Garrett Olson's 2008 Debut and Pitch f/x

Garrett Olson pitched last year in the majors and suffered a forgettable 32.1 IP. He logged in 28 Ks, which is respectable. He also wound up with 28 walks, which is not. He was also whacked with 42 hits. It was a rather forgettable first taste of the majors and he was chased with a lot of criticism about nibbling down and away.

In spring training this year, he was touted as the most likely fifth pitcher. Instead, the team signed Steve Trachsel and Olson was sent to the minors. The Orioles pitching coach informed him that he needed to learn how to go after hitters and not pitch "scared." At Norfolk he pulled in this line:

24.1 IP 1.85 ERA 18 K 9 BB 1.36 WHIP

Without knowing much about his starts . . . that WHIP suggests to me that he is quite hittable to AAA hitters. They seem not to be able to turn those hits into runs, which means there is a lot of luck or that Olson knows how to pitch and change speeds.

This past Wednesday, Olson was called up to face the Tampa Bay Rays. He came out with the win and had this line:

6.2 IP 2 R 4 H 6 K 5 BB

That walk rate is troublesome. Doubly so when that was one of the main issues with his poor performance last year. The hit rate is nice, but one game hit rates are notorious for being misleading. It was not a dominating performance, but at his age . . . he has room to grow. It looks, for the moment, to be good enough to give him five or so starts and then reevaluate. So let's get acquainted with Olson.

Pitch Selection:
Olson appears to use four pitches based on the f/x data. He throws a fastball, curve, slider, and change up.

Fastball
His fastball tails about 9.5 inches and remains 7.9 inches up in the air (due to backspin) from a motionless pitch. It ranges from 88-93 mph. He throws this pitch 57% of the time and equally to each batter. With the small sample size of the number of pitches he threw, fastballs can be expected the majority of the time on 0-0, 1-0, 1-1, 2-0, 2-1,2-2, 3-0, and 3-1 counts. He never threw one on two 1-2 pitches and rarely threw it on 0-2 and 3-2 counts.

Curveball/Slider
I thought Olson threw a mid-70s curveball, but it looks like the f/x system is a bit confused on this. It says he threw three curveballs and twenty seven sliders. He either threw a hard curve or a soft slider as the two groups look more like subsections than different pitches. I'm going to assume that he still uses his curve, but throws it slightly harder than I remember. Anyway, speed ranged from 79-83. The release point drops slightly in comparison with the fastball. It comes in 11.6 inches below the fastball or 2.1 inches below the trajectory of a spinless ball. The pitch breaks across 2.5 inches horizontally. This sure sounds like a weak slider. This pitch is thrown 38% of the time. 80% of these pitches were thrown to lefties and it is often used as his secondary strikeout pitch with the fastball being the primary one.

Changeup
His changeup has a very similar release point to his fastball, which it should as it has to look like a fastball. Speed ranged from 79-83. It tailed slightly more than the fastball at 11.39 inches and came in about the same height. He threw this pitch 10% of the time and only to right-handed batters. He preferred throwing it at 0-0 and 1-0 counts.






Location
This is probably the graph that needs the least amount of explanation. He throws inside and down toward the righties. This graph is not separated between righties and lefties, but it appears he never go low and outside to righties or low and inside on lefties. It would be nice if I had a better source for this data. Oh well.









Pitching Counts
A big knock on Olson last year was his inability to stay ahead in the count. I decided to break down his counts from last year and this year. First strikes were recorded 50% of the time (0-0 balls in play not included). This was up from last year when 44% were first strikes. To evaluate his progression through the counts, I created a graph. I did not include 0-0 counts in the calculations. Counts I included in the behind category were: 2-0, 3-0, and 3-1. These are situations where less pitches are required to result in a walk than a strikeout. I thought it more important to define counts on the endpoint as opposed to the progression. Even counts were: 1-0, 2-1, and 3-2. Ahead counts were: 0-1, 0-2, 1-1, 1-2, and 2-2. The result is the bar chart to the right. He is actually getting behind more in the count than he did in 2007. This should be a concern. Of course, it may just be a single game event. I'm not sure. If this was his "issue" last year, then it seems like he has done little to correct it.

