Showing posts with label 2012 Orioles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2012 Orioles. Show all posts

24 January 2013

Can the Orioles Expect to Bounce Back by Being Healthy This Year?

There is a simple phrase going about, "The Orioles were lucky last season."  This in turn has sprouted talk radio segments and internet articles on how the Orioles in fact had bad luck last year, too.  My immediate response is that: (1) The Orioles were lucky in how well they did in games decided by one run by going 29-9 (one run win records are highly variable year to year with no predictability, but typically group around .500--in other words, they performed 10 wins better than expected) and (2) The Orioles' misfortune with injuries was not out of the ordinary.  With that perspective, I find the whole argument insufficient to think the team will bounce back merely due to good health, but that is sort of a lazy way of going about it.  Let us jump into some numbers.

Jeff Sullivan has done a great job with collecting disabled list numbers.  You can find his collected information here on the DL (edit-some of the datai is squirrelly and I used it as is. There needs to be some double checking on it).  How does the AL East look?


Total Consequence
Blue Jays 1431 228
Orioles 1381 109
Rays 987 200
Red Sox 1604 213
Yankees 1753 672
The table above shows the total number of days on the DL spent by players of a specific organization as well as the total number of days spent by players who I deemed as significant losses.  Those lists are certainly arguable:
Blue Jays - Jose Bautista (77), Brett Lawrie (34), J.P. Arencibia (43), Brandon Morrow (74)
Orioles - Nick Markakis (38), Jason Hammel (54), Mark Reynolds (17)
Rays - Evan Longoria (98), B.J. Upton (17), Desmond Jennings (24), Jeff Keppinger (34), Matt Joyce (27)
Red Sox - Jacoby Ellsbury (90), Cody Ross (31), Dustin Pedroia (15), David Ortiz (77)
Yankees - Michael Pineda (183), Brett Gardner (160), Mariano Rivera (153), CC Sabathia (37), Andy Pettite (83), Alex Rodriguez (40), Ivan Nova (17)
I think the only teams where they may be some argument in whether or not I left out a player of consequence would be the Orioles and Red Sox.  I am fairly confidant in those lists those.  For the Orioles, Zach Britton and Nolan Reimold are missing.  Britton's issues with control and Reimold's history (along with McLouth's emergence) cast doubt on how meaningful those absences really were.  I'm not sure Britton's absence is all that much different from the Blue Jays missing Dustin McGowan or the Rays missing Jeff Niemann and Jeremy Hellickson.

For the Red Sox, I decided not to include Carl Crawford, John Lackey, Josh Beckett, Kevin Youkilis, and Felix Doubront.  The first four names are big names and the last is a younger player who shows good potential.  However, I think there is a good argument to suggest that these players may not have added much to the team.  I am still a Carl Crawford believer (though not at that money) and the Yankees think Youkilis is a good player to have around (evidenced by the contract he received for the upcoming year).


Back to the table above, I think there are a couple ways to look at it.  One, looking at the overall numbers, the Orioles appear to be not much different from the rest of the division on average (1431 days), so it is difficult to say they suffered extraordinary through DL visits on that point.  When you look at the number of days lost to the absence of players of consequence, the Orioles actually appear quite lucky in comparison to the other teams.  If you add in Reimold and Britton along with the other teams adding in their arguably marginal talent, you get the follow table for DL days:


Loose
Blue Jays 411
Orioles 447
Rays 324
Red Sox 594
Yankees 672
The average above is 490 days.  Again, nothing seems incredibly unique about the number of days lost to injury for the Orioles.  Health alone does not seem to be something the Orioles suffered worse for than the other teams in the division.

In the end, I think the hope for next year is that somehow two months of play from Chris Tillman, Miguel Gonzalez, Nate McLouth, and Manny Machado will somehow be extrapolated over the course of an entire season.  If that happens, it adds about 8 or 9 wins to the team.  So, yes, if you believe those four are real and the performances of the others on the team can be repeated as well as the club not suffering more significant injuries than they suffered last year (as opposed to the Rays, Blue Jays, Yankees, and Red Sox who lost top tier elite players over large swaths of the season)...then, yes, the Orioles could repeat their success seen in 2012 for 2013 without fortune smiling on them in one run games.

21 December 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Adam Jones

Adam Jones. Above average hitter despite plate discipline issues. Gold Glove center-fielder, even though the defensive stats don't like him. Team leader, who entered the season only 26 years old and approaching free agency. Jones may not have quite lived up to the expectation some had of him when he was acquired from the Mariners for Erik Bedard* in previous seasons, but he sure made up for some of that with how he started the 2012 season.

* Along with Chris Tillman. And George Sherrill, who go the team Steven Johnson. And Kam Mickolio, who was sent to the D'Backs in the Mark Reynolds trade. That Erik Bedard deal ended up having big ramifications for the '12 O's playoff-bound team. And to think, many fans hated it at the time.

The Orioles got off to a hot start, going 14-9 in April, and a big part of that was Jones tearing the cover off the ball - .333/.368/.611 with 6 home runs. And it didn't slow down in May, as a lower batting average was made up for with some extra pop and a few more walks - .298/.362/.623 and 10 longballs. Was the Adam Jones some people always thought he could be finally arriving? Well... no, not really. It was pretty clear even in the early going that his home run per flyball rate was unsustainably high, and would surely come down (dragging his batting line with it somewhat).

That didn't stop the Orioles from giving Jones a 6 year, $85 M contract though. Panned by some due to the obviousness of the first two months being a hot streak and Jones' low OBP, (and obviously loved by most O's fans), I thought it was a solid deal for the club - one which paid him to be the guy he was in previous seasons (good, but not great) as opposed to expecting him to have reached a new level. (And with the increase in salaries we're apparently seeing, the contract might look a little better now.)

Adam rewarded the team by having an atrocious June, combining a power-outage with a lack of patience as he hit just .272/.299/.427. There were ups and downs after that, but from the day he agreed to the contract extension until the end of the year, Jones hit .277/.325/.467. From 2009 to 2011, Adam Jones hit a combined .281/.326/.455. Generally speaking, he was who we thought he was, plus maybe a little bit extra. He still swung at way too many pitches out of the strike-zone (and missed a lot of them), but the additional extra-base hits (not so much the homers, which is what people noticed, but the doubles - Jones hit 39 of them after years of only 21-26) made up for it, as they have in the past.

Overall, Jones ended up getting some MVP votes with his career high 32 home runs and .287/.334/.505 line (and 4.6 fWAR, but I doubt his voters were looking too closely at that). I think he was undoubtedly the Orioles' 2012 MVP, even if his playoff performance was a horror show (.077/.074/.077). Going forward, it seems more likely Jones will settle in more in the 2.5-4 win range than approach 5 as he did (or 7+, as he was on pace for early); and it's at least possible that the increase in doubles portents that an expected drop-off in HR/FB rate might be mitigated somewhat by some of those two-baggers clearing the fence, and he's closer to the higher point in that range.

