Showing posts with label L.J. Hoes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label L.J. Hoes. Show all posts

27 November 2015

What To Know About L.J. Hoes

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The Orioles made another low-end move on Wednesday, bringing back L.J. Hoes in exchange for cash considerations. When Baltimore shipped the outfielder away two-odd years ago (in the Bud Norris trade), he had a total of four major-league plate appearances to his name, along with 2,770 in the minors. Since then, he's gone to the dish 333 times in the show and 577 throughout the levels below that. Now that Hoes has returned to their area code, what can fans of the Birds expect from him? Let's dissect his production to this point.

He's shown (probably) acceptable defensive range...

Jon's reaction to one aspect of the deal lined up with my initial thoughts:


This certainly passes the smell test. Lough — whom Hoes would presumably replace as the fourth outfielder — has this and this on his resume, plays that Hoes can't hope to match. Or can he?

Across his 753.2-inning career, Hoes has cost his teams 6.1 runs by UZR, which translates to 9.7 runs for every 1,200 innings. On the flipside, he's saved his teams four runs by DRS, equaling 6.4 per 1,200 frames. That amounts to a difference of more than sixteen runs — one and a half wins of value per year. Certainly, the latter mark can't compare to Lough's lifetime 22.4 DRS/1200, but Hoes still looks like an adequate defender in the eyes of this metric.

When I see such a disparity as this, I usually turn to FanGraphs' Inside Edge Fielding data. This comes from the judgment of scouts, who (in theory) can help to bridge these gaps. For Hoes, they paint a somewhat inconsistent picture:

Player 0% 1-10% 10-40% 40-60% 60-90% 90-100%
Hoes 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 66.7% 100.0% 98.7%
MLB 0.0% 6.3% 30.7% 55.0% 82.7% 99.3%

In terms of "routine" plays — the most common and thus important variety — Hoes has struggled. Although a difference of 0.6 percentage points might look insignificant, it matters immensely: Among fielders with 750 innings over the past four seasons, that 98.7 percent figure ranks 166th, in the 9th percentile. He's paired that ineptitude on easy balls with a total failure to catch the "remote" ones, a distinction he shares with 74 others players in that sample.

Elsewhere, however, Hoes has held his own. His capacity to convert "unlikely" balls into outs places 25th, while he finishes 58th with regards to "even" ones. And he has yet to botch a "likely" opportunity, which ties him for first with ten other fielders. The samples of these pale in comparison to that of the routine plays, but this still appears to give him some credit. In essence, Hoes has done poorly at the extremes and well in the middle.

We should also observe the other variable in play here — quantity. Hoes hasn't seen an even distribution of plays:

Player # 0% # 1-10% # 10-40% # 40-60% # 60-90% # 90-100%
Hoes 23.0% 1.7% 3.5% 1.3% 4.8% 65.7%
MLB 18.9% 2.6% 1.9% 1.9% 3.6% 71.1%

Most of Hoes's chances have occurred on the more trying end of the spectrum, which may have harmed his numbers. Given a pitching staff that has maximized weak contact as of late, he could improve his output.

On a per-600 plate appearance basis, Steamer thinks Hoes will lose 4.2 runs defensively in 2016. That projection comes from UZR, though, which takes the pessimistic view. Personally, I think Hoes's talent lies in the middle of the two extremes — going forward, he should be an average-ish fielder. (Argument to moderation, schmargument to moderation.) As a defender, he can't hope to touch Lough, but he deserves some respect.

...in addition to a (seemingly) insufficient arm.

But not all of the UZR-DRS difference stems from range, the element of fielding that Inside Edge gauges. The two pillars of defense have differed regarding Hoes's arm as well:

Metric Arm Runs Arm Runs/1200 Range Runs Range Runs/1200 Error Runs Error Runs/1200
UZR -4.1 -6.5 -1.9 -3.0 -0.1 -0.2
DRS  0 0.0 5 8.0 -1 -1.6

This is a tricky area to parse — in most all cases, UZR and DRS evaluate outfield arms equivalently. Does Hoes possess a limp noodle, or a satisfactorily firm one?

