The Pros and Cons of Signing Kendrys Morales

The Orioles have a DH problem. This topic was covered in our offseason series, and I've written about the potential acquisition of Billy Butler and the potential signing of Mike Napoli. So far, the O's have only opted to deal one potential DH option away, when they shipped Danny Valencia to the Royals for outfielder David Lough. Valencia was the team's lone bright spot at DH, as Orioles' designated hitters batted a combined .236/.290/.418 last season.

Right now, the O's DH situation looks similar to how it was at the beginning of last season. Steve Pearce and Nolan Reimold, who were both tendered contracts this offseason, each started out last season getting an opportunity to DH. But Pearce (44 games) ended up battling wrist injuries for much of the season, and Reimold (40 games) needed neck surgery for a second time. Pearce and Reimold were supposed to handle the right-handed side of that DH platoon; Wilson Betemit was supposed to provide the left-handed pop. But he sustained a right knee injury in March that required surgery, and although he was able to return in late August, he failed to get a hit in 10 at-bats and was soon designated for assignment.

One potential answer to the team's DH issues is to scrap the DH platoon and just sign Kendrys Morales. Here's Roch Kubatko, expressing an opinion that seems to be popular with plenty of fans:

I want a full-time designated hitter - I'm still beating the Kendrys Morales drum - which allows Reimold to serve as an extra outfielder (and occasional DH) and Henry Urrutia to play every day in left field at Triple-A Norfolk. He's raw and needs the reps.

I agree on Urrutia. I'm not sure he's ready to handle even a part-time role in the majors just yet, and it would not be bad for him to play every day at Norfolk. But let's explore the Morales possibility a bit further.

Kendrys Morales (photo via Keith Allison)

Morales turns 31 in June. In 156 games for the Mariners last year, he hit .277/.336/.449; he also has a career batting line of .280/.333/.480. Morales had a career year at the plate in 2009, finishing with a .387 wOBA while playing all of his 152 games at first base (where he was already a below average defender). In 2010, he was putting up pretty good numbers -- and then this happened:



Morales broke his lower left leg celebrating that grand slam, and he missed the rest of the 2010 season. He needed surgery to repair the injury, and about a year later, he opted for a second surgery after he had yet to fully recover. He missed the entire 2011 season as well. But he battled back, and Morales played in 134 games in 2012 and 156 games in 2013, while mainly DHing and playing occasionally at first base. His offensive numbers did not approach that career-best 2009 season, though: He had a wOBA of .339 in 2012 and .342 in 2013.

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There are obvious reasons why Morales was listed fourth on Dave Cameron's "Land Mines of the 2014 Free Agent Class" post from November. Besides the injury concerns (fair or unfair) listed above, Morales is not a great defender at first base and can no longer handle a full workload at the position; is a liability on the basepaths (career 34.6 baserunning runs below average); is a good but not great hitter who may be in decline; will likely command a two- or three-year deal; and will cost the team that signs him a draft pick because the Mariners extended him a qualifying offer, which he rejected.

Morales, a switch-hitter, is also not particularly adept at hitting left-handed pitching (.318 wOBA). He is much better against right-handed pitching (.359 wOBA). So, because Morales doesn't bring much to the table besides his bat, the O's could instead choose to find a good bat against right-handed pitching elsewhere. They lost a very good option against lefties when they traded Valencia (.380 wOBA vs. LHP) away, but Pearce (.349 wOBA vs. LHP) is effective against them. Unfortunately, he cannot hit right-handed pitching (.276 wOBA). Reimold has hit about the same against both -- .338 wOBA vs. RHP and .327 wOBA vs. LHP. But he is a wild card and should not be counted on to stay healthy.

Do you view Urrutia as a DH option? I don't, but it's possible. What about bringing back Betemit for cheap? As long as he's healthy, Betemit wears out right-handed pitching (.352 wOBA). The O's could then use that saved money to sign a starter and maybe another reliever. I am a bit surprised the Orioles haven't done more yet in free agency, but that will be something to revisit down the road if they don't spend more to fill some holes on the roster.

So what would you prefer? Morales's .359 wOBA vs. RHP and .318 wOBA vs. LHP, no first-round draft pick, and handing him a decent-sized contract? Or Betemit's .352 wOBA vs. RHP and Pearce's .349 wOBA vs. LHP? Betemit is not an option at third base (and maybe not even first base) and can't hit lefties, so he would limit roster flexibility. But he would only receive a one-year deal, and he wouldn't cost a draft pick. Morales is still probably the better option.

