You might not believe it, but the Camden Depot staff wrote a bunch of articles in 2016. It's true! We didn't write as many as we would have liked, but that's how things go when things like families, jobs, and writing for free are involved. We're doing the best we can, and we want to thank all our readers and commenters (yes, even the ones who have some... interesting opinions).
Here's a look back (in reverse order) at the five most popular Camden Depot posts of 2016:
5. Orioles Are The Worst Team In The AL East
That wasn't our prediction, but instead an early look at preseason FanGraphs projections. Jon broke down the projections by position. The Orioles did go on to add Yovani Gallardo (bad) and Pedro Alvarez (good), but neither of those moves would have moved the needle much anyway.
4. A Closer Look At Joey Rickard's Defense
Joey Rickard came with a lot of hype after a strong preseason performance that bled into the beginning of the season. Rickard recorded hits in his first seven games, but things started to slow down after consecutive three-hit games in late April. Still, while Rickard's bat was a question mark, his glove was supposed to be a sure thing, with reporters sharing and offering glowing praise. Some scout even compared him to Steve Finley. Rickard rated poorly when it came to advanced defensive metrics, though, so I took a closer look at some of his impressive and frustrating defensive plays. If you look hard enough, you can see an above average defender in him. There's still time to improve, for sure, but he's probably not the superb outfield glove that many fans hoped for.
3. First-Place Orioles Obviously Aren't Sellers, But Should They Buy?
The title is pretty self-explanatory. The Orioles ended up doing what you maybe figured they'd do, not making any major moves (if they even had the required trade pieces) and adding a bunch of minor upgrades. They added Wade Miley and Steve Pearce at the nonwaiver trade deadline, and a month later added Michael Bourn and Drew Stubbs at the waiver deadline. Bourn was the best move of the bunch; Pearce got hurt and didn't add much; and Miley, while posting decent peripheral numbers, still put up an ERA of 6 in 54 innings.
2. CF To RF Defensive Modeling: Austin Jackson Is Dexter Fowler
Jon examined center to corner outfield conversion for outfielders in their late 20s to early to mid 30s. To do this, he created a regression model which compared players' last two seasons in center field to their first two seasons in right field. The results may surprise you. Losing out on Dexter Fowler ended up being a pretty big loss for the Orioles, though much of that is due to Fowler's tremendous year at the plate.
1. Bon Voyage, Zach Britton
Fans love talking about Zach Britton trades. Jon decided to use the value of the prospects that were sent to the Padres in exchange for Craig Kimbrel to estimate Britton's trade value. Some interesting prospect names are mentioned. While the O's aren't dealing Britton now, which is reasonable, a rough start to the 2017 season may force them to reconsider. If so, there's no doubt that the left-handed closer would be a top trade chip.
-----
Thanks again to our readers for helping to make the 2016 season a fun one. Have a happy and safe New Year's.
Showing posts with label 2016 Baltimore Orioles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2016 Baltimore Orioles. Show all posts
30 December 2016
14 December 2016
Buck Showalter's Adherence to Bullpen Roles has Shown Up in the Playoffs Before
Remember when the Orioles had to win a single game to continue in the 2016 playoffs and their manager chose to leave their best reliever - and arguably the best reliever in baseball - in the bullpen? That decision relied on flawed logic, that even if the Orioles got a lead with Zach Britton on the mound, they'd still need another reliever to close the game out and he might give it away. The Orioles eventually lost with Britton sitting alone in the dugout, mostly fresh (he warmed up a few times during the game), thereby creating the new saddest six-word story in the English language: "For sale: playoff jersey; never worn."
The image of Britton sitting on the bench stood in stark contrast to the way Terry Francona and Joe Maddon managed their relentless bullpens throughout the playoffs and into the World Series. The AL Manager of the Year and the NL runner-up each deployed members of their respective bullpens in emergency, high-leverage situations for extended outings regardless of inning. Francona especially garnered a great deal of attention for his unorthodox, win-at-all-costs bullpen management. Journalists and fans around the country began to wonder if this model of bullpen management - firefighting rather than game saving - was key to season-long success (don't be ridiculous; it's incredibly taxing over a postseason, much less 162 games). It was very reminiscent of the Royals in 2014, whose bullpen shut down the Orioles in the ALDS en route to a World Series victory.
Andrew Miller, left handed relief pitcher for the Indians, seemed to be the centerpiece around which Francona deployed his bullpen. Miller was also a member of the 2014 Orioles who were dispatched in 2014, and his short stint in Baltimore made a lot of fans think that the team had a winning model going forward: stock the pen with arms, send them to the mound whenever the team needed an out, and shut down scoring opportunities before they happened. Maybe Francona's plan wasn't novel after all... in fact, FanGraphs highlighted the Orioles, Buck Showalter, and Andrew Miller himself in 2014 as examples of forward-thinking bullpen management.
Looking back at the usage of Andrew Miller in the 2014 bullpen, we find that perhaps Buck Showalter wasn't so forward thinking after all. Like in 2016, Miller was not the team's closer, and he was "free" to appear in any inning in which he was needed. Here's how that usage shook out in each year:
The image of Britton sitting on the bench stood in stark contrast to the way Terry Francona and Joe Maddon managed their relentless bullpens throughout the playoffs and into the World Series. The AL Manager of the Year and the NL runner-up each deployed members of their respective bullpens in emergency, high-leverage situations for extended outings regardless of inning. Francona especially garnered a great deal of attention for his unorthodox, win-at-all-costs bullpen management. Journalists and fans around the country began to wonder if this model of bullpen management - firefighting rather than game saving - was key to season-long success (don't be ridiculous; it's incredibly taxing over a postseason, much less 162 games). It was very reminiscent of the Royals in 2014, whose bullpen shut down the Orioles in the ALDS en route to a World Series victory.
Andrew Miller, left handed relief pitcher for the Indians, seemed to be the centerpiece around which Francona deployed his bullpen. Miller was also a member of the 2014 Orioles who were dispatched in 2014, and his short stint in Baltimore made a lot of fans think that the team had a winning model going forward: stock the pen with arms, send them to the mound whenever the team needed an out, and shut down scoring opportunities before they happened. Maybe Francona's plan wasn't novel after all... in fact, FanGraphs highlighted the Orioles, Buck Showalter, and Andrew Miller himself in 2014 as examples of forward-thinking bullpen management.
Looking back at the usage of Andrew Miller in the 2014 bullpen, we find that perhaps Buck Showalter wasn't so forward thinking after all. Like in 2016, Miller was not the team's closer, and he was "free" to appear in any inning in which he was needed. Here's how that usage shook out in each year:
Showalter brought Miller into the game exactly one time before the 7th inning, and never used him for more than 5 outs. He threw 32 pitches in his first outing against the Tigers and then proceeded to throw fewer than 25 in each game afterwards. Some of that is a credit to Miller being good enough to get five outs on 20 pitches; another piece is Showalter adhering to traditional bullpen roles. Miller was used in back-to-back games twice, and only once on back-to-back days.
