Buck Showalter's Adherence to Bullpen Roles has Shown Up in the Playoffs Before

Remember when the Orioles had to win a single game to continue in the 2016 playoffs and their manager chose to leave their best reliever - and arguably the best reliever in baseball - in the bullpen? That decision relied on flawed logic, that even if the Orioles got a lead with Zach Britton on the mound, they'd still need another reliever to close the game out and he might give it away. The Orioles eventually lost with Britton sitting alone in the dugout, mostly fresh (he warmed up a few times during the game), thereby creating the new saddest six-word story in the English language: "For sale: playoff jersey; never worn."

The image of Britton sitting on the bench stood in stark contrast to the way Terry Francona and Joe Maddon managed their relentless bullpens throughout the playoffs and into the World Series. The AL Manager of the Year and the NL runner-up each deployed members of their respective bullpens in emergency, high-leverage situations for extended outings regardless of inning. Francona especially garnered a great deal of attention for his unorthodox, win-at-all-costs bullpen management. Journalists and fans around the country began to wonder if this model of bullpen management - firefighting rather than game saving - was key to season-long success (don't be ridiculous; it's incredibly taxing over a postseason, much less 162 games). It was very reminiscent of the Royals in 2014, whose bullpen shut down the Orioles in the ALDS en route to a World Series victory.

Andrew Miller, left handed relief pitcher for the Indians, seemed to be the centerpiece around which Francona deployed his bullpen. Miller was also a member of the 2014 Orioles who were dispatched in 2014, and his short stint in Baltimore made a lot of fans think that the team had a winning model going forward: stock the pen with arms, send them to the mound whenever the team needed an out, and shut down scoring opportunities before they happened. Maybe Francona's plan wasn't novel after all... in fact, FanGraphs highlighted the Orioles, Buck Showalter, and Andrew Miller himself in 2014 as examples of forward-thinking bullpen management.

Looking back at the usage of Andrew Miller in the 2014 bullpen, we find that perhaps Buck Showalter wasn't so forward thinking after all. Like in 2016, Miller was not the team's closer, and he was "free" to appear in any inning in which he was needed. Here's how that usage shook out in each year:

Showalter brought Miller into the game exactly one time before the 7th inning, and never used him for more than 5 outs. He threw 32 pitches in his first outing against the Tigers and then proceeded to throw fewer than 25 in each game afterwards. Some of that is a credit to Miller being good enough to get five outs on 20 pitches; another piece is Showalter adhering to traditional bullpen roles. Miller was used in back-to-back games twice, and only once on back-to-back days.

At face value, this paints Showalter as a more conservative manager who adheres slightly more strictly to defined bullpen roles. Even though Miller wasn't the "closer" or "setup man," he was probably safe in assuming that he would enter the game in the 7th inning if he was available that day. Francona's usage was much more variable over the course of the postseason, with Miller entering the game in each mid and late inning with an even frequency.

To be clear, this is merely one aspect of bullpen management, and only one example of it. Without knowing any context for the leverage of the situation in which Miller entered, it's possible that he was used as a fireman as much in 2014 as he was in 2016.

But such adherence to predictable late-inning entrances in 2014 probably wasn't by chance, and should have tipped fans off (if they weren't already aware) of Showalter's unwillingness to truly break away from defined bullpen roles. At least in the postseason, where every out matters to the team's very near future, the Orioles' manager needs to do a better job of firing the big guns when he needs them and not saving them for later - something he seems to have done consistently.

Another Option for Getting Rid of Ubaldo Jimenez

This article was developed before the Braves traded Jason Heyward, hence their trading B.J. Upton is now less likely. Nevertheless, I thought there was still some points worth exploring.

No Orioles fan will be upset if this is the last appearance Ubaldo Jimenez makes for the Norfolk Tides. Photo courtesy of Christopher McCain / Norfolk Tides.

