What's Wrong With Jim Johnson?

Photo: Keith Allison

The short answer?  Nothing.  Jim Johnson is who we thought he was (sorry for the link, I couldn’t resist).  He’s a groundball pitcher who pitches to contact and doesn’t strike out a lot of batters.  His tremendous success in 2012 has almost been a double-edged sword, as his club record 51 saves gave some people unrealistic expectations that he was an elite reliever; someone who is nearly automatic in save situations.  However, despite his success in 2012, Johnson should not be viewed in that light.  Typically, when you think of an elite reliever, you think of someone who can dominate hitters, and limit the number of batters who reach base (i.e., high strikeout rate/low walk rate).  Jim Johnson doesn’t really fit that bill. 

To illustrate this point, let’s take a look at the 2013 saves leader board.

When you think of the best relief pitchers in the league, many of the names above come to mind, and for the most part, they all share similar traits as high strikeout/low walk pitchers.  Only 6 of these top 15 pitchers have a strikeout rate less than 25%.  Of the ones who don’t, Mariano Rivera, Addison Reed, and Steve Cishek are fairly close.  Edward Mujica is just over 20%, but his BB% sits at an incredibly low 1%.  Rafael Soriano has the lowest strikeout rate on this list, however, a 17.7% strikeout rate is unusual for Soriano, who has a career rate of 25.4%.  Then there’s Johnson, who is having one of the best strikeout seasons of his career, with a rate nearly 3% higher than last year.  Still, among all relievers with at least 30 innings pitched, Johnson only ranks 136^th in K% and 65^th in BB%. To put it another way, if you could choose to have any one of these relievers, would Jim Johnson even be in the top 10, even though he leads the league in saves?  Probably not.

Don’t get me wrong, Johnson is a very good pitcher who induces a lot of ground balls (also a good trait to have in a reliever), but those ground balls can find holes and are often times subject to the whims of the Luck Dragon.  Other than the number of blown saves, Jim Johnson’s 2013 doesn’t look all that different from his 2012.  His strikeouts are up slightly, but so are his walks.  His LOB% is virtually the same, and while he’s getting less ground balls than he did from 2011-2012, his 55% GB% is only slightly under his career level of 57.3%, and still well above the league average of 44.1%.  

There are differences between this year and last year though, and unfortunately they are the result of the aforementioned dragon.  In 2012, Johnson sported a well below league average BABIP of .251, helping fuel his 2.49 ERA.  Additionally, the few times that he allowed fly balls, they only left the park 6.8% of the time.  So far in 2013, his luck has shifted, as both his BABIP and HR/FB% have jumped well above his career levels, to .321 and 10.3% respectively.  The fact that Johnson’s xFIP is only 0.23 runs higher than it was in 2012 helps confirm that his luck has changed considerably in comparison to last year.

Even if there appears to be sufficient evidence, it’s difficult to say that only a pitcher’s luck has changed and leave it at that.  If you can point to a more tangible reason why Johnson may be struggling, you can look at the movement and command of his sinker, his most effective pitch and the one he throws most often (48.8% in 2013).  According to Pitch F/X information from Brooks Baseball, Johnson’s sinker has had less horizontal movement this year than it did in 2012, which when combined with a slightly lower velocity, will likely help the pitch become much more hittable. 

Additionally, Johnson’s command of his sinker has not been executed as well this year either, as the two figures below will show.  As you can see, in 2012 Johnson peppered the outside edges of the strikezone, rarely leaving the pitch out over the plate.  Compare that to the current season, where he’s throwing the pitch over the middle of the zone with increased frequency.  

Jim Johnson is a good relief pitcher, and one that the Orioles should be happy to have on their roster.  But he’s not an elite relief pitcher, and just because he racked up 51 saves last year does not make him one.  His underlying numbers tell us that he benefitted from good luck in 2012, the way those same numbers tell us he is suffering from bad luck in 2013. Additionally, decreased effectiveness and command of his sinker may also be contributing to his struggles.  

Despite Johnson’s recent string of blown saves, the Orioles don’t really have another option who would present an obvious upgrade, though they may be able to find more success finishing games by shifting to a match-up based approach.  However, managers are not generally fans of using a “closer by committee”, so the Orioles will likely stick with Johnson for the moment and pray that the Luck Dragon has a change of heart, which isn’t all that bad of an idea.

What Have We Learned About T.J. McFarland?

Photo: Keith Allison

Ed. Note: This post was written before last night's game.

When T.J. McFarland was selected last December in the 2012 Rule 5 draft, the Orioles seemed to have made a decent pickup. At the time, Baseball America's Jim Callis said, "It's not like you are really having to stretch to believe to say this guy could be a (No.) 5 or maybe a 4 starter. ... I don't think he is a high-ceiling guy, but he could be a back of the rotation guy. It cost, what, $50,000 if you're wrong." Ben Badler, also of Baseball America, said, "He's got great control and can really sink the ball. The Indians had him as a starter. I don't think he has the repertoire to have success as a starter at the big league level, but maybe they put him in the 'pen and he can stick there. I thought this was one of the better picks of this draft." (For what it's worth, Keith Law weighed in that McFarland is an "Org guy. Not a prospect." So Law was likely tempering expectations, unless, of course, you believe that he hates the Orioles.)

