The Ones They Gave Away - Nick Delmonico and Josh Hader

During the 2013 season, the Orioles traded two prospects in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to make the postseason. On July 23, the Orioles traded Nick Delmonico to acquire relief pitcher Francisco Rodriguez from the Brewers. On July 31, the Orioles included Josh Hader in a package to acquire starting pitcher Bud Norris from the Astros. Going into the 2013 season, Baseball America ranked Delmonico as the number 4 prospect in the Orioles system, and he had produced a .819 OPS at High-A Frederick. Baseball America had ranked Hader as the #19 prospect in the Orioles system, an impressive ranking for a nineteenth-round draft pick in the season he was drafted. Hader made the midseason all-star team in the Low-A South Atlantic League in 2013, and had pitched 85 innings with a 2.65 ERA.

Both Delmonico and Hader ranked among their new team's top 30 prospects in Baseball America's 2014 Prospect Handbook. Delmonico is the Brewers' number 12 prospect, and Hader is the Astros' number 14 prospect. That raises an interesting question - if Delmonico and Hader were still in the Orioles' system, where would they rank?

Before I look more closely at that question, I need to mention a few points about prospect rankings. The Depot has provided its 2014 top ten prospect rankings, as have many other people and organizations. We should remember that "ten" is an arbitrary number and that there may not be much difference between the tenth-best prospect - who makes the list - and perhaps the fifteenth-best, who doesn't. We should also remember that a specific rank may be determined by the evaluator's personal biases, especially for players rated closely together. The Depot is, in our own words, more bullish on Christian Walker than most - in part, I think, because Walker represents a class of player Jon believes to be undervalued. I am more bearish on Mike Wright than most, because I've seen Wright pitch twice and was unimpressed. I did see Nick Delmonico play on June 4 and Josh Hader pitch on June 9, and they played well. While I'm going to try to not let my experience color my judgment, be forewarned that it might.

As a standard for measuring prospects, I'm going to use Baseball America's grade/risk system from its Prospect Handbook. The grade, on what is essentially a 40-80 system, is an attempt to measure a prospect's realistic ceiling, with a 40 being a bench player or low-leverage relief pitcher and 75-80 being a franchise cornerstone. The risk, ranging from extreme to safe, is an attempt to measure how much more development the prospect needs to reach his ceiling. Delmonico and Hader are both 50/High, which means BA thinks their realistic ceiling is solid-average regular player who might play in an all-star game in a good year (for Delmonico) or fourth starter on a typical playoff team (for Hader) but that they'll have to develop quite a bit to reach that ceiling.

Another aside - it's somewhat revealing that Delmonico is the twelfth-best prospect in a bad farm system (BA ranks the Brewers 29th) and that Hader is the fourteenth-best prospect in a good farm system (the Astros are fifth.) If this is typical - every farm system's tenth-through-fifteenth prospects are all graded 50/high - it means that the differences among farm systems is either at the very front end, at the back end, or both.

The Orioles have several prospects whom Baseball America grades at 50/High:

• #6 Tim Berry
• #8 Mike Wright
• #9 Michael Ohlman
• #11 Zach Davies
• #12 Adrian Marin
• #13 Josh Hart
• #14 Steven Brault

BA's #10 prospect is Chance Sisco, whom they grade at 55/Extreme, virtually equivalent to 50/High with a higher peak but more development required. Their #7 prospect is Henry Urrutia, an older Cuban refugee whom they grade at 45/Low. His unusual background makes him less of a traditional prospect; for this exercise I'll leave him out of the discussion. There are legitimate reasons for ranking him ahead of this prospect cluster and legitimate reasons for ranking him behind this prospect cluster. I will also leave Sisco, Hart, and Brault out of the discussion because I know almost nothing about them. They were players acquired in the June 2013 draft and have played less than a full season of professional ball.

