Player Opt-Out Clauses Could (Have) Really Help(ed) the Orioles This Offseason

The Orioles finally did something last week by signing Andrew Cashner to a 2-year, $16 million deal. According to MLB Trade Rumors, the deal also includes a $10 million vesting option if Cashner throws 340 innings over those two yers. That option turns into a player option if he pitches at least 360 innings. As the article points out, Cashner has only topped 170 innings twice over his career, and has only exceeded 180 innings once, so it’s unlikely that those options will come into play.

This article isn’t going to focus on the Cashner deal though (we covered that here and here). Don’t get me wrong, I think the deal is fine, and it certainly fills a need, though the Orioles have more roster holes to fill, even as players have reported to spring training. The semi-inclusion of the player option in Cashner’s contract actually got me thinking about player opt out clauses in contracts over the past few seasons. The Orioles front office has been pretty adamant about not wanting to include opt-out clauses in their contracts, so I definitely don’t expect them to act on this, but at this point in the off-season, handing out a few multi-year deals with opt-outs after year 1 would be a great strategy to round out the roster. In my opinion, it would be beneficial for both the team and certain players that could help them in 2018.

From the team’s perspective, 2018 is arguably the last season where the Oriole’s competitive window is open to contend. I say arguably, because it really does depend on who (if anyone) they sign to round out the starting rotation. We’ve talked about which players will most likely not be on the major league roster next season so many times that there is no need to lay it out again. And without much immediate help coming from the farm system, the post 2018 landscape doesn’t look too promising at the moment.

With that in mind, the team probably would not like to be committed to many long-term (and likely expensive) contracts during what will almost certainly be very lean years. This makes perfect sense. Not only do they not want to be spending a lot of money during multiple losing seasons, but it’s essential during those bad years to “play the kids” so the front office can get a good idea of which players should stick around for the team’s next competitive window. During the rebuilding process, available roster spot(s) can almost be more important than the veteran salary commitment. Offering players a long-term contract with an opt-out after the first year provides a path for an increased chance at 2018 contention, while also providing an opportunity for that contract to not exceed one year.

Obviously the 2017-18 offseason has been unique in that there have been a lot of players that are still not signed. Regardless of the reason, at the core, those players remain unsigned because they are not getting offers they feel are in line what they’re worth. So from the player’s perspective, a multi-year deal with an opt-out after year 1 seems like a good option, This provides them the opportunity to test the market again next year, while also providing a backup plan should they underperform in 2018. It may even be beneficial to both parties to front load the deals in the first year. In that case, the players maximize their earnings in 2018 (and make the Orioles more competitive), while incentivizing those players to opt out given that the salaries in years 2 through x would likely be lower than fair market value.

I would imagine that a contract structure such as this may be intriguing options to some of the players still left on the market who could help the Orioles, such as a Lance Lynn or Alex Cobb. The Orioles could even take this option to someone like Mike Moustakas. With Manny Machado’s move to SS confirmed, signing Moustakas would be an upgrade at 3B. This would move Tim Beckham to a super utility role, one which he is much more likely in which to succeed (I believe Matt Perez suggested signing Moustakas in his 2018 blueprint).

Of course there are downsides to handing out contracts with opt-out clauses after year one. The first is that if everyone has a down year, they all decide to stick around after 2018. This puts the Orioles on the hook for another couple of years in which they likely won’t be competitive. However, if they can be frontloaded, those out years wouldn’t hurt as badly. Additionally, players with upcoming opt-outs will have their trade values diminished in 2018, due to the acquiring team not knowing exactly how many years of that player they’re getting.

Giving out contracts with player opt-outs after year 1 is definitely not without risk, but this offseason, the Orioles and some players were/are both in unique situations where this contract structure may be mutually beneficial. If the Orioles are truly serious about contending in 2018 (and other than publicly saying so, I’m not sure that they are), then this idea should not be off the table, despite the front office’s disdain for doing such things. Maybe if someone mentioned to the front office that player opt-outs are essentially the same as player options they wouldn’t be opposed to it. I mean, they did just kind of give one of those to Andrew Cashner.

Pick One, Orioles: Trade Manny Machado Now Or Pay For Pitching

Last January, Jon did an excellent job of framing the Orioles' dilemma with Manny Machado and laying out the difficulties and possibilities. Of course, we know the O's have held on to Machado and now have him under control for just one more season, and that they're unlikely to sign him to an extension.

The Orioles have gotten off to a slow start this offseason to address their needs, and there's nothing surprising about that. Under Dan Duquette, the O's typically wait out the market while they search for potential bargains and players they feel have slipped through the cracks. Sometimes it works, and it seems to fit how O's ownership operates.

There are a few differences between the team's situation now and previous years, though. The O's clear weakness is starting pitching, and they currently only have two starting pitchers they can rely on for 2018: Dylan Bundy and Kevin Gausman. There's nothing new about this deficiency, and there was no question that the Orioles absolutely, positively had to address this to have any chance to compete for a playoff spot in the upcoming season.

There's also the matter of the team's impending free agents. It's not just Machado, whose probable departure would be stressful enough on its own. There's also Adam Jones, Zach Britton, and Brad Brach who could be on the way out of Baltimore. Again, none of this is a new development. Duquette talked a couple months ago about the team's need to reload, not retool. Considering the weight of the roster decisions, then, you'd figure that would lead to some sense of urgency. It hasn't.

It's almost mid-December, and the O's haven't done anything to address the rotation. Tyler Chatwood seemed like a sensible target, and he signed with the Cubs on Thursday for three years and $38 million. The Cubs, apparently on a mission to destroy O's fans' dreams, also have strong interest in Alex Cobb to complete their rotation. There are other free agent pitchers out there who the Orioles could pursue -- Lance Lynn, Jhoulys Chacin, Jason Vargas, Jaime Garcia, Andrew Cashner, CC Sabathia, Miguel Gonzalez, Chris Tillman, and others -- but Cobb and Chatwood are two of the better choices after the top two options in Yu Darvish and Jake Arrieta, who the O's will avoid because they're going to command lots of money and plenty of years.

