Is A Reunion With Jim Johnson A Good Idea?

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It was reported last week that Jim Johnson could be a potential free agent target for the Orioles this offseason, even as a starting pitcher. Between 2008 and 2013, he was an effective reliever for the Orioles, throwing 395 innings to the tune of a 2.92 ERA (3.48 FIP) while producing a total of 5.5 WAR (according to Fangraphs). This fWAR number was good enough to place Johnson 16th among relief pitchers over that time period (minimum 300 IP). Johnson sticks out on that list, as the majority of pitchers ahead of (and behind) him include closers and other relievers one would likely consider “dominant”. That is of course a subjective term, but in this case I’m specifically referring to pitchers with high strikeout rates. Despite ranking 16th in fWAR, Johnson ranked 51st (out of 53 pitchers) in K/9, with a paltry 6.02. There is however, “more than one way to skin a cat” (DO NOT go off skinning cats), and while Johnson never was a strikeout machine, he kept the ball on the ground and in the ballpark, ranking 6th in groundball percentage (58.0%) and 4th in HR allowed per 9 innings pitched (0.52) during that time, both excellent attributes to have while pitching in Camden Yards.

Jim Johnson (photo by Keith Allison)

Prior to the start of the 2014 season (and entering his last year before becoming eligible for free agency), the Orioles surprisingly dealt Johnson to the Oakland Athletics for former prospect Jemile Weeks and a player to be named later (that PTBNL would turn out to be minor league catcher David Freitas). To some however, this trade wasn’t as surprising as it appeared on the surface, as Johnson’s expected $10 million salary was considered expensive for a pitcher with his profile, especially for a team with a limited payroll such as Baltimore. Johnson’s inflated salary of course was a result of the arbitration process, one which rewards relief pitchers for saves (despite it being a dumb statistic), something Johnson had accumulated a lot of over the previous two years.

Since leaving the Orioles, Johnson has travelled quite a bit, performing as two completely different pitchers (but mostly as a bad one), depending on whose uniform he happened to be wearing. This is pretty obvious looking at his numbers in the table below.

So if the Orioles are seriously considering a reunion with Johnson, which version of the pitcher are they more likely to get?

Let’s first focus on Johnson’s “luck” based peripherals over the past two years. It’s important to note that the word luck is in quotes since poor pitching by Johnson could certainly have been a major contributor to his “bad luck”. Everything that could have gone bad in 2014 (and his time with the Dodgers in 2015) for Johnson did, as those numbers look horribly out of whack in comparison to his career norms.

But how much of this was truly a result of bad luck compared to just bad pitching? Obviously, Johnson also didn’t help himself by walking 13.3% of the batters he faced in 2014, although he appeared to correct those problems in 2015. Taking a look at his batted ball tendencies doesn’t really tell us much, as they stayed relatively close to his career levels. Yes, his LD% was up about 2.5% and his percentage of “hard” hit balls (according to Fangraphs) was up about 3.5% in 2014, but both levels were similar (or lower) than their levels in his very productive 2013 season. It’s interesting that he did allow 48.3% of balls in play to be pulled in 2014, which possibly helped contribute to his increase in HR/FB%.

What about changes in the pitches themselves, such as the velocity, movement, etc? Velocity does not appear to be the culprit as his velocity over the years has remained fairly consistent. The quality of his pitches is where we start to see some differences, especially with Johnson’s sinker, which is his main pitch. According to Brooks Baseball, the horizontal movement on the sinker has fluctuated depending on the year, but has been trending in the wrong direction since 2012. Johnson has also been getting less vertical movement on the sinker as well, showing a clear downward trend over the course of his career.

Finally, let’s take a look at pitch location. According to Brooks Baseball, Johnson has thrown his sinker 63% of the time over the course of his career, so we’ll keep the focus on that specific pitch. Additionally, Johnson has never shown a platoon split (.301 wOBA against facing LHB, .310 wOBA against facing RHB), so we won’t limit the analysis to facing certain batters. Here’s how the location of his sinker has evolved from 2012 (arguably his best year) to 2015.

