Dan Duquette's Trades in 20/20 (2013)

The last post covered Duquette's deals during the 2012 season and found that five of his seven deals were simply parts with minimal value dealt for other parts with minimal value.  The two deals that differed were very much in his favor: (1) Jeremy Guthrie for Jason Hammel and Matt Lindstrom and (2) Matt Lindstrom for Joe Saunders.  Five pushes and two pluses are a track record that any first year General Manager would enjoy having.

In this post, we progress to the 2012 season and see how things shake out.

November 20, 2012
INF Robert Andino for OF Trayvon Robinson

This was one of those deals where each team wants to check out an uninspiring piece the other team owns to fill a place of organizational need.  Andino's four years in baseball hate some highlights, such as a game winning hit that knock the Red Sox out of the 2011 playoffs, but largely was a long trial that showed that Andino was a Norfolk shuttle type of player who had no options.  Seattle gave Trayvon Robinson two extended shots in a pretty meager outfield, but his free swinging and marginal defense were poor fits in SafeCo (and likely everywhere else).  So, the clubs exchanged pieces they were quite willing to simply release.

Robinson wound up playing well in Bowie last season and was then granted free agency status where he quickly returned to his first club, the Los Angelos Dodgers.  Andino had a miserable stint with the Mariners and is now organizational filler for the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles didn't give up much in Andino or probably get much in Robinson.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR, Push

November 30, 2012
RHP Jhondaniel Medina for INF Yamaico Navarro

Second base has been a sore subject for the Orioles ever since Brian Roberts's extension became an albatross of medical calamities.  Each season, some hope was placed on Roberts to fulfill his annual 10 MM salary with some useful play at second, but age and conclusions can be cruel.  To provide a bit of a cushion the Orioles tried to use players like Robert Andino and Ryan Flaherty in 2012 to varying success.  They now looked for a new collection of second basemen to provide a safety net for Roberts.

Navarro was an interesting prospect who was continually not living up to expectations and frustrating clubs with his behavior.  However, it was clear to see there was talent there and that keeps a guy employed.  After a season in Pittsburgh where he dominated AAA and was dominated in the Majors, the Pirates saw him as a commodity they no longer saw as part of their future.  They were willing to ship him to the Orioles for a hard throwing pitcher in rookie ball named Medina.  It was a commodity that most teams have in spades, a hard throwing pitcher in the low minors.  However, it is a commodity that the Orioles largely lack.  That said, these guys rarely pan out, so losing one is not a big loss.  Though, having no stable full of hard throwing relief arms in the low minors is an issue, but that article is for another day.

What happened?  Navarro appeared in a couple games for the Orioles while performing well in AAA.  He is now toiling in the Yankees system.  Medina has moved up to HiA ball where his stuff plays well against the hitters, but he has little clue where his pitches are going.  He does not look destined for the big league club yet.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles find themselves with a player who used to be an interesting prospect and has failed multiple times at the major league level, but gives them more options for filling second base.  The Pirates get more flexibility in their 40 man roster by dealing a guy two other teams had given up on in the past two seasons along with acquiring an slightly interesting, but certainly not unique, arm.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR; Push

April 10, 2013
RHP Luis Ayala for LHP Chris Jones

Luis Ayala is one of the pitchers who seems to always find himself gainfully employed as the third or fourth righthander out of the pen or as someone who is earning some money in AAA, waiting for a spot to open up.  After a strong 2012 season where he prevented his own baserunners from scoring, but not others, he was a someone extra arm in the pen for the 2013 squad.  The Braves, however, needed another decent and cheap arm in the pen.  They offered a talented and erratic southpaw reliever by the name of Chris Jones.

Ayala proceeded to produce well for the Braves, making the Orioles kind of wish that Pedro Strop was dealt instead and led to more dealing that now looks somewhat poor now to make up for a lack of right handed bullpen depth.  Jones has been strong in AAA and is on target this year to throw more innings in season than he ever has.  Ayala returned to the Orioles this year, but was released and was most recently throwing for the Blue Jays in their minor league system.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment was made.
Conclusion: -0.4bWAR; Arguably the Braves benefited.

