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Our long, citywide nightmare — also known as The Yovani Gallardo Experience — is over. The owner of
the fourth-highest cFIP in the majors will weigh down Seattle's rotation in 2017, as the Orioles dealt Gallardo to the Mariners yesterday in exchange for Seth Smith. The 34-year-old outfielder will make $7 million in 2017, thereby saving the Birds at least $6 million (Gallardo is due $11 million this year and has a $2 million buyout for next year).
Aside from salary, Smith appears to differ from Gallardo in three key regards:
- He's a hitter;
- he's a lefty; and
- he's a competent major league baseball player.
On that last note, let's elaborate! Smith brings a career triple-slash of .261/.344/.447 to Charm City, which has been good for a .343 wOBA and 112 wRC+. Thanks to that dependable bat and a not-terrible glove (more on that below), Smith's been worth 13.1 fWAR and 11.7 rWAR across 3,711 lifetime plate appearances — he's been just about an average player, which the Orioles will gladly take as they try to contend in 2017.
He has a good eye, and possibly a great one.
The Orioles, as you may have heard, don't walk very much as a team — they've placed in the bottom half of the majors in free pass rate in
the last four seasons. Strikeouts have become a problem as well in recent years: After putting up
the 11th-highest K rate in the majors in 2014, Baltimore's been in the top 10 in
2015 and
2016. Plate discipline, in other words, is something for which the Orioles are wanting.
At the beginning of his career, Smith had some plate discipline. From 2007 to 2013, he swung at 27.8 percent of pitches outside the strike zone (the
214th-highest mark out of 429 qualified hitters), along with 61.6 percent of pitches inside the strike zone (
233rd-highest); simultaneously, he made contact on 78.2 percent of his swings (
134th-lowest). All that resulted in a 10.0 percent walk rate and 19.3 percent strikeout rate across those years — respectable figures, albeit nothing impressive.
But Smith became quite impressive in 2014, when he arrived in San Diego. That campaign, he reduced his O-Swing rate to the
18th-lowest among 146 qualified hitters, at 23.2 percent, while his Z-Swing rate dipped to the
34th-lowest at 59.2 percent. And he accomplished that as he made far more contact, posting the
69th-lowest figure in the majors at 81.1 percent. A more patient approach and better judgment on his swings gave Smith a superb 13.2 percent walk rate and 16.7 percent strikeout rate.
His 0.79 BB/K ratio was on par with David Ortiz, and better than Edwin Encarnacion and Andrew McCutchen, among many others.
Did Smith undergo a legitimate breakout? That was the conclusion drawn by
MLB.com's Corey Brock,
FanGraphs' Matt Klaassen,
The San Diego Union-Tribune's Dennis Lin, and others. These writers attributed Smith's improved plate discipline — which boosted his wRC+ to a career-best 131 — to
the Lasik surgery he'd undergone the previous summer. It certainly seems that being able to see would help a hitter out. Maybe with sterling vision, Smith was finally reaching his potential.
Sadly, that narrative has deflated after two campaigns in humid Seattle. During 2015 and 2016, with his eyes presumably still intact from the surgery, Smith walked in 10.7 percent of his plate appearances, while striking out in 21.1 percent. His O-Swing rate (24.6 percent), Z-Swing rate (58.2 percent), and contact rate (76.4 percent) all began to regress toward his prior career levels. The breakout faded, and Smith returned to normal.
For 2017, what does this mean? The rational expectation is that Smith will maintain his 2015-16 level of play; that's what Steamer foresees, calling for a 10.7 percent walk rate and 21.2 percent strikeout rate. Still, the potential for a resurgence remains in place — plate discipline doesn't necessarily fade with age. If Smith remembers how to judge pitches again, he could again reach the Ortiz level of plate discipline.
He doesn't fare too well against fellow lefties.
Last offseason, after the Pirates non-tendered him, the Orioles reeled in Pedro Alvarez on a one-year deal. Though Alvarez threw right-handed, as virtually all nominal third basemen do, he hit from the left side of the plate. This meant he'd perform poorly when facing left-handed pitching — to such an extent that he'd be virtually unplayable against southpaws. Understanding this, Baltimore deployed Alvarez accordingly: He received only 42 plate appearances versus a left-hander last year, compared to 334 versus right-handers.
Smith, too, hits left-handed (although he also throws left-handed, which thankfully prevents him from manning third base and doing
this). And like Alvarez, he's always come up short against same-handed opponents:
| Handedness |
PA |
BB% |
K% |
ISO |
BABIP |
AVG |
OBP |
SLG |
wRC+ |
| L |
558 |
9.3% |
22.9% |
.109 |
.251 |
.202 |
.282 |
.312 |
60 |
| R |
3153 |
10.9% |
18.7% |
.200 |
.309 |
.272 |
.355 |
.472 |
121 |
Smith's wRC+ against righties
puts him 28th among 101 hitters with at least 3,000 plate appearances; he's tied with Evan Longoria and slightly ahead of Nelson Cruz. Meanwhile, his wRC+ against lefties
ranks 322nd, in a sample of...327 hitters. So he does pretty well for himself when the pitcher throws with his right hand, and pretty terribly otherwise.
The BABIP and ISO troubles don't stem from an altered batted-ball distribution — Smith has an identical ground ball rate against righties and lefties. But he's made hard contact much more often off the former (33.5 percent) than the latter (24.4 percent). As with many platoon-hindered hitters, that's probably due to the location patterns he encounters:
Righties give Smith more pitches to hit, which he obviously capitalizes on. Lefties stay far, far away from him, thus preventing him from doing damage.
