Translating Yu Darvish's Performance to MLB

As we showed earlier this week, the Orioles had by far the worst starting pitching in the American League.  This begs the question exactly how to improve such a poor area of the team.  John Stockstill has flown off to Japan to personally scout Darvish's final games in the Japanese Players League for the 2011 season.  The team also expressed interest last off season.  It is assumed that Darvish will be posted and will then enter into a contract with the winning team.  The Orioles, in fact, may be interested in making a splash.

Darvish has proven himself as a star in the Japan, but it remains a question as to how well he would play in North America.  In this post, I will be using his statistics in the JPPL as well as three other recent pitchers who made the transition to try to predict what Yu might do and how much he would be worth.  

Five straight seasons of sub 2.00 ERA ball is pretty amazing, but it is difficult to figure out what exactly it means in MLB.  The game is played a bit differently over in Japan, so direct transition of statistics may not be incredibly useful.  Jim Albright came up with a rather interesting way to do this several years ago and I plan on doing something similar.  I am not entirely sure that it is useful to convert Darvish's numbers using coefficients derived from player performance in the 1990s and early 2000s.  I do not assume that the leagues have maintained their differences in performance.  Because of this, I would want to use more recent performances.

I decided to take three recent transitions: Hiroki Kuroda, Daisake Matsuzaka, and Kenshin Kawakami.  Here are there numbers in the three years prior to leaving Japan and what they were able to accomplish in MLB.

To create the coefficients, I pooled the performance of each pitcher by league.  I then scaled each league to 1,000 IP.  This resulted in the following coefficients:

Strikeouts: 1.079
Walks: 0.553
Home Runs: 0.804

It should also be noted that by using three pitchers, park factors may play a large role in these numbers.  Averaged park factors for Turner Field, Dodger Stadium, and Fenway Park were 1.02 for walks and 0.92 for home runs.  This will need to be taken into account for Camden Yards that has a walk factor of 1.04 and home run factor of 1.14.  This results in the following table:

That is a very solid pitcher.  Over the course of the next three years (assuming the prior assumptions are valid), Darvish would be worth about 20 WAR.  That would be a succession of three Cy Young quality seasons.  To be conservative, I think it would be fair to assume Darvish could potentially produce 20 WAR over five years, which would be worth about 120MM.  That would be equivalent to a pitcher who would average as a 2/3 slot pitcher on a first division team.  If I was the Orioles, I would consider bidding somewhere between 60-80 MM with the understanding that a contract would amount to a 5 or 6 year deal in the neighborhood of another 70 MM.

Extra Pitch F/X info
Based on Pitch F/X, Darvish throws seven different pitches: four seamer, two seamer, cutter, curve, slider, forkball, and change up.  I think as a MLB pitcher his lesser offerings will be discarded.  In Japan, he relies primarily on his four seamer and slider.  Those will work well in MLB, particularly with right handed batters.  In Japan, he often relied on his forkball against lefties, but I doubt that will play well over here.  I think his primary pitches will be his four seamer, slider, and cutter will be the pitches that will likely make the transition, but I am not entirely confidant in my ability to say so.  His four seamer works in the 93-95 range, the cutter comes in at 89-91, and his slider appears to have a lot of snap and sits at 81-83.  However, it would not surprise me if he loses a few mph when he transitions because he will be pitching more often.  In that case, I would expect his velocity to drop to the 91-93 range.  That drop in velocity may make things look worse with an expected ERA of around 3.50, which would be right about what a 3 slot pitcher should be on a first division team.  Looks good to me.

Orioles Starting Pitching in 2011 was worst in AL

Our last descriptive graph detailed how the offense performed according to different metrics used to calculate fWAR for offensive players.  In this post, we present runs saved above replacement level pitcher for starting pitchers.  What one can see is a major area for the team to improve.

• The Orioles' starting pitching was 42.6 runs worse than the next team in the AL (Blue Jays).  
• They were about 137.1 runs worse than the best team in the AL (White Sox).

