The MASN Lawsuit: Orioles And MASN File An Appellate Brief

The next act in the MASN Lawsuit started a few weeks ago after MASN filed an appeal of the original decision by Justice Marks. As a refresher, the underlying dispute concerns the amount of telecast right fees payable to the Nationals. In 2014, MLBs Revenue Sharing Definitions Committee (RSDC) ruled that MASN would need to pay the Nationals $300 million in rights fees from 2012-2016. The RSDC is an MLB committee comprised of three MLB club owners, each of whom is appointed and at the sole discretion of the Commissioner of Baseball.

MASN argued that the RSDCs ruling was due to an unfair process and appealed their ruling in court. In 2015, Justice Marks agreed with MASN that the process was unfair and vacated the RSDCs original decision. However, Justice Marks didn’t agree to order a rehearing in front of a different arbitral court, but rather that the sides should come to a consensus about the next step. Now, MASN will argue that this case should be reheard in front of a neutral arbitral panel instead of going back to the RSDC.

MASNs argument is that the RSDC can’t rehear the case because MLB is incurably partial, irredeemably biased and financially interested in the outcome. Arbitrators are supposed to be neutral and therefore able to judge fairly. If the RSDC has been biased by MLB, then a rehearing in that forum would ultimately end up being overturned and would simply be a waste of time and judicial resources. There are three primary reasons why MASN argues that this is the case.

MASN notes that the Commissioner of Baseball has stated in a public forum that “sooner or later” MASN will be required to pay the amounts reflected in the now vacated award. The Commissioner has stated publicly how he thinks the RSDC should rule. Due to his ability to appoint owners to the RSDC at his own whim, this could potentially bias their decision. As I’ve mentioned on a number of occasions, it was extremely unwise for the Commissioner to make a number of his public pronouncements. Why give MASN ammunition to claim that MLB and the RSDC is biased?

MLB first attempted to prevent judicial review of the award threatening both the Nationals and Orioles with sanctions if they went ahead with court proceedings. After this threat failed, MLB actively litigated against MASN. This puts into question MLBs ability to be impartial. While it’s understandable that MLB would not be in favor of this, parties have the right to judicial review if they’re unhappy with the result of an arbitration. Again, one has to question the prudence of some of MLBs actions in this case. If MLB stayed on the sidelines and let MASN exercise its rights, they’d be in a much better position to demand that the case be reheard in front of the RSDC.

MLB also decided to give the Nationals $25 million in 2013 to ensure that the Nationals wouldn’t take legal action to demand the release of the award. MLB promised the Nationals that they wouldn’t be required to pay this money back to MLB. Rather, MLB would be repaid from any additional money that MASN would be forced to pay the Nationals for their 2012 and 2013 media rights. Justice Marks felt that this $25 million didn’t bias the RSDC because the award was written before MLB agreed to give the Nationals this cash. However, it seems plausible that it could bias a future RSDC decision because MLB has a current financial stake in the outcome of the case.

It is reasonable to presume that MLB had good intentions when giving the Nationals the $25 million. MLBs hope was that this payment would buy the parties enough time to come to a mutually agreeable decision to avoid a messy court battle. While it is unquestionably true that arbitral bodies like the AAA would never make a payment to a party, it is reasonable to expect different behavior from MLB due to MLBs relationship with each of its clubs. Furthermore, given that MLB made this payment with the knowledge of the RSDCs decision, it’s fair to say that this payment didn’t bias MLB. But now that the decision has been vacated, this payment makes it extremely difficult for MLB or the RSDC to judge the case fairly. While MLB had good intentions, it was irresponsible not to get buy-in from all the parties before giving the Nationals money. MLB may have an interest in ensuring that each of its clubs resolve their differences peacefully, but that doesn’t give MLB the right to make a deal that hurts another party.

MASN also discussed the relationship between MLB and the RSDC. MASN makes the claim that MLB was in charge of conducting the prehearing conference, determining which data was provided to the parties, provided data and instructions to the arbitrators, discussed the case with the arbitrators and ultimately wrote the final award. Manfred also wrote a set of e-mails to Alan Rifkin discussing scenarios where MLB would look into either not issuing the RSDCs award or giving the RSDC different instructions in the future. There is a substantial amount of evidence showing that the RSDC has very little independence from MLB and therefore can’t be trusted to give an independent decision.