At face value, this paints Showalter as a more conservative manager who adheres slightly more strictly to defined bullpen roles. Even though Miller wasn't the "closer" or "setup man," he was probably safe in assuming that he would enter the game in the 7th inning if he was available that day. Francona's usage was much more variable over the course of the postseason, with Miller entering the game in each mid and late inning with an even frequency.
To be clear, this is merely one aspect of bullpen management, and only one example of it. Without knowing any context for the leverage of the situation in which Miller entered, it's possible that he was used as a fireman as much in 2014 as he was in 2016.
But such adherence to predictable late-inning entrances in 2014 probably wasn't by chance, and should have tipped fans off (if they weren't already aware) of Showalter's unwillingness to truly break away from defined bullpen roles. At least in the postseason, where every out matters to the team's very near future, the Orioles' manager needs to do a better job of firing the big guns when he needs them and not saving them for later - something he seems to have done consistently.
25 November 2016
Starting Pitching Was Not (Really) a Strength of 2016 Orioles
Joe Reisel's Archives
Jon Shepherd's recent Camden Depot article, Orioles Starting Pitching Was Not a Weak Part of 2016 Club, made a case that the 2016 Orioles starting pitching was, well, not a weak part of the 2016 team. Some commenters, including myself, observed that while the rotation as a whole might have been average, the front half (Gausman, Tillman, Bundy, and Worley (4 starts) performed well while the back half (Jimenez, Gallardo, Wilson, Wright, and Miley) performed poorly. This started a lively exchange in the comments.
I probably misunderstood what Jon was saying. Digging beyond the headline, he was seeking to correct the narrative that the 2016 Orioles starting pitching was a "train wreck" (among other narratives.) The title and the article itself contain another source of potential misinterpretation - that if starting pitching wasn't a weakness, then there is no need to improve it for 2017. Jon didn't actually say that in the article and, in subsequent comments, made it clear that he wasn't trying to imply that the starting pitching was just fine the way it was.
Nevertheless, I thought I would explore the idea that the Orioles' starting pitching was either very good or very bad in 2016, and see what (if anything) I could discover. The simplest approach was to look at each team, and count the number of games started by good, average, and poor starting pitchers. As this is an initial exploration, I decided to keep things really simple, using ERA+ as the measurement. ERA+ is a context-adjusted measurement of a pitcher's ERA, so that 100 is league-average (adjusted for context), above 100 is better than average, and below 100 is worse than average. Because starting pitchers have higher ERAs than relief pitchers, I decided to define an ERA+ of 101 or better as above average, 90-100 as average, and 89 or below as below average.
The below table shows the counts. For each team, the number of games started by a pitcher with a season ERA+ at the appropriate level for that team is counted. These values are retrieved from baseball-reference.com. Two points - this doesn't distinguish a pitcher's ERA+ as a starter as opposed to his ERA as a relief pitcher, so a few pitchers who were primarily relief pitchers but made a couple of starts would be listed in a category heavily influenced by their relief usage. And, it uses the pitcher's ERA+ with the team only, so James Shields is considered average for San Diego and below average for the Chicago White Sox.
Regarding the 2016 Orioles, it does seem that they didn't have a truly terrible starting rotation, although it was the worst among playoff teams. Their 84 games started by poor pitchers was the 24th most among all teams and by far the most among playoff teams. The next highest-total was 64 (the Dodgers.) On the other hand, their 78 games started by good pitchers was the 17th most among all teams, and last among the playoff teams. Their starting pitching wasn't bad enough to keep them out of the playoffs.
Unlike two other contending teams. While most of the teams with bad starting rotations were bad teams, Houston and St. Louis were in wild-card contention until late in the season (the final day for St. Louis.) And most observers concluded that their lack of starting pitching is why those two teams didn't make the postseason.
To some extent, this chart understates how bad the Orioles' second-line starting pitching was. I used a cutoff ERA+ of 89 to define a "bad" starting pitcher; none of the five Orioles in that category - Jimenez, Gallardo, Wilson, Wright, and Miley - came particularly close to that level. (Wilson was the best at 84.) So the Orioles could improve their second-line starting pitching and still not have it show up in this measurement.
Although the Orioles did make the postseason in 2016, they probably need to improve their second-line starting pitching if they want to make the postseason in 2017. To make the playoffs, you have to survive the 162-game regular season - and it's very tough to do so if you have below-average pitchers starting half your games. They don't necessarily need more good starting pitching; they just need less bad starting pitching.
A few arbitrary observations:
Jon Shepherd's recent Camden Depot article, Orioles Starting Pitching Was Not a Weak Part of 2016 Club, made a case that the 2016 Orioles starting pitching was, well, not a weak part of the 2016 team. Some commenters, including myself, observed that while the rotation as a whole might have been average, the front half (Gausman, Tillman, Bundy, and Worley (4 starts) performed well while the back half (Jimenez, Gallardo, Wilson, Wright, and Miley) performed poorly. This started a lively exchange in the comments.
I probably misunderstood what Jon was saying. Digging beyond the headline, he was seeking to correct the narrative that the 2016 Orioles starting pitching was a "train wreck" (among other narratives.) The title and the article itself contain another source of potential misinterpretation - that if starting pitching wasn't a weakness, then there is no need to improve it for 2017. Jon didn't actually say that in the article and, in subsequent comments, made it clear that he wasn't trying to imply that the starting pitching was just fine the way it was.
Nevertheless, I thought I would explore the idea that the Orioles' starting pitching was either very good or very bad in 2016, and see what (if anything) I could discover. The simplest approach was to look at each team, and count the number of games started by good, average, and poor starting pitchers. As this is an initial exploration, I decided to keep things really simple, using ERA+ as the measurement. ERA+ is a context-adjusted measurement of a pitcher's ERA, so that 100 is league-average (adjusted for context), above 100 is better than average, and below 100 is worse than average. Because starting pitchers have higher ERAs than relief pitchers, I decided to define an ERA+ of 101 or better as above average, 90-100 as average, and 89 or below as below average.
The below table shows the counts. For each team, the number of games started by a pitcher with a season ERA+ at the appropriate level for that team is counted. These values are retrieved from baseball-reference.com. Two points - this doesn't distinguish a pitcher's ERA+ as a starter as opposed to his ERA as a relief pitcher, so a few pitchers who were primarily relief pitchers but made a couple of starts would be listed in a category heavily influenced by their relief usage. And, it uses the pitcher's ERA+ with the team only, so James Shields is considered average for San Diego and below average for the Chicago White Sox.
