26 May 2008

Ready for Prime Time Performance? ... Position Players

The minor leagues are a source of new talent. With the dire states of the Orioles offensive production, it might be useful to evaluate the potential help down at Norfolk. Now, the main thing to remember about Harbor Park is that it is cruel to hitters. I assume much of this is from the shore winds playing havoc with balls hit out to right field and those hugging the line in left. It has always played as a pitcher's park and the pitchers certainly appreciate it as I am sure we will find when we focus on them in a following post.

The Orioles, as mentioned previously, do not have their best hitting catcher in the majors. Matt Wieters is down at Frederick taking his cuts and getting use to the professional game. Probably the best course is just to let him go at his own pace and bring him up next year. That being said, do we have anything at Norfolk.

Chris Heintz.......(61AB, 344/379/426) - MLE: 321/349/397, 102 OPS+
Omir Santos........(87AB, 241/313/287) - MLE: 225/288/267, 76 OPS+
Ben Davis..........(38AB, 211/231/237) - MLE: 197/213/221, 59 OPS+

So, yeah, the answer is probably no. Santos and Davis are having difficulty hitting and have never really shown the ability to do so. Chris Heintz is playing his best ball since his 2002 season as a 27 year old in AA. I feel pretty confidant that his high batting average and his low slugging suggest that he has been benefiting from an unsustainable BABIP (.382). I would not expect him to be an upgrade over anything we have.

We have only gotten major league performance out of Brian Roberts. Millar is slightly rebounding, but he looks to have fallen off a cliff as I thought he was prime for. Mora started out solidly average and has downgraded that to solidly bad. I still think he is capable of horrendously awful. This should be his last year as a starter. Actually, last year should have been. Also mentioned earlier, our shortstop position has been a mess and there is not really any solution, but having a mess at shortstop is not as bad as people seem to think it is on the offensive end of it. So what does Norfolk have to offer:

Oscar Salazar......(192AB, 307/353/490) - MLE: 287/324/456, 107 OPS+
Eider Torres.......(131AB, 305/357/351) - MLE: 285/329/327, 90 OPS+
Brandon Fahey......(70AB, 286/342/343) - MLE: 267/315/319, 87 OPS+
Mike Costanzo......(164AB, 244/317/360) - MLE: 228/292/335, 86 OPS+
Scott Moore........(109AB, 183/270/339) - MLE: 171/249/316, 77 OPS+

Honestly, there isn't much to be excited about here. Torres, Fahey, and Moore have all been up with the big league clud and sent down. Torres is too dependent on hitting singles. That approach is prone to break down. Fahey has the same issue. Both are capable backup middle infielders on a MLB club or, more specifically, a NL club where offensive incompetence is more tolerated. Salazar is also way too dependent on contact, but has power to make up for it somewhat. He probably should be playing a bit in the majors on this club. He would not be good, but he just might be better than Millar. Salazar's inability to walk at the AAA level will probably depress that MLE a bit more as he faces pitchers with better stuff and control. Moore has just looked like a mess, but he hasn't lost the ability to take a walk from time to time and still has power. Costanzo is in the same boat except that some of his hits are falling in. These two guys should be battling for 3B at the MLB level or taking turns between Baltimore and Norfolk. They are just as good as Melvin. Moore has nothing more to learn at AAA. Costanzo could probably use a bit more seasoning, but he seems more in the flow right now. Both of these guys should be on the parent club next year. If the logjam is still there, I expect Moore to make the cut and an option to be used on Costanzo.

The Orioles outfield is actually pretty solid. Markakis is turning in league average LF performance. Scott is about league average LF. Adam Jones is also not too far away from league average and appears to be making adjustments. This is good news for the Orioles who have a cheap and productive group out there. This is not good news for Luis Terrero who is tearing up AAA and may just have learned how to avoid swinging at off speed pitches.

Luis Terrero.......(176AB, 324/396/523) - MLE: 302/364/487, 116 OPS+
Tike Redman........(160AB, 275/343/338) - MLE: 257/316/315, 86 OPS+
Chris Roberson.....(137AB, 248/338/328) - MLE: 232/311/305, 84 OPS+
Adam Stern.........(89AB, 247/289/315) - MLE: 231/266/293, 77 OPS+

Redman and Roberson are fine 4th outfielders on a big league club because of their ability to play center and left (right field in a pinch). Terrero has it a bit more difficult on the defensive end. If he was capable of league average defense in center field, he probably would have been in the majors for the past four years. His mental miscues and a recent loss of a step or two has hurt him. Still, I imagine if Jay Payton wasn't on the major league roster . . . we would have seen Terrero promoted by now. In fact, if we find a home for Payton, it would be Terrero who would be promoted as opposed to Redman, a Trembley favorite. Luis' AAA season has been that good. Again, I think his MLB performance is probably a bit less than the MLE suggests. My reasons for writing that is that Terrero has such a long history of not being able to hit those pitches and his season has been driven by a .397 BABIP. Still, it would be nice to see him spell Jones and Scott from time to time.

Our AAA roster is full of MLB quality backups based on their limited performance at Norfolk in 2008. Eider Torres, Brandon Fahey, Tike Redman, Chris Roberson, and Oscar Salazar are fine backups. None are starting material. Scott Moore and Mike Costanzo are both young and have the potential to be league average third basemen. Luis Terrero also has potential, but his defensive miscues and inability to tell a changeup from a fastball are probably still present. All in all, there really is not anyone who is being mistreated by being kept in the minors.

22 May 2008

Link of the Day

As you have noticed, the Link of the Day feature comes and goes. Today though, I think we have a decent one. As a primer to Stotle's eventual draft write-ups and his 5 round shadow draft . . . I'll send this link out. I linked to some of Alex Eisenberg's stuff before when it appeared on the Hardball Times. I found that he also has a website called Baseball Intellect and he is on Orioles Hangout as NoVaO. It should also be noted that Kiley McDaniel at SaberScouting has mused that he thinks Eisenberg makes sweeping statements on limited video footage. Kiley was a scout for three years or so and is now employed by some unmentioned baseball organization, which lets him travel around and watch a lot of amateur games in the Southeast. I don't know Alex's background. So, take this as you will. I do think Eisenberg's analysis is good and instructional. He also seems to do well backing up him insights with others who have viewed the players in question. Anyway, with all of that out of the way . . .

Eisenberg looks at Brian Matusz today. Everyone and their momma are predicting Matusz being selected by the Orioles with the 4th pick of the 2008 amateur draft on June 5th. It will probably happen since everyone last year was having us take Ross Detwiler with our pick. Oh, wait, that didn't happen. I have little clue as to what will happen and that is why we have Stotle lurking around.

The basic run down on Matusz, which I agree with (if that means anything), is that he is a projectable lefty starter. That probably means that he has about a 50 or 60% chance to playing several years in the majors as a starter (1st round pitchers typically have a 1 in 3 chance of going to the big leagues). His most likely destination is league average or slightly above league average. It seems doubtful he will become a top tier pitcher. Eisenberg thinks that we should go with the best player available and that would be a position player.

That seems to be the growing consensus that Matusz and Aaron Crow are probably in the 6-9 pick range in terms of talent. I think Jonathan Mayo and John Sickells both have them slotted there. It just does not seem to be a draft full of high end pitching.

21 May 2008

The Wieters Shift

A few posts back I discussed our catching. Along with what I wrote I brought up a possibility with Posey being drafted and Wieters shifted to 1B. The logic behind that goes that if Wieters hits well enough to be an all star 1B, he should be moved to a position that causes less duress. Catching is more likely to cause injury and also requires time off. I thought that we probably should go beyond the abstract and get a little bit more concrete.


