Addison Reed, rhp, San Diego State
23. Hunter Morris, 1b, Auburn
24. Austin Wates, of, Virginia Tech
25. Derek Dietrich, ss, Georgia Tech
26. Tony Wolters, ss, Rancho Buena Vista HS, Vista, Calif.
27. Jacob Petricka, rhp, Indiana State
28. Kevin Chapman, lhp, Florida
29. Drew Cisco, rhp, Wando HS, Mount Pleasant, S.C.
30. Will Swanner, c, La Costa Canyon HS, Carlsbad, Calif.
31. Tyler Holt, of, Florida State
32. Jared LaKind, 1B/OF, Cypress Woods HS TX
33. Stefan Sabol, c/of, Aliso Niguel HS, Aliso Viejo, Calif.
34. Andrelton Simmons, ss/rhp, Western Oklahoma State JC
35. Marcus Littlewood, 3b, Pine View HS, St. George, Utah
1. Stetson Allie, rhp, St. Edward HS, Lakewood, Ohio
2. A.J. Cole, rhp, Oviedo (Fla.) HS
3. Brandon Workman, rhp, Texas
4. Austin Wilson, of, Harvard-Westlake School, Los Angeles
5. Brett Eibner, rhp/of, Arkansas
6. Chad Bettis, rhp, Texas Tech
7. Yordy Cabrera, ss/rhp, Lakeland (Fla.) HS
8. Jesse Hahn, rhp, Virginia Tech
9. James Paxton, lhp, Grand Prairie (American Assoc.)
10. Ryan LaMarre, of, Michigan
11. A.J. Vanegas, rhp, Redwood Christian HS, San Lorenzo, Calif.
12. Micah Gibbs, c, Louisiana State
13. Kevin Gausman, rhp, Grandview HS, Centennial, Colo.
14. LeVon Washington, of, Chipola (Fla.) JC
15. Jarrett Parker, of, Virginia
16. Jedd Gyorko, ss, West Virginia
17. DeAndre Smelter, rhp, Tattnall Square Academy, Macon, Ga.
18. Sammy Solis, lhp, San Diego
19. Ryne Stanek, rhp, Blue Valley HS, Stilwell, Kan.
20. Jordan Swagerty, rhp, Arizona State
21. Aaron Shipman, of, Brooks County HS, Quitman, Ga.
22. Addison Reed, rhp, San Diego State
23. Hunter Morris, 1b, Auburn
24. Austin Wates, of, Virginia Tech
25. Derek Dietrich, ss, Georgia Tech
26. Tony Wolters, ss, Rancho Buena Vista HS, Vista, Calif.
27. Jacob Petricka, rhp, Indiana State
28. Kevin Chapman, lhp, Florida
29. Drew Cisco, rhp, Wando HS, Mount Pleasant, S.C.
30. Will Swanner, c, La Costa Canyon HS, Carlsbad, Calif.
31. Tyler Holt, of, Florida State
32. Jared LaKind, 1B/OF, Cypress Woods HS TX
33. Stefan Sabol, c/of, Aliso Niguel HS, Aliso Viejo, Calif.
34. Andrelton Simmons, ss/rhp, Western Oklahoma State JC
35. Marcus Littlewood, 3b, Pine View HS, St. George, Utah
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