Hit Quality
Another part of the puzzle may be that somehow he is able to induce poorly hit balls. This may be a skill or it may just be luck. Here is a comparison of important hit categories:
Category........2007..........2008
LD%..............18%............6%
GB%..............34%...........53%
LOB%.............66%...........78%
Ok, so what can you tell me from that? If we think what Olson did on Wednesday will continue, then it seems we think he is going to keep these new rates. Well . . . there is no way he can keep a 5.9% line drive rate. His batting average against (BAA) would be about .180 and his stuff is not that good. Now, has he become a groundball pitcher? That is a large shift and I am inclined not to believe that is one. I think when the rates shift to something more reasonable, the number left on base will also decline. I am completely and totally confident that he cannot sustain that level of batted ball success. It has been mentioned that he is hiding the ball better this year and if that has anything to do with it . . . David Blaine is a chump. Olson would be the master illusionist.

Conclusion
Having only looked at the stats and not one second of video . . . take this for whatever you think it is worth. Olson is young and is bound to improve, but his rates suggest he just might get shelled in his next start. I hope I am wrong. One game is not much to base an opinion on. He needs to improve on the number of walks he gives up, his counts, and somehow retain a high enough groundball percentage (or else those eventual long balls are going to knock him out of games). He definitely has talent, but I doubt he has arrived. If we are able to acquire some of his pitching performance . . . Stotle will analyze it, put it up here, and tell me that I am wrong.

Breaking Them Down: Daniel Cabrera (Part 2 of 2)

To recap our findings in Part 1, Cabrera's April 2 start was plagued with inconsistent motion at the end of his delivery. This seemed to cause a loss of command -- primarily up in the zone. We now turn to his April 23 start, the third of three very effective outings in which he went 20.2 IP allowing just 5 walks and 16 hits. Our supposition was that Cabrera's delivery would be a little more uniform in this start, leading to better command and fewer walks and hits (due to an increased ability to keep the ball down). Let's see how it went.


April 23

42308OriolesMarinersCabrera
Uploaded by gatecitycanes

Hmmmm. Unfortunately, it looks like Cabrera hasn't slayed his mechanical demons just yet. While there is still a lot to be satisfied with, the conclusion of his weight transfer is still inconsistent, meaning any sort of long term success -- at least to the tune of his last three starts -- will be difficult. One positive to take away is that he seems to be gradually moving towards a comfort zone with his follow-through, which may indicate progress towards a more consistent motion down the road. Let's look at the start in a little more detail.

As with the April 2 start, the middle-innings seemed to be the trouble spot. If you look at the 5th inning of the April 23 game, you see the follow-through gets a little more exaggerated, at times mimicking a full step towards 1st. Ideally, Cabrera will sit in his motion where he does at 0:10 in the above clip. His momentum is primarily towards home, though he still finishes with a soft fall-off to the 1st base side (if you recall, we found his motion to be at its cleanest in the April 2 start when the right foot finished between the plant foot and home plate). So which motion should Cabrera focus on moving forward?

As opposed to the April 2 start, it looks like Cabrera has begun to find a sort of comfort zone when his finish falls-off a bit to the 1st base side of the mound (wrapping his hip and leg across his body). The key to success, should he keep with this as his target follow-through, will be keeping his momentum towards home as long as possible. The right leg will act as a counter-balance at the release point and should be moving forward towards home. As soon as the release point has passed, he can fall off softly to the 1st base side by continuing to "wrap" his leg, which as mentioned above seems to be where he is most comfortable right now. If Daniel can focus on hitting that motion on a pitch-by-pitch basis, he'll put himself in the best position to consistently hit his spots.

We'll revist D-Cab later in the season to check his progress. Hopefully, Crawdaddy can add some color with a look at the f/x data, as well.

*This was written prior to this week's White Sox game, in which Daniel regressed a bit in walking 7 hitters on a cold and dreary Chicago day. Perhaps we can write this one up to the weather, but let's all pay attention to his follow-through when he takes the mound this weekend.