Ubaldo Jimenez has been a bust. Orioles fans want to get rid of him. Recently, the Depot has examined trading Jimenez to Cleveland for Nick Swisher, who had a bad 2014 with the Indians. But if that doesn't work out, and the Orioles really want to get rid of Jimenez, here's another idea that's so crazy it just might work.

Trade Jimenez to the Atlanta Braves for B.J. Upton. Really.

WHAT??? I'm sure that's what all the readers of this post are thinking. B.J. Upton? The poster child for failed free-agent signings? We don't want him on the Orioles; why help the Braves out? And those are legitimately initial reactions. On further thought, however, the trade does have some positives, as we'll see.

Before I look at the trade in details, I should emphasize that I do not advocate trading Jimenez for Upton straight-up, without balancing the salaries involved. Upton is owed $46.5 million over the next three seasons; Jimenez only $38.75. I would insist that the Braves pay the Orioles the difference so that, essentially, the Orioles would be paying $38.75 million for three seasons of B.J. Upton; the Braves paying $46.5 million for three seasons of Ubaldo Jimenez ($38.75 million to Jimenez, the rest to the Orioles.) This trade leaves the Orioles and the Braves in the same position they are in now, except that the Orioles have B.J. Upton and the Braves have Ubaldo Jimenez.

Such a trade is plausible. The Braves are willing, if not positively eager, to move Upton. Earlier this season, there were rumors that the Braves were trying to move Upton to the Cubs for Edwin Jackson, who was owed less than Jimenez ($22 million over two years) but was also substantially worse. It is true that B.J. Upton was the regular center fielder for the Braves in 2014, and the Braves have dealt Jason Heyward. However, if the Braves keep Justin Upton, they could move Evan Gattis from catcher to left field and play prospect Christian Bethancourt at catcher. They also have several marginal-to-adequate prospects who spent much of 2014 in AAA - Jose Constanza, Todd Cunningham, Joey Terdoslavich. While none of them are great prospects, the Braves could play some combination of those players if they decide B.J. Upton is a poor risk.

And there's a reasonable argument that such an exchange would help both sides:

• Despite our hopes and dreams, the money the Orioles have committed to Ubaldo Jimenez is committed; the Orioles can't trade Jimenez for anything other than another team's bad contract.I think that pretty much goes without saying; I can't think of any trade in which an expensive player on a multi-year contract, coming off a bad season, was traded for a quality player with a reasonable contract. So the $38.75 million owed to Jimenez is sunk; the Orioles will have to pay that money to Ubaldo or to someone else.

• Ubaldo Jimenez is a poor risk for the Orioles.
• Ubaldo Jimenez is not a very good pitcher. In the four seasons since Jimenez' outstanding 2010 with Colorado, he's had one good season (115 ERA+ in 2013); one injury-plagued and bad season (2011), and two bad, full seasons (2012 and 2014.) And a pitcher is responsible for only one thing; preventing runs. If Jimenez doesn't prevent runs, he is useless.
• Ubaldo Jimenez is not necessary for the Orioles. Right now, Jimenez would be their sixth starter. It's true that a sixth starter is almost a necessity for a team, because it's very unlikely that the first five starters will be effective and healthy all season. But even without Jimenez, the Orioles have rotation protection. Although Mike Wright struggled for four months at Norfolk, he seemed to right himself in August and is close to being ready for a big-league job. Tyler Wilson pitched quite well at AA and AAA in 2014 and is also nearly ready. Wright and Wilson could easily start 2015 at Norfolk, awaiting a call-up if the Orioles need a starting pitcher.

• Ubaldo Jimenez is probably more likely to pitch well with the Braves than the Orioles.
• While the American League East isn't the division it was a couple of years ago, it's still probably easier to pitch in the National League than the American League. It's surprising but true - in every one of his seasons in the National League, Jimenez had an ERA+ better than 100. There's still no designated hitter in the National League, which provides a safety valve for pitchers (despite the occasional Madison Bumgarner.)
• Turner Field is a better pitcher's park than Camden Yards. Oriole Park at Camden Yards lowered run production by about 3% in 2014, but that's a one-year fluke; historically, Oriole Park increased run production by about 3%. Turner Field had a similar fluke year in 2012, but otherwise has been essentially a run-neutral park.
• The Braves have had some success with seemingly washed-up pitchers. In 2014, Aaron Harang had his third above-average season since 2007. In 2013, after the Orioles released Freddy Garcia, the Braves got three good starts out of him.