MiLB Year in Review: Frederick Keys

Interesting mix fuels Frederick playoff run

The Frederick Keys ended the season with a tie for the best record in the League (losing the tie-breaker to Potomac for regular season title), a playoff series win in the Northern Division Championship against Potomac, and a Mills Cup title over Kinston. The players constituting the 2011 Keys were a blend of young and old, including two of the youngest and most talented players in the high Class A Carolina League -- Manny Machado and Jonathan Schoop.

There are a number of solid performers and potential Major League contributors, but as is the case throughout the Baltimore system, the impact talent is limited. At the plate, Machado and Schoop are the only two potential above-average Major Leaguers, though Trent Mummey, Tyler Townsend and Kyle Hudson have a chance to carveout roles off the bench at the highest level. LJ Hoes still has everyday potential, but spent more significant time in Class Double-A Bowie, and will accordingly be discussed in more detail in our review of the Baysox.

On the hill, Bobby Bundy took a nice step forward, rewarding Camden Depot's steadfast support of him as one of the top arms in the system. Clayton Schrader completed the second half of his dominating first pro year with a strong showing at Frederick, and both Oliver Drake and Sean Gleason showed potential as future bullpen arms.

Frederick By the Numbers:
Record: 39 - 31 (Northern Division Champions; Mills Cup Champion)
Top Arm: Bobby Bundy (2008 Draft, 8th Round)
Top Bat: Jonathan Schoop (2008, international FA)

Player of the Year:
Bobby Bundy (121 IP, 102 H, 43 R, 37 ER, 31 BB, 100 SO)

Camden Depot readers will recognize Bundy as a staple in the top half of our Prospect Rankigns for the past three seasons. After a breakout summer, Bundy will see his name climbing the rankings of blogs and national outlets, as well, and deservingly so. A workout nut, Bundy is a strong and durable body, listed at 6-foot-2, 215-pounds. He logged a total of 136 IP this year between Frederick and Bowie, and projects as a #3 or #4 starter capable of eating innings at the Major League level.

Mechanically, Bundy has seen some lengthening in his arm action over the past three seasons, but has utilized his athleticism and solid body control to repeat his mechanics and release without too much inconsistency. The result is solid control/command and, more importantly, increasing consistency in the execution of his offerings. He throws out of a true three-quarters slot and creates solid downhill plane on his fastball and a decent angle on his curve. His sturdy base provides good drive and a muscular core serves as a capable the generator while maintaining an easy arm action.

His fastball is a low-90s heater that can come with some bore. He spots it well to both sides and can elevate it when needed, touching 94/95 mph up in the zone. His best breaking ball is an upper-70s curve with downer action, though he still rolls it from time-to-time, causing it to lose bite and rendering it hittable. He throws a firm change-up that will improve as he continues to gain feel. He has flashed a slider, but remains generally a three pitch arm with mid-rotation upside and high marks for durability.

Players to know:

Oliver Drake has a compact, under-control delivery and maintains a good line to home. His 89-92 mph fastball has some life and can induce soft contact down in the zone. His slider is a solid average to above-average offering, and he has also flashed average throughout his pro career with both a change-up and a curve. Drake has the body and endurance to chew through innings, but his stuff may be better suited for the pen, where his fastball/slider combo could be solid in middle-inning work. Baltimore will give him a second run at Bowie next year. If he stumbles, he could shift to the pen prior to promotion to Norfolk.

Since transitioning to the pen in 2010, Sean Gleason has emerged as a potential future contributor with the big club, and a candidate for late-inning work if he can spot better in the zone. He is primarily a fastball/slider reliever, sitting 91-94 mph and touching 96 mph when he reaches back for it. One scout shared that, in his first appearance in this year's Arizona Fall League, Gleason topped out at 97 mph up in the zone. His slider is an average offering that can flash plus, but he can tip the pitch at times with arm slot, and needs to find a balance between throwing it as a case pitch and catching too much of the plate. He'll also mix in a change-up and a curve as a change of pace, though both are generally below average. He'll turn 27 next year, and Baltimore will need to decide whether to protect him on the 40-man or expose him to the Rule 5 Draft in December (where an opportunistic organization could roll the dice on Gleason's arm strength).

