Ariel Miranda Wasn't Going to Help the Orioles

Joe Reisel's Archives

Many Orioles fans were disappointed when the only deadline-day acquisition the Orioles made to improve their pitching staff was Wade Miley, a well-traveled pitcher often described as a durable innings-eater. Despite Dylan Bundy's recent outstanding performances, it's still believed that the Orioles needed another pitcher good enough to start a post-season game, and Miley really isn't that. Acquiring Miley is reminiscent of the Scott Feldman acquisition of 2013, for whom (and Steve Clevenger) the Orioles traded Jake Arrieta (and Pedro Strop). To get Miley, the Orioles traded Ariel Miranda, a left-handed starting pitcher and a Cuban émigré who signed with the Orioles in May 2015.

Before the 2016 season, Baseball America rated Miranda as the 23rd-best prospect in the Orioles' organization. He pitched 70 innings in 14 2015 starts, mostly with Advanced-A Frederick and AA Bowie. After some early-season fiddling with their minor-league rosters, the Orioles assigned Miranda to AAA Norfolk on April 11 and he's been in the Tides' rotation ever since.

How good a prospect is Ariel Miranda, really? How likely is it that the Orioles will regret trading him the way they might be regretting trading Josh Hader, Zach Davies, or Arrieta? Or is he more like Xavier Avery, L.J. Hoes, or Nick Delmonico, other prospects the Orioles traded for veterans? I scored, either as the BAM datacaster or for Baseball Info Solutions, five of Miranda's starts and may have some insights.

First, it's important to remember that Miranda, at age 27, is only two years and two months younger than Miley. That doesn't mean that Miranda can't be a good pitcher or that he's not a prospect, but it does mean that he's probably physically mature.

What struck me most about Miranda was his delivery. He has a twisty, whip-like delivery with a higher leg kick than most pitchers; he reminded me of Dontrelle Willis. I can't prove it, but I believe that pitchers with high leg kicks are more affected by age; as they age, they're less able to maintain their balance during their delivery.

Here are Miranda's pitching lines for the five games I've scored:

Date	Opp.	BFP	IP	H	R	ER	BB	K	Dec.
4/11	CHA	22	4.2	6	1	1	2	6	ND
4/23	DUR	17	4.1	2	0	0	2	6	ND
6/18	DUR	23	7	1	0	0	1	9	ND
7/8	SYR	28	6.2	5	2	2	2	1	ND
7/23	TOL	26	5.2	8	3	3	2	6	W

It's clear that I've seen Miranda at his best. In these five games, his ERA is 1.91; overall, his Norfolk ERA was 3.93. His strikeout-to-walk ratio in these games was 3.11; overall, 2.81. His strikeouts-per-nine-inning ratio in these games was 8.89; overall, 7.78. While on the surface his performance in these games may suggest that he can be a good pitcher, the details reveal something that suggest that he wouldn't be effective in Camden Yards.

The below table shows the total number of ground balls, fly balls, line drives, walks and strikeouts Miranda induced. The batted-ball totals include hits, errors, and outs, and so are more complete than the data in the official statistics. Also, there is a discrepancy between these results and the above lines because of hit batsmen.

Ground Balls	28
Fly Balls	35
Line Drives	13
Walks	9
Strikeouts	28

Even pitching well, Miranda has fly-ball tendencies. That works well in Norfolk's Harbor Park, which has a large center-field area and is at a low altitude, but won't work well in Oriole Park at Camden Yards. Because of this, I don't think Miranda would have been effective pitching at Camden Yards, and consequently would not have been effective as an Oriole. Because of that, and because of Miranda's relatively advanced age, I don't think the Orioles will regret trading him.

The Orioles Are Still Andy MacPhail's Team

On November 6, 2011, the page was turned from the Andy MacPhail era to the Dan Duquette era.  Buck Showalter finished his first full season in Baltimore with a 69-93 record, which was good for last place in the AL East.  The team was composed of Jeremy Guthrie and a promising Zach Britton rotation that was backed up with solid setup men, Koji Uehara and Jim Johnson, and not much else.  The offense saw a resurgent J.J. Hardy turn heads with blossoming Matt Wieters and Adam Jones.  Still, it was a pretty poor team. 

With MacPhail out the door, players with MacPhail's fingerprints departed: Felix Pie, Craig Tatum, Vladimir Guerrero, Cesar Izturis, and Jake Fox.  Two weeks later, Duquette would make his first official transaction: signing Matt Antonelli to a major league contract.  It still perfectly describes his apparent strategy: find the fringe that no one else wants and maybe it will go big.  Anyway, the team began its change into Dan Duquette's team.

However, the team in the midst of its fifth season under Dan Duquette does not really look like Dan Duquette's team.  The club is dominated by MacPhail era players, such as Zach Britton, Chris Tillman, Manny Machado, Jonathan Schoop, Chris Davis, Matt Wieters, J.J. Hardy, and Adam Jones.  Duquette's main contributions are in the pen (e.g., Brad Brach, Vance Worley), one year positional trappings (e.g., Hyun Soo Kim, Mark Trumbo, Pedro Alvarez), and rotation desperation (e.g., Yovani Gallardo, Ubaldo Jimenez).  It is fair to say that the primary structure was developed by MacPhail's group and was then adorned by Duquette.

As you can see above, half of the primary performance of the club is tied into original deals made by MacPhail's administration.  At 21% are MacPhail players who were then re-signed by Duquette (e.g., Chris Davis, Matt Wieters, Adam Jones).  At 29% are players that never overlapped with MacPhail's tenure.  This does not mean to say that Duquette is simply playing out MacPhail's string.  It is unknown whether MacPhail would have been capable to bring the little pieces together to form a strong ballclub or know which pieces were important to retain or moved.  Perhaps the only thing to be said is that Duquette has been a remarkable caretaker.