• Although B.J. Upton was terrible overall, with the Braves, it's still possible that the Orioles could get something out of him.
• Upton's problems in Atlanta may be circumstantial. He may have been pressing to live up to his contract. He may have been pressing because he was playing with his younger and better brother Justin. He may simply have been exceptionally negatively affected by Turner Field. It's certainly possible that a different set of circumstances may rejuvenate his career.
• In the Showalter era, the Orioles have gotten value from players as far gone as B.J. Upton. Before 2014, Delmon Young was a disappointing veteran signed to a minor-league contract. Nate McLouth was released in mid-year after scuffling in AAA. There have also been some players who didn't recover, but there's at least a chance that that Orioles magic would rub off on B.J.
• Unlike a pitcher, there are many ways a position player can help a team win. One thing that B.J. Upton did do well in 2014 was steal bases; he stole 20 bases in 27 attempts. And, despite their success, the 2014 Orioles didn't steal a lot of bases. I hesitate to bring this up because it's seemingly out of character and I can't explain it, but B.J. Upton did accrue a .336 OBP vs. left-handed pitchers in 2014. It's possible that he could be an interesting change-of-pace option against left-handed pitchers.
• Andruw Jones, whose decline was even more complete than Upton's, did manage a couple of good bounceback years after his nadir.

I'm not saying that the Orioles should make this trade, or that it would work out brilliantly if they did make it. It's possible that B.J. Upton is through. I'm saying that as an Orioles fan, I'd be equally happy paying $38.75 million for three years of B.J. Upton as for three years of Ubaldo Jimenez; and as a Braves fan I'd be equally happy paying $46.5 million for three years of Ubaldo Jimenez as for three years of B.J. Upton. Considering that the players have failed in their current environment, this change-of-scenery trade has more upside than downside for both teams.

Surviving the Monster

The Orioles may have swept the series but it could have gone either way. After a five-inning start by Chris Tillman in Game 1, the Orioles were up 4-3 at the start of the eighth inning before pulling out of reach with an 8-run inning. After an unfortunate start by Wei-Yin Chen in Game 2, the O's were down 6-3 in the eighth before some late-inning heroics provided primarily by Delmon Young gave the O's a 7-6 lead.  Finally, Zach Britton held on in the ninth for the save to get a clinching 2-1 win in Game 3. The offense certainly came through by scoring an average of seven runs per game. Tillman and Bud Norris put together two strong starting pitching performances. But in each of these games the fact that the bullpen bent but didn't break was a major factor for why the O's advanced to the ALCS.

Before this series started I wrote that the key matchup would be the Orioles bullpen versus Torii Hunter, Miguel Cabrera, Victor Martinez, and J.D. Martinez because those four players carried the Tigers offense in the regular season. As it turns out, the playoffs were no different. Here's how all of the other Tiger batters did aside from those four.

	AB	R	H	1B	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	PA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Game One	19	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	2	5	21	0.333	0.26	0.596
Game Two	20	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	5	20	0.1	0.25	0.35
Game Three	17	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	2	4	19	0.211	0.18	0.387
Total	56	1	9	7	1	0	1	1	4	14	60	0.215	0.23	0.445

Nick Castellanos hit a home run in Game 2 and that was the only run or RBI for the Tigers that wasn't from one of the main four hitters. The chart shows that these batters went 9 for 56 with one home run, one double, and a .161/.215/.230 line. To put that in perspective, Zach Greinke put up a .200/.262/.350 line this year. Jake Arrieta had a .179/.220/.282 line. They probably did better than the average pitcher but certainly not by much. It's hard to win with production like that from your starting cast.

The real damage came from the big four. This is what they did against the rotation.