Is our defense saving our pitching?

Before this becomes a Terry Crowley fan site, I wanted to delve into how well our defense is performing. Of course, to Oriole fans, defense immediately brings to mind the exploits of Brooks Robinson. Here on this blog, I think of Luis Hernandez. In the offseason and spring training, it was emphasized that one of the major keys to this team was going to be defense in order to help our fledgling starting rotation grow. Luis Hernandez was handed the keys to SS from the much criticized Miguel Tejada (somewhat unfairly, I still think). Luis has never mastered any level of pitching. Some could say his progression through the minors was largely an issue of social promotion. Now, Dave Trembley did some shootin' from the hip and declared that Luis has twelve days to show his stuff or will, presumably, be designated. We'll see. Anyway, the rest of the personnel movements were replacing same with same. Corey Patterson, a fleet defensive CF, was replaced by Adam Jones, a fleet defensive CF. Jay Payton, a defensive LF who is really neither, was replaced by former platoon player Luke Scott.

Null
Defense is neither saving runs or giving up runs.

Method
I decided to use RZR as it calculates efficiency in terms of ball entering the player's defensive zone. For each position (except catcher, which is not included in these calculations) I used all qualifying American League players and determined a median of performance. I think took the difference between the Oriole fielder's RZR and the median AL RZR. This percentage difference was then multiplied by the number of balls in the Oriole player's zone. The resulting number is the number of plays the player has made above or below median. This number was then multiplied by 0.600 runs as that is roughly the amount of probable runs when comparing 1 out with no one on and 0 out with a man on first. So, in other words, the result of not making or making a play was considered the difference between a single and an out. Outfielders were given a little extra help for earning assists. A typical assist would be worth about 1 run (difference between a double and an out). To be conservative, I put the worth at 0.75 runs and assumed all players were equally efficient at throwing men out. Finally, the runs saved or given were added up to produce a total runs saved or given. This total was then divided by 10 to determine number of wins earned or lost.

Results
Mora has been the most efficient position player based on efficiency and opportunity. He has saved 2.46 runs (+4 plays). Jones' fielding is also above average with 0.95 runs saved (+1.5 plays). Scott and Markakis both cost the team runs with their fielding, but make up for it with their assists. They save the team 0.42 and 1.97 runs, respectively. Fielding-wise Scott is at -0.5 plays and Markakis is at -1.75 plays.

The other positions have cost runs. The most egregious offender is Mr. Defense himself, Luis Hernandez. He has cost the team 1.44 runs, missing 2.5 plays. Next worse is Kevin Millar with 0.53 runs given (-1 play). Roberts is almost the median player. He costs the team 0.13 runs (-0.25 plays).

When we total that up together (ignoring the backups who have logged time), we come to 3.69 runs saved. That comes to 0.369 wins earned based on defense. If we keep this level of play for the entire year . . . we will have earned 2.2 wins.

How much can we gain by replacing Luis Hernandez mean?
Well, let us assume that the next player is just as awful hitting the ball. This will be a conservative estimate. We'll assume that whoever replaces Luis has league median UZR. That would be worth an extra 0.9 wins to yield 3.1 wins. Add that to the probable fact that they are most likely worth a win or two more than Hernandez with the bat and it is conceivable the team would be 5 wins better with someone else at shortstop.

I'll take a look in a few days if such a ball player exists in the Orioles' system.

Keep On Keepin' On

Well, we now have 5 data points, so I think it is now a good time to convert this over to a chart format. The chart details the total season wins predicted by PECOTA and ELO for each week. After every 40 games, I will readjust the ZiPS/Morong prediction that I arrived at. Finally, I am including the actual number of wins.

The prediction models now has as a 100:1 (PECOTA) and 8:1 (ELO) odds of making the playoffs. These are our best odds of the year. The two major questions we have as we stand at 14-11: 1) how representative are the player's performance in the first 25 games for the entire year? and 2) how representative has our schedule been in relation to the rest of the year?