The obvious player to compare Nick Delmonico to is Michael Ohlman. Both are bat-first players who really project as first basemen or left fielders - Delmonico has played third base but it's questionable if he can stick there; Ohlman is nominally a catcher but almost certainly won't stick there. (Ohlman caught 1/3 of the games at Frederick last season; the others were split between Allan de san Miguel, a 25-year-old minor league free agent, and Zane Chavez, a 26-year-old independent league refugee.) Both played at high-A in 2013. Neither Delmonico nor Ohlman has been durable.

There are some differences. Delmonico is eighteen months younger than Ohlman. Delmonico hits left-handed, Ohlman right-handed. Ohlman had a much better 2013 season than did Delmonico, .313/.410/.524 to .232/.346/.423 (although Delmonico's numbers were depressed by his time with the Brewers' Florida State League affiliate.) Delmonico has been consistent in his two professional seasons; Ohlman's 2013 was substantially better than any other of his seasons and his professional career has been an archetype of inconsistency.

If you believe that Ohlman's 2013 is a consequence of his development, then you would rank Ohlman ahead of Delmonico. If you think Delmonico's youth gives him more development room, then you would rank Delmonico ahead of Ohlman. I don't think there's any question that Delmonico ranks close to Ohlman as a prospect.

The obvious player to compare Josh Hader to is Tim Berry. Both are left-handed starting pitchers listed at 6'3". In 2013, Hader pitched at low-A at age 19; Berry pitched at high-A at age 22. Both strike out around seven batters per nine innings. Hader appears to have more room for physical development than Berry does; he's listed at 160 pounds while Berry is listed at 180 pounds. Berry has much better control than Hader and has been more durable. On the other hand, Berry pitched much worse at Delmarva when he was there than Hader did, and Hader was a year younger. I think it's reasonable to conclude that Hader probably has slightly more upside than Berry does, but also Hader must develop more than Berry.

Both Delmonico and Hader are roughly equal as prospects to Ohlman and Berry, and consequently with the other 50/High prospects mentioned above. So, depending on your subjective preferences, Delmonico and Hader could rank between sixth and sixteenth among the Orioles prospects. The Orioles, in hindsight, would not have made the Delmonico trade and it's still too early to reach a firm conclusion on the Hader trade. But both Delmonico and Hader would have ranked among the better prospects in the Orioles system.

The Bagwell "Bungle"

On August 30, 1990, the Boston Red Sox acquired relief pitcher Larry Andersen from the Houston Astros in exchange for minor-league third baseman Jeff Bagwell. The Red Sox were in a tight race with Toronto for the American League Eastern Division championship. The bullpen supporting closer Jeff Reardon was not doing the job, and Andersen was pitching well for the last-place Astros. Andersen provided the deisred bullpen support, allowing only three runs in 22 September innings; and, the Red Sox held off the Blue Jays by two games. Andersen was declared a free agent; the Red Sox hoped to sign him but he signed with San Diego. Bagwell, at the time of the trade a 22-year-old AA third baseman, moved to first base the following spring and made the Astros. He won the 1991 National League Rookie of the Year award and went on to a career better than that of many Hall of Famers.

The relevance should be clear - on July 23, 2013, the Baltimore Orioles acquired relief pitcher Francisco Rodriguez from the Milwaukee Brewers in exchange for minor-league third baseman Nick Delmonico. Rodriguez will become a free agent at the end of this season. While it's possible that Rodriguez may be so happy with the Orioles that they'll have an advantage in re-signing him, tangibly they've acquired him for two months.

Back in the 1930's, the Detroit Tigers had acquired future Hall-of-Fame lefthanded pitcher Carl Hubbell. For unknown reasons, the Tigers allowed Hubbell to be acquired by the New York Giants for, essentially, nothing. On the surface, that's a terrible blunder, but as it turned out it made very little difference in the big picture. For during Hubbell's Hall of Fame career, the Tigers were never in a pennant race that they didn't win anyway. So, at least based on that measure, the Tigers wouldn't have been any more successful with Hubbell than they were without him.