Nicholas Haughian started 21 games for the Keys, but projects at best as a situational lefty at the Major League level. He commands his upper-80s fastball fairly well, and could sit 88-92 mph when permitted to go all out iun a relief role. His slider is a solid breaker and he'll also mix in a fringy change-up, though he slows his arm too often when dealing the mid-70s offspeed. Baltimore may continue to run him out as part of a rotation until he stumbles, but his stuff, as well as his limited ability to miss bats, indicate a shift to the pen may be unavoidable.

LJ Hoes struggled offensively in a 41-game stay in Frederick before righting the ship in Bowie. Owner of a compact frame with increasing strength, Hoes should see some power starting to develop in his game over the next twelve months. This will be an important development to monitor, as without that added dimension to his game, Hoes could be cast as a 'tweener, with a solid stick for second base but not the glove, and a solid defensive profile in left with not quite enough offensive pop.

Speedster Kyle Hudson toured through four levels in 2011 (Frederick, Bowie, Norfolk and Balitmore), and will be discussed in more detail in our review of the Triple-A Norfolk. Hudon's game is dependent on speed, and he'll have to show a consistent ability to find ways to first base against Major League pitching in order to provide any value at the Major League level. The complete absence of any power in his offensive game will open him up to aggressive arms at the highest level, and will drastically cut into his ability to maintain a lofty on-base percentage as his ability to draw a walk is taken away from him.

Manny Machado was once again the highest-ceilinged player on his squad, though the on-field results were mixed during his second half stay in Frederick. Machado continued to show a solid understanding of the strikezone, but struggled some with pitch identification, leading to too much soft contact on "pitchers" pitches. At his best, he still showed an ability to punish fastballs and mistakes, and there is little doubt he will make the necessary adjustments to continue to grow, offensively. Whether he starts 2012 back in high Class A Frederick or at Class Double-A Bowie will likely be determined in the spring.

Nathan Moreau has a phone booth delivery with a "just below" three-quarters arm slot. He struggles to finish and will occasionally cut himself off, each of which can have a negative impact on his ability to throw strikes. His fastball is generally 88-91 mph and he pairs it with a sweeping breaking ball that shows depth but inconsistent bite. His change-up is a workable third pitch but projects merely as potentially average. Seen as an upside selection when selected out of the University of Georgia in 2008, Moreau has stagnated, failing to improve upon his command or his stuff over the past two seasons. He still has a chance to provide value as a lefty specialist if he can find more consistency in his breaking ball and command.

As noted in our low Class A Delmarva review, Trent Mummey has limited ceiling, but plays a good center field, runs well, and has a short swing capable of spraying the gaps. He's undersized, but strong, and likely fits best as a future 4th outfielder. He gets tied up on the inner half when faced with good velocity, and his ability to adjust to more advanced secondary stuff at Class Double-A Bowie will say a lot about his future potential.

Jonathan Schoop saw a dip in his in-game power once he was promoted to Frederick, but continued to show a solid approach and ability to barrel balls. Like many young players, Schoop needs to tighten-up his pitch-ID, and should see a nice jump in power production once he is more comfortable working for and identifying pitches he can drive. Already thickening in his core, Schoop's future power tool is his best asset. He could end-up at third base, second base or an outfield corner, depending on Baltimore's needs, and has the athleticism and arm to fit into any of those roles.

Clayton Schrader followed up 22 dominant innings at low Class A Delmarva (where he was Camden Depot's selection for top arm) with 24 dominant innings at high Class A Frederick, boasting 13.1 SO/9 and 3.0 H/9 as a Keys reliever. Unfortunately, he also walked 19 batters in those 24 innings, though those baserunners were largely negated by his ability to miss bats. Schrader's performance at Bowie will help to ground his projection, which could be as high as a true shut-down late-inning arm and as low as a Four-A arm. Camden Depot entered 2011 bullish on Schrader and remains so, projecting him as a solid late-inning contributor with a future plus fastball and plus slider. He could be ready for Baltimore by next summer.