Relying on Pearce, Reimold, Betemit, or any other platoonable bat at DH is risky. They are all injury risks, and it's not like there are many other good options at this stage of free agency to bring aboard as competent bench bats. But Morales is far from a sure thing, and while he'd make the O's somewhat better right now, he's also an injury risk, isn't quite as good as fans think, would cost the team a draft pick, and is a more expensive option. I wouldn't be surprised at all if the O's eventually signed him, but I'm not sure they should.

Relievers Getting Paid the Same and Resolving the Orioles Closer Postion

Hunter is Baltimore Backup Plan | Photo by Keith Allison

Yes, we have written a great deal about the Orioles' closer position over the past few months.  It has ranged from a lament about how much in terms of resources was devoted to Jim Johnson, to potential replacements, to the Grant Balfour quasi-fiasco, and, now, where to go now.  Before we move on, let me write one thing, I doubt the Balfour situation changed anyone's mind about the Orioles.  I think all it did was provide evidence for people to solidify their thoughts about the Orioles.  This, I believe, is primarily true because most people in baseball have negative thoughts about how the team has been, is being, and will be run.  With that in mind, the club can still compete for high profile players and retain high profile home grown talent.  They have done it and they will do it.  That said, not all teams and talent will be willing to listen too long given the history of the franchise.  However, I digress.  That is a topic to explore at another time.

In general, closers are overrated.  Over time, that view has ebbed and flowed.  As the save statistic was embraced and bullpen specialization flourished in the 1980s, we began seeing importance grow for pitchers who ended game and threw maybe 60-70 innings a year.  The high water mark took place in 1989 where for a few weeks the Royals' signing of Cy Young winning closer Mark Davis to a 4 year, 13 MM contract made him the highest paid player in baseball.  Since Davis, no closer has been the highest paid player in baseball.  A lesser water mark took place in early 2000 when Mariano Rivera set a record for a salary awarded through arbitration when he lost and received 7.25 MM.

Currently, there appears to be an ebb after Ruben Amaro Jr. awarded the last major free agent deal to a closer when he signed Jonathan Papelbon to a 4 year, 50 MM deal with a vesting option for another 13 MM.  This off season there has been a common refrain that the golden age of closers has ended as teams become more aware that the difference between an elite 60 innings pitched and a good 60 innings pitched might not matter all that much.  That, perhaps, not all relievers have the mentality to be closers, but many of them do.  The longest contract a closer has received has been 2 years (i.e., Joaquin Benoit, Edward Mujica, Joe Nathan), the great commitment was 20 MM (i.e., Joe Nathan), and the largest annual salary was 10 MM (i.e., Joe Nathan, Brian Wilson).  Those numbers may not seem much different than Papelbon's.  This seems especially true when you consider the injury histories, age, and performance of the pitchers mentioned.  In other words, this idea that the golden age is done might be more sound than fury.

Maybe the tide is turning, but I don't see the proof of it yet.  Here is a quick table showing top relief pitcher signings over the past several years and contract salary adjusted for this offseason (assuming 20% increase in costs this offseason):

		MM	Adj MM
2014	Joe Nathan	10	10
	Brian Wilson
2013	Rafael Soriano	14	16.8
2012	Jonathan Papelbon	12.5	16.6
2011	Rafael Soriano	12	16
2010	Jose Valverde	7	10.5
2009	Francisco Rodriguez	12.3	16.5
2008	Mariano Rivera	16	21.3
2007	Danys Baez	6.3	9.1

By my eye, it appears that this may simply be a down year and teams are valuing elite closers as guys worth about 2-3 WAR.  Perhaps the only real exception would be Rivera who had two things going for him: (1) Hall of Fame closer ability and (2) deep Yankee pockets.  Nathan and Wilson (throw in Jim Johnson if you wish) are simply closers with some questions attached to them in their placement as a first division closer.  Nathan and Wilson have injury concerns while Johnson closes in an incredibly non-traditional way.

Now, with that slight aside over with, whom should the Orioles target?  Below is a quick rundown of five candidates who would be on my board (in order of my preference):

Jesse Crain
In July, the White Sox placed Jesse Crain on the disabled list for a shoulder strain/tendonitis.  The Rays traded for him while he was on the disabled list and never pitched for them even though he was activated at the end of September.  The Rays lost LHP Sean Bierman and SS Ben Kline for their overtaking of Crain's rehab.  His time missed for a shoulder problem is worse than Balfour's long junked shoulder.  However, Crain will carry a lower price tag because of it and arguably has been the better pitcher during this time.  He is a fly ball pitcher, like Balfour, who dominates right handed batters and makes lefties look slightly below average.  It certainly is a split that can work as a closer.  He can throw in the mid 90s with a plus breaking ball.  He would be a target as a low base with incentives type of deal.  Crain should also be cheaper as he has never experienced closing opportunities as a MLB pitcher.

