First-Base Defense - A Look at Triple-A

Travis Ishikawa receiving a pickoff, a play I don't examine in this article. Photo courtesy of Norfolk Tides/Elaina Ellis.

During a rain delay, the Norfolk Tides' media relations intern, myself, and the Tides' official scorer, killed time by discussing the divide between the traditional evaluation methods and the new sabermetric methods. While all three appreciated the goals and efforts of the new analysts, I said that I was concerned that the advanced methods provide the illusion of knowledge without a strong foundation. Many of these statistics are proprietary - the data on which they are based are not available for examination. None of these statistics are verifiable - with offensive statistics, we can confirm that they "work" at a team level, but we can't check these statistics at a team level. And the statistics are inconsistent - it's common for a player to be rated an outstanding defender by one measure and a below-average defender by another.

In order for the newer methods to achieve true recognition, we should first focus on solid, easily understandable counts than on all-encompassing, single-number ratings. For example, before we can determine which of the various advanced defensive metrics is best ,we need to know some basic information that we don't really have - such as how many batted balls defensive players actually field and turn into outs.
During the discussion I referenced above, we all agreed that first-base defense is not measured well by traditional statistics. First basemen are credited with a putout on every play on which the batter-runner is retired at first base, although their contribution to the play is often simply catching a throw from another player. Those plays likely tell us relatively little about a first baseman's defense, because there is (presumably) relatively little difference among first basemen in their ability to catch such routine throws. I said that, before I can appreciate the value of the advanced evaluations, I want to know some fundamental information about first basemen - specifically, the number of batted balls first fielded by the first baseman and turned into outs. This article will look at the first basemen's defense in 2013 games played in Norfolk's Harbor Park.

There are four types of batted balls which first basemen turn into outs - ground balls (taken to the base himself, flipped to the pitcher covering, or thrown to another base to retire a runner); fair pop flies; foul pop flies, and line drives. The table below provides the totals of each type of batted balls that first basemen turned into outs in the Norfolk games for which I have data. First, the totals for both the Tides and their opponents:

	Games	Innings	Ground Balls	Fair Fly Balls	Foul Fly Balls	Line Drives
Norfolk	71	634	78	6	14	6
Visitors	71	602 2/3	73	15	13	8

Or, converted to a per-nine-innings basis:

	Ground Balls	Fair Fly Balls	Foul Fly Balls	Line Drives
Norfolk	1.107	0.099	0.198	0.085
Visitors	1.090	0.224	0.194	0.119

Before I looked closely at the play-by-play results I didn't know this. The first thing that struck me is there probably isn't much of a difference between the Norfolk first basemen and the visiting first basemen in their defense at Harbor Park. The one possibly noteworthy distinction is that the visitors recorded substantially more outs on fair fly balls than the Tides, but given the closeness everywhere else that's probably a random variation, not reflecting a real ability. The second thing that struck me is how few outs are recorded by first basemen by catching batted balls in the air. The Tides first basemen caught a fly or line drive about once every 2.6 games; the visitors, about once every 1.86 games. In contrast, first basemen fielded a ground ball that was turned into an out about once every game.

However, it does seem likely that the typical first baseman in Harbor Park fields about 1.1 ground balls a game (or about 160 in a 144-game AAA season) and catches about 0.2 foul fly balls a game (about 30 in a AAA season.) So we're not talking about a lot of plays.

The data above aggregates bad defensive first basemen and good defensive first basemen. It's certainly possible that good defensive first basemen are significantly better, and bad defensive first basemen significantly worse, than the total. Next we'll look at the individual Tides first basemen, to see if there's a significant difference among them.