Tyler Townsend produced a triple-slash line of .317/.358/.583, but once again failed to stay healthy, logging just 72 games this summer (67 of them with Frederick). When healthy, Townsend shows some raw power and a solid enough glove at first base. He has a deep hand load and a fair amount of length to his swing, which causes him to start his swing early and hampers his ability to properly identify more advanced breakign stuff. His hand-eye coordination is such that he has been able to square pitches, even when fooled, at the lower levels. But he will need to overhaul his aggressive approach, including tightening his swing mechanics, in order to succeed against the advanced arms he'll see in Bowie, Norfolk and Baltimore. Townsend doesn't yet project as a future Major League regular, but could greatly improve his stock by staying healthy through 2012 with a solid showing at Bowie.

Bad Outfield Defense or a Bad Fielding Metric?

When I decided to write that title I did not mean that fielding is unfair between teams.  Rather, I wonder whether the way fielding is measured is fair.  I was wondering this because there has been discussion about Carl Crawford's defense not translating well to Fenway Park.  It made me wonder whether there was anything peculiar about Camden Yards.  My only resource (FanGraphs) informs me about career UZR home and away, so I decided to use Oriole outfielders who have been nearly exclusively part of the Baltimore Orioles:

• Nick Markakis has played 7874 innings for the Orioles in RF.
• Adam Jones has played 3405 innings for the Orioles in CF and 227 for the Mariners.
• Felix Pie has 852 inning for the Orioles in LF and 13 for the Cubs.

Now from this we can basically declare that all three of these Orioles have overwhelmingly played at these positions for the Orioles.  With these players, we can attempt to measure if there are any unaccounted park factors.

Here is a short description of UZR if you need to be refreshed on how it is calculated.

How to calculate UZR: The baseball field is divided into 78 zones, 64 of which are used in UZR calculation. (As Lichtman explains, infield line drives, infield pop flies, and outfield foul balls are ignored. Pitchers and catchers are not included.)

Here's what is calculated for each zone: the out rate and the percentage of balls in that zone that turn into outs. The league average out rate is then subtracted from the player's out rate — if this number is negative, it means the player is worse than league average. If it's positive, it means he's better than league average.

That rate is then multiplied by the number of balls that hit in that player's zone. This yields a Zone Rating. To obtain the run value, it's multiplied by the Zone Ratings that are calculated for each zone the fielder covers, and then summed. This sum is a simple, unadjusted UZR. It is then further adjusted for park factors, batted ball speed, which side of the plate the batter was hitting from, the pitcher's groundball/flyball ratio and the number of baserunners and outs at the time. The adjustments are made because each of these variables can significantly affect the average out rate in a particular zone. Using run expectancy charts, these rates can be converted to runs.

UZR / 150

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Each player does remarkably worse at home than on the road.  It is actually a pretty remarkable finding.  Pie has only about 135 games worth of innings in left field, which is not nearly enough to get a good idea of how dependable a fielder he is.  UZR typically requires 2-3 years of data to get a good read on a player.  Adam Jones has about 546 games worth of innings.  With that amount split between assumed home and road games, it is arguably just enough to be usable.  Markakis has about 875 games worth of innings and is perfectly fine as a data source.  It seems clear enough that this is a real effect.  Playing in Camden Yards in any position in the outfield decreases your defensive metrics.  This means that as useful as UZR might be, it appears to do a poor job characterizing what normal means for Camden Yards.  The alternative explanation is that the Orioles outfielders are actually rather poor defensive players at home.

The question now lies as to whether we can discern what part of UZR has the problem and whether it makes any sense.

Arm

 

 No pattern appears with arm values.  This makes sense as throws are contained within the playing field.  It would be unlikely if a stadium could play much havoc with throws outside of wind issues, which apparently is not the case with Camden Yards.

Incidence of Errors

Incidence of errors also does not appear to be greatly affected by Camden Yards.  This is also expected as grounds crews do a fairly good job ensuring that each stadium has an excellent field.

Range

Range is where we see the issue.  I am not entirely sure what the problem is.  Range is basically determined by how plays are in a players' area and how many he winds up catching.  Somehow, Camden Yards is a difficult place to track down baseballs.  I am not sure if there is an issue with see the ball come off the bat, if high flies are greatly affect by wind, or something else.  Unfortunately, I do not have any data for how visiting teams perform here.  UZR does account for park factors and one would think such a shift in fielding would be figured into the final number.

What if the numbers are correct?