That said, is a 71% connection to a regime from five years ago notable or not?  Twelve days before Duquette inked his contract, the Cubs brought on Jed Hoyer to be their General Manager.  Below is what his chart looks like.

The only players remaining from the Randy Bush era are Javier Baez, Wilson Contreras, and Matt Szczur.  The Cubs literally have been rebuilt while the Orioles were refurnished.

There certainly is more than one way to skin a baseball and the skills Dan Duquette and Jed Hoyer have shown worked for their situations.  We are hard pressed to know whether they would be as successful were the roles reversed.  With the Orioles, Duquette never tried to start from scratch.  He had an amazing structure left behind by Andy MacPhail.  However, as the MacPhail era ages or becomes too expensive, the Duquette regime will need to find long-term replacements.  Maybe Duquette can do that as well as MacPhail did.

Cup of jO's: Paul Richards and Dylan Bundy

This is probably the first Cup of jO's in about five years.  When we first joined ESPN, we had a short post almost every morning chewing on the events of the previous day.  Nothing intense, just a little jaunt.  This morning I am thinking about two things: Paul Richards and Dylan Bundy.

Last night, the Orioles victory lifted Buck Showalter's win total past Paul Richards for him to take second place on the all time Orioles win list.  Strangers, or infrequent visitors, of the site might be unaware of Paul Richards, but basically Richards established the infrastructure of the Baltimore Orioles.  His tenure during the late fifties was not exactly one of on field success, but he created the infrastructure, teaching philosophies, and talent investment that created the dominating Orioles teams of the sixties and seventies.  If you are a casual fan to the history of the Orioles, simply credit Richards with what you had thought Weaver had done.  This is not to diminish what Weaver achieved because it takes a brave soul to have seen Richards wisdom through his failures, but Weaver was a devout follower of Richards.  Anyway, it can be simply said that the Orioles Way was Richards Way.

Here is a batch of writing here at the Depot on Paul Richards that actually includes some notes on Dylan Bundy.

Speaking of Dylan Bundy, he did last night what talent evaluators has dreamed of for years and what Keith Law gave up on this preseason by not even listing Bundy among the club's organizational prospects.  The controversy with Bundy has never been about his talent or stuff (please walk past the cutter discussion).  It has been about his health and how exactly to bring along a pitcher who had put up only 60-some innings of professional ball from 2013 to 2015.

Off the bat, no one is 100% certain about arm injuries and rehabilitation.  It has been a slow slog of medical innovation that is greatly hampered by strong desires to hide any beneficial medical information from competing organizations.  Conventional wisdom borne out of the pitcher death spirals of the early 1900s was that young pitchers need years to build up muscle and bone structures to be able to be workhorses.  The first five man rotations began popping up in the 1950s, became the norm in the 1970s with swingmen, and fully entrenched by the late 1980s.  Bullpen specialization then rose to minimize impact of backend arms as well as to take advantage of specific matchups.

Also borne in the 1940s and 1950s were pitch count limits.  Back then, they sat around 110 and the managers who used them tended to use them solely for pitchers under the age of 25.  After half a century, firm 100 pitch counts were established even though that specific number is generic and somewhat arbitrary.  The problem with pitch counts largely is that it is difficult to know whether a manager or pitching coach is accurately observing when a pitcher becomes tired, so it bluntly takes guesswork out of it.  That largely is what most the arm fixes MLB has implemented: things that over time feel right.

The science, often due to the aforementioned proprietary drive of MLB clubs, is far from certain.  It is fair to say that throwing a whole lot increases risk of arm injury.  It is fair to say that based on studies in other sports that stamina is something that is built incrementally and is not an on/off type of switch.  It is fair to say that other sports have established that switching from a short, daily event to a weekly long event increases injury risk.  However, there is nothing to directly say that about pitching.  And so, does it make sense to take a promising young pitcher with potentially dominating stuff and see whether or not he, individually, can defy the body of literature in other sports, and the strong implicatory information about baseball, and come out of this both unscathed and a high performer?

Back in Spring Training when Buck suggested that maybe Bundy will be starting in the second half, I scoffed.  True, to do this to a non-prospect as Law's writing might suggest would be something worth a shrug, but Bundy has franchise altering potential.  My view was simply have him as a late inning to multi-inning arm this year.  Next year, have him entrenched as a long relief arm with swingman status in the second half.  In 2018, pop him into the starting rotation.  The Orioles skipped my first year suggestion and have ramped up swingman status to full starter.  Again, my judgment was based on an abundance of caution, evidence, and expert opinion.

Is this current path for Bundy the right one?  I do not know.  It worries me because it is trailblazing, but done at such a small scale that it does not inform us much about any other arms in the future.  What is worth more: a dominant 7 inning start or two dominant multi inning relief outings protecting leads?  Right now, the start.  In the future? Well, I do not know, but I feel more comfortable with the latter.

Arrivals and Departures: Miley and Pearce Coming to Town

During the Dan Duquette era, July and August are a time of player arrivals.  The Orioles' barren farm system tends to restrict the club to finding second and third tier additions with the lone exception of 2014 when elite relief arms were cheaper.  2016 was not like 2014, it was more like other seasons where a B or C level prospect was dispensed for a potentially useful player.  The two coming in this year were LHSP Wade Miley and UTL Steve Pearce.