Breaking Them Down: Daniel Cabrera (Part 1 of 2)

If you're an Orioles fan, you've come to find lines like this familiar over the past few seasons:

Game A

5.0 IP, 2 H, 3 ER, 7 BB, 4 SO

Game B

5.0 IP, 4 H, 4 ER, 7 BB, 6 SO

Can you guess the starting pitcher? Okay, it's a trick question. These were actually lines posted this past Thursday night by Tom Gorzelanny and Dustin McGowan, respectively. Of course, no one would hold it against you if Daniel Cabrera was the hurler that came to mind. In fact, Daniel started the season much like the Daniel Cabrera of old:

April 2 vs. TAM
4.0 IP, 6 H, 6 ER, 5 BB, 2 SO

April 7 vs SEA

6.0 IP, 5 H, 4 ER, 4 BB, 5 SO

Since then, however, Cabrera has strung together three straight solid outings, with an impressive combined line:

20.2 IP, 16 H, 5 ER, 5 BB, 12 SO

That is an incredible 2.23 ERA and 1.04 WHIP for the normally combustible D-Cab. To quote MJ, a good friend and co-owner of a fantasy team with both McGowan and Gorzelanny, "The only pitcher not pitching like Daniel Cabrera is Daniel Cabrera!" So what has been the secret? This 2 part piece breaks down two starts -- April 2 and April 23 -- taking a look at Daniel's mechanics to see if there are any clues as to the reason behind his apparent turnaround.

APRIL 2

Let's start by looking at April 2, a start in which Cabrera struggled to keep runners off base, allowing 6 hits and 5 walks in 4 innings.

4208OriolesRaysCabrera
Uploaded by gatecitycanes

Two things jump out. First, Cabrera was very consistent with his release. He's finding the same arm slot and release point in each of the pitches shown. Second, periodically he tends to slip into a little extra movement at the end of his motion -- essentially forcing his follow-through on his back leg all the way across his plant foot and to the left side of the mound. Let's take a look at each of these one at a time and talk about their significance.

One of the most difficult tasks for a tall pitcher is to find a consistent arm slot and release point. Often times, younger pitches will struggle to achieve consistency in this area, which is a huge reason why a "repeatable" delivery is one of the more important characteristics a pitcher can show a scout. Cabrera seems to be much more consistent this year in his motion, and as a result is finding a consistent arm slot and release point. Curiously, as you'll note in the video, the resulting pitches are not necessarily improved. That brings us to point number 2.

Ideally, a pitcher wants his motion focused towards home plate once he starts toward the catcher. Cabrera isn't bad in this regard. At the end of his release, however, his right leg will swing around and land anywhere from directly in front of his plant foot (left foot) to two to three feet to the left of his plant foot. These inconsistencies translate to erratic pitch location -- namely, in Cabrera's case, elevation in the strike zone. The 1st follow-through is generally less exaggerated than the 3rd inning follow-through, and likewise the 5th. Cabrera seemed a bit out of sync towards the end of his motion, and simply lost command as a result. This is still a large improvement from the more serious issues D-Cab has had with his mechanics in the past, but one would expect it to be difficult to find consistent results if Daniel can't work to conform the last bit of weight transfer towards home. It looks like his ideal motion drops his right foot almost directly in between the left foot and home plate (see 0:27 and compare with the two pitches following).

So, you might guess correcting this is the key to his success over the last three starts? Well, take a look in Part 2...

Eating Crow 2.2: Murray and Ripken

Before launching into this exercise, I'll recap the previous Crowley entries. In the first one we evaluated his patience and contact rate as a player. We found that his contact rate was higher than league average, but his patience was league average. In the second study, we tried to discern whether changes in pitching coaches altered patience and contact rate on the Orioles. It did appear that batting approach did change slightly toward being less patient during Crowley's stay. It also appeared that the talent level may not have been high enough to make that approach work as contact rate was somewhat below average.