MASN also notes that MLB primarily used the Bortz Methodology to determine the fair amount of rights fees for team controlled RSNs. This methodology was used at least 19 times over a decade and a half to determine fair market value. However, soon after Bortz sided with MASN in this court case, MLB decided to end its relationship with Bortz and Mr. Wyche. This just further shows how MLB will punish any party that dares disagree with their dictates.

MASN did an excellent job tying the RSDC to MLB and showing how MLB is biased against MASN. Simply put, fair arbitrators don’t argue for one side. If the appellate court ultimately does agree with MASN, then this will largely be due to some poor decisions by MLB. The Commissioner didn’t have to make public remarks suggesting that MASN would lose and indeed this made him look biased. Nor was MLB required to join the lawsuit in support of the Nationals. MLB could have ensured that all parties were willing to let MLB give the Nationals the $25 million instead of doing it behind the Orioles’ and MASN’s back. Finally, MLB could have done a better job ensuring that the arbitral body was able to make a fair and impartial decision. Due to this collection of errors, MASN has a strong stronger chance of convincing the arbitral body that the RSDC is unable to be partial and that this case needs to go in front of a different arbitral panel. If this occurs, MLB can only blame itself for the embarrassment and loss of prestige that it will suffer.

To the best of my knowledge, neither the Nationals nor MLB has written a response to this brief. It will be easier to understand these parties’ positions after they write such a response. Both the Nationals and MLB wrote a pre-argument statement when filing their appeal against Justice Marks’ decision, but failed to explain why they felt his decision should be overturned. Indeed, the Nationals have argued that Justice Marks’ decision should be overturned solely if the appellate court feels that this case should be arbitrated by a different panel. In addition, MLB and the Nationals will argue that the parties in this arbitration have chosen their method of dispute resolution, and can ask no more impartiality than inheres in the method they have chosen.

A number of things will occur before this case is heard by the appellate court. Both MLB and the Nationals will appeal Justice Marks’ decision because they don’t think the RSDCs original decision should have been vacated. If the arbitral court agrees with MLB, then the original decision will be reinstated and MASN will be largely out of legal options. In addition, the Nationals want to appeal Justice Marks’ decision that the parties shouldn’t go back in front of the RSDC a second time before the appeals are completed. Ironically, despite the Nationals’ claims that they want this matter judged expeditiously, this appeal will do nothing more than waste time. The Washington Post believes that the appellate court will hear oral arguments in December.

The next act may have started, but there will be a lot of documents written before it is complete.

Ridiculous Trade Idea: How The Orioles Could Acquire Chris Sale

We all know the Orioles need another decent starting pitcher. But what they could really use is an excellent starting pitcher. Considering the O's farm system, however, they don't have the necessary pieces to acquire a true ace (if one were truly available). Well, let's go a little outside the box, then.

The Washington Nationals are desperate for a solid late-game relief arm. Hey, the Orioles have some of those (and one who is really, really good in Zach Britton)! And if you believe everything that's passed along from apparently plugged-in MLB reporters (hint: not always a great idea), the Nationals are willing to trade prized starting pitching prospect Lucas Giolito to accomplish the task:

Sources who have spoken with #Nats believe they would trade Lucas Giolito to #Yankees for Andrew Miller, straight up.

— Jon Morosi (@jonmorosi) July 29, 2016

Apparently the Yankees are not willing to do this. But, you know, perhaps the Orioles should. The Orioles are trying to win now, and dominant relief arms are extremely important. But the O's should also be in the hunt for any kind of starting rotation help. And picking up one of the best young starters in the minors while also not trading away a young, everyday talent like Jonathan Schoop is enticing.

Picking up Giolito but losing Britton, though, isn't a win-now move. While it definitely helps in the long run, losing Britton still hurts. And even though it would make sense to keep Giolito and hope he transforms into an ace, why not use him to trade for someone who's already an ace? That ace would be Chris Sale.

As they should, the White Sox are asking for a ridiculous amount in return for Sale. If they were somehow able to land Giolito, the O's would be able to put together a competitive package for the... let's say, eccentric lefty. By offering Giolito and then two or three of the team's top prospects -- Chance Sisco, Cody Sedlock, Jomar Reyes, Ryan Mountcastle, etc. -- the O's would have a shot to land one of the very best starters in the game.

By doing so, Sale would headline a rotation that immediately doesn't make you shake your head in frustration:

Chris Sale
Chris Tillman
Kevin Gausman
Yovani Gallardo
Dylan Bundy

Regardless of what you think of Bundy's usage, that's a very intriguing and talented crop of pitchers (minus Gallardo). And the best thing about acquiring Sale, besides him being outstanding, is that he's under team control through 2019 for extremely reasonable terms: $12M in 2017, $12.5M option for 2018, and $13.5M club option for 2019. I mean, that's Ubaldo Jimenez money!