101+
|
90-100
|
89-
|
101+
|
90-100
|
89-
|
|||
BAL
|
78
|
0
|
84
|
ARI
|
0
|
124
|
||
BOS
|
92
|
54
|
16
|
ATL
|
38
|
32
|
91
|
|
CHW
|
87
|
28
|
47
|
CHC
|
160
|
0
|
2
|
|
CLE
|
142
|
0
|
19
|
CIN
|
100
|
58
|
||
DET
|
73
|
69
|
COL
|
120
|
3
|
39
|
||
HOU
|
29
|
43
|
90
|
LAD
|
84
|
14
|
64
|
|
KAN
|
63
|
46
|
53
|
MIA
|
61
|
33
|
67
|
|
LAA
|
57
|
32
|
73
|
MIL
|
52
|
81
|
29
|
|
MIN
|
30
|
0
|
132
|
NYM
|
124
|
0
|
38
|
|
NYY
|
66
|
26
|
PHI
|
74
|
24
|
64
|
||
OAK
|
43
|
43
|
76
|
PIT
|
50
|
30
|
82
|
|
SEA
|
60
|
66
|
36
|
STL
|
36
|
0
|
126
|
|
TAM
|
87
|
40
|
35
|
SDG
|
40
|
11
|
111
|
|
TEX
|
101
|
20
|
41
|
SFO
|
112
|
12
|
38
|
|
TOR
|
99
|
61
|
2
|
WAS
|
110
|
19
|
Regarding the 2016 Orioles, it does seem that they didn't have a truly terrible starting rotation, although it was the worst among playoff teams. Their 84 games started by poor pitchers was the 24th most among all teams and by far the most among playoff teams. The next highest-total was 64 (the Dodgers.) On the other hand, their 78 games started by good pitchers was the 17th most among all teams, and last among the playoff teams. Their starting pitching wasn't bad enough to keep them out of the playoffs.
Unlike two other contending teams. While most of the teams with bad starting rotations were bad teams, Houston and St. Louis were in wild-card contention until late in the season (the final day for St. Louis.) And most observers concluded that their lack of starting pitching is why those two teams didn't make the postseason.
To some extent, this chart understates how bad the Orioles' second-line starting pitching was. I used a cutoff ERA+ of 89 to define a "bad" starting pitcher; none of the five Orioles in that category - Jimenez, Gallardo, Wilson, Wright, and Miley - came particularly close to that level. (Wilson was the best at 84.) So the Orioles could improve their second-line starting pitching and still not have it show up in this measurement.
Although the Orioles did make the postseason in 2016, they probably need to improve their second-line starting pitching if they want to make the postseason in 2017. To make the playoffs, you have to survive the 162-game regular season - and it's very tough to do so if you have below-average pitchers starting half your games. They don't necessarily need more good starting pitching; they just need less bad starting pitching.
18 November 2016
Orioles Starting Pitching Was Not A Weak Part Of 2016 Club
In the aftermath of success or failure, explanations skitter around until conventional wisdom settles on a final narrative. That narrative may be accurate, indulged, or utterly wrong. An astute observer understands this and does their best to challenge these ideas in order to bring oneself closer to whatever the truth is likely to be.
As I understand the conventional wisdom of the 2016 Orioles, I have heard these primary conclusions:
1. Starting Pitching was a train wreck.
2. Chris Davis failed in his first year on a major contract.
3. Jonathan Schoop broke out.
4. Trumbo's magnificent bat in right field saved club.
5. The Relief Corps was the heart of the club.
Out of those conclusions, some are likely to be true and others not so much.
One way we often look at value by position is to use Wins Above Average. One way to calculate that is Baseball Reference's version, which takes into account, roughly, what actually happens on the field in comparison to FanGraphs', which, again roughly, tries to figure out the underlying value of the events on the field as opposed to what actually occurred. Anyway, various perspectives look at both and have ideas about how they each handle uncertainty, but for the purposes here we are simply going to go with Baseball Reference to look through the conclusions above.
Below is a graph of Orioles Wins Above Average for American League clubs. The whiskers illustrate the entire range of performance among AL teams. This sort of illustrations does better to show actual range of performance than a metric like WAR, which assumes a certain base level of play. Year-to-year, base levels of play vary and it may be better to describe what happened last year by actually assessing what happened.
1. Starting Pitching was a Train Wreck Last Year
Well, if you remember the Zach Britton discussion about the Cy Young award, then you might remember how lackluster starting pitching was in the American League. The graph above suggests that maybe the feeling that the starting pitching was a train wreck was true in comparison to league wide performance in year's past, but not this year. The Orioles actually enjoyed the fifth best rotation in the AL, according to bWAA.
2. Chris Davis Fell Flat on his Face
First base was also a position in the AL where nothing much seemed to happen. In fact, the Chris Davis led Orioles first base situation was found to be the third best outfit in the American League.
3. Jonathan Schoop Broke Out
Schoop actually was worth a win less per average American League second baseman. His banner holding second base performance put the Orioles as having the 10th best second base crew in the American League. Out of 15 teams, that is nothing much to write home about.
4. Trumbo's Magnificent Bat
The two positions Trumbo touched most, right field and designated hitter, were pretty awful with the Orioles ranked 12th and 9th in the AL, respectively. In fact, if you combine the entire outfield performance then the Orioles ranked dead last in all of the AL. Perhaps, what is missing is just how dreadful the outfield was last year and how the club could really improve themselves by shoring themselves up there.
5. Bullpen was the Heart of the Club
Of the five main talking points emerging from the season, this is the one that actually holds water quite well. The club was pretty remarkable with bullpen performance.
Yeah, but how does overall team WAA compare to the actual club record?
The Orioles went 89-73 last year. WAA expected them to go 86-76. Considering Britton's fortune in the closer role, WAA did a decent job explaining the Orioles success.
Perhaps the actual talking points coming out of the season are that the starting pitching was average, Davis was one of the better first basemen in the league, Schoop is still full of unfulfilled promise, Trumbo's home runs hid a lot of rotten wood, and the bullpen really was quite precious.
As I understand the conventional wisdom of the 2016 Orioles, I have heard these primary conclusions:
1. Starting Pitching was a train wreck.
2. Chris Davis failed in his first year on a major contract.
3. Jonathan Schoop broke out.
4. Trumbo's magnificent bat in right field saved club.
5. The Relief Corps was the heart of the club.
Out of those conclusions, some are likely to be true and others not so much.
One way we often look at value by position is to use Wins Above Average. One way to calculate that is Baseball Reference's version, which takes into account, roughly, what actually happens on the field in comparison to FanGraphs', which, again roughly, tries to figure out the underlying value of the events on the field as opposed to what actually occurred. Anyway, various perspectives look at both and have ideas about how they each handle uncertainty, but for the purposes here we are simply going to go with Baseball Reference to look through the conclusions above.
Below is a graph of Orioles Wins Above Average for American League clubs. The whiskers illustrate the entire range of performance among AL teams. This sort of illustrations does better to show actual range of performance than a metric like WAR, which assumes a certain base level of play. Year-to-year, base levels of play vary and it may be better to describe what happened last year by actually assessing what happened.