So, we have (1) an Orioles trade that is a parallel to an historical trade; (2) the historical trade worked about as well for both teams as they could have hoped; and (3) anecdotal evidence that a team can give away a Hall-of-Famer without affecting the number of championships it won. Given that, I thought it might be interesting to see what impact Jeff Bagwell might have had if he had stayed with the Red Sox - in how many more years would they have made the playoffs? That history might provide perspective on the impact of surrendering Nick Delmonico for Francisco Rodriguez.

Bagwell played with the Astros from 1991 through 2005; he only played 39 games with the Astros in 2005 and there was no postseason in 1994, so this analysis will look at 1991-1993 and 1995-2004. It helps that Andersen left the Red Sox as a free agent after the 1990 season, so we don't have to allow for his contributions. This analysis will also ignore any other moves that the Red Sox might or might not have made.

1991 Bagwell was the National League Rookie of the Year after moving to first base in spring training; he was worth about 4 games better than replacement.The Red Sox finished in second place in the American League East, seven games behind the Blue Jays. Even if Bagwell had played full-time with the Red Sox, which is doubtful, he probably would have been at best a 2-game improvement over the players the Red Sox did have. He wouldn't have gotten the Red Sox a championship.

1992 The Red Sox finished in last place. Bagwell wouldn't have made a major difference.

1993 The Red Sox finished in fifth place, fifteen games behind the Blue Jays. Again, Bagwell wouldn't have made a major difference.

1995 The Red Sox won the Eastern Division, so Bagwell wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason.

1996 The Red Sox finished third in their division, seven games back but only three games out of the wild card. Bagwell had a great season for the Astros, worth 7.5 WAR (according to baseball-reference.com), so they would have made the playoffs had they kept Bagwell. Maybe. The Red Sox' best offensive players were first baseman Mo Vaughn (5.6 WAR), designated hitter Jose Canseco (3.0 WAR in 96 games), and utility cornerman Reggie Jefferson (1.9 WAR in 122 games, 413 plate appearances.) It starts to get speculative here, but I'll say that if Bagwell had played all season, starting by taking all of Jefferson's playing time and the rest from Canseco, the Red Sox could have edged Baltimore for the wild card. It's not a sure thing.

1997 The Red Sox finished in fourth place, twenty games out and 18 games out of the wild card. Bagwell wasn't good enough to make up that dfference.

1998 The Red Sox finished in second place, twenty-two games behind the 114-win Yankees but good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell (1) wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason and (2) wasn't going to make them catch the Yankees.

1999 The Red Sox finished in second place, four games behind the Yankees but again good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason. In 1999, Bagwell did have a 7.4 WAR season, and the Red Sox DH spot wasn't real good, so it's possible that if they had Bagwell, they would have caught the Yankees for first place.

2000 The Red Sox finished in second place, 2.5 games behind the Yankees and six out of the wild card. Bagwell didn't have a great season (5.4 WAR) but that still would have been much better than the Sox got from Brian Daubach (0.2 WAR) in 142 games. I'll say it - the Andersen for Bagwell trade cost the Red Sox a postseason berth in 2000.

2001 The Red Sox finished in second place, 13.5 games behind the Yankees and 19.5 out of the wild card. Bagwell wasn't going to overcome that.

2002 The Red Sox finished in second place, 10.5 games behind the Yankees and six out of the wild card. And, they got less than nothing from their first basemen and desginated hitters. But by 2002, Bagwell was starting to decline; he produced only 3.7 WAR. It's possible, but very unlikely, that Bagwell could have made the difference and gotten the Red Sox into the playoffs.

2003 The Red Sox finished in second place, six games behind the Yankees but good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell produced 4.1 WAR; he wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason but wasn't by himself going to make them catch the Yankees.

2004 The Red Sox finished in second place, three games behind the Yankees. They were good enough to win the wild card and went on to win the World Series. It's hard to imagine Bagwell making the season any more successful.