Matt Perez and Matt Kremnitzer addressed the Miley addition yesterday.  My only addition would be to note that Miley has had a rather up and down season, but has strung together a series of adequate games.  I believe Ryan Romano will dive into that for us on MASN.  Miley certainly is not a pitcher you expect great things from,  His main issue this year has been leaving the ball up a few times and getting it punished.  The Orioles tend to emphasize pitching low in the zone and rising with high four seamers, so maybe Miley can escape the home run bug or at limit it to bases empty scenarios.  One would think most teams disagree as the cost was rather low: an older prospect who one day hopes to be Wade Miley.

The second piece the Orioles added was a replacement of their earlier target: Melvin Upton, Jr.  The Orioles were looking for a bat to deliver more production against left handed starters, which their end of season schedule is likely to be chock full of.  The replacement is a name common to Orioles fans and was perhaps the player who strongly pushed the Orioles into a 2014 runaway season: Steve Pearce.

Pearce is a right handed hitter who, when on, is the living embodiment of a professional hitter and, when off, is the guy you want to shuttle back to Norfolk.  2015 saw the guy who should be in Norfolk, but who still inspired many of the writers here to advocate for him to be re-signed during our October blueprint series.  Pearce wanted immensely to return to Baltimore and basically put himself in stasis until it was painfully obvious that the Orioles had zero interest in him.  He decided to go home on a one year deal at 4.75 MM and, at age 33, be the oldest player on the Rays by two years.

Although, in all too typical fashion, Pearce has experienced some injuries this season, he has also rediscovered his 2014 glory.  He is slashing 389/484/741 (227 wRC+) against southpaws and a more modest 280/351/440 (118 wRC+) against right handers.  Although he played often in the outfield for Baltimore, Pearce's time in Tampa has been spent at first base, second based, designated hitter, and a splash at third base.  In Pearce, the Orioles appear to have found all of their needs answered except for someone who can backup Adam Jones.  All in all, he fits.

The cost for Pearce may at first glance not appear to be much, but it was more than Ariel Miranda, the pitcher exchanged for Wade Miley.  The Orioles gave the Rays, arguably, their only true catcher in the system: Jonah Heim.  Heim is known as a defensive first catcher whose bat has lagged, but who is still young enough for him to figure out enough offensively.  Defensively, he is a gem.  Good footwork, short arm path, short pop times, gets out in front of the plate with ease, solid receiving skills, and decent blocking.  These are important skills to have as a catcher because history has shown that catchers who lack defensive adequacy almost never acquire it.  It is a rule that a few organizations take as gospel in that they never draft defense-suspect catchers.

Heim is not an elite prospect.  He profiles more as a backup catcher and is one who I am fairly confident will reach the majors and put in at least a few years.  I have great doubt that Chance Sisco can figure out what he needs to do behind the plate and have similar concerns about Alex Murphy.  Sisco, though, has enough of a bat that he might be able to hit enough for second base and has the athleticism for it.  Though, like Schoop, he appears to lack the reflexes and agility to be a good defensive second baseman.  Anyway, the point being that Heim was actually unique in the Orioles system: a likely MLBer who actually could catch.  Sure, getting someone like Pearce will cost something of value, but we should be aware that just because a number of people are playing catcher in this organization that it does not mean the club has actual depth at catcher.

In the end, Heim is probably worth the one win that Pearce will be worth.  Pearce shores up the bench and gives a solid starting option against left handers.  He makes for a more compelling platoon partner with Hyun Soo Kim, and those extra runs will help make up for problems with the starting rotation that Wade Miley may not be able to fix.

Orioles Count On A Collection Of Swingmen Because They Have To

Teams with an average to decent starting rotation don't really have a need for more than, say, one long reliever. The Orioles, though, have a bad rotation and currently have several swingmen on the roster: Dylan Bundy, Ubaldo Jimenez, Vance Worley, Odrisamer Despaigne, and Tyler Wilson. Yes, Bundy is slated in the rotation right now and is firmly in the team's long-term starter plans, but he was used as a multiple-inning reliever earlier in the year and it's at least possible he shifts back to that role before the end of the season.

Jimenez is in the swingman role for two reasons: 1) He's been terrible and lost his regular starting gig; and 2) He's only still on the team because the Orioles still haven't figured out a convenient way to unload his contract (which they've been trying to do since late 2014).

Besides Bundy, the real hero of the long relief corps is Worley. In 62.1 innings out of the bullpen and in four starts, he's posted a 2.89 ERA and has been getting a bunch of ground balls (48%). His peripheral numbers aren't as good, with a FIP near 4, but that's hardly awful. And considering the O's plucked him from waivers and are paying him $2.6 million this season, those are decent, and much-needed, results.

Despaigne has a strikeout rate under six and a walk rate of nearly five, but somehow he's managed to pitch 24 innings without being a complete disaster. And Wilson has had his ups and downs, but in limited duty has been more effective out of the bullpen - when he's not asked to work through a lineup more than once or twice.

This is far from a perfect situation, and it's something the Orioles have been dealing with all season. Ideally, the O's would employ starters capable of pitching six innings and then handing the ball off to Mychal Givens, Darren O'Day, Brad Brach, and Zach Britton. Surely that's what Dan Duquette hoped for when bringing aboard Jimenez in 2013 and Gallardo this past offseason. And obviously, that's not the case this season. O's starters have thrown the third fewest innings in the majors. Enter the team's collection of long relievers.

It's unclear exactly how the addition of Wade Miley will change things. Most likely, he'll be slotted into the rotation with Chris Tillman, Kevin Gausman, Yovani Gallardo, and Bundy (for now). The Orioles need to create a spot on both the 25- and 40-man rosters, and the O's have also been working with a three-man bench lately. Wilson and Despaigne are the two long relievers who have options, so likely one of them will be sent down. You'd have to think the O's would prefer to jettison Jimenez from the roster, but that appears unlikely.