Four Tides players played what I consider to be a significant number of first-base innings at Harbor Park The first table shows the total number of plays by each player, the second shows the plays per nine defensive innings:

	Innings	Ground Balls	Fair Fly Balls	Foul Fly Balls	Line Drives
Russ Canzler	198	27	1	3	0
Travis Ishikawa	164	17	2	1	2
Alex Liddi	98	10	1	4	0
Buck Britton	77	10	1	3	1

	Innings	Ground Balls	Fair Fly Balls	Foul Fly Balls	Line Drives
Russ Canzler	198	1.227	0.045	0.136	0.000
Travis Ishikawa	164	0.933	0.109	0.055	0.109
Alex Liddi	98	0.918	0.092	0.367	0.000
Buck Britton	77	1.167	0.116	0.350	0.117

The other first basemen included Chris Robinson, Brandon Wood, Steve Clevenger, and Dan Johnson, none of whom played more than five games at first base.

So, in a full 144-game season, Alex Liddi would have fielded about 132 ground balls and Russ Canzler about 177. Britton and Ishikawa would have fit between these totals.

It's interesting that Travis Ishikawa, who has had a good-glove reputation at first base, ranked below the average in the number of ground balls he fielded and turned into outs. The fly-ball data is too small to really allow us to draw meaningful conclusions. One point that may be worth further exploration is that Travis Ishikawa, who had been trained as a first baseman since his amateur days, caught fewer foul fly balls than did Russ Canzler, Alex Liddi, and Buck Britton, all of whom moved to first base from other infield positions.

This is a first step toward providing a better understanding of first-base defense. The biggest conclusion is that more research is needed. To me, the most interesting results are (1) how few fly balls and line drives are caught by the first baseman; and (2) that first basemen, on average, field one ground ball each game.

Of course, there are plenty of complicating factors - the ground-ball and strikeout tendencies of the pitching staff, the number of left-handed and right-handed batters in the opposing lineups, the size of foul territory, etc. The advanced fielding metrics attempt to account for all these factors. However, I don't think we can evaluate the metrics until we see how they compare with the more elementary components of first-base defense. This is a first attempt to quantify these elementary components.

Decrease in Run Production Might Be Due to Defense

This is just a short little post today, but I think it raises a decent question in light of comments made my Mark Cuban about how there is no evidence that shows human growth hormone improves athletic performance.  In fact, evidence shows that it has no significant effect on performance and there is also some information developing that shows that therapies using this hormone are unlikely to produce tissue that is functional for an athlete.  In other words, hGH therapies are probably ideal for individuals who simply need to heal as opposed to those who need to heal for athletic competition as well as not for those who used it to reduce down time between cycling of other chemicals.  This really is not much of a surprise because gym rats and athletes have rarely been on the cutting edge for any therapeutical chemical use.  Conventional wisdom tends to think that everything that successful players do must work because the players are successful.  We should recognize this as being absurd.  However, we tend to believe, as a population, in fantastically simple explanations, such as magic pills and treatments devised by non-science majors who have no practical skills beyond taste testing performance supplements.

With this in mind, shouldn't we also consider the possibility that something that has been shown to increase muscle mass and improvement in some forms of athletic events, such as anabolic steroids, might also not have been all that impacting?  A few years back, I noted how we have all of a sudden been treated to an amazing improvement in fastball velocity since around 2007.  Additionally, there also appears to be a relationship between velocity and run environments.  I think that makes sense and should be readily acceptable.

Another consideration I wish to make is this: run environment and appreciation of defensive ability are also linked.

Consider the graph below showing numbers from the American League over the past decade and a half:



How does that relationship work with the run environment?



It actually fits pretty well, which is an impressive thing because errors are a very limited measurement of defensive ability.  In fact, errors are a pretty poor way to measure defensive ability as evidenced by our infamous Rubbermaid Trashcan notion.  That is, such a trashcan would have a 1.000 fielding percentage while also being the worst defender in baseball.

Anyway, I think that it is plausible to think that along with increased pitcher velocity that a greater appreciation (or measurement) of defense probably also contributed to the decline in the run environment.  This more and more marginalizes the conventional wisdom of drug testing impacting the game in a very significant way.  As teams began to realize the importance of preventing runs then they began to move away from the pure mashers who produced runs at a significant cost to defense.  At least, that would be the narrative explanation to carry forth this hypothesis.

