Darvish: Worst 100 MM Free Agent Pitcher Deal Ever?

The first 100 MM contract signed by a free agent pitcher was Kevin Brown before the 1999 season, which he played at 34.  It was scheduled to take him to age 41 and included many perks, such as private jet flights and what not.  It was shocking at the time.  It would be shocking now.  If you inflated his deal to what free agents are currently getting paid, his deal would be equivalent to a 7/307 contract.  That is a 44 MM salary each year.  So, yeah, that is a stunning deal.  Yu Darvish's 6/126 taken back in time would be around 6/43 in 1999.

In other words, 100 MM means different things over the years as revenue in the game increases.  Still, it marks a major bright line for players to cross.  Only twelve free agent pitchers, including Brown and Darvish, has signed deals passing the 100 MM mark.  When Jake Arrieta inks his name, he might make it a lucky 13.

	1st Yr	Yrs	Total $
David Price	2016	7	217
Max Scherzer	2015	7	210
Zack Greinke	2016	6	206.5
CC Sabathia	2009	7	161
Jon Lester	2015	6	155
Johnny Cueto	2016	6	130
Barry Zito	2007	7	126
Mike Hampton	2001	8	121
Cliff Lee	2011	5	120
Jordan Zimmermann	2016	5	110
Kevin Brown	1999	7	105
Yu Darvish	2018	6	126

While the talk about Yu Darvish as being a great bargain for the Cubs has been the main story line this past week, I thought it at first to be a weird statement.  Darvish arrived in MLB with incredible promise and a dizzying array of pitches.  He pitched very well, but never really transcended the scene to become a feared ace.  He has been largely restricted to that frame of mind about what if he could hit the next level.  That kind of talk feels peculiar now that next season will be his age 31 season.  Add on to that how hittable he was last year and the persistent search to find one easy trick to get him back to where we all thought he was going.

So what I did was compare all of the pitchers in this 100 MM FA club.  I added up the bWAR they accumulated over their previous six years and their previous three years.  Additionally, I did a simple count of seasons in the past six years where they accumulated more than four bWAR.  These are simple metrics, but metrics that give a decent indication of how good a pitcher was and how often he was quite good.

	6 yr bWAR	3 yr bWAR	>4 bWAR
Kevin Brown	33.6	23.6	5
David Price	27.9	13.4	4
Barry Zito	27.5	10.5	4
Zack Greinke	26	17.5	2
CC Sabathia	24.2	17.7	3
Jon Lester	24.2	8.3	4
Max Scherzer	23.5	16.9	3
Johnny Cueto	22.5	11.7	2
Cliff Lee	20.8	17.1	3
Jordan Zimmermann	19.4	12.1	2
Mike Hampton	19.3	14.8	2
Yu Darvish	19.3	5.8	1

Can we just take a moment and reflect how amazing Kevin Brown was and how we all basically ignored how amazing he was or perhaps that we really on focused on him when he was a 40 year old Yankee pitcher?  How is that guy not in the Hall of Fame?

Anyway, what we see is that Darvish is tied for the lowest 6 yr bWAR tally, clearly lower in the 3 yr tally (and would be at best second lowest if he did not lose a whole season to Tommy John), and the only pitcher with only one season above a four bWAR.

At first blush, it looks like Darvish is leading the pack as the worst 100 MM contract recipient, but we still have that change in revenue issue.  To look at that, I decided to utilize the BORAS model that we use to project free agent contracts.  This works by looking at recent performances and project salary terms based on that performance.  This way we can strip out the differences in pay over time and compare that to adjusted 2018 earnings.

	2018  AAV*	BORAS	Diff
Barry Zito	24.4	16.4	49%
Yu Darvish	21.0	17.3	21%
Zack Greinke	34.4	28.7	20%
Mike Hampton	29.5	24.7	19%
Kevin Brown	43.8	40.4	8%
Jon Lester	25.8	24.2	7%
Jordan Zimmermann	22.0	20.8	6%
Max Scherzer	30.0	28.5	5%
Johnny Cueto	21.7	21.4	1%
David Price	31.0	31.4	-1%
CC Sabathia	27.3	35.0	-22%
Cliff Lee	24.0	32.5	-26%

There have really only been two deals that looked like great signings at the time according to BORAS: CC Sabathia with the Yankees and Cliff Lee with the Phillies.  BORAS considers both to be well below the expected market value.  On the over-committed end, Zack Greinke comes in third place.  Of course, this probably overstates the overpay as much of his deal was deferred, which decreases the cost.  Deferments are not easy to find for all of the deals, so I simply assumed that they did not exist.

