How Zach Britton "Struggled" In 2016

Zach Britton, with a 0.54 ERA and a perfect 47 for 47 in save opportunities, had a pretty decent year in 2016. As noted by Steve Melewski, Britton is one of three pitchers in major league history to have at least 40 saves and an ERA below 1. At one point of the season, Britton went nearly four months without allowing an earned run. So, the obvious question is how much of his performance was luck and whether he can maintain these results in 2017.

Obviously, to do what Britton did in 2016, a pitcher needs to be dominant. But what’s interesting is that Britton held opposing left handed batters to a .495 OPS (.185/.254/.241) and right handed batters to a .410 OPS (.155/.211/.199). In addition, Britton had a K% of 26.7% and a BB% of 8.3% against left handed batters, but a 29.9% K% and a 6.7% BB% against right handed batters. This is surprising because normally a left handed reliever does better against left handed batters than right handed batters.

In fact, Britton easily had his worst year against left handed batters since he became a reliever. In 2015, he held batters to a .145/.181/.145 line with a 40.3% K-rate and a 4.2% BB-rate. In 2014, he held these batters to a .170/.215/.170 line with a 23.7% K-rate and a 5.4% BB-rate. And after not allowing a single extra base hit to a left handed batter in either 2014 or 2015, Britton allowed 3 doubles to lefties in 2016, 2 of which (including a ground-rule double) were hit by Brad Miller of the Rays.

Part of his problem against left handed hitters was his high walk rate. Left handed hitters struggle against him, even when putting the ball into play, so he doesn’t need to worry about giving up contact. But he still had a “poor year” in 2016 against lefties when they put the ball into play. Left handed hitters had a .267/.267/.333 line against him when putting pitches in the strike zone into play compared to an OPS of .452 in 2015 and .483 in 2014. His rank was 21st out of 216 relievers that appeared in 30 or more games. In 2015, he ranked 5th out of 218 and in 2014 ranked 6th out of 203.

He also had some poor luck against lefties when they put pitches out of the strike zone into play. Opposing batters went 2 for 8 against Britton with a single and a double in 2016 good for 93rd out of 215 relievers. Given Britton’s dominance against lefties, this is pretty surprising. Given the small sample size, this is almost certainly just random luck.

Some of the blame for Britton’s relatively high walk rate to left handed batters is due to his sinker. Britton only threw 45.7% of them in the zone in 2016 compared to 48.7% in 2015 and 64.1% in 2014. Opposing batters had a good eye when deciding not to swing at these sinkers as they had a called ball rate of 33.1% and a called strike rate of 14%. In 2014 and 2015, Britton’s sinker was a called ball 30% of the time and a called strike 21% of the time. This chart shows its results.

However, the bigger problem was his slider. Left handed batters only swung at 7 of his 31 sliders, missing 5 of them, fouling off another and putting only one into play. However, of the other 24, 17 resulted in called balls while 7 were called strikes. In 2015, batters swung at 14 of 29 sliders and missed 10 of them. Of the 15 they didn’t swing at, 8 resulted in called balls while 7 resulted in called strikes. Without a successful slider to keep batters honest, Britton wasn’t able to maintain his high strikeout rate of 2015. Britton’s slider is devastating, even when thrown inside the strike zone and perhaps he should consider trying to throw it in the strike zone more often. This graph shows the results.

If Britton had a “poor” year against lefties, he made up for it with his performance against right handed hitters. Right handed batters had a .250/.250/320 line when putting pitches in the strike zone into play in 2016, compared to a .350/.350/.510 in 2015 and a .250/.250/.426 in 2014. In addition, Britton allowed a .130/.130/.174 line to right handed batters when putting pitches out of the strike zone into play, compared to a .316/.316/.388 in 2015 and an .182/.182/.182 line in 2014. Right handed batters may have had success against Britton in 2015, but they sure struggled in 2014 and 2016.

Britton also had some improvement in his strikeout rates. In 2016, Britton had a 29.9% K-Rate and a 6.7% walk rate. In 2015, he had a 27.6% K-Rate and a 6.1% walk rate while in 2014 he had a 20.8% K-Rate and a 9.4% walk rate. Clearly, he’s showing some progression. Part of the reason for it is that Britton’s sinker against righties was a bit nastier this year than in years past. Batters put a lower percentage of his sinkers into play, and therefore gave Britton more chances to strike them out.

Going forward, Britton is very good against right handed batters. He’ll put up strong strikeout and walk percentages against right handed batters, but he’ll need to do an excellent job preventing damage on balls put into play in order to put up elite numbers against right handers. To be fair, it’s awfully hard for even right handed batters to do anything more than just ground out. However, he has it in him to be absolutely otherworldly against left handed batters. All he needs is a bit better luck on balls put into play, and the ability to either get them to swing at his slider or put a few more in the strike zone. It’s likely that we should expect some regression from Zach because I suspect right handed batters will have more luck against him next year. I’d expect to see him have an ERA in the low to mid 1s range next year.

The average pitcher had a .350 OPS last season when batting. If Britton can put together his 2016 season against right handed batters with his 2015 season against left handed batters, then opposing hitters might not break that .350 OPS mark. If so, he’ll almost certainly have another excellent season and might possibly improve on his 2016.

Does Miguel Gonzalez's Orioles Career End Here?

With the regular season only a few days away, major-league teams must make the final moves to prepare their rosters for the 162-game haul. Some clubs must decide who will serve as the fourth outfielder; others will choose the backups for the starting catcher and infielders. And for teams like the Orioles, it means they must conclusively determine their starting pitching situation.

Baltimore knows that Chris Tillman, Ubaldo Jimenez, Yovani Gallardo, and Kevin Gausman will (in some order) occupy the 2016 rotation. Tillman rebounded somewhat in the second half of 2015, and his solid work prior has earned him the Opening Day start for the third straight year. Jimemez and Gallardo have solid resumes and pricey contracts, both of which will grant them some job security, deserved or not. And once Kevin Gausman returns from his shoulder injury, his flame-throwing arm will allow him to take the hill every fifth day.

