Showing posts with label Andrew Cashner. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Andrew Cashner. Show all posts

31 March 2018

If Andrew Cashner's Slider Is Back, Expect More Strikeouts

Andrew Cashner will make his first start for the Orioles today. Despite a 3.40 ERA in 166-plus innings in 2017, projection systems aren't that high on him due to clear concerns with his peripheral stats (including a low strikeout rate). There are reasons to be nervous, but now that the O's also have Alex Cobb, they'll rely on Cashner more as a No. 4 starter instead of a No. 2 or 3, and that's helpful. It's also a positive that, as Jeff Sullivan pointed out at FanGraphs, "Cashner still has most of his old velocity, the velocity he had when he got more strikeouts."

There may be another cause for optimism. That's because "Cashner believes he's regained the feel for his slider, a pitch that was a regular part of his arsenal before last season pitching for the Texas Rangers," according to Eduardo Encina of The Baltimore Sun. Here's more, from Cashner, a few days ago:
“I really think I just figured it out in the last five days,” Cashner said. “For me, I’ve been throwing a cutter. The cutter is still pretty good, but I think I’ve finally found my balance point and release point with my slider and right now, I’ve got it. So you just have to keep that feeling and keep going forward with it.”
It remains to be seen if Cashner has indeed figured things out with his slider. I couldn't find any video of Cashner throwing his slider in spring training, not that that would offer definitive proof anyway. But first, per Brooks Baseball data, last year was the first year in which Cashner didn't throw a single slider. Instead of throwing his slider about 20% of the time, as he did in 2015 and 2016, he threw a cutter about 12% of the time, while also mixing in more curveballs and change-ups.

That mix of pitches, along with Cashner's sinker (40%) and four-seam fastball (24%), helped him post one of the best ERAs of his career, in what also happened to be his first year pitching in the American League. But simply looking at one year's low ERA doesn't paint a full picture.

Cashner's 4.64 K/9 was the lowest of his career (previous low of 6.58), and his 3.46 BB/9 was good but far from great. His groundball rate of 48.6% was also basically the same as his career average of 49%. But he was also able to do a couple things well: limit home runs (8.6% HR/FB) and induce weaker contact (his 18.5 Soft% was a career best).

Perhaps those are things Cashner will be able to keep doing well, or at least keep doing them adequately enough. The reintroduction of Cashner's slider, though, could give him an extra boost. That's because it's easily his best swing-and-miss pitch. Throughout his career, the whiffs per swing on Cashner's slider have never dipped below 32%. In 2017, the whiffs per swing on his cutter was about 22%.

Here's an example of Cashner's slider from 2015:


Here's another from 2016:


Those are both effective pitches, the first a down-and-away breaking ball to finish off a right-handed batter (Hernan Perez); the second, a pitch breaking in to a left-handed Brandon Crawford who has no idea what to do with it. They aren't the best sliders you've ever seen, but they're certainly good enough to give Cashner something useful to work with to finish off opposing batters.

A return to a mix of pitches that includes his slider, along with some increased durability -- Cashner has only thrown more than 170 innings twice -- could give the Orioles a version of Cashner that's better at inducing weak contact, but also generates more strikeouts. That pitcher would be a much-welcomed addition to a team that needs all the pitching it can get.

Stats via FanGraphs and Brooks Baseball

30 March 2018

Are Sinkerballers Affected by the Team's Spring Training Location?

On Tuesday, the Baltimore Sun had an article about Andrew Cashner and how he feels coming into the season.  It read:
Cashner said having spring training in Florida for the first time in his career — he trained in Arizona when with the San Diego Padres and Rangers – allowed him the opportunity to get a better feel for his sinker.
“You go to Arizona and you really don’t have a chance to work on your sinker because it really doesn’t sink there, so I think I really had the chance to work on it all spring,” Cashner said. “I feel like I’m in the best place I’ve been in a long time with my breaking ball.”
I have not seen this suggested before and it is a fairly interesting idea.  If you are unable to see the outcome of your pitches, it might well be difficult to get ready.  Last year, Cashner threw a sinker 54% of his pitches, so he certainly would be a prime candidate to be impacted if this is a real effect.