Buck Showalter will need to keep going to this cast of characters, and unfortunately, this could be the case next year as well. The only real hope is that this version of Tillman is for real (a dangerous assumption), and that Gausman and Bundy both stay healthy and continue to progress. Gallardo is somehow getting a pass that Jimenez never received, and Miley is the very embodiment of a back-end starter. If the Orioles don't develop a starter or pull another Miguel Gonzalez out of their hat, there really isn't much relief in sight. It's not like the O's are going to start paying top dollar for starting pitching, which they maybe shouldn't do anyway because of the risks involved.

The Orioles have constructed a flimsy bridge from the rotation to their dominant group of relievers. It's no sure thing this collection of starters can even get the ball to any of their relievers with a lead intact, but these long relievers will play an important part in how the O's fare the rest of the year. It's hard to expect a lot from them, because if they didn't have flaws in their game, they'd be in a starting rotation somewhere instead of a bullpen. But that's more or less what the O's have excelled in these last few successful seasons: getting helpful performances out of unlikely places. They'll need more of that.

If Miley Is Going To Be Successful, He'll Need To Throw More Balls

The Orioles, in need of starting pitching help, have just made a trade for Wade Miley.  The prospect that they traded, Ariel Miranda, isn’t considered a particularly good prospect. Rather, this trade seems to be about cash. The Orioles are on the hook for Miley for the remainder of 2016 and owe Miley $9M for 2017. If Miley is decent, then $9 million will be a bargain. But if Miley does poorly, then $9M is a lot of cash to throw away. The Orioles will have a considerable amount of cash invested in Miley, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Yovani Gallardo next year and will be in trouble if none of the three can produce. (Data for this post is from ESPN Stats and Information and Brooks Baseball.)

Miley has had a poor 2016 season, with a 4.98 ERA and 4.75 FIP, but had been relatively decent the past three years with a FIP in the 3.90 range. This season, his strikeout and walk rates have been similar to his three year average as has his BABIP, but batters have just been crushing his pitches and hitting them out of the park as he’s allowed a 16% HR/FB rate. If that’s bad luck, then he’s due for some positive regression. Otherwise, it’s bad for a pitcher to be home run prone in Camden Yards.

So far in 2016, out of 93 qualified starters, Miley ranks 65th in wOBA in at-bats that end in either a walk, strikeout, or hit by pitch; 79th in at-bats where the pitch put into play is thrown in the strike zone; and 26th when a pitch put into play isn’t thrown in the strike zone. In contrast, from 2013-2015, out of 201 qualified starters,  Miley ranks 122nd in wOBA in at-bats that end in either a walk, strikeout, or hit by pitch; 126th in at-bats where the pitch put into play is thrown in the strike zone; and 133rd when a pitch put into play isn’t thrown in the strike zone. Overall, he ranked 134th from 2013-2015 and 74th in 2016. The bottom line is that he’s always been a below average starter but has been even worse this year because batters are pounding his pitches that are thrown in the strike zone.

Against left handed batters, Miley primarily throws a fastball, followed by a slider, curveball, and changeup. Miley started throwing the curveball against lefties in 2015 and prior to that relied on a fastball and slider combo to combat left handed batters. The problem was that he wanted to use his slider as an out pitch, but it resulted in a swinging strike less than 20% of the time in 2013-2014 and now less than 15% of the time in 2015-2016. In each year from 2013-2016, batters were more likely to put a slider into play than swing and miss. As a result, the slider really wasn’t good enough to be the out pitch every pitcher needs. His curveball suffers from the same problem against left handed batters. It improved significantly in 2016, but it still only results in a swinging strike 13% of the time. He rarely uses his changeup against left handed batters because the pitch is terribly ineffective.

Against right handed batters, Miley primarily uses a fastball, changeup, slider, and curve with heavy use of the slider in two strike counts. The problem is that his slider has digressed since 2013-2014. In 2013-2014, Miley had a 20% swinging strike rate with the pitch while opposing batters only put 16% of sliders into play. In 2015-2016, Miley has a 17% swinging strike rate with the pitch while opposing batters put 19% of the pitch into play. Meanwhile, his curveball is largely thrown in the strike zone and generates single digit swinging-strike rates.  His changeup is effective against right handed batters as it generates a 30% called ball rate, a 33% strike rate (15.4% swinging strikes), and a 24% in play rate.

Going forward, if Miley wants to be successful he’ll need to change his strategy. Opposing left handed batters struggle against his curveball when they put the pitch into play, with only a .256 wOBA in 2016. So, it makes sense for Miley to use a fastball, slider, and curveball against left handed batters with the knowledge that he’ll need to use his slider to strike batters out. But he also needs to start helping himself. Opposing left-handed batters have chased 44.6% of sliders outside of the strike zone in 2016, but he’s thrown 49.5% of sliders inside the strike zone. With two strikes, he’s thrown 46% of sliders inside the strike zone. It’s hard to get swinging strikes when a pitch is in the strike zone. If he’s going to be successful, he needs to be able to throw his slider largely outside of the strike zone and still get batters to swing. Otherwise, he’s going to continue to have below average strikeout rates against left handed batters and will struggle to be serviceable.

Against right-handed batters, Miley needs to scrap the curveball. He isn’t able to use the pitch to get swinging strikes, it results in significantly more balls than strikes and right-handed batters crush the pitch when they put it into play. Opposing right-handed batters have a .464/.464/.857 line against it in 2016 and have had an OPS at or above 1.000 against the pitch each year from 2013-2016. Relying on a fastball, changeup, and slider combo will help him significantly. Miley does a good job throwing his slider out of the strike zone, and thereby is able to use it to get swinging strikes. However, Miley may want to consider throwing his changeup out of the strike zone more often so he can use that pitch in two strike counts also.