 

It’s fairly obvious that Johnson kept his sinker out of the middle of the zone in 2012 (effectively working both corners), which could go a long way to explain why he was so good that season. Generally, it also looks like he benefitted from some good fortune during 2013 as his sinker found the middle of the plate quite a bit. It’s possible that an argument could be made for bad luck in 2014 based on the figure, as Johnson generally kept the pitch down and towards his arm side’s edge, but I would hesitate to make that argument based on two things: it doesn’t excuse his walk rate (friendly reminder, it was 13.3%) and he basically abandoned working the pitch to his glove side of the strike zone.

Johnson’s 2015 season is arguably his most interesting, as he was very effective with the Braves, but was “dumpster fire” terrible with the Dodgers, so let’s take a closer look at where he threw the sinker during his time with each team.

The figure depicting his time with the Braves looks awfully similar to the one from 2013, which shows a lot of sinkers thrown middle-middle, indicating that he benefitted from some good luck. However, it looks like he also generally kept the sinker down in the zone better than he did in 2013, which is a good thing. However, there is no getting around the fact that Johnson was just bad in Los Angeles. He left nearly all of his sinkers up in the zone, making it hard to argue that his .446 BABIP and 25% HR/FB rate were just a function of bad luck, even in a very small sample size. It’s true that bad luck may have contributed, but Johnson wasn’t doing himself any favors.

There’s a mantra that hitters are supposed to follow against a pitcher who throws a sinker: “If it’s high, let it fly…if it’s low let it go.” Well, during his time with the Dodgers, Johnson was “pitchin’ ‘em high” and batters were “lettin’ it fly” to the tune of a .184 ISO. Compare that to a 0.046 ISO against his sinker during his time with the Braves and .099 ISO against his sinker over the course of his career.

Jim Johnson will never be a dominant pitcher, especially as the effectiveness and movement of his primary pitch (the sinker) continues to erode, which makes it even more important that he effectively locates the pitches he throws. Over the last couple of years, he’s failed to do that on a consistent basis. At this point, the Orioles would be wise not to offer him a guaranteed major league contract to be a member of their bullpen. And the notion that he’s a potential rotation candidate (as inferred in the link above) is even less advisable. I would never be against a team adding a guy like Johnson on a minor league deal with an invite to spring training, because it’s essentially a move with very limited downside. But even if that’s the route the Orioles take, they should be ready to cut bait at the first sign of trouble.

Three Under the Radar Free Agents the Orioles Should Pursue

As usual, the Orioles aren't expected to be in the running for the highest priced free agents available. They weren't in the running for Pablo Sandoval or Hanley Ramirez and they won't be pursuing Max Scherzer or Jon Lester. They could still bring back Nick Markakis or Nelson Cruz. They've also been mentioned as candidates to land Melky Cabrera or Nori Aoki.

But what is almost certain, based off of Dan Duquette's track record, is that he will bring in under the radar players in need of another chance, who other teams may be unwilling to take a shot on. Here's 3 players the Orioles should consider.

Photo by Keith Allison

Luke Hochevar

Hochevar missed the entire 2014 season after undergoing Tommy John surgery in March. The #1 overall pick by the Royals in 2006, Hochevar struggled in his 128 starts between 2007-12. In 2013, the Royals converted him to a reliever and he thrived. His 10.49 K/9 ranked 24th among 135 qualifying relievers. He also posted a 1.92/2.96 ERA/FIP.

Steamers projects Hochevar to put up 9.41 K/9 and 2.91/3.12 ERA/FIP in 2015. He earned $5 million last season, but since he's been converted to a reliever and is coming off of Tommy John, it won't take nearly that to sign him. He would be a nice compliment to a strong Orioles bullpen that doesn't strike enough batters out.