April 28, 2013
RHP Rob Delaney for C Chris Snyder

This was a deal done simply for depth and a chance to see if a player could regain former glow at a position of need while dealing out a player who did not fit the organization.  That sentence could be written for the Orioles' side as well as the Angels'.  Delaney was a smart right handed pitcher who succeeded everywhere in the minors except AAA where his stuff came across as average.  Two short stints in the Majors were largely full of trouble.  Chris Snyder used to be the future of the Diamondbacks organization with a profile of being an exceptional offense first talent.  However, by the time the Angels got him, the Diamondbacks, Pirates, Astros, and Nationals had given up on him.

This deal also wound up being a lot of nothing.  Delaney struggled to finish his year and is no longer with any organization.  Chris Snyder played in nine games for the Orioles and held his own, but it was nothing special.  He retired after the season.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Chris Snyder has operated long under the guise of being an offensive catcher.  He does have a little pop, but that was more present his first few years in the league.  Since 2009 though, he has had issues with power, contact, or both.  This, combined with slightly below average skills behind the plate and you wind up with a veteran playing in AAA without a MLB contract.  You can say that Snyder is no worse than Teagarden, which is largely true.  Both are essentially replacement level players.  Exposito caused concerns because his offensive calling card simply has not shown up and his defense is worse than Teagarden’s or Snyder’s.  For the Orioles to only have to give up a fringe MiL relief pitcher, it was a good move.  You should expect Snyder to be DFA’d upon Teagarden’s return.
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 2, 2013
RHP Jake Arrieta, RHP Pedro Strop, and international money for RHP Scott Feldman, C Steve Clevenger

As July opened up, the Orioles were clearly in trouble.  Their starting pitching was a bit in shambles.  This was particularly true with Jason Hammel's regression and the imploding of Jake Arrieta whenever he took the mound.  The bullpen was also on shaky ground with Pedro Strop looking more like his Rangers' enigmatic self as opposed to the often dominating form he showed for the Orioles in 2012.  Yes, the talent was there, but they were not productively using it and the team was seeing their playoff opportunity fade.

On the Cubs' side, Scott Feldman was emerging with one of the better pitching performances in the National League.  With a 3.46 ERA, he looked to some to be a decent option as a front end or middle rotation starter on a playoff club.  It was a performance that was not wholly unexpected, but one that certainly was not especially exceptional.  Still, h appeared to be one of the shining arms available on the market.

What happened is that the Cubs wound up running away with this deal.  The international money helped them avoid penalties for their amateur spending.  Strop has put in very good 2013 and 2014 campaigns.  Arrieta has emerged as a good starter who could a no hitter when the moment strikes him.  For the Orioles, Scott Feldman produced below average production for the rest of the season and Clevenger has performed at a replacement player level.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This deal is about the Orioles giving up on a good international prospect or two along with two pitchers full of promise and irritation in exchange for more catcher fodder and a backend rotation arm.  It is an improvement as it means no more Freddy Garcia, but not a great one that will change the fortune of this club.  They would be better off using Strop in mopup duty and giving Arrieta more time to sort himself out whether it being in Baltimore or in Norfolk.
Conclusion: -4.2 bWAR; Cubs

July 12, 2013
INF Russ Canzler for RHP Tim Alderson

There is not much to say about this trade.  Canzler was a bit redundant in the Orioles organization with the club already employing marginal right handed bats without much fielding acumen in Steve Pearce and Danny Valencia.  The Pirates however wanted more depth there in case they needed a bat for their bench.  Alderson was more or less a decent organizational bullpen arm.  The Orioles had been shuttling pitchers through Norfolk trying to catch lightning in a bottle ever since saying goodbye to Pedro Strop and maybe something would click with Alderson.