Based on the evidence here, I'd say the latter. Hoes has notched four assists in his 753.2 innings, whereas an average defender would accumulate around five in that span. Plus, scorers have charged him with two throwing errors during his major-league tenure, so he owns an unsightly assist-error ratio of two flat — a far cry from the league average of 7.2 since 2012.

Not only has Hoes neglected to gun down baserunners, they've taken the extra base far too often. Hoes has held opponents on 48.1 percent of his chances, which falls short of the 51.5 percent MLB standard. In particular, he's had trouble with throws home, where runners have scored 60 percent of the time; this contrasts with their 45.9 percent rate of advancement to third base. Hoes has struggled in both the flashy and mundane elements of throwing, as UZR has stated.

I should note that this combination — respectable range to go along with an unthreatening arm — diverges from the scouting reports on Hoes. Back in his farmhand days, he earned a 50 arm grade and a 45 overall defense grade from the Depot's Nick Faleris, indicating decent throws and subpar field coverage. With that said, and I don't mean this to disparage Nick in any way, the numbers here testify differently. While Hoes may have had that potential at the time, I'll go with the major-league achievements.

His batting average hasn't translated to the show...

Enough defense — let's move to the more exciting side of the ball. In the minors, Hoes hasn't displayed anything resembling power, with a career ISO of .094. Rather, he's survived offensively with his ability to reach base, doing so at a lifetime clip of .368. Part of that has come from a 10.7 percent walk rate (which I'll discuss momentarily), but a .287 batting average has contributed to it the most.

To gain hits that frequently, a hitter has to avoid strikeouts and have valuable balls in play. Hoes has done both in the minors, posting a 14.7 percent strikeout rate and .335 BABIP. Neither of those have made the jump to the majors, where's he's gone down on strikes 20.5 percent of the time and seen 28.9 percent of his balls in play go for hits. As the result, his major-league batting average sits at an uninspiring .237.

We'll start with the strikeouts. 19.4 percent of Hoes's pitches at the major-league level have been called strikes, which tops the mean of 17.5 percent. That, and an average swinging-strike rate of 10.6 percent, have allowed pitchers to punch him out with gusto.

Primarily, Hoes hasn't offered at pitches on the outer part of the strike zone:


The opposition has generally targeted him away, which makes for an unhealthy combination. Although Hoes has demonstrated a reasonable amount of aggression on pitches closer to him, he's simply laid off too many on the outer part of the plate.

In terms of whiffs, we see an interesting trend:

 

Hoes has actually done fairly well within the strike zone, where his 6.6 percent whiff rate trails the MLB average of 8.0 percent. By contrast, he's flailed at pitches outside the strike zone, swinging and missing at 13.5 percent of such pitches — higher than the 11.1 percent standard his peers have established.

Because most of his contact has occurred on hittable pitches, Hoes should have a lot of hard-hit balls on his ledger, right? After all, the BABIP for pitches inside the zone greatly exceeds that for pitches outside it. Sadly, Hoes has a meager 20.9 percent rate of hard contact, a level that even Everth Cabrera can top. That's doomed him to a mediocre BABIP, which along with his high strikeout rate has kept his batting average down.

Hoes's batted-ball profile doesn't disqualify him from success. He's tallied a 19.8 percent line-drive rate, about an average level, to accompany a sky-high 58.8 percent ground-ball rate. That's the sort of line you'd want from a hitter who lacks power — he should keep the ball low, to maximize his chances of getting a hit. And Hoes has even distributed his grounders pretty evenly, with a 42.0 percent pull rate (the major-league average is 53.3 percent) that prevents the shift from becoming a factor. He just hasn't stung the ball often enough to keep his head above water.