All in all, I don’t think that Miley has good enough stuff to be an above-average starter. His fastball isn’t particularly good as a starter and he doesn’t really have good secondary stuff. I’d imagine he’s far more likely to see success in the pen than as a starter. As such, I'm not really a fan of the trade. The Orioles really need Miley to at least be mediocre as a starter and I don't think he's that good. I suspect that he turns into another Gallardo or Jimenez.

On the other hand, he was reasonably successful from 2012-2015 while throwing around 200 innings a season. If he can give the Orioles 70 average innings this year, and another 200 average innings next year, then the Orioles will be happy with his performance and it will be worth the price they paid. He’s done it before, so it stands to reason he can do it again.

But if he wants to improve his chances of doing so, he’s going to need to show that he can throw more balls. He needs to try something different to get more strikeouts because what's he doing now isn't going to work.

Ridiculous Trade Idea: How The Orioles Could Acquire Chris Sale

We all know the Orioles need another decent starting pitcher. But what they could really use is an excellent starting pitcher. Considering the O's farm system, however, they don't have the necessary pieces to acquire a true ace (if one were truly available). Well, let's go a little outside the box, then.

The Washington Nationals are desperate for a solid late-game relief arm. Hey, the Orioles have some of those (and one who is really, really good in Zach Britton)! And if you believe everything that's passed along from apparently plugged-in MLB reporters (hint: not always a great idea), the Nationals are willing to trade prized starting pitching prospect Lucas Giolito to accomplish the task:

Sources who have spoken with #Nats believe they would trade Lucas Giolito to #Yankees for Andrew Miller, straight up.

— Jon Morosi (@jonmorosi) July 29, 2016

Apparently the Yankees are not willing to do this. But, you know, perhaps the Orioles should. The Orioles are trying to win now, and dominant relief arms are extremely important. But the O's should also be in the hunt for any kind of starting rotation help. And picking up one of the best young starters in the minors while also not trading away a young, everyday talent like Jonathan Schoop is enticing.

Picking up Giolito but losing Britton, though, isn't a win-now move. While it definitely helps in the long run, losing Britton still hurts. And even though it would make sense to keep Giolito and hope he transforms into an ace, why not use him to trade for someone who's already an ace? That ace would be Chris Sale.

As they should, the White Sox are asking for a ridiculous amount in return for Sale. If they were somehow able to land Giolito, the O's would be able to put together a competitive package for the... let's say, eccentric lefty. By offering Giolito and then two or three of the team's top prospects -- Chance Sisco, Cody Sedlock, Jomar Reyes, Ryan Mountcastle, etc. -- the O's would have a shot to land one of the very best starters in the game.

By doing so, Sale would headline a rotation that immediately doesn't make you shake your head in frustration:

Chris Sale
Chris Tillman
Kevin Gausman
Yovani Gallardo
Dylan Bundy

Regardless of what you think of Bundy's usage, that's a very intriguing and talented crop of pitchers (minus Gallardo). And the best thing about acquiring Sale, besides him being outstanding, is that he's under team control through 2019 for extremely reasonable terms: $12M in 2017, $12.5M option for 2018, and $13.5M club option for 2019. I mean, that's Ubaldo Jimenez money!

Will this actually happen? Of course not. The O's aren't going to trade Britton in the middle of a pennant race, though it will make sense to explore a Britton trade during the offseason. Still, you could kinda, sorta imagine it happening. And it's at least interesting, right?

The Three Outcomes For Ubaldo Jimenez

Ubaldo is Mr. F.

Over the past week, the Orioles engaged the Padres in an effort for each club to rearrange their own financial allotment into other areas.  These financial commitments had no positive value, but varied on opinion to what extent they were negative. 

For the Orioles. their regretful commodity is Ubaldo Jimenez.  A pitcher who teams were unwilling to commit money to two and a half years ago because his mechanics are temporal, an annual salary requirement over 10 MM, and a lost draft pick.  He was the final pitcher the Orioles targeted in an offseason full of pitchers they were targeting.  I christened him Plan F as a designation of how far down the list we knew he was and as a statement that this was highly unlikely to work out.  Jimenez' first season was a mess.  His second season was adequate.  His third season so far rivals many of the largest tire fires.  There is still one more season to go at 13.5 MM.

For the Padres, they were saddled with Melvin Upton, a once promising star player who over the past year experienced a modest performance revival.  Upton is a true left fielder, but is capable of playing center field and adequate in right field.  Over the past year, Upton has punished left handed pitching and has performed slightly below average against right handers.  He has amassed an fWAR of 3 over that time period with 1.9 this year (for comparison, Chris Davis sitis at 2.2).  Even with an annual salary of 16.45 MM that lasts through next season, he seems like an expensive but useful player.  Particularly, if the end result is a highly capable second division outfielder for 2.95 MM in 2017.  Upton is really what some people around Baltimore think Joey Rickard is.

Allegedly, the deal was:

Ubaldo Jimenez, Garrett Cleavinger, and Jhon Peluffo
for Melvin Upton

Garrett Cleavinger is a left handed pitcher who was selected out of Oregon in the third round of last year's draft.  Cleavinger has the promise of a backend bullpen arm, but has some considerable hurdles in his way.  He works in the low 90s though has creeped into the mid-90s at times.  He also employs a hard slider that is highly effective when he actually gets it across the plate.  His main issue is that there is inconsistency in the quality of his pitches as well as a general inability to locate them.  Promoted mid-season to Frederick, batters appeared to be forcing him deeper into counts and exposing his weaknesses.  The hope is that he could be a late inning complement to Mychal Givens, but he will need considerably more developmental time.

