With or Without Crowley: 2011

This is a simple statement of intent.  It will be more interesting after the season.

For many an Oriole fan, the presence of Terry Crowley in the dugout has been a sore point.  A long time ago, I tried to loosely determine to what extent Crowley affected hitters.  This year, I am going to trying another way of exploring to what affect his absence from the everyday running of the clubhouse will have on the players.  Wanting a robust sample size, I have chosen to compare the projected performance of Orioles who played last season currently on the team as well as those who have left against their performance last season.  Why am I including the castoffs?  In order to determine if there are any lingering effects of Terry Crowley roaming the underbelly of Camden Yards.

The metrics I will be most interested in will be % walks, % strikeouts, number of pitches, and your basic slash line (AVG / OBP / SLG).

So I guess we will see after the season.

Eating Crow 2.2: Murray and Ripken

Before launching into this exercise, I'll recap the previous Crowley entries. In the first one we evaluated his patience and contact rate as a player. We found that his contact rate was higher than league average, but his patience was league average. In the second study, we tried to discern whether changes in pitching coaches altered patience and contact rate on the Orioles. It did appear that batting approach did change slightly toward being less patient during Crowley's stay. It also appeared that the talent level may not have been high enough to make that approach work as contact rate was somewhat below average.

A conservative way to go about determining if a hitting coach affects the hitting approach of his team may be to focus on the team's star players. It follows reason that star players are those who are the most likely to retain their previous approach because, in their mind, it is what made them a star in the first place. I would assume that these established players would probably not pay much attention to what their hitting coach would say. This is doubly true as both Murray and Ripken, the Orioles established stars, played with Crowley.

Null
The hitting coach does not affect plate patience in established stars (Eddie Murray and Cal Ripken Jr.).

Method
As used in the previous two exercises, we will use estimated pitches per plate appearance to measure plate patience. Contact rate will also be measured as it is a type of skill that works well for an aggressive approach. Murray and Ripken will be compared individually, to the team, and to MLB. The time frame we will use is from 1981 to 1991. This includes four seasons coached by Rowe, four by Crowley, and three by McCraw (except for Murray who was traded to the Dodgers for those final three seasons).

Eddie Murray
Eddie Murray was perhaps the best 1B in the game during this stretch. From 1981 to 1984, he was clearly the best 1B in MLB and perhaps the best player. He was never a prolific homerun hitter, but he had plus power, plus contact, and good patience at the plate. During this time, he scored 156OPS+ every year during this stretch. That is consistency. Crowley was hired for the '85 season and Murray's performance eroded. Murray was healthy and should have been in his prime (Age 29), but he may have just peaked early. His next four years were 149, 136, 120, and 136; which is still quite good. It is interesting to see his strikeouts and walks decreasing along with power. Typically, when walks and power decreases . . . strikeouts increase as pitchers are testing the batter. It is a sign of reduced bat speed. He would never regain that tendency to walk as he had during that amazing four year stretch.

Cal Ripken
Cal Ripken seems like a guy who has little faith in his hitting coaches or way too much. Going to a game was often to provide you with a myriad of batting stances. One thing I am not too sure of is whether this was true very early in his career. He second and third best offensive seasons were 1983 and 1984. He won the MVP in '83 and should have won it in '84. His best season came in '91 where he once again won the MVP. Cal was not like Eddie. He has always seemed to be a bit more aggressive at the plate. Anyway,you all should be well aware of his exploits, so I'll move on to the results.

Results

Pitches per Plate Appearance
Murray's numbers were above average in terms of plate patience prior to Crowley's arrival. After his arrival, Murray's patience was league average for the entirety of his remaining years with the Orioles. Cal's patience was somewhat below average, but decreased even further during his first two years under Crowley. His final two years under him shows a marked increase in patience. This trend would not continue into the McCraw years. It is interesting how plate patience decreased once Crowley began coaching. It also seems that in '87 and '88 Cal began taking a different approach. I can't really blame talent level on Cal's progression as he had Eddie performing above average behind him. I doubt people were pitching around Cal. Also, Cal typically did not come up with anyone on base. This is especially true in '88 when Frank Robinson was all hopped up on pills and let Billy "Gold Glove, Lead Bat" Ripken take in 540 PA, primarily, in the 2 hole. That is 207/260/258 for the year and we think Luis Hernandez is bad (sorry, that is another topic). Anyway, it looks like Cal changed his approach in '85 and '86 to be more aggressive.