I looked at seasons from 2015 through 2017 for pitchers who threw sinkers 40% or more of the time.  I considered these pitchers to be heavily dependent on sinkers.  For Florida, the data set contained 23 player seasons.  For Arizona, the data set contained 28 player seasons.  A few players are counted twice for their separate seasons.  The metrics I used for comparison were FIP and wOBA.
40% SI/2S FIP wOBA
April Rest April Rest
Florida 3.70 4.00 .296 .319
Arizona 4.35 4.32 .317 .320
t-test 0.34 0.26
The data is messy.  That is the first thing to notice.  In general, it appears that Florida sinkerballers see their performance erode past the first month while Arizona sinkerballers remain the same.  However, none of the data here is significant (t-test).  If this was a significant finding, it would perplex me a little bit.  The narrative should be that Florida pitchers would remain constant while Arizona pitchers improved.  We do not see that.  Really, the only aspect that came up with a significant t-test was when we compared Florida pitchers wOBA for April to the rest of the season (0.02).  They performed better in that month and then significantly reduced their performance.

I decided to take another stab with, of course, worse data.  I looked at pitchers with a sinkerball rate greater than 50%, which is more representative for the kind of pitcher Andrew Cashner is.  At first, I took a subset of the above dataset, which was a far reduced amount of data.  A couple weird things emerged, so I thought it was best to increase the data set.  For this, I looked at seasons 2011 to 2017.  This yielded 17 Florida player seasons and 23 Arizona player seasons.
50% SI/2S FIP wOBA
April Rest April Rest
Florida 3.61 3.83 0.296 0.317
Arizona 4.04 4.02 0.301 0.312
t-test 0.42 0.59
And, so we got more of the same, which is not interesting and also a little bit interesting.  It is interesting that we again observe an insignificant decrease in FIP for the Florida pitchers while the Arizona ones are level.  We then see a significant increase in wOBA for the Florida pitchers (0.05).  Meanwhile, nothing else seems to emerge from the data.

So, what we might be seeing is just a weird artifact that will disappear with a larger dataset.  Strangely, what we do not see is what Cashner appeared to claim we would see, which would be a poor handle in the beginning of the year and then improvement.  The only thing that might be happening is that for some reason sinkerball pitchers who train in Florida seem to come out of the gates very strong in the first month and that advantage appears to escape them as the year progresses.

19 February 2018

Player Opt-Out Clauses Could (Have) Really Help(ed) the Orioles This Offseason

The Orioles finally did something last week by signing Andrew Cashner to a 2-year, $16 million deal. According to MLB Trade Rumors, the deal also includes a $10 million vesting option if Cashner throws 340 innings over those two yers. That option turns into a player option if he pitches at least 360 innings. As the article points out, Cashner has only topped 170 innings twice over his career, and has only exceeded 180 innings once, so it’s unlikely that those options will come into play.

This article isn’t going to focus on the Cashner deal though (we covered that here and here). Don’t get me wrong, I think the deal is fine, and it certainly fills a need, though the Orioles have more roster holes to fill, even as players have reported to spring training. The semi-inclusion of the player option in Cashner’s contract actually got me thinking about player opt out clauses in contracts over the past few seasons. The Orioles front office has been pretty adamant about not wanting to include opt-out clauses in their contracts, so I definitely don’t expect them to act on this, but at this point in the off-season, handing out a few multi-year deals with opt-outs after year 1 would be a great strategy to round out the roster. In my opinion, it would be beneficial for both the team and certain players that could help them in 2018.

From the team’s perspective, 2018 is arguably the last season where the Oriole’s competitive window is open to contend. I say arguably, because it really does depend on who (if anyone) they sign to round out the starting rotation. We’ve talked about which players will most likely not be on the major league roster next season so many times that there is no need to lay it out again. And without much immediate help coming from the farm system, the post 2018 landscape doesn’t look too promising at the moment.

With that in mind, the team probably would not like to be committed to many long-term (and likely expensive) contracts during what will almost certainly be very lean years. This makes perfect sense. Not only do they not want to be spending a lot of money during multiple losing seasons, but it’s essential during those bad years to “play the kids” so the front office can get a good idea of which players should stick around for the team’s next competitive window. During the rebuilding process, available roster spot(s) can almost be more important than the veteran salary commitment. Offering players a long-term contract with an opt-out after the first year provides a path for an increased chance at 2018 contention, while also providing an opportunity for that contract to not exceed one year.