In order to determine production, I will use the generalized formula is used in previous exercises. I don't really know how the lineup would be, so I think it is more applicable if we just view differences from a more comprehensive metric. So, the numbers generated are basically from a team of potential Wieters and a team of a comp . . . which is then divided by 9 in order to put it all in a basic predicted runs saved or lost product.

I tested Wieters performance as restricted by 120, 110, and 100 games as catcher along with him being unable to DH. These numbers will give a conservative perspective as to what we can expect. As a first baseman, I used 150 games played as the benchmark. I paired Wieters with a replacement level first baseman (.333/.420) when he caught and with a league average catcher (.320/.403) when he played first base. Under this scenario, we would expect this to be a liberal predictor of Wieters worth as a first baseman. A league average catcher is not always the easiest thing to find and catcher tend to degrade (everyone wave to Ramon and Javy!). I added these pairs for combination of Wieters hitting ranging from .300 to .450 for obp and .350 to .600 for slg. In turn, I subtracted the 1B Wieters scenario from the C Wieters scenario. Simply put, a negative value is the number of runs you gain by switching Wieters to 1B. A positive value is the number of runs you gain by keeping him behind the plate.


If Wieters can average 120 games as a catcher.

At 120 games, differences are just not very significant. Within the study range, there was no combination of OBP and SLG that would result in Wieters shift being worth more than a gain of 8 runs (0.8 wins). The break even line is about the type of player Russell Martin was last year. Victor Martinez is slightly above the line and Jorge Posada was worth about 0.5 wins above average if he was switched. As you can tell, you really have to rake to be worth the move at this level and a move does not result in as many wins as you may think.

If Wieters can average 110 games as a catcher.

Not much has changed with respect to group players from last year. Martin and Martinez are above the line more noticeably now, but Varitek is still below. Posada is now worth 0.9 wins above average. This is starting to be significant. I would probably think hard about moving a player if I could improve by a win. Of course, this scenario suggests that I can only find replacement level 1B and I can procure a league average catcher. It still does not seem viable. Although I does seem to suggest that the Yankees might be better off with Posada at first base and making a play for Varitek, Zaun, or Barajas.

If Wieters can average 100 games as a catcher.

2007 Jason Varitek is now the break even point. Martinez and Martion are clearly above the line. Shifting Posada-type performance would be worth 1.3 wins. This is probably where things get interesting. If Wieters would get injured so often catching that he is only averaging 100 games there each year . . . it may begin to make sense to shift him over to 1B. The most it seems to hurt a team would be about 1.5 wins.

Wieters should probably stay at catcher unless he shows a great propensity to get injured. Perhaps the ideal solution would be to sign some one like Teixeira to a seven year deal and at the end of the deal, shift Wieters to 1B, and bring in a catcher. Wieters bat looks pretty solid. It is the kind of bat where as he gets older . . . it may make sense to shift him so he stays healthy and potentially will hit better. Below is a chart that displays the break even points for the three game averages. That is probably the idea to take home.

20 May 2008

Link of the Day

Catfish stew is a solid little blog focused on the Oakland A's. This is a little old, but I thought people might enjoy it.

Guthrie's aunt was one of those kindly old ladies who loves you no matter what, and everything you do is great, because you're trying your best. Her cheering, complete with anachronistic shouts of "Yay!" and "Yahoo!" and "Hooray!", was so charmingly optimistic--"C'mon Jer, you can do it, I know you can!", I began to fall under her spell. After about three or four innings, I had somehow come to believe that the worst possible outcome of this game would not be a loss for either team, but that Jeremy Guthrie might somehow end up with his feelings hurt.

So when Kurt Suzuki blasted this two-run homer, I didn't really have the heart to cheer very much.

Poor Jer. He must have felt so bad. Guthrie was on the hook for the loss until Andrew Brown entered the game in the eighth inning, and proceeded to give up twenty-nine consecutive grounders in the hole between Daric Barton and Mark Ellis. I'm sure Andrew Brown felt bad about turning a two-run lead into a 5-4 deficit, and perhaps even worse when walking off the mound to a round of boos. Aunt Guthrie was appalled. "That's just terrible, booing a player like that. I'm sure he was doing his best."

Moving On Up

Well . . . the numbers are all moving on up for the season ending number of wins. We are about a quarter of the way through the season and our odds stand at 1:147 (PECOTA) and 1:8 (ELO) for making the playoffs. The disparity is due to PECOTA's adherence to the season beginning predictions and ELO's use of a ranking system. The teams we have faced have a .503 winning percentage, so that explains the numbers being reported.

A quick run through:
PECOTA is the PECOTA based model.
ELO is the ranking based model.
Crawdaddy is the model I created originally based on ZiPS, but now based on 2008 PrOPS and xFIP.
Pythagorean Win Expectancy Model is kind of self explanatory.
Actual wins is also self explanatory.

19 May 2008

Revisiting the Season Prediction

Several weeks back I predicted the number of runs the Orioles would give up and the number of runs the Orioles would score. The basis of this prediction depended on a few assumptions:

1) ZiPS/Morong Formula (my arrangement) would properly predict offensive and pitching performance.
2) Offensive replacements would cause a 10% reduction in run scoring while unearned runs would be ignored for pitchers.
3) Top 5 starters would start every game and provide an average of 6 innings pitched.
4) Relief pitchers would be league average.

1. ZiPS/Morong predicting performance.
ZiPS actually overpredicted the runs scored (with the run reduction application). ZiPS predicted that 193 runs would be scored. In actuality, 179 were scored. Even more of an issue was prediction of pitching performance. 222 runs were predicted, while 184 were actually scored. A major contribution to this error was the unexpected development of Daniel Cabrera and a bullpen that was much better than expected. It should be mentioned that my placeholder of a league average bullpen was actually somewhat optimistic. This formula under predicted the Orioles success.

2. Offensive reduction and static pitching.
My educated guess of a 10% reduction was pretty apt. Plugging in the actual OBP and SLG of each player resulted in a coefficient of 0.927 to reach the actual runs scored. The pitching prediction appeared a bit too kind. After plugging in the actual SP and RP era, the system predicted 177 runs, where there were actually 174 runs scored. The application of a coefficient (1.057) would have been appropriate to account for unearned runs.

3. Top 5 Starters would remain so and would average 6 IP.
It was to be expected that a starter or two would be injured. It was known this was a weak assumption. Loewen's injury made it so. The 6 IP prediction is actually almost right on the button.

4. RP would be league average.
Orioles RP are actually pitching 13% better than the league average bullpen.

New Adjustments

1. ZiPS is being replaced by PrOPS and xFIP.
As the season continues, in-season statistical methods may actually predict future performance better than season beginning predictions. The reason for this is that certain growth or degradation may not be apparent prior to the season. PrOPS takes in peripheral batting data to predict OBP and SLG. xFIP takes peripheral pitching performance data and predicts future ERA. Current relief pitching ERA will be multiplied by the coefficient factor mentioned in the next paragraph.

2. Performance Coefficients

The batting performance reduction coefficient will be changed from 0.9 to 0.927. The pitching performance coefficient will be changed from 1 to 1.057.

3. Record Calculation
The current record is considered a given, so the new predicted winning percentage will be applied to games yet to be played. The number of wins determined by the formula will then be added to the current total.

Team Used for Calculations
2 Roberts.........374obp/424slg
3 Mora............348/454
R Markakis........414/521
D Huff............324/441
L Scott...........328/395
1 Millar..........354/444
C Hernandez.......326/332
C Jones...........293/354
S Placeholder.....300/330

S Olson...........3.75
S Guthrie.........4.19
S Cabrera.........4.19
S Trachsel........5.92
S Burress.........4.64
R Bullpen.........3.42


In the games left, this method predicts the Orioles will score 542 runs and give up 537 runs. The season ending run totals would be 722 runs scored and 721 runs given up. In the remaining games, the winning percentage would be .505, which would end with us having a .518 winning percentage at the end of the year (Pythagorean Win Expectancy). This means that the current rendition of the model predicts we wind up with a 84-78 record, which is 2 wins above the PWE.