You're already hearing some of the same, old things from years past: that the O's "had interest" when someone signs with another team (Chatwood, Mike Fiers), and now that improving the rotation is going to be a challenge. This is the problem when the O's version of going "all in" is more or less the same way they operate in a typical offseason. How can you reload if you're going to sit out while the best starters go elsewhere? The O's don't just need to add a fifth starter or some maybe underappreciated, low-tier pitching option. They need multiple accomplished starters.

If the Orioles are not going to do everything possible to upgrade the starting rotation, including outbidding other teams for desired players, then why hold on to Machado, Britton, and others and pretend like they have any real chance to compete? The Yankees just added the reigning NL MVP in Giancarlo Stanton. The O's won't even pay for three or four years of Tyler Chatwood. Considering the full picture, why would anyone think this is going to end well?

The Orioles are not going to pay what it takes to keep Machado. It would be painful, but if they trade him right now, at the very least the O's could get a few valuable prospects in return. Machado is currently healthy and will be in demand for some team. The same goes for Britton, Jones, and Brach, just to a lesser extent. Don't want to trade Britton and hope that he re-establishes his trade value enough to deal at the trade deadline? Sure, whatever. The others have value, but Machado is the big piece.

One problem with this whole thing is the O's can't be trusted to rebuild in any meaningful way. A fire sale is not the organization's style under Peter Angelos. But besides that, they're not going to reverse course and start spending in the international market. They're not going to tear everything down in an effort to correct whatever has been wrong with their pitcher prospect development for years. And they're not going to get the most out of whatever promising pitchers are currently in the lower levels of their system. In that sense, maybe you can see why the O's would be stubborn and just roll the dice one more time. But how in the world can you expect to tangle with the rest of the AL East and come out on top when you're not going to give Bundy and Gausman some major help?

Scared of signing the next Ubaldo Jimenez? Not going to pay what real starter upgrades cost? Planning to count on Miguel Castro, Gabriel Ynoa, or Mike Wright to be meaningful rotation contributors? Trade Machado and co. right now and jump-start a possible rebuild. The Orioles had a wonderful run under Buck Showalter and Duquette, and it was a lot of fun. But those two might not even be in Baltimore after next season. It's time to stop punting and make some real decisions.

Is There a Potential Bad Contract Swap With the Giants?

Mark Trumbo (photo via Keith Allison)

A little over a week ago, Dan Connolly of Baltimore Baseball wrote an article that suggested a trade of Mark Trumbo to the San Francisco Giants could make sense for both teams. The return to the Orioles potentially centered around either Jeff Samardzija or Matt Moore, two of the Giant’s higher priced, but underperforming starters. He cited an article from the Chicago Tribune that suggested a similar “bad contract” trade in which the Cubs would send Jason Heyward. With the Giants looking to upgrade their outfield (they ranked last in fWAR in 2017 at 0.8), getting Heyward would actually improve one of San Francisco’s needs, although the likelihood that Heyward does not opt out of his current contract would complicate things. So could the Orioles do something similar with Mark Trumbo as Connolly suggests?

The better return for the Orioles here would be Samardzija, but he also comes with a heftier contract. Samardzija has 3 years and $18 million per year left on his deal. Ultimately though, a Trumbo/Samardzija trade on the basis of bad contracts doesn’t work because Samardzija’s contract isn’t bad as Connolly believes. Yes, he’s owed a lot of money over the next 3 years, but he’s a quality pitcher. Despite a 4.42 ERA in what looked like a down year, Samardzija’s 2017 season was actually very productive. His strikeout rate (24.2%) was the highest it’s been since 2012 (the year he began starting) and his walk rate (3.8%) was easily a career low.

Connolly correctly points out that home runs were certainly a problem for him in 2017, but everyone has been giving up home runs the last couple of seasons and Samardzija’s 13.8% HR/FB rate only ranked 33rd out of 58 qualified starters in 2017. Add everything up, and Samardzija was worth 3.8 wins above replacement in 2017 according to Fangraphs. Even if you prefer Baseball-Reference’s method of WAR, Samardzija was still worth 2.4 wins above replacement. While his contract isn’t a steal, Samardzija is a legitimately good pitcher, not a salary dump candidate. And with the Giants indicating their intent to contend in 2018 (it is an even year after all), I see no reason as to why they would want to part with Samardzija.

Matt Moore, similar to Samardzija, had a down 2017 season. He finished with a 5.52 ERA (a 4.75 FIP) and was worth 1.0 fWAR. At -0.3 WAR, Baseball Reference thought he was slightly below replacement level. It was easily the worst full season of his career. Still, Moore was almost a perfectly decent pitcher in 2016, throwing nearly 200 innings, with both an ERA and FIP just north of 4, and ending up at 2.3 fWAR. Moore is still young (2018 will be his age 29 season), was once a top prospect, is relatively cheap ($9 million, with another relatively cheap $10 million club option in 2019), and has previously shown electric stuff. This combination of factors makes him more desirable than one would initially think given how poorly he pitched last year. It’s why picking up his 2018 option was an easy decision for the Giants. As Connolly correctly points out, the Giants would likely want more than just Trumbo for Moore, but I disagree in that I don’t believe the Giants would want Trumbo at all.

I would assume that the Orioles would take either Samardzija or Moore in return for Trumbo (and change) any day of the week. These trade ideas don’t work is for two reasons. The first is that the contracts of Samardzija and Moore are not all that bad. Samardzija is a very good pitcher, and Moore’s contract is relatively small, especially if you take into account his pedigree and the chance that he bounces back even a little bit in 2018. The second (and most important) reason is that I don’t see how Trumbo fits anywhere on the Giant’s roster.