1. Starting Pitching was a Train Wreck Last Year
Well, if you remember the Zach Britton discussion about the Cy Young award, then you might remember how lackluster starting pitching was in the American League. The graph above suggests that maybe the feeling that the starting pitching was a train wreck was true in comparison to league wide performance in year's past, but not this year. The Orioles actually enjoyed the fifth best rotation in the AL, according to bWAA.
2. Chris Davis Fell Flat on his Face
First base was also a position in the AL where nothing much seemed to happen. In fact, the Chris Davis led Orioles first base situation was found to be the third best outfit in the American League.
3. Jonathan Schoop Broke Out
Schoop actually was worth a win less per average American League second baseman. His banner holding second base performance put the Orioles as having the 10th best second base crew in the American League. Out of 15 teams, that is nothing much to write home about.
4. Trumbo's Magnificent Bat
The two positions Trumbo touched most, right field and designated hitter, were pretty awful with the Orioles ranked 12th and 9th in the AL, respectively. In fact, if you combine the entire outfield performance then the Orioles ranked dead last in all of the AL. Perhaps, what is missing is just how dreadful the outfield was last year and how the club could really improve themselves by shoring themselves up there.
5. Bullpen was the Heart of the Club
Of the five main talking points emerging from the season, this is the one that actually holds water quite well. The club was pretty remarkable with bullpen performance.
Yeah, but how does overall team WAA compare to the actual club record?
The Orioles went 89-73 last year. WAA expected them to go 86-76. Considering Britton's fortune in the closer role, WAA did a decent job explaining the Orioles success.
Perhaps the actual talking points coming out of the season are that the starting pitching was average, Davis was one of the better first basemen in the league, Schoop is still full of unfulfilled promise, Trumbo's home runs hid a lot of rotten wood, and the bullpen really was quite precious.
31 October 2016
Looking Back At My 2016 Blueprint: Some Good Chicken Salad
Here at Camden Depot, we’re doing our off-season blueprints. I think it’s only fair for me to take a look at what I suggested last year and see whether it panned out.
Qualifying Offers:
I suggested that the Orioles offer qualifying offers to Chris Davis and Wei-Yei Chen. I also stated that I would probably offer Wieters a qualifying offer, but expect that the Orioles wouldn’t. Then again, I also didn’t expect the Orioles payroll to skyrocket.
These were probably the right decisions. Chris Davis and Wei-Yin Chen were easily able to find lucrative contracts despite being offered a qualifying offer. To my surprise, Matt Wieters was not only offered a qualifying offer but accepted it. Wieters didn’t have a particularly good year with only a .320 wOBA and 1.7 fWAR, but the other Orioles catchers were terrible as Pena had a .244 wOBA and Joseph has a .192 wOBA. Without Wieters, the Orioles certainly wouldn't have made the playoffs so sometimes bad decisions work out.
Non Tenders:
I recommended tendering Matusz and Reimold contracts, but non-tendering Miguel Gonzalez. In retrospect, this worked out poorly. I was correct in suggesting that the Orioles non-tender Gonzalez. Instead, the Orioles waited to non-tender him until they were on the hook for some of his contract and thereby wasted a million dollars. Gonzalez did have a strong season for the White Sox, primarily due to lowering his home run rate at home. I don’t think he would have been successful in Camden Yards.
Matusz and Reimold were both unsuccessful in Baltimore. The Orioles needed to trade their competitive balance pick to get rid of Matusz while Reimold put together a .222/.300/.365 season worth -.4 fWAR. In retrospect, the Orioles would have been better off without either of these players.
Free Agents:
Mat Latos for 1 year and $9 million: Bust.
This was one of my biggest busts in the blueprint. I saw something in Latos and thought that he might be able to bounce back. However, the market was decidedly cool on Latos and he only received a one year $3 million dollar deal, suggesting that his baggage hurt him. After 60 innings with the White Sox, Latos was cut. The only saving grace for this pick is that the Orioles probably wouldn’t have signed him due to his baggage.
J.A Happ for 3 years and $36 million: Hit
As I projected, Happ received a 3 year and $36 million dollar deal from the Blue Jays. Happ continued to make me look good by putting together a 20-4 season with a 3.18 ERA. However, his FIP wasn’t as impressive at 3.96 in part due to a mediocre strikeout rate. Happ showed some regression from his impressive 2015 with the Pirates. Against right handed pitching, his fastball is still dominant, but he lacked a quality second pitch to go with it. Against lefties, he struggled to throw his secondary pitches into the strike zone. Going forward, I think it’s safe to say that Happ had a lucky 2016 but should be seen as a likely #3 starter for 2017 and 2018. For 3 years and $36 million, that’s a huge hit.
Darren O’Day for 4 years and $32 million: Unclear
I was reasonably close when projecting how much O’Day would receive. I said 4 and $32 million with some deferred money while he actually got 4 and $31 million with some deferred money. Unfortunately, due to injuries, O’Day only threw 30 innings and had home run issues. O’Day was definitely disappointing in 2016 but there’s reasonable hope that he can bounce back in 2017 and be the setup man that the Orioles need.
Byung Ho Park for 4 yrs and $20 million with an $8 million posting fee: Bust
Park had a terrible season where he was completely unproductive in the majors and was ultimately sent to the minors. He was one of my two biggest busts. However, unlike the Latos pick, I get a mulligan on this pick because the Twins topped my posting fee by over $4 million. I had no interest in Park for a posting fee of $12.8 million. This is another case where sometimes it’s better to be lucky than good.
Matt Joyce for 1 year and $2.5 million: Hit.
Matt Joyce had a strong year for the Pirates as a platoon player with a .242/.403/.463 line and 1.3 fWAR. Given that Joyce signed a minor league contract, he should have been happy to sign with the Orioles for a major league contract.
Mark Reynolds for 1 year and $2 million: Hit
Mark Reynolds had a decent year for the Rockies with a .282/.356/.450 line good for about .1 fWAR. This is pretty much what I was hoping from him – basic competence at the DH position. Realistically, there’s no way he would have taken this offer over what the Rockies offered him.
All in all, this team would have been probably better than what the 2016 Orioles fielded. It seems likely that Angelos made the decision to sign Davis. Fortunately, this team would have enough cash to afford him. Likewise, this scenario didn’t allow me the opportunity to make any trades, so it’s only fair that I have Trumbo added to this squad. As such, the offense and relief pitching would have been reasonably similar to what the Orioles actually fielded. But my rotation would be far better. I felt the Os should sign Happ and Latos instead of using Gallardo and Wright, and this was easily a victory for me. In addition, this club would have cost $139 million on opening day compared to the $148 million that Cot’s said that the Orioles payroll actually was on opening day. That means I’d have an extra $9 million to spend, and as it happened, I did suggest two players that the Orioles consider signing late in the offseason.