The current model is placing a great amount of worth on the ability of PrOPS and xFIP to accurately predict future performance. In addition, the new coefficients are assumed to remain constant. Finally, expecting the current rotation to remain as the final rotation is, again, quite a weak assumption. Anyway, things look a lot brighter for the O's than it did a few months back.

15 May 2008

What to do about Orioles' Catchers

A growing conversation in the past few weeks has been about the Orioles' catching position. It was thought this year was going to be a lost year and that catcher wouldn't be a major consideration (or shortstop for that matter) even in light of a horrific offensive showing. The two Orioles on the major league squad manning the position are Ramon Hernandez and Guillermo Quiroz. The guy most talked about replacing these folks is last year's 1st round pick, Matt Weiters.

Ramon Hernandez
Ramon Hernandez is an injured and undependable catcher. His inability to block pitches and react to poorly located balls often gives spectators the idea that he is nonchalant in his work. That really is far from the truth, but it seems to make people feel better if they can turn physical limitations into mental ones. People can be blamed more for the latter. What I think we are observing is the physical decline of Hernandez. We signed him at age 30, which is old for a catcher. Particularly, for a catcher's defense. Age usually results in more injuries and four out of his past five years have been involved at least one major injury that sidelined him. Of course, we signed him less for being a better defensive option that the old and fading Javy Lopes (and Ramon was better defensively than Javy), but also because Ramon was an above average offensive catcher. His first season he was well above average (an OPS of 90 is average for a catcher), he second year was average, and this current one has been poor. I fear that this might be Ramon's last multiyear contract. I think it is likely that he does not rebound offensively or defensively . . . and a catcher with poor motor response who cannot hit is only worth so much. He does seem to be pulling the ball more than he has in years past. I wonder if he is cheating on fastballs.

Guillermo Quiroz
Quiroz was a highly touted prospect in the Blue Jays system. Well, not at first. He was signed as a 17yo international free agent. His defense was excellent and much of his minor league career he average about 0.12 PB/9. That is outstanding. His 4th season he was promoted to HiA and began to display some power as he jumped from 21 to 41 extra base hits. The following season at AA, he broke out with 890 OPS (he was 21yo). He tried to play through a collapsed lung, but had to be shut down as he could no longer run. As he progressed, he began to lose the plate discipline he showed in AA and his defense started to erode. Part of that was blamed on a broken hand. Baltimore is now his fourth organization and his future does not look much brighter than being a backup catcher. He still flashes power and could be something if his contact rate improves, but he has shown to be a target for opposing base stealers to take advantage of. He will probably turn out to be slightly better than Geronimo Gil (how did that guy ever get to start?). He is fine as a backup, but nothing more.

Matt Weiters
Weiters was the 5th overall pick in the 2007 MLB draft. He fell that far because of fears of Boras' demands. Weiters proved difficult to sign, but right before the deadline his father called Peter Angelos and was able to get the ball rolling. He didn't play short season last year, but was impressive in Hawaii*. This year he was slotted in to the lineup in Frederick where he has proceeded to deliver a 333/421/582 line, which is a 136 OPS+ for the Carolina League. His equivalent line in the majors would be 258/319/426, which is a 102 OPS+. Right now, Wieters is an above average offensive catcher. Right now, his defense is probably on par with Ramon and maybe on par with Quiroz. Right now, Weiters is the best catcher in the organization. That is a problem.

The Problem
There are a few reasons for keeping Weiters in the minors. First, he may have holes in his offensive game that will be easier to work on in the minors than in the majors where the quality and placement of pitchers is significantly better (remember Weiters is in HiA ball). Second, Weiters also will have to learn at the MLB level how to call a game, which probably takes some time. Third, this will be Weiters longest and most grueling season ever. To add the physical strain of being a catcher to the mental strain of adjusting to the MLB game . . . it is asking a lot.

Weiters probably develops just as well in HiA. In another month, promote him to Bowie and let him ride the year out there. His bat is looking good enough that I would start eyeing another position for him to play when he gets to be an amazing hitter and a poor catcher (around age 27 or 28). Ramon needs to go. If his value can rise high enough, send him off this summer. If not, try to package him this winter. The problem with this winter is that there are a few guys like Hernandez out there who will take 1 year deals for significant less money (Barajas, Estrada, Barrett, Irod, LoDuca). Last offseason would have been better. We may not be regretting the loss of Lastings Milledge, but I imagine we could have gotten something in exchange for salary relief and similar production from some other retread catcher.

Wieters' Future
I have thought of him as a catcher until about a month ago. His hitting is just unbelievable. He could be a truly special player at several positions. I would start him out in the majors as a catcher, but would give him some looks at other positions when he felt more comfortable. That being said, if Tim Beckham or Pedro Alvarez is not available . . . Posey would be a nice acquisition with the 4th pick in the draft. Posey would be MLB ready about the time it would be a good idea to shift Wieters to another position.

14 May 2008

Daniel Cabrera's Batted Balls

Daniel Cabrera pitches tonight against the typically patient and talented Red Sox offense. He has been able to string together six seemingly good games in a row. Several of his game scores were not impressive during this period as three were in the 50s. This helps give the impression that he has changed and is a much better pitcher. In fact, quotes are beginning to be dug up by unnamed scouts declaring the Cabrera has turned the corner and is now a legitimately fulfilled talent. Now, he might be. He might actually be a very good pitcher now. He certainly is throwing differently as in he has really imploded in any start this year other than his first. He has certainly comes close several times during this stretch though. I mentioned in a previous post how his peripheral numbers do not make any sense and that he is more truly a 3 or 4 and not an ace as his current ERA suggests. Today we are going to look more into his batted ball data.

Battered Balls
I have taken his batted ball data from baseball reference and normalized it to the 2007 AL batted ball data. As you may realize, changes in batted ball data can be explained by: 1) changed pitch run (this is quite rare for an established pitcher to drastically change how his pitches run to the point that his batted ball data would also change dramatically), 2) improved defense (this can greatly improve or hinder BABIP, but typically teams do not make wholesale changes in defense from year to year), and 3) pure luck (batted balls are typically not uniform in their dispersion over the course of partial seasons and sometimes full seasons). Using that base knowledge, we are able to discern potential discrepancies in Cabrera's batted ball data.

Infield and Outfield - BABIP of balls hit to these respective areas
BABIP - Overall batting average of balls in play
First, Middle, and Third - BABIP of balls hit to these areas of the field, including the outfield
GB, FB, LD - BABIP of balls classified as groundballs, fly balls, and line drives.

When you look at a graph like this, you look for extreme differences. A difference of about 20% is a good rule of thumb for identifying extremes. Using that as a benchmark we have these weird BABIPs: overall BABIP, infield, third, middle, groundballs, and line drives. It is good to categorize the data because it can give us better ways to identify what is going on here. BABIP alone shows that something weird is going on, but the rest of the data suggests why.