Should Hoes learn to swing at pitches on the outside, and swing with more authority, perhaps he'll cut down on his strikeouts and increase his BABIP. Of course, we could make similar statements for every player in this mold — if Henry Urrutia can develop his power, if Dariel Alvarez can start to take walks, if Christian Walker can make enough contact, then they'll become legitimate major-league contributors. Until then, they, like Hoes, will function as quad-A roster depth.

...and neither have his walks.

We'll wrap up with the other facet of Hoes's minor-league game, arguably his calling card: bases on balls. In an organization allergic to plate discipline, his ability to work a free pass set him apart. Why, then, has he only done so in 6.8 percent of his major-league plate appearances?

Hoes has certainly been selective against major-league pitching: He's swung at just 23.8 percent of pitches outside the strike zone. However, they've thrown 52.6 percent of their pitches inside those confines; the resulting expected strike rate of 63.8 percent matches his actual 63.4 percent clip. While a discerning eye can get you pretty far, at some point you have to make pitchers fear you enough to pitch around you.

Still, that level of play should lend itself to a solid walk rate; after all, 64 percent of all pitches in baseball go for strikes. Hoes's problem has been situational aggression — he's taken far fewer balls when they matter the most:

Player 0-Ball Strike% 1-Ball Strike% 2-Ball Strike% 3-Ball Strike%
Hoes 59.3% 61.3% 70.8% 78.3%
MLB 58.0% 63.9% 69.5% 73.3%
(Averages here from 2008-2014, via Chris Teeter.)

Hoes has mirrored the leaguewide number for every count except three balls. He'll work his way to the brink of a free pass, then swing away, blowing any shot at one.

This tendency obviously has something to do with Hoes's poor batting average. Since he struggles to hit, he presses, his nerves taking over and wrecking his approach. If he ever implements the aforementioned changes, which should improve his batting average, he'll probably regain his composure and start to take walks. The former premise is something of a stretch, though, meaning the latter is too.

***

This poll, from a few hours after the deal to bring back Hoes, accurately sums up the feelings of Birdland regarding the move:


At the time, I voted for Lough (I have my reasons). I don't know, looking back, that I would change that decision. While Hoes has a glorious name and a possibly tolerable glove, his bat just won't suffice on a club that wants to contend. With his 26th birthday coming in March, he has probably passed the point at which he could make the leap. The Orioles should look elsewhere for their fourth outfielder.

01 August 2013

Orioles Pick Up Bud Norris, Part With More Mid-Level Prospects

The Orioles, having already acquired a starter (Scott Feldman) and a reliever (Francisco Rodriguez) in the last few weeks, decided they needed to make one more move for a pitcher at the trade deadline. That move happened to be trading for Astros starter Bud Norris, who will make his O's debut tonight (against his former club). For Norris's services, the O's sent L.J. Hoes, Josh Hader, and a 2014 competitive balance pick to Houston. Besides Norris, the O's received an international signing bonus slot.

Norris, 28, happened to be the Astros' best starting pitcher, though that doesn't say much. In 126 innings this season, he has a 3.93 ERA, but there are some worrisome signs. His strikeout rate (6.43) is about two fewer than his career rate (8.39). He's been fortunate with his HR/FB rate as well: Only 7% of the fly balls against him have left the ballpark, while his career average is around 11%. Also, as this FanGraphs article notes, Norris's velocity is in decline (which explains some of the strikeout issues), he is not good against left-handed batters, and he may have more of a "reliever's arsenal."

But it's not all negative with Norris. He's been walking fewer batters (3.07 BB/9 vs. 3.67 for his career). He's also thrown at least 153 innings the last three seasons (and is on pace to easily exceed that mark this year), which is not amazing in itself, but is always good to avoid giving starts to pitchers like Freddy Garcia and Josh Stinson. And he has two arbitration-eligible years left (he's not a free agent until 2016), so he should be relatively team-friendly cost wise. He'll likely replace either Feldman or Jason Hammel, who are both free agents, in next year's rotation.