Connolly thinks Trumbo could fit on the Giants’ roster by mentioning that Trumbo and Brandon Belt can both play either first base or the corner outfield. While defensive metrics show Belt to be a slightly below average outfielder over his career (in about 460 innings), Trumbo is essentially unplayable in the outfield, especially if he’ll be playing most of his games in the NL West, where many of the stadiums have very large outfields.

Additionally, while the defensive metrics view Trumbo as a positive at first base, Belt is also the superior defender there, averaging 3 more defensive runs saved per 1,000 innings than Trumbo (Trumbo trails in UZR/150 by 0.9). And while Belt doesn’t have the power that Trumbo does, he’s been the much better (and more consistent) hitter over the course of his career (Belt owns a career 128 wRC+ compared to Trumbo’s 106). Mark Trumbo is simply not a fit for the San Francisco Giants roster.

Realistically, a trade involving Mark Trumbo would likely be a salary dump returning no one of significant value, and definitely not a quality major league pitcher in my opinion. There are probably teams with bad contracts that the Orioles should be talking to, but I believe they’d be wasting their time with the Giants. A couple of weeks ago, Jon tweeted the following with respect to a potential Trumbo trade.

Had a front office exec without an opening at 1B tell me that if he needed a 1B then his priority would be to see if the Orioles would get rid of Trumbo for a fringe 40 man arm.

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) November 9, 2017

Like it or not, that’s probably the best Orioles can hope for this offseason.

Orioles Should Target These Starting Pitchers for Norfolk Depth

In years past, I noted how an important aspect of constructing a solid MLB roster is to have flexibility in the MLB roster where players can be shifted around to no negative effect and all to have a few guys on the farm who can step in without being a disaster.  While it may seem like the Orioles suffered with a rotating cast of starting pitchers, they really did not come from the farm.  The actual starting rotation remained fairly healthy and threw the first pitch often.  Let's look back over the years at the top three contributors to the rotation from the farm.

	IP	FIP
2012	239	4.47
2013	132.2	5.13
2014	118.7	4.43
2015	167	3.34
2016	157.1	5.53
2017	61	4.33

Most impressive was the 2012 performance where more than one starting pitcher's worth of innings was needed to fill the void.  That year, of course, saw the emergence of Chris Tillman and Miguel Gonzalez as legitimate rotation arms.  2015 also saw a mighty impressive performance from Kevin Gausman as the sixth arm with a 100.1 strong innings (4.00 FIP).  Seen as a whole, having a reliable 6th, 7th and even 8th pitcher is important because one or two starting pitchers is bound to get hurt enough to visit the disabled list (or having a strong supporting rotation lets a pitcher go on the DL in the first place.

2017, the starting rotation was pretty much a disaster.  The club flirted around with having the worst ERA- in team history, but fell short at 129 (1991 Orioles are the worst with a 132 ERA-).  If you want a larger focus, then the 2017 starting rotation, since 1954, was the 24th worst starting rotation ever.  What might be more interesting is that it was done with an incredibly healthy starting rotation with only 61 innings needed from the farm.  While contractual obligations limited the kinds of moves the Orioles could make, it was pretty apparent that the farm offered little that was appreciably better than what the starting rotation currently employed.

The short of it is, the club needs a strong AAA pitching staff.  And, well, that is not what is currently present at Norfolk. Assuming that the Orioles have Kevin Gausman, Dylan Bundy, and three external solutions to the starting rotation, then Norfolk's current rotation looks like: Alec Asher, Jordan Kipper, David Hess, John Means, and Yefry Ramirez.  That is a decent collection of AAA workhorses, but not exactly a situation where you feel comfortable bringing more than one player up.  Asher may be needed for a bullpen role and that really leaves you with some stretches who have not shown enough performance at AAA or, even, AA to provide much confidence.

With that in mind, if I ran the Orioles, I would want to add two more rotation talents whom I would have slightly more confidence in as not being complete losses at the MLB level who would be added to David Hess, Yefry Ramirez, and probably Alec Asher.  The others would work on things down at Bowie.  Existing arms like Christopher Lee and Brandon Barker would see various roles emerging from the bullpen.

Minor League Free Agents
When I sit back and think about the kinds of pitcher to target as rotation depth, I consider a couple things.  I would want someone who is in the top half of starting pitchers at the MiL AAA level for swinging strikes and for DRA.  Second, I want them as young as possible.  That really is it.

Who is on that list who is also a MiL free agent?

Ryan Carpenter, LHP
David Hurlbut, LHP
Drew Hutchison, RHP 

Ryan Carpenter, LHP (26 yo)
DRA: 2.39
Swinging Strike %: 10.7%

Carpenter was never considered much of a prospect.  He is a control guy who mixes in decent enough fastball, changeup, and curve.  Carpenter shines a bit more than Hurlbut and Hutchison.  While they barely made both cutoff marks, Carpenter had one of the best DRAs and a slightly higher swinging strike rate.  The optimistic wrinkle is that around the mid-season mark, Carpenter added a slider to his pitches and saw his season turn around.  His first half saw him pitch to a 5.15 ERA and his second half, with the slider, when down to 3.37.

That said, the Rockies apparently did not see enough of an upside and let him go.  I think the ceiling on him is perhaps a better T.J. McFarland if it all works out.  McFarland was a lefty who showed no handedness advantage and was just a hair away from being a useful swing man.  Carpenter might be able to be a hair better than McFarland.  That would be useful.

David Hurlbut. LHP (27 yo)
DRA: 3.95
Swinging Strike %: 10.3%

Hurlbut looks like a lesser Carpenter.  He too had a rebirth in the second half of the season.  Actually, it was really just one horrific May outing.  He does not see much of an improvement against lefties and gets by on three average pitches, but he locates them well and seems to have enough deception in his delivery to make guys miss.

However, twice drafted by the Twins and in the Twins' system these past 6+ years, Hurlbut has been aggressively average.  He has never exactly looked good at any level, but holds his own with some thinking that perhaps a breakout is possible.  It appears that the Twins have given up on that breakout and with his inability to be a LOOGY he does not have much of a safety net.