Conclusions: Trading the full career of Jeff Bagwell for one month of Larry Andersen was a bad trade. It definitely cost the Red Sox the 2000 Eastern Division title. And it's conceivable, although improbable, that it cost them two other postseason berths and a division title (instead of a wild card.) The trade of Bagwell had less impact on Red Sox success than I would have thought.

Applying this to the Orioles trade of Nick Delmonico for Francisco Rodriguez, it seems very unlikely that the loss of Delmonico will make much of a difference to the Orioles. Even if Delmonico becomes a Hall of Famer, his absence probably won't cost the Orioles much. And, if Rodriguez pitches well, and the Orioles do make the postseason this year, it will likely have been worth it - Delmonico probably won't have more impact.

I was dismayed when I heard that the Orioles traded Delmonico for Rodriguez for the usual reasons - Delmonico could develop into a star, Rodriguez won't have much impact in twenty innings, even if he does pitch well in twenty innings, he wouldn't be that much better than what they could get for nothing. The more I listen to people, the more I look at the facts, I'm reluctantly becoming convinced that although the trade is a bad trade, it's a trade the Orioles should (and did) make.

O's Acquire Francisco Rodriguez, Get Marginally Better

Even if you're just a casual fan, you've likely heard by now that the Orioles acquired reliever Francisco Rodriguez from the Brewers in exchange for infield prospect Nick Delmonico. Heading into this season, Delmonico was ranked by Baseball America as the O's fourth best prospect (behind Jonathan Schoop but ahead of Eduardo Rodriguez). According to Baseball Prospectus, he was the O's sixth best prospect.

First, let's stop to note Rodriguez's previous off-field antics, which I'll briefly discuss (but won't have any effect on the breakdown of the trade below). In August 2010, he punched the father of his girlfriend after a game. He pleaded guilty to assault charges and received a sentence of 52 weeks of anger management. Then in September 2012, he was arrested for allegedly assaulting his new girlfriend. The case was dropped, though, because his girlfriend and the housekeeper, an eyewitness, went back to Venezuela. Some may have different opinions on whether or not such behavior matters when signing or acquiring a player, but facts are facts. Back to the analysis.

Rodriguez signed a minor league contract with the Brewers in mid-April, and he'll be a free agent after this season. He's also making a bit more than $2 million. So the O's are parting with Delmonico for a few months of Rodriguez's services. Rodriguez did start the year in the minors, pitching two innings each in single- and triple-A, and he was eventually promoted to the major leagues in mid-May.

In 24.2 innings with the Brewers, he had a 1.09 ERA and 10 saves (if you care about things like save totals). An ERA that low is obviously great in any situation, but it's misleading. His strikeouts are up and his walks are down from last season, which are both positives. But he's been lucky on balls in play (.250 BABIP vs. .276 for his career), his 99.1% strand rate is ridiculously high (the major league average is 73.2%), and his 28.3% ground ball rate would be the lowest of his career by nearly 10%. Again, we're dealing with a little more than 24 innings, and weird things can happen in such a tiny sample. But more hits are probably going to start dropping in against him, more runners are going to score instead of being left on the basepaths, and if his low HR/FB rate jumps any higher, he's going to see an increase in homers allowed, especially if his fly ball rate (50%) stays close to where it is. (Ed. note: Just wanted to clarify that last part. Because he's been giving up a lot of fly balls, any jump in his HR/FB rate would not be a good thing. I probably could have worded that better.)

So it's not surprising to note that Rodriguez is due for some regression, but he's still a useful bullpen piece that Buck Showalter gets to experiment with. Rodriguez should fit in nicely with Darren O'Day and Tommy Hunter to form a troika of right-handed relievers to pitch anytime in the sixth, seventh, and eighth innings in front of Jim Johnson. So that part is helpful.