And that's just fine. An above average hitter (105 wRC+ career, 126 in 2012 due to his hot start) with plate discipline issues (4.8% walk rate career, 4.9% last season) is still an above average hitter (with some upside potential). A center-fielder who the defensive stats don't like (-7 UZR, -16 DRS) is still a guy playing up the middle (so he could be an OK corner outfielder, where his bat would still play - and, to my eye, I thought he looked a little better out there for much of the season). A now 27 year-old team leader who's going to be hanging around for the next few years (and is also a good player) isn't a bad thing to have around for a club that's hopefully going to at least have a chance of being competitive.

04 December 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Wilson Betemit

When the Orioles signed Wilson Betemit to a two-year contract, it was initially a little confusing. Multiple years for a part-time player? But the price was low enough ($3.25 M total), and Betemit's adequate production in 2012 has things looking alright even if the O's decide to cut ties with him.

Though he missed a fair bit of time later in the season, Betemit started often in the first four months and still amassed his most plate appearances since 2006 (376). At the plate, he largely repeated his 2011 season, minus over 50 points of BABIP - it fell all the way to .336 (still well above average and around his .341 career mark). Betemit was able to walk (even if his 8.2% rate of drawing free passes was down a bit) and hit for some power though, which kept his batting line of .261/.322/.422 just barely above average (101 wRC+) despite him striking out in over 27% of his plate appearances.

It's been said before, but it might be a good idea for Betemit to give up on the switch-hitting entirely - and 2012 was a new low for the guy as a right-handed swinger. As a lefty, Betemit's .302/.357/.502 is more than worthy of a starting job even if his third-base defense leaves a little to be desired*. As a righty, it was a disaster; .140/.219/.186 and a wRC+ of 10. 10! Almost 30% of the pitchers who had at least 50 PA on the season finished with a wRC+ above 10. Though he might not have always been able to maximize it, Buck did get Betemit in there against righties a touch more often than had been the case for Wilson in recent years.

* Betemit was pressed into service at the position when it became clear that Mark Reynolds was not going to be able to handle it, and was more or less his usual self over there with a -5.5 UZR (-12 UZR per 150 games, compared to -14 per 150 career).

Overall, Betemit's 0.7 fWAR (0.6 rWAR) made him a fine contributor to the team and worth his $1 M (and then some). Having him as a "left-handed" bat of the bench who can fill in various positions (he also played some first and left-field) when needed for 2013 isn't bad, but counting on him to be play almost every day (when healthy) might not be for the best (especially given that 324 more PA would cause his 2013 option for $3.2 M to vest).

30 November 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Chris Tillman

When the Orioles acquired Chris Tillman from the Mariners in the Erik Bedard trade, he was considered a top prospect. Mid 90s fastball, big curve, good numbers in the minors at a young age. Tillman continued that minor league success for the O's, before getting called up to the big club in 2009. Since then, it had been a series of disappointments surrounding occasional flashes of upside - largely due to a fastball that declined from 92 mph to 90 mph to 89 mph last year, and didn't have the movement or command to compensate.

This season, Chris Tillman seemed like a different guy. In Triple-A, he posted numbers we hadn't seen since 2009; striking out better than a batter an inning while keeping the walks and home runs down (3 BB/9, 0.5 HR/9). When he was brought up to the Majors in July, he showed us why - his first start, he averaged 95 mph with the fastball, while pitching 8.1 innings against the Mariners and striking out 7 (he gave up 2 runs, both unearned). Hope had been rekindled.

Tillman ended up pitching 86 innings for Baltimore, and though he never again touched those Seattle highs, he was effective enough to keep rotation spot while things were constantly in flux for the O's. His 6.9 K/9 was only about average, but it was a career high. And he managed it while walking only 2.5 batters per nine.

Beyond throwing harder again - his fastball averaged a touch over 92 mph - Tillman also showed a more distinct repertoire, with the cutter figuring more prominently and the slider being its own offering. Here are the whiff rates on his pitches:

FastballCurveChangeCutterSlider
200910%26%32%--
201012%17%26%--
201110%18%19%24%21%
201214%27%28%14%25%

The fastball was a bit better, but the curve and change regained their prior success.

Tillman once again had a reverse platoon split in 2012; 3.67 xFIP versus lefties, and 5.39 xFIP versus righties. You can see that the improved whiff rates on his off-speed pitches from this, as lefties missed his change-up 31% of the time they swung at it and the curve 33% of the time. That's more like what happened in 2009, then in the previous two years when he could crack 20% against lefties with either pitch, though in 2011 the slider and cutter picked up some of that slack.

For his career, Tillman has actually handles lefties a fair bit better than righties, striking out almost 2 more batters per nine against them (6.9 K/9 vs. 5.2 K/9). Part of that is the change-up, which he used to throw mostly and now throws almost exclusively to left-handed batters, and which is maybe his best pitch - it not only gets swings and misses, but also some groundballs now (it had a 51% groundball rate in 2012). Right-handed batters were much more likely to see the slider and cutter this year, and as those are Tillman's newer (and, likely, worse) pitches, it's not so surprising that he'd be somewhat less effective with them.

That's actually not a terrible sign for his future, I think. If opposing teams don't pick up on this (or if the disparity goes away, as is possible considering we're talking about less than 150 IP against either side), then Tillman might once again get to face more lefties than righties (60% of the batters he faced in 2012 were left-handed; up from 58% in 2011 and 50% in 2010). And further development of the cutter or slider could help him decrease the split - a 3.67 xFIP against lefties is pretty darn good from a right-handed pitcher. Plus, he's (still) only 24 years old.

Going back to the fastball velocity - though it did take a distinct tumble after his 2012 debut, it still averaged 92 mph (and was more like 91-92 late in the year). That isn't as exciting as seeing him touch 98, but can be perfectly serviceable in a Major League rotation when combined with decent control and some quality off-speed pitches (especially if he can hold mid 90s in the tank for when he needs it). 

There are certainly some less positive signs; Tillman's 2.93 ERA is largely an illusion created by his .221 BABIP. He is a flyball pitcher and does induce more than his share of pop-ups, so a better than average BABIP isn't unexpected, but certainly nothing near that low. On the flip side to that, as an extreme flyball pitcher (and his 2012 groundball rate was a career low 35%) who doesn't suppress home runs like some of the more successful pitchers of that type have, Tillman can be susceptible to the longball - as his 1.3 HR.9 allowed can attest. Also, despite dropping his walk rate to 2.5 BB/9, he didn't really avoid three-ball counts or get ahead of batter much more than he had previously (a little bit, but not as much as one would think given that his previous career walk rate had been 4 BB/9). So some of the old flaws are still around, at least in part.