Norris gives the Orioles more rotation depth and is probably a minor upgrade over Hammel, who went on the disabled list yesterday. But he basically provides more of the same for an O's rotation that is not very good in the strikeout department. Here are the strikeout rates for the team's five other starters (including Hammel):

Chris Tillman: 7.39
Miguel Gonzalez: 6.33
Jason Hammel: 6.22
Wei-Yin Chen: 5.50
Scott Feldman: 6.31 (5.40 with O's)

Zach Britton and Steve Johnson aren't high strikeout guys either. That's one of the reasons why fans are so excited about Dylan Bundy and Kevin Gausman, and also why some refused to give up on Jake Arrieta. Certainly it helps any pitcher to have Manny Machado and J.J. Hardy fielding behind them on the left side of the infield, but most of the O's starters don't get a ton of groundballs anyway (Norris doesn't).

Maybe it would have made sense to just roll the dice with someone like Britton, who has pitched well at times but overall hasn't been that great. Interestingly enough, the Astros were interested in acquiring Britton as the lefty alongside Hoes in the trade, but the O's parted with Hader instead. Maybe that means Britton will strongly be considered for a rotation spot next season, or maybe the O's just didn't want to lose a 25-year-old starter who's a decent option and has major league experience.

So what did the O's give up in the trade? More of the same: mid-level prospects who the organization may or may not have soured on. Baseball Prospectus had Hoes seventh and Hader 10th on its preseason Orioles top 10 prospects list, while Baseball America listed Hoes sixth and did not include Hader. Hader appears to have a higher ceiling than Hoes, who many view as a fourth outfielder type. Still, the Orioles managed to hold on to Bundy, Gausman, Jonathan Schoop, and Eduardo Rodriguez, probably the organization's top four prospects. I'm also relieved that the O's did not sell low on Bundy.

Still, by not trading any of those four, the O's did not really improve the team that much. Feldman and Norris will help more than Rodriguez, but it's not like they were real valuable acquisitions. If Hammel is legitimately injured, the Norris trade looks a little better (again, unless you're a big believer in Britton). But none of the three are genuinely great pitching options.

As discussed in the K-Rod trade analysis, could the O's have packaged Delmonico along with the now traded Hoes and Hader (or Arrieta)? Even for a shallow farm system like Baltimore's, that would have still been an intriguing collection of prospects, and it should have netted a better starter than Feldman or Norris. But, again, it's hard to know who was actually available and how much the Orioles were willing to spend on whoever they acquired.

Dan Duquette made the decision to spread some assets around and trade for three decent but flawed pitchers. I'm not sure if the O's sacrificed that much talent for those pitchers, but I don't think their presence makes the team that much better. They're somewhat better, but was it worth the risk?

13 July 2013

The Walks of L.J. Hoes

It hasn't been a good year for the Orioles' farm system. There have been a few positives — Kevin Gausman has had occasional success in the major leagues; Henry Urrutia is shaking off the rust; Nicky Delmonico and Eduardo Rodriguez are staying the course. But there have been more negatives — Dylan Bundy and Jonathan Schoop have been injured, Branden Kline has struggled; tools players like Brenden Webb and Greg Lorenzo have failed to develop.

Then there's L.J. Hoes.

Going into 2013, L.J. Hoes was projected to be a consistent high-average hitter. However, because he was defensively limited to a corner outfield position, the consensus was that he would have to increase his power to be a productive regular. He hasn't. In 2012, in 82 games at Norfolk, he had an isolated power of .098; in 2013, in 85 games through July 9, he had an isolated power of .099. But Hoes has stepped up his offensive game in a different direction. He's increased his walk rate, from .095 in 2012 to .130 in 2013. As a result, he's improved his on-base percentage from .374 to .405. And if he can keep his on-base percentage near .400 in the major leagues, you'd think he could play regularly, even in a corner outfield spot, even without much power.