Contact Rate
I at least don't see much of interest here. You can tell when guys are patient and when their skill levels increase. They are both players who could do well with an aggressive approach as they both do a good job with making contact. For Eddie, it looks like a change in his approach. For Cal, it looks like his growth as a hitter.

Conclusion
Well, like last time, the data is somewhat confusing, but it appears that Crowley's philosophy about aggressive hitting was embraced by Eddie all four years and by Cal for two years. I think that is more definite about Cal. Eddie may have just seen a regression in his abilities, but losing the ability to take a walk so soon after establishing it as a hitting trait seems unusual. That is why I think this data indicates that they listened to him. So, if established stars are listening to Crowley . . . I imagine the rookies and those desperate to stick on with the team are also listening to him. I think players probably stick with their approach until they think they are in a slump and then seek out advice. A hitting coach is supposed to know what he is doing, so they listen. I think Crowley's suggestions may work for some, but I don't know if we have found who yet.

Eating Crow 2.1: Crowley's Affect on the Orioles '85-'88

Terry Crowley was the hitting coach during the dark stretch between the '83 World Series win and the '89 Why Not? season (of course the answer to that question was because after Bob Milacki and Jeff Ballard . . . we had awful, absolutely dreadful starting pitching). Anyway, Crowley, fresh out of retirement, plied his trade and tried to mold Oriole hitters. If he has influenced his teams, we should see a decrease in plate patience measured as pitches per plate appearance. We may also see an increase in contact rate as he teaches hitters to actively pursue pitches on the fringe of the zone, which are often poorly hit.

The null here would be:
There is no difference between Crowley-influenced Orioles and non-Crowley-influenced Orioles.




Methods
This section will be handled simply. Crowley's team hitting will be compared to Ralph Rowe's teams (81-84) and Tom McCraw's (89-91). The measures will be P/PA and contact rate. These measures are explained more in depth in the first entry on Terry Crowley. This study will assume that the player's are relatively uniform in quality and openness to be taught.

Results

Pitches Per Plate Appearance
Ralph Rowe's years with the Orioles are notable in that his teams we slightly above the league average in pitches per plate appearance. The differences are not great, but are significantly above the league average (Rowe = 3.71 +/- 0.02; MLB = 3.67 +/- 0.01). Crowley's team only had one year noticeably above the MLB average and it was his first season. I wonder to what extent Rowe's hitting concepts were still being applied as it was Crowley's first year coaching and hitters typically stick with what works until they struggle. It appears as if, under Crowley's watch, the hitters are getting less patient. It is also interesting to note that in 1986 and 1987, there is a weird blip in terms of P/PA. I have no explanation. I know 1987 was the year in which an uncharacteristic number of homeruns were hit. Finally, McCraw's first and second year were typified by a major correction in P/PA. His third and final year had the team back at league average. The main explanation here would be Mickey Tettleton leaving, Worthington replaced by Gomez, and Ripken changing his approach. It appears McCraw also professed being patient. I am actually quite surprised by what this data seems to say.

Contact Rate
The metric seems to relate well with P/PA. They should be inversely related to each other. As plate patience decreases, contact rate should increase. This is due to coaching encouraging the utilization of balls located on the boundary of the strike zone. Likewise, batted balls are more likely to become productive hits as plate patience increases. I have a feeling Rowe's results that are above average might be due to the team being more talented offensively during his strand. During Crowley's tenure, it is a bit all over the place. McCraw's time is characterized by below average contact rate. This all makes sense with what the data seems to be suggesting, but the data here is hard to parse.

Conclusion
These are in no way conclusive results, but strangely . . . it seems the Crowley might have an effect on team batting behavior. It appears, maybe superficially, that his teams are less patient than Rowe's or McCraw's and that his hitters go after pitches that may not best utilize their at bats. It seems that the head coach does not seem to affect these metrics as Weaver/Rowe did not have the same result as Weaver/Crowley. Although, Rowe's teams were superior and this may be affecting the data. I'm not sure how to normalize talent level.

Next Time
I am going to still keep at Crowley's first tenure with the Orioles. I will analyze his affect on hitters at different career points and see if there are any tendencies.

Eating Crow: A Tendency for Aggression?