Neither player played in the Majors for the other club.  Canzler is currently being a professional hitter with the Phillies on their AAA squad while Alderson has struggled greatly this year in Norfolk before being given his release.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment.
Conclusion: 0 bWAR; Push

July 23, 2013
INF Nick Delmonico for RHP Francisco Rodriguez

Salt was in the wound.  The Orioles dealt out Strop as part of the package for Scott Feldman.  At this point, Feldman was struggling and Strop had found his form again.  More so, the Orioles had trouble with their bullpen options.  Their fourth right handed option was largely Jairo Ascencio and that was not working out well.  Meanwhile, the postseason hopes of the Brewers fanbase had been dashed and the club was looking to deal out pieces.  Francisco Rodriguez was enjoying a stellar two months after being promoted to the Majors just before his opt out clause would go into effect.  He had had a rough go of it the year before with the Brewers and had issues with violence toward teammates and his family.  That said, he was effectively performing at a low cost and that is what baseball teams like to see.

Delmonico has been a bit shaky with the Brewers and has yet to escape HiA ball.  He is not bad, but the odds grow longer each day of him being a meaningful big leaguer.  Rodriguez wound up being wholely less than average for the Orioles, giving up the long ball a bit too often.  He did not meaningfully impact the Orioles', which was to be expected because they were simply upgrading their fourth righthander in the pen.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Delmonico does not need to be a meaningful prospect to have value.  I’d suggest that his ability to augment a trade package is probably worth more than him being traded straight up for a reliever who at best makes the 2013 Orioles a +1 win team.  It is difficult to ever know what is possible in trades and it is an illness in the brain that us followers of the game tend to want to believe in an abundance of trade opportunities, but I do think that a package of Delmonico plus one would likely bring back to the Orioles a player of greater importance than Rodriguez.  Of course, this contention is somewhat unfair.  It is difficult for the addition of Rodriguez to stand up against a comparison of something that does not exist.  The vagueness of the unknown is certainly a draw for many to embrace and questioning Oriole front office authority has been a talent that has been thoroughly developed over the past decade and a half.  That said, I maintain that the health of the franchise is better served when second tier prospects are stacked instead of being doled out one at a time. 
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 31, 2013
Josh Hader, LJ Hoes and competitive draft pick for Bud Norris

The Orioles at this point were still in a discussion for the playoffs and still needed rotation help.  Feldman was a sure starter every five days, but had not been putting the team in a position to win.  The Astros were an awful team and had an expensive player in Bud Norris who was also in his arbitration years.  He had broken out somewhat to be considered a mid-rotation arm on a playoff team.  Their original asking price of a top 25 prospect was steadily depreciating as the deadline neared.  The Orioles offered MLB filler in LJ Hoes, a highly valued competitive draft pick, and a low probability, high upside arm in Josh Hader.

Norris would up pitching rather poorly for the Orioles in 2013 and has really been only been somewhat average this year with some disconcerting peripherals.  For the Astros, Hoes has been a useful stand-in as an outfielder and the competitive draft pick helped buffer the team's misplay of not signing major pieces of their draft.  That said, the low probability high upside arm of Josh Hader has been all upside this summer.  Some scouts are thinking he has established himself as a top 100 pitching prospect.  Maybe that is a worthwhile cost for being able to employ Bud Norris, but it would be possible to imagine that Hader might be off limits in a deal now.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This is a team in need of a push and the play of Norris is unlikely to be much better than what a random collection of arms from Norfolk could produce.  You could argue that these moves are for stability and to shore up against potential injuries in the stretch run.  I would argue that would make sense for a team that sat slightly comfortably in first place. That team is not the Orioles.  Maybe that is the new inefficiency and Duquette figured it out before everyone else.  To me, it looks like a Dutch boy sticking a finger in the dike when doing nothing probably has the same result.
Conclusion: 0.6 bWAR; Push

August 30, 2013
OF Xavier Avery for UTL Mike Morse

The Orioles had about a 1 in 7 chance to make the playoffs as August drew to a close.  They were in need of a pick-me-up to improve their chances, but that was a hard thing to find past the unrestricted trade deadline.  They now had to sort through various broken and overpaid pieces to find something.  That thing was Mike Morse, a player who had made a living off of one good year.  At that point in time, he was terrible with the Mariners as he had a known leg injury that sidelined him, but was hiding a wrist injury.  The Orioles held a speedy potential fourth outfielder piece in Xavier Avery that the Mariners could use in their cavernous park.