The doubt comes beyond that. Mike Wright and Tyler Wilson each started some games last season, but neither has really impressed to this point. While Vance Worley has some talent, the fact that the Pirates put him on waivers tells you about his potential. Yet each of these three apparently has more potential than Miguel Gonzalez, with whom the Orioles have decided to part ways. After a solid run for the Birds, it looks as though Gonzalez has reached the end of the road.

Out of the many pitching prospects that Rick Peterson has tampered with developed, Gonzalez stands out as perhaps the biggest success. Before the Orioles signed him in the 2011 offseason, he was an oft-injured 27-year-old farmhand with 5.0 innings in Triple-A and zero innings in the majors. Then he broke out in 2012, twirling a 3.25 ERA over 105.1 innings to support the team's Cinderella run. That kicked off a three-year stretch of solid starting pitching, in which Gonzalez posted a 3.45 ERA in 75 games (69 starts — nice) and 435.2 innings. Dan Duquette and Co. seemed to have found a diamond in the massive minor-league free agent rough.

Then the wheels came off in 2015. Gonzalez deflated to a 4.91 ERA over 144.2 frames. It could have been a fluke, but since he'd outperformed his FIP in the prior years (more on that in a moment), this appeared to indicate that his luck had run out. He sealed his fate with a ghastly stint in Sarasota, stumbling his way to a 9.78 ERA in 19.1 spring training innings. That takes us to where we are now: Gonzalez on waivers and the Orioles looking elsewhere to round out their rotation.

In retrospect, we should note that Gonzalez's decline happened not in 2015, but in 2014. Over the first two years of his career, Gonzalez allowed 3.87 runs per nine innings and tallied a 3.64 DRA, both above-average marks. DRA reflected some of the more advanced areas in which Gonzalez excelled — chiefly, his ability to limit production at the plate. Despite facing difficult competition (he had an opponent TAv of .265 over those two seasons), Gonzalez held hitters to a combined TAv of just .254*. Because DRA focuses so much on plate appearance outcomes, this helped Gonzalez's case immensely.

*TAv is scaled so that the MLB average is .260.

When the success at the plate went away, Gonzalez should have given up more runs. In 2014, batters knocked Gonzalez around to the tune of a .278 TAv, driving his DRA up to 4.91. He didn't have quite as low a BABIP in that year as he did in the preceding ones, and home runs plagued him like never before. But Gonzalez got lucky: He allowed just 3.45 runs per nine innings and cruised through the season (when healthy). Gonzalez had the same problems in 2015 that he had in 2014 — too many hits and long balls leading to an inflated TAv — except his good fortune vanished. His 5.04 RA matched his 4.80 DRA and doomed him to the waiver wire.

For two or three years, depending on your preference of peripherals or results, Gonzalez was a respectable, major league-caliber starting pitcher. That's a phenomenal feat for someone who endured as many hurdles — a recurring knee ailment, Tommy John surgery, numerous trips up and down the minor leagues, and the premature death of his close friend — as he did. Still, 31-year-old pitchers who lose their touch usually won't get it back. While the memories he gave us during the 2012 and 2014 runs make this a painful decision, ultimately it'll benefit the team to run out someone such as Worley or Wright.

Why The Orioles Needed Ian Desmond And David Freese

The Orioles had a very eventful off-season. They resigned Matt Wieters, Darren O’Day and Chris Davis, traded for Mark Trumbo and added Yovani Gallardo, Mike Carp and Pedro Alvarez. In order to make all of these additions, they had to open up the checkbook as payroll is at $145M according to Cots. It's impossible to argue that the Orioles are trying to build this club on the cheap. But despite all of these additions, the projections sure don’t like the Orioles very much. PECOTA thinks the Orioles are a 74 win team while Fangraphs thinks they’ll win 80 games. Turns out that $145M doesn't go very far in the free agent market. It doesn't seem like they've used their resources efficiently.

Part of the Orioles’ problem is that the projection systems think that the Orioles have weak projected starting pitching and minimal pitching depth. If things go wrong, and Spring Training hasn’t gone well for them so far, then this is going to be a long season for the bullpen. But I’d argue that the Orioles major problem is that they didn’t sign Ian Desmond and David Freese.

Ian Desmond isn’t a particularly good hitter. He did have a poor 2015 in which he only had a wRC+ of 83, but his wRC+ was 128 in 2012, 116 in 2013 and 108 in 2014. It seems reasonable to presume that he’s trending downwards. He’s considered to have above-average range as a shortstop but has a lot of errors per year. Pretty soon, he’ll be unable to play shortstop and he doesn’t have a good enough bat to be a strong outfield option.

Ian Desmond does well when he puts the ball into play as he’s typically in the 70th to 80th percentile. However, nearly half of the pitches he’s put into play have been ground balls since 2013 good for around the 70th or 80th percentile since 2014. He has comparatively good production when making that kind of contact, but I’m worried about what happens to his production when he starts to lose power and speed.  Desmond typically has poor BB/K ratios and fails to put enough pitches into play. His plate discipline isn’t going to carry him.

I think that Steamer and ZIPs are a bit low on him, but I think they have the right idea for what one can expect from him going forward. I see him as a league average batter that can play passable defense at a number of positions.

David Freese also isn’t a particularly good hitter. He also reached his peak in 2012, and for the past three years has been slightly above average with the bat. But he does not have significant power nor does he boast above average OBPs. Speed isn’t his biggest virtue as he’s had 1 season where he’s had over 1 stolen base and his defense is questionable. Aside from that, he typically misses significant time each season due to his struggles to remain healthy.

Freese also is primarily a groundball hitter with a 55% ground ball rate since 2013 and typically is in the 90th percentile in putting ground balls into play. As his speed and power begin to degrade, his ability to be successful when putting pitches into play will struggle. One of these days in the next few years, he’s going to be unable to contribute to a club. Until then, one should expect league average production from him and passable if not average defense.

I don’t think these players are very good. Then again, the fact that they received about $11 million combined suggests that front office don’t think much of them either. So, why do I think that the Orioles biggest problem wasn’t signing them?