Obviously the 2017-18 offseason has been unique in that there have been a lot of players that are still not signed. Regardless of the reason, at the core, those players remain unsigned because they are not getting offers they feel are in line what they’re worth. So from the player’s perspective, a multi-year deal with an opt-out after year 1 seems like a good option, This provides them the opportunity to test the market again next year, while also providing a backup plan should they underperform in 2018. It may even be beneficial to both parties to front load the deals in the first year. In that case, the players maximize their earnings in 2018 (and make the Orioles more competitive), while incentivizing those players to opt out given that the salaries in years 2 through x would likely be lower than fair market value.

I would imagine that a contract structure such as this may be intriguing options to some of the players still left on the market who could help the Orioles, such as a Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb. The Orioles could even take this option to someone like Mike Moustakas. With Manny Machado’s move to SS confirmed, signing Moustakas would be an upgrade at 3B. This would move Tim Beckham to a super utility role, one which he is much more likely in which to succeed (I believe Matt Perez suggested signing Moustakas in his 2018 blueprint).

Of course there are downsides to handing out contracts with opt-out clauses after year one. The first is that if everyone has a down year, they all decide to stick around after 2018. This puts the Orioles on the hook for another couple of years in which they likely won’t be competitive. However, if they can be frontloaded, those out years wouldn’t hurt as badly. Additionally, players with upcoming opt-outs will have their trade values diminished in 2018, due to the acquiring team not knowing exactly how many years of that player they’re getting.

Giving out contracts with player opt-outs after year 1 is definitely not without risk, but this offseason, the Orioles and some players were/are both in unique situations where this contract structure may be mutually beneficial. If the Orioles are truly serious about contending in 2018 (and other than publicly saying so, I’m not sure that they are), then this idea should not be off the table, despite the front office’s disdain for doing such things. Maybe if someone mentioned to the front office that player opt-outs are essentially the same as player options they wouldn’t be opposed to it. I mean, they did just kind of give one of those to Andrew Cashner.

16 February 2018

Is Andrew Cashner The O's New Yovani Gallardo?

Before Andrew Casher signed with the Orioles, he already reminded some people of Yovani Gallardo. It probably had something to do with this:

Gallardo in 2015: 184.1 IP, 3.42 ERA, 4.00 FIP, 5.91 K/9, 3.32 BB/9
Cashner in 2017: 166.2 IP, 3.40 ERA, 4.61 FIP, 4.64 K/9, 3.46 BB/9

That was Gallardo's season with the Rangers before signing with the O's and Cashner's pitching line from last season. Cashner's numbers aren't as good (just looking at ERA only can be misleading), but they're a little closer if you instead look at each pitcher's last three seasons before joining the O's:

Cashner previous 3 years: 483.1 IP, 4.26 ERA, 4.38 FIP, 6.8 K/9, 3.5 BB/9
Gallardo previous 3 years: 557.1 IP, 3.70 ERA, 3.95 FIP, 6.6 K/9, 3.0 BB/9

Simply scouting the stat line performance alone, Gallardo is still the winner. He threw more innings and has slightly better peripheral stats. You can see why the O's wanted Gallardo. And considering the state of the team's starting rotation, you can see why the O's want Cashner.

That doesn't mean the signing is a sure-fire win. It's not because there are, of course, red flags. Bringing in a pitcher with a K/9 under 5 is not reassuring. Cashner has never thrown more than 185 innings in any season. And in his only season in the American League, he posted a 3.40 ERA that was rather fluky and that he's unlikely to replicate. As Jon discussed on Thursday, Cashner as a No. 5 starter sounds a whole lot better than a No. 3.

Still, while it's not hard to paint a picture of Cashner going off the rails in Baltimore like Gallardo did, the O's at least did not pay Gallardo prices. Comparing the career workloads for both when they signed with the O's, Gallardo had thrown about 580 more innings than Cashner. Gallardo deserves credit for being a workhouse, but that larger workload was a concern.

Gallardo's original deal with the O's for three years and $35 million dropped down to two years and $22 million (with a $13 million club option) after the O's oft-criticized (usually unfairly) physical process revealed a shoulder issue of some kind. (Gallardo hasn't been the same pitcher since.) The bargain improved the deal somewhat, but there were still injury worries. On top of that, the O's had to sacrifice the No. 14 overall pick in the 2016 MLB Draft because Gallardo had been offered the qualifying offer by the Rangers. The O's also tried to add Dexter Fowler in order to sign two QO free agents, like they had done with Ubaldo Jimenez and Nelson Cruz in 2014 to double-up and decrease the loss of the draft picks, but that plan fell through.