Darvish ranks as second worst.  As an overpay of 21%, according to BORAS.  Some will note that this is due to BORAS' inability to differentiate between time lost due to injury and simply being unable to accrue bWAR during terrible performances.  And that may be the rationale.  If we assume that 2016 was increased from 100.1 IP to 180 IP at the same WAR rate and 2015 went from 0 IP to 180 IP with the 2016/2017 average WAR rate, then BORAS would estimate a 5/108 deal (21.7 AAV).  That is pretty close to what he got.  The other pitchers on the list did not have to deal with that situation.  If we assume that Tommy John's mean nothing and performance is projectable, then that places Darvish on the other end in the same grouping as Johnny Cueto and David Price.  This would represent what BORAS would consider an on-market value.  In other words, not a bargain.

This leaves us with the answer as Barry Zito.  His deal awarded him what BORAS considered a 49% overpay.  This off season only one other free agent pitcher may see a 100 MM deal: Jake Arrieta.  BORAS projects him as a 17.3 MM AAV just like Yu Darvish.  He would need a deal paying him 25.8 MM to be on par with Zito.  That seems unlikely to me, but supposedly his agent is trying to push that 25 MM number.  Arrieta would have the far lowest 6 year bWAR with 18.8, but a very respectable 14 bWAR over the past three seasons.

We shall wait and see if Zito is forced to hand over the crown.

Orioles 2018 Blueprint Follow-Up: Why I Decided to Non-Tender Zach Britton

Zach Britton (photo via Keith Allison)

A couple of weeks ago, some of the writers here at Camden Depot went through our annual exercise of outlining our vision of how the Orioles should approach the offseason. My blueprint was the first to be published, and within it, I made the somewhat controversial decision to non-tender Baltimore closer Zach Britton. By doing so, the move saved me $12.2 million in payroll, but significantly weakened my proposed bullpen. For our fictional exercise, I thought the move was necessary to make the club as competitive as it could be for the 2018. And instead of getting into all of the reasons as to why I thought it was best to non-tender Britton within that piece (essentially inserting 1,000+ word tangent), I promised that I would post a follow up article detailing my reasons for doing so. Well, here it is.

With one more season of Manny Machado and Adam Jones, I wanted to put the best team possible on the field to compete in 2018, without much consideration as to what the team would look like in the following season. To do accomplish that, the two main things I was focused on in my blueprint was strengthening the bench with players who could play multiple positions and remaking the starting rotation. A more complete bench was the easy task, and in my view that goal was accomplished by signing Jon Jay, Howie Kendrick, and Cliff Pennington.

There is no getting around the fact that the 2017 Baltimore starting rotation was terrible. The only good thing about them was that the 3 worst performers were all going to be free agents.

2017 Baltimore Orioles SP Ranks

Like many of the other writers, I believed the lack of quality starting pitchers in the minor league system meant that it was essential to sign at least 3 starting pitchers. I believed that the only way to significantly improve the rotation was to get the best starting pitcher available, and in my mind that was Yu Darvish. With Darvish costing $17.3 million per year (and considering all the other areas this team needed to improve as well as a limited budget), my decision essentially boiled down to whether I would want Britton or Darvish. I chose Darvish.

The main reason I felt why I ad to go with Darvish was due to just how BAD the Orioles starting rotation was in 2017/could be in 2018. The Orioles have proven that they don’t need a great rotation to be successful and make the playoffs. However, the 2017 rotation was so bad (combined with the lack of internal options), I believed that anything less than Darvish would be applying a band-aid to a wound that required 40 stitches. And while he’s looked at as an injury risk, he’s coming off a sub-par season, where he was still worth 3.5 fWAR (3.9 bWAR). He’s averaged 4.1 fWAR (4.2 bWAR) per 180 IP over the course of his career. To put that into perspective, the Orioles haven’t had a starting pitcher eclipse the 3.0 fWAR mark since Erik Bedard did it in 2006 (4.6) and 2007 (5.0).

Comparing average Yu Darvish against Zach Britton at his absolute best (2.5 fWAR during the 2016 season), the Orioles get an additional 1.6 wins for the added cost of $5 million. I realize that Darvish would come with an additional 3 years of commitment according to our BORAS projection system, but as I mentioned, I was only concerned with 2018. Granted that average Darvish versus the best Britton argument doesn’t work when using bWAR bWAR (which based on run prevention instead of FIP), but what is the likelihood we see 2016 Britton again in 2018? It’s not impossible, but coming off an injury-plagued season with good (but not great) numbers, I think it’s highly unlikely.