The Orioles have a very interesting offensive structure at the moment. Players like Schoop, Machado, Jones and Joseph both have decent bats and are able to play premium defensive positions. Wieters will also be a huge help to the offense and defense if his elbow isn’t ruined. Chris Davis is likely to lock down 1B.

Aside from those positions, the Orioles have question marks. JJ Hardy will likely at least be a good defensive option at shortstop if he’s healthy enough to play. If he isn’t, the Orioles will likely need to choose between Machado, Flaherty or Janish at shortstop. Reimold may be able to lock down a corner outfield position if he could stay healthy, but that seems unlikely. Hyun-Soo Kim appears to have below average fielding ability at LF and is having a horrendous Spring Training. Players like Trumbo and P. Alvarez are able to hit, but will be disasters in the field.  Players like Avery, Hoes or D. Alvarez would be acceptable in the field, but aren’t the best hitters.

The Orioles have a decent number of offensive pieces but the pieces they do have don’t fit together. It's sort of like a 500 piece puzzle after your toddler has gone to town on it.  As far as I can tell, the Orioles likely will have 2 DHs, 2 1B/LF, a catcher, utility man, center fielder, second baseman and third baseman in the projected everyday lineup. If other players than Reimold and Hardy are injured, then the Os will quickly need to resort to hoping to receive production from replacement level players. Not to mention that Trumbo in RF is going to be awfully interesting.

There’s some window dressing that the Orioles can do. Presuming Hardy is injured, they can put Machado at SS and Flaherty at 3B. That would probably be decent defensively; although Flaherty doesn’t have a good enough bat to play regularly. They can put Davis in RF and Trumbo at 1B every once in a while. That’s not ideal, but it would be a slight upgrade.

Adding Ian Desmond and David Freese would have changed that. If JJ Hardy is unable to play as expected, then Ian Desmond would be able to play shortstop. Now it looks like the Orioles can look forward to having Flaherty play there for 100 games this season. When Hardy is healthy, Ian Desmond would be able to play defense in an outfield corner. Likewise, Freese is an acceptable piece to play at 1B, 3B or possibly corner outfield.

With those two players, the Orioles could have had the following offensive players on their roster: Wieters, Davis, Schoop, Hardy, Machado, Kim, Jones, Desmond, Trumbo, P. Alvarez, Joseph, Freese and Reimold. Flaherty could be stashed in the minors (he has options remaining) and used as the utility player when Hardy was on the DL. Alvarez and Freese make excellent depth pieces that can also be used regularly to give stars an occasional day off. Reimold and Kim could compete for a starting spot in the outfield and if both were ineffective could be replaced in the outfield by Trumbo or Freese. Given the Orioles lack of talent in Norfolk, having a few guys like that on the bench would have been nice.

Of course, money is a factor. The Orioles have already spent a lot of money and another roughly $10M would make a huge impact on the budget. In addition, Desmond would have cost the Orioles’ a pick. On the other hand, the Orioles as currently constituted have a lot of questions. Adding those two pieces would have gone a long way to giving the Orioles some well needed depth. As it is, the Orioles have a $145M roster with pieces that don't quite fit together.

How Well Are The Contract Projections Holding Up: Position Players

At the beginning of the off season, several different writers/entities decided to give a go at what they thought the market would bring.  At Camden Depot, I developed BORAS.  It is a model that looks at recent multi-year performance and individual characteristics, regressing that to contracts signed in years past.  Fangraphs reported two different prediction approaches: the thoughts of writer Dave Cameron as well as performing crowd surveys.  MLB Trade Rumors releases predictions from founder Tim Dierkes each year.  Former GM Jim Bowden and writer Jon Heyman also produce their own lists.

The season is not done, but we do have nine total position players that all six predictions have covered.  It might be good to think about how each of us has performed in order to look forward as the final players come trickling in to agree to terms.  Now, a few notes: (1) I am only considering position players here because my BORAS model is an entirely different model for pitchers as opposed to position players and I am unaware that anyone else has that issue; (2) None of our systems consider deferred money, so that is the elephant in the room that I will remain pretending that it does not exist; and (3) this comparison is based on yearly salary as defined by total divided by years.  In reality AAV is very much impacted by years, but I think with how the different estimates come about that years are an aspect that is not exactly as well drilled down than AAV.  I would also comment that contract years is a prediction that all systems get right roughly the same with differences of at most a year.

The table below shows the current performance of each model and reports on the difference between the predicted and actual spending, the regression coefficient from Least Squares Fitting, and standard deviations related to that coefficient.

	Difference	LSF	1SD	2SD
BORAS	1.30%	1.01	0.04	0.08
Bowden	0.20%	1.01	0.03	0.07
Cameron	8.20%	0.90	0.05	0.10
Dierkes	5.80%	0.94	0.04	0.10
FGC	3%	1.03	0.03	0.06
Heyman	7.80%	0.93	0.04	0.09

Jim Bowden's estimates has been solid as shown by his estimates missing on total by only 0.2% spending and the Least Squares Fit (you want that to be 1 as it is the slope of the relationship between the estimate and the actual AAV).  His estimates have also been very internally consistent as shown by the standard deviations.  The BORAS model comes in behind Bowden with overall accuracy, but is more middle of the pack with internal consistency.  The others have dealt with overestimating the market and being a little bit more dispersed.

A major issue for Cameron, Dierkes, and Heyman may be that they overestimated the price per win.  For Cameron, I believe he begins with the assumption that the cost is 8 MM per win with that cost increasing 5% each season.  My own calculations assumed 7 MM per win and a 5% increase with each year.  If that was the only issue, then we should see a 14% difference between our estimates and that is not the case.  I do think though that the cost per win is likely part of the reason for the difference.  For individuals like Heyman who likely do not cost cost per win, it would be more akin with him thinking in general that more money was out there for the taking.

Anyway, the offseason chugs along and below are a smattering of available free agent position players and how the three currently best performing systems view them.