But was that bullpen upgrade worth a mid-level prospect in Delmonico? That depends who you ask. Two writers I read regularly, Keith Law and Jonah Keri, differ on the topic. Law, who writes more from the scouting side of things, thinks the O's paid a "steep price" in the trade (Insider access required). Keri, though, believes the O's "didn't give up a ton" in parting with Delmonico, noting some of his weaknesses and then equating him to "something of a lottery ticket."

Some fans weren't happy when the O's traded for Scott Feldman because he's merely a decent but not great rotation option. But he's already thrown 26.2 innings for the O's (and has pitched better than his 4.73 ERA indicates) and has plenty of starts to go. Rodriguez, on the other hand, may not surpass that inning total by much, yet you could argue that the Brewers (with Delmonico) made out better than the Cubs (with Jake Arrieta and Pedro Strop).

In a way, it's hard not to admire Dan Duquette's gumption. When the Orioles have seemingly soured on a prospect or someone they've signed to a minor league contract, they're not afraid to cut ties with that player. Obviously shipping Delmonico to Milwaukee is different than losing someone like Jair Jurrjens or Jon Rauch, but the O's deemed Delmonico expendable and used him to shore up the bullpen.

I don't agree with the thinking that because the O's have Manny Machado and Chris Davis manning the corners that it's OK to part with any corner infield prospect. Why? Organizational depth is important. Players get hurt. And promising players, even ones viewed as expendable, can be traded in a package for more value in return. Feldman has been a nice pickup; hopefully Rodriguez pitches well, too. But if the Orioles are really "going for it," would it have been wiser for them to pool some of these mid-level assets in order to acquire a better player? That depends on the specifics of a potential deal, of course, but a front-line starter would look a whole lot better than Feldman or Jason Hammel right now.

Maybe that's a pipe dream, but I still think the Orioles could have done better in this situation. Shoring up the bullpen is perhaps the easiest thing on a major league roster to fix, but this trade didn't reflect that. Then again, if Delmonico never develops in the Brewers system, this trade probably won't matter that much.

Camden Depot's Orioles top 10: 6 through 10

I mentioned in a previous post that the prospect evaluation here at the Depot has undergone some changes with Nick Faleris' departure to Baseball Prospectus.  Briefly put, I am writing up each of these prospects, but the list was formed by averaging out the prospect lists of mine, Jeremy Strain, and Joe Reisel.  Last time, we reviewed the top five and this time we go through numbers six through 10.

No. 6 - CIF Nicky Delmonico
Ht/Wt - 6'2", 196
B/T - L/R
Age at 6/13 - 20y 11m
Drafted 6:4 by Baltimore in 2011
Prospect Grade - C+ (44)

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	G	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG
2012	19	Delmarva	SALL	A	95	393	22	0	11	8	1	47	73	.249	.351	.411

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Last year, Delmonico rated as our sixth prospect, but was viewed slightly more positively than he was graded this year.  What was good about 2012?  As a 19 year old in full season A ball, Delmonico certainly held his own in the batter's box making up for poor contact with a strong walk rate and a very promising display of power.  His .770 OPS was 12% greater than the league average when park factors are considered.  The optimist would note that his poor June numbers (.688 OPS) coincided with a knee injury while his numbers in May and July were greater than .800.  Regardless of your viewpoint on how to use those numbers, these numbers are excellent for a 19 year old in A ball.

My concern comes from two things: health and defense.  A back injury was a major reason why Delmonico dropped from a high round draft pick to the sixth round.  In his first professional season, he strained his knee.  As a rule, back and knee injuries cause me a great deal of concern.  This is particularly true for a player who is playing second base where they get torn up and blindsided while turning double plays.  The good news for Delmonico is that he really cannot play second and will be shifted off to first, third, or maybe even the outfield.  A catcher in high school, a second baseman in his first professional year, and now sitting on the hot corner.  The uncertainty in his defensive home hopefully gets resolved giving him more time to concentrate on his bat, which in the end is what will carry him to the show.  With that in mind, any struggle with the bat and he becomes minor league depth.