Overall, Tillman's 4.34 xFIP is probably more indicative of how well he pitched than his ERA (and his FIP of 4.24 leans much more towards the former). That xFIP is more or less in line with what the Orioles got from their starters overall in 2012, and ranked Tillman behind Hammel and Arrieta, and tied with Chen, but in front of Miguel Gonzalez, Brian Matusz, and various guys I wouldn't expect to starting games for the team in 2013. That probably leaves Tillman with a rotation spot heading into next season, but one that he'll need to maintain or improve upon his 2012 season to hold on to. And for the first time in a while, I have at least some confidence that that's possible.

20 November 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Tommy Hunter

Quick; who was second on the Orioles in innings pitched this year (pretend you haven't seen the title)?

Right, Tommy Hunter with 133.2 IP. Sometimes you just need a guy to take the ball, I guess.

The O's picked Hunter up from the Rangers last season in the Koji Uehara trade, and moved him from the bullpen (where he spent all of 2011 for Texas) to the rotation. He began 2012 as the O's #2 starter, but that didn't go especially well.

It wasn't totally unexpected; Hunter maintained his excellent control (1.8 BB/9) but continued to not miss many bats (4.7 K/9). The biggest problem - by far - was that batters started to take Hunter deep left and right. Allowing 30 home runs in 20 games (2.3 HR/9) is not a recipe for success, and his ERA (5.71) and FIP (6.09) reflected that.

Of course some of that was poor fortune, as Hunter's 21.3% HR/FB rate was the highest in the Majors for starters with at least 100 IP. That's why his xFIP was a more reasonable 4.52, which still isn't good but is more in line with his career numbers as a back of the rotation starter.

Hunter was used in relief a couple times earlier in the season, but finally moved to the bullpen full-time in September. And that's where he may have finally found his role. Because Tommy Hunter the starter throws a 90-91 mph fastball, but Tommy Hunter the reliever throws a 95-96 mph fastball that he can actually blow by people. Here's the change in whiff rates against his pitches during the year:

Fastball
Cutter
Curve
Slider
Change-up
Sinker
April-August
11%
10%
20%
13%
20%
10%
September
20%
15%
18%
29%
-
-

As a reliever, he simplified his repertoire and is much more content to let it rip with the heater. It's also possible that the slider compliments things better that way than the curve, but this is a relatively small number of pitches to look at.

In any case, it's working. Out of the bullpen, Hunter pitched to a 3.71 ERA, 3.45 FIP, and 3.39 xFIP. Only Troy Patton had a lower xFIP (and his was just 0.01 lower) of pitchers with more than Tommy's 17 innings out of the pen. Hunter struck out 16 batters in those 17 innings, while handing out just 3 unintentional walks. he also threw the fastest pitch of any Oriole this year, at 100.1 mph.

As nonplussed as I was about the excitement some had when the O's added Hunter to the team as a starter, I can definitely get on board with him as a power-reliever who can potentially throw multiple innings out of the pen (I think I'm more comfortable with him in the 7th or 8th than Pedro Strop, at the very least). This could be one of those not-often-seen situations where a guy is so much better in shorter outings that he's more* valuable despite a somewhat reduced workload.

* More likely he'd be about as valuable; perhaps 1+ win in 80 innings as a reliever versus 1+ win in 120 innings as a starter.

16 November 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Lew Ford

Before the 2012 season, the last time Lew Ford played in the Major Leagues was in 2007. The last time Lew Ford had even 300 plate appearances in the Major Leagues was in 2005. So when the Orioles signed him to add some outfield depth to the team, it was largely viewed as a joke by many.

The 35 year-old Lew Ford then proceeded to hit .331/.390/.500 with 11 homers in 62 games in Triple-A. He was called up at the end of July to help fill some in when Nick Markakis got hurt, and ended up hitting just .183/.256/.352 for the Orioles in 79 PA.

Ford actually didn't play that poorly - his walk and strike-out rates (9%, 16%) were virtually identical to his minor league numbers and were both better than average. His .169 ISO was also above average. The main difference after his promotion was the nose-dive his batting average on balls in play took, from .365 to .182. Part of that was bad luck, and part of it was him hitting as many pop-ups as Joey Votto has in the last four years (combined).

Used mostly as a platoon guy, Ford posted an above average .330 wOBA against lefties compared to a .123 wOBA against righties. Part of that was BABIP-fueled, but he also walked twice as often against southpaws and hit all 3 of his home runs off of them (CC Sabathia, Chris Sale, and Francisco Liriano, no less).

Add in some decent defense in outfield corners, and Ford was a replacement level player even with the horribly low BABIP ("freely avialable talent" indeed). It's very possible - maybe even likely - that he showed enough to catch on with some team as a fourth-outfielder and righty bat, which is certainly a pretty neat story.

Given the current roster make-up though, I doubt it's worth bringing him back for 2013 on anything more than a minor league deal. But that doesn't at all take away from the fact that Lew Ford started a playoff game for the Orioles - as the designated hitter! - or that he hit  .375/.375/.500 in the post-season overall.

14 November 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Robert Andino

Robert Andino was pressed into duty last year with the loss of Brian Roberts, and acquitted himself relatively well. A solid walk rate and an OK strike-out rate can play at second-base when they come with some defense. Brian Roberts wasn't expected to play much (if at all) this year, leaving Andino as the starter at second again. Things went... less well.

On the plus side, the improvements Andino made with his plate discipline were solidified and extended. He upped his walk rate from 8% to 8.6%, and did an even better job of not swinging at pitches out of the strike-zone. He also showed a bit of pop early in the season, with 3 homers in his first 27 games (after hitting only 5 in 139 games in 2011). As late as May 15th, the home run leader-board read Robert Andino - 3, Albert Pujols - 1. (Pujols then homered in consecutive games, and finished with an impressive - given his start - 30 on the season).

Every else was not so good. Andino's contact rate fell to 80%. That, in and of itself, isn't terrible - it's actually a touch above average. The problem is that pitchers had no reason to fear him (they weren't checking the home run leader-boards, apparently), and just pounded the strike-zone. Of Major Leaguers with at least 400 PA, Andino saw the third highest proportion of pitches in the zone. And on those pitches, he swung and missed more than the average batter. Seeing strikes + swinging and missing them = strike-outs, and Andino's K rate jumped to over 23%.

Often, strike-outs will come with power production. That was, sadly, not so much the case here. Though Andino hit a career high 7 home runs and improved his isolated power from .081 to .094, that second figure is still poor. Of the 39 batters who struck out more often than Andino did, only one had a lower ISO (Everth Cabrera, who was to play half his game at PETCO).

And while more strike-outs will obviously hurt the batting average, Andino's plunged even further with the drop in his BABIP from .311 to .266. That'll happen when you hit fewer line-drives and more pop-ups, I guess.

So at the plate, Andino went from a perfectly respectable .263/.327/.344 to just .211/.283/.305. He couldn't even be platooned that effectively, as he couldn't hit lefties (67 wRC+) or righties (57 wRC+). Piling on even more, he made 13 errors at second (up from 4) which put his UZR underwater (-2 runs; plus another -2 from his time at third).