Terry Crowley is a name many Oriole fans despise. They complain about how he supposedly affects Oriole hitters. He preaches being aggressive at the plate. Others, myself included, think that hitting coaches do quite little at the Major League level beyond offering useless advice and acting as a guidance counselor . . . as in someone who is good to talk to, but doesn't really change things. In this piece I will try to determine if Crowley has a history of affecting his team's offensive production. This project will consist of four parts: Crowley as a player and Crowley's three stints as a MLB hitting coach.

Our working null hypothesis is that there is no difference between Crowley's performance and his team's performance against league performance as measured by pitch counts, a measurement of aggressiveness.

Part I: The Player

Terry Crowley was drafted by the Orioles in the 11th round of the 1966 amateur draft. He progressed quickly through the Orioles farm system: 154 games at HiA Miami, 55 at AA Elmira, and 2007 at AAA Rochester. He really didn't show much statistically until his second go around at Rochester in 69 where he displayed plus power. Once he reached the majors, he showed that he just was pretty average as a hitter. He never developed into anything more than a pinch hitter.

Methods
First we need to convert his statistical line to pitches per plate appearance. I do not have that data and I doubt they kept track of pitch counts by batter back then, so we'll have to estimate this. The basic formula is as follows:
[3.3*(plate appearances) + 1.5*(SO) + 2.2*(BB) ] / (plate appearances)
We will then compare his P/PA against the league average. This should be a decent indication of his aggressiveness as a player. It should be noted that we are dealing with a small sample size. The years with more than 100 AB are 70, 72-74, 78, and 80-82. Other metrics will also be compared: contact rate. Contact rate will relate to success of aggressiveness.

Results
Based on the chart, Crowley was not a hacker. He was about league average. If you ignore the seasons where he had less than 100 PA, He excedes the league average his second year and toward the tail end of his career. During , his prime . . . league average. This somewhat backs up Bill James' often cited, but never conclusively evidenced theory of age and walk rates. Basically, it goes that as players realize their bat speed is gone, they compensate by taking more pitches and waiting for the right pitches to hit. The result is that a player will start walking at a higher rate until the opposition realizes that he can no longer hit. Then he will bottom out completely. That describes Crowley's tail end Oriole career and horrendous stint with the Les Expos.

Interestingly, Crowley's contact rate is predominantly better than league average. It typically decreases as the more patient he is, but not every year. His only years with over 100 PA, his contact rate was much better than average. Here is where the issue of his theory of aggressiveness may lie. His patience is somewhat fluctuating, but his contact rate is always exceptional during the seasons when he was given significant at bats. Even in his final year, he displays a very good contact rate, but he was unable to do anything with it.

Conclusion
So, let's revisit our null. Is there any difference between Crowley's and the league's P/PA? Crowley comes in with a 3.72 +/- 0.11 P/PA. The league comes in at 3.69 +/- 0.02 P/PA. Crowley's numbers are NOT different from the league over the course of his career and there seems to be no general pattern except that he seems more patient during the beginning and end of his career. When contact rate comes into play . . . things get a little hazier. The seasons in which he was rewarded with significant at bats were those that also we years where he was successfully aggressive. It seems as if, as a player, his approach was never based on plate patience, but looking for a pitch he could make contact with. Contact rates over the career also do not differ from league contact rates, but it appears that Crowley had focused on simply making contact.

Contrary to the current perception of Crowley, he was not an overly aggressive hitter, even though he had a notoriously violent swing. He was selective, but not overly aggressive. He was not a hacker. As we know from ex-players like Joe Morgan and Billy Beane, a lot of old ballplayers think quite differently about the game now than what they did back then. Joe Morgan is notorious for his stubbornly held views about run production and Billy Beane reached epiphany, realizing why he was such a horrible talent. It may be that Crowley has bought into the perception of himself being the free swinging buck who was very much aggressive at the plate. Why he would teach this to others? I have no clue as he was a pretty average ballplayer with a 104 lifetime OPS+.

Next Time
The next segment will analyze Crowley's affect during his first stint with the Orioles. This will include several sub-studies. The first one will be discerning whether the team as a whole was more or less aggressive than MLB as a whole. After that we will compare his affect on inexperienced players and experienced players as well as free agents. It will be interesting to see if he has designed his team to be selective, but target contact.