So far, Badler seems wise in retrospect, because McFarland has pitched relatively well out of the O's bullpen in what is his first work as a major league pitcher. In 56 innings, McFarland has a 4.18 ERA despite being a little unlucky (.322 BABIP is a bit higher than MLB average of .293). His 53.9% ground ball rate also trails only Jim Johnson (56.5%) and Zach Britton (54%) on the O's pitching staff.

McFarland's numbers are very close to what the average MLB pitcher has done this season. Take a look:

	ERA	K/9	BB/9	HR/9	HR/FB
MLB Avg	3.89	7.53	3.00	0.97	10.6%
McFarland	4.18	7.71	3.05	0.80	10.4%

McFarland, now 24, has not been fantastic, but there is certainly something to be said for being an average pitcher in the majors. It's a whole lot better than pitching like Freddy Garcia did in his 10 starts earlier this season.

So McFarland is relatively young, seems to be a decent option pitching multiple innings out of the bullpen, and is under team control through the 2018 season. He isn't eligible for arbitration until 2016. Plus, he's proficient in getting opposing batters to hit the ball on the ground, which is a great skill when J.J. Hardy and Manny Machado are covering the left side of the infield. The Orioles also didn't have to surrender any players to obtain McFarland (just a little bit of money) -- which is normally better than building a bullpen by sending away a player with any kind of upside.

Still, as Callis mentions above, McFarland has a limited ceiling. He relies mostly on his sinker and slider, and his fastball velocity only sits around 88-89. In a June Baltimore Sports and Life piece suggesting that McFarland should stay in the bullpen, Tucker Blair noted that McFarland is not very good when facing batters a second time through the lineup. As a reliever, the first time through a lineup McFarland has held batters to a .250/.310/.378 line. And the second time through? .300/.341/.475. (McFarland also started one game and didn't perform well overall, lasting 2.2 innings and allowing three runs and seven hits on June 28 against the Yankees.) Granted, that's an even smaller sample size for someone who's pitching in the majors for the first time.

Strangely enough, McFarland, a 6'3 lefty, hasn't done well against left-handed hitters. 

In 24 IP vs. lefties: .338 wOBA

In 32 IP vs. righties: .303 wOBA

Those may be two things to keep an eye on. If McFarland struggles to retire batters a second time through the lineup, it'll be difficult for him to ever pitch in the rotation. And if he's not retiring lefties consistently -- especially if right-handed batters start hitting him better -- he also loses a chunk of value.

Regardless, McFarland obviously has some flaws. So does Ryan Flaherty, who the Orioles selected in the 2011 Rule 5 draft. But both have been useful at times this season, and they were both added for very little. There are worse ways to round out a roster.

Google Guessing with the Orioles

It is a slow beginning of the week here at the Depot, but things will be back in motion tomorrow.  Be sure to check out some of our more popular stories in the past week, helpfully located in the column to the left.  Also to the left is our Facebook feed, so like us.

Anyway to pass the time during the lunch hour, Google Guessing the Orioles:

Click to Make Larger

Yes, it is true.  When you type "Who does Keith Law hate", Google assumes you want to know about a bias against the Orioles.

Anyway, feel free to explore on your own and tell us what you find.

Potential September Call-Ups - Who's on the 40-Man?

The major-league roster limit expands from 25 to 40 players on September 1. Every year, teams recall or add players to the major-league roster from their minor league affiliates. The Orioles, who are now contending for a playoff spot, are more likely to promote role players and depth rather than prospects. It's simpler for them to promote players who are already on their 40-man roster.

As of Tuesday, August 6, there are 39 players on the Orioles' 40-man roster and two on the 60-day disabled list, which doesn't count against the 40-man roster. That means there are 14 players on the 40-man who aren't on the Tides' active roster. One is Jason Hammel, on the 15-day disabled list; a second is Dylan Bundy, who is parked on the Bowie roster while he recovers from season-ending surgery. All 12 of the remaining players are on the Norfolk Tides' roster. I'll review these 12 candidates for a September call-up.

Of course, the Orioles aren't limited to these players on the 40-man roster. Chris Dickerson and Freddy Garcia, among others, are playing for Norfolk but aren't on the 40-man roster. The Orioles could still promote them but they'd have to create space on the 40-man roster to do so.

Xavier Avery: Although Avery has regressed in 2013 (2012: .236/.330/.356; 2013: .223/.302/.303 at Norfolk) I would not be surprised if the Orioles called him up. He still can run and his outfield range is still good. That makes him useful as a bench player on an extended roster, and he's almost the only potential call-up with above-average speed. He was with the Orioles in 2012, so if he is called up, it will be as a pinch-runner / defensive replacement.

Mike Belfiore: It's something of a surprise that Belfiore is still on the 40-man roster considering that he's been pitching long and mop-up relief in Norfolk. This season, he's been recalled to Baltimore twice and has been sent back before pitching in a game. He has struck out a fair number of hitters (69 in 60 2/3 innings pitched) but has also allowed too many home runs (8), six of those being hit by left-handed batters. Belfiore doesn't deserve to be recalled and doesn't project to be a helpful addition, but the Orioles might recall him if they decide they need another left-hander in the bullpen.

Zach Britton: Britton is very likely to be recalled for September. He's made six starts for the Orioles earlier this season and wasn't bad enough to pitch himself out of the Orioles' future. The Orioles might recall him for use as a spot starter/long relief man. He hasn't pitched well at Norfolk, and I mean that literally - he has a 6.57 ERA at home, and a 3.46 ERA on the road (with significantly more unearned runs allowed at home as well.)