Gallardo had the better track record when he signed with the Orioles, but he signed a larger contract and had an apparent shoulder concern to worry about. Cashner, meanwhile, hasn't performed as well, but he hasn't thrown as many innings (both a good and bad thing) and signed for less money two years later. While some of that can be credited to the painfully slow offseason and perhaps some kind of referendum on the pursuit of free agents, waiting around and hoping for smaller deals is far from new to the Orioles under Dan Duquette.

It would not be surprising at all to see Cashner post an ERA over 5 in 2018. In his first year in Baltimore, Gallardo put up a 5.42 ERA in just 118 innings. Considering that performance and the options around him not named Bundy and Gausman, Cashner doesn't have to pitch that well to be useful. Still, hopefully the O's have another signing to make, preferably bringing in a pitcher who's better than Cashner.

15 February 2018

Andrew Cashner is Pretty Pretty Pretty OK

At the Depot, we have a model called BORAS.  BORAS is a model that takes away all our experty opinions and troublesome feelings in order to gauge past performance and age, converting that into a contract.  When BORAS considered Andrew Cashner, it determined he was worth a 3/34 deal.  Peripherals indicate a strong role player in 2015 and 2017 as well as quite good performance on the field in 2017.  His velocity is a concern, it has been dropping.  His strikeout rate collapsed, which is troubling.  His avoidance of home runs last year appeared magical.  In other words, he is a pitcher who carries some red flags despite a passable track record.

What the Orioles signed Cashner to was a 2/16 deal with a 1/10 option which requires 360 IP in 2018 and 2019 total to activate.  If he hits all of his incentives then the deal will push up to 41 MM.  For all intent and purposes, this deal looks good for the Orioles if we assume BORAS is right.  BORAS has performed fairly well so far this year as it does every year, but this peculiar logjam of late might mean we are about to see a lot of contract coming in that are low in years and low in guaranteed pay.

What I mean to say is this, the Orioles signing Andrew Cashner is either terrible or good.  If the club sees itself as a playoff contender and Cashner as its third rotation piece, then we are in terrible territory.  If it sees him as the fifth option in a rotation, then it is pretty good.  Fourth, is, I guess, OK depending on who winds up being that third slot pitcher.

This off season, I have told folks to keep their powder dry and wait until you see the whites of their eyes.  With the Cashner signing, I think we are nearing the point to be concerned.  We are not there yet, we are closer.  We need to wait a little bit longer.  This could still work out.  Or not.  It all depends on what the actual role of Cashner is.  He can be a good pitcher and is perhaps a better candidate to be a good pitcher than someone like Miguel Gonzalez who went for slightly less.

There is still some hope if the next guy through the door is Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb.  If it is Tillman, then, you know, yeah.

19 November 2017

The Orioles Are Interested In Being Interested

One constant among nearly every MLB offseason is that the Orioles are going to be interested in lots of players. That has no bearing on whether they'll actually follow through, of course. The O's are the department store customer who's not only just browsing, but who really has no desire to purchase anything that's not on the discount rack. If you're familiar with the pros and cons of free agency, that's not a horrible strategy. Still, the annual charade can be exhausting (though mildly amusing).

Just check out which players the Orioles are reportedly "interested in" in the past couple weeks:
There will be more. Still, it makes sense that the Orioles would have interest in the tier of starting pitchers under Yu Darvish and Jake Arrieta. Even though O's ownership likely wouldn't be thrilled with another four-year deal near or above the $50 million it took to sign Ubaldo Jimenez, if they want to bring aboard the services of Cobb or Lynn or maybe even Chatwood, it could take something close.

The Orioles always cast a wide net in their free agent search, but it's one that's filled with holes. Dan Duquette would probably tell you the O's target potential bargains who slip through the cracks; as O's fans have learned, those players often slip through for a reason.

The O's have found success using these strategies in the Duquette/Buck Showalter era, but they need real help in the starting rotation. Sometimes you can't get around paying what actual upgrades cost. And, well, if you do, you might end up selling Vargas and Tillman as the main upgrades to a rotation that's destined to fail again - and in perhaps the final seasons that Manny Machado, Adam Jones, and Zach Britton will be in Baltimore.