Rotation	AB	R	H	1B	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	PA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Torii Hunter RF	7	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	8	0.25	0.143	0.393
Miguel Cabrera 1B	7	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	7	0.429	0.429	0.858
Victor Martinez DH	7	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	7	0.286	0.714	1
J.D. Martinez LF	7	2	2	0	0	0	2	4	0	2	7	0.286	1.142	1.428
Sum	28	6	7	3	1	0	3	6	1	8	29	0.276	0.607	0.883

They may not have done a good job getting on base but they certainly hammered the ball. They hit three home runs and scored five runs via the long ball. And it's certainly hard to complain when your top four batters hit into just twenty-one outs while scoring six runs.

But the big four also had to hit against the bullpen. And here's how they did against them.

Bullpen	AB	R	H	1B	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	PA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Torii Hunter RF	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0.5	0.333	0.833
Miguel Cabrera 1B	4	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0.4	1.25	1.65
Victor Martinez DH	5	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	5	0.4	0.8	1.2
J.D. Martinez LF	5	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	5	0.2	0.4	0.6
Total	17	3	6	2	3	0	1	3	2	4	19	0.421	0.706	1.127

Turns out they hammered the bullpen even harder than they hit the starters. Now admittedly, Andrew Miller was a monster, going 3 1/3 innings and allowing only one walk total. But Miguel Cabrera hit a home run off of Darren O'Day in Game 1. Kevin Gausman gave up a double to V-Mart in Game 2 that allowed Miguel Cabrera to score. Zach Britton allowed doubles to Victor Martinez and J.D. Martinez before saving the day in Game 3. All in all, those four guys pretty much hammered everyone.

Now it is true that the bullpen allowed just three runs and had an ERA of 2.25 compared to the rotation's ERA of 4.20. But the bullpen certainly wasn't able to stop those main four batters.

In the end, the Orioles didn't really stop the Tigers' four-headed monster. All the Orioles needed to do was simply survive them. Now it's time to savor the Orioles victory and look forward to the ALCS.

Q&A With Tigers Blogger Grey Papke

Grey Papke writes for the Tigers ESPN SweetSpot affiliate, Walkoff Woodward. Recently, he took the time to answer some questions I emailed him about the Tigers. I also answered some of his questions here. While you're there, check out their site for coverage of the series from a Detroit perspective.

Pat Holden: The Tigers have a good number of big name players, but who is a lesser known player that will likely have a big impact on the series?

Grey Papke: Does J.D. Martinez still count as lesser known? He's basically been for Detroit what Steve Pearce has been for you guys - a guy who was on waivers at one point, came out of nowhere, and was a big offensive producer for the team. I don't even want to think of where the Tigers would be without J.D. He adds a third big threat to the middle of Detroit's order - an extra bat who can provide support and knock in the bigger names of Miguel Cabrera and Victor Martinez. When Detroit's offense is clicking, J.D. is usually involved.

PH: Some things I've read throughout the year have been critical of Brad Ausmus in his first year as manager. How would you assess the job he's done?

GP: Well, he did get them to the playoffs, I guess, but I've been quite critical of Ausmus. He's pretty old school, which I deal with, but the big issue has been his bullpen management, which tends to vary from poor to awful. Admittedly, he hasn't been given many great pieces to work with, but Dave Dombrowski went out and parted with two pitching prospects to get him Joakim Soria. Ausmus has proceeded to use him basically only in blowouts or the seventh inning while Joba Chamberlain and Joe Nathan pitch to varying degrees of success. Soria is Detroit's best reliever but Ausmus essentially uses him as a mopup guy. The other criticism is that Ausmus can be slow to make moves; if he does something and it doesn't work, he sometimes gets caught without a backup plan. He can be frustrating to watch.

PH: As someone who has watched a lot more of the Tigers this year than me, is their defense as bad as advanced metrics suggest (26th in MLB)?