No. 7 - RHP Mike Wright
Ht/Wt - 6'5", 195
B/T - R/R
Age at 6/13 - 23y 6m
Drafted 3:4 by Baltimore in 2011
Prospect Grade - C+ (41)

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	W	L	ERA	G	GS	IP	HR	BB	SO	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	SO/9
2011	21	Orioles	GULF	Rk	0	0	0.00	1	0	1.0	0	0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
2011	21	Aberdeen	NYPL	A-	2	1	3.77	7	7	31.0	3	6	29	8.4	0.9	1.7	8.4
2011	21	Delmarva	SALL	A	1	1	10.54	4	1	13.2	3	4	12	13.8	2.0	2.6	7.9
2012	22	Frederick	CARL	A+	5	2	2.91	8	8	46.1	3	5	35	9.1	0.6	1.0	6.8
2012	22	Bowie	EL	AA	5	3	4.91	12	12	62.1	7	17	45	10.3	1.0	2.5	6.5

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

To me, Mike Wright is someone like Jim Johnson.  He is a pitcher who induces groundballs with an interesting breaking ball.  Wright has an interesting, flashy above average slider while Johnson has a curve.  Wright also throw a four seamer, a curve, and has a decent changeup.  With those pitches at his disposal, the team wants to bring Wright along as a starter.  He may struggle at times, like he did last year in Bowie, but he should be able to progress through the minors as a decent starting pitcher.

The trick for him would be to continue success with his two seam fastball.  As he moves up from level to level, his two seamer will have more difficulty in resulting in swing and misses as well as swing and poorly hit balls as batters are more capable of discerning when the sink will drop the ball below the strike zone.  My rule of thumb for groundball pitchers without any steady plus pitches is to force them to be successful at each level.  It is the same reason why I was hesitant about Zach Britton and Brad Bergesen being successful Major Leaguers.

Wright is a useful prospect.  With more consistency from his slider, he profiles as a solid middle reliever.  For now, he will likely begin in Bowie as a starting pitcher with Norfolk coming in 2014.

No. 8 - INF Adrian Marin
Ht/Wt - 5'10", 165
B/T - R/R
Age at 6/13 - 19y 3m
Drafted 3:4 by Baltimore in 2012
Prospect Grade - C+ (40)

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	G	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG
2012	18	Orioles	GULF	Rk	47	193	7	3	0	6	1	11	34	.287	.339	.360
2012	18	Delmarva	SALL	A	6	23	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	.286	.348	.286

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

I aggressively rate shortstop prospects, so that might be putting a bit of a shine on Marin for me.  It simply is incredibly difficult at this time to find solid options for shortstop.  With such scarcity, any potential shortstop carries good value for me.  Adding to Marin's worth has been positive comments that have been shared with me from two evaluators.  In the long run, I am not sure what his value as a shortstop is to the Orioles, but that is an issue to be dealt with a few years from now.  There is no reason to think about that right now.

So, Marin's value is tied to him being a shortstop because his bat is not going to carry him.  At times, he produces great velocity as the ball jumps off the bat.  Last year, that produced doubles and triples.  With a little more loft, they should turn into a few home runs, but it is unlikely though that the bat produces much more than a handful in any given year.  Again, that kind of player works if he sticks at shortstop.  If he has to shift to second or third, the bat will have to exceed expectations or he would need to become the best defensive second baseman or third baseman in the game.  Marin has the reflexes and speed to make up for an average arm as a shortstop. I would estimate he may be ready for the Majors in 2016 if everything works out.