Fielding cannot really be relied on as having changed. Much of the difference looks like it applies to groundballs going up the middle and to the right as well as line drives in the same area. The only difference in the infield is Luis Hernandez and he got benched because of poor defense. There are seems to be little reason to think that Brian Roberts or Melvin Mora have been significantly better at what they do this year. In the outfield, we have Adam Jones and Luke Scott. I think we can say Luke Scott improved our defense. I also think Adam Jones is better than Corey Patterson. I also think the differences between this year and last is just not enough to explain the differences. What is telling is that difference in line drive percentage. You can explain away grounders by suggesting Cabrera is inducing weak groundballs, which is plausible (though I doubt with his repertoire of four seamers--it should be noted that althought I see little difference between pitch quality this year and last beyond placement . . . I could certainly be wrong about the quality of his stuff compared to last year). You really can't explain his dramatic difference in line drives. Line drive success has little to do with good defense and more to do with simple luck. Not only is his line drive percentage unsustainably depressed . . . the line drives that are actually hit off him are going straight to his defenders at an unsustainable rate. Add this to my doubts about the groundballs being more effectively covered and you have a guy who is ripe for a downturn in success.

I will be bold and predict that Cabrera has trouble tonight. Some people will point to his 116 pitches in his last outing. Others will just say he is no good. Or maybe he will balance a dozen plates and toss 8 innings and give up a run or two. My guess though is that he will eventually drop down to about an era in the high 4s by the end of the season. He has been lucky avoiding baserunners and getting out of jams. His LOB% is about 10% above where it should be. His K/BB is 1 when people are on base, which is a third worse than league average. There just isn't much to like with him going up against a team with the 3rd most walks, best obp, and the best slg in the AL. Anyway, cross your fingers

13 May 2008

2008 Playoff Odds Update

I have added a new feature to this weekly column: the Pythagorean Expected Wins. This method is often scrutinized, so I felt it would be interesting to throw it up there and see how it responds throughout the season. This method will not predict playoff chances. I have also narrowed the viewable field. I will continue to do this as the season goes on in order for us to more easily discern the differences between the methods presented.

PECOTA has downgraded the Orioles' chances from 1:176 to 1:205. ELO has actually upgraded us from 1:16 to 1:15.

12 May 2008

Napkin Scratches: Handle with too much care?

One topic that comes up time and time again is how strong and durable pitchers used to be. Gone are the days where a pitcher would finish half the games he started. Gone are the days that no one needed a LOOGY. These are things we often lament. Right in hand with that lamenting is a palpable anger toward today's pampered pitchers. These guys are given strict pitch counts in the minors right into the majors. Gone too are the days when it was common to hear about some obscure prospect in PCL who threw 255 pitches in a single game that lasted 18 innings. It just isn't done.

So . . . why?

The first culprit is money. In 1976, the Reserve Clause was shot down. This enabled free agency and it changed the way a lot of different aspects in baseball were handled. In terms of pitching, it affected a few things. First off, it increased the value of pitching. Not only did the current game or season matter, but also seasons down the road. You had to invest a significant amount of money into a pitcher and you would not want to take a loss on it. This may have been the main pushing force of the five man rotation. Although, the five man rotation was not unheard of before the ruling, it quickly became the norm after it. Of course, as you may remember, the Orioles switched to the five man rotation in 1983 when Joe Altobelli took over.

Now, what the five man rotation does is give the pitcher more time off between starts for rest. The idea behind this is that pitching is a violent action. It is also not a very normal way to use your body. Quite unnatural. It follows reason that chronic repetition would result in physical damage. More time off between starts should equate to allowing the body to recuperate. Others argue against this though because it results in an uneven workout schedule. In the 4 man rotation, you would take a day off, throw a side session, then take a day off between starts. There is really little reason to think an uneven schedule hurts performance for any athlete that is not obsessive compulsive about such things. In my opinion, the value of a 5 man rotation is only a plus if the amount of strain forced on a pitcher requires an extra day of rest. It should also be expressed that not all arms are alike.

After the five man rotation was cemented in, pitch counts started popping up on the horizon. As far as I can tell, concern about pitch counts emerged in the late 80s and early 90s as drafted pitching prospects began making serious mint. The philosophy seeped into the majors in order to help preserve oft-injured pitchers (i.e. Saberhagen) or with fresh faces (i.e. Josh Beckett). The number typically chosen is 100. The PAP system goes with that. Top tier pitchers usually throw about 100 pitches per game. Even guys who claim not to use counts (i.e. Oziie Guillien) still seem to have pitchers that hover around the 100 mark.

That is the weird thing. Coaches who believe in pitch counts and those who don't . . . they do not vary much in terms of when a pitcher should be taken out. Again, this is now a bright line criteria. There is variation from arm to arm, some seem to be able to handle more and some less. This is pretty much regardless of coach. It seems that either no one uses pitch counts or that pitch counts just don't vary from normal performance measures.

This got me to wonder some things:
1. Training and development is better now than it was in the past
2. Players are more athletic and stronger now than they were
3. Pitching, which is more reliant on tendons and ligaments, has less potential to benefit from improvements in other areas of training and sport medicine. For instance, you can strengthen a pitcher's legs, but you cannot strengthen his tendons and ligaments to withstand a higher degree of torque.

As technology and knowledge increases, so does the player's ability to perform, which is most likely to benefit a hitter more so than a pitcher due to the physical limitations placed on each activity.

That reminded me of this study. Read it. Seriously, read it. Good stuff. It is not perfect, but it provides a great approximation of how developed talent has increased over the years. Some interesting things pop out in that study. The ten best hitters ever in order from best to worst:
Bonds, Ted Williams, Aaron, Musial, Mays, Frank Robinson, Yaz, Ricky Henderson, Cobb, and Mantle.
Honestly, it makes sense. People often overlook how good guys like Ricky and Musial were. It is also interesting to think that Ted Williams would still kill in today's game.

Anyway, if players have gotten better . . . wouldn't pitching have gotten tougher if you assume that hitters will benefit more due to not being so reliant on tendons and ligaments? To this extent, we can use league quality as a coefficient to determine how today's pitching load per start compares to other eras. For this napkin scratching effort I am considering all starting pitching data in the AL from 1969 to 2007. I am predicting pitch counts based on the method I previously used. I am also normalizing the pitch counts based on the competition level of the league, taken from this graph.

The black line is raw SP Pitches per Game and the orange line is league quality adjusted SP Pitches per Game.

What is interesting to note here is that as pitch counts are reduced, the league quality coefficient somewhat accounts for it. This suggests that league quality is causing a decrease in pitching counts. Others have countered that it might just be a relationship with runs per game. So, I ran another one with runs per game and as you can see there is much more variability in the runs per game adjusted line (black) and the league quality adjusted.

League quality appears to be affecting the number of pitches a SP throws. This suggests that pitch counts are either not followed or are more complex than a single line. It appears as if pitchers are being used quite similarly to how they were back in the 70s even though IP/G has dropped from 6.2 in 1973 to almost 5.2 in 2007.

09 May 2008

Cabrera Strikes Again

Daniel Cabrera has been able to pitch well on a rather consistent basis using a fastball. This sort of thing is possible in Little League, but it should not be in the Majors. Particularly, he throws it in the low 90s. He benefits from a BABIP of .226 while his career BABIP is .300. His FIP is 4.75, while he ERA is 3.54. He is posting his worst K/BB rate for his career (1.43) and has upped his career left on base percentage by ten points to 78.9%. All of this marks for a downturn. The only thing that explains it to me is that his Line Drive percentage is at 11.8%, which is about 6% less than he normally posts. As you all know, a rough hand estimate for batting average is taking your line drive percentage and adding 12% to it. So, with an 11.8%, you'd explain a batting average of roughly .238 and that is essentially what we have. His groundball percentage is also 6% higher, so it seems he has essentially traded some line drives into groundballs. The weird thing here is that his fastball looks like a four seemer as opposed to a sinker. How is this possible when you only throw fastballs (85% of his pitches are fastballs) and they average at 92.9 mph? I don't know, but that graph below is pretty (note: he has little command of his slider).

Cabrera's Fastball and Slider Pitch Location for May 8, 2008 against the Royals.