Britton missed most of May, all of June, and the beginning of July due to a strained left forearm. He was then shut down for the rest of the season after his September 18th appearance due to an MCL sprain in his left knee, an injury that was serious enough for him to receive a stem cell injection. When he did pitch, he was effective, but certainly not his usual self, finishing with career worst strikeout and walk rates (since being transitioned to the bullpen full time).

Obviously I don’t know exactly how bad either of those injuries are, but that forearm injury (combined with his performance) was a big reason why teams weren’t offering a trade package the Orioles liked at the deadline. Along with the knee injury, he didn’t do anything the last two months of the season to bring his trade value back up. When you combine the injuries, the performance, and the assumption that he’ll make $12.2 million in his 4th and final year of arbitration, I don’t believe that he has much trade value. This kind of torpedoes the idea of tendering him a contract and trading him later in the offseason. If the Orioles couldn’t find an attractive offer at the 2017 trade deadline, they’re certainly not going to find a better one this offseason. Furthermore, I don’t think his value will be that high at the 2018 trade deadline if the Orioles are out of it. The only way the Orioles get a good package for him is if he pitches like he did in 2016 again and there’s a desperate contender who needs a closer. Again, that scenario is possible, just not probable.

The need to greatly improve the starting rotation, combined with the injury questions and decreased trade value of Zach Britton, led to my decision to non-tender him. I ultimately thought the $12.2 million saved could be better spent to make the team better in 2018. So if I were actually sitting in the GM chair in real life, would I still take the same course of action? Probably not (actually, almost definitely not).

For the purposes of our blueprint exercise, I stand by my decision. But I don’t think it’s a smart one to make in real life. And that’s not because the fans would probably be pissed about non-tendering a favorite (although that should be given consideration as well). The real reason you don’t non-tender Zach Britton is because it’s not guaranteed that you’ll be able to reinvest those savings into players that will improve the team. The readers who commented on my blueprint started to hit on this topic a bit. Yu Darvish, Alex Cobb, and all of the other players we proposed to sign are human beings. They have a choice of where they want to play. If they don’t want to play in Baltimore, they’re not going to sign with Baltimore. The blueprint exercise takes that choice away from them. Non-tendering Britton in real life could very possibly yield a team without Zach Britton and an extra $12.2 million. That may be ok for the owners of the team, but from the perspective of being competitive, the Orioles would be decidedly worse off.

Blueprint For The 2018 Orioles (Option #1): So Yu Think Yu Can Pitch

Well, we’re finally here. The 2018 season has long been considered the likely last year that the Orioles will have a legitimate chance at competing for a playoff spot with their core players for the foreseeable future. Maybe “core players” casts too large of a net. This idea largely centers around the fact that, as of now, Manny Machado and Adam Jones will be free agents at this time next year, and those are two players that are difficult to replace. Though with several players in the minors taking big steps forward this past season, the post 2018 landscape may not be as bleak as it once seemed.

With that being said, having a (mostly) consistent 6+ WAR third baseman and an All-Star centerfielder on your roster doesn’t happen very often. So with the two of them possibly departing after the upcoming season, it’s extremely important to pull out all of the stops and make the 2018 Orioles as competitive as possible. And that’s what the Camden Depot writers (and some of our readers) will be trying to accomplish over the next week or two in our annual “Orioles Blueprint” series. I’m up first, but before we get to my proposal, let’s go over a couple of things.

Jon laid out the rules last week (along with Camden Depot's BORAS salary projections for pitchers and hitters). Here’s a quick recap:

1. No trades
2. Camden Depot’s BORAS salary projection model will be used to sign free agents
3. MLB Trade Rumor arbitration projections are used for arbitration eligible players
4. All team-controlled non-arbitration eligible players are assumed to have a salary $550,000

Budget: $155 million

Between Adam Jones, Chris Davis, Mark Trumbo, and Darren O’Day, the Orioles have a total of $53.33 million in salary committed for the 2018 season.

Remaining Funds: $101.67 million

Team Options

First thing is first; there are some decisions to be made on a couple of options. One of the assumptions we made was that Welington Castillo would decline his player option, making him a free agent. If anyone wants him on the 2018 Orioles, they’ll need to pay him market price.

J.J. Hardy has a $14 million team option that would have vested if he received 600 PA’s in 2017 or 1,150 PA’s combined between 2016 and 2017. He reached neither. Hardy has had a great career in Baltimore, but there is no chance I’m picking up that option. Declining the option means I buy him out for $2 million.