Nolan Reimold

Despite the fact that he was let go by the team during the 2014 season, Reimold is the exact type of player Duquette would bring in. I can't imagine too many teams are lining up to give Reimold a spot on their 40-man roster, so a minor league deal with an invite to the big league camp (like Delmon Young last season) might be enough to bring Reimold aboard. While Reimold doesn't excel against LHP, the fact that he hits right-handed could prove to be an asset to a club that's 2015 OF will potentially feature left-handed hitters David Lough and Alejandro De Aza. 

The Steamers projections aren't pretty, as they have Reimold as a 76 wRC+ player next season. But if he is healthy, he could very well out-produce those projections. This would be a low-risk, depth move, so I can't really see any reason for the club not to pursue Reimold. I'd rather the Orioles hand Reimold a one year deal than give Cruz or Markakis a 4 year deal.

Jim Johnson

I would expect plenty of teams to be interested in buying low on Johnson. His history in Baltimore could prove to be a deciding factor, depending on how he feels about his time in and departure from the team. If he's open to a return, the club should pursue it. While he may never have another 50 save season, Johnson is due for a bounce back. His .366 BABIP in 2014 is way out of whack with his career. 297. His FIP of 5.08 wasn't pretty, but it suggests he was a good bit better than his 7.09 ERA. 

Johnson may be a little redundant in an Orioles bullpen that features plenty of RHP, as well as a lot of guys who don't get a lot of strikeouts. But, bringing him in gives the team added depth and flexibility, which we all know is something Duquette and Buck Showalter cherish. 

While none of these moves are going to move the fan excitement needle much, and in fact might bring some criticism, these are the exact kind of signings Duquette has shown a knack for since coming to Baltimore. All of these guys give the Orioles more depth, as well as a potential bargain, as players such as Nate McLouth and Delmon Young have previously. 

More on Jim Johnson and Elite Closers Status

A couple months back, I wrote about making an argument that Jim Johnson is effectively an elite closer.  This gave rise to a few thoughts from Matt Perez.

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Thoughts on Jim Johnson and Elite Closers
by Matt Perez

A couple months ago, Jon wrote a post discussing whether JJ Johnson is an elite closer by looking at JJs conversion rate of save and hold opportunities. While blown holds and saves do get a lot of notice, I was wondering whether they were related to run prevention. Do pitchers with a significantly lower ERA have a higher conversion rate than those pitchers with a significantly higher ERA? 

In order to test this, I looked at individual seasons for all relievers with both a qualifying amount of innings and also ten or more saves plus holds as well as all relievers with eighty or more saves plus holds total from 2003-2013. For each of these relievers, I determined their Save plus Hold conversion rate (in order to save time, I’ll use the abbreviation Sv_Hld_Pct for the rest of this post) as well as their ERA and FIP . Then I determined their correlation coefficient . 

A correlation coefficient is a statistic that determines how strongly specific metrics resemble each other.  In this case, the metrics are ERA and Sv_Hld_Pct. The possible values range from -1 to 1. The closer the value is to -1 or to 1, the higher the likelihood that the two metrics resemble each other. The definitions for when a correlation is strong, weak or non-existent depends on what one is studying and can be subjective rather than objective. However,  a general rule of thumb is that an r with an absolute value below .4 or above -.4 is weak, between .4-.7 or -.4 to -.7 is moderate and higher than .7 or lower than -.7 is strong. 

Listed below is a table with the results.

Individual Seasons

Metric                    r

With ERA:            - .3657

With FIP               -.2715

Career Numbers

Metric                  r

With ERA            -.5038

With FIP             -.4431

These results indicate that there is only a weak correlation between Sv_Hld_Pct and ERA/FIP for individual seasons and a moderate correlation between Sv_Hld_Pct and ERA/FIP for a full career. It would seem that it wouldn’t make sense to judge a closer based on his Sv_Hld_Pct.