Buy-Low Opportunity: Gavin Floyd

The Orioles may be looking to sign a back-end starting rotation option this offseason. A few starters have already been signed, though. The Giants signed Tim Hudson for two years and $32 million. Josh Johnson signed a one-year, $8 million deal (with a 2015 option) with the Padres. And the Royals signed Jason Vargas for four years and $32 million. The O's may have been interested in all three of these pitchers, but talks were never reportedly serious (though, in the case of someone like Johnson, maybe the O's should have been more persistent. Then again, a career resurrection is probably a bit easier in Petco Park than Camden Yards). The O's certainly weren't going to hand out four years or $32 million to someone like Vargas, but the free agent market is already turning out to be very expensive.

Gavin Floyd
(Photo via Keith Allison)

The O's are unlikely to offer a pricey contract to any free agent starting pitcher. But one name the team has been linked to is Gavin Floyd, who would not be overly expensive or likely receive a multiyear deal, but does come with some injury risks. Floyd, who turns 31 in January, also has the local ties thing going for him: He was born in Annapolis and went to Mount Saint Joseph High School in Baltimore. The Orioles also looked into acquiring Floyd before, nearly dealing for him in early 2012.

Floyd started his career with the Phillies before being traded to Chicago in 2006, and he pitched in at least 168 innings from 2008 to 2012 with the White Sox. The O's are usually thin in the rotation and are always interested in decent starters who can throw a good amount of innings. That's why it was smart when the Orioles acquired Scott Feldman last year (and, to a much lesser extent, Bud Norris).

Floyd is essentially a league average starter. Take a look:

Floyd career: 7.06 K/9, 3.05 BB/9, 44.7 GB%, 11.9 HR/FB, 4.48 ERA
2013 avg starter: 7.19 K/9, 2.83 BB/9, 44.6 GB%, 10.8 HR/FB, 4.01 ERA

His home run rate and ERA are a little higher, but the rest of his numbers are not far off. Let's compare that to, say, Vargas, who turns 31 in February:

Vargas career: 5.87 K/9, 2.77 BB/9, 37.1 GB%, 9.1 HR/FB, 4.30 ERA

So who would you rather have? It's at least close -- that is, until you factor in Floyd's injury.

Floyd underwent Tommy John surgery in May 2013 to repair his ulnar collateral ligament and torn flexor tendon in his elbow, but, according to Floyd's agent, his rehab appears to be going smoothly and he should be be on track to return around opening day in 2014. Floyd was originally expected to miss between 14 and 19 months, but his timetable appears to have changed.

If not for the injury, Floyd could have been looking to sign a contract similar to Vargas's. But the injury does present a buy-low opportunity for the Orioles or any other interested team, especially on a one-year deal. Floyd for one year and a few million (and the possibility of more in incentives) doesn't seem like such a bad idea.

Sunday Comics: Welcome to the Orioles, Edgmer Escalona!

Meet the newest Oriole, everyone!

Scouring the League for Second Base Surplus

The Orioles offseason needs have been discussed at great length on the Depot during the offseason.  One of those needs is at second base.  Earlier in the offseason, Joe took a thorough look at Baltimore’s in-house options to man the position in 2014, as well as potential free agents and some trade options (namely Howie Kendrick and Darwin Barney).  Additionally, Matt wondered if the Orioles should pursue Mark Ellis.  Today, I’ll be taking a broader look at trade targets by examining teams that currently have a surplus of second baseman.  Additionally, we’ll look at what those teams may be looking for in a return (based on reports/rumors/common sense) and see if they match up well in a potential trade with Baltimore.