A conservative way to go about determining if a hitting coach affects the hitting approach of his team may be to focus on the team's star players. It follows reason that star players are those who are the most likely to retain their previous approach because, in their mind, it is what made them a star in the first place. I would assume that these established players would probably not pay much attention to what their hitting coach would say. This is doubly true as both Murray and Ripken, the Orioles established stars, played with Crowley.

Null
The hitting coach does not affect plate patience in established stars (Eddie Murray and Cal Ripken Jr.).

Method
As used in the previous two exercises, we will use estimated pitches per plate appearance to measure plate patience. Contact rate will also be measured as it is a type of skill that works well for an aggressive approach. Murray and Ripken will be compared individually, to the team, and to MLB. The time frame we will use is from 1981 to 1991. This includes four seasons coached by Rowe, four by Crowley, and three by McCraw (except for Murray who was traded to the Dodgers for those final three seasons).

Eddie Murray
Eddie Murray was perhaps the best 1B in the game during this stretch. From 1981 to 1984, he was clearly the best 1B in MLB and perhaps the best player. He was never a prolific homerun hitter, but he had plus power, plus contact, and good patience at the plate. During this time, he scored 156OPS+ every year during this stretch. That is consistency. Crowley was hired for the '85 season and Murray's performance eroded. Murray was healthy and should have been in his prime (Age 29), but he may have just peaked early. His next four years were 149, 136, 120, and 136; which is still quite good. It is interesting to see his strikeouts and walks decreasing along with power. Typically, when walks and power decreases . . . strikeouts increase as pitchers are testing the batter. It is a sign of reduced bat speed. He would never regain that tendency to walk as he had during that amazing four year stretch.

Cal Ripken
Cal Ripken seems like a guy who has little faith in his hitting coaches or way too much. Going to a game was often to provide you with a myriad of batting stances. One thing I am not too sure of is whether this was true very early in his career. He second and third best offensive seasons were 1983 and 1984. He won the MVP in '83 and should have won it in '84. His best season came in '91 where he once again won the MVP. Cal was not like Eddie. He has always seemed to be a bit more aggressive at the plate. Anyway,you all should be well aware of his exploits, so I'll move on to the results.

Results

Pitches per Plate Appearance
Murray's numbers were above average in terms of plate patience prior to Crowley's arrival. After his arrival, Murray's patience was league average for the entirety of his remaining years with the Orioles. Cal's patience was somewhat below average, but decreased even further during his first two years under Crowley. His final two years under him shows a marked increase in patience. This trend would not continue into the McCraw years. It is interesting how plate patience decreased once Crowley began coaching. It also seems that in '87 and '88 Cal began taking a different approach. I can't really blame talent level on Cal's progression as he had Eddie performing above average behind him. I doubt people were pitching around Cal. Also, Cal typically did not come up with anyone on base. This is especially true in '88 when Frank Robinson was all hopped up on pills and let Billy "Gold Glove, Lead Bat" Ripken take in 540 PA, primarily, in the 2 hole. That is 207/260/258 for the year and we think Luis Hernandez is bad (sorry, that is another topic). Anyway, it looks like Cal changed his approach in '85 and '86 to be more aggressive.

Contact Rate
I at least don't see much of interest here. You can tell when guys are patient and when their skill levels increase. They are both players who could do well with an aggressive approach as they both do a good job with making contact. For Eddie, it looks like a change in his approach. For Cal, it looks like his growth as a hitter.

Conclusion
Well, like last time, the data is somewhat confusing, but it appears that Crowley's philosophy about aggressive hitting was embraced by Eddie all four years and by Cal for two years. I think that is more definite about Cal. Eddie may have just seen a regression in his abilities, but losing the ability to take a walk so soon after establishing it as a hitting trait seems unusual. That is why I think this data indicates that they listened to him. So, if established stars are listening to Crowley . . . I imagine the rookies and those desperate to stick on with the team are also listening to him. I think players probably stick with their approach until they think they are in a slump and then seek out advice. A hitting coach is supposed to know what he is doing, so they listen. I think Crowley's suggestions may work for some, but I don't know if we have found who yet.