Drew Hutchison, RHP (26 yo)
DRA: 3.97
Swinging Strike %: 10.2%

Until sometime in 2015, Hutchison was considered a future workhorse for the Toronto Blue Jays.  It all came crashing down.  Teams started hitting him hard; especially the teams that were able to stack up powerful lefties.  The Pirates thought they could turn him around and dealt out a wobbly and expensive Francisco Liriano, past prospect Reese McGuire, and stalling prospect Harold Ramirez.  There have not been any clear winners there, but the Blue Jays might get something out of McGuire and the wobbly Liriano remained wobbly, but was able to fetch the unexpectedly excellent Teoscar Hernandez from the Astros this past year.

Anyway, the Pirates could not fully right the ship.  They were able to improve him from being horrendous against southpaws to acceptable, but he could not crack a non-playoff Pirates roster.  That said, he would have surely appeared in Baltimore last year.

Are these guys better than the batch last year?
At the levels at which the three above performed, yes.

	DRA	SwgSt%
Tyler Wilson	6.20	7.9%
Gabriel Ynoa	5.52	8.3%
Jayson Aquino	4.65	10.3%
Mike Wright	4.31	9.5%
Jordan Kipper	4.94	5.6%
Alec Asher	5.97	6.9%

Kipper's 5.6% mark was the worst swinging strike rate in the International League for pitchers with 50 or more innings pitched.  Asher and Wilson were not far behind.  Only Aquino had an above average rate.  As far as DRA is concerned, none of the Norfolk rotation appeared as average or better.  Now, Ynoa is already gone--to Tampa.  [Ed. note: Vidal Nuno signed a minor-league deal with the Rays. Ynoa is still with Baltimore. We regret the error.] Wilson and Aquino are minor league free agents.  Wright and Asher are on the roster bubble with Asher having one more option remaining.  Kipper, I believe, is Rule 5 eligible, but that kind of performance would make many teams question as to how he could get through an MLB lineup with such hittable offerings.

I could understand bringing back Aquino, but I would prefer someone whose peripherals are slightly better. Yes, Aquino is a year or three younger then the three arms I identified, but youth is not all.  There has to be another gear that can get him to perform well enough at the MLB level.  Regardless, last year AAA SP performance was poor and it appears the best way to move forward is with some new blood.

Sensible, yet Expensive: A Davis/Trumbo First Base Platoon

One of the major points I made in the 2017/18 Orioles Blueprint finale was that the club should begin the season with a first base platoon of Chris Davis and Mark Trumbo.  This would be a major shift in what was intended when either of these players were signed to their contracts.  Chris Davis still has five years left at 17 MM a season with 6 MM on top of that deferred every year.  From a management perspective, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that your big ticket item, your monetary face of the organization after just two years on his current deal needs to ride the pine against same sided pitching.

When Davis signed, there certainly was some fear here.  Davis has two major things working against him.  One, his hit tool is on the threshold of being unplayable.  His immense power compensates when he is able to put the ball in play, but that depends on him making enough contact and getting power in that contact.  In 2013 and 2015, he made contact and got on base about 15-20% more often than the past two seasons.  It is hard to be productive when you are not getting on base.  Second, his immense .300-some ISO has dropped to a solid .200 ISO, but that still makes it difficult to make up for his lack of contact.

The second aspect that was concerning was that even in his great years, Davis was still rather adequate against left handed pitching.  As the rest of his game has fallen, his performance against left handers has cratered.  It is so poor that it is hard to think that Davis has gotten 365 PA these past two seasons against left handers.  Buck and the Orioles have shown zero interest in protecting him from pitchers that he is unable to handle.

Chris Davis Platoon Splits

Split	PA	BA	OBP	SLG
vs RHP ('16)	464	.223	.341	.487
vs LHP ('16)	201	.216	.313	.398
vs RHP ('17)	360	.218	.317	.468
vs LHP ('17)	164	.208	.293	.326

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 11/1/2017.

In 2017, Chris Davis had a .118 ISO against left handed pitching.  That is bad, but really how bad is it?  Off the 25 first basemen who had more than 125 PA against left handed pitching, Chris Davis second worst.  What is the median value? .205.  Chris Davis' power performance (which is what his value is) is 50% of what the average first baseman does against lefthanded pitching.  Now, let us only consider left handed batters who play first base.  There were 11.  What was that median? .186.  Baltimore has a problem.

If the club can stomach Davis as a first baseman against right handed pitching, then the question comes to who plays first base when Davis sits.  As I noted, Mark Trumbo fits that bill and he is also a problem for the Orioles.  The club signed Trumbo after he found great difficulty in getting decent offers as a free agent.  The Orioles placed a qualifying offer on him and he refused it, thinking he had enough leverage to secure a deal elsewhere.  Instead, he came back to the Orioles at what honestly was a bargain price though the Orioles already had players cluttering up his best defensive positions: 1B and DH.

As I have often mentioned here and on Twitter, Mark Trumbo suffers from playing designated hitter.  Some scoff at the idea that a player could be impacted based on whether or not he plays in the field.  However, this has been shown to be true as a population effect.  The next statement I receive is that 14 points of wOBA are not that much.  Yes, that is correct.  It is not much of a difference even though it is a significant population effect.  One needs to go to the next step though.  The population is full of players who are found to be worse than or better than that average.  No one is that average.

On that spectrum, Mark Trumbo finds himself on the very bad side during his Oriole career:

Mark Trumbo 2016 and 2017
In field 280/338/543, 263 ISO, 133 wRC+
at DH 220/278/413, 193 ISO, 81 wRC+

And even worse last year:

Mark Trumbo 2017
In field 331/366/504, 173 ISO, 132 wRC+
at DH 207/268/368, 161 ISO, 66 wRC+

It is plainly obvious that Trumbo simply does better when he gets to use his glove.  Why?  I do not know.  There certainly are ideas out there to explain it.  For instance, when is the least safe time when you are in a plane?  When the pilot disengages from autopilot.  Having spent up to several hours not flying a plane, that moment where the pilot is suddenly engaged winds up causing significantly more flight errors than at any other point and even when correcting for pilots not using autopilot.  That would seem to suggest that maybe why some batters do worse when riding the pine is that their mind is not engaged.  That playing the field may prime a player for when he steps into the batters box even though that activity is far different from what one does in the field.