Steve Clevenger: Clevenger is an ideal candidate for a September call-up. He's one of three catchers on the 40-man roster, and his addition will give the Orioles more flexibility. He's a left-handed hitter, which is a positive. He's also played first base, and he might allow the Orioles to rest Chris Davis as a DH more safely. Clevenger was recently activated from the disabled list, and I've only seen him play games so far.

Kevin Gausman: Gausman will almost certainly be called up in September. He's pitched with the Orioles before, can be used as both a spot starter or reliever, and is a young, top prospect. The Rays promoted both David Price and Matt Moore to be bullpen arms in their postseason hunts, and Gausman is similar to them in that he's a young, dynamic arm. Gausman hasn't pitched as well at Norfolk as I would have hoped; from what I've seen (in only two starts) his fastball has velocity but little movement and he gets hit more easily than you'd expect. Despite that, I think he'd be an excellent addition to the Orioles' bullpen for their postseason push.

Steve Johnson: Johnson is another pitcher who will likely be called up. He's missed most of this season because of injuries, but pitched very well down the stretch in 2012. He also has major-league experience as both a starter and a relief pitcher. He is currently working his way back into condition at Norfolk.

Alex Liddi: Liddi, who was acquired from the Mariners after he had been designated for assignment off the Mariners' 40-man roster, is unlikely to be called up. He's a poor man's Danny Valencia - a right-handed hitting corner infielder but not as good a hitter. Because both he and Valencia would serve the same role, it doesn't make sense to promote both and of the two. Valencia would be the choice.

Jonathan Schoop: If the Orioles were out of contention, then they would likely promote Schoop. He's the best in-house, long-term option at second base, and he would likely be given some looks. But because the Orioles are in contention, he wouldn't be likely to get much playing time. And Schoop is recovering from a stress fracture in his back. I think the Orioles are more likely to send Schoop either to the instructional league or the Arizona Fall League to continue his recovery. Schoop has been playing fairly well at Norfolk but hasn't been dominant.

Josh Stinson: Stinson, who was promoted to the Orioles to make one spot start, is still on the 40-man roster. He hasn't pitched badly for Norfolk, but he hasn't pitched extremely well either. He's mainly pitched as a starter in 2013, and he doesn't have the dominant stuff teams like to have in their bullpen. I don't think the Orioles are likely to recall him.

Eric Thames: Thames is an interesting case. He's a left-handed hitting outfielder with fairly good speed and fairly good power. He's been playing well at Norfolk (.324/.372/.493 in 19 games, 71 at-bats; 3 stolen bases) since he's been acquired from Seattle. Because he hits left-handed, he might be recalled to be a backup outfielder.

Danny Valencia Valencia is almost certain to be recalled. He's been up with the Orioles for 25 games and has hit with power. He's continued to hit at Norfolk. He'll be recalled to be a right-handed PH/DH who can also play first base if Chris Davis needs to play DH for a day's rest.

Tsuyoshi Wada: I don't think the Japanese left-handed starting pitcher is likely to be called up. Wada has pitched very well recently; he has a 1.99 ERA in his last four starts, covering 22 1/3 innings. And his fastball velocity has improved from the mid-80s to 90-91. On the other hand, Wada is being handled very gingerly. Because he is recovering from arm injury, and because he pitched in Japan with five days' rest, he's rigidly starting only every sixth day for the Norfolk. Even though the Tides have a six-man rotation, on Monday's doubleheader the Tides pitched Game 2 as a bullpen game rather than pitch Wada on "only" four days' rest. Consequently, it's unlikely that Wada would be used in a bullpen role. His stuff and game are very similar to Zach Britton's, and I think the Orioles are more likely to recall Britton than Wada.

Can the Orioles Afford Mark Reynolds' Strikeouts?

Mark Reynolds in 2012 / photo: Keith Allison

Last year, Mark Reynolds was the Phoenix.  Whether he was rising from the ashes of his first half of a season or rising from one of his signature toe anchored flops at first base, he embodied the team last year.  He did not look good and probably really was not all that good, but he wound up successful over and over again.  In the fall, we took a hit from some of our Passengers at the Depot (not all, just a few) about our conclusion that Reynolds' option should not be picked up and that the team should let him go.  They did that and he wound up taking a pay cut with the Indians.

Here are his month by month slashes:

April - 301/368/651, .427 wOBA, 179 wRC+
May - 218/310/386, .310 wOBA, 98 wRC+
June - 187/288/253, .250 wOBA, 57 wRC+
July - 098/233/098, .178 wOBA, 7 RC+

Unsurprisingly, the playoff hoping Indians designated Mark Reynolds for assignment.

The presents the Orioles with a potential opportunity to provide some offense, which is something they failed to do when the regular trade deadline came and went in July.  In case you forgot, the Orioles have the third worst hitting DH performance in the American League:

Houston Astros - 185/266/313, 32.4 runs created
Oakland Athletics - 211/303/338, 40.8 runs created
Baltimore Orioles -  210/269/389, 41.1 runs created
New York Yankees - 208/293/350, 41.2 runs created
Chicago White Sox - 225/289/397, 43.8 runs created

It would be incredibly beneficial to the team to improve their weakness here.   True, this level of DH performance will not exclude them from making the playoffs as the Oakland Athletics are trying to illustrate, but it certainly makes things easier when your DH is not repeatedly relegated to the bottom of the lineup.