Ian Desmond: 1 year and $8 million: Hit
I suggested that the Orioles should have been in on Ian Desmond at 1/$8 because he could either be a right fielder or a shortstop if Hardy got hurt. I didn’t think Desmond would be a strong offensive player and he ended up with a wRC+ of 106 or slightly above average. However, Desmond was excellent on the basepaths and showed competence in center field. Having Desmond on the team would have given the Orioles above average defense in right field instead of being forced to rely on Trumbo and his poor defense with decent offensive production. As it turns out, Desmond would have fit perfectly in the Orioles remaining budget under my blueprint and would have fit in beautifully in right field. Oh well.
David Freese: 1 year and $3 million: Hit
I also said the Orioles would regret not signing David Freese. Freese had a good year with a .270/.352/.412 line while matching his wRC+ of 110 as he did in 2015 and being worth 1.9 fWAR. For $3 million, such production would have been a steal. I’m not sure the Os could have fit both Freese and Desmond on the club, but either one would have been a huge boost to the Orioles playoff chances.
All in all, if the Orioles followed my blueprint, they would have had a slightly upgraded offense. The Orioles wouldn’t have picked up Kim, Rickard or Alvarez, but they would have added Joyce and Desmond. The offense would have been slightly better and the outfield defense would have been much improved. Adding Happ to the rotation would have been a huge upgrade for both 2016 and the future instead of Gallardo. Happ and Desmond would have been huge hits while Latos would have been the biggest bust.
If nothing else, this blueprint would have ensured that the Blue Jays missed the playoffs. But it’s likely that the Orioles would have at minimum taken the first wild card spot and likely would have just edged out the Red Sox for the division. If you ask me, that would have been a pretty good result and I’d say some pretty good chicken salad.
Qualifying Offers:
I suggested that the Orioles offer qualifying offers to Chris Davis and Wei-Yei Chen. I also stated that I would probably offer Wieters a qualifying offer, but expect that the Orioles wouldn’t. Then again, I also didn’t expect the Orioles payroll to skyrocket.
These were probably the right decisions. Chris Davis and Wei-Yin Chen were easily able to find lucrative contracts despite being offered a qualifying offer. To my surprise, Matt Wieters was not only offered a qualifying offer but accepted it. Wieters didn’t have a particularly good year with only a .320 wOBA and 1.7 fWAR, but the other Orioles catchers were terrible as Pena had a .244 wOBA and Joseph has a .192 wOBA. Without Wieters, the Orioles certainly wouldn't have made the playoffs so sometimes bad decisions work out.
Non Tenders:
I recommended tendering Matusz and Reimold contracts, but non-tendering Miguel Gonzalez. In retrospect, this worked out poorly. I was correct in suggesting that the Orioles non-tender Gonzalez. Instead, the Orioles waited to non-tender him until they were on the hook for some of his contract and thereby wasted a million dollars. Gonzalez did have a strong season for the White Sox, primarily due to lowering his home run rate at home. I don’t think he would have been successful in Camden Yards.
Matusz and Reimold were both unsuccessful in Baltimore. The Orioles needed to trade their competitive balance pick to get rid of Matusz while Reimold put together a .222/.300/.365 season worth -.4 fWAR. In retrospect, the Orioles would have been better off without either of these players.
Free Agents:
Mat Latos for 1 year and $9 million: Bust.
This was one of my biggest busts in the blueprint. I saw something in Latos and thought that he might be able to bounce back. However, the market was decidedly cool on Latos and he only received a one year $3 million dollar deal, suggesting that his baggage hurt him. After 60 innings with the White Sox, Latos was cut. The only saving grace for this pick is that the Orioles probably wouldn’t have signed him due to his baggage.
J.A Happ for 3 years and $36 million: Hit
As I projected, Happ received a 3 year and $36 million dollar deal from the Blue Jays. Happ continued to make me look good by putting together a 20-4 season with a 3.18 ERA. However, his FIP wasn’t as impressive at 3.96 in part due to a mediocre strikeout rate. Happ showed some regression from his impressive 2015 with the Pirates. Against right handed pitching, his fastball is still dominant, but he lacked a quality second pitch to go with it. Against lefties, he struggled to throw his secondary pitches into the strike zone. Going forward, I think it’s safe to say that Happ had a lucky 2016 but should be seen as a likely #3 starter for 2017 and 2018. For 3 years and $36 million, that’s a huge hit.
Darren O’Day for 4 years and $32 million: Unclear
I was reasonably close when projecting how much O’Day would receive. I said 4 and $32 million with some deferred money while he actually got 4 and $31 million with some deferred money. Unfortunately, due to injuries, O’Day only threw 30 innings and had home run issues. O’Day was definitely disappointing in 2016 but there’s reasonable hope that he can bounce back in 2017 and be the setup man that the Orioles need.
Byung Ho Park for 4 yrs and $20 million with an $8 million posting fee: Bust
Park had a terrible season where he was completely unproductive in the majors and was ultimately sent to the minors. He was one of my two biggest busts. However, unlike the Latos pick, I get a mulligan on this pick because the Twins topped my posting fee by over $4 million. I had no interest in Park for a posting fee of $12.8 million. This is another case where sometimes it’s better to be lucky than good.
Matt Joyce for 1 year and $2.5 million: Hit.
Matt Joyce had a strong year for the Pirates as a platoon player with a .242/.403/.463 line and 1.3 fWAR. Given that Joyce signed a minor league contract, he should have been happy to sign with the Orioles for a major league contract.
Mark Reynolds for 1 year and $2 million: Hit
Mark Reynolds had a decent year for the Rockies with a .282/.356/.450 line good for about .1 fWAR. This is pretty much what I was hoping from him – basic competence at the DH position. Realistically, there’s no way he would have taken this offer over what the Rockies offered him.
All in all, this team would have been probably better than what the 2016 Orioles fielded. It seems likely that Angelos made the decision to sign Davis. Fortunately, this team would have enough cash to afford him. Likewise, this scenario didn’t allow me the opportunity to make any trades, so it’s only fair that I have Trumbo added to this squad. As such, the offense and relief pitching would have been reasonably similar to what the Orioles actually fielded. But my rotation would be far better. I felt the Os should sign Happ and Latos instead of using Gallardo and Wright, and this was easily a victory for me. In addition, this club would have cost $139 million on opening day compared to the $148 million that Cot’s said that the Orioles payroll actually was on opening day. That means I’d have an extra $9 million to spend, and as it happened, I did suggest two players that the Orioles consider signing late in the offseason.
Ian Desmond: 1 year and $8 million: Hit
I suggested that the Orioles should have been in on Ian Desmond at 1/$8 because he could either be a right fielder or a shortstop if Hardy got hurt. I didn’t think Desmond would be a strong offensive player and he ended up with a wRC+ of 106 or slightly above average. However, Desmond was excellent on the basepaths and showed competence in center field. Having Desmond on the team would have given the Orioles above average defense in right field instead of being forced to rely on Trumbo and his poor defense with decent offensive production. As it turns out, Desmond would have fit perfectly in the Orioles remaining budget under my blueprint and would have fit in beautifully in right field. Oh well.