GP: Well... yes. The Tigers are strong at short with Andrew Romine and at second with Ian Kinsler, and Alex Avila is a good defensive catcher. Everything else is average at best. Nick Castellanos is below average at third, Miguel Cabrera is better at first than he was at third but still not great, and the outfield defense is a major issue - J.D. Martinez is okay, Rajai Davis is merely okay, and Torii Hunter isn't the Gold Glover he once was anymore. Defense is not Detroit's strong point, especially in the outfield, where the Tigers never really replaced Austin Jackson's outfield defense. Davis is a clear step down, and the defensive mistakes have become more frequent since he took over everyday duties.

PH: What worries you the most about facing the Orioles?

GP: If you ask me, the most important thing the Tigers have to do in this series is keep the Orioles from hitting the ball out of the ballpark, because Baltimore can hit homers pretty much anywhere. Us Tiger fans are very familiar with what Nelson Cruz can do in a postseason series as he basically singlehandedly torched them back in the 2011 ALCS when he was with Texas. As good as Detroit's rotation is, David Price can have moments of homer-proneness, Justin Verlander wasn't Ace Verlander this season, and Rick Porcello has been leaving the ball up at an alarming rate lately. If the Tigers can't keep the Orioles in the ballpark, they'll have issues.

PH: If you had to name one thing that makes you confident of the Tigers chances in the series, what is it? And the one thing about the Tigers that gives you the most concern?

GP: As for confidence: the Tigers will go as far as the rotation takes them, and it's hard not to feel good about a group headlined by Max Scherzer and Price. Plus, despite the concerns listed in the last question, Detroit pitching has actually done a pretty good job keeping homers down this year. And while I hate to be this obvious, the bullpen is a huge concern. Chamberlain and Nathan have been better lately but you still never really feel that great when you entrust the ballgame to them. If the Tigers get into a bullpen battle with Baltimore, the odds will be stacked against them.

_________________________________________________________________

Thanks to Grey for taking the time to answer these questions.

Why Fans Should Be Excited About the 2014 Orioles Bullpen

Last week, Matt Kremnitzer wrote an article about the Orioles bullpen in which he compared the 2012 bullpen to the 2014 bullpen. In this article he included a chart comparing certain statistics of the 2012 and 2014 bullpen and noted the results have been reasonably similar even if the 2012 bullpen has been better. 

I was thinking about this article and how it measured bullpen performance. Bullpen performance is typically measured by taking the results for each reliever and weighting them by the number of innings pitched by that reliever. Two relievers that each threw sixty innings would have the same amount of weight when determining reliever performance. A reliever that throws sixty innings would have twice the weight as one that threw thirty innings.

The problem with this method is that it presumes that all relievers in the bullpen should be treated equally. I'm not sure I would do that because it’s only logical that the performance of a closer is more important than the performance of a long man. The closer usually comes into games in the ninth inning when the game is close while the long man comes into the game considerably earlier when the game isn’t close. If the long man gives up a run then little harm is done but if the closer allows a run then it could lead to a blown save and a loss. Teams would rather have a closer with a 0 ERA than a long man with a 0 ERA and it only makes sense to reflect that in bullpen performance. All relievers aren’t equal and it’s necessary to find some method of ensuring that the most important relievers have the most value in these calculations.

Tom Tango developed a statistic called leverage index (LI). This statistic measures how important a particular situation is in a baseball game depending on the inning, score, outs, and number of players on base. It is possible to use this statistic to determine which relievers have been used in the most important situations and therefore which relievers are most valuable. This allows us to quantify the difference between a closer and a long man. The leverage index most commonly used is one that measures a player’s average LI for all game events known as pLI. In fact, Fangraphs uses this leverage index when determining pitching WAR. Another leverage index is called gmLI. This index measures a pitchers average LI when he enters the game. I personally believe that gmLI is a better metric than pLI and will therefore use gmLI in this article. 