Morse wound up hurt the Orioles' chances by about a game.  It was a poor move to make and giving him time to show how bad he would be ate into the ability of other right handers on the club who had already shown they could hit.  Avery had a decent time finishing the year in Tacoma, was designated for assignment without anyone claiming him, and now has been on a month long tear at Tacoma.  Interestingly enough, he has actually been mentioned in trade rumors as a complimentary piece in the Mariners' attempts to get into the playoffs.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: I think this is a meh deal, but that it was a marginally bad deal in a greater context.  Right handed hitting opportunities were available for cheaper in terms of money and prospects than what the Orioles wound up paying.  They gave up on a marginal prospect (of which they have very few in their system) in exchange for a player who does not seem to be an upgrade over what they already have.  I am not a fan of movement for the sake of movement.  I understand that with the team's playoff chances so low that a bet was a good idea to make.  I simply do not see Morse as the bet I would like to make.
Conclusion: -0.4 bWAR; Push, but -0.4 bWAR is awful in less than a month's play.

Final Tally
-3.8 bWAR

Costing your team four wins is pretty awful, but that margin would not have gotten the club into the playoffs.  It was good to see Duquette move pieces around and try too make things work, but the team basically got Bud Norris for Josh Hader, Pedro Strop, Jake Arrieta, a first round pick, a decent international amateur prospect, and maybe even a more emergent Xavier Avery.  That is quite a difference from the previous season when Duquette squeezed blood from stones.  Of course, 20/20 hindsight makes it easy to see that these moves hurt the Orioles and that the team perhaps could have figured out another way to spell Bud Norris' 0.3 bWAR in 2014.  That said, at the Depot, I certainly was not in favor of any of these deals.  They seemed like deck chair shuffling to me and that has been borne out to be true.

One thing that has amazed me was how much the success of Duquette's first season has created this halo of him in many a fan's eyes.  Yes, it is difficult and I have no idea if a year is a proper sample size to judge how successful a general manager is, but with a sunny 2012 and a stormy 2013 on the trade front it appears that Duquette might be more run of the mill.

The Ones They Gave Away - Nick Delmonico and Josh Hader

During the 2013 season, the Orioles traded two prospects in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to make the postseason. On July 23, the Orioles traded Nick Delmonico to acquire relief pitcher Francisco Rodriguez from the Brewers. On July 31, the Orioles included Josh Hader in a package to acquire starting pitcher Bud Norris from the Astros. Going into the 2013 season, Baseball America ranked Delmonico as the number 4 prospect in the Orioles system, and he had produced a .819 OPS at High-A Frederick. Baseball America had ranked Hader as the #19 prospect in the Orioles system, an impressive ranking for a nineteenth-round draft pick in the season he was drafted. Hader made the midseason all-star team in the Low-A South Atlantic League in 2013, and had pitched 85 innings with a 2.65 ERA.

Both Delmonico and Hader ranked among their new team's top 30 prospects in Baseball America's 2014 Prospect Handbook. Delmonico is the Brewers' number 12 prospect, and Hader is the Astros' number 14 prospect. That raises an interesting question - if Delmonico and Hader were still in the Orioles' system, where would they rank?

Before I look more closely at that question, I need to mention a few points about prospect rankings. The Depot has provided its 2014 top ten prospect rankings, as have many other people and organizations. We should remember that "ten" is an arbitrary number and that there may not be much difference between the tenth-best prospect - who makes the list - and perhaps the fifteenth-best, who doesn't. We should also remember that a specific rank may be determined by the evaluator's personal biases, especially for players rated closely together. The Depot is, in our own words, more bullish on Christian Walker than most - in part, I think, because Walker represents a class of player Jon believes to be undervalued. I am more bearish on Mike Wright than most, because I've seen Wright pitch twice and was unimpressed. I did see Nick Delmonico play on June 4 and Josh Hader pitch on June 9, and they played well. While I'm going to try to not let my experience color my judgment, be forewarned that it might.

