Where is Dan Duquette? or Is this Brady, Year One?

Who is in Charge?
It is blurry.

There is an idea that takes all sorts of forms: Dan Duquette is not really the head of the Baltimore Orioles operations.  The arguments vary.  One is the well-tread idea that Duquette is playing out the string that Andy MacPhail spun.  The other that we have yet to really explore here is that, what one rival executive once told me, "the two-headed monster in Baltimore" is going through a process where one head is atrophying.  What was once an equal partnership has gradually faded into something quite uneven with Buck Showalter and, perhaps, Brady Anderson taking over the organization.

In years past, much of the credit for overriding Duquette was placed at the hands of Peter Angelos.  As you may remember, when Chris Davis' last team control season winded down in September, Angelos made a rare public comment about how important it was to re-sign Davis.  As the off season dragged on and Davis was deep into negotiations with the Tigers, supposedly Angelos gave Duquette some wiggle room.  If they failed in signing Davis, the money could be allotted to Justin Upton.  However, baseball folks in Detroit convinced their owner to let go of Davis and sign Upton.  Davis then quickly signed a much deferred and option-less deal in Baltimore.

Much more publicized was Brady Anderson's involvement in re-signing two other major allotments over what seemed to be against Duquette's preference.  Anderson was key in the negotiations between the club and Darren O'Day, stealing him at the last moment from the Washington Nationals.  Fast forward, and Anderson was key in finally convincing Mark Trumbo to return to the club.  The Trumbo deal was rumored to have been connected to Buck Showalter's desire to beef up their designated hitter position, a role in which Trumbo has largely failed in his entire career, than to leave that to Trey Mancini who is an ill fit in left field.

That leaves us with this season where every acquisition has been more closely linked to Buck or Brady than Duquette.  Andrew Cashner, a long-time Buck Showalter favorite, was someone who Brady Anderson was in direct contact with since November.  The same is true with Chris Tillman.  Finally, the Colby Rasmus announcement appeared to be devoid of Duquette with Rasmus extolling the virtues of Buck Showalter.

As always, it is hard to tell where the Orioles leadership begins or ends.  Nothing concrete, but rumors did suggest that the Manny Machado trade discussions may have not been conducted by Duquette either.  One gets the creeping and nonsensical idea that Duquette is basically left out of the decision making that has largely taken place this off season.  It may well be that that the Machado rumor is false and that these minor deals are considered minor by the front office, so Duquette lets his competing forces in the front office and clubhouse have those responsibilities while he tries to fill a major ticket item or two.

However, players are getting signed.  Big ticket items are no longer plentiful.  Rotation slots are all locked up except for one.  If last year was a sustainable budget, the Orioles have 30-35 MM left to spend.  Maybe Duquette is targetting Lance Lynn and Mike Moustakas, but they are doing everything they can to make the press report that the club is not interested in those segments of the market.

So, what is left?  I do not know.

The Orioles Aren't Rebuilding, But They're Not Reloading Either

It's a normal response to frequently ask what the Orioles are doing. They don't operate like other teams, and they don't often do what you want them to. Sometimes that's good, and it has led to wonderfully unexpected things in the Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette era. Hopefully you didn't overlook the return to relevancy.

Regardless, this offseason has been a disaster for the Orioles. The O's weren't open to trading franchise player and soon-to-be-free-agent Manny Machado, but then soon after the Yankees acquired Giancarlo Stanton, that changed. The O's entertained offers, but they never received one that was enticing enough to pull the trigger. They were also at least willing to discuss a trade for Zach Britton. In late December, Britton ruptured his right Achilles' tendon and will miss a chunk of the season.

There's a lot more, of course. Important players are entering the final year of their deals. Contract extensions are not being discussed. Showalter and Duquette are also working on expiring deals. There is almost no part of this team's future that is set in stone other than knowing it's going to be frustrating.

Did you want the Orioles to sell early and get a head start on rebuilding? Too bad. And, well, if you wanted them to go all in -- or, to use Duquette's own word, "reload" -- that ship seems to have sailed. The very reasonable goal heading into the offseason was to inject some life into the starting rotation and add a competent left-handed outfielder to help balance out the lineup. The Orioles have kinda/sorta added to the rotation while also hoping fans will talk themselves into Colby Rasmus or Alex Presley (added on minor league deals).