It is possible to split up pitchers into two categories; pitchers that have more saves than holds and pitchers with more holds than saves. Determining the correlation between ERA/FIP and the above categories save or conversion rate will determine whether one category has a significant correlation. Listed below is a table with the results.

Individual Season

Metric                  r for More Saves       r for More Holds

With ERA            -.6059                           -.2644                           

With FIP             -.4798                           -.1780

Career Numbers

Metric                r for More Saves     r for More Holds

With ERA          - .6837                        -.3945

With FIP            -.6306                         -.3229

There are drastically different results for these two categories. ERA and FIP have a moderate to high correlation with save conversion percentage but only a low to moderate correlation with hold conversion percentage. 

There are a few reasons why this could be the case. Closers are typically brought into the game at the start of the ninth. In contrast, a setup man is more likely to be called into a game in the middle of an inning. Suppose a reliever comes into the game in the middle of an inning when there is an offensive player already on base. If that reliever allows that runner to score then he wouldn’t be charged the run but he may blow the lead and thus get a blown save. This is because runs are charged to the pitcher that allows an opponent to reach base and not to the pitcher that allows an opponent to score.

However blown saves are charged to the pitcher that allows a runner to score but not to reach base. If a reliever allows many inherited runners to score then he could in theory have a low Sv_Hld_Rate as well as a low ERA.

However, I think the main reason is how closers and setup men are used. The average closer gets either a save, a hold or a blown save 57% of the time. The average setup man gets a save, hold or a blown save 33% of the time. It would make sense that the average closers’ Sv_Hld_Rate would be more likely to resemble his ERA then it would for the average setup man because the average closer simply comes into the game a lot more frequently in one of those situations. 

In order to properly judge Jim Johnson’s save conversion rate we need to compare him to other closers. I looked at all qualified relievers from 2003-2013 who had at least two complete seasons where they had ten saves and had at least three times as many saves than holds.  Any pitcher that fulfilled these conditions was at minimum the closer of a team for most of the year.  There are a total of 57 closers who fulfilled these conditions. Then, I compared how these relievers did in their first year to how they did in their second year. 

It turns out that the median reliever who fulfilled all of the above conditions converted 89.1% of their save attempts in their first year but only 86.3% in their second year. Likewise, ERA goes from 2.54 in their first year to 3.19 in their second year while FIP goes from 3.01 to 3.45. If we look at relievers who have a 90% conversion rate or higher in their first year, we see a drop in their conversion rate from 91.3% in their first year to 88.8% in their second year.  Their ERA drops from 2.50 in their first year to 3.22 in their second year and their FIP drops from 3.08 in their first year to 3.51 in their second year. These differences are significantly high and suggest we could have expected Jim Johnson to be significantly worse in his second season than in his first season. 

Now that we know this, suppose we look at all qualified relievers from 2003-2013 who had all the same qualifications as above except had three complete seasons instead of two. There are a total of 30 closers who have fulfilled these conditions.

It turns out that the median closer who closes for three seasons has a conversion rate of 90%, an ERA of 2.45 and an FIP of 2.79 in his first year, a conversion rate of 89.4%, an ERA of 2.69 and an FIP of 2.78 in his second year and a conversion rate of 88.1%, an ERA of 2.77 and an FIP of 3.23 in his third year. While these differences aren’t significant, they do indicate that the average closer continues to degrade in performance the longer he closes.

The problem is that it doesn’t matter whether a closer was elite his first year. The question is whether he can repeat his performance in future years. Unfortunately, this indicates that even closers like JJ who were successful in their first year become increasingly likely to fail in future years. Just because a closer has one successful year doesn’t mean he’ll be successful in later years.

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Grant Balfour Going Elsewhere; Why That Might Be Good

Many fans rejoiced when the Orioles had apparently signed Grant Balfour on Tuesday, not necessarily because they knew a whole lot about Balfour, but because his arrival represented the team's first free agent signing of note. However, the soon-to-be 36-year-old right-hander from Australia won't be taking over the closing duties from Jim Johnson after all. Roch Kubatko of MASN hinted on Thursday night that when the Orioles received the results of Balfour's physical, there was some kind of issue. Apparently the issue is with Balfour's right shoulder; as Kubatko mentioned, "Something was revealed on the X-rays that must have raised concerns." Concerns were definitely raised, and by Friday, the deal was off.