08 May 2008

Adam Jones Spotlight

Adam Jones has had a rough year so far. He has hit 231/272/359. This was expected. He is a contact-based hitter (meaning he does not and most likely will not walk much), so until he understands how to hit off speed pitches . . . he will be taken advantage of. There are some good things to like. Defensively, Jones has been quite good in the field. He has saved about 1.5 runs (+2 plays and 1 assist). He also has made 19 plays out of his zone, which is tied for the AL lead with BJ Upton and Torii Hunter. I imagine over the course of the season he will wind up being about +4 or +5 runs in the field, which is good for about a half win above median.

Offensively, well, we'll take the good with the bad here. Let's go into some Pitch f/x data.

Pitch Types


Many folks want to place Jones in the two spot in front of Markakis. This would enable him to see more fastballs than when he bats in front of Luis Hernandez or some other below average hitters. At least, this is the hypothesis people use. Jones has seen 222 fastballs, which comprise 60% of the pitches he sees (this compares to 67% Mora sees in the 2-spot and league average is 58%). It doesn't seem like he is being thrown an abnormal number of off speed pitches. I also wonder to what extent Mora's 67% is a product of his declining bat speed because last year he was in a similar lineup position and saw the league average of fastballs. Anyway, lefties and righties throw him about the same number of fastballs. Two-thirds of his at bats end on a fastball. As you can see on his fastball graph . . . he goes after the inside pitches, but lays off the outside ones. Two guesses on this one: 1) he is trying to push the count and try to walk or 2) he is not an outside fastball hitter and is waiting for a pitch in his zone at which to swing. You may also note that when he does swing at pitches on the outside he makes contact. Every time. He has no swinging strikes out there, but when he chooses to swing he has four singles and a lot of fouls and in play outs. I guess the bottom line to take from this is that it appears he has a plan, which is good . . .usually.


Jones has seen 25 curves or about 6% of the pitches he has seen. Lefties and righties throw it equally and the percent is a third less than the league average. Only 3% if his at bats end on a curveball. As the graph shows . . . he swung for 12 of them, making contact with seven. Six of those balls were not in the strike zone. He also chose not to swing at five that were strikes. In terms of pure pitch recognition . . . he "saw" 14 of 25 as their correct calls (56%) assuming he did not choose not to swing at a pitch he knew to be a strike. Torii Hunter has a 50% recognition on curves this year.


So far, righties like to toss sliders at Jones. He has seen 65 (18%), which is 20% more than league average (this may be the result of us facing more right handed pitchers, but I am not sure about that being true). Almost 22% of his at bats end on this pitch. He displayed a 78% accuracy rate in reading these pitches with 6 called strikes. Torii identifies 62% correctly with 5 called strikes. Again this "accuracy" rate assumes the players are not choosing to ignore strikes. Jones seems more adept here.

Change Up

Lefties love to toss the change to right handed Jones. Again, this is probably due to it being harder to hit a pitch breaking away from the batter than a pitch breaking into the batter as evidenced by personal experience, watching, and from several physics papers. A southpaw is three times as likely to throw a changeup to Jones than a righties. His overall rate is 10%, which is a sixth less than league average (probably due to my unresearched belief that we have faced more righties than the average hitter). Only 4% of these pitches end his at bat. He shows 68% recognition with five called strikes. He seems to be able to recognize these pitches as strikes, but misses them. This seems like it should be a pitch people could rely on to get him out as it appears he thinks a lot of these are fastballs. Torii recognizes 21% of these and hits them well. With a similar number of pitches, Jones is three times more likely to swing and miss a change up. This seems like an area he will need to improve upon if he wishes to hit better against lefthanded batters.

Pitch Counts
It should be noted that getting behind in a counter from the hitter's perspective is the opposite of that with the pitcher. So, if you want to compare this chart to the pitching version, flip them. Anyway, what we see here is that Jones, as most batters, gets behind in the count often. He is not as successfully aggressive as Jones is and is not as patient as Markakis is. Pitch counts for batters is not as effective as a measure as it is for pitchers because the data will skew much more due to individual batting approaches. What it does show is that, along with the Pitch f/x data, Jones needs to do more with his batted balls.

Jones is struggling like you would expect a young contact-based hitter to struggle. He is learning to identify much better off speed pitches than he faced in AAA and that takes time. Torii Hunter's career is a good comparison. He struggled early and as he learned to identify pitches . . . he has gotten a lot better. Adam Jones' approach may be similar to his, but I think Jones has more power potential and not as much defensive potential. That said, enjoy these moments as we watch a very good talent adjust his game.

07 May 2008

Garrett Olson's 2nd Game and Pitch f/x

So, yeah, I wrote that Garrett Olson was a prime candidate to get shelled in his next game when his unsustainable LD% becomes sustainable. I mentioned how his pitch counts were also going to hurt him. So what does he do? He 4 hits (w/ no extra base hits) the wild card leader and marks 7 K's and a single walk (to his last batter). Now, the caveats to this performance are: 1) the A's have no power and rank 13th in slugging in the AL, 2) Oakland Coliseum is a pitcher's park, 3) Frank Thomas would have had a homerun in almost any other park, and 4) Garrett is somewhat lucky. Now, that said . . . he did a great job with his pitching counts and seemed to be quite aggressive toward the batter. This is what he needed to do and he did it. I don't think he is an ace type of pitcher, but I think he can deliver a 100 ERA+ or a little below. So I'll go through some of the data from the Pitch f/x system:

Pitch Type

More curveballs peeked into the Pitch f/x data. I still don't know what I happening. I thought Olson threw a fastball, change, and curveball. It may be that the equipment here are recording lower speeds than those at Camden Yards and the logarithm that predicts pitch type is seeing the lower speed and calling more of them curveballs.

Fastballs appear to be thrown at the same frequency between the two starts with 57%. Changeups have increased from 10% to 18.75%, which is most likely due to the lack of left-handed batters. Garrett does not throw his change up to lefties. The curve/slider has decreased from 38% to about 24%. This is again most likely due to the heavily right-handed lineup Oakland uses.

All in all, 55 fastballs were thrown (69% strike or hit in play), 18 changeups (60%), and 23 slider/curves (70%). In terms of purely missing the ball, the harder curveball appears to be his major out pitch. He seems to have less control of the pitch as it decreases in speed (likewise, increasing in drop). The graph to the right displays strikes, ball, and hits in play.


Here are his location and pitch types (green=fastball, orange=slider, brown?=curve) for lefties. The first thing you probably noticed is that Oakland has far fewer lefthanders in their lineup (only 1). The next thing you probably notice is that Olson hit his spots against Oakland. He really is hugging the outside part of the plate. When you see this sort of difference between starts . . . you get led to release point and pitch breaks. The pitch breaks look the same, but the release point reveals a major difference between the two starts. On the April 29th game, his fastball release point varied horizontally by almost a foot. This looked a lot like Cabrera's typical release point. Against the Athletics, Olson actually narrowed his release point to a range of about 6 inches. I think him being able to position the ball is linked to that metric. That metric suggests that his delivery was more repeatable than it was in his 2008 debut. Oh, right, this is about left handed hitters. Not much can be said as he faced so few in his second start. He still isn't throwing his changeup to them. Three of his walks came against lefties in the debut and his only walk came against a lefties in this most current game. An issue? I don't think we have enough data on that yet. Last year, he walked lefties and righties at the same rate.

Olson's first game consisted of pitching insides as often as possible. It looks like he had more spray to his location. In Oakland, he did not focus inside much, but was incredibly sharp at keeping the ball in the lower 2/3rds of the strike zone. This may be the result of better command or a more uniform approach to each hitter. I'm not sure there is much else to discuss on how he pitched to righties. Feel free to comment if you see something.