Arizona Diamondbacks

Potential Targets: Didi Gregorius, Chris Owings, Aaron Hill, Martin Prado

The emergence of Chris Owings as a top shortstop prospect is creating the log-jam in the Diamondbacks’ middle infield.  Owings was ranked by Baseball Prospectus as Arizona’s 3^rd best prospect heading into the 2013 season, and he played well when he was called up to the big leagues in September, hitting .291/.361/.382 in 61 PA’s.  Both Owings and Gregorius are considered above average to plus defenders at shortstop (both can play 2B as well), with Owings projected to be the better hitter of the two.  That being the case, Owings’ bat may end up being below average at the keystone, due to some questions about his approach.

Aaron Hill (photo via Keith Allison)

Since both Gregorius and Owings have less than a year of service time (making them cheap from a financial point of view, but expensive in terms of a trade), the likely target out of these 3 should probably be Hill (Prado’s availability is likely limited due to his versatility and contract).  After a tough 2-year stretch in 2010 and 2011, Hill bounced back in 2012, hitting .302/.360/.502.  His 2013 was similar in terms of his rate stats, but he missed half the year due to a fractured left hand when he was hit by a pitch in April.  Hill is only an average runner, but will provide above average hitting and defense.  He is beginning a 3 year, $35 million contract in 2014, and because of this, he should cost less in talent than Gregorius and Owings.

Team Needs: By all indications, Arizona is looking for outfield power (which the Orioles don’t have) and major league starting pitching.  Unless Arizona believes that Brian Matusz can still start and/or Zach Britton can throw strikes, it may be difficult to complete a deal for Hill.

Los Angeles Angels

Potential Targets: Howie Kendrick, Grant Green

Joe already provided a good synopsis of a potential deal for Kendrick (linked above), so I won’t go into that, and trading for Green wouldn’t improve the Orioles at second base in 2014.  Compared to Hill, Kendrick will give you a little less production (through less walks, more strikeouts, and slightly less power), but he will give you a better batting average if you’re into that sort of thing.

Howie Kendrick (photo via Keith Allison)

Team Needs: P & P (which is something I made up and stands for Pitching and Prospects).  I think a deal for Kendrick would look similar to a proposed deal with Arizona, but more likely to happen due to the Angels increased willingness to accept prospects as part of the deal.

Milwaukee Brewers

Potential Targets: Rickie Weeks, Scooter Gennett

A team that's in the position the Brewers find themselves (they’re not very good) will not be trading Gennett, who had a great 2013 (in 230 PA’s), even if he likely outperformed his true talent.  As for Weeks, I bet you could basically get him for free, not that you’d necessarily want to.  He’s not a good defender and the last 2 years, he hasn’t been a good hitter either, posting a below average wRC+ in both years (with an ugly wRC+ of 86 last year).  On top of that, Weeks will be paid $11 million in 2014 and has a vesting option for $11.5 million in 2015 (the option vests if Weeks accumulates 600 PA’s in 2014 or 1,200 PA’s in 2013 and 2014 combined).  Despite missing some time with injuries, Weeks was very productive from 2009 to 2011 (a minimum 124 wRC+ in each year), but that seems like a long time ago.

Still, if the Orioles can convince Milwaukee to cover much of the cost in addition to not having to give up much talent, this may be an intriguing option for Baltimore.  If Weeks struggles, the 2015 option won’t vest anyway.*

Team Needs: Prospects.  It doesn’t look like they will be contending in 2014, and their farm system is pretty weak.  There is a possible match here if Baltimore wants to take a chance on Weeks.

*Weeks ended the 2013 season on the DL and had surgery on his left hamstring.  His timetable is 4-6 months, so depending on how his rehab is going, Weeks may not be a viable trade candidate.

Oakland Athletics

Potential Targets: Alberto Callaspo, Jemile Weeks, Eric Sogard, Jed Lowrie

There are a lot of options to target from the A’s, except there aren’t.  Jed Lowrie will be difficult to acquire, especially if the A’s can’t find a shortstop to move him to second base (a better position for him defensively).  Sogard is an above average fielder but can’t hit, Callaspo is an average hitter, but can’t field (at second base anyway), and Weeks is pretty much an unknown.