Grant Balfour
Unless you have been out in the remote tundra, you probably know who Balfour is, the troubles the Orioles have had with him, and how the closer market moved on while he danced with the Orioles.  Why do I prefer him?  I imagine his arm is no worse than it was the past several years (which means that his arm has been on the brink of falling apart for a long while as it is with many older pitchers with injury history)/  I have him second because he has been a solid fly ball pitcher.  He is certianly fine as a closer.  With many things being equal and if Crain looks like he cannot pitch, I'd try to make things right with the Orioles and mend this relationship.  Not signing him likely won't affect things much, but it would be good to show some good faith that can be leaned on with other players in the future.

Suk-Min Yoon
Yoon is a free agent after a rather successful Korean Baseball Organization career.  As a starter, he profiled as a low 90s pitcher with a good changeup and an average breaking ball.  It is a profile that looks good as a backend arm in a rotation, which is supposedly what Yoon is looking for.  Part of the reason he has yet to sign is that the starting pitcher market has been frozen as teams have been waiting to see what happens with Masahiro Tanaka.  With his posting ending in late January, free agent pitchers probably will need to simply move forward.  The other issue with Yoon is that performance in KBO is often held as suspect and he has also experienced shoulder trouble.  From my perspective, I think a multiyear deal with an initial handling of closer duties would put Yoon in a position for success.  He might see an uptick in his velocity as well, which will make his offering more playable in MLB.  Worse comes to worst, he can be a middle reliever and spot starter.  I'd offer something around 3 years and 10 MM and see what comes of it. I don't think he is the third best closer available, but he should be able to admirably serve in this role while freeing up the team to spend elsewhere.

Fernando Rodney
What irks people most about Rodney is his rendition of Katniss from the Hunger Games after every successful save.  Aesthetically, it can be pretty annoying.  However, most fans like it when their team wins games and Rodney does a great job putting teams in the position of winning games.  He is one of the hardest throwers in baseball and misses a lot of bats.  You can rather easily argue that he is the best closer on the market.  With the Rays, he found performance levels similar to those he experienced early in his career and he is the only elite talent out there without the specter of arm troubles.  He is looking for Joe Nathan money and commitment.  Teams have no agreed so far with that assessment.

Miguel Gonzalez
MiGo is the second player on the list whose health is not questioned and is the only player on this list already owned by the Orioles.  So, why MiGo?  He simply is not that good of a starter and the reason for that is also the reason why I think he would do fine as a reliever.  Last year, the first time he runs through a lineup, he holds them to a .607 OPS.  Second time through, it rises to .671.  Third time, OPS of .903.  That deterioration is not something that works for well for a starter.  He tends to blow up in the 5th or 6th innings.  His ideal position would likely be as a long reliever, but he could work as a closer capable of going longer than three outs.  He also performs rather well against batters on both sides of the plate.  That is what the difference is between him and another starter who deteriorates rapidly after the first time through the order: Wei-Yin Chen.  Chen is rather susceptible to right handed batters.  Of course, a problem with this approach is that it will require the acquisition of a starting pitcher, which is more expensive than signing a closer.

Why not Darren O'Day and Tommy Hunter?
I hesitate making O'Day the closer.  I think he is the best reliever the team has and his services are needed to get the team out of sticky situations in the 7th and 8th innings in order for the eventual closer to be handed a clean slate in the 9th.  The worship of the save stat often prevents a team from employing their best reliever in some of the more important situations.  That explanation likely will irritate most people, but we have to acknowledge how pitchers are actually used.

Hunter?  Hunter displayed a rather amazing split between lefties (.857 OPS) and righties (.344).  He simply would not be best utilized as a closer.  Having trouble with lefties will not be exploited as well as Chen would be with righties simply because there are more righties than lefties in baseball as well as benches rarely having any decent options to pinch hit.  As an arm in the pen, Hunter can be deployed in right handed hitting heavy innings to make short work of the side.  This makes him a solid option as the third righthander in the pen, but not much more than that or he will be exposed.  This does not mean he would be a horrible closer.  He would be acceptable in that role.  The issue is that I think his value would likely decrease in that role.

More on Jim Johnson and Elite Closers Status

A couple months back, I wrote about making an argument that Jim Johnson is effectively an elite closer.  This gave rise to a few thoughts from Matt Perez.

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Thoughts on Jim Johnson and Elite Closers
by Matt Perez

A couple months ago, Jon wrote a post discussing whether JJ Johnson is an elite closer by looking at JJs conversion rate of save and hold opportunities. While blown holds and saves do get a lot of notice, I was wondering whether they were related to run prevention. Do pitchers with a significantly lower ERA have a higher conversion rate than those pitchers with a significantly higher ERA? 