Regardless of why, Trumbo has repeatedly struggled as a designated hitter for a long while.  This leaves the club starting off with a lineup against right handed pitchers with Chris Davis at first base and Trey Mancini at designated hitter.  If pinched, Mancini moves to left field, Davis to the designated hitter slot, and Trumbo goes to first base.  Against southpaws, Trumbo starts at first and Mancini once again is the designated hitter.  If pressed, Trumbo stays, Mancini moves into the field and Davis gets the designated hitter slot.  This si what the plan should be on opening day.

If Davis is setting the world on fire, he can press for a full time role.  Against lefties, I think this would likely mean that Mancini gets more time in left field.  Likewise, if Trumbo reflects his 2016 self then that probably means squeezing Davis into more designated hitter time than first base time.  Yes, Davis is a very good first baseman.  Yes, I am ignoring last year.  His average play last year was likely impacted by core injuries that not only limited his acceleration, but also his lateral movement.  From that, I would think he would bounce back in 2018, defensively.  I also think that Trumbo's ability there (rather decent in his youth) is not much of a drop from where Davis is.

So what we are left with is Chris Davis making 17 MM in 2018 and Mark Trumbo tacking on 12.5.  Yes, I am suggesting the Orioles start off with a 29.5 MM first base platoon.  It is not anything that any of us wanted, but it is what we got.  Time to make some lemonade.

BORAS (po) 2.0: Improving Upon the Original BORAS Position Player Contract Model

A few years back, I introduced two models to predict contracts terms: BORAS (pi) and BORAS (po).  That acronym, like many in the data science world, came first and then the words later, but it means Baseball Observation-based Renumeration Assumption System.  The idea being that the bias in determining contract value (even in comp model systems) could be removed, perhaps, by throwing all the recent contracts together in a big pot and regression modeling them with certain performance parameters.

The BORAS (pi) system, which is for pitcher contract, worked remarkably well.  The cumulation r2 of the model is 0.86 and the median miss is 1.7 MM.  Some of the misses are great, such as being off on Ian Kennedy by 11 MM AAV.  Simply put, highly encapsulated pitching metrics were rather effectively in projecting what a contract would be for pitchers.  Traditional metrics were batched together and more "advanced" metrics were batched together.  The previous three years of performance were considered.  It worked out.

I used the same approach with the BORAS (po) system for position players.  Encapsulation of traditional and those more "advanced" metrics appeared to be the wrong move.  Where the pitching metrics for starting pitchers largely all met needed confidence points, the data for position players was more varied.  For instance, fielding metrics for position players needs about two to three years to really stabilize and I was batching this information into more certain offensive data.  In other words (and this is very simply stating it), I was valuing a great fielding season the same as a great offensive season which is a no good, terrible, oh so awful way to do things.  It yielded an r2 of 0.47 and median value off of 3.9 MM, which is decent if you know nothing.  However, a passing interest in contract terms would make you far more away of probable terms than this model would.

This performance has led me to think about other ways to utilize data and come up with, perhaps, a better performing model.  First, I wanted to thin down data sources and noted that, unlike the pitching model, the hitting model valued similar statistics regardless of their traditional nature or more "advanced" nature, so I decided to just go ahead and use less encapsulated "advanced" metrics and ignore the traditional ones.  I also separated out fielding metrics and put them in a more appropriate bin with similar certainty.  So, now we have BORAS 2.0 (po).

Below is how the models compare.

	BORAS 1.3		BORAS 2.0
	Yr	Total	Yr	Total
Alonso	2	18.7	3	34
Duda	2	19.6	2	21.4
Holliday	NRI		NRI
Hosmer	4	61.2	5	93.8
Lind	1	7.9	2	17.5
Moreland	2	21.4	2	16.1
Morison	3	34.8	4	59.8
Reynolds	1	9.5	1	7.7
Santana	3	45.2	3	51.4
Kendrick	1	10.6	2	20.4
Utley	NRI		1	6.8
Walker	2	22.3	3	41
Cozart	4	59.3	5	83.7
Escobar	NRI		1	8
Frazier	3	50.6	3	37.7
Moustakas	3	34.2	3	35.2
Reyes	NRI		1	8.7
Nunez	2	20.8	4	53
Cabrera	NRI		1	8
Dyson	2	25.2	3	32.5
Granderson	1	12.7	2	25.9
Jay	1	9.2	2	17.6
Martinez	4	64.8	4	85.1
Maybin	2	21.8	2	20.5
Upton	5	83.9	5	100.8
Cain	5	92.2	4	64.7
Gomez	2	21.2	3	31.3
Jackson	2	21.8	2	20.6
Bautista	NRI		NRI
Bruce	3	30.1	3	37.5
Ethier	NRI		1	7.2
Gonzalez	1	8.6	2	15.7
Smith	NRI		1	8
Werth	NRI		NRI
Sogard	2	17	2	14.1

BORAS 2.0 appears to do better with the higher end players.  Justin Upton at 5/100.8 made more sense than 5/83.9.  Cain makes more sense as a 4/64.7 than 5/92.2 player.  However, BORAS 1.0 seems to be more into handing our NRIs.  It will be interesting to see how this offseason plays out and whether BORAS 2.0 is an actually improvement on the original model.

Blueprint For The 2018 Orioles (Option #4): Coach Them Up

Per Camden Depot tradition, a number of writers write up their blueprints for the upcoming offseason. Here are the rules and the BORAS contract numbers.