So what happened? According to Kubatko, the Orioles simply went with what their doctors said:

#Orioles went with drs recommendations. Would probably do 1 year with option. 2nd guaranteed year became issue after physical
— Roch Kubatko (@masnRoch) December 21, 2013

Even though the two-year, $15 million contract seemed to be a reasonable deal, it's still a lot of money for an aging reliever. Plus, the Orioles are notoriously wary of taking risks on free agent pitchers (mostly starters, but still):

The Orioles traditionally don’t give starting pitchers deals beyond three years. Orioles executive vice president Dan Duquette doesn’t like to do it, and club owner Peter Angelos doesn’t like to do it.

Balfour isn't a starting pitcher, obviously, but the normally cautious Orioles evidently weren't wild about handing over guaranteed second-year money to Balfour. Eduardo Encina and Dan Connolly of The Baltimore Sun did an effective job on Thursday of going over Balfour's injury history:

[B]efore Balfour, who converted 62 of 67 save opportunities for the Athletics over the past two seasons, emerged as a dependable late-inning arm, he missed two full seasons in 2005 and 2006 after reconstructive elbow and shoulder surgeries.

As a member of the Minnesota Twins, Balfour had Tommy John surgery on his right elbow in May 2005. Four months later, he had surgery to repair a torn labrum and rotator cuff in his shoulder, costing him the entire 2006 season.

Balfour has not missed time because of his shoulder since. He’s been on the major league disabled list just twice, having missed 32 games with an intercostal strain in 2010 and 13 games for an oblique strain the next season. Last offseason, Balfour had surgery to repair a torn meniscus in his right knee, but returned to the mound within two weeks and was on Oakland’s Opening Day roster.

As you'd expect, Balfour claims that he's completely healthy, and as told to Susan Slusser of the San Francisco Chronicle, he had a few choice words for Duquette and the Orioles:

“I called Dan Duquette and told him, “I’ve played in this league for 10 years, I deserve to be treated with respect and you did not treat me with respect. Two well respected physicians said I am completely healthy – because I am healthy. I’m a fighter and a winner and I would have given you your best chance to win.

“I was looking forward to pitching for the Orioles and helping them to go to the World Series, where they haven’t been for 30 years,” Balfour continued. “I wanted to help them as a team.”

Balfour is a fiery guy, and I'm sure he wholeheartedly believes all of that. Still, the Orioles likely realize that the missing piece to their World Series puzzle probably isn't a single good but not fantastic reliever. Besides, Balfour can't help the team if he's injured.

Balfour and his agents understandably have a few doctors on their side. (Kubatko shared an amusing anecdote on one of those doctors.) But they aren't the Orioles' doctors, and the team is going with their word. The Orioles are probably more cautious than most teams -- right or wrong, good or bad. Overall, the whole thing still looks bad for the Orioles, and it will look even worse if Balfour signs with another team and pitches well. But for two years and $15 million, they weren't willing to risk being wrong.

To me, it's laughable that some believe the deal was nixed simply because Orioles' ownership decided at the last minute that they just didn't want to pay that much money for Balfour. Jon Heyman of CBSSports.com said as much:

the idea the orioles retracted the $15M/2 deal w/ balfour only because they changed minds is silly. o's loved that deal.
— Jon Heyman (@JonHeymanCBS) December 21, 2013

The Orioles traded Jim Johnson away a few weeks ago, and ever since that move they've been linked to a handful of "proven closers" to fill the role. Now that Balfour is no longer an option, the O's are considering Fernando Rodney as an option at closer -- and he won't come cheap, either. If the Orioles were simply being cheap, I'm not sure why they would even bother with Balfour or Rodney in the first place.