In order to test this, I looked at individual seasons for all relievers with both a qualifying amount of innings and also ten or more saves plus holds as well as all relievers with eighty or more saves plus holds total from 2003-2013. For each of these relievers, I determined their Save plus Hold conversion rate (in order to save time, I’ll use the abbreviation Sv_Hld_Pct for the rest of this post) as well as their ERA and FIP . Then I determined their correlation coefficient . 

A correlation coefficient is a statistic that determines how strongly specific metrics resemble each other.  In this case, the metrics are ERA and Sv_Hld_Pct. The possible values range from -1 to 1. The closer the value is to -1 or to 1, the higher the likelihood that the two metrics resemble each other. The definitions for when a correlation is strong, weak or non-existent depends on what one is studying and can be subjective rather than objective. However,  a general rule of thumb is that an r with an absolute value below .4 or above -.4 is weak, between .4-.7 or -.4 to -.7 is moderate and higher than .7 or lower than -.7 is strong. 

Listed below is a table with the results.

Individual Seasons

Metric                    r

With ERA:            - .3657

With FIP               -.2715

Career Numbers

Metric                  r

With ERA            -.5038

With FIP             -.4431

These results indicate that there is only a weak correlation between Sv_Hld_Pct and ERA/FIP for individual seasons and a moderate correlation between Sv_Hld_Pct and ERA/FIP for a full career. It would seem that it wouldn’t make sense to judge a closer based on his Sv_Hld_Pct.

It is possible to split up pitchers into two categories; pitchers that have more saves than holds and pitchers with more holds than saves. Determining the correlation between ERA/FIP and the above categories save or conversion rate will determine whether one category has a significant correlation. Listed below is a table with the results.

Individual Season

Metric                  r for More Saves       r for More Holds

With ERA            -.6059                           -.2644                           

With FIP             -.4798                           -.1780

Career Numbers

Metric                r for More Saves     r for More Holds

With ERA          - .6837                        -.3945

With FIP            -.6306                         -.3229

There are drastically different results for these two categories. ERA and FIP have a moderate to high correlation with save conversion percentage but only a low to moderate correlation with hold conversion percentage. 

There are a few reasons why this could be the case. Closers are typically brought into the game at the start of the ninth. In contrast, a setup man is more likely to be called into a game in the middle of an inning. Suppose a reliever comes into the game in the middle of an inning when there is an offensive player already on base. If that reliever allows that runner to score then he wouldn’t be charged the run but he may blow the lead and thus get a blown save. This is because runs are charged to the pitcher that allows an opponent to reach base and not to the pitcher that allows an opponent to score.

However blown saves are charged to the pitcher that allows a runner to score but not to reach base. If a reliever allows many inherited runners to score then he could in theory have a low Sv_Hld_Rate as well as a low ERA.

However, I think the main reason is how closers and setup men are used. The average closer gets either a save, a hold or a blown save 57% of the time. The average setup man gets a save, hold or a blown save 33% of the time. It would make sense that the average closers’ Sv_Hld_Rate would be more likely to resemble his ERA then it would for the average setup man because the average closer simply comes into the game a lot more frequently in one of those situations. 

In order to properly judge Jim Johnson’s save conversion rate we need to compare him to other closers. I looked at all qualified relievers from 2003-2013 who had at least two complete seasons where they had ten saves and had at least three times as many saves than holds.  Any pitcher that fulfilled these conditions was at minimum the closer of a team for most of the year.  There are a total of 57 closers who fulfilled these conditions. Then, I compared how these relievers did in their first year to how they did in their second year. 

It turns out that the median reliever who fulfilled all of the above conditions converted 89.1% of their save attempts in their first year but only 86.3% in their second year. Likewise, ERA goes from 2.54 in their first year to 3.19 in their second year while FIP goes from 3.01 to 3.45. If we look at relievers who have a 90% conversion rate or higher in their first year, we see a drop in their conversion rate from 91.3% in their first year to 88.8% in their second year.  Their ERA drops from 2.50 in their first year to 3.22 in their second year and their FIP drops from 3.08 in their first year to 3.51 in their second year. These differences are significantly high and suggest we could have expected Jim Johnson to be significantly worse in his second season than in his first season. 

Now that we know this, suppose we look at all qualified relievers from 2003-2013 who had all the same qualifications as above except had three complete seasons instead of two. There are a total of 30 closers who have fulfilled these conditions.

It turns out that the median closer who closes for three seasons has a conversion rate of 90%, an ERA of 2.45 and an FIP of 2.79 in his first year, a conversion rate of 89.4%, an ERA of 2.69 and an FIP of 2.78 in his second year and a conversion rate of 88.1%, an ERA of 2.77 and an FIP of 3.23 in his third year. While these differences aren’t significant, they do indicate that the average closer continues to degrade in performance the longer he closes.