But just because Hoes has increased his walk rate doesn't mean that he's become a truly productive player. If most of Hoes walks are coming when opposing pitchers are pitching around Hoes in key situations, or when the opposing pitcher is struck with a bout of wildness, or when a walk does no particular harm, then it's unlikely that Hoes can play regularly in the major leagues. I've looked at 24 of Hoes' walks this season, most from games I've recorded either for MLBAM or BIS but a few from Gameday.

Is Hoes drawing walks at the start of the inning, at the end of the inning, or in the middle of a rally? How many outs are there when he draws his walks?

Nine of the 24 walks were drawn with no outs; six with one out; eight with two outs. That's good; walks are more valuable at the start of an inning or rally; less valuable late in the inning.

Is Hoes drawing walks when he could be driving in runners already on base? Is he too passive?

Of the twenty-four walks I've looked at, seventeen have come with no runners on base. Five have come with a runner on first base only; one with a runner on second base only; and one with runners on first and second. It's safe to say that he's not getting the walks because he's being pitched around in key situations. It's interesting that none of these walks were drawn with a runner on third base, so he's not missing chances to drive in a run with a fly or ground out.

Combining the two points, eight walks have been drawn in what we might call leadoff situations (no outs, no one on base), which is generally the best time to draw a walk. He's scored three times after "leadoff" walks. Five were drawn with two outs and no one on base; he did score after one of those five walks when Jason Pridie followed with a home run.

How many pitches does Hoes see when he draws a walk?

Hoes has drawn four 4-pitch walks; six 5-pitch walks; eight 6-pitch walks, five 7-pitch walks; and one 8-pitch walk. During these 24 walks, he's fouled off seven pitches with two strikes.

14 of the 24 walks were drawn when the pitcher clearly was not simply trying to avoid pitching to Hoes (either with four-pitch walks, or with three balls, an automatic strike, and the fourth ball. I am NOT saying that every one of the four- or five- pitch walks was an attempt to pitch around Hoes; I remember that some were clearly not. I'm being very conservative with my interpretation here.)

How often does Hoes score when he draws a walk?

Hoes has scored after six of these twenty-four walks.

What does all this mean?

I don't know. I think it means that L.J. Hoes' increase in walk rate is not a situational fluke, and that Hoes has decided to focus on getting on base rather than hitting for power. If so, and he's able to maintain an on-base percentage of .380 or so in the major leagues, then he should be able to be a productive regular, even at a corner outfield spot, even with sub-.100 isolated power. Back in the 1980's, Mike Hargrove used a similar skill set to have a productive career at first base with the Indians.

I want L.J. Hoes to have a successful major-league career. With the increase in his walk rate, couple with his ability to maintain his .300 batting average, I think he can.

13 March 2013

Camden Depot's Orioles' Top 10 Prospects: 1 through 5

In the past year, we lost an amazing resource, Nick Faleris, to Baseball Prospectus.  It will be difficult to replace the skills he had for talent evaluation, but we will soldier on as best we can while suggesting that you should head over to Baseball Prospectus and take a look at his work.  Sadly, his responsibilities and new readership are more broad, so his Orioles' work there is not as immediately detailed as it was here.  However, ask him about something and he does well to get back to you with his thoughts.

That said, this year we are moving forward with a group approach.  I will now be producing the prospect rankings list along with new writers, Jeremy Strain and Joe Reisel.  Jeremy's opinion are largely formed by the regional scouting trips he makes, the scouts he knows, and being generally well read in all of the trade journals.  Joe takes in quite a many games in Norfolk and provides datacasting for BIS and their fielding metrics.  My background is heavily bent toward statistics (which often are of little use when assessing minor league play), video work, some personal scouting nearby, and my connections.  I want to be transparent here with our backgrounds to let you know how we are informed to make our decisions.  So much of internet prospecting is a black box and it really does not need to be that.