Recently, the Orioles have been employing the tandem of Henry Urrutia and Danny Valencia (now, Steve Pearce).  Mark Reynolds, over his career, tends to show a slight platoon with him hitting better off of southpaws.  This means that his addition would be to replace the mish mash of Valencia and Pearce.  However, he probably would be not incredibly worse than the Human Opposite Field Single hitter Henry Urrutia.  None of the current batch is a solid fielder, but having Reynolds in place of those two would enable the team to have a more capable defensive player on the roster.
After a monster April, Reynolds has been utterly horrific and that is being kind.  The Indians, fighting for a space in the playoffs, finally decided to let him go.

Now, it has been argued that Mark Reynolds is horrible.  Sure, he is.  He also has something like a one in twenty chance of being mind blowingly good.  The team is currently 1.5 games behind Texas or Oakland in the chase for the second Wild Card.  They also have Cleveland right behind them.  I think we can all agree that the Indians are playing over their head and that the race is essentially something like the A's, Rangers, and Orioles.  Of those three teams, two will make it.  How comfortable are you with the current offensive output from the DH slot?  Should the team be satisfied with the low grade chill that Uruttia and Pearce will provide?  Pearce can probably deliver a slightly below league average DH for the team, but it seems fairly obvious that Uruttia's bat needs a bit more seasoning at least.  With that in mind, maybe it makes sense to give Reynolds a chance to correct himself and go on a tear no matter how unlikely.  I mean, it is difficult to get much worse and, if Reynolds does nothing for a couple weeks, the September roster opens and you can bury him.

Another concern has been about having several high strikeout guys on the team.  Currently, the Orioles have one batter (Chris Davis) in the top ten for strike out percentage (29.2%).  Having Mark Reynolds on the team would increase that to two as he goes down on strikes 32% of the time this year so far.  This contention about having multiple big K guys on the team is somewhat of an issue that draws sides.  Some people think that too many people with high amounts of strikeouts would result in a lot of runners stranded without the opportunity of a batted ball to challenge the other team's defense.  Others think that with the high level of defense in the Majors that how you make an out is far less important than what you do when you are not making an out.

To try to test this, I decided to use a formula that Tom Tango came up with relating wOBA to runs scored per plate appearance.  The idea here is that if we find teams who had multiple high strikeout bats that if this actually poses a linear issue in run production then we should expect that those outs will not be properly accounted for in the wOBA formula.  In other words, the projected amount of team runs will be consistently greater than the actual runs a team scores.

2012
Baltimore Orioles
Chris Davis (30.1%) and Mark Reynolds (29.6%)
Tampa Bay Rays
Carlos Pena (30.3%) and B.J. Upton (26.7%)
2011
Cincinnati Reds
Drew Stubbs (30.1%) and Jay Bruce (23.8%)
Washington Nationals
Danny Espinosa (25.2%) and Jayson Werth (24.7%)
2010
Arizona Diamondbacks
Mark Reynolds (35.4%), Adam LaRoche (28.0%), and Justin Upton (26.6%)
Tampa Bay Rays
Carlos Pena (27.1%) and B.J. Upton (26.9%)
Los Angeles Dodgers
Matt Kemp (25.4%) and Casey Blake (24.2%)
2009
Arizona Diamondbacks
Mark Reynolds (33.7%) and Justin Upton (23.3%)
Tampa Bay Rays
Carlos Pena (28.6%) and B.J. Upton (24.3%)
Philadelphia Phillies
Ryan Howard (26.5%) and Jayson Werth (23.1%)

Out of those ten teams, we should expect that five would wind up scoring more runs than expected and five would score fewer if the number of high strikeout players on a team does not matter.  Just eyeballing it, if we wind up with 8 in either direction then I think it seems likely that there is an effect.

Year	Team	wOBA	Runs	Difference
2012	Orioles	0.317	712	13
	Rays	0.311	697	30
2011	Reds	0.322	735	-6
	Nationals	0.305	624	-15
2010	Dbacks	0.325	713	-24
	Rays	0.326	802	50
	Dodgers	0.309	667	5
2009	DBacks	0.324	720	-23
	Rays	0.342	803	-14
	Phillies	0.339	820	1

Five teams scored more than was expected and five teams scored worse.  Now, this is simply a pilot study, but this tends to suggest that there is not really an overwhelming impact on run production when a team has several high strikeout players in the lineup.  That concern is one that is likely overblown simply because strikeouts are a rather visual thing.

We often tend to take for granted how good MLB defenses actually are.  What is more important is not making outs and what happens to the ball when it is hit.  With that in mind, Mark Reynolds probably is a decent bet to take in hopes of leap frogging over the second wild card slot as well as making a break for the first wild card and maybe the division.  To do that, I think the team needs to be bold.  I do not think bold means Henry Urrutia or Steve Pearce.  I think bold means letting Mark Reynolds ride out August with his bat in the lineup and then reassess.

To put it another way, over the rest of August the tandem of Urrutia and Pearce look to be worth replacement level.  Urrutia so far has been worth -2 runs above replacement over 44 plate appearances with the bat (please, let's ignore his horrible baserunning for the moment) and Pearce's bat has been worth 2 runs above replacement over 99 plate appearances.  Zero seems like a fair number.  If Reynolds puts up a 40 wRC+ over the next 60 plate appearances to finish out the DH slot in August, the team stands to lose 4 runs of offense in comparison to Urrutia/Pearce.  I do not see how you could do anything other than taking a chance on Reynolds.