The problem is that it doesn’t matter whether a closer was elite his first year. The question is whether he can repeat his performance in future years. Unfortunately, this indicates that even closers like JJ who were successful in their first year become increasingly likely to fail in future years. Just because a closer has one successful year doesn’t mean he’ll be successful in later years.

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Failed Physicals and Testing the Orioles' Success

An Unhappy Grant Balfour

Grant Balfour has to be pretty upset over his failed physical with the Baltimore Orioles.  He has to be upset because being refused by a team dampens the glow of your free agency as well as stalls you out while other teams like the Indians and Padres find solutions for their closer role.  Perhaps what might make you even more distraught is that the Orioles have been well served when their medical staff shakes their heads no.

Now, some of you out there may be taking the easy rationalization path and accuse Angelos of inserting himself into the process.  That line of thought includes shipping Johnson off due to his price tag and then him somehow being blindsided by the Balfour proposal even though it was a very long and public courting.  There are some mental gymnastics on display there, which is not to be unexpected.  Angelos' real and imagined interaction with the operation of the club has helped cultivate the part of us that is driven toward the conspiratorial.  It is difficult to reason with those who have given in to those urges because that belief system requires a near complete suspension of disbelief.  These individuals tend to believe in absolutes.  I will try to reason anyway.

What we have is a disagreement between two sets of medical staff using somewhat non-standardized assessment.  On each side sits well-respected doctors on their own right.  On the Orioles side is essentially the same staff that approved the physicals of Adam Jones and others.  On the other side lauded by Balfour's team are doctors responsible for his shoulder surgery and conducted his contract physical for his previous team, the Athletics.  As you can see there is interplay in non-standardized assessment tools as well as involvement of individuals who have invested interests.  That can result in honest disagreement and unconscious bias with only Balfour's side talking.  The Orioles side cannot speak due to medical privacy laws, which Balfour could waive (but I see no reason for him to consider that and the union would be rightfully upset).  Anyway, the Orioles' process has served them well in the past.  Perhaps I have forgotten a few names, but the three major free agents before Balfour who were at the threshold and not invited in were Xavier Hernandez in 1999, Aaron Sele in 2000, and Jeromy Burnitz in 2006.

Xavier Hernandez
With Alan Mills departing in free agency, the Orioles looked to fill their setup man void.  They agreed to terms with Xavier Hernandez on a two year deal for 2.5 MM that also included an option.  The previous year was spent in the Rangers pen putting up a 3.57 ERA (135 ERA+) that looked awfully dependent on luck due to a remarkably low BABIP.  Anyway, the physical came out poorly and the deal was pulled back with Hernandez filing a grievance.  Houston wound up signing him for 1 year at $750,000.  He never made it out of Spring Training.  However, the team did not completely make out as Frank Wren's front office made a mistake which enabled Hernandez to take a settlement for 1.75 MM.  Additionally, they had the poor judgement of signing Heathcliff Slocumb to replace Hernandez.  Future signings would now include a rather meticulous protocol for ensuring deals.  Current Braves GM Frank Wren was the GM for Baltimore at the time.  In interviews since, he has attributed the Hernandez signing as the impetus for Angelos acting on signings and trades with physicals being an excuse to nix deals he did not like.  One could say that that sounds like sour grapes.

Aaron Sele
After the 1999 season, the Orioles were looking better their rotation with the absence of Juan Guzman.  Sele would team up with Mussina to form a formidable 1-2 punch at the top of the rotation.  In 1999, Sele was 5th in Cy Young voting as a rather strong strikeout pitcher who managed 18 wins with a decent (at that time) 4.79 ERA (106 ERA+).  He was not as astounding as the wins made him out to be, but he was certainly solid for the Rangers.  Sele and the Orioles agreed on a 4 year, 29 MM contract.  His physical turned up some issues with his shoulder and the team reduced the deal from four to two years with the Baltimore medical staff saying that Sele had 400 innings left in the arm before his shoulder went out.  Sele walked.  He wound up signing that two year deal for 14.5 MM, but with the Mariners.  There his strikeout rates cratered, but a strong Seattle defense and SafeCo helped him maintain a very successful stint in the Northwest.  He turned that performance into a 3 year, 24 MM deal with the Angels where he proceeded to develop shoulder problems and found himself on the DL with a rotator cuff injury 550 innings after he walked away from Baltimore.