Fangraphs provides the gmLI for each reliever. It is possible to use this statistic to weight bullpen performance by the importance of each pitcher as well as by innings thrown which should result in a more accurate measure of bullpen performance than considering each pitcher to be of equal performance regardless of role. We can use this statistic to see how the Orioles 2014 bullpen compares to other teams bullpens. In addition, I’m only using relievers on an active roster because Orioles’ fans are excited about their current relievers. Orioles’ and other teams’ fans couldn’t care less about guys like Evan Meek.  

This table shows the number of pitchers used by each bullpen, the bullpen’s ERA without using leverage, the bullpen’s ERA using leverage and the difference between the two.

Team	Pitchers	Non-Leveraged ERA	Leverage ERA	Difference
Rays	10	3.12	3.14	-0.02
Mets	11	3.01	3.02	-0.01
Mariners	11	2.49	2.49	0.00
Tigers	18	4.28	4.24	0.04
Marlins	14	3.07	3.02	0.05
Giants	10	2.65	2.60	0.05
Twins	11	3.33	3.25	0.07
Blue Jays	16	3.75	3.66	0.09
Orioles	12	3.07	2.99	0.09
Rockies	15	4.84	4.74	0.10
Athletics	12	2.72	2.62	0.10
Indians	14	2.84	2.72	0.12
Astros	16	4.85	4.73	0.12
Nationals	12	2.81	2.69	0.13
Yankees	16	3.33	3.19	0.13
Braves	14	3.19	3.06	0.14
White Sox	16	4.28	4.14	0.14
Diamondbacks	15	3.75	3.60	0.15
Padres	12	2.39	2.22	0.18
Rangers	23	3.96	3.76	0.20
Cardinals	14	3.68	3.48	0.20
Cubs	15	3.45	3.24	0.21
Brewers	15	3.56	3.31	0.24
Angels	20	2.96	2.70	0.26
Pirates	14	3.40	3.10	0.29
Reds	12	3.96	3.58	0.38
Red Sox	14	3.27	2.82	0.45
Dodgers	13	3.75	3.27	0.48
Phillies	14	3.67	3.19	0.48
Royals	15	3.18	2.38	0.79

Using this method shows the strength of the Royals bullpen. The Royals have only three relievers that have pitched over ten innings with a gmLI over 1.1. All three of those relievers have an ERA under 2. The backend of the Royals bullpen has been dominant and as a result their bullpen ERA using leverage is considerably lower than their bullpen ERA not considering leverage. Likewise, the Phillies have had Papelbon and Adams pitch most of their high leverage innings and both of them have low ERAs. This method makes them look better than they would otherwise.

This does little to explain why people should excited about the Orioles bullpen. While our leveraged ERA is 2.99 this is only good for tenth in the majors. The difference between our leveraged bullpen ERA and non-leveraged bullpen ERA is miniscule and one of the lowest in the majors. In addition, the 2012 bullpen is still better then the 2014 bullpen even when considering leverage.

Fortunately, this next table may answer this question. This table consists of the team name and the average leverage of the bullpen and shows that the Orioles bullpen has the second highest game leverage.

Team	Average Leverage
Rangers	0.997
Blue Jays	1.010
Dodgers	1.019
Padres	1.023
Giants	1.050
Nationals	1.071
Twins	1.077
Astros	1.087
Royals	1.090
Athletics	1.106
Brewers	1.115
Tigers	1.117
Indians	1.120
Rockies	1.121
Cubs	1.156
Mets	1.165
Diamondbacks	1.181
Pirates	1.184
Mariners	1.191
Phillies	1.193
Angels	1.194
Reds	1.224
Marlins	1.229
Rays	1.231
Cardinals	1.252
White Sox	1.270
Red Sox	1.286
Braves	1.312
Orioles	1.340
Yankees	1.387

Orioles fans are excited about their bullpen because it has done well in high pressure situations. As I write this post, O'Day has just struck out Abreu and Garcia with runners at first and second to maintain a one run lead while Britton had a one-two-three ninth to pick up his 27th save despite having little margin for error with just a one run lead. The Orioles have needed their bullpen to come through in the clutch this season and it has met the challenge. As a result, the Orioles are in excellent position to clinch the division and fans are showing their bullpen the love.