Wade Miley also has a team option for $12 million. With the free agent market for starters the way it is, I did not think Miley would have to perform all that well for me to pick up his option. He ended up not even meeting the low bar I set. Fortunately, his buy out of $500,000 is cheap, so declining his option was a relatively easy decision for me.

Remaining Funds: $99.17 million

Arbitration Eligible Players

Seven Orioles players are eligible for arbitration. I’ll be tendering contracts to all of them in 2018 except…Zach Britton. I know, it sounds crazy, and I actually can’t believe that I am typing these words right now. Don’t get me wrong, I still think Zach Britton is a good pitcher, but there are a lot of reasons why I decided to not tender him a contract this offseason. I am planning to explain this decision in more detail in a follow up post. In short, it boiled down to my opinion that his trade value has been greatly diminished coupled with the thought that the extra $12.2 million saved can be put to better use.

Remaining Funds: $56.27 million

Qualifying Offers

None of the impending free agents are even close to being in consideration for a qualifying offer. This is the easiest decision of this entire exercise.

2018 Roster

The figure below will be the starting point for my Orioles blueprint.

As you can see, there are quite a lot of positions to fill (3 SP’s, 5 RP’s, 2 corner OF’s, 1 catcher, and 3 bench spots). Of course, some of them will be filled with players who are under team control and are not yet eligible for arbitration. I’ll outline that in the upcoming sections.

Before moving on, let's factor in Dylan Bundy's assumed $1.50 million salary for 2018.

Remaining Funds: $54.77 million

Infield

With the (pretty great) acquisition of Tim Beckham before the 2017 trade deadline, the 2018 infield was pretty much set. While I think Chance Sisco (probably) showed enough to make the opening day roster as the second catcher, I wouldn’t be opposed to sending him down to AAA to start the season. In the event of that, I would sign a strong framer/defender (someone like Rene Rivera) on a non-roster invite to spring training for a low base salary (< $1 million) if they make the major league club. For now, though, we’ll pencil in Caleb Joseph as the starting catcher to begin the season, with Sisco ($550,000) getting semi-regular playing time as the backup until at some point their roles hopefully reverse.

You can swap Davis and Trumbo between 1B and DH. While Davis grades out as the better defender there over his career, Jon will occasionally mention on Twitter that Trumbo hits much better when he’s playing the field (Matt K. also posted about it).

Remaining Funds: $54.22 million

Outfield

Trey Mancini had a great year offensively and did not embarrass himself out in left field. At an assumed cost of $550,000, he’s going to be the starting left-fielder.

Austin Hays had a much better 2017 season than anyone probably thought he would have. Putting aside his small sample size struggles during his brief cup of coffee in the majors last year, I think it would be asking too much for him to come up and be the team’s everyday right fielder. I think he needs to spend a little bit of time in AAA before he’s ready to be in Baltimore full time. With that in mind, I would fill the right field position with Jon Jay. I actually advocated for the Orioles to sign Jay in my blueprint for 2017. Here’s what I said:

“…Jay is essentially your league average hitter (career 106 wRC+) and fielder (career -1 Defensive Run Saved), can play all 3 outfield positions adequately…”

Jay ended up signing a 1-year deal with the Cubs last offseason and put up another average season (this is a reminder that average is good). Jay’s going to play the 2018 season at age 33, so his defense is going to start trending slightly below average, but BORAS only sees a 1-year deal for $9.2 million for him, so there is limited risk in signing him. And if Hays plays well enough to get called up early in the season, Jay can easily shift into a supporting role, where his league average bat can adequately fill in at any outfield position.

Remaining Funds: $44.47 million

Pitching Staff

I may be publishing my blueprint first, but I think it’s safe to say that everyone’s blueprint will be focusing mainly on starting pitching. And that’s not just a coincidence, as the Baltimore rotation was absolutely dismal in 2017, ranking 27th in fWAR (29th in bWAR), 30th in ERA, 28th in FIP, 28th in innings pitched, etc, etc, etc. After declining Miley’s option, I’m left with Kevin Gausman and Dylan Bundy as my only 2 starters. There are (in my opinion, very questionable) internal options to fill those slots, and while at least one of them may emerge as a decent end of the rotation starter, I don’t want to go into the 2017 season depending on any of them. I’m ideally looking for an ace, a mid-rotation starter, and a flyer on a high risk starter.