In a season where he could have established himself as a decent starting position player, it was unfortunate to see Robert Andino go from 1.8 fWAR to -0.6 fWAR and contribute to the black hole that was the second-base position for the Orioles this year. But hey, credit to him for being one of the few players on the team to remember to bring his (or someone else's) bat to the post-season, where he hit .417/.417/.500. He can probably still be a productive bench player, but it might behoove the O's to actually find a good second-baseman if they want to be competitive next year.

10 November 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Stu Pomeranz

I had never heard of Stu Pomeranz before I saw him pitch for the Orioles in Spring Training this year. I came away relatively impressed, thinking Pomeranz would be able to contribute to the O's bullpen at some point during the season.

Injuries kept him out for much of the season, but Pomeranz did get into three games in Baltimore in May, pitching 6 innings with 3 K's, a walk, and 7 hits (including a two-run home run) allowed. His minor league numbers - split between Double-A and Triple-A - were slightly more impressive; 23.1 IP, and 35 strike-outs to just 3 walks. And a 0.00 ERA.

A tall guy who averaged 94 mph with his fastball in the Majors, Pomeranz also got a little bit of sink on some of his heaters which helped him keep the ball on the ground pretty well (59% groundball rate). The curve doesn't seem like a knockout offering, but it isn't the worst complement to the fastball (it can at least make the latter look better).

Already 27 years old, there's probably not much upside left with Pomeranz. I certainly wouldn't feel less comfortable going to him in the middle innings than to Kevin Gregg though, and if he sticks around with the O's for 2013 I wouldn't be surprised if he did a fine job in middle relief for the team.

26 October 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Nate McLouth

I've seen Pirates fans complain about Nate McLouth, and I've seen Braves fans complain about Nate McLouth, and I've seen some Orioles fans be confused when the team signed Nate McLouth this year. Many a joke was made by people (including me) about the O's - the contending O's, fighting for a playoff spot - counting on a guy who hadn't done anything in the Majors since 2009.

But it was McLouth and the O's that had the last laugh, as he hit .268/.342/.435 for the team and then .308/.321/.462 in the post-season. There is no doubt that he gave the team a shot in the arm down the stretch.

And yet, it seems very clear to me that - contra* Jeremy's post - counting on Nate McLouth to be the starting left-fielder for the O's in 2013 is not the best move.

* I assume Jeremy doesn't know Nate personally and doesn't have any actual knowledge about his state of mind and the effects thereof, so I'm not even going to address the arguments about how McLouth can be counted on to continuing playing so well in Baltimore because he's happy here. That stuff is malarkey the vast majority of the time, I think.

Projecting a player's production by looking at what he did in the last two months of a season and seasons three years prior, while ignoring everything in between, is generally wrong. Sure McLouth hit pretty well for the Orioles, but his overall 2012 batting line was just .241/.314/.380 and he accumulated 0.8 fWAR (decent in half a season of work, but not all that great).

Just because McLouth was hurt in the intervening years doesn't mean that's wiped away completely - it negatively impacts not only how much we should expect McLouth to play, but it certainly means we shouldn't ignore the generic effects of aging.

Also, McLouth had about as many plate appearances in 2012 as he did in 2011 and 2010 (each). Over the entire span, he hit .221/.320/.340 - which is quite bad for a corner outfielder. He accumulated -0.4 fWAR. Just for comparison's sake, Nolan Reimold has hit .247/.317/.447 with 1.4 fWAR (in like 400 fewer PA). But sure, McLouth is the "proven guy"*.

* Reimold needs to stay healthy, but so does McLouth, right? Counting the minors, McLouth only has like 200 more PA than Reimold over the last three years (1276 to 1067). Why is one a huge injury risk while the other isn't at all?

To expect a player to continue hitting as well as he did in less than 250 PA at the end of a season - a substantially higher level than he has in years - is a mistake that overzealous fans sometimes make, but that GMs should not.

Even beyond that, one shouldn't expect McLouth's Orioles production to continue. His .306 BABIP would have been his best ever, and his career mark is just .277. So even just adjusting that down (and you better believe his career BABIP is what's more likely to show up in 2013 than 55 games if BABIP from this year), Nate's line falls to around .242/.318/.402 - that's a below average batting mark.

There are good parts of his game - he walks at a solid clip (9% for the O's, 10% career), doesn't strike out a ton (18% for the O's, 17% career), and has a bit of pop (.167 ISO for the O's, .173 career). But those are all merely solid, not great, as evidenced by his career 101 wRC+. A batter who's been almost exactly average in his career - with most of his playing time coming in his prime age 25-27 years - is very unlikely to be better than that (or even that good) when playing his age 31 season.

So we've got a slightly below average hitter at best, probably. Defensively, the numbers and the eye-test (to me, at least), indicate an average-ish left-fielder. His career UZR out there is -3 runs per 150 games, which is actually what you'd expect given his -13 runs per 150 games career in center-field (the positional adjustment between center and left is around 10 runs). The Gold Glove he has, like many of those that are handed out, was... not necessarily deserved.

Sure McLouth is a good baserunner - about +5 runs per full season in his career, 99 steals with an 86% success rate - but that isn't enough to turn a below average offensive, below average to average defensive corner outfielder on the wrong side of 30 who can't be counted on to play all year into a player who a team that wants to contend should give a starting spot to. And beyond the overall ability, McLouth probably shouldn't be starting anyway given his platoon splits (.342 career wOBA against righties, but only .292 against lefties).

Signing him to a one-year $2-3 M contract could be OK value (all of the above does add up to a 0.5 to 1 win player), but it doesn't actually make the O's a better team (they accumulated about a win from left-field in total in 2012). It's more promising him a job and then having to rely on him to do what no one should fairly expect from him that's the issue.

I will have many fond memories of Nate McLouth's contributions to the 2012 Orioles, and I wish him all the best in trying to land a starting gig on another (third-tier) team. If he finds those opportunities lacking, then bringing him back as a 4th outfielder isn't the worst (though his inability to play center in anything other than an emergency situation hurts). (This post was more negative on McLouth than I had originally intended, but it serves more as a counter-point to yesterday's decidedly pro-Nate post.)

24 October 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Jim Johnson

I've spent years arguing that Jim Johnson could be an effective closer. Years. It used to be taken as an article of faith amongst fans (as well as some people with the team), that JJ just didn't have the "stuff" to close. Not his stuff - the hard sinker, curve, and change-up - but his "stuff". He just didn't have that "closer's mentality". Seriously.