No. 9 -RHP Clay Shrader
Ht/Wt - 5'11", 200
B/T - L/R
Age at 6/13 - 23y 2m
Drafted 10:3 by Baltimore in 2010
Prospect Grade - C (39)

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	W	L	ERA	G	GS	IP	HR	BB	SO	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	SO/9
2010	20	Aberdeen	NYPL	A-	1	0	0.00	7	0	8.0	0	4	10	4.5	0.0	4.5	11.2
2010	20	Delmarva	SALL	A	0	1	6.75	3	0	4.0	0	2	6	9.0	0.0	4.5	13.5
2011	21	Delmarva	SALL	A	1	1	2.05	12	0	22.0	1	13	38	4.5	0.4	5.3	15.5
2011	21	Frederick	CARL	A+	1	1	1.12	15	0	24.0	1	19	35	3.0	0.4	7.1	13.1
2012	22	Frederick	CARL	A+	1	1	1.29	23	0	35.0	0	27	51	5.1	0.0	6.9	13.1
2012	22	Bowie	EL	AA	1	0	2.74	19	0	23.0	1	24	17	5.9	0.4	9.4	6.7

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Schrader would have probably fallen off the this list if not for being somewhat championed by Joe Reisel.  Last year, the Depot had him at the nine slot as well, but with more hope than I currently have.  There certainly are things to like about him.  He has a plus mid 90s fastball that has a great deal of movement, resulting in swings and misses.  However, who knows where it will wind up?  As his walk totals suggest, Schrader struggles greatly with his command.  Additionally, he has a plus slider that breaks hard and is also a true swing and miss pitch.  Again, it dances around the strike zone as well.

His success will depend on how well he can gain control of his pitches.  Although it involves only 23 innings, one should expect his walk rate to increase and his strikeout rate to decrease as he moves up the ladder.  That expected outcome has largely followed him throughout his minor league career.  Advanced hitters will face will hold off against more pitches on the edge of the strike and force him to prove he has command of his pitches.  If he cannot cut his walk rate down from 7 batters per 9 innings, then he will need to retain a 13 or more strikeouts per 9 innings to be of any use.  That will be difficult.  Simply put, he is going to put a lot of baserunners on first and that usually is a bad thing.

No. 10 - OF Xavier Avery
Ht/Wt - 6'0", 190
B/T - L/L
Age at 6/13 - 23y 6m
Drafted 2:4 by Baltimore in 2010
Prospect Grade - C (39)

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	G	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG
2008	18	Orioles	GULF	Rk	47	192	8	1	0	13	3	10	51	.280	.333	.337
2009	19	Delmarva	SALL	A	129	509	15	8	2	30	10	27	111	.262	.306	.340
2010	20	Frederick	CARL	A+	109	498	25	6	4	28	14	42	96	.280	.349	.389
2010	20	Bowie	EL	AA	27	120	6	0	3	10	0	7	34	.234	.288	.374
2011	21	Bowie	EL	AA	138	626	31	2	4	36	14	49	156	.259	.324	.343
2012	22	Norfolk	IL	AAA	102	458	13	5	8	22	7	51	106	.236	.330	.356

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Baltimore statistics:

Year	Age	G	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	OPS+
2012	22	32	107	6	1	1	6	3	11	23	.223	.305	.340	.645	76

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

There is certainly a certainty in the value of Xavier Avery.  He is now a 23 year old who profiles well as a defensive fourth outfielder with speed who could face a right handed pitcher of the bench.  He does not offer plus defense as his solid range with improving routes is balanced by a pretty dreadful arm.  It is important to remember that he has been able to hold his own at every step along the way even though he has been one of the youngest players at each level.

My hesitancy in valuing him more is that I cannot see what it is that he can become.  I do not see him adding much more in terms of power and his inability to hit left handed pitching severely limits his usefulness as a full time player.  The key for him will be to improve his contact rate.  If he can push it up to where he could bat .280 line at the MLB level, he could be a very valuable as it probably puts him as a .750 to .800 OPS hitter against righties.  That could work.  Again, though, I am not aware of a single other batter who has been able to perform at a MLB average level of performance after being a mid to low .200 batting average hitter with no power in the minors.  I do expect him to be offered many opportunities over the next 5-8 years to prove me wrong.

Others considered:
Branden Kline - RHP
Josh Hader - LHP
Henry Urrutia - OF
Hector Veloz - INF/OF
Glynn Davis - OF
Ty Kelly - INF