Like the rest of the writers, I would decline the player options for JJ Hardy and Wade Miley. Wade Miley had a terrible season last year, and I don’t think he has good enough stuff to be a starter in the American League. JJ Hardy has failed to play more than 120 games in a season since 2014, and had a terrible .217/.255/.323 line. I can’t justify paying him an extra $12M to put up those kinds of numbers.

I would tender all of the Orioles arbitration eligible players’ contracts. There has been some debate over whether to tender Britton a contract, but I don’t recommend dumping one of the best relievers in 2015 and 2016 simply due to having a terrible 2.89 ERA in 2017. That stated, the Orioles know more about Britton’s health than myself, and I could change my mind if his health was a concern.
By decree of Jon, the Orioles projected payroll has been set at $155 million. The Orioles have $53 million committed in 2018, and MLBTR projects the Orioles to spend another $55 million in arbitration. I’m not a fan of the MLBTR arbitration model, but it’s an objective way to determine arbitration salaries. In addition, $2.5 million goes towards buyouts. This leaves me eleven players and $45.5 million to complete the roster.

Backup Catcher

I think the best way to start something like this is give people what they're really interested in and talk about the backup catcher. The Orioles have Caleb Joseph and Chance Sisco, so one could be persuaded to go into 2018 with just these catchers. However, I’m not convinced that Sisco is ready for MLB right now, and even still the Orioles need some help in Norfolk. So, I’m going to suggest adding Orioles’ favorite Francisco Pena to the club on a minor league deal. Ideally, Pena would be the backup catcher until Sisco is ready for a promotion, but it’s possible that the Os will decide to promote Sisco regardless because of the importance of this upcoming season, before a number of key Orioles hit free agency.

Outfield

I’d have liked to sign a player to play right field so that I could store Austin Hays in Norfolk. This would give the 2018 Orioles some depth and give Hays a bit more seasoning before he goes to the majors. Adding Lorenzo Cain would make a good deal of sense, as he could play RF in 2018 and take over CF from Adam Jones in 2019. The problem is that I’m not willing to go to 5/90 in order to add him. Other decent defensive options like Dyson, Gomez and Jackson are projected to earn more money than I’d be willing to spend. Curtis Granderson is getting to be too old and slow to be effective in the majors, and Carlos Gonzalez is unable to hit left-handed pitching or have success on the road. I’m going to suggest starting the season with an outfield of Trumbo/Jones/Rickard/ Santander. Ideally, Hays will start the season in Norfolk, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see the Orioles call him up to the majors to play right field.

Infield/DH

The Orioles already have a decent infield/dh with Mancini, Davis, Schoop, Beckham and Machado. However, Beckham had his huge month in 2017 against poor pitchers and I’m not sure that I want him as a starter. That’s why I’m going to recommend going after Moustakas for 3/34.

I can understand why BORAS has Moustakas receiving less than I’d expect. He was injured in 2016, has limited defensive range and is only a good offensive player. If his range gets worse and can’t play 3B, then he’d be yet another addition to the Orioles collection of 1B/DH type players. Having four of those guys is not a good thing. Still, he was able to show significant power in Kansas City and will still be in his prime for the length of this contract. He has decent plate discipline, isn’t terrible against left handed pitching and may see significant improvements in a hitter-friendly stadium like Camden. It’s hard to find a player with his offensive abilities that isn’t a 1B/DH that will earn just $10M. I expect him to get a richer deal than BORAS expects and for him not to fit into the Orioles’ budget.

Adding Moustakas pushes Machado to shortstop and lets Beckham become a poor mans’ Ben Zobrist – especially if he can play a passable center field. This would allow him to get a significant amount of playing time and keep other players fresh. He could also play a good bit of right field until Hays is called up.

Starting Rotation:

The Orioles current starting rotation is Gausman and Bundy, with minimal help available in Norfolk so clearly the Orioles need to focus on this.

It would make sense for the Orioles to go after one of the top arms on the market – either Darvish or Arrieta. However, I don’t see the Orioles taking that big of a risk. I think signing Rick Nolasco, Jaime Garcia and Chris Tillman is a more plausible scenario.

Ricky Nolasco has not had such good performance over his last contract. In the four year period, his best ERA was 4.42 and last year he had a 4.92 ERA and a 5.10 FIP. In 2017, he had ok numbers (wOBA of .376 or about average) when left handed batters put the ball into play but had a poor 14.3% k-rate and an 8.2% walk rate. Against right handed batters, he had a strong 22% k-rate to a 6.6% walk rate, but they had a .487 wOBA against him – ranking last out of 56 qualified pitchers.

The reason why he’s an interesting pitcher is that he has good enough stuff to strike lefties out. His splitter has a 22.5% swinging strike rate against lefties. He’s able to get a decent amount of swinging strikes with his slider and knuckle curve. He just can’t seem to convert his success at getting swinging strikes early in the count to getting swinging strikes when the batter already has two strikes.

Part of the problem is that left-handed batters were able to put his splitter into play at very high rates in 2017. Part of the problem is that left-handed batters swung at pretty much every slider and sinker he threw in the strike zone. Part of the problem is that his splitter has a higher swinging strike percentage without two strikes than with two strikes. If you can just find the minor tweak that lets him have success with two strikes, then he’ll be dangerous against lefties.

Against right-handed hitting, he just needs to throw his splitter more often. His two-pitch repertoire of fastballs and sliders seems to be enough to get him strikeouts, but not enough to avoid getting drilled. Make opposing batters guess a bit more about what’s coming, and they should hit him less.

He hasn’t performed well where it counts over the past four years, but he does have good enough stuff to be successful. In the worst case scenario, he averaged nearly 5.5 innings per start in 2017 and over 6 in 2016, which suggests he can at least eat innings. For 2 years and $16 million, that seems fair enough. If he didn’t have issues, he’d be earning more than $16M a year.

Next, the Orioles should sign Jaime Garcia. Garcia is another pitcher that hasn’t had much success lately. He’s been pretty solid against left-handed batters with a 26% k-rate, 4% walk rate and just a .303 wOBA against. His problem is that he didn’t face many of them last year --- just 21.3% of the batters he faced were left handed. His bigger problem is against right handed batters who have a .342 wOBA against him – in part because he has a decent 17.3% strikeout rate and a high 11% walk rate against them.