Here's from September 2011:

"Johnson once blew a save (or two), which resulted in some people deciding that he didn't have the mentality of a closer, or something like that. His career numbers in saves are sparkling: an 0.79 ERA, a 2.8 strikeout to walk ratio and a .175/.221/.200 batting line against (batters are hitting .162/.205/.201 against Mariano Rivera in saves in his career). That's only 16 games, though. Let's expand out and look at all save situations versus non-save situations:

Save situations: 2.91 ERA, 114 1/3 innings pitched, 5.4 K/9, 2.4 BB/9, 0.55 HR/9, Fielding Independent Pitching of 3.59

Non-save situations: 3.28 ERA, 134 1/3 innings pitched, 6.4 K/9, 2.9 BB/9, 0.54 HR/9, Fielding Independent Pitching of 3.53

More strikeouts in non-save situations, but also more walks; he's pretty much the same guy overall (check out those FIPs). Batters are hitting .252/.304/.340 against him in save situations and .253/.318/.348 in non-save situations. Johnson can close if the team wants him to - he'd be fine at it."

There's some not dissimilar point here from April 2010.

It was entirely unnecessary to reproduce that passage, but it's a nice reminder of where we were once upon a time. Buck Showalter accepted this argument at the end of last season and into this season (though there was some discussion of moving JJ to the rotation), and so Jim Johnson was installed as the closer. Here are his stats for the last two years in a random order:

Year A: 2.67 ERA, 3.22 FIP, 3.42 xFIP, 5.7 K/9, 2.1 BB/9, 0.5 HR/9, 62% GB
Year B: 2.49 ERA, 3.25 FIP, 3.63 xFIP, 5.4 K/9, 2.0 BB/9, 0.4 HR/9, 62% GB

Ah, but what if I add:

Year A: 1.7 fWAR, 2.5 rWAR
Year B: 1.4 fWAR, 2.3 rWAR

Then it might be easier to guess. Year A - the season where Jim Johnson contributed more wins to the team - is 2011, of course. Year B is 2012. That's because as the closer, JJ was only rarely* asked to go more than one inning, so he finished with 68.2 IP (in 71 games). Last season, JJ had 91 IP in 69 games.

* He only pitched more than an inning twice, both times getting 2 IP against the Red Sox, in Boston, a month apart.

You don't often see a huge amount of consistency from year to year for relievers, but JJ was pretty much exactly the same guy this season that he was last season. You know, other than setting a club record by picking up 51 saves in 54 chances. He was consistent all year too, with two outings accounting for more than half of the total runs he allowed. In 32 of his 71 games, Johnson pitched an inning facing the minimum three batters*.

* No idea how that compares to the average closer, but it seems good. One data point; in 2009, Mariano Rivera pitched an inning facing the minimum 22 times in 66 games. Though he did go more than more inning more often, Mo faced the minimum in 39% of his outings that lasted an inning or less and Johnson did it in 46% of his.

It's a bit of a shame that JJ's sometimes devastating sinker isn't more of a swing and miss* offering. Though he can gets whiffs on his curve (and sometimes his change-up), pounding the zone with sinkers does keep things move along quickly and prevents walks and homer, but can leave Johnson vulnerable to the BABIP gods. Not that that's often been a problem - his BABIP against is just .279 for his career, and was .251 in 2012 - but, especially as a groundball pitcher in front of a sometimes poor infield defense, getting the K can often be better.

* His 5.4 K/9 is easily the lowest strike-out rate for a pitcher with 50 saves in a season. Next closest is 7.1 K/9, and that was back when strike-outs were less prevalent in general. 

The lack of strike-outs keeps Johnson from being one of the elite relievers in the Majors - even going by ERA, he was just 36th this year - but he's a good, usually* dependable guy to have at the back of the bullpen. The 51 saves might make his price-tag go up though (and he'll be a free agent soon), which means that it might actually be in the Orioles' best interests to shop him this off-season to a team in need of help in that area. Not that I'd mine terribly seeing him try to break his own record next year.

* Having the outcome of the ALDS essentially in his hands (though not really - an actual offense would have been nice), seeing Jim Johnson blow two games after the success he had this year was brutal. Luckily we seem to have avoided returning to the "he doesn't have a closer's mentality" stuff but, humorously may have tilted too far the other way in Game One ("he's a closer, don't bring him into a tie game").

22 October 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Mark Reynolds

Mark Reynolds did not have a particularly good 2011. Though he hit pretty well, his atrocious defense at third-base ate into his value enough that he ended up being only barely above replacement level. With a dearth of good options coming into this season though, Reynolds was sent right back out to the hot corner. 6 errors in 15 games quickly put that effort to an end; especially since he wasn't making up for his lead glove with his bat (just .143/.260/.206 in April, as he K'ed a ton and hit for no power).

Things started to turn around after that - Reynolds hit .308/.457/.654 in the first couple weeks of May - but a strained oblique landed him on the DL. He came back striking out less (and thus hitting for a somewhat higher average), but the power was still lacking. At the trade deadline, Mark Reynolds - who had hit 44, 32, and 37 homers the previous three years - had just 8 longballs in 79 games and was slugging .367.

From August 6th to September 8th though, Reynolds went on an absolute tear; .320/.431/.773. He homered 3 times in 3 games (twice in the opener) in Boston as the O's won a par. He went to New York and had a two home run game leading to a W, and then did it a again two days later. The Birds went up to Toronto, and we went deep twice more (the O's again took two of three on the road). Then the Yankees came to Baltimore on September 6th (Cal Ripken Jr. Statue Day), and Reynolds hit two home runs again. He added another round-tripper in the third game of that series. 29 games. 13 home runs.

Reynolds fell into a slump again to end the season, and continued it into the playoffs where he struck out 10 times in 25 plate appearances with just 3 hits (all singles) and a walk. Still, that one hot streak was enough to push his season batting line to an above average .221/.335/.429. He struck out less frequently than he ever had before, in (a still high) 29.6% of his times to the dish. He had the best season of his career when it came to working walks, drawing a free pass in over 13% of his plate appearances (excluding intentional walks).

It was pretty much just the power-outage that hurt him. Perhaps Reynolds had re-worked his swing or something, since his line-drive rate (according to FanGraphs) went way up - from just over 13% in the past two seasons (pretty low) to over 20% (a career high) - while his flyball rate was a career low. Fewer flyballs means that even a small drop in power would lead to a more substantial drop on home run production, and Reynolds HR/FB rate was his lowest since his rookie season (though 18% is still pretty good).

One would think that hitting more line-drives could drive up a player's batting average, and though he hit just .221 Reynolds did have his highest BABIP since 2009 at .282 (was ~.260 the last couple seasons). Trading some strike-outs for singles is good, but trading some strike-outs and some home runs for singles isn't especially helpful. Still, at least he made his home runs count; 6 came against the Yankees and 7 against the Red Sox, of his 23 total.

On the other side of the ball, things were perhaps a little more ambiguously interesting. Reynolds shifted across the diamond to first-base, and people began to talk about him being a Gold Glove caliber player over there. It strikes me now that perhaps this is no dissimilar to the story from Moneyball where - in an effort to bolster Scott Hatteberg's confidence as he transitioned to first - he was repeatedly told that he was a "pickin' machine".