Callaspo and Weeks are probably the best candidates to target, but each should make Orioles GM Dan Duquette a little uneasy based on what they would likely cost.  With Callaspo, any value he provides on offense (again average to slightly below average), would be given back on defense, as he has a career UZR/150 of -8.4 in over 2000 innings at second base.  He is a versatile defender though (in the sense that he can play many positions without completely embarrassing himself), and is actually an above average defender at the hot corner.  Weeks is a former top prospect that hasn’t really produced anything at the major league level.  Besides what seems like a “luck driven” debut in 2011, Weeks hasn’t hit and has played below average defense as well.  Still, if the price is low for the former top prospect, the Orioles may want to look into acquiring him, just not with the idea that he’d be their starting second baseman in 2014.

Team Needs: Oakland appears to be primarily looking at upgrading their starting pitching and shortstop positions.  I don’t think there is a fit here that would help both teams, as I probably wouldn’t give up a significant player/prospect for either Callaspo or Weeks, which is something Oakland will probably ask for.

Seattle Mariners

Potential Targets: Dustin Ackley, Nick Franklin, Brad Miller

Franklin and Miller won’t be going anywhere, as the Mariners are in the process of quasi-rebuilding and they’re both under team control for the next 6 seasons.  Ackley may not be going anywhere either, as the team is now trying him out in centerfield (one of the positions he played in college), although he may become expendable if Seattle signs Jacoby Ellsbury as it has been rumored.  Seattle sent Ackley to the minors in 2013 and may be giving up on Ackley after 2 straight years of lackluster hitting, which is the ONE thing that basically every scout was sure he would be able to do.  What’s worse is that no one seems to know exactly why Ackley isn’t hitting, and some have even suggested that the issue is mental.  What we do know is that Ackley has turned himself into an above average defender at second base (7.3 UZR/150 in over 2,400 innings) to go along with his above average baserunning skills.  If Ackley is available at a discounted or even a reasonable cost, I’d be extremely tempted to take a chance on him.

Team Needs: Seattle is looking for power this offseason, and although they prefer it to come from the outfield, they’ll take it anywhere.  They’re also looking for a frontline starter (who isn’t).  There doesn’t appear to be too much of a fit here either, but acquiring Ackley may not require much of a return.

St. Louis Cardinals

Not anymore.  With the trade of David Freese to the Angels, the Cardinals will likely move Matt Carpenter to third base and have Kolten Wong man the keystone.

Texas Rangers

Not anymore.  Although, at the time this trade went through, I found myself wondering how the deal would have looked if the Rangers would have traded Kinsler to the Orioles for Chris Davis (ie, who else would have been coming to the Orioles besides Kinsler).

Washington Nationals

Potential Targets: Danny Espinosa, Anthony Rendon

Forget about trading for Rendon, he wouldn’t be worth what the Nationals would ask for him.  They should be willing to discuss Espinosa though, and he probably wouldn’t be expensive.  He is very risky, since he’s coming off a terrible year where he needed surgery for a fractured wrist.  For a player whose best attribute at the plate is his power (actually it’s really his only offensive attribute), that’s not good news.  Espinosa is a plus defender (he can also provide good defense at shortstop) and isn’t eligible for arbitration yet, so it’s not all bad news.

Team Needs: Not much.  They are looking for left handed bullpen help, so with the excess left handers currently on the Orioles 40 man roster, the two teams could easily get something done.  However, Espinosa is so risky right now that there’s a decent chance he provides less production than Baltimore’s in-house options.

Conclusion

So after all that, realistic options include (in approximate order of lowest risk/highest cost to highest risk/lowest cost) Aaron Hill, Howie Kendrick, Dustin Ackley, Rickie Weeks, Danny Espinosa.  As you can see, the list drops off dramatically after Kendrick.  Whether the Orioles should make a trade for any of these players obviously depends on what they would need to give up in talent, in addition to the added salary commitments of the player acquired.  However, in what seems to be an increasingly expensive free agent market, any money owed to Hill and Kendrick as a result of a trade may end up looking like a steal.