One of his problems against righties is that he uses six pitches, but not all of them are effective. Resorting to a Fastball, Slider and Changeup repertoire will allow him to use his most effective pitches more often and let him focus on his best pitches.

With the money they have remaining, they should sign Chris Tillman to a one year $4 million deal. BORAS has Tillman signing a two year, $7 million dollar deal, but I can’t see Tillman agreeing to sign a multi-year deal at that low of a salary. Tillman probably isn’t a great option, and I don’t have high hopes for him. But he may have a bounce-back season and is probably a better option than Wright/Wilson.

Bullpen:

With Britton, Brach, Givens and O’Day on the team, it doesn’t make sense to add a free agent reliever. I see Bleier, Castro and Hart making up the rest of the bullpen.

Remaining Cash:

At this point, I have about $3.5 million remaining for one bench spot. With that cash, I’d be looking for either a player with good speed that could be used as a pinch runner/defensive replacement and preferably could play corner outfield. Perhaps someone like Craig Gentry? Most likely, this money would be saved to make a move at the trade deadline. It doesn’t hurt to have a bit of extra cash to make a splash at the trade deadline like trading for Hellickson, Parra or Norris.

2018 Roster:

Final Thoughts:

The problem with free agency is that there’s never enough cash to get everything you want. If the Orioles had kept some of their young pitching prospects that have panned out for other teams, their situation would be different and they’d be able to use their cash on Darvish or Arrieta. Instead, I recommended free agents that haven’t had much success lately but that I think have potential. If I’m right about these guys, then they could easily solidify the Orioles rotation, while helping their offense become elite. But many of these guys haven’t been effective the past few years, and that’s probably a bad sign.

2017/18 Baltimore Orioles Blueprint Series

Just like every other offseason, the Depot will kick things off with our long running annual blueprint series.  A subset of our writers will tackle the club and try to do what they think is best for the Orioles while staying under the budget.  Additionally, we are asking you, our dear readers, to feel free to submit your own plans using our rules to CamdenDepot@gmail.com for me to consider.  Once everyone has posted or emailed their ideas, I will act as Lord Supreme GM and make my final determination.

Some rules:

1) No trades. Trades are hard to predict and these exercises seem to be a bit optimistic about returns.  We have recently had someone state that Mark Trumbo and Zach Britton could be dealt for Julio Teheran and Matt Kemp.  I am unsure how exactly that works for the Braves in any way.  That said, whoever would have imagined that the Orioles would have been able to deal Yovanni Gallardo for Seth Smith.  Now that did not exactly work, but it was at least a better fit for the club than Gallardo was.

2) 155 MM payroll.  Payrolls are hard to figure out.  Sources I have vary from 152 to 185.  The reason why those numbers fluctuate so much is due to bonus clauses, buyouts, deferred money, partial payments in trades, and roster bonuses from veteran MiL signings.  From my terribly incomplete count, I found about 5 MM in potential roster bonuses from MiL signings last year, which is somewhat astounding.  So, we decided to go on the lean side of the payroll tallies and choose an aesthetically clean 155 MM.

3) Contracted Money (53.33 MM)

• Chris Davis 17 MM (ignoring 6 MM deferred)
• Adam Jones 17.33 MM (ignoring performance bonuses)
• Mark Trumbo 11 MM (ignoring 1.5 MM deferred)
• Darren O'Day 8 MM (ignoring 1 MM deferred)

4) Choose Your Options (2.5 MM to 26 MM)

• J.J. Hardy 2 MM buyout (or 14 MM club option; ignoring performance bonuses)
• Wade Miley 0.5 MM buyout (or 12 MM club option)
• Welington Castillo PLAYER OPTION (7 MM 2018 salary, assume he declines)

5) Arbitration Tender or Not (0 MM to 55.1 MM)

• Manny Machado (17.3 MM)
• Zach Britton (12.2 MM)
• Jonathan Schoop (9.1 MM)
• Kevin Gausman (6.8 MM)
• Brad Brach (5.2 MM)
• Tim Beckham (3.1 MM)
• Caleb Joseph (1.4 MM)

6) Peculiarities (1.5 MM)

• Dylan Bundy (est. 1.5 MM, non-arbitration inflated salary)
• Chris Johnson's 1 MM buyout is from an old contract, not current one.

7) Assume all other non-arbitration players at 0.55 MM.

8) Fill up only the 25 man roster.

9) Use BORAS contract projections for pitchers and position players even though some look unrealistic in our eyes.  If a player is not listed, comment on this post and I will run the numbers.

10) Contract money cannot be deferred and must be evenly distributed by years.

Let me know if you all who wish to contribute have any questions.

2017/18 BORAS Position Player Contract Projections: I Tried

As much as I have been impressed by the performance of my BORAS pitcher contract projections, I have been pretty equally unimpressed with last year's position player projection.  To be clear, the models are different.  Different inputs, obviously, which for pitchers track well, but is still a mess for position players.  One of the major issues is that fielding ability is measured differently by each team and can vary significantly over the years even within one club.  There may also be some deviation in what kind of skills are appreciated over the years being more dynamic than it is for pitchers.

Long story short, we will be using these contract projections, but the model is not the strongest.  Anyway, we will still be using these figures to inform our 2017/18 Blueprint series.  Tomorrow, I will post more information about that and invite our readers to provide their own blueprints in addition to the ones our writers are developing.  At the end, I will review them and choose what I think makes the most sense moving forward.