Yu Darvish (photo via Keith Allison)

There are 2 pitchers on the free agent market that come close to being called an ace. One is Jake Arrieta, who is in no way coming back to Baltimore. The other is Yu Darvish, and he is my main target. BORAS projects Darvish to land a contract of 4 years and $69.26 million ($17.31 million per year)*. Darvish had a rough second half of 2017, which (as Jon noted in the BORAS projection for pitchers), significantly hurt his free agent standing in our projection system’s eyes. Other than a spike in his BABIP and HR rate in July and August, the rest of his peripherals appear to be in line with the more successful months of his season, so I’m not too worried.

For a mid-rotation starter, I would target Alex Cobb, who, according to BORAS, can be signed for 3 years and $31.14 million ($10.38 million per year)*. Performance wise, Cobb has been a really dependable middle of the rotation starter since coming into the big leagues in 2011. Outside of an injury shortened 2016 where he pitched only 22 innings (he also missed all of 2015 due to a torn UCL requiring Tommy John surgery), Cobb has averaged 2.8 fWAR per 180 innings pitched. The problem is, Cobb’s never reached 180 innings in a season, so there is some risk in this signing (he had a career high of 179.1 IP in 2017). Cobb is not a high strikeout pitcher, but he doesn’t walk many either and for the most part keeps the ball on the ground, which is good when one pitches half their games at Camden Yards.

I’m going to fill out the starting rotation by taking a flyer on Derek Holland for a BORAS projected 1 year deal for $1.5 million. Holland has been both injured and mostly ineffective since 2014. A spike in his home run rate and an inability to find the striekzone (leading to a 2017 walk rate of 12%) led to a 2017 where he was nearly an entire win worse than replacement level. However, I’m hoping I can get a little bit of productiveness out of the 32-year-old left-hander. I’m not expecting him to return to his 2013 form, but it’s not crazy to think he could provide some production as a 5th starter. During the 2016 season, he was worth 0.9 fWAR in 107.1 innings pitched when his walk and home run rates were more in line with his career levels. He doesn’t have to be great, and even if he’s terrible, the $1.5 million guaranteed will easily allow the team to cut their losses if needed. In that event, Baltimore can use one of Gabriel Ynoa, Jayson Aquino, Alec Asher, or Miguel Castro to fill the 5th spot in the rotation.

In the bullpen, I’ve got Brad Brach closing and Darren O’Day setting up. As in years past, I’m filling in the remainder of the relief corps with internal options making the league minimum. Mychal Givens, Miguel Castro, and Richard Bleier have certainly earned spots in the bullpen based on their 2017 performance (although Castro and Bleier’s peripherals do worry me). I’ll go with Donnie Hart as my second left-handed pitcher. Gabriel Ynoa is out of options, so he’ll likely get the last spot in the bullpen as a long man (I’d rather keep him as starting pitching depth than risk losing him to waivers). Other internal options such as Tanner Scott, Alec Asher, and Chris Lee can be in the mix as well. I’ll admit, that group does not inspire a lot of confidence, but bullpens can be fickle and it’s the one place where you can find something that sticks if you throw enough at the wall. With that in mind, I’m also handing out a bunch of non-roster invites to spring training to flawed relievers.

Remaining Funds: $12.53 million

Bench

We need 3 players to round out the bench. There is no real infield depth, so finding an infielder will be a priority. Furthermore, unless you want to count Mark Trumbo, there isn’t really much outfield depth either. I’m going to use the bulk of my remaining dollars to sign Howie Kendrick, who BORAS projects can be acquired for 1 year and $10.6 million. Kendrick solves some of the depth problem by being able to adequately play both infield and outfield corner positions, as well as his natural position of second base. Additionally, he’s a career 107 wRC+ hitter, who just finished up a very productive season at the plate, hitting .315/.368/.475. Of course, that came in only 334 plate appearances, as Kendrick has been somewhat of injury prone the last couple of seasons. Hopefully playing the role of part-time super utility player (something he’s done the last 2 year) will help keep him healthy.

The next bench spot goes to Anthony Santander over Joey Rickard. While I think Rickard can be a useful player, I think Santander has more promise, and I’d be interested to see if he can fulfill some of that. Plus, as a Rule 5 draft pick who spent most of the 2017 season on the 60-day DL, Santander needs to be on the active roster in 2018 for 44 days before he can be optioned to the minor leagues. The Orioles have stuck with him this long, I think it makes sense to get to the finish line.