Speeds were about 3-4 mph less than his debut. This may just be a difference in equipment between stadiums or he could have toned it down a bit. I'd bet on the former. Also, more of an appearance of the curves and sliders.

Pitch Counts
One of the problems I saw with Garrett last start was his inability to get ahead in his pitch counts. He was actually worse against the Rays than he was during his forgettable 2007 run. It was one of the major reasons why I thought he would get shelled. If you combine a lot of guys walked on base and an average line drive percentage (more on that in a moment) . . . you are going to get hit. Hard. Anyway, he turned it around rather dramatically. His behind counts went from 27% to 10%. His even counts went from 31% to 24%. His ahead counts went from 42% to 67%. Typically, when you are ahead in the count 67% of the time . . . you are going to do well. I wonder if the A's approach of only swinging at their pitches allows pitchers to get into favorable counts. I'm not sure. Anyway, he did a great job reversing these numbers from last time. League averages are 12% for behind counts, 29% for even counts, and 59% for ahead counts. His numbers are potentially sustainable. It also sheds light to how poor his numbers were before.

Hit Quality
The second part of my hypothesis about Olson getting shelled was that a 7% LD rate is unsustainable. I swear this line drive percentage is not sustainable. I'm not aware of another pitcher who is capable of putting up such a line. This is just crazy. So, yeah, 7% again. His groundball rate dropped to a more realistic, in my opinion, 42%. His left on base percent remains in the high 70s. So . . . either his stuff is nasty and no one can see that . . . or he benefited from a weak hitting Oakland lineup who somehow couldn't figure out how to earn a walk against him (A's are 3rd in runs scored).


That line drive rate will go up. It won't hurt him much if he can continue to not walk anyone. I'm still calling for him being a 3 (95 ERA+) or 4 (85 ERA+) this year. I guess we will see.

06 May 2008

Have we passed the high water mark for 2008?

This week is less rosier than last week. PECOTA downgrades our playoff chances from 100:1 to 176:1. ELO, though more optimistic, agrees that this past week did not bode well for the plucky Orioles. They dropped them from 8:1 to 16:1. After going 2-4 since our last playoff odds update . . . the O's are sitting at 16-16. Next week I will update the ZiPS/Morong derived prediction. Oh . . . here is the chart:

NOTE: I am going to try to quickly write up a Garrett Olson piece tonight. Just skimming the data on Pitch f/x . . . looks like a much better pitcher. I also think his counts were in better shape. Anyway, I love it when I project some negative criticism toward an Oriole and get proven wrong.

05 May 2008

Shortstops and 2009

As mentioned last week, Luis Hernandez has been awful. He was brought in to play defense and anything resembling offense would be appreciated. Well, according to RZR . . . he is the worst defensive SS in the AL. His offense 241/303/259 would inspire a Woody Guthrie tune about the collapse of production. It is not good and he cannot remain our shortstop. There is really no scrap of evidence that has been presented that shows he deserves to be above AAA, in my opinion. At AAA, he would be a league average hitter with decent defense. At the MLB level, he is one of the worst offensive players ever and a poor defensive shortstop this year. This entry will try to determine if there are any better in house options or players potentially available this offseason. If anyone wishes me to add anyone, let me know.

Using Cyril Morong's run expectancy formulas, I compared each player as potential 7, 8, or 9 lineup position hitters. The algibraic mean of their expected run performance was used and related to Luis Hernandez'. Defense was based on RZR. If defensive statistics existed for SS, an approximation of expected RZR was used. If not, below average defense was determined to be 7% worse than the average. Performance data for players with less than a season of information was taken from their accumulated experience. Players with more than a year of experience used ZiPS projections for offensive performance and an average of their last three years of defensive performance at SS. Due to the ages of most of the players, the predicted defensive performance is most likely a liberal estimate as SS play deteriorates rapidly with age (more so than with any other position, including catching). As we had done before, these are converted into saved and given runs. It was assumed that SS face 400 chances over 162 games. These numbers are converted to wins/162 games based on dividing runs produced and runs saved by 10.


Luis Hernandez and the Average SS
Luis Hernandez, based on his career, is a bottom of the latrine hitter and a good fielder. The average SS in 2007 had a batting line with a .330 OBP and .407 SLG. The average SS also had a .807 RZR. Luis' career .301 OBP and .315 SLG results in 21 less expected runs, which is divided by 10 to give -2.1 wins (compared to the average offensive production for a SS. His defense has been measured to be 0.842 RZR (we'll assume his career RZR is more accurate to his true production at SS than his 2008 .765 RZR). His defense is worth 0.8 runs above average or +0.8 runs. This reduces his cost to -1.2 wins (after rounding). This means that having Luis as our shortstop will cost us 1.2 wins in comparison to having an average SS in place. If he truly had the .930 RZR he showed in limited play last year, he would actually have been worth 0.9 wins . . . that is a difference of 2.1 wins. Using the same reason, this year's .765 RZR would mean his worth would be -3.1 wins. It should be noted that for the purpose of this study, we are using the "average" SS. Typically, replacement level performance is used. A player worth 2 wins below average is about what a replacement level player would be worth. Replacement level as I define it is your average AAA SS.

In-House Options
The in-house options are Eider Torres (.282 OBP/.314 SLG, 0.800 RZR; -2.1 bw, -0.2 fw), Alex Cintron (.291/.350, .765; -1.9, -1.0), Brandon Fahey (.316/.330, .800; -1.4, -0.2), Freddie Bynum (.307/.379, .750; -1.0, -1.4), and the improbable Scott Moore (.311/.409, .750; -0.5, -1.4). Of these five in-house options, none are better than what we project for Luis Hernandez. He seems to be our best SS option. We have no potential SS who are better than -1.2 wins.

2009 SS Options
Potential Free Agent Possibilities are as follows:
David Eckstein (336/344, .840; -0.7, 0.8)
Adam Everett (285/330, .860; -2.3, 1.3)
Orlando Cabrera (332/372, .800; -0.4, -0.2)
Rafael Furcal (347/387, .830; 0.2, 0.6)
Christian Guzman (302/342, .800; -1.7, -0.2)
Felipe Lopez (345/383, .780; 0.1, -0.6)
Cesar Izturis (296/318, .850; -2.2, 1.0)
Juan Uribe (304/427, .800; -0.5, -0.2)
Of these options, only Cristian Guzman comes off worse than Luis Hernandez and he does it by half a win (5 runs). Now, you may be shocked here, but we are using ZiPS as the measure of true performance. Guzman's recent play may be legit . . . if so, he will be worth 0.1 wins instead of -1.9 wins. The only free agent shortstops that are projected to be better than the average MLB SS are David Eckstein and Rafael Furcal. Eckstein is better by 0.1 wins and Furcal by 0.8 wins.


How much does a win cost?

A rough figure of 4.5 MM has been mentioned as how much a win costs on the open market. This typically ignores the reality that improving by a win is more important for a 90 win team than it is a 100 or 80 win team. What I mean is that wins are worth more to teams near the Wild Card or pennant than those who are further from that dividing line. For instance, a 90 win team signing a player who improves them by 2 wins for 12MM makes more sense than a 70 win team signing the same player for the same price. Why? Because 2 more wins will not get a 70 win team into the playoffs. Some fans demand a team win as many games as possible, but it can be easily seen that sometimes . . . that money can be better spent for production at a later date (i.e. prospects, saving up for a difference making free agent). So where does this leave the Orioles? They are a 70 win team this year for all intents and purposes. They could go as high as 80 and as low as 60. Next year, they will probably be a 75 win team. To be a playoff team we have to improve this roster by 15 wins. Furcal (+2), Teixeira (+5 guess over Millar), Sabathia (+7 guess over Trachsel), and our own player improvement (i.e., Markakis, Jones). The is about 50-65MM in annual salaries . . . maybe 400 MM in total contract money.