Jhon Peluffo is a 19 year old who has been turning heads in the Gulf Coast League.  The Orioles are not a major player on the international amateur market and typically play in the low cost fringes.  Occasionally, this strategy of spending less than any other team in baseball on this type of talent still winds up being successful.  When the Orioles signed the 16 year old in March 2014, he was not considered a valuable prospect.  Valuable 16 year olds sign within a few years of the yearly active date of July 2nd.  Just within Colombia, Peluffo was considered somewhere around the ninth or tenth best pitching prospect that year with players like David Ayala (Reds), Erick Julio (Rockies) and Erling Moreno (Blue Jays) receiving far more attention and money.

After two decent yet unspectacular seasons in the Dominican Summer League, Peluffo, who is 6'3 with a considerable frame that has yet to fill out, broke out in the Gulf Coast League.  I was told that he works around 90 with a good breaking ball and that Peluffo will emerge from the farm wasteland to be recognized as a top five arm in the organization's minors.  I was then reminded that the Orioles system is quite barren and that Peluffo would be a ten to fifteen arm in a top rated farm below what Hansel Rodriguez was.  Beyond that, I do not know much about Peluffo.  He appears like your typical low minors pitcher with current success and a lot of projection. 

Beyond that there was some talk of money exchanging hands, but that has been a pretty loose and vague rumor.  Some love the oldies and are playing the vinyl Peter Angelos is Cheap even though the current perspective in front offices is that the Orioles are desperate and that they are willing to take on more money than most mid-season.  That makes this analysis a bit uncertain.  Also uncertain is that it simply is difficult to get good information on Peluffo or someone among my circle who both is qualified and has seen him pitch. 

With all that in mind, I would have leaned in favor of this deal happening.  A Hyun Soo Kim / Melvin Upton platoon in left field would have been remarkable.  Kim has a 147/-22 wRC+ RHP/LHP split.  Meanwhile, Upton carries a 85/143 wRC+ RHP/LHP split (2015's split was 102/124).  A leftfielder with a 140 wRC+ would be equivalent to fielding someone like Kris Bryant or Yoenis Cespedes out there.  To get that kind of production out of less than 10 MM in cost would be impressive.  However, that was simply not done and Upton now plays for the Blue Jays.

This leads us to consideration of the Three Outcomes for Ubaldo Jimenez:

1. Designation for Assignment
The argument to release Jimenez has nothing to do with cost.  Cost is considered sunk into him and that simply is that.  The true argument for his release is that there is no one appreciably better as a fifth starter or as the last man in the bullpen.  Rumor mill suggests that Peter Angelos is willing to let Jimenez go free and swallow the rest of the contract.  There is a growing feeling in the industry that Jimenez will not be an Oriole on August 1st.  This is due to Jimenez' struggles with command and control for all of his pitches.  He was described to me as a AA starting pitcher with no option in the pen as his fastball simply is not fast or deceptive enough to be overly relied on when his struggles with the strike zone deepen his counts.

However, the other lingering question is what else do the Orioles have.  Tillman and Gausman have been solid members of the starting rotation.  Dylan Bundy has shown glimpses of being a strong middle of the rotation starter.  Yovani Gallardo unimpressively is putting out some adequacy and profiles at this point in his career as a solid 5th starter on a playoff team, a guy who gets left off post-season rosters typically.  Then your fifth starter options consist of Jimenez, Vance Worley, Mike Wright, and Tyler Wilson.

Amongst that final rotation slot group is an abundance of underwhelming talent.  Wright has been the darling of several organizations who are enamored with his velocity and think a few personalized tweaks can turn him into a solid MLB pitcher or, at worst, find him as a 7th or 8th inning arm.  Tyler Wilson lives on the edge of effectiveness and is no stranger to good and poor games, unlikely to ever see much positive consistency.  Worley exists in a similar space.  You can dream on a few of his innings, but those dreams tend to dissipate into a cruel reality.  Jimenez fits the same bill, but with such an issue with control that the pen is not an option.  This hurts the club because it cannot do what teams generally do when all they have to offer at a slot is trash, which is riding the hot hand.  Jimenez simply cannot be stored in the pen for a start or two.

2. Every Fifth Day, Praying for a Miracle
Based on his many ups and downs in the past few seasons, projection models had to cover their bases with Jimenez.  His stretch of respectability last year resulted in him being perceived by the models as having a 25-30% chance of delivering above average performances over the course of the entire season.  After a horrific first half, the model I use revised its estimate to about a 2% chance of a resurrection to above average performance.  Worley, Wright, and Wilson all sit in the 5-15% range.  For this year alone, it is difficult to argue that Jimenez should remain.  Indeed, if he was sitting on a walk year, he would be gone.

He is not on a walk year though and another season is left on his contract.  A season that will probably see him as a one in ten chance of being a positive pitcher, which would be in line with the W crew vying for that last rotation slot.  With that in mind, it makes a little sense to keep him around simply in order to have him available next Spring Training.  It is a meager hope.

3. Find Another Melvin
The third option is to find another bloated contract and get something that is at least of some use to the Orioles.  Who would that be?  I am unsure.  Upton's deal fit well for what the Orioles need to shore up: outfield defense and another strong bat against left handers.  Other options, like Upton's former teammate Matt Kemp, simply fall into a category of pointlessness for the club by providing little defensive value and a bat that comes and goes.  Maybe something is out there, but I am unsure what.

So what Now?
I lean slightly to the idea that the Orioles lost out on an opportunity with Melvin Upton, assuming the money difference was not much, Peluffo is not some wunderkind, and Upton would be cool with remaining as a platoon player.  Moving on from that situation, I frankly am at a loss to see another trade opportunity appearing.  I think the club is unable to ride a hot hand with one of their other options, so the only option I see is the difficult one of letting him go to be the beautiful butterfly he could be.  Jimenez would be a useful piece in Spring Training next year, but is that worth suffering through four starts in August before rosters expand?  Maybe it is.  Maybe four horrible starts is not a major trauma against the club's post season hopes.  I think it might well be.