David Freese: 1 year and $3 million: Hit
I also said the Orioles would regret not signing David Freese. Freese had a good year with a .270/.352/.412 line while matching his wRC+ of 110 as he did in 2015 and being worth 1.9 fWAR. For $3 million, such production would have been a steal. I’m not sure the Os could have fit both Freese and Desmond on the club, but either one would have been a huge boost to the Orioles playoff chances.
All in all, if the Orioles followed my blueprint, they would have had a slightly upgraded offense. The Orioles wouldn’t have picked up Kim, Rickard or Alvarez, but they would have added Joyce and Desmond. The offense would have been slightly better and the outfield defense would have been much improved. Adding Happ to the rotation would have been a huge upgrade for both 2016 and the future instead of Gallardo. Happ and Desmond would have been huge hits while Latos would have been the biggest bust.
If nothing else, this blueprint would have ensured that the Blue Jays missed the playoffs. But it’s likely that the Orioles would have at minimum taken the first wild card spot and likely would have just edged out the Red Sox for the division. If you ask me, that would have been a pretty good result and I’d say some pretty good chicken salad.
10 October 2016
How Zach Britton "Struggled" In 2016
Zach Britton, with a 0.54 ERA and a perfect 47 for 47 in save opportunities, had a pretty decent year in 2016. As noted by Steve Melewski, Britton is one of three pitchers in major league history to have at least 40 saves and an ERA below 1. At one point of the season, Britton went nearly four months without allowing an earned run. So, the obvious question is how much of his performance was luck and whether he can maintain these results in 2017.
Obviously, to do what Britton did in 2016, a pitcher needs to be dominant. But what’s interesting is that Britton held opposing left handed batters to a .495 OPS (.185/.254/.241) and right handed batters to a .410 OPS (.155/.211/.199). In addition, Britton had a K% of 26.7% and a BB% of 8.3% against left handed batters, but a 29.9% K% and a 6.7% BB% against right handed batters. This is surprising because normally a left handed reliever does better against left handed batters than right handed batters.
In fact, Britton easily had his worst year against left handed batters since he became a reliever. In 2015, he held batters to a .145/.181/.145 line with a 40.3% K-rate and a 4.2% BB-rate. In 2014, he held these batters to a .170/.215/.170 line with a 23.7% K-rate and a 5.4% BB-rate. And after not allowing a single extra base hit to a left handed batter in either 2014 or 2015, Britton allowed 3 doubles to lefties in 2016, 2 of which (including a ground-rule double) were hit by Brad Miller of the Rays.
Part of his problem against left handed hitters was his high walk rate. Left handed hitters struggle against him, even when putting the ball into play, so he doesn’t need to worry about giving up contact. But he still had a “poor year” in 2016 against lefties when they put the ball into play. Left handed hitters had a .267/.267/.333 line against him when putting pitches in the strike zone into play compared to an OPS of .452 in 2015 and .483 in 2014. His rank was 21st out of 216 relievers that appeared in 30 or more games. In 2015, he ranked 5th out of 218 and in 2014 ranked 6th out of 203.
He also had some poor luck against lefties when they put pitches out of the strike zone into play. Opposing batters went 2 for 8 against Britton with a single and a double in 2016 good for 93rd out of 215 relievers. Given Britton’s dominance against lefties, this is pretty surprising. Given the small sample size, this is almost certainly just random luck.
Some of the blame for Britton’s relatively high walk rate to left handed batters is due to his sinker. Britton only threw 45.7% of them in the zone in 2016 compared to 48.7% in 2015 and 64.1% in 2014. Opposing batters had a good eye when deciding not to swing at these sinkers as they had a called ball rate of 33.1% and a called strike rate of 14%. In 2014 and 2015, Britton’s sinker was a called ball 30% of the time and a called strike 21% of the time. This chart shows its results.
However, the bigger problem was his slider. Left handed batters only swung at 7 of his 31 sliders, missing 5 of them, fouling off another and putting only one into play. However, of the other 24, 17 resulted in called balls while 7 were called strikes. In 2015, batters swung at 14 of 29 sliders and missed 10 of them. Of the 15 they didn’t swing at, 8 resulted in called balls while 7 resulted in called strikes. Without a successful slider to keep batters honest, Britton wasn’t able to maintain his high strikeout rate of 2015. Britton’s slider is devastating, even when thrown inside the strike zone and perhaps he should consider trying to throw it in the strike zone more often. This graph shows the results.
If Britton had a “poor” year against lefties, he made up for it with his performance against right handed hitters. Right handed batters had a .250/.250/320 line when putting pitches in the strike zone into play in 2016, compared to a .350/.350/.510 in 2015 and a .250/.250/.426 in 2014. In addition, Britton allowed a .130/.130/.174 line to right handed batters when putting pitches out of the strike zone into play, compared to a .316/.316/.388 in 2015 and an .182/.182/.182 line in 2014. Right handed batters may have had success against Britton in 2015, but they sure struggled in 2014 and 2016.
Britton also had some improvement in his strikeout rates. In 2016, Britton had a 29.9% K-Rate and a 6.7% walk rate. In 2015, he had a 27.6% K-Rate and a 6.1% walk rate while in 2014 he had a 20.8% K-Rate and a 9.4% walk rate. Clearly, he’s showing some progression. Part of the reason for it is that Britton’s sinker against righties was a bit nastier this year than in years past. Batters put a lower percentage of his sinkers into play, and therefore gave Britton more chances to strike them out.
Going forward, Britton is very good against right handed batters. He’ll put up strong strikeout and walk percentages against right handed batters, but he’ll need to do an excellent job preventing damage on balls put into play in order to put up elite numbers against right handers. To be fair, it’s awfully hard for even right handed batters to do anything more than just ground out. However, he has it in him to be absolutely otherworldly against left handed batters. All he needs is a bit better luck on balls put into play, and the ability to either get them to swing at his slider or put a few more in the strike zone. It’s likely that we should expect some regression from Zach because I suspect right handed batters will have more luck against him next year. I’d expect to see him have an ERA in the low to mid 1s range next year.
The average pitcher had a .350 OPS last season when batting. If Britton can put together his 2016 season against right handed batters with his 2015 season against left handed batters, then opposing hitters might not break that .350 OPS mark. If so, he’ll almost certainly have another excellent season and might possibly improve on his 2016.
Obviously, to do what Britton did in 2016, a pitcher needs to be dominant. But what’s interesting is that Britton held opposing left handed batters to a .495 OPS (.185/.254/.241) and right handed batters to a .410 OPS (.155/.211/.199). In addition, Britton had a K% of 26.7% and a BB% of 8.3% against left handed batters, but a 29.9% K% and a 6.7% BB% against right handed batters. This is surprising because normally a left handed reliever does better against left handed batters than right handed batters.