Will this actually happen? Of course not. The O's aren't going to trade Britton in the middle of a pennant race, though it will make sense to explore a Britton trade during the offseason. Still, you could kinda, sorta imagine it happening. And it's at least interesting, right?

How Much MASN Money Is At Stake?

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The Washington Post recently claimed that:

"Television contracts play a major role in the sport’s finances, which for the Nationals prevents an obstacle. They suffered a major setback last month in their legal fight with MASN and the Baltimore Orioles over how much money they should receive in rights fees. Their television contract with the Orioles, put into place by Major League Baseball before the Lerners purchased the team, ensures they cannot reap profits from their rights fees as much as other teams in their situation could.

The fate of MASN and Harper are intertwined. It’s why Boras, in December 2014, attended one of the New York Supreme Court hearings in New York regarding MASN."

Thomas Boswell has also wondered whether having that money would have impacted their last offseason. Camden Depot and others have discussed the implications of Justice Marks ruling in favor of MASN and vacating the RSDC's decision. What hasn’t been well defined is how this decision financially impacts the Orioles and Nationals or the amount of money that is actually at stake. Could this decision potentially cause the Nationals to lose Bryce Harper?

The Washington Post has stated that the difference between the RSDC decision and MASN's offer is $20M per year in annual TV rights fees. This is technically accurate, but misleading because it ignores changes in equity stake distributions and impacts of revenue sharing. Basically, suppose someone worked at a job where they received both a salary and an end of the year bonus. If ones' salary increased $20,000 but their bonus decreased by $20,000 then they wouldn't see an increase in income. These extra annual TV rights fees come out of profits and means that the Nationals receive less in profits then they would otherwise.

Documentation filed in the court case shows that the actual difference between the two offers is $9.2 million in 2012 (plus $4.2 million in interest and tax rebates), $10.9 million in 2013 (plus $180,000 in interest) and $10.6 million in 2014 resulting in a total of $30.7 million. There has been no documentation provided to the public discussing the difference for 2015 and this figure probably hasn't been calculated yet. MASN disagrees with these figures in part because they don’t account for all the cash that MASN has given the Nationals.

However, as first publicized by Jonah Keri, MLB decided to compensate the Nationals for the difference between these two scenarios for both 2012 and 2013. The Nationals requested and received documentation from MLB stating that they don’t need to repay this money regardless of how this situation is ultimately resolved. MLB further reiterated this in court in December. If the Bortz Methodology is ultimately implemented, then the Nationals will keep the $25 million from MLB and the extra profit distributions from MASN. This will result in them receiving more money than they're supposed to receive.

In any event, the Nationals have received all of the money that they're supposed to for 2012 and 2013. The only money that the Nationals haven’t received already is the $10.6 million in 2014, whatever they’d receive in 2015 and relevant interest and tax compensation.

The documents that MLB provided explaining why the Nationals were owed what they were in 2012 and 2013 can help determine what they might be owed in 2015. Below is the document describing what MLB thought that the Nationals were owed in 2013.

Basically, there are five steps involved. The first step is to determine the difference in media rights fees between the two offers. The second step takes into account revenue sharing and the Market DQ. Subtracting these two numbers from each other is the difference in media rights fees after taking revenue sharing into account.

The third step is to determine the much interest MASN owes the Nationals for not paying them right away as well as the taxes the Nationals owe due to receiving money as profits as opposed to rights fees.

The fourth step is to determine the difference that the Nationals receive in profits due to these two decisions and the fifth step is to simply add the increased rights fees to the interest and subtract from the reduced profits.

In order to determine the difference for 2015, the first step is to determine the difference in media rights fees between MASN's offer and the RSDC's decision. For 2015, the RSDC decision was that the Nationals TV rights were worth $62,611,974 while MASN's argument was that they were worth $42,044,874. Multiplying this number ($20,567,100) by two ($41,134,200) is the entire extra amount that MASN needs to pay both teams and therefore the amount that comes out of MASN's profits.

The second step is determining the amount of media rights fees that goes towards revenue sharing. Teams do not need to pay revenue sharing taxes (32.866%) for money distributed by RSNs via equity rights distributions but do for money earned via media rights fees. The RSDC decision would increase media rights fees at the expense of equity rights distributions and therefore trigger larger revenue sharing taxes. 32.866% of $20,567,100 is $6,759,583 and therefore the extra amount that each club would owe via revenue sharing taxes.