It just might be that UZR is actually accurately measuring defensive ability at Camden Yards. The Orioles may be horribly position themselves and/or are inadequately instructed in how to play in their own ball park.  This reminds me of an article from a couple years ago, but I fail to remember who exactly wrote it.  Peter Gammons, I think, mentioned how the Red Sox did not care that Jacoby Ellsbury had a -9.7 UZR after the 2009 season.  They said that their internal metrics measured defense better at Fenway Park better than UZR did.  Ellsbury looks like a good centerfielder, so maybe they were correct.  Likewise, maybe UZR measures defense in Camden Yards as well as it does in Fenway Park.

Conclusion

I do not have a solid conclusion after looking at this data.  If the Orioles are doing this poorly at Camden Yards and UZR adequately adjusts for park factors then it would mean that every other team  on average is playing about 2 WAR better defensively.  While also meaning that when the Orioles are on the road, they outperform various home teams about the same.  I just have a hard time understanding how the numbers can be accurate here.  I inclination is to think there is a significant failing in UZR in the outfield at Camden Yards.

MLB 2011 Offensive Values

Below is a simple graph showing the different components used to determine fWAR.  I re-engineered the values, so they may not be exactly correct, but they should be close.

Items of note:

• Orioles had the second worst rated defense in baseball, bested only by the Mets.
• Their base running ranked 22nd overall.
• Their hitting ranked 19th overall.

Simply put, the Orioles did not do anything particularly well on offense.  The greater problem may be pitching, but it is not as if the Orioles can stay firm with their offense either.  Getting league average performance out of their fielding would mean an improvement of 4 wins.  Almost all of that could be attained by getting Mark Reynolds away from third base or last year simply being an anomaly for him.  Base running make become about league average with Vladimir Guerrero and Derrek Lee gone and result in a couple wins.  This still leaves the team in need of about 10-15 more wins from their offense to be considered peers of the Rays, Red Sox, and Yankees.

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Pitcher Velocity and Run Environments

Last night Will Carroll tweeted wondering about whether the perception was accurate that there were more pitchers thrower with greater velocity than there were in seasons before.  I had been sitting on a couple graphs for a month or so waiting to have something more interesting to say, failing that I published the graphs last night because at least it was timely.  Andrew over at Camden Chat asked about how the change in the number of hard throwing pitchers has affected the run environment.  In this post I compared the number of hard throwing starters (>90 mph) and reliever (>93 mph) to changes in the run environment as measured by starters' or relievers' FIP.  Each point is the data from a single year (2002-2011)

Starters

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The R2 for the above graph is 0.86.  That is a tight graph, but it should be stated that correlation does not always mean causation. 

Relievers

The R2 is not as good or the relievers with an R2 of 0.62.  That is still a decent correlation, but again it does not outright say that the increase in velocity is the reason why the run environment has decreased.

Conclusion
The reasons for change in the run environment are likely to be rather numerous.  There has been greater recognition of the value of defense, which decreases run scoring in two ways: better fielding and reduced emphasis on offensive performance.  It is assumed that the reduction in effective PED use has also decreased offensive performances.  Another factor is that, as it always has, that baseball becomes more and more competitive every year.  By that I mean that the players today are better than the players who came before (Yes, the Babe Ruth is Matt Stairs argument).  It may also be that the recent upswing in pitchers who can throw hard has also resulted in dampening the run scoring environment.

Of course, the big question is why are there more harder throwing pitchers?  Here are the various explanations I have determined and collected:

• There are a greater number of highly talented players to choose from.
• Training has vastly improved.
• Preventative and reconstructive medicine has improved.
• Teams may be pushing more athletic, strong-armed players to the mound instead of the field.

On that last point, Keith Law disagreed with me on that one.  As far as I can tell, the four top throwers in the relief corps (Henry Rodriguez, Aroldis Chapman, Jordan Walden, and Daniel Bard) were never given much consideration for playing the field.  It may well be that idea sounds better than it looks when you begin looking at the data.  It may well be that advancements in training and medicine taking effect somewhere between 1995 and 2005 for amateurs may be the primary reason for hard throwing pitchers.  Or it may be that advances made in the 2000s in college and lower minors are improving the development and preserving the health of hard throwing pitchers.