In fact, Britton easily had his worst year against left handed batters since he became a reliever. In 2015, he held batters to a .145/.181/.145 line with a 40.3% K-rate and a 4.2% BB-rate. In 2014, he held these batters to a .170/.215/.170 line with a 23.7% K-rate and a 5.4% BB-rate. And after not allowing a single extra base hit to a left handed batter in either 2014 or 2015, Britton allowed 3 doubles to lefties in 2016, 2 of which (including a ground-rule double) were hit by Brad Miller of the Rays.
Part of his problem against left handed hitters was his high walk rate. Left handed hitters struggle against him, even when putting the ball into play, so he doesn’t need to worry about giving up contact. But he still had a “poor year” in 2016 against lefties when they put the ball into play. Left handed hitters had a .267/.267/.333 line against him when putting pitches in the strike zone into play compared to an OPS of .452 in 2015 and .483 in 2014. His rank was 21st out of 216 relievers that appeared in 30 or more games. In 2015, he ranked 5th out of 218 and in 2014 ranked 6th out of 203.
He also had some poor luck against lefties when they put pitches out of the strike zone into play. Opposing batters went 2 for 8 against Britton with a single and a double in 2016 good for 93rd out of 215 relievers. Given Britton’s dominance against lefties, this is pretty surprising. Given the small sample size, this is almost certainly just random luck.
Some of the blame for Britton’s relatively high walk rate to left handed batters is due to his sinker. Britton only threw 45.7% of them in the zone in 2016 compared to 48.7% in 2015 and 64.1% in 2014. Opposing batters had a good eye when deciding not to swing at these sinkers as they had a called ball rate of 33.1% and a called strike rate of 14%. In 2014 and 2015, Britton’s sinker was a called ball 30% of the time and a called strike 21% of the time. This chart shows its results.
However, the bigger problem was his slider. Left handed batters only swung at 7 of his 31 sliders, missing 5 of them, fouling off another and putting only one into play. However, of the other 24, 17 resulted in called balls while 7 were called strikes. In 2015, batters swung at 14 of 29 sliders and missed 10 of them. Of the 15 they didn’t swing at, 8 resulted in called balls while 7 resulted in called strikes. Without a successful slider to keep batters honest, Britton wasn’t able to maintain his high strikeout rate of 2015. Britton’s slider is devastating, even when thrown inside the strike zone and perhaps he should consider trying to throw it in the strike zone more often. This graph shows the results.
If Britton had a “poor” year against lefties, he made up for it with his performance against right handed hitters. Right handed batters had a .250/.250/320 line when putting pitches in the strike zone into play in 2016, compared to a .350/.350/.510 in 2015 and a .250/.250/.426 in 2014. In addition, Britton allowed a .130/.130/.174 line to right handed batters when putting pitches out of the strike zone into play, compared to a .316/.316/.388 in 2015 and an .182/.182/.182 line in 2014. Right handed batters may have had success against Britton in 2015, but they sure struggled in 2014 and 2016.
Britton also had some improvement in his strikeout rates. In 2016, Britton had a 29.9% K-Rate and a 6.7% walk rate. In 2015, he had a 27.6% K-Rate and a 6.1% walk rate while in 2014 he had a 20.8% K-Rate and a 9.4% walk rate. Clearly, he’s showing some progression. Part of the reason for it is that Britton’s sinker against righties was a bit nastier this year than in years past. Batters put a lower percentage of his sinkers into play, and therefore gave Britton more chances to strike them out.
Going forward, Britton is very good against right handed batters. He’ll put up strong strikeout and walk percentages against right handed batters, but he’ll need to do an excellent job preventing damage on balls put into play in order to put up elite numbers against right handers. To be fair, it’s awfully hard for even right handed batters to do anything more than just ground out. However, he has it in him to be absolutely otherworldly against left handed batters. All he needs is a bit better luck on balls put into play, and the ability to either get them to swing at his slider or put a few more in the strike zone. It’s likely that we should expect some regression from Zach because I suspect right handed batters will have more luck against him next year. I’d expect to see him have an ERA in the low to mid 1s range next year.
The average pitcher had a .350 OPS last season when batting. If Britton can put together his 2016 season against right handed batters with his 2015 season against left handed batters, then opposing hitters might not break that .350 OPS mark. If so, he’ll almost certainly have another excellent season and might possibly improve on his 2016.
06 September 2016
Why Is Chris Davis Struggling?
(Stats accurate through September 4th and data from ESPN Stats and Information TruMedia Data Portal)
Chris Davis is having a good but disappointing season. On the one hand, he has been worth 2.7 fWAR, has a 114 wRC+ and has 33 home runs and 74 RBIs. His offensive production ranks 65th out of 154 qualified batters or roughly in the 58th percentile. On the other hand, after giving him a 7 year, $161 million contract, the Orioles were probably hoping that he’d be better than good. Furthermore, this may have worrisome connotations for the rest of his contract. If he’s poor this year, then what does this mean for future years?
Fortunately, a comprehensive look at his statistics shows reason for optimism. With a 13.6% walk rate and a 33.2% strikeout rate, Chris Davis has a decent wOBA rate on pitches not in play. In fact, his .208 rate is around the 50th percentile and is a career high. In addition, Chris Davis is crushing pitches that are in the strike zone. His wOBA of .582 matches his rate in 2015 and ranks only behind Mike Trout this year. His problem is making contact against pitches not in the strike zone. Against those, Chris Davis only has a .229 wOBA good for 9th worst in the majors. His home run against a pitch out of the strike zone on the fifth was just his second of the year. This is how his numbers look.
In general, while wOBA against pitches in the strike zone and wOBA in plate appearances where the ball isn’t put into play are skill-based, wOBA against pitches out of the strike zone is largely due to luck. Chris Davis is in the sixth percentile against those pitches this year, and that’s probably due to laughably bad luck. If he was in the 50th percentile in this skill, he’d have an overall wOBA of .366 and would rank 40th out of 154 in the majors or the 74th percentile. If he was in the 80th percentile, he’d have a wOBA of .373 and would rank 33rd or the 79th percentile. If he was in the 95th percentile, as one would expect from a top slugger, he’d have a .378 wOBA and would rank 28th or be in the 81st percentile. If Chris Davis had those numbers, then the Orioles would be in better shape.
However, it also indicates that this isn’t Chris Davis’ only problem. Part of his problem is due to pitch selection. In 2015, 41.34% of his plate appearances ended with him putting a strike into play and 44.8% resulted in either a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch. In 2016, 38.6% of his plate appearances ended with him putting a pitch in the strike zone into play and 48% have resulted in either a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch. In order for Chris Davis to be successful, he needs to put pitches in the zone into play.
The reason for this seems to be in part due to the drop in his swing rate. Chris Davis reduced his swing rate from 47.3% in 2015 to 42.7% in 2016 and as a result, his in play rate dropped from 13.3% to 12.5%. I suggested that Chris Davis swing less in the offseason, and it hasn’t worked so well for him. The reason it’s failed is because his called ball rate has only increased from 40.3% to 41.3% but his called strike rate increased from 12.5% to 16%. This is especially bad because pitchers are throwing him fewer strikes this year than in the last year.