	Years	BORAS	Bowden	FGC
Howie Kendrick	2 to 4	13.4	15	13
Yoenis Cespedes	5 to 7	18.8	21	22
Justin Upton	4 to 7	16.5	23	20
Dexter Fowler	2 to 4	12.1	15	14
Austin Jackson	2 to 4	12.4	10	10

The apple amongst these oranges is Justin Upton.  BORAS thinks Upton is good, but is not really impressed with him.  The model largely sees him as being pretty good, but not valuing that he has been pretty good incredibly consistently.  BORAS seems to appreciate exceptional years more than being an extremely good lunch pail slinger.  Upton could very well be a big enough miss for BORAS to knock the model down a peg.  To a lesser extent that might be true of any eventual Cespedes deal.

What the above table does make me think is that perhaps if the Orioles choose to grab another starting position player that perhaps Austin Jackson might be a good one to grab.  Him and Fowler are similarly valuable players, but Jackson has a stigma lying over him of which I am unsure why.  He wound up being a glorified bench player with the Cubs at the end of last season, which is a considerable red flag or, perhaps, a considerable opportunity to find a starting quality outfielder on the cheap.


***6:52 am***
As expected, the Upton deal changes the landscape here a bit.  With him pulling in almost exactly what Bowden suggested and well beyond what BORAS pegged, we can expect to see quite a shift in model accuracy.  For the sake of my model, it will likely need to perform well on the remaining deals to get back close to Bowden's predictions.

The Money Is There. Where Is It?

As we settle into the final stages of free agent acquisition, the market begins to stabilize. First of all, several top tier talents remain available. To be elite and available in January is not an unusual thing. Ask Max Scherzer or Prince Fielder. However, to have as many perceived elite talents out there for hire is indeed unusual. According to STEAMER, Chris Davis, Howie Kendrick, Yoenis Cespedes, Justin Upton, Wei-Yin Chen, and Ian Kennedy are all present and stand to be worth more than two wins for 2016. Six players stand to make about 18 MM apiece (a total of 108 MM for 2016). That is a great deal of talent to change the outlook of the league without mentioning mid-range talents like Ian Desmond, Yovani Gallardo, and others. In all, STEAMER project 54.4 loose wins remaining, a value of about 380 MM. Complicating the matter is that many teams in search of talent have spent a great deal of money, which might have caused the market to constrict significantly.

Of course, available talent though does not equal available money. If there are 12 apples whose intrinsic value is a dollar while only six dollars are available in the market, then those apples will likely sell for less than they are worth. We do not know how much money each franchise has, but we can guess. To arrive at a reasonable answer for this, payrolls from 2013, 2014, and 2015 were assessed for change over time. This change could then be used to estimate what might be the overall pool of money available for 2016. Estimated current total payroll for 2016 is $3,747,200, which is a 1.01% increase over last year. Should we expect more?

	Payroll	%
2013	3150500
2014	3396200	7.80%
2015	3709800	9.23%
p2016	4025875	8.52%

If that 8.52% increase happens, then we have about 280 MM in open spending available. With overall talent at 380 MM, it looks like it might shape up to be an incredible buyer's market, which was something we thought Dan Duquette would be angling for this offseason. Also, the rumors about players considering one-year deals, punting a season, and then resetting for the 2016/17 offseason make a bit more sense. It must have someone like Chris Davis thinking twice about rejecting the 7/154 offer he had on the table or why he is refusing that offer if it is indeed still there.

Using the generic 8.52% increase over 2015 payroll marks might help us understand who exactly is in play for major talent. To note, this is generic because we are not considering whether 2015 was an abnormality in excess or under payment. Additionally, we do not know if resources are being redirected for immediate play or to support future franchises fortunes. Off the bat though, we have several teams that appear to be out of the game: Toronto (13.5 MM above 2015 + 8.52% payroll), Cleveland (22.5 MM), Angels (24 MM), Oakland 13.4 MM), Arizona (28.5 MM), Chicago (37.9 MM), St. Louis (4.1 MM), and New York Mets (1.3 MM). These eight teams seem, at a glance, out of the running for any of the top-tier talent.

What are the team needs of the 22 other clubs based on STEAMER projections?
(x denotes minor need as defined by 25th to 50th percentile; X denotes major need as defined by 1st to 25th percentile):

Team	C	1	2	3	S	LF	CF	RF	SP
NYY								x
Baltimore		x	X		x	X		X	X
Tampa	X	X						x
Boston	x			x		x
Kansas City			X		X			x	X
Twins	x	X		x	x		x	x	x
Chicago AL			x		X	X	x	X
Detroit	x			X	x	X	X		X
Texas	x	x				x	X
Houston	X	X		x		x
Seattle		x			x	x	X
Colorado	x	X	X		x	x	X	x	x
San Diego	x	x	X	X	X	X	X	x
San Francisco						x
LAD			x
Cincinatti	x		x	x		X	x	X	x
Milwaukee		X	X	X		x	x		X
Pittsburgh		X			X
Philadelphia	X	X	X		x	X	X	X	X
Atlanta	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Miami	X	X		x	X				X
Washington	x	x					X

The data provided by STEAMER is slightly dated. For instance, it is difficult to portray Washington as having a great need in center field when they have just acquired Ben Revere. However, the data is nearly up to date and gives us a good indication of roughly where clubs are at the moment (as of Alex Gordon's re-signing).