Also, it's curious why Oakland didn't try to re-sign Balfour if the cost would have been close to what he and the Orioles originally agreed to. Rob Neyer of SB Nation wondered the same thing Friday morning: "[T]his still doesn't explain why the A's would happily trade for the Orioles' Jim Johnson, who's slated to make around $10 million next season. But it does explain why they let Balfour get away. We were wondering, since Balfour is essentially the same pitcher -- when healthy, that is -- as Johnson, and wound up costing significantly less money."

Maybe Oakland just really wanted Johnson, or maybe they want to see if they can use him as trade bait at the trade deadline. But it's also possible that the A's were, on some level, worried about Balfour's health.

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Before the Orioles' contract with Balfour fell through, I was working on a post on Balfour's change in pitch usage. It may not be as relevant now that he won't be pitching for the Orioles, but considering the injury issues being discussed, I think it's worth noting. So, here we go.

As I briefly discussed on Wednesday, Balfour accumulates three things: strikeouts (9.78 K/9), walks (3.94 BB/9), and fly balls (43.6 FB%). He's also posted sub-2.60 ERAs in each of the last four seasons. When his ERA has been up in the past -- for example, in 2009 when he had a 4.81 ERA -- he wasn't all that different to the current version of himself other than a slight increase in his walk rate. He was, however, unlucky BABIP wise (.296 vs. career .264), and he only stranded 65.4% of baserunners (career 76.8%). Because he doesn't get more groundballs and doesn't limit his walks more, he is not considered an elite reliever, but he is still very good.

Balfour has two main weapons: his four-seam fastball and slider. According to Brooks Baseball, since 2007 (which is as far back as their data goes) Balfour has thrown his four-seam fastball 74.5% of the time and his slider 15.7% of the time. He also mixes in a curveball (6.7%) and an occasional sinker (2.1%) and change-up (1%).

As he's gotten older, though, Balfour's pitch usage has changed in an intriguing way. His velocity has been steady; last year his average fastball velocity was about 93 miles per hour, which is right around his career average. But since 2008, he's throwing fewer fastballs and more sliders each year. Take a look:

Pitch usage chart for Grant Balfour

You'd think Balfour would lean more on his secondary pitch, his slider, if his fastball velocity was dropping, but as noted above, that isn't the case. The movement on Balfour's pitches hasn't drastically changed either. His four-seam fastball doesn't move quite as much vertically as it did a few years ago, but that's really it. The movement on his slider also hasn't changed much.

Overall, Balfour has done an effective job in his career of retiring left- and right-handed batters. Lefties have a combined .272 wOBA off of him, while righties have a .281 wOBA. But he's attacking both sets of batters differently than he did in 2008 (which was the year he really started to pitch effectively).

First, here's how Balfour's repertoire to left-handed batters has changed:



The takeaway there? Fewer fastballs and more offspeed pitches.

How about right-handed hitters?

 


Balfour basically throws only fastballs and sliders to righties. The drop-off in fastballs is much greater here, though, as is the jump in a single offspeed pitch.

Maybe Balfour has simply had to adjust to opposing batters as his career continues. In a time when there are a ton of specialist relievers, it's certainly valuable to be able to summon one pitcher who can pitch well against both right- and left-handed batters.

Changes in pitch usage happen, and it doesn't mean anything is wrong with Balfour's arm or shoulder. His velocity is still consistent with his career average. But maybe not having to reach back and throw as many fastballs has been beneficial for him and allowed him to keep pitching and dodge another major injury. I doubt it's a red flag, but it's at least some kind of flag (maybe with an Orioles' orange hue).

Stats via Brooks Baseball and FanGraphs.