Why Is Brian Roberts Playing Every Day?

Photo: Keith Allison

For the past few years, the general consensus among fans has been that if Brian Roberts could just stay on the field, he could rectify the Orioles' deficiencies at second base. Maybe in 2010 that was the case. In 2009, Roberts hit .283/.356/.451 in 159 games -- but that was also the last season he was truly productive. The next year, his power numbers went down but he still got on base (.278/.354/.391), but he only played in 59 games. Then he played in just 39 in 2011, and 17 the next. Roberts, though, kept battling back from various injuries, and he was healthy to start the season in April. But he injured his hamstring in the third game of the season in Tampa Bay, and although it was disappointing, no O's fan could truly have been surprised.

Still, on June 30 Roberts made his way back yet again, and he appears to currently be fully (or at least mostly) healthy. That is fantastic news considering what Roberts has gone through health-wise these past few years. Unfortunately, he hasn't been very good.

Roberts hasn't batted more than 261 times in a season since 2009, so we're dealing with portions of seasons in that time frame. But at least partly because of his age (35) and injury history, he's lost much of his power at the plate. In 107 plate appearances, he has only five doubles and two home runs. His .357 slugging percentage is bad, but the O's could probably live with that number out of their ninth-place hitter -- after all, Nick Markakis isn't hitting for power either. But Markakis still gets on base at a decent clip; Roberts does not.

Overall, Orioles' second basemen have been disastrous at the plate. This season, MLB second basemen have averaged the following batting line:

.251/.311/.372 (.300 wOBA)

And here's what O's second basemen have done (small sample size qualifier):

Ryan Flaherty: .220/.277/.366 (.281 wOBA)
Brian Roberts: .245/.283/.357 (.280 wOBA)
Alexi Casilla: .221/.262/.316 (.254 wOBA)

Yikes. Those are Billy Ripken-like numbers.

Compared to the other 29 teams at second, the O's rank pretty low. They're tied for 23rd in wOBA (.277) and are third to last in OBP (.279). They have also hit for a below average amount of power (.352 SLG, ranked 20th).

All right, so none of them can really hit. And if Roberts isn't hitting, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to keep playing him -- especially every day. He's no longer good defensively (he hasn't been for years), and he does not steal bases anymore. Casilla probably has the better glove of the three, and he's also the better baserunner (well, normally). I'm not sure I buy Flaherty's jump in defensive value (5.5 UZR on FanGraphs), but he's certainly no worse than Roberts, whose range is still pretty bad. At best, Casilla and Flaherty are both bench guys, and I'm not really sure what Roberts is at the moment. That sounds harsh, but much of the talk surrounding the team suggests they're in win-now mode (read Dan Duquette's comments). The team's recent trades reflect that philosophy as well. And although the team doesn't have any good options, running Roberts out to second every game is not a win-now move.

Maybe instead of trading for two average starters and a relief pitcher (who has allowed four hits, all home runs, in four innings pitched with the O's), the team could have focused on upgrading the rotation slightly less and second base more. Again, the O's are tied for 23rd in wOBA among MLB second basemen. Here are their ranks at other positions:

C: t-19th (.290 wOBA)
1B: 1st (.423)
SS: 9th (.310)
3B: 8th (.340)
LF: 18th (.313)
CF: 6th (.354)
RF: 18th (.318)
DH: 14th (out of 15) (.286)

The Matt Wieters topic has been discussed ad nauseum, but the Orioles cannot replace his defensive value. Nate McLouth has been very good in left field, but none of the team's other options at that position have done well. Markakis isn't the same hitter anymore, but he's not going anywhere just yet. And the O's apparently did their best to upgrade the DH slot but came up empty. But other than a few message board rumors and fans' hopeful thoughts, I did not read much about the O's pursuing a better second base option, and I'm not really sure why. Maybe a realistic trade option at the position simply never materialized, though I find it hard to believe that there wasn't at least some second baseman with a decent bat who wasn't available.

Shipping away Nick Delmonico and some of the organization's other trade pieces may have made more sense for a second baseman instead of a rental relief pitcher and a back-end starter who may eventually end up in the bullpen.

The Failure of MLB's Drug War

Photo: Keith Allison

As I am writing this column, boos are showering down upon Alex Rodriguez at U.S. Cellular Field in Chicago.  It is not a good situation for him, the Yankees, Major League Baseball, or the fans.  It has brought the worst out in many of those who wish to engage in this event.  What perhaps is most unfortunate is the lack of understanding of the dangers of how supplements are handled or perceived in baseball.  By issuing knee jerk responses as policies and then trying to backwardly apply reasoning, a moment that could have been used to improve the game has been lost.

I have been following MLB's indifference and then overreaction to the use of supplements in baseball for two decades now.  My attention was first caught with Mark McGwire's admitted usage of androstenedione, which is a precursor for testosterone and estrogens.  I think that initial story frames the error of baseball's way in dealing with supplements.  It starts out with the press finding out that a rather good player is using some sort of supplement.  That supplement then shares some connection to other supplements that are deemed illegal.  MLB then reflexively cracks down hard on those supplements before we really comprehend what those chemicals do and whether they are safe.