First Base
The Orioles offered Chris Davis 7/154, BORAS model projected 5/110, and the Comp model thinks 5/91 makes sense. Regardless, he is a near 20 MM first baseman (even though the actual Boras is trying to sell him as an outfield option). Teams with great need at first base include Tampa Bay, Minnesota, Houston, Colorado, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Miami. Of those, it is difficult to see Tampa or Pittsburgh putting out the money from a payroll perspective. Meanwhile, entrenched veterans exist in Minnesota (Joe Mauer), Milwaukee (the newly signed Chris Carter), and Philadelphia (Ryan Howard with Darin Ruf and Maikel Franco making future noise). This leaves us with Houston and Miami as the most sensible destinations. A team that really values Davis, like the Orioles, seemingly has pretty much these two clubs as primary competitors. My guess is that Houston would be reluctant to meet Baltimore's price and may well be waiting on the Orioles to make a move elsewhere and then swoop in with a low offer to Davis. Houston right now looks weak only at catcher and first base, so Davis makes a great deal of sense. Miami? Who knows? They could have something up their sleeve. That said, Miami also has weakness at catcher, shortstop, and starting pitcher. As it stands, Miami likely only has payroll to acquire one elite player.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Houston, Miami

Second Base
The second base market has been a bit quiet since Ben Zobrist signed, and Howie Kendrick is Mr. Incognito. A solid second baseman, but someone who has not been heard of much this offseason. Based on the clubs with cash and STEAMER, the weakest clubs appear to be Baltimore, Kansas City, Colorado, San Diego, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. That hurts for Kendrick. Baltimore appears to be quite happy to see how Jonathan Schoop develops. Kansas City has fringe options in Omar Infante and Christian Colon and appears to be largely disinterested in the infield market. They could be a landing place for a one-year bid. Colorado has larger troubles and appears content with D.J. LeMahieu to continue on. San Diego could be a spot when the dust clears. They have a number of weaknesses and should be looking at player to fall off to the floor. Milwaukee likes Scooter Gennett, the Phillies are in no place to compete and are working with Cesar Hernandez, and the Braves likewise have too many holes and a promising 2B in Jace Peterson. With all of that said, it looks like the Royals and, moreso, the Padres are the two openings. Both appear to be one-year deal scenarios, but the Padres could commit longer.
Likely Destinations: Kansas City, San Diego

Corner Outfield
The big paydays predicted for Yoenis Cespedes and Justin Upton have lost some of their shininess. The list here is not exactly as long as one might think: Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit, San Diego, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. To mention previous points, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Atlanta appear to be dedicated to rebuilding and signing a player descending from peak value seems doubtful. If there is cash to burn, there is an extreme scenario where one of these clubs signs a Qualifying Offer player, hands over a second-round pick as their first-round picks are protected, and either moves up with a compensation pick or deals said player at the trade deadline. A move up in draft selection looks like a waste of money spent, but a deal for prospects could help jump-start the rebuild a little and make it worth sinking 10 MM for half a season.

More realistically, these two players will wind up in Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit, or San Diego. After San Diego pushed their budget far, plopping down 20 MM for one of these guys might be too much, too soon. They have not been attached in the papers with an elite free agent, so it might well be that they are in the sub-15 MM market (such as Ian Desmond). For the others, they have each been mentioned in passing with either/both Cespedes and Upton. Baltimore may find themselves in a situation where it is difficult to choose because they could finalize deals with Cespedes, Upton, or Davis and only have Houston, Chicago (AL), and Detroit as primary competition. Perhaps Baltimore is the domino. It makes sense now that Alex Gordon re-signed with Kansas City because this market could wind up looking bad for someone.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit

Starting Pitching
This is another area where the market is not as great as it might appear for Wei-Yin Chen and Ian Kennedy. Of course, it always seems like an unknown team will launch themselves into the void to secure a stronger pitching rotation (again see Max Scherzer), but how often might that happen? As it stands, we have Baltimore, Kansas City, Detroit, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Miami. It is hard to see Milwaukee, Philadelphia, or Atlanta stepping into this negotiation. As they are all in rebuilding mode, starting pitchers tend to be poor options for those clubs. Starting pitchers primarily provide value their first season (~90% give more than 100 IP), but break down in the years following (~50% give more than 100 IP in year two or three or etc. afterward).

As it stands, Baltimore, Kansas City, Detroit, and Miami are the primary players one might think based on the above methodology. We know Baltimore is in the market and has been circling Gallardo. Ian Kennedy makes a great deal of sense for them as well, but it makes one wonder if they can fit two 20 MM players on their roster. Kansas City appears to have pieced together a rotation, but would like to push Danny Duffy or Kris Medlen to a sixth starter role. It is questionable whether they are planning on any more splurges after Gordon. Detroit and Miami are options. Detroit is being pushed in a few ways, but I doubt they want anyone significant after signing Jordan Zimmermann. That leaves Miami who has been the most noticeable in their quest to secure Chen.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Miami

Slightly Informed Projections
So where will everyone go? My choice yet is for everyone to find a need that meets their interests. Here we go.

Chris Davis, Houston Astros
The Astros have one big need and that is first base. This fit seems to make a great deal of sense and might well happen. Davis has been a major target of Peter Angelos, but after a while someone saying no to 154 MM gets frustrating.

Howie Kendrick, San Diego Padres
I do not know whether this would be a one-year deal (which I think would make more teams interested) or a multi-year deal. One might think ownership would be concerned after devoting so much money to older players last offseason.

Yoenis Cespedes, Baltimore Orioles
Justin Upton makes more sense for the Orioles with his youth, but his youth makes it likely a player option or two would be involved. Those things apparently make Dan Duquette mad. Cespedes is old enough where opt outs stop making as much sense. Cespedes also has a much better arm and range than Upton, fitting in more with the Orioles' defensive goals. The Orioles may also like that Cespedes will not cost them a draft pick for signing him.

Justin Upton, Chicago White Sox
While there has been no mention of Upton to the White Sox, this seems to make sense once Baltimore settles in on Cespedes. The White Sox are probably more willing to offer a player option. Detroit, in my opinion, will rest on their laurels as their payroll is nearing luxury tax levels.

Wei-Yin Chen, Miami Marlins
The Marlins have cash, have been highly associated with Chen, and he seems to be a great fit for them. I would also assume that Chen, who lives outside the United States, would not be all that bothered if Miami went and traded him elsewhere after a couple seasons.

Ian Kennedy, Kansas City Royals
This scenario has the Royals coming in unexpectedly to beef up their rotation with a short-term deal for Kennedy. If Orioles secure Upton over Cespedes, then I think they will be more willing to let go of a second-round pick to ink Kennedy to a deal in a similar vein to Ubaldo Jimenez'.