Reynolds posted a -3 UZR at first-base this year - better than his -5 at third (in only 15 games!), but still below average. It seems like he often makes plays that look like they're hard, but they only appear hard because he had a tough time with them. The fall-down stretch at first can be a display of coordination and athleticism, or it could be the mark of a guy isn't the best at making a regular stretch (or both). The many sliding stops seem good, but they often just display a lack of range. The numbers didn't get better as the year went on, either, but that gets into some small (or, one should say, even smaller) sample sizes. Plus, when you account for the positional adjustment (allowing for first-base being easier to play than third), Reynolds had the second worst defensive season of his career.

Sure the metrics aren't exact, but all the ones I've looked at are in agreement that he's not a good first-baseman. "Fall-down" range at third-base isn't going to translate into excellent first-base play all that often. Maybe if he keeps working at it he can be adequate over there, but a Mark Reynolds who isn't hitting 30-35 home runs just isn't a useful player for a team looking to be at all competitive (and, perhaps at this point in his career, not even for a team that isn't). Given that, I'm not sure it's really worth bringing him back for 2013, despite his desire to return. Maybe a really cheap contract (definitely not his $11 M option), while not counting on him to start every day. Perhaps even in a platoon role to compliment Chris Davis and Wilson Betemit, as Reynolds has a career 123 wRC+ versus lefties (105 versus righties). That's a lot of all-hit no-field guys to keep on the roster though.

In any case, it was always enjoyable seeing Mark Reynolds hit those long home runs while in an Orioles uniform. The Sheriff of Swatingham indeed.

19 October 2012

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Jason Hammel

When Dan Duquette traded Jeremy Guthrie to the Rockies for Jason Hammel and Matt Lindstrom, a lot of Orioles fans were not particularly pleased. "Guthrie's the team's only real starter." "He's the O's #1 guy." And so on. Hammel didn't do much of anything in Tampa Bay, and then followed up two solid seasons in Colorado with a down year in 2011. I thought that Guthrie and Hammel could be expected to be about equally good in 2012, but that Hammel had a better chance of providing the O's with above average production. And I still ended up underestimating Jason Hammel. Boy what a difference one pitch can make.

Hammel added heavy use of a two-seam fastball to his repertoire in 2012, and it proved quite effective. Always a pitcher who could get a few groundballs, he became one of the best in the league at it (his 53.2% groundball rate was 9th in the AL amongst pitchers with at least 100 IP). That improvement allowed Hammel to post the lowest home run rate of his career (0.7 HR/9). When he had gotten groundballs in the past, it was usually with his off-speed stuff. This year though, it was with that sinker; almost 60% of the time that that pitch was put into play, it was on the ground.

Normally there might be some sort of trade-off keeping the ball on the ground and getting strike-outs, but not only did Hammel keep the ball in the yard but he also set a career high by striking out 8.6 batters per nine. After being around 7 K/9 in 2009-2010, that fell off to just under 5 K/9 in 2011 - so seeing a rebound (and then some) was hugely encouraging. Let's compare the whiff rate on his various pitches from this season to that 2009-2010 stretch, which was his previous best:

Year Fastball Slider Curve Change-up
'09-'10 10% 25% 37% 28%
2012 17% 38% 43% 19%

The "fastball" combines the two-seamer with the four-seamer. Breaking them out for 2012 it's 15% and 20%, respectively. As primarily a fastball-slider guy, it's easy to see why Hammel's strike-out rate jumped so much - he started missing way more bats. The sinker and the slider tend to work well together, and he started going to the slider more often this year as he added the sinker - from ~17% of his offerings to over 22%.

Hammel velocity also improved; the 93.5 mph that his fastballs (both similarly) averaged this year was a career high. The change-up, though he only used it sparingly, was up to over 88 mph. Power pitchers who also get groundballs are pretty rare. Here's the list of guys with at least a 50% GB rate, a 93+ mph fastball, and at least a 7 K/9 from this year: David Price, Edison Volquez, and Jason Hammel.

All that, and his control didn't fall off a cliff either. While a 3.2 BB/9 isn't great (and it's worse than the low-to-mid 2s he posted in '09-'10), it's perfectly serviceable for a guy who brings everything else to the table that Hammel did (and is actually better than the 3.6 BB/9 from 2011). Here's the list of guys with the GB/K/velo numbers from above who also walked fewer than 5 guys per nine: David Price, Jason Hammel. That's it.

It's truly a shame that a knee injury kept Jason Hammel out from almost all of the last month and a half of the season, because he was on pace to have the best season of his career (2.9 fWAR in 118 IP translated to about 4.2 fWAR in 170 IP - he had between 170 and 178 IP each of the three previous years). Hammel came back for the playoffs though, and largely picked up where he left off; 11.1 IP, 11 K, 4 UIBB, 3.18 ERA.

There are certainly some doubts about what Hammel will do next year (he's under team control for one more season - another nice bonus from the trade) given his history, but I think he's just not the same pitcher he used to be. While a 3.43 ERA, 3.29 FIP, and 3.46 xFIP might not happen again, there's good reason to think he can be an above average starter in 2013. And if he's able to stay a little healthier, that might even translate into a more valuable season. It's been a while since the O's have had an Opening Day where they could be pretty comfortable throwing their #1 out against whoever the opposing team has, but that might be the case next year.

14 October 2012

Sunday Comics: Thank You, Orioles

This was not something I wanted to draw this early. I was hoping I wouldn't have to do this until November, to be honest, but here we are.


I didn't get to watch the last game of the season as I've been spending this weekend being a nerd at New York Comic Con doing stuff like this (and sadly not at a table selling this yet, but maybe someday). I'm crushed that it all ended against the Yankees, but at the same time I'm so beyond proud of this team for clearly overachieving what they were predicted to do on paper. They took us on one heck of a ride this year. And hey, they certainly gave the Yankees a good scare, didn't they? 

Thank you, Orioles, for making me fall in love with baseball all over again this year. 

20 August 2012

Just Some Graphs: Run Scoring and Earning

In a comment on the post before this one I put forth my current untested hypothesis on how the Orioles can win so many close games, but look so awful in games decided by more than a few runs.  Here it is:
The Orioles have a solid bullpen to go along with a feast or famine starting rotation and an offense that is atrocious at hitting themselves or walking themselves on base.  Therefore, in games where the score is close, the Orioles' solo or two run home runs help make the difference.  In games in which the other team get more of a lead, the Orioles simply cannot put enough men on base unless they begin to chase relievers.
That is it.  I do not know if it is correct.  Why I do know is that somehow the Orioles are doing something that no one has done before to the extent that they are doing it.  They are dominant in close games and positively atrocious in the others.  Remarkable.

Here is a graph for your amusement depicting runs scored or giving over the course of a single game as a frequency:


Here is a cumulative run scoring chart, adding from low scores to high scores:


I am not sure if that informs us of much.  However, you do see a shift where the Orioles tend to score two to five runs at a greater frequency than their opponents.  They have also given up four scores higher than any they have produced this season.  It may well be that this team is constructed to brilliantly split hairs.