However, in the latest CBA (Attachment 26), a new clause was created called market disqualification. Prior to the current CBA, large market clubs (top fifteen clubs by market rank) were able to receive revenue sharing funds if they had below average revenue. This led to a situation where teams in small markets such as the Cardinals were forced to subsidize teams in large markets such as Nationals or Mets because they were successful and the other teams were less so. Teams earning a large amount of revenue could accept the need to help subsidize teams like the Rays, Marlins and Orioles that are in small or mid-sized markets but didn’t think it was fair to be forced to subsidize teams in large markets such as the Mets.

The current CBA has a rule that prohibits large market teams like the Nationals (ranked #12) from receiving revenue sharing funds. It was scheduled to start in 2013, when large market teams were to receive only 75% of what they would if they were small market teams and decrease by 25% for the next three years.

The Nationals were receiving money from revenue sharing from 2012 to 2014 and therefore had below average (mean) revenue in those years. If this trend continues in 2015, then it is possible that they wouldn’t pay any revenue sharing taxes on this extra revenue. If the Nationals did have above average revenue in 2015, then they would be taxed as much as $6,759,583. The Orioles are ranked twentieth and therefore would pay revenue sharing taxes on this revenue regardless of whether they had below average revenue.

The third step is to determine the difference that each team receives via equity rights distributions based on MASN's proposal and the RSDC ruling. The RSDC ruling states that an extra $41,134,200 should be awarded to the teams’ via media rights fees. The Nationals control 16% of MASN as of 2015, and therefore would lose $6,581,472 in equity rights distributions while the Orioles would lose $34,552,728 in equity rights distributions.

It is safe to say that the Nationals would receive no more than $14 million and earn no less than $7.2 million before interest and tax payments while the Orioles would lose roughly $20.75 million in 2015 if the RSDC decision was implemented instead of Bortz.

Of course, all of this revenue wouldn’t necessarily go to payroll. The rule of thumb is that 47% of revenue goes towards payroll suggesting that the RSDC decision would increase the Nationals payroll by between $3.4 and $6.6 million and decrease the Orioles payroll by about $10 million. Matt Swartz argues that only 40% of revenue now goes to payroll and therefore the impact on payroll is even lower than the above figures. This would seem to have a minimal impact given the amount that the Nationals spend on players and therefore would mostly be a non-factor when deciding to extend Harper. It could potentially have a larger impact on the Orioles.

It is important to understand that if the Nationals have above average revenue then they’ll receive a minimal amount of cash from MASN. If the Nationals have below average revenue then they may receive a good chunk of change from MASN in this situation but then they have below average revenue.

In the meantime, they had a $165 million dollar payroll in 2015 or the fifth or sixth highest in the majors. If they did have below average revenue then this means that the Nationals payroll was $30 to $40 million more than their revenue would suggest and therefore that they lost a lot of money in comparison to other teams. It would seem that having below average revenue but above average payrolls would have a bigger impact on the Nationals' future payroll decisions then how this case is ultimately resolved.

The Nationals spent so much money on payroll because they had a chance to sign Max Scherzer in free agency and were unwilling to pass up the opportunity. It’s hard to argue with that decision given that he threw two no-hitters, had an ERA of 2.79 and an fWAR of 6.2 in nearly 230 innings despite somehow having a 14-12 record. He may have been expensive but was certainly a dominant starter.

Instead of praising the Lerners for being willing to absolutely shatter their budget and suffer significant losses in an attempt to win, the Washington Post argues that this signing was simply an example of the Lerners trying to do too much. Boswell argues that the Lerners set sufficient yet inflexible budgets and that therefore made it impossible for Mike Rizzo to make in-season additions such as Gerardo Parra or Tyler Clippard. Mr. Wagner argued that this was a clear flaw in the Nationals’ process since “Because of ownership, the front office had little wiggle room in adding payroll.” The Post further argued that: “this will be the Lerners’ toughest offseason to show good judgment, respect their baseball people and do enough but not too much. And it will be the roughest winter for Rizzo, whose astronomical batting average has been seriously dented by hiring Matt Williams and trading for [Jonathan] Papelbon.”