The Orioles could have done almost anything to their starting rotation and it would have been viewed as a modest upgrade. Still, instead of tackling the deficiencies head-on and at least meeting last year's payroll, the O's have opted to only move the needle in minor and relatively inexpensive ways.

So far, the Orioles have signed two noteworthy starting pitchers. The first, Andrew Cashner, is fine. He's a No. 4 or (preferably) No. 5 starter, and he signed a two-year deal with a club option. The hope is he's not the next Yovani Gallardo. With the second signing, Chris Tillman, the hope is that he's healthy and doesn't pitch the way that Chris Tillman pitched just last season. The O's signed Tillman to a major league deal, for $3 million guaranteed and a bunch of incentives, while a couple other teams were interested in inking him to a minor league deal. Again, while not an amazing option, he's fine. With so many unknowns also in the fold, Tillman has had past success in a tough division.

Added to a very good rotation, Cashner and Tillman could round it out as long as they aren't being counted on to perform better than adequately. But Cashner and Tillman aren't joining a great or even above-average rotation. That's not a knock on Kevin Gausman and Dylan Bundy; it's just the way it is. Those two guys need more help, and the kind of help they need is more than Cashner and Tillman.

One hope all along is that the O's are just waiting in the weeds to sneak in and sign Alex Cobb or Lance Lynn. (There's no way they sign Jake Arrieta.) But, well, Roch Kubatko doused those hot stove dreams on Tuesday morning:

The Orioles checked on Jake Arrieta, Lance Lynn and Alex Cobb, determined that there wasn’t a financial match and moved on from the trio.

That's pretty much been the report all along, unless the prices for those two drop significantly and they accept a short-term deal. Without them, the O's are still surely going to bring in another starting pitcher. The need (more want) for a lefty starter won't go away. And they could always bring in someone like... Scott Feldman, apparently.

The O's plans under Duquette always involve waiting, but what does waiting around do now if the O's don't intend to use any of their assumed payroll room? And yes, it's assumed. Right now, the O's are around $130 million spent, and in 2017 they spent about $165 million on their 25-man roster. What a truly bizarre time this would be to shrink payroll. There's no guarantee that even adding Cobb or Lynn would make the O's playoff contenders, but at the bare minimum the O's need more help to have any chance to flourish this season. That help also includes the ever-present need for actual MLB-quality outfielders who can do things like field and run, and yet two years and $7.5 million for Jarrod Dyson is apparently too risky? Yikes. There is no move that is completely without risk. The Orioles know this, but maybe they want you to think otherwise.

The O's might not be bad in 2018, but they surely don't seem primed to contend for a playoff spot. There are things they could do or could have done that would move them closer to contention while also keeping an eye on not sacrificing the future. But they aren't doing them. That isn't the Orioles' style. They'll only do the things they're comfortable with, and it'll make Showalter and Duquette look even more like miracle workers years down the road.

The Orioles Shouldn't Tear Down - An Alternative View

Almost six weeks ago, Matt Kremnitzer wrote a piece entitled How Can the Orioles Win You Over? His thesis was that many fans aren't very happy with the Baltimore Orioles organization, primarily because the fans don't know or understand what the Orioles are planning to do in 2018. The offseason had been frustrating, so what can the Orioles do to change our outlook?

How do I feel about the Orioles? As I've written on this site, the Orioles are not the team I root for. I grew up in Chicago and have been a Cubs fan for close to fifty years. I do have a history with the Orioles. I'm a 1983 Georgetown graduate (Hoya Saxa!) and earned my Master's degree (1986) from College Park when the Orioles were DC's team. I've been living in the Hampton Roads, VA area, for 25 years; the Orioles and Nationals have shared local press and cable TV coverage. And, for the past 11 years, I have datacasted games for the Orioles AAA affiliate, the Norfolk Tides. Over the years, I've seen six games in Memorial Stadium and eleven in Oriole Park at Camden Yards.

I'll provide a brief summary of datacasting for those who may not know exactly what that is. Most of you probably know about GameDay, the program that provides on-line, near-real-time pitch-by-pitch updates of all major league games. GameDay is also available for all AAA and at least some AA minor league games as well. I sit in the press box in front of a computer and, using a special program, enter each pitch into a central server from which GameDay app users receive their updates. When a ball is put into play, I enter those results as well. Perhaps I'll write an article covering everything I do later this season; you might find what happens at a minor-league game interesting.