10 August 2012

The Replacement Arms


by Jon Bernhardt

There’s been a lot of talk about the luck the Baltimore Orioles have had in being nine games above .500 going into the second weekend of August, tied for a berth in the new second Wild Card slot and generally playing over their heads across the board.

Specifically, it’s been tied to the Orioles’ record in one-run games—22-6 (.786) –and their record in extra innings—12-2 (.857). Neither of those winning percentages are sustainable at those margins.
The above sentence should be read not as “the Orioles are about to regress in one-run games and extra innings, hard” but instead as “it’s more likely than not that moving forward, they will see a more normal rate of success; that is, closer to .500.” There is absolutely no reason that just because the Orioles have played .750 ball in one-run games up until this arbitrary point, that they must play deplorably to even things out—just that you shouldn’t be too surprised or disappointed if that goes on for a little while. In other words, there’s no such thing as being due. This is elementary probability.
But baseball games—and most human endeavors—are governed by far more than luck, and the most important thing that a team can have in a game that’s late and close is good pitching. As Taylor Teagarden has demonstrated on multiple occasions, if a game goes long enough just about any hitter will do; it’s the pitchers that really matter. Once you get into the soft belly of a bullpen things have a tendency to go south very fast.

The Orioles bullpen, however, hasn’t shown many signs of that—excepting 2011 closer Kevin Gregg, of course, who has been all but explicitly demoted to mop-up duty. In the offseason there was massive turnover in the composition of the Orioles pen from last year, due mostly to the efforts of Buck Showalter and new General Manager Dan Duquette. Showalter is not, and should not, be showrunning actual baseball ops decisions, but the man knows how to put together and use a pitching staff. It’s useful now, I think, as the Orioles go into the final run of the season, to examine a few members of the current Baltimore pen and exactly how they’re doing what they’re doing—especially late and close.
Mop-Up: Kevin Gregg
2011 Role: MLB Closer, Baltimore
2012 Compensation: $5,800,000
2013 Contract Status: Free Agent
Let’s start with Kevin, actually. Gregg was last year’s closer and Gregg was abysmal last year, but one hardly had much to do with the other; Gregg’s a marginal major leaguer to begin with and it’s likely only his make-up and personal bravado kept him hanging around in the late innings as long as he did. Not that Gregg has a bad make-up, per se. Closer mentality is horribly overrated and terribly misused as a term, but the fact remains that the late innings are higher pressure situations than the earlier ones simply because journalists, fans, coaches, and other players act as if it were so. There have been pitchers—LaTroy Hawkins is the classic example walked out here, but there have been others—who have been able to handle every relief duty except the closer’s role. The reason men like Hawkins are so rare are because generally players that can’t psychologically handle closing also can’t handle other instances of high leverage relief, pitch poorly across the board and are quickly remanded back to the minor leagues.

All that said, having a closer mentality doesn’t actually make one better at throwing baseballs, as Orioles fans discovered when Gregg came out. There was a metric last year that I had called the Kevin Gregg Hat Trick: the strikeout, the walk, and the hit allowed in a single inning. There were instances last year where Gregg recorded two of those in the same outing, though he never had an inning where he recorded a save with three, to my knowledge. Considering that recording three Kevin Gregg Hat Tricks requires allowing six baserunners while making no outs on the basepaths, I’m not even sure it’s possible. As the year wore on, he began allowing more hits and walking more batters while striking out fewer and trying to keep a running tally just became an exercise in depression.
Gregg’s been a bit of a nuisance in 2012, but nothing heart-stopping or nightmare-fueling like last year. The reason isn’t because his pitching’s improved all that much—his 105 ERA+, 1.76 K/BB, 1.598 WHIP line in 2012 is better than his 97 ERA+, 1.33 K/BB, 1.642 WHIP line in 2011, but not excessively so—but because his game-entering Leverage Index (gmLI), which tracks how important the situation is to the team when a pitcher enters the game with 1.0 being average pressure, has plummeted from 1.4 in 2011 to 0.5 in 2012. So in essence, he’s being used just like a guy who can give you 60-70 innings of middling with lots of hits, lots of walks, and lots of strikeouts should be used—sparingly. Showalter gave Gregg an entire lost season to prove he could pitch late and build his value, he couldn’t, he didn’t, he’s mop-up, case closed.

To his credit, Gregg’s taken his demotion with surprising grace considering his willingness to call out former teammate Koji Uehara last year when the Baltimore media began debating whether Gregg or Uehara should close, and there were reports that he’s tried to take on some sort of mentor role towards younger players on the team. Good on him, I say. It’s a savvy move, too: if you’re not going to beat the world on the field, you better show that you’re worth something to a club off of it. Gregg probably won’t have trouble finding work with a club next year, though it won’t be for the ludicrous 2/12 the Orioles gave him.
Middle Relief: Troy Patton
2011 Role: MLB Middle Relief, Baltimore; AAA Long Relief/Spot Starter, Norfolk
2012 Compensation: $480,000
2013 Contract Status: First Year Arbitration Eligible
Troy Patton’s had an interesting year; in fact, it might be the most interesting of all of pitchers that returned to the pen from last year’s squad. Patton came to Baltimore in the (first) Miguel Tejada trade, which sent Miggy to Houston for Luke Scott, Patton, Matt Albers, Dennis Sarfate, and Mike Costanzo. Scott is now a Tampa Bay Ray, Albers a Diamondback by way of Boston, Sarfate’s in Japan and Costanzo is tooling around the Cincinnati organization, but Patton remains in Baltimore. He was the best prospect in the deal (Scott was already a major leaguer, if a part time player of sorts before coming to Baltimore), and he rewarded the Orioles by immediately tearing his labrum and missing all of 2008. He stayed in the minors for almost all of 2009, pitching only 2/3 of an inning, but then came up late in 2011 put up a 142 ERA+ and 4.40 K/BB (components: 6.6 K/9, 1.5 BB/9) in 30 IP working mostly in relief of beleaguered Orioles starters. He looked to build on that in 2012.
He has: 50 IP, 156 ERA+, 4.18 K/BB (8.3 K/9, 2.0 BB/9). He wasn’t used as much of a longman in 2011 (1.5 IP per G), but that’s fallen even further in 2012 (1.04 IP per G); Patton also has the distinction of being the only left-handed pitcher in the pen most nights in 2012, so Showalter will occasionally use him in match-ups situations; last year Mike Gonzalez had that honor, and usually made a horror show of it.

I will begin by falling on my own sword: I wasn’t particularly impressed with what I saw of Patton last year despite the numbers and I thought the Orioles should have kept Zach Phillips, who came over from the Texas Rangers at the same time as Pedro Strop, as the match-up lefty. Phillips has been decent in AAA, but Patton has been one of the most useful lefty relievers in baseball, putting up a 1.6 rWAR.