At the end of the day, a lot can happen. The Yankees may think they need to tighten up right field. Boston might determine they can spin some players around and get a proven left fielder. Rangers ownership could do a 180 on their stance about not significantly raising payroll. Regardless, all of these should be answered in the next four weeks.

Updating The 2016 Orioles

The other day, a commentator asked the following:

“I'd like to see someone here do a dual comparison of say Upton/Trumbo vs. Davis/Pearce or Davis/Parra or even Davis/Markakis and see how it grades out. I bet Upton/Trumbo is not too bad especially if Trumbo can bring 25-30 HR.”

This request is definitely doable using Steamer projections. However, a few changes need to be made to this question. First, the Orioles already have Trumbo on their roster and therefore shouldn’t be considered an addition. Second, I question whether the Orioles will spend more than $130 to $135 million on payroll and therefore think that adding Davis and Markakis would break their budget. This results in five possible permutations. One is that the Orioles add only Davis, that they add Upton, that they add Pedro Alvarez and Parra, that they add Markakis and Pearce and that they add Alvarez and Pearce.

Before the off-season started, the 2016 Orioles’ were projected to score about 661 runs if they didn’t add any players. Since then, the Orioles have added Matt Wieters, Mark Trumbo, L.J Hoes and Joey Rickard while losing Steve Clevenger and therefore have improved their offense.  My rudimentary model, which uses Steamer projections for performance and plate appearances, suggests that the Orioles have improved from scoring 662 runs to 699 runs. The Orioles scored 713 runs in 2015 and therefore have mostly replaced their offensive production.  This is how the baseline has changed.

In part, this is because Steamer believes that Machado will have 672 PAs and Adam Jones will have 654 PAs. Machado has over 700 PAs when healthy while Jones broke 680 PAs each year from 2012-2014 while having 581 in 2015 suggesting that both of these projections are feasible. If either of these players misses significant time, then the Orioles expected production will be inflated. In addition, I think that Steamer is awfully optimistic for players like Hoes (.262/.330/.358), Urrutia (.277/.319/.404), Alvarez (.273/.301/.423), Walker (.254/.311/.426), and Rickard (.256/.324/.350).

Steamer projects Chris Davis to have a .236/.329/.466 line, have 630 PAs and be worth 2.4 fWAR. In 2015, Chris Davis had a .262/.361/.562 line. Needless to say, if Steamer is accurate about Davis’ performance, then he will be a huge disappointment. In such a case, using him at 1B and Trumbo at DH as opposed to using players like Paredes, Walker or Mancini at DH will result in the Orioles being projected to score 720 runs or seven more than last year.

I’m far more bullish on Chris Davis then Steamer and project him to have a .264/.345/.524 line which would be slightly worse than his 2015 numbers but in the same ballpark. If so, the club would be projected to score 736 runs in 2016. This is how the Orioles depth chart looks if they add Davis.

Steamer projects Justin Upton to have a .260/.343/.467 line over 638 PAs and be worth 3 fWAR. Upton would presumably be the Orioles’ left fielder and would be a probable offensive upgrade from guys like Reimold, Rickard, Hoes, Urrutia and Alvarez. This lineup is expected to score 728 runs in 2016. Here's how the lineup looks.

Given the Orioles large number of weaknesses, one might think that adding multiple players could possibly help the team more than adding one great player. Steamer projects Nick Markakis to have a .269/.340/.369 line in 655 PAs and for Steve Pearce to have a .252/.324/.446 line in 377 PAs. If Steamer is correct, then trading for Markakis would be a mistake as he’d be a slight offensive upgrade over L.J Hoes and would cost considerably more money. Steamer appears to be a fan of Steve Pearce given the amount of cash that he’ll receive. This lineup is projected to produce 715 runs in 2016 and looks like this.

Steamer projects Pedro Alvarez to have a .243/.322/.466 line and for Gerardo Parra to have a .267/.315/.394 line. Steamer is justifiably bearish on Gerardo Parra and feels like he’d be a minimal upgrade over Nolan Reimold (albeit more likely to stay healthy) and worse than Henry Urrutia. As a result, this lineup would be expected to score 714 runs in 2016.

Alvarez and Pearce are the best players in these groupings with the exception of the expensive players like Davis or Upton. If the Orioles added Alvarez and Pearce, they’d be expected to score 720 runs in 2016 or about the same amount of runs as Steamer would predict the Orioles to score with Chris Davis.

The current Orioles prediction that they will score 699 runs is enough to put their offense in the middle of the pact (7th in the AL). Adding Upton or Davis would put the Orioles around 5th in majors based on previous year or that the Orioles should have an average to above-average offense. Then again, I also think that Steamer is highly optimistic on a number of the Orioles outfield options.

If Steamer was slightly optimistic when it came to the hitting, it’s even more so when it comes to the pitching. Steamer thinks that potential starters like Tyler Wilson, Dylan Bundy, Mike Wright, Vance Worley and Parker Bridwell can maintain ERAs below 5 as well as projecting minor league depth relievers like Oliver Drake, Chris Jones, Andrew Triggs, Tim Berry and Edgar Olmos of being above replacement level. That’s certainly possible, but I would be surprised if a few of those pitchers don’t get completely shelled next year ala Norris and Wright in 2015 or Hammel, Arrieta, Britton, Gausman and Garcia in 2013 or Arrieta, Britton, Matusz and Hunter in 2012. The Orioles currently only have four starting-caliber starters and will likely suffer due to a severe lack of depth.

Steamer projects the Orioles to allow 647 earned runs in 2016. Presuming that the Orioles allow 35 unearned runs, it would mean that the Orioles would allow 682 runs total or eleven runs less than last year.  It further suggests that the Orioles are currently an 83 win team and should be expected to win between 84 and 87 games based on which hypothetical scenario they follow.  This is enough to be competitive and possibly enough to win a playoff spot if the Orioles upgrade their team at the trade deadline.

I would expect the Orioles’ pitching prospects to do considerably worse than Steamer thinks. I expect them to allow an extra 30 runs more for a team total of 712 runs unless they add another starter to avoid relying so heavily on unproven prospects. This would mean that the Orioles should currently be expected to win 80 games and these possible additions would put them in the 81-83 win range.