We see the same thing with hGH.  We know athletes have used it.  We know good athletes have used it.  The hormone is known to increase tissue mass and overdosing on it is known to cause a great number of side effects.  Based on the mechanistic research, it appears unlikely that hGH will do anything substantial with respect to improving athletic performance.  This research is not conclusive, but a general working understanding of the hormone is that it induces cell replication, but does so without the components or at too fast of a rate to produce highly functional muscle.  Why do we not really understand how it works?  Well, in my opinion, the several studies showing no increased athletic performance was bad for the therapy business.  However, being able to detect metabolites of hGH in various biological media became big business.  In other words, athletic associations care less about whether it worked and more about detecting it in order to keep it out of the games as well as to have something to point toward in their punitive approaches.

This causes another problem.  Not only do we not comprehend fully how many of these supplements work, we are also probably several years behind the curve in the development of some of these approaches.  MLB's whack-a-mole policy with these supplements make players less likely to be open with any new approaches they may be trying out.  We do not know how they use these chemicals and have no solid way of measuring the effect of taking those chemicals.  Of course, people want to jump on the performance impact of the supplements, which is important.  However, a truly responsible and comprehensive program should be invested in the health of the players.  This means not to hold a hard line, but to bend.  Why should players not use anabolic steroids or hGH (lets ignore legality for a second) if they can be used safely?  We already know drugs like cortisone are not used safely in sports.  We already know that doctors will engage in radical surgeries.  I mean, there is a lot of attempted performance enhancing going on and there should be a cohesive plan to assess new techniques, approaches, supplements, whatever.

To be succinct, MLB's drug policy is archaic and overly harsh.  I think it is an overly simple solution designed to keep at bay the stark raving congressional moralists looking to earn a few points in the polls and a few grand in the war chest on an issue that is summed up by saying with a straight face: think of the children.  What it produces is a system where players are not really all that much safer.  Some drugs are given a free pass and are used with reckless abandon.  Other drugs are framed as performance enhancing even though evidence for such a thing is light beyond some evidence of player use and whose success is as anecdotal as Jason Giambi's golden thong's impact on the Yankees winning in the past decade.  This makes new therapies more likely to cling to the dark recesses as players looking for an edge are also wary that they may be the next posterboy for cheating in the game of baseball...and cheating in a Barry Bonds way as opposed to a Gaylord Perry way or in a name-your-favorite-50s-60s-70s-80s-baseball-star way.

This driving of players on the fringe into the shadows is something that baseball needs to work on.  It is potentially catastrophic to entrust baseball players to get advice from fringe doctors or, worse, gym rats.  Both have their places in the grand scheme of things, but neither is usually all that great in determining how effective a drug treatment is.  Sample sizes of one or two are pretty worthless and those sample sizes cannot be very meaningful until data can be openly shared.  It would be truly interesting to see how procedures like stem cell therapy and platelet-rich plasma could be better understood if it had not taken so long to even get them mentioned in the press with the latter appearing to have more acceptance simply because the phrase "stem cell" is not used.

I recognize the process is not going to change.  I recognize that the health of the player is not as respected as the perceived health of the game and that MLB coming down with an iron fist approach is the easiest way to pretend to solving this issue in the game.  Unfortunately, fear of being caught is of a certain magnitude.  Likewise, the fear of being released is of a certain magnitude as well.  We are dealing with a population that is under a great deal of pressure to succeed and faces a lot of adversity.  Drug use is rampant in the game.  Much of it is legal and, I would argue, much of it is done without as much concern for the health of the player as should be implemented.

So, yeah, the veneer looks grand with many joining together in shouting down Alex Rodriguez, but there is an incredible amount of rotten wood underneath it.

Should the Orioles Extend the New Nate McLouth?

gif by Steph Diorio / video: http://youtu.be/XMzCNO2wlWM

Last year, Jeremy Strain wrote an article for the Depot that generated a great deal of discussion between him, myself, Daniel Moroz, and the passengers (yes, lets see how well this term I just made up for followers of the Depot sticks...get it, Depot, trains, passengers, nevermind).  To paraphrase, Jeremy thought that Nate McLouth's performance for the Orioles last season in 55 games (268/342/435) was more indicative of his future performance due to him being fully healthy and surmising that he was unhappy to be in Atlanta.  I and, largely, Daniel, countered that it would be unfair to ignore his poor performances in Atlanta and Pittsburgh in predicting the future because there was nothing we could point toward to show that his talent level had increased.  One of the many ideas the passengers put forward was that the real question was how do we resolve left field when the team is unlikely to pay much for an outfielder to which I thought Nate Schierholtz would have been a solid replacement.

Anyway, I think how things settled as the offseason dragged on actually wound up where we thought it was appropriate (except with Schierholtz signing with the Cubs for 2.25 MM and still under arbitration).  The Orioles dragged their heels on Nate McLouth with no one else willing to make much of a play on him.  With trade options dwindling and asking prices undesirable, the team decided to resign him for 2 MM with some understanding expressed to him that the left field position would be up for grabs against Nolan Reimold, Ryan Flaherty, L.J. Hoes, and whoever else they could find (i.e., Steve Pearce, Chris Dickerson, Conor Jackson).  The move was largely interpreted as uninspiring and signified the difficulty the front office had in finding a big bat, which is what they were trying to acquire.