One of the side effects of my datacasting is that I have become less emotionally involved with my teams. I've become somewhat of a baseball professional (I do get paid for datacasting), although I do get to - have to - watch and pay attention to the games as games. But I can't allow myself to get emotionally involved. I have to see each game, each inning, each batter, each pitch as an independent event, not a part of a season with a pennant race - or I'll quickly find myself missing pitches, forgetting to advance base runners, and otherwise not performing my function well. I can be thrilled by David Washington hitting a game-tying home run, but I have to get right back to business with the next pitch.

And that feeling has crept into my fandom. I don't watch the Orioles or even the Cubs the same way I did before. On the occasions when I do get to watch or listen to the Orioles play, I want them to win - but I don't have a strong interest in whether or not they've won games I haven't watched or listen to. The game is over; the O's have won or lost; I'll be watching another game tomorrow, or next week, or in a couple of weeks, whenever.

So I'm happy that the Orioles haven't begun a total tear-down. I'm happy that they haven't traded Manny Machado and Jonathan Schoop and Adam Jones and Kevin Gausman. Because the Orioles are more likely to play better with those players than without them. Because I'll be more entertained watching the Orioles if those players are still around.

You may say, "Joe, you're a Cubs fan. Surely it was better for the Cubs, better for you as a Cubs fan, that the Cubs were terrible for three seasons and built the team that won the World Series." But, as I look back on it, I'm not sure that it was. Winning the World Series was great. But, at least for me, of all the moments of the 2016 season and post-season, the only one that wouldn't have been as good if it had occurred in a 2013 regular-season game was Game 6 of the NLCS, in which the Cubs won the pennant. And I'm sure there were many Cubs fans who suffered through years of games in which the team wasn't trying their hardest to win and never got to see the finished product.

You don't have to agree with me; in fact, I'm sure almost all of you won't. In fact, I'll even concede that the Orioles are more likely to win a championship eventually if they do trade away their best players and don't worry about wins and losses for a couple of seasons. I'm pointing out the other side.

If you do choose to comment on this article, I ask that you do not tell me that my way of looking at baseball is wrong, that the World Series is all that matters. It may not be your way of looking at baseball, but it's mine - and it's right for me.

Chris Tillman is Back and I Feel Fine

The Orioles re-signed Chris Tillman on Monday to a one year contract, guaranteeing him $3 million while offering incentives that could bring the total commitment to $10 million for 2018. This was a widely expected move, given the apparent slowness of Tillman's market and the fact that the Orioles are the only team he has pitched for in the big leagues. Tillman has pitched over 1100 innings for the Orioles since 2011, winning 73 games and acting as the de facto ace of the staff, and given the holes in the rotation, a one year deal for not much money always seemed like an obvious one.

The problem, of course, is that Tillman has struggled for the better part of three seasons. Excluding his excellent first half in 2016, in which he put a 3.41 ERA and struck out nearly 8 batters per 9, Tillman has been mediocre or worse since 2015 began. In fact, in total from 2015 to 2017, he has pitched to a 5.12 ERA, a 4.89 FIP, a 1.454 WHIP, 6.6 K/9, and 3.7 BB/9.

That's...not great. In fact, not great would be an improvement over whatever this is. This is bad. Really, really bad. Since 2015 began, Tillman has the 7th worst ERA , the 9th worst FIP, and the 13th worst WHIP among all qualified starters in baseball. He is also in the bottom 25 starters in fWAR, putting up just 3.2 wins in that time period.

It's easy to write off Tillman's mind-boggling 2017 as injury-related or simply an extreme outlier, but  his decline was not as drastic or dramatic as maybe it seems. One of Tillman's defining traits during the years he was good, or at least solid, was an ability to get of jams. In 2013, 2014, and 2016, he was well above average in strand rate, and not coincidentally had three of his best seasons. Last year, he allowed over a third of his baserunners to score, which, I'm here to tell you, is incredibly bad. 

Maybe this was a fluke, but his stuff may also be in significant decline. In 2015, he threw his fastball 65% of the time. In 2017, it was down to just over 50%. He gave up by far the most hard contact in his career, had his worst strikeout rate, walked an insane 4.94 hitters per 9 innings, and generated the fewest swings at pitches outside of the strike zone in his career. He also got crushed in the strike zone, with hitters making contact with over 90% of pitches in the zone (side note, Andrew Cashner gave up contact on 92% of all swings on pitches in the zone, so that should work out just fine).