Here are the position player projections:

		AGE	YR	2017 AAV
Alex	Avila	31	3	34.1
Welington	Castillo	31	2	24.4
Nick	Hundley	34	1	8.9
Chris	Ianetta	35	1	8.7
Jonathan	Lucroy	32	1	10.9
Yonder	Alonso	31	2	18.7
Lucas	Duda	32	2	19.6
Eric	Hosmer	28	4	61.2
Adam	Lind	34	1	7.9
Mitch	Moreland	32	2	21.4
Logan	Morison	30	3	34.8
Mark	Reynolds	34	1	9.5
Carlos	Santana	32	3	45.2
Howie	Kendrick	34	1	10.6
Neil	Walker	32	2	22.3
Zack	Cozart	32	4	59.3
Todd	Frazier	32	3	50.6
Mike	Moustakas	29	3	34.2
Eduardo	Nunez	31	2	20.8
Jarrod	Dyson	33	2	25.2
Curtis	Granderson	37	1	12.7
Jonathan	Jay	33	1	9.2
JD	Martinez	30	4	64.8
Cameron	Maybin	31	2	21.8
Justin	Upton	30	5	83.9
Lorenzo	Cain	32	5	92.2
Carlos	Gomez	32	2	21.2
Austin	Jackson	31	2	21.8
Jay	Bruce	31	3	30.1
Carlos	Gonzalez	32	1	8.6

How Much is That Pitcher in the Window?: 2017/18 FA SP BORAS Projections

After the 2015 season, the Depot decided to get more organized with our off season blueprint series.  To make things more standardized, I developed a model, BORAS (Ballplayer Observation-based Remuneration Assumption System).  There are actually two models, a pitcher model and a position player model.  The models use a variety of data and considers player performance against the 2017/18 adjusted contract money.  Players are limited to those who pay reflected a value of 1 WAR or more.  In the first year, both models outperformed other projection estimates (e.g., Bowden, Heyman, MLBTR, Cameron, FG Fan Model).  Last year, the pitching model performed second best of that group and the position player model was the second worst.  This year,my sniff test is telling me that the pitcher model might be a little conservative, but will be much more on the nose than the position player model.  In my next article, I will discuss my concerns with the position player model, but this post is about the pitchers.

This pitching post is likely of particular interest to Orioles fans.  With about 50 MM in spending room after arbitration and assuming that payroll will remain steady, the club has the opportunity to revamp their starting rotation.  As the Orioles enter into this offseason, they effectively have Dylan Bundy and Kevin Gausman in the rotation.  Some have suggested that Gabriel Ynoa or Miguel Castro should be given a 5th slot competition, but when you have 50 MM on hand you probably should aim higher.

BORAS Projected Contract Terms (updated 10/16)

	Age	Years	Total
High
Jake Arrieta	32	3	51.8
Yu Darvish	31	4	69.3
Andrew Cashner	31	3	33.9
Jhoulys Chacin	30	3	37.4
Moderate
Jaime Garcia	31	2	22.9
CC Sabathia	37	2	23
Alex Cobb	30	3	31.1
Miguel Gonzalez	34	2	20.9
Lance Lynn	31	2	18.4
Tyler Chatwood	28	4	41.9
Low
Wade Miley	31	2	15.8
Jeremy Hellickson	31	2	15.7
Jason Vargas	35	2	17.2
Extrapolated - Poor
Clayton Richard	34	2	17.5
Ricky Nolasco	35	2	15.8
Francisco Liriano	34	1	5.8
Hisashi Iwakuma	37		NRI
Scott Feldman	35	1	5
Trevor Cahill	30	2	8.4
Yovani Gallardo	32	1	4.6
Brett Anderson	30	2	10.2
Hector Santiago	30	1	4
Chris Tillman	30	2	6.8
Tyson Ross	31	1	3.4
Matt Cain	33	1	2.4
Derek Holland	31	1	1.5

The strength of the model has really been driven by accuracy in players with three or more years projected.  Additionally, there is more strength in the model when players are projected to earn between 10-25 MM in 2017/18 dollars.  With that in mind, the model expresses a high level of certainty for Arrieta, Darvish, Cashner, and Chacin.  One wrench is that Marco Estrada also fell into this sweet spot and wound up get two years less on his extension, but for the same average annual value.

Several players seemed to drop off from their midseason expectations with less than stellar second halfs.  Yu Darvish went from a projected 6/118 deal to 4/59 as he scuttled.  It will be interested to see if his struggles in the second half will put a major damper on his value.  Jason Vargas, as I was expected, had his value collapse as he came back down to earth.  He dropped from a stunning 4/80 (man, that first half was good) to 2/16.  Jake Arrieta delivered a stronger second half and saw a modest increase from 3/45 to 3/53.

Below are the changes from midseason (which projected a continuation of first half performance throughout the season) and the end of year projection.

	AAV
	ASB	End	%
Miguel Gonzalez	6	10.1	68
Jhoulys Chacin	9.3	11.5	24
Alex Cobb	13.3	10.2	23
Jake Arrieta	15	17.6	17
Wade Miley	8	9.3	16
Andrew Cashner	12.7	11.8	-7
Jeremy Hellickson	10.3	8.9	-14
CC Sabathia	12.5	10.5	-16
Francisco Liriano	7	5.4	-23
Brett Anderson	6	4.6	-23
Jaime Garcia	14	10.7	-24
Yu Darvish	19.7	14.8	-25
Hector Santiago	5.5	4.1	-26
Lance Lynn	14	9.9	-29
Clayton Richard	11	7.7	-30
Tyler Chatwood	14.3	9.9	-31
Yovani Gallardo	7	4.8	-31
Chris Tillman	6	4	-32
Tyson Ross	6.5	3.4	-48
Scott Feldman	11	5	-55
Trevor Cahill	15.7	5	-68
Jason Vargas	20	8.2	-69
Derek Holland	5	1.5	-70

It certainly amazing how much a second half can change the trajectory of overall performance. Anyway, based on these figures, the Orioles should be able to acquire three new starting pitchers. No, not much looks to be available which is similar to last year.  With each free agent season, it appears that incredibly enticing free agents are typically locked into deals before they hit the market.  Maybe without a top tier of pitching available yet there still being a need for pitchers, we might see these contracts wind up being on the low end.

We shall see.