The methodology for this post was that each of the three writers would identify their own top twelve players.  Weighted scores would be derived from those rankings, which then would result in the final composite system.  Here is the ranking:

No. 1 - RHP Dylan Bundy
Ht/Wt - 6'1", 200
B/T - B/R
Age at 6/13 - 20y 7m
Drafted 1:4 by Baltimore in 2011
Prospect Grade - A (65)

YearAgeTmLevWLERAGGSIPHRBBSOH/9HR/9BB/9SO/9
201219BaltimoreMLB000.00203.00239.00.06.69.0
201219DelmarvaA100.008830.002401.50.00.612.0
201219FrederickA+632.84121257.0518667.60.82.810.4
201219BowieAA203.243316.218137.60.54.37.0
In 2011, the draft was rich with elite pitching prospects.  Dylan Bundy was the fourth overall selection as well as the fourth pitcher selected.  Before him were Gerrit Cole, Danny Hultzen, and Trevor Bauer.  A year and a half later, Baseball America ranks them as Bundy (2nd overall), Cole (7th), Bauer (14th - who was traded by the Diamondbacks for a somewhat limited ceiling SS prospect), and Hultzen (29th).  Baseball Prospectus saw them slightly differently with Cole (3rd) leading, Bundy in 4th, Bauer 24th, and Hultzen 50th.  Needless to say, the Orioles did pretty well for themselves selecting fourth as the two prominent prospect evaluation sources rate him as either the best or second best pitching prospect in baseball.

Most readers of the site likely saw him during his two appearances in relief with Baltimore last season and perhaps you have noted the many pictures that make their way through Twitter illustrating his incredible work ethic.  However, it might be useful to brush up on his abilities.  Bundy was noted as an amateur for his clean delivery and two signature pitches.  He threw a loud upper 90s fastball and had a devastating cutter.  Both profiled as plus plus caliber pitches.  Once in the midst of a professional schedule with less rest between outing, his fastball lost a couple ticks and he now works in the mid 90s.  It still is a plus pitch, but Bundy began to mix in a two seamer last Summer that very effectively gives a look different from his four seamer.  He has excellent command of both pitches.

The Orioles organization decided that Bundy would not use his cutter professionally.  Though, once he establishes himself in the Majors, it has been mentioned that the Orioles will let him reintroduce the pitch to his repertoire.  Not throwing it in such a long time is a bit of a risk, but typically once you have a pitch, it is probably still there.  Why did the team tell him to get rid of it?  There is some organizational thought that the cutter hurts arm strength and that it is so effective in the minors that it can prevent pitchers from learning to develop acceptable breaking balls and change ups.

Speaking of breaking balls and change ups, Bundy is ahead with his curve ball in comparison to his change up.  The curve has been very uneven (as you may recall from his cup of coffee last September).  When he throws it well, it has the makings of a plus pitch with great 12 to 6 drop.  The change up does not look like it will be as kind to him, but he does show some understanding of it to make it an average pitch.

We expect Dylan to dominate Norfolk and be in Baltimore some time in June when the club can keep him an additional year of service.  The only thing derailing that time table would be solid performance by the opening day rotation, absence of injuries to the rotation, or Kevin Gausman breaking out and surpassing Bundy.

No. 2 - RHP Kevin Gausman
Ht/Wt - 6'4", 185
B/T - R/R
Age at 6/13 - 22y 5m
Drafted 1:4 by Baltimore in 2012
Prospect Grade - A- (60)

AgeTmLgLevWLERAGGSIPHRBBSOH/9HR/9BB/9SO/9
21AberdeenNYPLA-000.00226.00051.50.00.07.5
21FrederickCARLA+016.00339.031810.03.01.08.0
Selecting fourth in the draft, the Orioles selected Gausman, who we viewed as the top talent.  Before Gausman (BA: 26th, BP: 13th), were Carlos Correa (Houston; BA:13th, BP: 26th), Byron Buxton (Minnesota; BA: 10th, BP: 8th), and Mike Zunino (Seattle; BA: 17th, BP: 33rd).