As with Alvarez, Smith's platoon split is most likely set in stone at this point — having turned 34 in September, Smith is what he is. With their new outfielder in the fold, the Orioles will likely have no need for Alvarez's services going forward; Smith will presumably team up with Joey Rickard in a corner outfield spot. If both players can maintain their solid production against opposite-handed pitching (Rickard had a 131 wRC+ off southpaws as a rookie), Baltimore will have a reliable platoon supporting its lineup.
He excelled in the first half of 2016, then struggled in the second half.
Like
another former Oriole and current free agent, Smith started 2016 off on the right foot. He sailed to a .298/.423/.544 batting line and 166 wRC+ in April, and although he couldn't match that in the subsequent months, he still entered the All-Star Break with a .277/.366/.450 triple-slash and 127 wRC+ to his name. When he came back, though, things took a turn for the worse: Smith limped his way to a .202/.306/.361 line in the second half, good for a measly 85 wRC+.
Smith's decline in the later months of 2016 wasn't really because of plate discipline — while his strikeout rate rose from 19.4 percent to 21.8 percent, his walk rate also went up from 10.8 to 11.2 percent. He appeared to fall off thanks to his ISO, which sunk from .173 to .156, and his BABIP, which plummeted from .310 to .236. Without his power and average, no amount of plate discipline could save Smith.
Did Smith stand any chance of sustaining his first-half numbers, or was the decline destined to happen? His ground ball rate didn't change much from before the All-Star Break (48.1 percent) to afterward (47.7 percent), nor did he lose a great deal of hard contact (34.6 percent first half, 32.4 percent second half). But he did undergo a massive change in one regard: His popup rate doubled, from 2.8 percent to 5.4 percent after the Midsummer Classic. Infield fly balls almost always turn into outs, so that obviously put a damper on Smith's season.
Smith's second-half struggles were in large part unlucky. It's plausible he puts them behind him and returns to his first-half level of play, thus breaking out in 2017 (although we saw how well that thinking worked out in 2014). On the flipside, the popup problem could remain in place, which would continue to depress Smith's BABIP and ISO. The hard contact and ground ball consistency should help his cause, but if he can't hit his air balls out of the infield, he'll be stuck as a mediocre hitter.
His defense fell off a cliff in 2016.
From 2012 — his first year outside Colorado, which
some evidence suggests may skew defensive metrics — to 2015, Smith compiled 2,794.1 innings in the outfield. In that time, he earned 6 Defensive Runs Saved and 6.2 Ultimate Zone Rating runs, which averaged out to 2.8 DRS/1300 and 2.9 UZR/1300 (about a full year's worth of innings). In other words, he was a modestly above-average corner outfielder, which coupled with his talent at the plate to make him a decent player.
That success didn't carry over into 2016, though. Last season, despite spending only 730.0 innings in the outfield, he cost the Mariners 7 DRS and 7.9 UZR, translating to 12.5 DRS/1300 and 14.1 UZR/1300. On a rate basis, Smith dropped off by more than a win and a half, which despite the small-sample caveats that come with defensive metrics is cause for concern.
How does FanGraphs' Inside Edge data appraise his decline? (As a primer: Inside Edge scouts put each play into one of six buckets, based on how often an average fielder would make it, then evaluate how often the defender in question succeeds on such plays. It's simpler than it sounds, trust me.) Let's look at his results from 2012 through 2015, and from 2016:
| Year(s) |
0% |
1-10% |
10-40% |
40-60% |
60-90% |
90-100% |
| 2012-15 |
0.0% |
5.0% |
16.7% |
25.0% |
92.0% |
99.8% |
| 2016 |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
12.5% |
100.0% |
99.3% |
The plays in the 90-100 percent bucket — referred to as "routine" — make up the majority of all plays a fielder will encounter, so even the smallest change there can portend a larger shift in overall output. This might not be the case for Smith, though, as he failed to make just one of the 150 "routine" plays he faced last year.
Rather, the more difficult plays seem to have caused Smith's problems in 2016. He couldn't field anything in the 1-10 percent bucket ("remote") or the 10-40 percent bucket ("unlikely"), and his clip of 40-60 percent successes ("even") was cut in half. This trend points to an unsettling culprit: Father Time. Smith still knows how to position himself to handle the easy plays, but as he enters his mid-30s he may be losing the speed and instincts necessary for the tougher ones.
This may not be the sole cause. While Smith's generally kept himself healthy,
he dealt with a groin injury earlier in the season, which might have hampered his performance in the outfield. Convalescing from that, with a full offseason to rest and rehab, might allow him to return to the field an above-average defender again. And, of course, this did all happen in a mere 730.0 innings; perhaps the Inside Edge scouts misjudged a few plays and screwed up Smith's numbers. From what we know about
defensive aging curves, though, we shouldn't be too optimistic about Smith's glove going forward.
***
Let's wrap up with some glass-half-full analysis. Smith is a satisfactory outfielder: He can take a walk (and won't strike out too often), he hits righties well, and he might have some upside if he can rediscover his early-2016 magic, which will hopefully compensate for a possible defensive decline. With the $4 million they'll save this year, maybe the O's can bring in a fifth starter to shore up their rotation, or a right-handed outfielder to pair with Hyun Soo Kim. With just one trade, Dan Duquette partially filled a gaping hole on his roster and got rid of an albatross — I guess it was worth the wait.