Should Brach Have Been An All-Star?

Brad Brach has had some of the best results of any reliever so far this season. As of July 5th, he had an ERA below 1, with opposing batters having just a .462 OPS against him. Even now, he has an ERA of 1.17 while opposing batters have a .495 OPS against him. In return, he was rewarded by being selected to pitch in the All-Star game. One note, the data in this post in from early July unless mentioned otherwise. Sorry, life got busy and it doesn’t seem like things have changed much.

Jeff Long, a writer for Baseball Prospectus, defended this decision by noting that Brach has been the best relief pitcher in baseball this season. Long noted that while Brach can’t boast the best FIP, Brach has the best RE/24 for a reliever in the majors.  RE/24 is context-dependent and measures the number of runs that a pitcher allowed or prevented in a given inning compared to an average pitcher. Meanwhile, Keith Law wrote that the Brach silliness reminds him of Neshek in 2014 who had a .70 ERA in the first half, a 3.41 ERA in the second half and has had a strong ERA but a poor FIP for the Astros the past two years. He also wrote that Brach is a dime for dozen pitcher who was an AAA arm 18 months ago. Law is clearly using an FIP based approach to judge Brach. Brach has been largely worthless according to fWAR before 2015. Long is using a context-dependent approach to judge Brach and believes that Brach has control over balls put into play. Should Brach be considered an all-star?

Brach really put it together in 2016. In 2014, Brach had ranked 66th out of 203 relievers in wOBA on pitches put into play, but 141st in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch with an ERA ranking 103rd. Brach may have had a 3.13 ERA, but that was still only about average. In 2015, Brach ranked 78th out of 218 relievers in wOBA on pitches put into play, but 129th out of 218 relievers in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch with an ERA ranking 65th. This year, Brach ranks 8th out of 135 relievers in wOBA on pitchers put into play and 24th in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch and 4th in ERA. He’s gone from average, to above average, to elite.

One reason he became successful starting in 2015 is because he improved significantly against left handed batters. His K% increased from 17.3% to 22% from 2014 to 2015 while opposing batters had only a .239 BABIP and .259 wOBA against him. He continued his success in 2016 by reducing his walk rate from 11.5% to 7.5% while increasing his strikeout rate from 22% to 24%. His wOBA against lefties actually increased from 2015 to 2016, due to him allowing a more sustainable .737 OPS when lefties put a pitch into play compared to a .594 OPS in 2015.

However, the reason why he’s so successful in 2016 is because he’s been absolutely butchering right handed hitting. Right handed batters have only a .164 wOBA against him and he has a K% of 37.8% and a BB% of 7.8%. Opposing right-handed batters have only a .198 wOBA and .104 BABIP when they put a pitch into play.

The reason Brach improved in 2015 is because he started to throw a changeup instead of a splitter. Prior to 2015, he primarily used just a fastball and a slider against right handed batters and a fastball and splitter against left handed batters. With the introduction of the changeup, Brach throws only 60% fastballs to lefties and righties compared to the 70% he threw beforehand. He throws the changeup and slider about the same amount of time against right handed batters, but tends to use a slider early in the count while using the changeup to get strike three. Against lefties, he tends to primarily use a fastball and changeup although he does use a slider 8% of the time.

Brach has thrown 786 splitters and sliders from 2013 to 2016 and picked up 39 strikeouts using those pitches. That’s good for a 5% rate. Brach has also thrown 551 changeups over that same period and picked up 54 strikeouts or roughly a 10% rate. Brooks Baseball tells a similar story. Brach has thrown 511 changeups in 2015 and 2016 resulting in 49 strikeouts or a rate of 9.6%. In contrast, the slider has about a 4.6% strikeout rate. Brach had a tough time before 2015 because he didn’t have an off speed pitch that he could use to get a strikeout. Adding his changeup has largely fixed that problem. Being able to implement a third pitch to use against left handed batters could turn him into a legitimate closing option or perhaps even a potential starter if he has enough stamina.

This year, Brach has taken a major step forward against right handed batters by giving up fewer called balls while collecting a similar amount of called and swinging strikes. He has a called ball rate of 31.8% and a called or swinging strike rate of 30.8%. There’s only a one percent difference between these numbers, and therefore it’s no surprise that he’s collecting a large amount of strikeouts with a relatively low amount of walks. In addition, batters have a 25% foul rate, but only a 12.5% in play rate. In the rare cases where batters do make contact, they’re not hitting the ball fair. In many cases, this means that the batter is one strike closer to striking out. In every case, Brach receives another chance to get a strikeout.

Right handed batters are especially having problems dealing with Brach’s fastball. They’re only putting 9.9% in play, while fouling off 28%, having 29% result in balls and a whopping 32.6% are resulting in either called or swinging strikes. Even better, opposing batters have only put 23 into play and have just a .095 BABIP and a .280 wOBA.

He’s also taken a step forward against left-handed batters. His called ball percentage has dropped from 40% to 36%, while his called plus swinging strike percentage has increased from 25% to 29%. Again, it’s largely because of improvements in his fastball. His fastball had a called ball rate of 39% in 2015, and it’s down to 33% in 2016. In addition, batters are missing at 12% of fastballs this year compared to 5% in 2015. I think the problem that Brach faces against lefties is that he throws his changeup roughly a third of the time, but throws his changeup in the strike zone only 23% of the time. Otherwise, he probably needs a fourth pitch that he can throw early in the count for strikes. But then, relievers typically don’t use four pitches.