But, take a look at this.

Tillman's strikeout, walk, and home run rate were all generally trending in the wrong direction even prior to his disastrous 2017. What immediately seems possible is that Tillman was always a borderline pitcher who leaned on his defense and slightly above average stuff to generate contact and get outs. Once the defense and stuff declined, however, yikes. It is certainly tempting to blame 2017 on the shoulder injury that limited him to under 100 innings pitched, but these numbers indicate that the injury (unless it's been with him for years) is not necessarily the only factor driving the decline. 

All that said, we're talking about $3 million. I think it's unlikely that Tillman's skill erosion is so extreme that he's now the worst pitcher in baseball at age 29, and more likely that 2017 was simply an extremely terrible and unlucky season. If he even "bounces back" to his 2015 numbers, he'll earn that guaranteed money. With Tillman is almost certainly penciled in as the number 4 starter, though, the Orioles are taking a fairly big risk that 2017 was an aberration and not simply the culmination of a longer-term trend. If they somehow end up signing one of the better free agent pitchers left on the board, this move will probably look better overall than it does now. Even if that doesn't happen, though, there's a modicum of upside here, and I'd certainly like to believe Tillman is a better option than, say, Mike Wright. On February 19, with a rotation spot still open, that's about as good as you can hope for.

DJ Stewart is Hyun Soo Kim

After the 2015 season, Hyun Soo Kim let it be known that he was interested in applying his skills to the Major League game.  Many in Korea predicted automatic success.  Kim was known as one of the best pure hitters that Korea had ever produced.  Athletic though with a bit of a bad body, he could have been called the KBO version of Tony Gwynn.  Combine that with the 2015 success of Jung Ho Kang, widely considered a lesser talent, and there was quite a bit of anticipation.

The scouting outlook that emerged from folks focused on the KBO was a bit rosy.  His speed was noted at average, but in Spring Training and later measured by Sprint Speed in the Majors that kind of fell apart.  Kim was the second slowest left fielder in baseball, just ahead of Melky Cabrera.  He could make decent routes.  He knew his limitations, but that awareness can only blunt the lack of range so much.  The changes in his swing to showcase more of his power in the KBO had to revert and go back to how he originally found success.  That took months to figure out.  All in all, it was a mixed bag.  Kim had to rely on his contact skills with nothing else to keep him afloat.  It worked mid-year 2016, but really at no other time.  He now finds himself back in the KBO and likely to dominate there.

Watching D.J. Stewart in 2016 and 2017, he actually looked a bit like Hyun Soo Kim to me.  Athletic, but bad bodied.  Moderate raw power than can translate into games with the right mechanics and approach.  Below average overall fielding.  The two differences that came forward though was that Stewart had a bit more raw power and he is far more able to apply himself on the basepaths.  Stewart understood and felt comfortable in how fast the game was played while Kim had difficulties (at a higher level).

To compare them, I brushed off my KANG model to project what D.J. Stewart would do (using long-term PECOTA projections) against what Hyun Soo Kim actually did at the same age:

		AVG	OBP	SLG
Kim	2012	.291	.358	.382
	2013	.302	.382	.470
	2014	.322	.396	.488
	2015	.326	.438	.541
Stewart	2018	.318	.450	.597
	2019	.326	.463	.618
	2020	.314	.450	.600
	2021	.327	.464	.624

PECOTA through KANG sees particularly more power coming from Stewart.  Stewart also appears to be able to draws more walks as well, but it should be noted that Kim made a point to adapt his game his final year, so you could potentially imagine Kim's power and discipline being underutilized in previous seasons.  Still, Stewart shows more walks and power.

I then wondered how it would look like with Stewart's projections before his 2017 renaissance.

		AVG	OBP	SLG
Kim	2012	.291	.358	.382
	2013	.302	.382	.470
	2014	.322	.396	.488
	2015	.326	.438	.541
Stewart -1	2018	.267	.380	.520
	2019	.263	.378	.521
	2020	.260	.376	.516
	2021	.260	.372	.514

They still do not quite match up.  Stewart still shows more power and similar discipline.  However, his hitting ability plummets.  If you squint though, you see something.