What has happened though was largely unseen.  McLouth has not produced the .250 BA/20HR/25 SB guy Jeremy predicted.  He has actually surpassed that average and matched the stolen bases, but likely will not meet that power amount.  I don't really like using those numbers to measure a player because they are some of the weaker metrics for correlations to actual performance.  Daniel, in a rebuttal post, expressed some of the numbers that mean more to me and largely to predictive approaches.  To try to put them on equal footing...I think under Jeremy's approach the split would be something like 250/330/450 while I saw something more like 250/330/400 with a large number of games being sat out due to left handed starting pitching with which he has historically failed at hitting (111 wRC+ vs RHP, 76 wRC+ vs LHP).

So what has happened?

Nate McLouth Playing for Baltimore

Year	Age	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+	bWAR
2012	30	236	.268	.342	.435	111	1.0
2013	31	413	.287	.355	.425	113	2.4

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/3/2013.

What has impressed me most about Nate McLouth's season is that he is not the player in the same vein as what he was doing earlier in his career and what is more similar to what Jeremy was projecting (mind you, Jeremy's projection is much closer to reality than mine or Daniel's so don't take that as a pile on).  Where he has found success has been his approach at the plate, which is the same approach he seems to have taken last year.  The approach is one where he covers more of the plate and produces solid line drives as opposed to deep fly balls.  He has cut down his fly ball percentage from about the mid to upper 40% range to upper 30% this year.  That massive change is reflected in his home run ability.  Simply put, a true line drive will result in a homerun only one percent of the time, so by reducing fly balls you should see a great reduction in home runs.  He has gone from someone who would hit a home run every 25 at bats in Pittsburgh to someone who hits one every 50 at bats in Baltimore.  Those fly balls have largely been translated into line drives.  His line drives are sitting at 26.5% whereas they were in the mid teens during his prolific Pittsburgh days. 

I also think a great deal of his success has been his ability to cover more of the plate with his new approach, particularly against southpaws.  In the past, McLouth's susceptibility to left handed pitching made him more suited for being a platoon outfielder and someone who would need a pinch hitter late in games if the opposing manager would send in a left handed pitcher to face him.  This was also problematic because what manager would pinch hit an All Star centerfielder late in the game?  Not many.

Using the data I have (from 2009 to the first half of 2012), McLouth would swing and miss against lefties 17.7% of the time.  In 2013 (up to August 3rd), that number is 14.8%, a decrease of 16%. He is swinging about 43% of the time, which is an increase from 41%.  In other words, he is swinging more and getting more contact from the left side.  Increasing that coverage has turned him into a full time player.

McLouth's Splits

I	Split	BB%	SO%	BA	OBP	SLG	wRC+
	vs RHP Career	10.7	16.3	.262	.348	.445	111
	vs RHP 2013	9.3	11.5	.298	.364	.429	118
	vs LHP Career	7.2	18.1	.226	.305	.353	78
	vs LHP 2013	6.6	15.4	.250	.318	.413	101

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/3/2013 with BB%, SO%, and wRC+ taken from Fangraphs.

McLouth still walks a decent amount of the time even though he has dropped slightly below average (but not to a significant degree with respect to the league).  However, that is buttressed by his increased batting average through increased meaningful contact.  That increase in getting on base more than makes up for the decrease in isolated power; highest in 2008 with a .221 mark, it now resides at .138.  That decrease in power might be concerning to you.  However it should be noted that if McLouth continues on his current pace that his fWAR and bWAR should be 3.2 and 3.5, respectively.  His career high marks for those two are 3.5 and 2.5, respectively.  That should impart two things: (1) Nate McLouth is having a career year and (2) getting on base, otherwise known as not getting out, is far more important than hitting for power.

In the end, I think all of us evaluating McLouth missed a major thing: he is no longer Nate McLouth.  He is the New Nate McLouth.  Jeremy suspected that a return to health would bring back his Pittsburgh halcyon days.  Daniel and I thought that it was presumptuous to ignore poor performances.  What we shared in our misjudgement was being able to identify what exactly it was that he was doing differently to enjoy success in the latter half of 2012.  This apparently was missed by all of baseball as his performance should have been worth much more than 2 MM in the open market.  He should have gotten a contract similar to what Melky Cabrera had received.

In the end, it is nice to be wrong when being wrong means things are right between the lines at Camden Yards.  However, how do the events from this season impart upon my thoughts on extending Nate McLouth?  Not much really.  I would suggest that a fair open market price on McLouth this offseason would be about 2 years and 16 MM, which is what Melky Cabrera signed when he agreed to play for the Blue Jays.  I assume that by the end of the year, McLouth will have produced about 4 bWAR over a little less than a year and a half in Baltimore.  If you project that over a full season, then McLouth would be expected to be worth about 3 bWAR a year or about 15MM.  Injury likelihood probably drops it down to about 10MM a year, which then probably get dropped further due to an uneven history and lack of power.

At a contract similar to Cabrera's, I feel uneasy inking McLouth.  Thirty one year old enjoying career seasons is not exactly the kind of commodity I like getting behind.  I think McLouth's skills play for a fringe first division team, but only if he is not one of the major offensive players you are relying on.  In other words, he is a complementary piece and I would hesitate making such a player the third or fourth highest paid player on the team.  Of course, if McLouth is not lining up in left field, who is?