These hometown writers seem to believe that the Lerners’ made a mistake by signing a genuine ace rather than having flexibility to trade for an outfielder that had a .237/.268/.357 line, an OPS+ of 69 and -1 fWAR after the trade deadline. If I had the option, I’d rather have the ace and damn the midseason flexibility.

The Lerners recently were involved in picking a new manager for their club. They ended up in the enviable position of deciding they were interested in both Bud Black and Dusty Baker. They were unsure which one they wanted so they started negotiations with both with compensation being a deciding factor. The Nationals were able to reach a mutually beneficial deal with Dusty Baker albeit not with Bud Black. Instead of praising the Lerners for properly using leverage to save money to go after top free agents, the hometown paper decided to write a number of articles criticizing them.

The Washington Post called this decision “a fiasco” and said that the Lerners should know better by now. They further wrote that "This season, the Lerners shelled out $165 million in payroll for players, sixth in the majors. Good for them. They still lack an understanding of how to treat people within their industry." They also claimed that “the Lerners are generally unwilling to spend freely on big free agents” despite the fact that the Nationals have signed high profile free agents such as Jayson Werth, Rafael Soriano, Dan Haren, Adam LaRoche and Edwin Jackson from 2011 to 2014. My datafile that tracks free agent spending has the Nationals ranked a respectable #10 in the majors over that four year period. It certainly seems like they were willing to spend on high profile free agents.

It is unclear why the Washington Post wrote what it did. Perhaps their writers really think that having the flexibility to trade for Parra and Clippard is more valuable than adding Scherzer. Maybe they believe that paying a manager a few million more than necessary will somehow help his performance and improve chemistry. Or maybe the real problem that the Washington Post has with the Lerners isn’t about their decisions but that they declined requests to comment through a team spokesman to talk during the season as well as declined repeated requests  for comment during the late-inning slide.

It is worth noting that the Braves general manager is also receiving his share of criticism. Mr. Coppolella recently had a phone conversation with reporter Bob Nightengale in which he complained about all of the accusations he's been receiving. He said "I’m getting so tired of this. If guys want to take shots, or (degrade) us, fine. But let’s let it play out for a few years before we start branding our pitchforks and torches. I feel in my heart this is the best for the Braves." This is despite the fact that Atlanta media has been supportive of his moves. If nothing else, it appears that high ranking officials are aware of what both the fans and media say about them and take it to heart.

The Lerner family has been reported to be frustrated due to the team’s competitive struggles despite their high payroll. This should come as no surprise as they lost tens of millions of dollars last year to try and build a winner and got savaged by their hometown media. They probably weren't happy to see article after article insulting them.

Given the Nationals’ inability to produce in 2015 and the excellent depth created by Rizzo, it would not be surprising if their payroll dropped in 2016. Why spend extra money if it isn’t appreciated and not necessary to build a winner? Why spend extra money if it just results in being mocked by the press?

If their payroll does drop, it won’t be due to an adverse decision in the MASN situation. This situation will have a minimal impact on year-to-year spending and is primarily valuable for maximizing long term asset value. And it's preposterous to argue that this situation could cause the Nationals to lose Harper. The Lerners have shown a willingness to lose money to build a top baseball team and it's unlikely that having a few million less in revenue will make them decide they can't afford to keep a Hall of Fame player. The only reason that their payroll may drop is because the Nationals lost a significant amount of money in 2015 and their reward was to be called inflexible for busting their budget signing Scherzer instead of going after Parra and Clippard as well as being called incompetent for negotiating for a manager.

How the New York Times Baseball Map Hurts MASN

The New York Times recently published an interactive map showing the percentage of Facebook fans for a given baseball team in a zip code or county. At first glance it looks pretty neat but it has negative consequences for MASN and by extension the Nationals and Orioles. In order to understand this it is necessary to look at two court cases.

The first court case was between Time Warner and MASN. Time Warner is the primary cable provider in North Carolina. Time Warner refused to carry MASN because the Orioles and Nationals had little popularity in North Carolina despite being considered the hometown teams. After years of court cases, the FCC agreed with Time Warner and allowed them not to carry MASN. If Time Warner was able to refuse to carry MASN in areas where the Orioles and Nationals weren’t popular then why can’t other providers do the same?

The second court case was between Comcast and MASN. Comcast didn’t want to carry MASN in parts of the Harrisburg/Lancaster/Lebanon/York, Tri-Cities TN-VA and Roanoke-Lynchburg Virginia areas. Comcast and MASN ultimately agreed to compromise. Comcast would broadcast MASN in those areas but wouldn’t pay any damages for refusing MASN carriage in earlier years. The reasoning why Comcast didn’t want to broadcast MASN isn’t important. What’s important is that they didn’t want to broadcast MASN in those regions.