The hope for Stewart is that his hit tool appears to be more well-rounded than Kim's.  Yes, the skill set is marginal, but broader.  Also working for Stewart, by likely coming to the Majors at a younger age, his defense should be more capable.  This will make him less of a minus value overall to the club and enable him to have more opportunities to let his ability shine through.  Kim was not afforded plentiful chances when his offensive play would go into funks because of his defensive limitations.

Player Opt-Out Clauses Could (Have) Really Help(ed) the Orioles This Offseason

The Orioles finally did something last week by signing Andrew Cashner to a 2-year, $16 million deal. According to MLB Trade Rumors, the deal also includes a $10 million vesting option if Cashner throws 340 innings over those two yers. That option turns into a player option if he pitches at least 360 innings. As the article points out, Cashner has only topped 170 innings twice over his career, and has only exceeded 180 innings once, so it’s unlikely that those options will come into play.

This article isn’t going to focus on the Cashner deal though (we covered that here and here). Don’t get me wrong, I think the deal is fine, and it certainly fills a need, though the Orioles have more roster holes to fill, even as players have reported to spring training. The semi-inclusion of the player option in Cashner’s contract actually got me thinking about player opt out clauses in contracts over the past few seasons. The Orioles front office has been pretty adamant about not wanting to include opt-out clauses in their contracts, so I definitely don’t expect them to act on this, but at this point in the off-season, handing out a few multi-year deals with opt-outs after year 1 would be a great strategy to round out the roster. In my opinion, it would be beneficial for both the team and certain players that could help them in 2018.

From the team’s perspective, 2018 is arguably the last season where the Oriole’s competitive window is open to contend. I say arguably, because it really does depend on who (if anyone) they sign to round out the starting rotation. We’ve talked about which players will most likely not be on the major league roster next season so many times that there is no need to lay it out again. And without much immediate help coming from the farm system, the post 2018 landscape doesn’t look too promising at the moment.

With that in mind, the team probably would not like to be committed to many long-term (and likely expensive) contracts during what will almost certainly be very lean years. This makes perfect sense. Not only do they not want to be spending a lot of money during multiple losing seasons, but it’s essential during those bad years to “play the kids” so the front office can get a good idea of which players should stick around for the team’s next competitive window. During the rebuilding process, available roster spot(s) can almost be more important than the veteran salary commitment. Offering players a long-term contract with an opt-out after the first year provides a path for an increased chance at 2018 contention, while also providing an opportunity for that contract to not exceed one year.

Obviously the 2017-18 offseason has been unique in that there have been a lot of players that are still not signed. Regardless of the reason, at the core, those players remain unsigned because they are not getting offers they feel are in line what they’re worth. So from the player’s perspective, a multi-year deal with an opt-out after year 1 seems like a good option, This provides them the opportunity to test the market again next year, while also providing a backup plan should they underperform in 2018. It may even be beneficial to both parties to front load the deals in the first year. In that case, the players maximize their earnings in 2018 (and make the Orioles more competitive), while incentivizing those players to opt out given that the salaries in years 2 through x would likely be lower than fair market value.

I would imagine that a contract structure such as this may be intriguing options to some of the players still left on the market who could help the Orioles, such as a Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb. The Orioles could even take this option to someone like Mike Moustakas. With Manny Machado’s move to SS confirmed, signing Moustakas would be an upgrade at 3B. This would move Tim Beckham to a super utility role, one which he is much more likely in which to succeed (I believe Matt Perez suggested signing Moustakas in his 2018 blueprint).

Of course there are downsides to handing out contracts with opt-out clauses after year one. The first is that if everyone has a down year, they all decide to stick around after 2018. This puts the Orioles on the hook for another couple of years in which they likely won’t be competitive. However, if they can be frontloaded, those out years wouldn’t hurt as badly. Additionally, players with upcoming opt-outs will have their trade values diminished in 2018, due to the acquiring team not knowing exactly how many years of that player they’re getting.

Giving out contracts with player opt-outs after year 1 is definitely not without risk, but this offseason, the Orioles and some players were/are both in unique situations where this contract structure may be mutually beneficial. If the Orioles are truly serious about contending in 2018 (and other than publicly saying so, I’m not sure that they are), then this idea should not be off the table, despite the front office’s disdain for doing such things. Maybe if someone mentioned to the front office that player opt-outs are essentially the same as player options they wouldn’t be opposed to it. I mean, they did just kind of give one of those to Andrew Cashner.