As a standard for measuring prospects, I'm going to use Baseball America's grade/risk system from its Prospect Handbook. The grade, on what is essentially a 40-80 system, is an attempt to measure a prospect's realistic ceiling, with a 40 being a bench player or low-leverage relief pitcher and 75-80 being a franchise cornerstone. The risk, ranging from extreme to safe, is an attempt to measure how much more development the prospect needs to reach his ceiling. Delmonico and Hader are both 50/High, which means BA thinks their realistic ceiling is solid-average regular player who might play in an all-star game in a good year (for Delmonico) or fourth starter on a typical playoff team (for Hader) but that they'll have to develop quite a bit to reach that ceiling.

Another aside - it's somewhat revealing that Delmonico is the twelfth-best prospect in a bad farm system (BA ranks the Brewers 29th) and that Hader is the fourteenth-best prospect in a good farm system (the Astros are fifth.) If this is typical - every farm system's tenth-through-fifteenth prospects are all graded 50/high - it means that the differences among farm systems is either at the very front end, at the back end, or both.

The Orioles have several prospects whom Baseball America grades at 50/High:

• #6 Tim Berry
• #8 Mike Wright
• #9 Michael Ohlman
• #11 Zach Davies
• #12 Adrian Marin
• #13 Josh Hart
• #14 Steven Brault

BA's #10 prospect is Chance Sisco, whom they grade at 55/Extreme, virtually equivalent to 50/High with a higher peak but more development required. Their #7 prospect is Henry Urrutia, an older Cuban refugee whom they grade at 45/Low. His unusual background makes him less of a traditional prospect; for this exercise I'll leave him out of the discussion. There are legitimate reasons for ranking him ahead of this prospect cluster and legitimate reasons for ranking him behind this prospect cluster. I will also leave Sisco, Hart, and Brault out of the discussion because I know almost nothing about them. They were players acquired in the June 2013 draft and have played less than a full season of professional ball.

The obvious player to compare Nick Delmonico to is Michael Ohlman. Both are bat-first players who really project as first basemen or left fielders - Delmonico has played third base but it's questionable if he can stick there; Ohlman is nominally a catcher but almost certainly won't stick there. (Ohlman caught 1/3 of the games at Frederick last season; the others were split between Allan de san Miguel, a 25-year-old minor league free agent, and Zane Chavez, a 26-year-old independent league refugee.) Both played at high-A in 2013. Neither Delmonico nor Ohlman has been durable.

There are some differences. Delmonico is eighteen months younger than Ohlman. Delmonico hits left-handed, Ohlman right-handed. Ohlman had a much better 2013 season than did Delmonico, .313/.410/.524 to .232/.346/.423 (although Delmonico's numbers were depressed by his time with the Brewers' Florida State League affiliate.) Delmonico has been consistent in his two professional seasons; Ohlman's 2013 was substantially better than any other of his seasons and his professional career has been an archetype of inconsistency.

If you believe that Ohlman's 2013 is a consequence of his development, then you would rank Ohlman ahead of Delmonico. If you think Delmonico's youth gives him more development room, then you would rank Delmonico ahead of Ohlman. I don't think there's any question that Delmonico ranks close to Ohlman as a prospect.

The obvious player to compare Josh Hader to is Tim Berry. Both are left-handed starting pitchers listed at 6'3". In 2013, Hader pitched at low-A at age 19; Berry pitched at high-A at age 22. Both strike out around seven batters per nine innings. Hader appears to have more room for physical development than Berry does; he's listed at 160 pounds while Berry is listed at 180 pounds. Berry has much better control than Hader and has been more durable. On the other hand, Berry pitched much worse at Delmarva when he was there than Hader did, and Hader was a year younger. I think it's reasonable to conclude that Hader probably has slightly more upside than Berry does, but also Hader must develop more than Berry.

Both Delmonico and Hader are roughly equal as prospects to Ohlman and Berry, and consequently with the other 50/High prospects mentioned above. So, depending on your subjective preferences, Delmonico and Hader could rank between sixth and sixteenth among the Orioles prospects. The Orioles, in hindsight, would not have made the Delmonico trade and it's still too early to reach a firm conclusion on the Hader trade. But both Delmonico and Hader would have ranked among the better prospects in the Orioles system.