The difference Furcal makes in improving the Orioles offense, really doesn't mean much unless we go out and throw money around this offseason. So remember that the next time you curse Hernandez. Unless we acquire Teixeira and Sabathia . . . it probably doesn't matter.

02 May 2008

Garrett Olson's 2008 Debut and Pitch f/x

Garrett Olson pitched last year in the majors and suffered a forgettable 32.1 IP. He logged in 28 Ks, which is respectable. He also wound up with 28 walks, which is not. He was also whacked with 42 hits. It was a rather forgettable first taste of the majors and he was chased with a lot of criticism about nibbling down and away.

In spring training this year, he was touted as the most likely fifth pitcher. Instead, the team signed Steve Trachsel and Olson was sent to the minors. The Orioles pitching coach informed him that he needed to learn how to go after hitters and not pitch "scared." At Norfolk he pulled in this line:

24.1 IP 1.85 ERA 18 K 9 BB 1.36 WHIP

Without knowing much about his starts . . . that WHIP suggests to me that he is quite hittable to AAA hitters. They seem not to be able to turn those hits into runs, which means there is a lot of luck or that Olson knows how to pitch and change speeds.

This past Wednesday, Olson was called up to face the Tampa Bay Rays. He came out with the win and had this line:

6.2 IP 2 R 4 H 6 K 5 BB

That walk rate is troublesome. Doubly so when that was one of the main issues with his poor performance last year. The hit rate is nice, but one game hit rates are notorious for being misleading. It was not a dominating performance, but at his age . . . he has room to grow. It looks, for the moment, to be good enough to give him five or so starts and then reevaluate. So let's get acquainted with Olson.

Pitch Selection:
Olson appears to use four pitches based on the f/x data. He throws a fastball, curve, slider, and change up.

His fastball tails about 9.5 inches and remains 7.9 inches up in the air (due to backspin) from a motionless pitch. It ranges from 88-93 mph. He throws this pitch 57% of the time and equally to each batter. With the small sample size of the number of pitches he threw, fastballs can be expected the majority of the time on 0-0, 1-0, 1-1, 2-0, 2-1,2-2, 3-0, and 3-1 counts. He never threw one on two 1-2 pitches and rarely threw it on 0-2 and 3-2 counts.

I thought Olson threw a mid-70s curveball, but it looks like the f/x system is a bit confused on this. It says he threw three curveballs and twenty seven sliders. He either threw a hard curve or a soft slider as the two groups look more like subsections than different pitches. I'm going to assume that he still uses his curve, but throws it slightly harder than I remember. Anyway, speed ranged from 79-83. The release point drops slightly in comparison with the fastball. It comes in 11.6 inches below the fastball or 2.1 inches below the trajectory of a spinless ball. The pitch breaks across 2.5 inches horizontally. This sure sounds like a weak slider. This pitch is thrown 38% of the time. 80% of these pitches were thrown to lefties and it is often used as his secondary strikeout pitch with the fastball being the primary one.

His changeup has a very similar release point to his fastball, which it should as it has to look like a fastball. Speed ranged from 79-83. It tailed slightly more than the fastball at 11.39 inches and came in about the same height. He threw this pitch 10% of the time and only to right-handed batters. He preferred throwing it at 0-0 and 1-0 counts.

This is probably the graph that needs the least amount of explanation. He throws inside and down toward the righties. This graph is not separated between righties and lefties, but it appears he never go low and outside to righties or low and inside on lefties. It would be nice if I had a better source for this data. Oh well.

Pitching Counts
A big knock on Olson last year was his inability to stay ahead in the count. I decided to break down his counts from last year and this year. First strikes were recorded 50% of the time (0-0 balls in play not included). This was up from last year when 44% were first strikes. To evaluate his progression through the counts, I created a graph. I did not include 0-0 counts in the calculations. Counts I included in the behind category were: 2-0, 3-0, and 3-1. These are situations where less pitches are required to result in a walk than a strikeout. I thought it more important to define counts on the endpoint as opposed to the progression. Even counts were: 1-0, 2-1, and 3-2. Ahead counts were: 0-1, 0-2, 1-1, 1-2, and 2-2. The result is the bar chart to the right. He is actually getting behind more in the count than he did in 2007. This should be a concern. Of course, it may just be a single game event. I'm not sure. If this was his "issue" last year, then it seems like he has done little to correct it.

Hit Quality
Another part of the puzzle may be that somehow he is able to induce poorly hit balls. This may be a skill or it may just be luck. Here is a comparison of important hit categories:
Ok, so what can you tell me from that? If we think what Olson did on Wednesday will continue, then it seems we think he is going to keep these new rates. Well . . . there is no way he can keep a 5.9% line drive rate. His batting average against (BAA) would be about .180 and his stuff is not that good. Now, has he become a groundball pitcher? That is a large shift and I am inclined not to believe that is one. I think when the rates shift to something more reasonable, the number left on base will also decline. I am completely and totally confident that he cannot sustain that level of batted ball success. It has been mentioned that he is hiding the ball better this year and if that has anything to do with it . . . David Blaine is a chump. Olson would be the master illusionist.

Having only looked at the stats and not one second of video . . . take this for whatever you think it is worth. Olson is young and is bound to improve, but his rates suggest he just might get shelled in his next start. I hope I am wrong. One game is not much to base an opinion on. He needs to improve on the number of walks he gives up, his counts, and somehow retain a high enough groundball percentage (or else those eventual long balls are going to knock him out of games). He definitely has talent, but I doubt he has arrived. If we are able to acquire some of his pitching performance . . . Stotle will analyze it, put it up here, and tell me that I am wrong.

01 May 2008

Breaking Them Down: Daniel Cabrera (Part 2 of 2)

To recap our findings in Part 1, Cabrera's April 2 start was plagued with inconsistent motion at the end of his delivery. This seemed to cause a loss of command -- primarily up in the zone. We now turn to his April 23 start, the third of three very effective outings in which he went 20.2 IP allowing just 5 walks and 16 hits. Our supposition was that Cabrera's delivery would be a little more uniform in this start, leading to better command and fewer walks and hits (due to an increased ability to keep the ball down). Let's see how it went.

April 23

Hmmmm. Unfortunately, it looks like Cabrera hasn't slayed his mechanical demons just yet. While there is still a lot to be satisfied with, the conclusion of his weight transfer is still inconsistent, meaning any sort of long term success -- at least to the tune of his last three starts -- will be difficult. One positive to take away is that he seems to be gradually moving towards a comfort zone with his follow-through, which may indicate progress towards a more consistent motion down the road. Let's look at the start in a little more detail.

As with the April 2 start, the middle-innings seemed to be the trouble spot. If you look at the 5th inning of the April 23 game, you see the follow-through gets a little more exaggerated, at times mimicking a full step towards 1st. Ideally, Cabrera will sit in his motion where he does at 0:10 in the above clip. His momentum is primarily towards home, though he still finishes with a soft fall-off to the 1st base side (if you recall, we found his motion to be at its cleanest in the April 2 start when the right foot finished between the plant foot and home plate). So which motion should Cabrera focus on moving forward?

As opposed to the April 2 start, it looks like Cabrera has begun to find a sort of comfort zone when his finish falls-off a bit to the 1st base side of the mound (wrapping his hip and leg across his body). The key to success, should he keep with this as his target follow-through, will be keeping his momentum towards home as long as possible. The right leg will act as a counter-balance at the release point and should be moving forward towards home. As soon as the release point has passed, he can fall off softly to the 1st base side by continuing to "wrap" his leg, which as mentioned above seems to be where he is most comfortable right now. If Daniel can focus on hitting that motion on a pitch-by-pitch basis, he'll put himself in the best position to consistently hit his spots.