Is Andrew Cashner The O's New Yovani Gallardo?

Before Andrew Casher signed with the Orioles, he already reminded some people of Yovani Gallardo. It probably had something to do with this:

Gallardo in 2015: 184.1 IP, 3.42 ERA, 4.00 FIP, 5.91 K/9, 3.32 BB/9
Cashner in 2017: 166.2 IP, 3.40 ERA, 4.61 FIP, 4.64 K/9, 3.46 BB/9

That was Gallardo's season with the Rangers before signing with the O's and Cashner's pitching line from last season. Cashner's numbers aren't as good (just looking at ERA only can be misleading), but they're a little closer if you instead look at each pitcher's last three seasons before joining the O's:

Cashner previous 3 years: 483.1 IP, 4.26 ERA, 4.38 FIP, 6.8 K/9, 3.5 BB/9
Gallardo previous 3 years: 557.1 IP, 3.70 ERA, 3.95 FIP, 6.6 K/9, 3.0 BB/9

Simply scouting the stat line performance alone, Gallardo is still the winner. He threw more innings and has slightly better peripheral stats. You can see why the O's wanted Gallardo. And considering the state of the team's starting rotation, you can see why the O's want Cashner.

That doesn't mean the signing is a sure-fire win. It's not because there are, of course, red flags. Bringing in a pitcher with a K/9 under 5 is not reassuring. Cashner has never thrown more than 185 innings in any season. And in his only season in the American League, he posted a 3.40 ERA that was rather fluky and that he's unlikely to replicate. As Jon discussed on Thursday, Cashner as a No. 5 starter sounds a whole lot better than a No. 3.

Still, while it's not hard to paint a picture of Cashner going off the rails in Baltimore like Gallardo did, the O's at least did not pay Gallardo prices. Comparing the career workloads for both when they signed with the O's, Gallardo had thrown about 580 more innings than Cashner. Gallardo deserves credit for being a workhouse, but that larger workload was a concern.

Gallardo's original deal with the O's for three years and $35 million dropped down to two years and $22 million (with a $13 million club option) after the O's oft-criticized (usually unfairly) physical process revealed a shoulder issue of some kind. (Gallardo hasn't been the same pitcher since.) The bargain improved the deal somewhat, but there were still injury worries. On top of that, the O's had to sacrifice the No. 14 overall pick in the 2016 MLB Draft because Gallardo had been offered the qualifying offer by the Rangers. The O's also tried to add Dexter Fowler in order to sign two QO free agents, like they had done with Ubaldo Jimenez and Nelson Cruz in 2014 to double-up and decrease the loss of the draft picks, but that plan fell through.

Gallardo had the better track record when he signed with the Orioles, but he signed a larger contract and had an apparent shoulder concern to worry about. Cashner, meanwhile, hasn't performed as well, but he hasn't thrown as many innings (both a good and bad thing) and signed for less money two years later. While some of that can be credited to the painfully slow offseason and perhaps some kind of referendum on the pursuit of free agents, waiting around and hoping for smaller deals is far from new to the Orioles under Dan Duquette.

It would not be surprising at all to see Cashner post an ERA over 5 in 2018. In his first year in Baltimore, Gallardo put up a 5.42 ERA in just 118 innings. Considering that performance and the options around him not named Bundy and Gausman, Cashner doesn't have to pitch that well to be useful. Still, hopefully the O's have another signing to make, preferably bringing in a pitcher who's better than Cashner.

Statcast Projected Isolated Power Performance in Predicting 2017 Performance

Last February, I took Statcast batted ball data to project Isolated Power performance.  The idea was that big in game power comes from hitting the ball hard and barreling up on it.  I lacked launch angle data, but considered batted ball types.  However, incorporating ground balls, fly balls, and line drives did not improve the model.  Regardless, a model knowing only average distance and barrel per at bat, you could fairly accurately predict Isolated Power performance.  Therefore, if a player underperformed according to the projection then you might expect a bounce back the following season.  However, I wondered whether there were reasons why a player would typically under or over perform the projection.