Jeromy Burnitz
Burnitz agreed in principal to a 2 year, 12 MM deal with the Orioles in 2006.  The 37 year old still showed some power, but was a mess in the field and had seen a difficult 2005 with the Chicago Cubs.  The Orioles presented him the terms for the agreement to pass and Burnitz' agent was concerned about the Orioles' terms related to the physical..  He wound up evacuating the deal and securing a 1 year, 6.7MM deal with a mutual option.  Burnitz proved to be horrific for the Pirates, suffering from leg problems all season long.  After his miserable season in Pittsburgh, the team declined his option.  Shortly after that decision, he retired.

Moving Forward
As you can see, there have been only a few contentions over the years.  Even last off season saw a problem with Jair Jurrjens and resulted with the team and him agreeing on a minor league deal.  What is remarkable is how the decision to not offer a MLB deal to the player or to provide a stringent protocol for finalizing the deal has succeeded in the case studies above.  This does not bode well for Balfour, but, of course, there are always exceptions.  We shall see.  There have been some rumblings between the Orioles and Balfour's representation.  Regardless of the emotions expressed, the team likes Balfour, but wishes to be better protected.  Balfour will likely shop himself elsewhere.  If unsatisfied and willing to swallow some pride as well as assuming the Orioles are patient, the two sides may still come to an agreement.

Other names in play that have been kicked around are Tommy Hunter, Fernando Rodney, and Jonathan Papelbon.  However, my bet is that none of them will be the closer.  It will be someone else or, a slight chance, Balfour.

Grant Balfour Going Elsewhere; Why That Might Be Good

Many fans rejoiced when the Orioles had apparently signed Grant Balfour on Tuesday, not necessarily because they knew a whole lot about Balfour, but because his arrival represented the team's first free agent signing of note. However, the soon-to-be 36-year-old right-hander from Australia won't be taking over the closing duties from Jim Johnson after all. Roch Kubatko of MASN hinted on Thursday night that when the Orioles received the results of Balfour's physical, there was some kind of issue. Apparently the issue is with Balfour's right shoulder; as Kubatko mentioned, "Something was revealed on the X-rays that must have raised concerns." Concerns were definitely raised, and by Friday, the deal was off.

So what happened? According to Kubatko, the Orioles simply went with what their doctors said:

#Orioles went with drs recommendations. Would probably do 1 year with option. 2nd guaranteed year became issue after physical
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) December 21, 2013

Even though the two-year, $15 million contract seemed to be a reasonable deal, it's still a lot of money for an aging reliever. Plus, the Orioles are notoriously wary of taking risks on free agent pitchers (mostly starters, but still):

The Orioles traditionally don’t give starting pitchers deals beyond three years. Orioles executive vice president Dan Duquette doesn’t like to do it, and club owner Peter Angelos doesn’t like to do it.

Balfour isn't a starting pitcher, obviously, but the normally cautious Orioles evidently weren't wild about handing over guaranteed second-year money to Balfour. Eduardo Encina and Dan Connolly of The Baltimore Sun did an effective job on Thursday of going over Balfour's injury history:

[B]efore Balfour, who converted 62 of 67 save opportunities for the Athletics over the past two seasons, emerged as a dependable late-inning arm, he missed two full seasons in 2005 and 2006 after reconstructive elbow and shoulder surgeries.

As a member of the Minnesota Twins, Balfour had Tommy John surgery on his right elbow in May 2005. Four months later, he had surgery to repair a torn labrum and rotator cuff in his shoulder, costing him the entire 2006 season.

Balfour has not missed time because of his shoulder since. He’s been on the major league disabled list just twice, having missed 32 games with an intercostal strain in 2010 and 13 games for an oblique strain the next season. Last offseason, Balfour had surgery to repair a torn meniscus in his right knee, but returned to the mound within two weeks and was on Oakland’s Opening Day roster.

As you'd expect, Balfour claims that he's completely healthy, and as told to Susan Slusser of the San Francisco Chronicle, he had a few choice words for Duquette and the Orioles:

“I called Dan Duquette and told him, “I’ve played in this league for 10 years, I deserve to be treated with respect and you did not treat me with respect. Two well respected physicians said I am completely healthy – because I am healthy. I’m a fighter and a winner and I would have given you your best chance to win.

“I was looking forward to pitching for the Orioles and helping them to go to the World Series, where they haven’t been for 30 years,” Balfour continued. “I wanted to help them as a team.”

Balfour is a fiery guy, and I'm sure he wholeheartedly believes all of that. Still, the Orioles likely realize that the missing piece to their World Series puzzle probably isn't a single good but not fantastic reliever. Besides, Balfour can't help the team if he's injured.