Orioles Pick Up Bud Norris, Part With More Mid-Level Prospects

The Orioles, having already acquired a starter (Scott Feldman) and a reliever (Francisco Rodriguez) in the last few weeks, decided they needed to make one more move for a pitcher at the trade deadline. That move happened to be trading for Astros starter Bud Norris, who will make his O's debut tonight (against his former club). For Norris's services, the O's sent L.J. Hoes, Josh Hader, and a 2014 competitive balance pick to Houston. Besides Norris, the O's received an international signing bonus slot.

Norris, 28, happened to be the Astros' best starting pitcher, though that doesn't say much. In 126 innings this season, he has a 3.93 ERA, but there are some worrisome signs. His strikeout rate (6.43) is about two fewer than his career rate (8.39). He's been fortunate with his HR/FB rate as well: Only 7% of the fly balls against him have left the ballpark, while his career average is around 11%. Also, as this FanGraphs article notes, Norris's velocity is in decline (which explains some of the strikeout issues), he is not good against left-handed batters, and he may have more of a "reliever's arsenal."

But it's not all negative with Norris. He's been walking fewer batters (3.07 BB/9 vs. 3.67 for his career). He's also thrown at least 153 innings the last three seasons (and is on pace to easily exceed that mark this year), which is not amazing in itself, but is always good to avoid giving starts to pitchers like Freddy Garcia and Josh Stinson. And he has two arbitration-eligible years left (he's not a free agent until 2016), so he should be relatively team-friendly cost wise. He'll likely replace either Feldman or Jason Hammel, who are both free agents, in next year's rotation.

Norris gives the Orioles more rotation depth and is probably a minor upgrade over Hammel, who went on the disabled list yesterday. But he basically provides more of the same for an O's rotation that is not very good in the strikeout department. Here are the strikeout rates for the team's five other starters (including Hammel):

Chris Tillman: 7.39
Miguel Gonzalez: 6.33
Jason Hammel: 6.22
Wei-Yin Chen: 5.50
Scott Feldman: 6.31 (5.40 with O's)

Zach Britton and Steve Johnson aren't high strikeout guys either. That's one of the reasons why fans are so excited about Dylan Bundy and Kevin Gausman, and also why some refused to give up on Jake Arrieta. Certainly it helps any pitcher to have Manny Machado and J.J. Hardy fielding behind them on the left side of the infield, but most of the O's starters don't get a ton of groundballs anyway (Norris doesn't).

Maybe it would have made sense to just roll the dice with someone like Britton, who has pitched well at times but overall hasn't been that great. Interestingly enough, the Astros were interested in acquiring Britton as the lefty alongside Hoes in the trade, but the O's parted with Hader instead. Maybe that means Britton will strongly be considered for a rotation spot next season, or maybe the O's just didn't want to lose a 25-year-old starter who's a decent option and has major league experience.

So what did the O's give up in the trade? More of the same: mid-level prospects who the organization may or may not have soured on. Baseball Prospectus had Hoes seventh and Hader 10th on its preseason Orioles top 10 prospects list, while Baseball America listed Hoes sixth and did not include Hader. Hader appears to have a higher ceiling than Hoes, who many view as a fourth outfielder type. Still, the Orioles managed to hold on to Bundy, Gausman, Jonathan Schoop, and Eduardo Rodriguez, probably the organization's top four prospects. I'm also relieved that the O's did not sell low on Bundy.

Still, by not trading any of those four, the O's did not really improve the team that much. Feldman and Norris will help more than Rodriguez, but it's not like they were real valuable acquisitions. If Hammel is legitimately injured, the Norris trade looks a little better (again, unless you're a big believer in Britton). But none of the three are genuinely great pitching options.

As discussed in the K-Rod trade analysis, could the O's have packaged Delmonico along with the now traded Hoes and Hader (or Arrieta)? Even for a shallow farm system like Baltimore's, that would have still been an intriguing collection of prospects, and it should have netted a better starter than Feldman or Norris. But, again, it's hard to know who was actually available and how much the Orioles were willing to spend on whoever they acquired.

Dan Duquette made the decision to spread some assets around and trade for three decent but flawed pitchers. I'm not sure if the O's sacrificed that much talent for those pitchers, but I don't think their presence makes the team that much better. They're somewhat better, but was it worth the risk?