Looking at the 2016 season, it found the following players whose actual 2016 ISO was the most underperforming in comparison to the model projections:

	2016 ISO	2016 xISO	Diff
Miguel Cabrera	.247	.295	-.048
Josh Harrison	.105	.147	-.042
Brandon Belt	.199	.239	-.040
Howie Kendrick	.111	.149	-.038
Kendrys Morales	.204	.242	-.038
Buster Posey	.147	.184	-.037
Albert Pujols	.189	.226	-.037
Alex Gordon	.160	.197	-.037
Adeiny Hechavarria	.075	.109	-.034
Yonder Alonso	.114	.147	-.033
Troy Tulowitzki	.189	.222	-.033
Nick Markakis	.129	.161	-.032
Mitch Moreland	.189	.220	-.031
Yadier Molina	.120	.151	-.031
Adam Jones	.171	.201	-.030

Looking at this data, Kendrys Morales jumped out to me.  He was quickly scooped up by the Blue Jays in what seemed like a fairly curious move.  He had been a decent hitter for the Royals, but was not doing anything incredibly productive.  His lack of position also hurt roster flexibility.  A three year deal for a player like that seems a bit like folly.  At the time of looking at this model, I thought well maybe the Blue Jays think his ISO underperformed because of Kaufman Stadium.

Mid-season, you heard similar things about Adeiny Hechavarria when the Rays traded for him.  He was hitting the ball hard and barreling it, so perhaps the Rays thought they could better channel that into more productive hitting.  Anyway, how did these guys do in 2017 compared to 2016?

	'16 ISO	'17 ISO	Diff
Albert Pujols	.189	.145	-.044
Yadier Molina	.120	.166	.046
Miguel Cabrera	.247	.149	-.098
Kendrys Morales	.204	.196	-.008
Howie Kendrick	.111	.161	.050
Alex Gordon	.160	.107	-.053
Nick Markakis	.129	.110	-.019
Troy Tulowitzki	.189	.129	-.060
Mitch Moreland	.189	.197	.008
Adam Jones	.171	.181	.010
Buster Posey	.147	.142	-.005
Yonder Alonso	.114	.235	.121
Josh Harrison	.105	.160	.055
Brandon Belt	.199	.228	.029
Adeiny Hechavarria	.075	.145	.070
		32+	-.020
		31-	.047
		All	.010

One thing you will notice is that I reordered them by age.  Moreland and up are 2017 seasons played as 32 or older.  Jones and down are age 31 and younger.  What this paltry little sample seems to suggest is that underperforming your expected ISO is a major red flag for players in the mid to late 30s.  It is indicative of something else happening that is eroding performance.  However, for younger players, who are in less of a decline phase age-wise, show significant rebounding in performance.

What does this mean going forward?  Below are the players who most underperformed their expected Isolated Power performance:

Player	2017 ISO	2017 xISO	Diff
Miguel Cabrera	.149	.230	-.081
Mitch Moreland	.197	.248	-.051
Alex Gordon	.107	.157	-.051
Kyle Seager	.201	.248	-.047
Jose Peraza	.066	.113	-.047
Justin Turner	.208	.252	-.044
Matt Carpenter	.209	.250	-.041
Nicholas Castellanos	.218	.258	-.040
Jed Lowrie	.171	.209	-.038
Alcides Escobar	.107	.144	-.037
Albert Pujols	.145	.180	-.035
Chris Davis	.208	.241	-.033
Shin-Soo Choo	.162	.194	-.032
Dansby Swanson	.092	.124	-.032
Ian Kinsler	.176	.207	-.031
Jose Bautista	.164	.195	-.031
Hanley Ramirez	.188	.218	-.030
Nick Markakis	.110	.140	-.030
Yadier Molina	.166	.196	-.030
Joe Mauer	.112	.142	-.030

What we see above in this list is a lot of older players who failed to live up to the projections.  If the 2017 data is indicative of anything, this does not bode well for most of these guys.  Younger players on the list are a mix in availability like Nick Castellanos are supposedly available in trade or like Dansby Swanson are not available.  It is these players who we might expect as they age they refine their skills and are able to turn their barreling and distance into something more useful.

Chris Davis, for the Orioles interested readership, will be entering his age 32 season.  Above, that barely places him into the upper range that saw a major erosion in performance.  Molina and Kendrick were really the only two players who bounced back.  The others treaded water or further collapsed.  For those hoping for Davis to reclaim his past greatness, it is a weak indicator that perhaps that simply is unlikely to be in the cards this upcoming season.