With L.J. Hoes now an Astro and Nolan Reimold losing another year, internal options appear scarce.  The free agent market for the 2014 season has a few outfielders that are interesting enough to consider trying to shift them over to left field.  Those would be Jacoby Ellsbury, Shin-Soo Choo, and Hunter Pence.  At this moment, it appears all three of them will be bid on hard by their current teams.  They also will probably earn considerably more than McLouth.  They would be players who would be leaned on hard for their offensive acumen.  Second tier players would include Mike Morse, David Murphy, Ryan Raburn, Coco Crisp (who is an older version of what Nate McLouth currently is), Marlon Byrd, Corey Hart, and Nate McLouth.

Perhaps Nate McLouth is the best choice here.

Sunday Comics: American League Top 40

Chris Davis has 40 home runs. Count 'em, 40. Forty. Four-zero. That's a lot.

He's done this 40 times already and he still has two months left to add onto that. He has a legitimate shot at catching Brady Anderson's mark of 50 dingers set back in 1996. This just adds an extra layer of excitement to a potential playoff run.

Orioles Pick Up Bud Norris, Part With More Mid-Level Prospects

The Orioles, having already acquired a starter (Scott Feldman) and a reliever (Francisco Rodriguez) in the last few weeks, decided they needed to make one more move for a pitcher at the trade deadline. That move happened to be trading for Astros starter Bud Norris, who will make his O's debut tonight (against his former club). For Norris's services, the O's sent L.J. Hoes, Josh Hader, and a 2014 competitive balance pick to Houston. Besides Norris, the O's received an international signing bonus slot.

Norris, 28, happened to be the Astros' best starting pitcher, though that doesn't say much. In 126 innings this season, he has a 3.93 ERA, but there are some worrisome signs. His strikeout rate (6.43) is about two fewer than his career rate (8.39). He's been fortunate with his HR/FB rate as well: Only 7% of the fly balls against him have left the ballpark, while his career average is around 11%. Also, as this FanGraphs article notes, Norris's velocity is in decline (which explains some of the strikeout issues), he is not good against left-handed batters, and he may have more of a "reliever's arsenal."

But it's not all negative with Norris. He's been walking fewer batters (3.07 BB/9 vs. 3.67 for his career). He's also thrown at least 153 innings the last three seasons (and is on pace to easily exceed that mark this year), which is not amazing in itself, but is always good to avoid giving starts to pitchers like Freddy Garcia and Josh Stinson. And he has two arbitration-eligible years left (he's not a free agent until 2016), so he should be relatively team-friendly cost wise. He'll likely replace either Feldman or Jason Hammel, who are both free agents, in next year's rotation.

Norris gives the Orioles more rotation depth and is probably a minor upgrade over Hammel, who went on the disabled list yesterday. But he basically provides more of the same for an O's rotation that is not very good in the strikeout department. Here are the strikeout rates for the team's five other starters (including Hammel):

Chris Tillman: 7.39
Miguel Gonzalez: 6.33
Jason Hammel: 6.22
Wei-Yin Chen: 5.50
Scott Feldman: 6.31 (5.40 with O's)

Zach Britton and Steve Johnson aren't high strikeout guys either. That's one of the reasons why fans are so excited about Dylan Bundy and Kevin Gausman, and also why some refused to give up on Jake Arrieta. Certainly it helps any pitcher to have Manny Machado and J.J. Hardy fielding behind them on the left side of the infield, but most of the O's starters don't get a ton of groundballs anyway (Norris doesn't).

Maybe it would have made sense to just roll the dice with someone like Britton, who has pitched well at times but overall hasn't been that great. Interestingly enough, the Astros were interested in acquiring Britton as the lefty alongside Hoes in the trade, but the O's parted with Hader instead. Maybe that means Britton will strongly be considered for a rotation spot next season, or maybe the O's just didn't want to lose a 25-year-old starter who's a decent option and has major league experience.

So what did the O's give up in the trade? More of the same: mid-level prospects who the organization may or may not have soured on. Baseball Prospectus had Hoes seventh and Hader 10th on its preseason Orioles top 10 prospects list, while Baseball America listed Hoes sixth and did not include Hader. Hader appears to have a higher ceiling than Hoes, who many view as a fourth outfielder type. Still, the Orioles managed to hold on to Bundy, Gausman, Jonathan Schoop, and Eduardo Rodriguez, probably the organization's top four prospects. I'm also relieved that the O's did not sell low on Bundy.

Still, by not trading any of those four, the O's did not really improve the team that much. Feldman and Norris will help more than Rodriguez, but it's not like they were real valuable acquisitions. If Hammel is legitimately injured, the Norris trade looks a little better (again, unless you're a big believer in Britton). But none of the three are genuinely great pitching options.

As discussed in the K-Rod trade analysis, could the O's have packaged Delmonico along with the now traded Hoes and Hader (or Arrieta)? Even for a shallow farm system like Baltimore's, that would have still been an intriguing collection of prospects, and it should have netted a better starter than Feldman or Norris. But, again, it's hard to know who was actually available and how much the Orioles were willing to spend on whoever they acquired.

Dan Duquette made the decision to spread some assets around and trade for three decent but flawed pitchers. I'm not sure if the O's sacrificed that much talent for those pitchers, but I don't think their presence makes the team that much better. They're somewhat better, but was it worth the risk?