Delmarva's Josh Hader and Two Bowie Knuckleball Trainees

Sometimes, you get lucky; sometimes not. For example of not getting lucky, on my recent scouting trip I took in the June 5 Bowie at Harrisburg game, and the Bowie pitchers were veterans Eddie Gamboa and Zach Clark, who are trying to salvage their careers by developing a knuckleball. You probably already know that their careers are on life support, and if you didn't, you could guess. The only interesting thing about them I can report after my observation is that Gamboa's knuckleball is a flutterer, whereas Clark's is sharp-breaking.

In contrast, the last day of my trip was scheduled for Salisbury, MD, the home of the Delmarva Shorebirds. Tropical Storm Andrea wreaked havoc with the schedules of most Atlantic Coast teams, and what was originally scheduled to be a 2:05 single game ended up a 1:05 doubleheader. Facing a three-hour drive home and work the following day, I chose to stay only for the first game and was fortunate that the Shorebirds game 1 starter was Josh Hader. Hader was Baseball America's preseason #19 Orioles' prospect and he has also been named the Shorebirds' representative in the South Atlantic League All-Star game.

Hader pitched the first 6 2/3 innings of the Shorebirds' 8-0 win (in the minor leagues, doubleheader games are scheduled for seven innings.) I was surprised that Hader came out for the seventh inning, as he had thrown 86 pitches through six and he's still only 19 years old. In his 6 2/3 innings, Hader allowed four hits and two walks and a hit batsman; he struck out 6. He walked two of the first three batters he faced. and hit the last batter he faced. Of the four hits he allowed, one was a checked-swing soft liner served over the second baseman's head; another was a grounder to deep short that Roman Quinn simply outran; another was a slow-medium speed grounder that found the hole up the middle. Only one hit, a double off the left-field wall, was hard-hit. Three outs were recorded on hard-hit balls — a fly to deep right field, a one-hop grounder right at the first baseman, and a line drive to third.

Hader has a low-three-quarters delivery, which means that he's not a true sidearmer but that he's about one quarter of the way up from true sidearm to true overhand. Usually, the lower a left-handed pitcher drops, the harder he is on left-handed batters; left-handed batters went 0-for-8 with the hit batsman and three strikeouts against Hader. Hader seemed to be throwing mostly fastballs, and they ranged from 87-94 miles per hour on the stadium radar gun; most of them were in the 89-90 range.

It's interesting to look at how many pitches he threw with different counts:

0-0 26 25
1-0 11
0-1 14

The interesting thing here isn't that he got ahead of batters with his first pitch slightly more than he didn't, but that only one no Lakewood BlueClaw was dispensed with one pitch. In fact, that one batter was the last batter Hader faced, whom he hit with the pitch. I haven't looked to see if this is a Hader trend, a Lakewood trend, or a deliberate Lakewood approach to facing Hader.

2-0 5
1-1 10
0-2 8
3-0 2
2-1 3
1-2 15

Hader generally isn't falling behind hitters.

3-1 2
2-2 3
3-2 3

Hader is generally retiring batters efficiently. Because of two-strike foul balls, it's may not be directly shown in the count log, but he threw five or more pitches to only 8 of the 26 25 batters he faced. Again, I don't know what this means, but Lakewood did not have a single foul ball on a 3-ball count.

In my opinion, Josh Hader resembles Zach Britton. They're lefthanded starting pitchers with good but not great control and fairly good strikeout rates. When they're on, they keep the ball down and induce weak contact. Hader is a year ahead of Britton; when Britton was 19, he was pitching in short-season ball while Hader is already at low Class A, a level Britton reached the following season. It's tempting to conclude that Josh Hader is on the Zach Britton career path, but it's also important to remember that Zach Britton's present wasn't inevitable. The ceiling of Josh Hader isn't Zach Britton; it's what Zach Britton could have been three and four years ago. He's a real prospect, and is definitely someone to keep an eye on.

June 17 update: Sometimes I can't read my own scoresheet. Hader was relieved by Sander Beck after giving up a single to Carlos Tocci to put runners on first and second. It was Sander Beck who hit Brian Pointer with his first pitch, and I've corrected the details of the post accordingly. My conclusions are unchanged.