The Low Down on the Orioles Rule 5 Selections and the Jim Johnson PTBNL

As the Winter Meetings came to a close, the Orioles finished with a flurry of activity.  The activity may have been disappointing because it very much related only to the Rule 5 Draft as opposed to the rumor mill that linked the team to Grant Balfour, Matt Garza, John Axford, Fernando Rodney, and Nelson Cruz.  With those expectations, it can be difficult to get excited about long tenured players who were not on any team's 40 man roster.  Regardless, we will address the new players joining the Baltimore Orioles Franchise.

Rule 5

The Rule 5 is one of the most overblown events of the year.  You will easily find more talent on waiver wires throughout the year than you do in the Rule 5 draft.  The Orioles have been particularly adept over the past two seasons in finding players that fit their active roster, something that other teams are unable or incapable of doing.  However, this success could make some expect the team to be successful in finding pieces year in and year out.  My perspective though is that is probably not the case this year.

MLB Portion
Michael Almanzar, CIF/DH
R/R
23 years old
6'3 190 lbs

Year	Age	Tm	Lev	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
2008	17	2 Teams	A-Rk	246	11	3	3	3	4	13	54	.262	.309	.376	.684
2009	18	2 Teams	A--A	446	14	3	4	1	2	25	105	.220	.276	.298	.573
2010	19	Greenville	A	531	27	3	10	4	1	30	114	.246	.294	.376	.670
2011	20	2 Teams	A+-A	425	18	0	4	4	5	15	93	.199	.243	.275	.517
2012	21	Salem	A+	498	36	0	12	10	4	33	77	.300	.353	.458	.812
2013	22	Portland	AA	561	29	3	16	13	3	42	100	.268	.328	.432	.760
6 Seasons				2707	135	12	49	35	19	158	543	.250	.302	.373	.675

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/12/2013.

In the MLB portion of the draft (which requires the team to hold selected players on their active roster for the entire season), the Orioles selected Michael Almanzar.  Almanzar is a product of the Red Sox international effort in the Dominican who paid him 1.5 MM for a signing bonus in 2007, which also employed his father as a minor league pitcher at the time.  Michael was viewed highly when he dominated rookie ball as a 17 year old while his struggles in low A ball that same year were ignored.  Those struggles have followed him over the years.  However, he has seen some marginal success these past two year in HiA and AA.

I asked an evaluator who was familiar with him for his thoughts:

There's leverage in the swing and [Almanzar] can hit it out of big league parks, but he has sizeable holes on the inner third and struggles with velocity up. Defensively he is a first baseman or DH, though I guess Baltimore could give him time at third in Spring Training and see where it goes -- especially if Machado's not going to be back. They might be able to stash him as a pinch hit and occasional first base/DH option, but it's more likely he gets shipped back to Boston at some point in March, or when Machado makes his way back to the team.

It may well be that the team, having no obvious holes in the bullpen or outfield or infield that a Rule 5 could fix, took a 25k chance on a player with some promise in the hope they could teach him how to field.  The Baltimore developmental system is not well known for much, but there has been some attention paid to their ability to refine fielding skills.  It is a long bet as you are betting on a bat that profiles around a .270 wOBA who has little fielding skill.  I don't think anyone expects Almanzar to break the season with the big league club.

AAA Portion
Julio Borbon, OF
L/L
28 years old
6'0 195 lbs

Year	Age	Tm	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+
2009	23	TEX	179	4	0	4	19	4	15	28	.312	.376	.414	105
2010	24	TEX	468	11	4	3	15	7	19	59	.276	.309	.340	71
2011	25	TEX	98	1	3	0	6	2	3	9	.270	.305	.348	73
2013	27	TOT	118	3	1	1	7	1	12	22	.200	.282	.276	54
4 Yrs			863	19	8	8	47	14	49	118	.272	.318	.347	76

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/12/2013.