We'll revist D-Cab later in the season to check his progress. Hopefully, Crawdaddy can add some color with a look at the f/x data, as well.

*This was written prior to this week's White Sox game, in which Daniel regressed a bit in walking 7 hitters on a cold and dreary Chicago day. Perhaps we can write this one up to the weather, but let's all pay attention to his follow-through when he takes the mound this weekend.

30 April 2008

Is our defense saving our pitching?

Before this becomes a Terry Crowley fan site, I wanted to delve into how well our defense is performing. Of course, to Oriole fans, defense immediately brings to mind the exploits of Brooks Robinson. Here on this blog, I think of Luis Hernandez. In the offseason and spring training, it was emphasized that one of the major keys to this team was going to be defense in order to help our fledgling starting rotation grow. Luis Hernandez was handed the keys to SS from the much criticized Miguel Tejada (somewhat unfairly, I still think). Luis has never mastered any level of pitching. Some could say his progression through the minors was largely an issue of social promotion. Now, Dave Trembley did some shootin' from the hip and declared that Luis has twelve days to show his stuff or will, presumably, be designated. We'll see. Anyway, the rest of the personnel movements were replacing same with same. Corey Patterson, a fleet defensive CF, was replaced by Adam Jones, a fleet defensive CF. Jay Payton, a defensive LF who is really neither, was replaced by former platoon player Luke Scott.

Defense is neither saving runs or giving up runs.

I decided to use RZR as it calculates efficiency in terms of ball entering the player's defensive zone. For each position (except catcher, which is not included in these calculations) I used all qualifying American League players and determined a median of performance. I think took the difference between the Oriole fielder's RZR and the median AL RZR. This percentage difference was then multiplied by the number of balls in the Oriole player's zone. The resulting number is the number of plays the player has made above or below median. This number was then multiplied by 0.600 runs as that is roughly the amount of probable runs when comparing 1 out with no one on and 0 out with a man on first. So, in other words, the result of not making or making a play was considered the difference between a single and an out. Outfielders were given a little extra help for earning assists. A typical assist would be worth about 1 run (difference between a double and an out). To be conservative, I put the worth at 0.75 runs and assumed all players were equally efficient at throwing men out. Finally, the runs saved or given were added up to produce a total runs saved or given. This total was then divided by 10 to determine number of wins earned or lost.

Mora has been the most efficient position player based on efficiency and opportunity. He has saved 2.46 runs (+4 plays). Jones' fielding is also above average with 0.95 runs saved (+1.5 plays). Scott and Markakis both cost the team runs with their fielding, but make up for it with their assists. They save the team 0.42 and 1.97 runs, respectively. Fielding-wise Scott is at -0.5 plays and Markakis is at -1.75 plays.

The other positions have cost runs. The most egregious offender is Mr. Defense himself, Luis Hernandez. He has cost the team 1.44 runs, missing 2.5 plays. Next worse is Kevin Millar with 0.53 runs given (-1 play). Roberts is almost the median player. He costs the team 0.13 runs (-0.25 plays).

When we total that up together (ignoring the backups who have logged time), we come to 3.69 runs saved. That comes to 0.369 wins earned based on defense. If we keep this level of play for the entire year . . . we will have earned 2.2 wins.

How much can we gain by replacing Luis Hernandez mean?
Well, let us assume that the next player is just as awful hitting the ball. This will be a conservative estimate. We'll assume that whoever replaces Luis has league median UZR. That would be worth an extra 0.9 wins to yield 3.1 wins. Add that to the probable fact that they are most likely worth a win or two more than Hernandez with the bat and it is conceivable the team would be 5 wins better with someone else at shortstop.

I'll take a look in a few days if such a ball player exists in the Orioles' system.

29 April 2008

Keep On Keepin' On

Well, we now have 5 data points, so I think it is now a good time to convert this over to a chart format. The chart details the total season wins predicted by PECOTA and ELO for each week. After every 40 games, I will readjust the ZiPS/Morong prediction that I arrived at. Finally, I am including the actual number of wins.

The prediction models now has as a 100:1 (PECOTA) and 8:1 (ELO) odds of making the playoffs. These are our best odds of the year. The two major questions we have as we stand at 14-11: 1) how representative are the player's performance in the first 25 games for the entire year? and 2) how representative has our schedule been in relation to the rest of the year?

28 April 2008

Breaking Them Down: Daniel Cabrera (Part 1 of 2)

If you're an Orioles fan, you've come to find lines like this familiar over the past few seasons:
Game A
5.0 IP, 2 H, 3 ER, 7 BB, 4 SO

Game B
5.0 IP, 4 H, 4 ER, 7 BB, 6 SO

Can you guess the starting pitcher? Okay, it's a trick question. These were actually lines posted this past Thursday night by Tom Gorzelanny and Dustin McGowan, respectively. Of course, no one would hold it against you if Daniel Cabrera was the hurler that came to mind. In fact, Daniel started the season much like the Daniel Cabrera of old:

April 2 vs. TAM
4.0 IP, 6 H, 6 ER, 5 BB, 2 SO

April 7 vs SEA
6.0 IP, 5 H, 4 ER, 4 BB, 5 SO

Since then, however, Cabrera has strung together three straight solid outings, with an impressive combined line:

20.2 IP, 16 H, 5 ER, 5 BB, 12 SO

That is an incredible 2.23 ERA and 1.04 WHIP for the normally combustible D-Cab. To quote MJ, a good friend and co-owner of a fantasy team with both McGowan and Gorzelanny, "The only pitcher not pitching like Daniel Cabrera is Daniel Cabrera!" So what has been the secret? This 2 part piece breaks down two starts -- April 2 and April 23 -- taking a look at Daniel's mechanics to see if there are any clues as to the reason behind his apparent turnaround.

Let's start by looking at April 2, a start in which Cabrera struggled to keep runners off base, allowing 6 hits and 5 walks in 4 innings.

Two things jump out. First, Cabrera was very consistent with his release. He's finding the same arm slot and release point in each of the pitches shown. Second, periodically he tends to slip into a little extra movement at the end of his motion -- essentially forcing his follow-through on his back leg all the way across his plant foot and to the left side of the mound. Let's take a look at each of these one at a time and talk about their significance.

One of the most difficult tasks for a tall pitcher is to find a consistent arm slot and release point. Often times, younger pitches will struggle to achieve consistency in this area, which is a huge reason why a "repeatable" delivery is one of the more important characteristics a pitcher can show a scout. Cabrera seems to be much more consistent this year in his motion, and as a result is finding a consistent arm slot and release point. Curiously, as you'll note in the video, the resulting pitches are not necessarily improved. That brings us to point number 2.

Ideally, a pitcher wants his motion focused towards home plate once he starts toward the catcher. Cabrera isn't bad in this regard. At the end of his release, however, his right leg will swing around and land anywhere from directly in front of his plant foot (left foot) to two to three feet to the left of his plant foot. These inconsistencies translate to erratic pitch location -- namely, in Cabrera's case, elevation in the strike zone. The 1st follow-through is generally less exaggerated than the 3rd inning follow-through, and likewise the 5th. Cabrera seemed a bit out of sync towards the end of his motion, and simply lost command as a result. This is still a large improvement from the more serious issues D-Cab has had with his mechanics in the past, but one would expect it to be difficult to find consistent results if Daniel can't work to conform the last bit of weight transfer towards home. It looks like his ideal motion drops his right foot almost directly in between the left foot and home plate (see 0:27 and compare with the two pitches following).

So, you might guess correcting this is the key to his success over the last three starts? Well, take a look in Part 2...