Andrew Cashner is Pretty Pretty Pretty OK

At the Depot, we have a model called BORAS.  BORAS is a model that takes away all our experty opinions and troublesome feelings in order to gauge past performance and age, converting that into a contract.  When BORAS considered Andrew Cashner, it determined he was worth a 3/34 deal.  Peripherals indicate a strong role player in 2015 and 2017 as well as quite good performance on the field in 2017.  His velocity is a concern, it has been dropping.  His strikeout rate collapsed, which is troubling.  His avoidance of home runs last year appeared magical.  In other words, he is a pitcher who carries some red flags despite a passable track record.

What the Orioles signed Cashner to was a 2/16 deal with a 1/10 option which requires 360 IP in 2018 and 2019 total to activate.  If he hits all of his incentives then the deal will push up to 41 MM.  For all intent and purposes, this deal looks good for the Orioles if we assume BORAS is right.  BORAS has performed fairly well so far this year as it does every year, but this peculiar logjam of late might mean we are about to see a lot of contract coming in that are low in years and low in guaranteed pay.

What I mean to say is this, the Orioles signing Andrew Cashner is either terrible or good.  If the club sees itself as a playoff contender and Cashner as its third rotation piece, then we are in terrible territory.  If it sees him as the fifth option in a rotation, then it is pretty good.  Fourth, is, I guess, OK depending on who winds up being that third slot pitcher.

This off season, I have told folks to keep their powder dry and wait until you see the whites of their eyes.  With the Cashner signing, I think we are nearing the point to be concerned.  We are not there yet, we are closer.  We need to wait a little bit longer.  This could still work out.  Or not.  It all depends on what the actual role of Cashner is.  He can be a good pitcher and is perhaps a better candidate to be a good pitcher than someone like Miguel Gonzalez who went for slightly less.

There is still some hope if the next guy through the door is Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb.  If it is Tillman, then, you know, yeah.

Book Review: Keith Law's Smart Baseball

We all can -- and should -- strive to learn something new. That's the main idea behind Keith Law's book, Smart Baseball.

The extended title of the book is Smart Baseball: The Story Behind the Old Stats That Are Ruining the Game, the New Ones That Are Running It, and the Right Way to Think About Baseball, and, well, that tells you plenty. Law undertakes the arduous task of explaining which traditional baseball statistics are misleading or not that informative (part one), and which numbers fans should be looking at instead (part two). Some chapters focus on topics like why batting average is flawed, why pitcher wins can be deceiving, and the issues with fielding percentage. Then, to close things out in part three, Law puts newer stats to use while painting a picture of what's next (including MLB Statcast and how scouting is changing).

If you've ever made your way to, say, the comments section under a MASNsports.com article, or maybe engaged in a debate about baseball on Twitter or *gasp* Facebook, then you know the number of fans who still rely on things like batting average, runs batted in, pitcher wins, and saves to win arguments about the value of current players. Because of the rise of sites like Baseball-Reference, FanGraphs, and Baseball Prospectus, there aren't quite as many of those fans around, but there are still lots of them. And that's OK, because not everyone has to look at baseball the same way.

But for those fans who want to know more about the game and how to more approximately value what's happening on the field, this book is a tremendous help. For someone looking to simply jump headfirst into baseball analytics, I can't think of many better ways to get started. Even for those who already read lots of analytical writing about baseball, Law's work is still worthwhile and includes new ways to approach much-debated topics.

Law tackles complex subjects and breaks them down bit by bit, slowly adding to each part and showing you why things matter. Why is on-base percentage important? What the heck is WAR, wOBA, or wRC+, and why should you not avoid them? How do analysts even attempt to separate pitching and defense? What makes one fielder better than another, and what's the best way to measure that? Why is the clutch baseball player a myth? For those seeking to learn more about the game they love, Law's book is a quick and informative read.

The last line of the epilogue stuck with me: "Using the best knowledge we have right now while remembering that we may know a lot more in the future is the essence of Smart Baseball." There's always something else to learn, and that's especially true if you can't get enough baseball.

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Smart Baseball
Keith Law
304 pages
William Morrow
Paperback available: March 13, 2018