Brach has also gotten pretty lucky in 2016. Opposing batters have a .236 wOBA against him with the bases empty and a line of .156/.221/.302. Part of it is due to a 27.9% K-rate and a 7.7% BB rate but a large part is due to a .188 BABIP. Batters have a .192 wOBA against him with one runner on base and a .105 wOBA against him with two or more runners on base. With two or more runners on base, opposing batters have a .077/.133/.077 line – or 4 strikeouts, 1 walk, 1 single and 9 outs in play. As of July 10th, opposing batters have a .099 wOBA against him, and have a .071/.176/.071 line against him – or 4 strikeouts, 2 walks, 1 single and 10 outs in play. It’s highly unlikely that such a line is due to skill.

Adding a changeup to Brach’s repertoire has definitely made him a better pitcher and taken him from average to good. Keith doesn’t give Brach credit for this and therefore significantly underestimates Brach’s’ value. If Brach can add another pitch to use against lefties, then he’d likely be good enough to become a closer. In 2016, there’s no question that Brach has been lucky. He’s gotten extremely good fortune with multiple runners on base. When that luck evens out, his ERA will go up. He isn’t pitching well enough to deserve an ERA before 1.00. Realistically, he’s good enough to be an  setup man. Not bad for a guy picked up in AAA.

In July, Brach is struggling as he "only" has a 1.69 ERA. This is because opposing batters have had an .804 OPS against him with two runners on base or with the bases loaded. He's allowed 1 strikeout, 1 walk, 4 outs in play, a single and a double. He's not getting as lucky with two or more runners on base as he had been previously and therefore it's hurting him.

I feel that Brach should be an all-star. Unlike Keith Law, I tend to think that 2016 performance should be the dominant factor in whether a pitcher is sent to the all-star game. I’m willing to consider previous performance when it comes to tiebreakers, but otherwise I want the best pitcher this year. Even if Brach has been lucky, there’s no question he’s also performed. But I also think that looking at RE24 just gives Brach credit for having an excellent BABIP with runners on base. Is that a skill or luck?

Brach is having a good year and has shown significant growth. If he can develop another pitch to use against lefties, he can legitimately become an elite reliever.

More Home Runs are Being Hit Because of the Middle Infield

Over half the season is in the books and one major story of the summer has been that home run rates have exploded to levels akin to the early 2000s.  Some have suggested that all of a sudden that players, all of them, found a new Performance Enhancing Drug that cannot be detected.  Of course, we can logic that out about how everyone just does not start doing something and that therapy treatments are rarely effectively trailblazed by gym rats and muscleheads.  Others have proposed that millennial pitchers lack control and command, leaving balls up in the air to be clobbered.  We dealt with that last week and it seems to hold no sauce.  And then a few folks proclaimed that the ball, while legally within specs, is more juiced compared to other seasons.

I, on the other hand, will make another argument and then I will offer some conjecture.  My argument is that we are not seeing a rise in home run rates around baseball.  What we are seeing are home run rates exploding for middle infielders.  Gone are the years of Cesar Izturises and now we welcome our Jonathan Schoops.  Below is a table with HR/PA rates and percent change from 2015.

American League
	2015	2016	%Change
Catcher	0.030	0.028	-5.1
1B	0.040	0.038	-4.6
2B	0.022	0.030	38.3
3B	0.032	0.037	17.1
SS	0.016	0.025	56.3
LF	0.028	0.026	-7.5
CF	0.022	0.025	13.5
RF	0.035	0.036	3.5
DH	0.035	0.041	16.3
Total	0.027	0.032	10.5
T wo/MI	0.031	0.033	4.6

A paired T-Test with Middle Infield included reaches significance at 0.03 while excluding the Middle Infield balloons it to 0.16.  Meanwhile, a comparison with the National League renders a greater jump with values of 0.0002 and 0.003, respectively.  Group it all together and both wind up as significant with 0.01 and 0.04, respectively.

Below is a graphical representation of how each position league-wide is impacted.  DH (not shown) is tucked into Total and Total without Middle Infielders.

So, the great home run explosion is largely the result of the current crop of middle infielders slugging the ball better than last year's batch.  Roughly, the leagues are seeing a 40% increase in home run hitting from those positions.  That is what is happening.  Now, some conjecture on why it is happening.

While the safe path is to simply call this a remarkable coincidence with so many  young exciting middle infielders this year, such as Jonathan Schoop, Manny Machado, Trevor Story, Marcus Semein, and Roughned Odor.  However, I wonder to what extent defensive shifts come into play here.  For instance, a player like Jonathan Schoop benefits greatly from a shift.  His main detriment is a lack of range while his greatest defensive advantage is his strong arm.  As such, he can play deeper back and utilize a shift to take advantage of his arm and reduce the impact of his limited range.  By doing this, you can get his bat in at second base when before you would need to rely on a more defensive player who likely has a worse bat.

Again, it may just be the ebb and flow of talent has decided to backwell into the middle infield. Or maybe it is a concerted effort to let guys with good bats stick in the middle infield until it is evidenced that they really do not belong there at all.  To a lesser extent, you also see the increase in other shift position like third base and center field.  If you batch position by shift impacted (2B, SS, 3B, and CF) vs. minimally impacted (C, 1B, LF, and RF), you see some stark differences.  Home run rates increased for the shift position by 25% (p=0.006) while minimal shift increased by 2% (p=0.19).

As it stands, it seems untrue to blame millennial pitchers.  It seems highly unlikely that there is some new wonder PED.  It seems curious that a new ball would impact only certain positional hitters.  It seems likely that for one reason or another players who are most employed with defensive shifts are those who also have a much stronger bat than those in years past.