In the AAA portion, teams simply pay 12.5k to acquire players who are neither on the 40 man roster or the 38 man AAA roster.  There are no conditions other than that.  For the Orioles, they helped address a major issue with the organization, upper minor league outfield depth.  They have seen Jason Pridie, L.J. Hoes, Xavier Avery, Trayvon Robinson, Chris Dickerson, Eric Thames, Lew Ford, Yamaico Navarro, Conor Jackson and Russ Canztler leave the organization.  The only Norfolk outfielders still in the organization are Buck Britton, Henry Urrutia, and Danny Valencia who made up only 49 plays in the outfield.

Julio Borbon is part of the resupply of the organization of high minors depth.  He joins other offseason acquisitions Ronald Bermudez, Chih-Hsein Chiang, and K.D. Kang.  I imagine that Henry Urrutia and Dariel Alvarez will also be in the conversation.  I also imagine a player like Tyler Colvin will likely be added to provide some corner power.  Regardless, Borbon is a solid option in the outfield who will be capable of filling in if a player goes down in Baltimore.  You probably do not want him up there for any significant time, but he can man the field.

Jim Johnson Trade

When Jim Johnson was dealt last week, it included a player to be named later.  Original speculation were that the PTBNL would be someone like fringe prospect Miles Head or a promising raw one tool player like Renato Nunez.  Those expectations were not met as the player to be included is catcher David Freitas.

David Freitas, C
R/R
25 years old
6'3 225 lbs

Year	Age	Tm	Lev	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
2010	21	Vermont	A-	261	19	0	4	2	0	34	47	.307	.408	.450	.857
2011	22	Hagerstown	A	516	30	0	13	2	1	82	87	.288	.409	.450	.859
2012	23	2 Teams	A+-AA	395	28	0	7	0	0	45	67	.283	.377	.429	.806
2012	23	Potomac	A+	321	22	0	5	0	0	39	52	.271	.374	.407	.780
2012	23	Midland	AA	74	6	0	2	0	0	6	15	.333	.392	.524	.916
2013	24	2 Teams	AA-AAA	356	14	0	10	0	0	31	53	.231	.306	.368	.674
2013	24	Midland	AA	246	6	0	9	0	0	20	39	.214	.285	.362	.646
2013	24	Sacramento	AAA	110	8	0	1	0	0	11	14	.268	.355	.381	.736
4 Seasons				1528	91	0	34	4	1	192	254	.276	.377	.424	.801

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/12/2013.

As I write, Freitas looks to pair up with the loser of the Steve Clevenger and Johnny Monell spring training battle to be Matt Wieters' back up.  Last year, Luis Exposito and Luis Martinez sat behind the plate, but find themselves out of the organization.  Brian Ward and Caleb Joseph may be in the conversation as the Orioles likely plan to stick Michael Ohlman behind the plate as much as possible in Bowie.  Joseph may find himself at 1B or in LF.  Some Orioles fans (and some local writers) do not understand why he was not placed on the 40 man roster, but it seems fairly clear that he is not a catcher and hitting well in Bowie at age 27 in not exactly a promising thing.

Beyond the nuts and bolts, what light does this put the Johnson trade in?  It was a salary dump where the Orioles acquired useful AAA players as depth.  Weeks never had a high upside, but he is missing out on what scouts envisioned.  He does not particularly field well and he does not particularly hit well.  He has been this way for a couple years and most are doubtful anything will change.  He has one more option and could visit Baltimore if anyone gets injured or fails immensely.  Freitas doesn't show much power, doesn't have much of a hit tool, and has struggled behind the plate.  He should be useful in Norfolk.  It is hard to see much beyond that.

Moving Forward
Well, the team is still talking with players.  As I write this, the team has a two-year deal out to Grant Balfour.  Supposedly, they have an offer out to a position player as well who is not Nelson Cruz.  By my calculation, they are about 20 MM under budget if last year's mark is also this year's.  From my perspective, I would like to see the team acquire John Axford, Franklin Gutierrez, and Masahiro Tanaka if he is posted.  If Tanaka is not available, then I would probably be interested in someone like Matt Garza or even A.J. Burnett.  In other words, there are still several options out there.  Some of those options are shinier than others.