It seems likely that the Orioles will compete for a playoff spot the entire season long. The Orioles bullpen is especially strong which likely means that they’ll give up fewer runs in important situations (when Britton, O’Day and Givens are pitching) and more runs in less important situations (when Wright and Wilson are pitching) making it more likely that they could steal a playoff spot. However, it also seems more likely than not that this club will fall just short of clinching a playoff spot regardless of whether they make a big signing. This team has talent, but needs one elite player, another good player and an average player in order to feel more comfortable about their chances of making the playoffs. Such a team would probably force the Orioles to spend $150M. Can their payroll go that high?

All in all, none of these scenarios are significantly different and they all leave the Orioles in a situation where they’re good enough to make it to the playoffs if random variation goes their way. They’ll just need to hope that a few players can outperform their projections.

Chris Davis' Contract: Using A Comp Model

Yesterday, it was reported again that Peter Angelos is personally involved in talks concerning Chris Davis.  This was considered a given after he had publicly stated an interest in resigning Davis the first week of October.  Angelos has never lost a signing that he publicly acknowledged an interest in making.  With this in mind, I decided to go back and try to figure out just what might make sense.

Last week, FanGraphs put forward an article considering their top statistical comps for Chris Davis and looking forward to see where that population of comps wound up in order to illustrate what potential outcomes we might see in Davis.  This is not an uncommon way to determine what just might be in store for a player, but if can be a pretty dodgy comparison.  I had some concerns about the methodology Fangraphs used.  Davis notoriously is a late bloomer and career comps by age will throw in players who are more a product of long term accumulation as opposed to the short burst of performance Davis has seen.  Second, I think by focusing on wRC+ and ISO, it obscures specific aspects of Davis that get lost in that metric flattening performance to a single number.  Finally, I think the position pool is too large and should be restricted to similar players.

For my comp pool, I only looked at player seasons from age 26 through age 29 for first basemen, left fielders, and right fielders with a wRC+ above 120, an ISO more than 125% than league average, and an OBP less than 115% of league average.  That led to the following list:

Sammy Sosa

Jay Buhner

Frank Howard

Lee May

Cecil Fielder

Adam LaRoche

Kirk Gibson

Jose Canseco

George Scott

Bobby Bonds

Andres Galarraga

Darryl Strawberry

I used this population to project performances from age 30 through age 39, a ten year outlay.  To accommodate for survivor bias, performance for players who no longer were playing were accounted for by regressing performance to the mean with an age factor included.  Going back to the list, we see a similar player emerge.  These players largely depend on hard contact and not much else.  Some of these players developed a few seasons in their later career where they figured out how to walk for a couple seasons, but that skill was not typically found through out their careers.

Year	Age	PA	HR	AVG	OBP	SLG	WAR	Value
2016	30	518	26	.263	.333	.482	2.2	15.4
2017	31	522	28	.265	.339	.498	2.5	18.4
2018	32	560	29	.271	.356	.501	3.2	24.7
2019	33	509	26	.261	.346	.481	2.4	19.4
2020	34	481	20	.248	.334	.438	1.5	12.8
2021	35	381	17	.243	.316	.438	0.9	8.0
2022	36	404	16	.237	.310	.418	0.6	5.6
2023	37	385	16	.222	.299	.405	0.2	2.0
2024	38	355	13	.211	.283	.379	-0.3	-3.1
2025	39	357	12	.200	.270	.356	-0.7	-7.6
Mean			203	.251	.333	.457	12.5	96

The mean player in this population remained a viable starter through age 34 (five seasons).  However, they performed at a first division level (above 3 WAR) for only one season.  That season was not age 30, but actually age 32 as several players tend to mature a bit later than normal in this group.  Unfortunately, we project that one season as the only season where Davis would be worth more than the expected 20+ MM he is expected to earn this off season.  It should also be noted that I compared this mean expectation with two proprietary models and mine was modestly optimistic.  The proprietary models were more in line with the FanGraphs mean.

Now, the mean result does not mean much without some concept of range.  To illustrate range, I divided this group into top and bottom halves and am reporting the averages of those groups to give some idea of what is a reasonable boom or bust.

Year	Low	Mean	High
2016	1.3	2.2	3
2017	0.9	2.5	4.1
2018	1.5	3.2	5
2019	0.9	2.4	3.9
2020	0.7	1.5	2.2
2021	-0.1	0.9	1.8
2022	0.1	0.6	1.6
2023	-0.6	0.2	1.7
2024	-0.2	-0.3	0.3
2025	-0.5	-0.7	0.3

Above, we see the top half projection would be a first baseman who perform as a first division first baseman for four seasons before performing as a second division (1.5 - 2.9) first baseman for an additional four seasons.  Those first four years help keep the contract on value for several years after he no longer warrants a 20+ MM salary.  Of course, if his play collapses (a la 2014), then the Orioles would be stuck with an albatross.

Here is the value outlay:

	5	6	7	8	9	10
High	141	157	172	190	192	196
Mean	91	99	104	106	103	96
Low	41	39	40	35	32	27

I would assume that you would rarely see a player signing for the mean because with player evaluation someone is likely to appreciate the player and expect better production than the mean.  That said, I would not want to push the club beyond paying for what Davis might be worth if he winds up being more like the players in the top half.  With that thought in place and with the assumption that he will command 25 MM a year, six years would be where I would stop (6/150).

Our BORAS model pegged Davis at five years and 104 MM, which would be a slight overpay given the comp player pool.  Based on the current chatter though, that sounds like a low ball offer.  This comp group appears to value Davis slightly more than other models of which I am aware.  In other words, all models that I know of think a deal of 6/150 or along those lines with be a loss of payroll flexibility.

Is A Reunion With Jim Johnson A Good Idea?