Patton’s going to get some money in arbitration, but he’ll be around for a bit longer, and that’s good. He came up as a starter but baseball in general and Baltimore specifically could use more guys who are able to pitch 80-90 elite innings out of the pen with multiple innings per appearance—it’ll be interesting to see if Patton will turn into a guy like that. The Orioles starters could use it.
Middle Relief: Luis Ayala
2011 Role: MLB Middle Relief/Set-Up, New York Yankees
2012 Compensation: $825,000
2013 Contract Status: $1,000,000 Club Option ($100,000 Buyout)
Luis Ayala is a fantastic example of cheap lightning in a bottle. He’s been a bit less overwhelming of late—it’s hard to play over one’s head forever, especially in the AL East—but he’s put up a 159 ERA+ with a 3.00 K/BB (5.5 K/9, 1.8 BB/9). For his career Ayala has a 2.2 BB/9, which highlights a common thread of the Baltimore bullpen this year: they don’t walk just about anyone. 

“Not walking anyone” correlates almost exactly with “being a good relief arm;” a certain number of walks are acceptable so long as they’re nullified by strikeouts, which don’t give those free runners much room to advance like long flyballs into the corners or simple grounders to first can, but really not walking anyone is the best policy. Some of the biggest problem children of Orioles bullpens past—Chris Ray, for example, or last year’s Mike Gonzalez and Kevin Gregg (hello there!)—struck out a lot of guys but walked a whole lot, too. A little bad luck on batted ball placement and that goes south real fast.

So Luis Ayala will likely be back next year, especially considering the general esteem surrounding his current season, and he might be less lucky than he’s been this year on batted balls or he might be luckier still, but he’s certainly not a bad arm and at his cost, grabbing his option is somewhat of a no-brainer.
Middle Relief: Darren O’Day
2011 Role: MLB Mop-Up, Texas; AAA Relief, Round Rock
2012 Compensation: $1,325,000
2013 Contract Status: Third Year Arbitration Eligible
Darren O’Day was one of the last acquisitions of the MacPhail regime, picked up only a few days before Andy MacPhail stepped down as Executive Vice President of Baseball Operatons—and so, one might presume given his team and when the Orioles grabbed him, O’Day is an Oriole because manager Buck Showalter wanted him. It was a good call.

O’Day pitches submarine style, and so far this year has been good for him and for Baltimore: 45.2 IP, 165 ERA+, 5.50 K/BB (8.7 K/9, 1.6 BB/9). Once again, O’Day doesn’t walk anyone; and once again, like Ayala, his BB/9 is a bit lower than his career rate (2.3 BB/9 in 226.1 IP). The best bullpens are lucky and cheap, and the Orioles’ three major middle relievers not walking anyone while costing less than $2.5 million altogether is a good instance of that.

There’s been little discussion of splits here amongst the middle relievers because Showalter doesn’t play to those, for the most part; Patton, Ayala, and O’Day are all average an inning or more of relief, and Showalter doesn’t have any one out guys he likes to play with—outside of the stalwarts, bullpen spots are filled by guys that Showalter and Duquette want to take a look at, like Stuart Pomeranz, Miguel Socolovich, Steve Johnson, and Miguel Gonzalez. In the case of the latter two, they liked that look enough to give the guys starts, and so far both have paid off. Sometimes Tommy Hunter or Dana Eveland have hung around as long relievers and swingmen, but otherwise the bullpen is essentially five or six guys.

Given his season and that he’ll likely be fairly cheap next year too, I’d expect to see O’Day resigned before going to arbitration instead of non-tendered.
Set-Up: Pedro Strop
2011 Role: MLB Mop-Up, Texas; MLB Set-Up, Baltimore; AAA Relief, Texas
2012 Compensation: $482,500
2013 Contract Status: Under Team Control
Strop is a bit of a conundrum. He was acquired from Texas at the end of last year for Mike Gonzalez and ever since he arrived he’s been lights out. After a very good end to the 2011 season with Baltimore, he was in contention with Jim Johnson for the closer’s spot going into camp this year—a spot Johnson won mostly based on seniority and himself being a good pitcher. Not that this seems to be a problem; Pedro Strop is pitching in the 7th and 8th innings and is tied with Aroldis Chapman for the most valuable reliever, by rWAR, in baseball with 2.8.

But how? Strop’s ERA+ is amazing, 332, but really ERA+ isn’t too useful when evaluating relievers beyond “below 100 is very very bad.” His K/BB, however, is only 1.58 (6.9 K/9, 4.3 BB/9). He’s doing what Chris Ray and Mike Gonzalez before him did: he’s walking far too many batters. How, then, is he getting away with it?

Strop is inducing terrible, terrible contact and getting very, very lucky. His GB% is 68, with a 3.79 GB/FB rate. His BABIP against is .231. His strand rate is 90.3%. Some of this might be sustainable—specifically, the groundball rate—and if it is it will make the other stuff more sustainable, but being real: Pedro Strop is not Aroldis Chapman. He’s just gotten outcomes vaguely like him. The good news is that Strop does have strikeout stuff, and if he can figure out how to make it move and make it a strike at the same time, he could turn into a legit late inning guy.
Closer: Jim Johnson
2011 Role: MLB Relief Ace, Baltimore
2012 Compensation: $2,625,000
2013 Contract Status: Third Arbitration Year Eligible
Johnson pitched 91 innings out of the pen last year in 69 games, showing up anywhere from the sixth to the ninth innings; he rarely showed up for less than one and he regularly threw two. By the end of the year he was the closer in all but name, and there was some discussion over the offseason whether or not Johnson would return to starting as he had in the minors or if he would become the team’s closer.

He became the closer, and while generally I think that’s been a waste of his talents as a durable sinkerballer who doesn’t strike a lot of guys out, walks even fewer, and gets a lot of groundballs, the performance of the rest of the bullpen hasn’t really pushed the issue and I’m willing to accept that Showalter probably knows better than I do. That said, Johnson’s gotten very lucky on grounders finding defenders up until recently—the last couple weeks have highlighted why the strikeout is preferable, especially with a bad defense behind you. Nevertheless, he’s been fine for what he is.
Honorable Mention: Matt Lindstrom
Lindstrom’s been hurt a bit, only recording 30 innings to the 45-50 innings of the other three middle relievers, but just about every results-based analysis of them applies to him too. He’s been valuable, and the Jeremy Guthrie for Jason Hammels/Matt Lindstrom deal is looking like the steal of the year even if neither Oriole pitcher is especially healthy right now.

---

So the Orioles pen going into the last fifty or so games of the season is essentially six men (and Kevin Gregg), all of whom are having some degree of an amazing year and none of whom are locked in for long in case that goes south in 2013. All in all, I’d say the Orioles front office did a pretty good job with this one.

But then there’s still fifty or so games to go, aren’t there?