If Comcast and other providers can prove using this map that the Orioles and Nationals have a limited fan base in certain areas where they are broadcast then they may want to revisit the decision to carry MASN in those areas. This is especially true for Comcast in the areas where they originally didn’t intend to carry MASN but were forced to do so in court.

The Orioles/Nationals media territory encompasses all of Maryland; Virginia; the District; Delaware; seven counties in West Virginia; 13 counties and three cities — York, Lancaster and Harrisburg — in central Pennsylvania; and most of central and eastern North Carolina. The territory can be seen on this map submitted in court testimony.

Unfortunately, the New York Times new interactive tool shows that there are a limited number of Orioles and Nationals fans in parts of this territory.

In Pennsylvania, the Orioles are the most popular team in Franklin, Adams, York and Fulton counties. They are one of the three most popular teams in Bedford and Cumberland counties. York, Adams, Franklin and Cumberland counties are all considered part of the DC/Baltimore inner region where MASN charges its largest subscriber fee. Fulton and Bedford counties are not in the Orioles/Nationals media territory. This is good news because the Orioles can justify having these counties as part of the DC/Baltimore inner region due to their high popularity.

The bad news is that the Orioles aren’t one of the three most popular teams in any other county in Pennsylvania. Fewer than 6% of baseball fans in Lancaster County, 8% of baseball fans in Lebanon Country and 9% of baseball fans in Dauphin County (where Harrisburg is located) are Orioles fans. Since the New York Times tool only shows the popularity of the three most popular teams it is impossible to tell how popular the Orioles are in those counties but it is probable that the Orioles have single digit popularity in every other county in the DMA aside from the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Neither the Orioles nor Nationals are considered one of three most popular teams in any county in North Carolina. This indicates that fewer than 10% of baseball fans in any county in North Carolina are fans of the Orioles or Nationals. Times Warner has 1.4 million cable subscribers in North Carolina and if the Orioles or Nationals were more popular than MASN could argue that Time Warner is discriminating against them by refusing them carriage. Unfortunately, this map just strengthens Time Warner’s position.

However, what’s more shocking is the limited number of Nationals and Orioles fans in Virginia. Highland County is the only county in the Roanoke-Lynchburg DMA where the Nationals or Orioles are one of the three most popular teams. In Highland County, the Orioles have a 12% popularity rate. The only county in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News DMA where the Orioles or Nationals are one of the three most popular teams is Accomack County where the Orioles are the most popular team. The Orioles or Nationals aren’t one of the three most popular teams in any county in the Tri-States DMA. The Orioles and Nationals are more popular in the Richmond-Petersburg DMA. There are a number of counties bordering the Washington DC/Hagerstown DMA where the Orioles and Nationals are one of the three most popular teams. In the central and southern part of the DMA, the Nationals or Orioles aren’t one of the three most popular teams in any of the counties. Neither the Orioles nor Nationals are popular in Central or Southern Virginia. There is some good news. The Orioles are popular in the Harrisonburg DMA while the Nationals are popular in the Charlottesville DMA. Likewise, the Orioles and Nationals are popular in the Baltimore, Salisbury and Washington DC-Hagerstown DMA.

There are 670,000 cable and satellite households in the Norfolk DMA, 525,000 cable and satellite households in the Richmond DMA, 420,000 households in the Roanoke-Lynchburg DMA, 303,000 households in the Tri Cities DMA, 680,000 households in the Harrisburg DMA and nearly 3 million cable and satellite households in North Carolina. Many of these households do not currently receive MASN. Some of these households live in counties where one of the Orioles or Nationals is popular. But if Comcast, Cox and other cable providers decide that it doesn’t make sense to pay the current rates for MASN in regions where the Nationals and Orioles have single digit popularity then it could cost MASN millions of dollars each year in subscriber fees.

It’s hard to quantify an exact number that MASN could lose if this happens. The Nationals and Orioles are still popular in their core media regions where they charge their subscribers the largest monthly subscriber fee and where they receive most of their revenue.  As a result, I doubt that MASN would be unprofitable even if cable providers refused carriage to MASN in regions where neither team is popular. But I do think that it would cause MASN to become less profitable and therefore weaken the Orioles and Nationals position.

This interactive map looks nice. It is possible to learn a lot from it. But it has huge implications that could end up hurting MASN.