So far this year, he’s swung at 61.7% of pitches in the strike zone compared to 70% in 2015, good for 120th out of 154 qualified batters. His in play percentage has dropped from 21.9% to 20.9% while his swinging strike rate has decreased from 19.56% to 16.41% and his foul rate has dropped from 28.5% to 24.4%. This seems to suggest that he’s suffered minimal damage from swinging at fewer pitches in the strike zone because he’s not swinging at the strikes he wasn’t hitting anyway. But he has also put 10.5 fewer pitches into play than he would have if he was putting strikes into play at his 2015 rate.
However, this year he’s also only swung at 27.7% of pitches out of the strike zone compared to 28.4% in 2015. Given his swing rates against pitches in the strike zone, I’d expect that number to have dropped to about 25%. It suggests that he’s struggled to determine when he shouldn’t swing at a pitch. In addition, despite swinging at fewer pitches out of the strike zone, the chances of one of these pitches being called a ball has dropped from 67.9% to 67.1% while his called strike rate has increased from 3.8% to 5.1%.
In addition, Davis has swung at 18.2% of pitches that are more than 18 inches from the strike zone this year, which is around his career average. He’s swung at 54.4% of pitches that are less than 18 inches from the strike zone, which is considerably lower than average. This suggests that his extra patience hasn’t resulted in considerably better selection.
The bottom line is that he’s been more patient and has decided to swing at fewer pitches close to the strike zone. Unfortunately for him, most of those pitches have ended up in the strike zone. This has resulted in him having his strike rate increase faster than his ball rate and therefore he hasn’t seen many benefits from swinging less frequently.
Going forward, a considerable amount of his problems are due to bad luck and probably won’t continue next year. Therefore, we should expect him to show significant improvement next year. However, this trend of swinging less promises to help him in the future. He needs to work on swinging less at pitches completely out of the strike zone. But I would expect his called ball rate to improve and his called strike rate to decrease next year even if it’s due to just random luck.
Chris Davis may have had a tough 2016 so far, but he’s showing he can make the adjustments that can keep him an elite hitter in 2017 and beyond. Expect good things out of him.
Chris Davis is having a good but disappointing season. On the one hand, he has been worth 2.7 fWAR, has a 114 wRC+ and has 33 home runs and 74 RBIs. His offensive production ranks 65th out of 154 qualified batters or roughly in the 58th percentile. On the other hand, after giving him a 7 year, $161 million contract, the Orioles were probably hoping that he’d be better than good. Furthermore, this may have worrisome connotations for the rest of his contract. If he’s poor this year, then what does this mean for future years?
Fortunately, a comprehensive look at his statistics shows reason for optimism. With a 13.6% walk rate and a 33.2% strikeout rate, Chris Davis has a decent wOBA rate on pitches not in play. In fact, his .208 rate is around the 50th percentile and is a career high. In addition, Chris Davis is crushing pitches that are in the strike zone. His wOBA of .582 matches his rate in 2015 and ranks only behind Mike Trout this year. His problem is making contact against pitches not in the strike zone. Against those, Chris Davis only has a .229 wOBA good for 9th worst in the majors. His home run against a pitch out of the strike zone on the fifth was just his second of the year. This is how his numbers look.
In general, while wOBA against pitches in the strike zone and wOBA in plate appearances where the ball isn’t put into play are skill-based, wOBA against pitches out of the strike zone is largely due to luck. Chris Davis is in the sixth percentile against those pitches this year, and that’s probably due to laughably bad luck. If he was in the 50th percentile in this skill, he’d have an overall wOBA of .366 and would rank 40th out of 154 in the majors or the 74th percentile. If he was in the 80th percentile, he’d have a wOBA of .373 and would rank 33rd or the 79th percentile. If he was in the 95th percentile, as one would expect from a top slugger, he’d have a .378 wOBA and would rank 28th or be in the 81st percentile. If Chris Davis had those numbers, then the Orioles would be in better shape.
However, it also indicates that this isn’t Chris Davis’ only problem. Part of his problem is due to pitch selection. In 2015, 41.34% of his plate appearances ended with him putting a strike into play and 44.8% resulted in either a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch. In 2016, 38.6% of his plate appearances ended with him putting a pitch in the strike zone into play and 48% have resulted in either a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch. In order for Chris Davis to be successful, he needs to put pitches in the zone into play.
The reason for this seems to be in part due to the drop in his swing rate. Chris Davis reduced his swing rate from 47.3% in 2015 to 42.7% in 2016 and as a result, his in play rate dropped from 13.3% to 12.5%. I suggested that Chris Davis swing less in the offseason, and it hasn’t worked so well for him. The reason it’s failed is because his called ball rate has only increased from 40.3% to 41.3% but his called strike rate increased from 12.5% to 16%. This is especially bad because pitchers are throwing him fewer strikes this year than in the last year.
So far this year, he’s swung at 61.7% of pitches in the strike zone compared to 70% in 2015, good for 120th out of 154 qualified batters. His in play percentage has dropped from 21.9% to 20.9% while his swinging strike rate has decreased from 19.56% to 16.41% and his foul rate has dropped from 28.5% to 24.4%. This seems to suggest that he’s suffered minimal damage from swinging at fewer pitches in the strike zone because he’s not swinging at the strikes he wasn’t hitting anyway. But he has also put 10.5 fewer pitches into play than he would have if he was putting strikes into play at his 2015 rate.
However, this year he’s also only swung at 27.7% of pitches out of the strike zone compared to 28.4% in 2015. Given his swing rates against pitches in the strike zone, I’d expect that number to have dropped to about 25%. It suggests that he’s struggled to determine when he shouldn’t swing at a pitch. In addition, despite swinging at fewer pitches out of the strike zone, the chances of one of these pitches being called a ball has dropped from 67.9% to 67.1% while his called strike rate has increased from 3.8% to 5.1%.
In addition, Davis has swung at 18.2% of pitches that are more than 18 inches from the strike zone this year, which is around his career average. He’s swung at 54.4% of pitches that are less than 18 inches from the strike zone, which is considerably lower than average. This suggests that his extra patience hasn’t resulted in considerably better selection.
The bottom line is that he’s been more patient and has decided to swing at fewer pitches close to the strike zone. Unfortunately for him, most of those pitches have ended up in the strike zone. This has resulted in him having his strike rate increase faster than his ball rate and therefore he hasn’t seen many benefits from swinging less frequently.
Going forward, a considerable amount of his problems are due to bad luck and probably won’t continue next year. Therefore, we should expect him to show significant improvement next year. However, this trend of swinging less promises to help him in the future. He needs to work on swinging less at pitches completely out of the strike zone. But I would expect his called ball rate to improve and his called strike rate to decrease next year even if it’s due to just random luck.
Chris Davis may have had a tough 2016 so far, but he’s showing he can make the adjustments that can keep him an elite hitter in 2017 and beyond. Expect good things out of him.
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