You may have also noted that despite all of the powdered donuts he partakes in, that Gausman has a lean yet strong athletic build with an easy delivery.  His most notable strength is his fast ball that peaks at 100 mph, which has been on display during his outings this Spring.  However, like Bundy's fastball, the velocity is expected to regress with a greater workload.  As it stands now, it is a plus plus offering with a plus floor with any velocity loss.  Gausman has excellent command of the pitch.  He also uses a two seamer for an effective, different look.  His slider is inconsistent, but flashes plus.  His change up looks ahead of Bundy's, but also rates as average.  Gausman's arm action looks better to me when throwing it, so it might become a plus pitch (which is something others have also communicated to me as well).

I expect Gausman to wind up in Baltimore sometime this Summer.  The speed at which he harnesses the change up will determine whether he or Bundy goes up first.  If Gausman can turn his change and curve into consistent plus pitches then he might be the better pitcher in the long term.  Regardless, if both pan out, they will provide the Orioles with one of the best front of the rotations in baseball.  That said, pitchers tend to be a difficult commodity to project.  Gausman's A- grade was the product of Jeremy and myself being comfortable with Gausman's lack of professional experience while Joe conservatively waits for him to prove his college success will be replicated.  From my perspective, the quality of his pitches and the quality of his command provide me with enough assurances that he will continue to be a successful pitcher.

No. 3 - 2B/3B Jonathan Schoop
Ht/Wt - 6'1", 185
B/T - R/R
Age at 6/13 - 21y 8m
International Free Agent - Curacao
Prospect Grade - B (54)

YearAgeTmLgLevGPA2B3BHRSBCSBBSOBAOBPSLG
200917OriolesDOSLFRk682847301132439.239.320.291
2010183 Teams3 LgsRk-A+622401815112025.290.350.453
2011192 Teams2 LgsA+-A128567245131274276.290.349.432
201220BowieELAA124555241145350103.245.324.386
Schoop has earned a great honor by serving as the starting second baseman for the Netherlands 2013 World Baseball Classic team.  At the time of this writing, he had played in three games, going 1 for 9 with a home run and a walk.  You can see that there is a pretty good baseball player developing, but he is still a season or two away from being a useful role player in Baltimore.

In the long run, third base is Schoop's home.  From the WBC games, you can see that he has a poor reaction time, but makes up for it with solid close body skills and a strong, accurate arm.  To put it another way, if you ignore the accurate arm part of it, it should be a description that sounds eerily familiar to Mark Reynolds.  Reynolds looked good, but his shoes appeared anchored to the ground.  It often wound up with balls going by him or him being put in an awkward position.  Schoop appears to have significantly better reactions than Reynolds to work at third base, but not at second where it combines with his poor speed to leave him with only a small range that he can cover.

That said, his bat looks good enough to play third base, but it is not certain that it can actually play at the major league level.  Again, as coincidentally shown in the WBC, watch the following video:
The outside part of the plate is where much of Scope's power shows up.  That coincides with a bit of a bat wrap that makes his swing long.   The catcher sets up Dushan Ruzic outside on a fat pitch that Schoop takes advantage of.  It is also apparent on the second video that popped up on YouTube as well:
Whether he is back in Bowie this year or moves on to Norfolk, he will have to work to eliminate the wrap.  With more advanced pitchers, Schoop will have to show he can adjust or simply peter out in the high minors.

I think the skills are there and I think he can work to protect the inner part of the plate while keeping power when he gets full extension on the outer part of the plate.  It is not ideal, but it will be good enough for him to develop into a low end first division third baseman.  I expect that he may see Baltimore in September or, perhaps, partway through 2014.