Balfour and his agents understandably have a few doctors on their side. (Kubatko shared an amusing anecdote on one of those doctors.) But they aren't the Orioles' doctors, and the team is going with their word. The Orioles are probably more cautious than most teams -- right or wrong, good or bad. Overall, the whole thing still looks bad for the Orioles, and it will look even worse if Balfour signs with another team and pitches well. But for two years and $15 million, they weren't willing to risk being wrong.

To me, it's laughable that some believe the deal was nixed simply because Orioles' ownership decided at the last minute that they just didn't want to pay that much money for Balfour. Jon Heyman of CBSSports.com said as much:

the idea the orioles retracted the $15M/2 deal w/ balfour only because they changed minds is silly. o's loved that deal.
— Jon Heyman (@JonHeymanCBS) December 21, 2013

The Orioles traded Jim Johnson away a few weeks ago, and ever since that move they've been linked to a handful of "proven closers" to fill the role. Now that Balfour is no longer an option, the O's are considering Fernando Rodney as an option at closer -- and he won't come cheap, either. If the Orioles were simply being cheap, I'm not sure why they would even bother with Balfour or Rodney in the first place.

Also, it's curious why Oakland didn't try to re-sign Balfour if the cost would have been close to what he and the Orioles originally agreed to. Rob Neyer of SB Nation wondered the same thing Friday morning: "[T]his still doesn't explain why the A's would happily trade for the Orioles' Jim Johnson, who's slated to make around $10 million next season. But it does explain why they let Balfour get away. We were wondering, since Balfour is essentially the same pitcher -- when healthy, that is -- as Johnson, and wound up costing significantly less money."

Maybe Oakland just really wanted Johnson, or maybe they want to see if they can use him as trade bait at the trade deadline. But it's also possible that the A's were, on some level, worried about Balfour's health.

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Before the Orioles' contract with Balfour fell through, I was working on a post on Balfour's change in pitch usage. It may not be as relevant now that he won't be pitching for the Orioles, but considering the injury issues being discussed, I think it's worth noting. So, here we go.

As I briefly discussed on Wednesday, Balfour accumulates three things: strikeouts (9.78 K/9), walks (3.94 BB/9), and fly balls (43.6 FB%). He's also posted sub-2.60 ERAs in each of the last four seasons. When his ERA has been up in the past -- for example, in 2009 when he had a 4.81 ERA -- he wasn't all that different to the current version of himself other than a slight increase in his walk rate. He was, however, unlucky BABIP wise (.296 vs. career .264), and he only stranded 65.4% of baserunners (career 76.8%). Because he doesn't get more groundballs and doesn't limit his walks more, he is not considered an elite reliever, but he is still very good.

Balfour has two main weapons: his four-seam fastball and slider. According to Brooks Baseball, since 2007 (which is as far back as their data goes) Balfour has thrown his four-seam fastball 74.5% of the time and his slider 15.7% of the time. He also mixes in a curveball (6.7%) and an occasional sinker (2.1%) and change-up (1%).

As he's gotten older, though, Balfour's pitch usage has changed in an intriguing way. His velocity has been steady; last year his average fastball velocity was about 93 miles per hour, which is right around his career average. But since 2008, he's throwing fewer fastballs and more sliders each year. Take a look:

Pitch usage chart for Grant Balfour

You'd think Balfour would lean more on his secondary pitch, his slider, if his fastball velocity was dropping, but as noted above, that isn't the case. The movement on Balfour's pitches hasn't drastically changed either. His four-seam fastball doesn't move quite as much vertically as it did a few years ago, but that's really it. The movement on his slider also hasn't changed much.

Overall, Balfour has done an effective job in his career of retiring left- and right-handed batters. Lefties have a combined .272 wOBA off of him, while righties have a .281 wOBA. But he's attacking both sets of batters differently than he did in 2008 (which was the year he really started to pitch effectively).

First, here's how Balfour's repertoire to left-handed batters has changed:



The takeaway there? Fewer fastballs and more offspeed pitches.

How about right-handed hitters?

 


Balfour basically throws only fastballs and sliders to righties. The drop-off in fastballs is much greater here, though, as is the jump in a single offspeed pitch.

Maybe Balfour has simply had to adjust to opposing batters as his career continues. In a time when there are a ton of specialist relievers, it's certainly valuable to be able to summon one pitcher who can pitch well against both right- and left-handed batters.

Changes in pitch usage happen, and it doesn't mean anything is wrong with Balfour's arm or shoulder. His velocity is still consistent with his career average. But maybe not having to reach back and throw as many fastballs has been beneficial for him and allowed him to keep pitching and dodge another major injury. I doubt it's a red flag, but it's at least some kind of flag (maybe with an Orioles' orange hue).

Stats via Brooks Baseball and FanGraphs.