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It was reported last week that Jim Johnson could be a potential free agent target for the Orioles this offseason, even as a starting pitcher. Between 2008 and 2013, he was an effective reliever for the Orioles, throwing 395 innings to the tune of a 2.92 ERA (3.48 FIP) while producing a total of 5.5 WAR (according to Fangraphs). This fWAR number was good enough to place Johnson 16th among relief pitchers over that time period (minimum 300 IP). Johnson sticks out on that list, as the majority of pitchers ahead of (and behind) him include closers and other relievers one would likely consider “dominant”. That is of course a subjective term, but in this case I’m specifically referring to pitchers with high strikeout rates. Despite ranking 16th in fWAR, Johnson ranked 51st (out of 53 pitchers) in K/9, with a paltry 6.02. There is however, “more than one way to skin a cat” (DO NOT go off skinning cats), and while Johnson never was a strikeout machine, he kept the ball on the ground and in the ballpark, ranking 6th in groundball percentage (58.0%) and 4th in HR allowed per 9 innings pitched (0.52) during that time, both excellent attributes to have while pitching in Camden Yards.

Jim Johnson (photo by Keith Allison)

Prior to the start of the 2014 season (and entering his last year before becoming eligible for free agency), the Orioles surprisingly dealt Johnson to the Oakland Athletics for former prospect Jemile Weeks and a player to be named later (that PTBNL would turn out to be minor league catcher David Freitas). To some however, this trade wasn’t as surprising as it appeared on the surface, as Johnson’s expected $10 million salary was considered expensive for a pitcher with his profile, especially for a team with a limited payroll such as Baltimore. Johnson’s inflated salary of course was a result of the arbitration process, one which rewards relief pitchers for saves (despite it being a dumb statistic), something Johnson had accumulated a lot of over the previous two years.

Since leaving the Orioles, Johnson has travelled quite a bit, performing as two completely different pitchers (but mostly as a bad one), depending on whose uniform he happened to be wearing. This is pretty obvious looking at his numbers in the table below.

So if the Orioles are seriously considering a reunion with Johnson, which version of the pitcher are they more likely to get?

Let’s first focus on Johnson’s “luck” based peripherals over the past two years. It’s important to note that the word luck is in quotes since poor pitching by Johnson could certainly have been a major contributor to his “bad luck”. Everything that could have gone bad in 2014 (and his time with the Dodgers in 2015) for Johnson did, as those numbers look horribly out of whack in comparison to his career norms.

But how much of this was truly a result of bad luck compared to just bad pitching? Obviously, Johnson also didn’t help himself by walking 13.3% of the batters he faced in 2014, although he appeared to correct those problems in 2015. Taking a look at his batted ball tendencies doesn’t really tell us much, as they stayed relatively close to his career levels. Yes, his LD% was up about 2.5% and his percentage of “hard” hit balls (according to Fangraphs) was up about 3.5% in 2014, but both levels were similar (or lower) than their levels in his very productive 2013 season. It’s interesting that he did allow 48.3% of balls in play to be pulled in 2014, which possibly helped contribute to his increase in HR/FB%.

What about changes in the pitches themselves, such as the velocity, movement, etc? Velocity does not appear to be the culprit as his velocity over the years has remained fairly consistent. The quality of his pitches is where we start to see some differences, especially with Johnson’s sinker, which is his main pitch. According to Brooks Baseball, the horizontal movement on the sinker has fluctuated depending on the year, but has been trending in the wrong direction since 2012. Johnson has also been getting less vertical movement on the sinker as well, showing a clear downward trend over the course of his career.

Finally, let’s take a look at pitch location. According to Brooks Baseball, Johnson has thrown his sinker 63% of the time over the course of his career, so we’ll keep the focus on that specific pitch. Additionally, Johnson has never shown a platoon split (.301 wOBA against facing LHB, .310 wOBA against facing RHB), so we won’t limit the analysis to facing certain batters. Here’s how the location of his sinker has evolved from 2012 (arguably his best year) to 2015.

 

It’s fairly obvious that Johnson kept his sinker out of the middle of the zone in 2012 (effectively working both corners), which could go a long way to explain why he was so good that season. Generally, it also looks like he benefitted from some good fortune during 2013 as his sinker found the middle of the plate quite a bit. It’s possible that an argument could be made for bad luck in 2014 based on the figure, as Johnson generally kept the pitch down and towards his arm side’s edge, but I would hesitate to make that argument based on two things: it doesn’t excuse his walk rate (friendly reminder, it was 13.3%) and he basically abandoned working the pitch to his glove side of the strike zone.

Johnson’s 2015 season is arguably his most interesting, as he was very effective with the Braves, but was “dumpster fire” terrible with the Dodgers, so let’s take a closer look at where he threw the sinker during his time with each team.

The figure depicting his time with the Braves looks awfully similar to the one from 2013, which shows a lot of sinkers thrown middle-middle, indicating that he benefitted from some good luck. However, it looks like he also generally kept the sinker down in the zone better than he did in 2013, which is a good thing. However, there is no getting around the fact that Johnson was just bad in Los Angeles. He left nearly all of his sinkers up in the zone, making it hard to argue that his .446 BABIP and 25% HR/FB rate were just a function of bad luck, even in a very small sample size. It’s true that bad luck may have contributed, but Johnson wasn’t doing himself any favors.

There’s a mantra that hitters are supposed to follow against a pitcher who throws a sinker: “If it’s high, let it fly…if it’s low let it go.” Well, during his time with the Dodgers, Johnson was “pitchin’ ‘em high” and batters were “lettin’ it fly” to the tune of a .184 ISO. Compare that to a 0.046 ISO against his sinker during his time with the Braves and .099 ISO against his sinker over the course of his career.

Jim Johnson will never be a dominant pitcher, especially as the effectiveness and movement of his primary pitch (the sinker) continues to erode, which makes it even more important that he effectively locates the pitches he throws. Over the last couple of years, he’s failed to do that on a consistent basis. At this point, the Orioles would be wise not to offer him a guaranteed major league contract to be a member of their bullpen. And the notion that he’s a potential rotation candidate (as inferred in the link above) is even less advisable. I would never be against a team adding a guy like Johnson on a minor league deal with an invite to spring training, because it’s essentially a move with very limited downside. But even if that’s the route the Orioles take, they should be ready to cut bait at the first sign of trouble.