No. 4 - LF/CF L.J. Hoes
Ht/Wt - 6'1", 185
B/T - R/R
Age at 6/13 - 23y 1m
Draft 3:4 in 2008 Draft
Prospect Grade - B (50)

YearAgeTmLgLevGPA2B3BHRSBCSBBSOBAOBPSLG
200818OriolesGULFRk481914311003022.308.416.390
200919DelmarvaSALLA11946519022052380.260.299.318
2010203 Teams3 LgsA+-A--AA10845424341195572.290.383.397
2011212 Teams2 LgsAA-A+13656624192095381.285.354.390
2012222 Teams2 LgsAAA-AA133586237520126576.287.372.388
L.J. Hoes has had hopes and dreams pinned on him by many after his 2008 stint in the Gulf Coast League.  There he showed an incredibly advanced approach at the plate, good speed, and incredibly hard and consistent contact.  The first thing you hear about Hoes from anyone you talk to is how hard he hits the ball.  It sounds great with excellent exit speed, but the swing plane does not generate the needed power.

The initial hope would be that Hoes would be able to come in from the outfield and learn to play second base well enough in order to make up for the bat if it did not develop.  However, he simply did not have a loose enough lower body to react quickly to balls hit to him at second.  In the outfield, he finds a more natural fit and could even manage an adequate centerfield if needed.  To play left, he needs to maintain a high contact rate and increase his secondary power performance.  Neither of those are a given.

Hoes appeared in two games at the end of last season.  Both he and Xavier Avery could perform well right now as fourth outfielders for the Orioles.  The expectation is that Avery is more versatile with his plus plus speed is a better fit as a late inning replacement.  The B grade, perhaps a bit to high, for Hoes is tied entirely to his ability to develop that power to a level where he can produce a 280/350/380 line with plus defense.  That would be worth about 2.5 fWAR.  It may not be what you would typically expect out of a LF, but it would be useful.

No. 5 - LHP Eduardo Rodriguez
Ht/Wt - 6'2", 175
B/T - L/L
Age at 6/13 - 20y 2m
International Free Agent from Venezuela
Prospect Grade - C+ (45)

YearAgeTmLgLevWLERAGGSIPHRBBSOH/9HR/9BB/9SO/9
201017Orioles 1DOSLFRk342.33121265.2028626.70.03.88.5
2011182 Teams2 LgsRk-A-112.22121148.2118506.30.23.39.2
201219DelmarvaSALLA573.702222107.0430738.70.32.56.1
When Andy MacPhail came to the Orioles, the state of international scouting concerned him.  He was not one to spend big on 16 year foreign talent, but he thought it was essential to get scouts on the ground to effectively scoop up tertiary talent with occasional movement on second tier free agents.  Rodriguez was one of those second tier signings (at 175k, he was signed for more than any reported Orioles signing during this IFA season which began July 1, 2012).

Rodriguez was one of the younger players in A ball.  He managed to keep up against the competition with an ERA that was 15% better than the league average.  In seasons past, we were excited about Rodriguez, but were concerned that this high 80s fastball and slow slider pitchability southpaw simply would not be able to generate swing and misses out of the zone as he faced more advanced hitters.  Delmarva saw him increase his velocity into the low 90s on his fastball and low 80s on the slider.  His changeup was also mentioned as having greatly improved, but inconsistent.

So the ranking, for me at least, comes to this: the scouts who their eyes on the player like him more than my familiarity with the history of the player and his peripheral statistics.  You can argue this is a weak place for me to stand, but my concerns are tied to a few things:
  • Rodriguez' HR rate is too low for a pitcher who is not a ground ball pitcher.  He gave up 4 homeruns last year.  I think he should have given up 9.  SIERA takes these things more into consideration and pegs him around 5% under league average, which is good for his age.
  • My general belief that low minors batters are more susceptible to excellent command lefties.  With this issue, I think contact rates and ISO will increase with more advanced hitters.
  • My final concern is that his strikeout rate is 20% below average for the league and, again, he is not a ground ball pitcher.
With those things in mind, Rodriguez will really have to prove to me that he can succeed at each level.