Comparing Cord Phelps and Ryan Flaherty at AAA

Maybe one of the Ryan Flaherty foul balls or in-play hits I talk about. Photo courtesy of Elaina Ellis / Norfolk Tides

In my last article, I reviewed Cord Phelps' 2010-2012 performance in games I had seen and scored in Norfolk's Harbor Park when his Columbus Clippers played against the Norfolk Tides. I summarized the final results of each at-bat; reviewed the outcome of each pitch; and counted the number of pitches he saw at each possible count.

I concluded by saying that I thought Phelps was of comparable value to Ryan Flaherty, although their respective offensive games took different shapes. I saw and scored eight games in 2012 and 2013 in which Flaherty played for Norfolk. In August 2012, Flaherty spent time in Norfolk on a minor-league rehab assignment; in May 2013, Flaherty was optioned to Norfolk when he was struggling in Baltimore. This article will review Flaherty's Norfolk stints in the same way my previous article reviewed Phelps'.

Flaherty's Results

I saw four games in 2012 in which Flaherty played. On August 14, against Gwinnett, Flaherty went 0-for-4 with two strikeouts; he played second base. On August 15, also against Gwinnett, Flaherty went 0-for-4 and played third base. On August 18, against Charlotte, Flaherty went 2-for-5 with a single, a solo home run, and a strikeout; he played first base. On August 19, also against Charlotte, Flaherty went 4-for-4 with three singles and a solo home run; he played left field. In the four games, Flaherty hit .353/.353/.706 with three strikeouts and zero walks.

I also saw four games in 2013 in which Flaherty played. On May 21, against Durham, Flaherty went 1-for-4 with a single and two strikeouts. On May 22, also against Durham, Flaherty went 2-for-4 with two singles. On May 27, against Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, Flaherty went 1-for-4 with a single and a strikeout. And n May 28, also against Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, Flaherty went 2-for-5 with a single, a three-run home run, and a strikeout. He played second base in all four games; overall, he hit .353/.353/.529. In the eight games over the two seasons, he hit .353/.353/.617 with three home runs. (Phelps hit .429/.467/.643 over ten games in three seasons.) Flaherty also had zero walks, which is in line with his reputation as a low-OBP hitter whose offensive strength is hitting home runs.

Pitches

To review, here are the pitches Cord Phelps saw in the ten games I scored in 2010-2012:

	2010	2011	2012	Total
Ball	17	25	24	66
Swinging Strike	2	6	1	9
Called Strike	3	13	8	24
Foul Ball	3	13	8	24
In-Play	9	17	9	35

And here are the pitches Ryan Flaherty saw in the eight games I scored in 2012-2013:

	2012	2013	Total
Ball	27	19	46
Swinging Strike	10	6	16
Called Strike	10	7	17
Foul Ball	8	8	16
In-Play	14	13	27

The big, and really the only difference, is that Phelps swung and missed at substantially fewer pitches than Flaherty did. The obvious explanation is that Flaherty is more of a power hitter - or at least perceives himself to be more of a power hitter - than Phelps. If that's the case, then it makes sense that Flaherty will sacrifice bat control for increased force.

Flaherty saw slightly more pitches per plate appearance than did Phelps - 3.58 to 3.51.

Counts

Here are the number of pitches Phelps and Flaherty saw with different counts in the games I scored:

                 Phelps                                                   Flaherty

	2010	2011	2012
0-0	11	22	12
1-0	4	8	8
0-1	4	12	3
2-0	2	1	3
1-1	4	10	6
0-2	0	4	0
3-0	0	0	0
2-1	4	6	5
1-2	0	5	1
3-1	4	0	2
2-2	0	6	5
3-2	1	2	5

	2012	2013
0-0	17	17
1-0	10	5
0-1	3	7
2-0	3	2
1-1	7	7
0-2	5	1
3-0	1	0
2-1	5	2
1-2	7	6
3-1	4	1
2-2	4	5
3-2	4	0

There are two notable differences. First, Phelps had 4 0-2 counts in 44 plate appearances (9.1%); Flaherty had 6 in 34 plate appearances (17.6%, or nearly twice as often.) The second distinction is the ratio of 2-1 to 1-2 counts - Phelps is 15/6, Flaherty 7/13. When we couple that with the swing-and-miss tendencies, we can guess what's happening here - again, Flaherty is sacrificing bat control for power.

Both Phelps and Flaherty have hit extremely well when I've been watching them play at Harbor Park. Flaherty is more of a home run hitter; Phelps has had more balanced results. Ryan Flaherty appears to be the frontrunner for the Orioles second-base job in 2014. If he struggles, Cord Phelps is a viable alternative, and he may even be a better fit for the Orioles offensive needs than Flaherty.