The last bench spot should go to someone who can play shortstop, as currently, the backup shortstop options are moving Manny Machado or Jonathan Schoop off of their positions. I don’t think there is an internal option here, and without much money left, I’ll need to take the cheap route. I’ll sign Cliff Pennington, who will get a 1 year contract for $800,000 if he makes the team out of spring training. Pennington isn’t much of a hitter (career 79 wRC+), but not only can he play an average shortstop (career +3 DRS in nearly 5,000 innings), but can also play an average or better 3B and 2B as well, giving Buck Showalter a little more flexibility when giving guys some extra rest.

Remaining Funds: $580,000

Conclusion

Here’s the final tally:
OF Jon Jay – 1 year, $9.20 million
SP Yu Darvish – 4 years, $69.26 million
SP Alex Cobb – 3 years, $31.14 million
SP Derek Holland – 1 year, $1.50 million
UTIL Howie Kendrick – 1 year, $10.60 million
INF Cliff Pennington – NRI (1 year, $800,000 if makes team)

I always love doing this exercise because it demonstrates just how difficult it can be to try and build a winning team while sticking to a realistic budget. Sometimes tough decisions need to be made. It was a difficult decision to non-tender Zach Britton, but with the starting pitching being as bad as it was, I felt that reallocating the $12.2 million owed to Britton was needed in order for me to adequately address the holes in the starting rotation and outfield/bench.

*Author's Note: The original version of this post used incorrect/outdated BORAS projected contracts for Yu Darvish and Alex Cobb. Their projected salaries have been updated. As a result of this change,  there was not enough money remaining to sign SP Francisco Liriano. Instead, Derek Holland was signed as the starting pitcher characterized as a high risk flyer. The paragraph on Liriano has been replaced by one discussing Holland.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Postscript: I realize that my blueprint this year is not as realistic as some of the blueprints I have completed prior to previous seasons. I am under no sort of impression that the Orioles would even dream of non-tendering Zach Britton this offseason. I also think that Darvish may get more than what BORAS projects for him (possibly Cobb as well), which likely puts him out of range for the Orioles, considering the other holes they need to fill.

Having said that, a more realistic option of my blueprint would be to tender Britton a contract ($12.2 million) and not sign Darvish. The extra $5+ million would then be used to sign someone more dependable than Holland, possibly Clayton Richard (2 years, $17.50 million) or Jason Vargas (2 years, $17.20 million)...or it can be used for a more attractive offer for Alex Cobb. In this scenario, the 5th spot in the rotation is open for someone in the Asher, Aquino, Ynoa, Castro group to win out of spring training.

Gem of the Offseason: Masahiro Tanaka?

The Nippon Pro Baseball league has been a source of hope and confusion.  Folks on this side of the Pacific try to make sense of the performances of those of that side.  The difficulty is a combination of multi-purpose stadiums, different types of scheduling, a widely diverse composition of talent, and an oft changing baseball.  All of these together make it hard to understand just what is happening.  If a pitcher is doing well, is he doing well because of the large stadiums, having an extra day of rest, eating up players who would have difficulty doing well in the International League, or did the ball have any impact?  It is a situation where one must depend on scouts and past history has shown that often scouts have difficulty projecting how well a player will transition to MLB.

Two surprises on this trek Eastward are familiar to Orioles' fans: Koji Uehara and Wei-Yin Chen.  The former was a question mark due to his injury history and how soft he tossed.  General opinion was that he could not start, which turned out to be true.  What was not seen is how well he would be in throwing an inning here and an inning there.  He turned into an incredibly useful pitcher and one that was able to net the Orioles relief pitcher Tommy Hunter and first base revelation Chris Davis.  The knock on the latter was potential injury risk and an inability to miss bats.  Upon reaching this shore, he has turned into an average to above average pitcher.  He does have some issues with endurance, but his stuff has risen to what is needed for this league.

A couple obvious transitions would be Daisuke Matsuzaka and Yu Darvish.  Although Matsuzaka fell apart after two seasons, his first two seasons were pretty solid.  If you considered era, Yu Darvish has been rather equivalent to what Matsuzaka accomplished.  We had projected Darvish to perform at this projection:

per 200 IP	K	BB	HR	FIP	WAR
15th	177	137	15	4.49	1.2
50th	209	106	12	3.47	2.8
85th	240	75	8	2.43	4.8

What he wound up doing?

	K	BB	HR	FIP
Per 200 IP	249	84	20	3.27
Proj Pct	94	74	1	56

Darvish outperformed our projections for strikeouts and walks, but well underperformed for home run rate.  In all, this wound up averaging everything out and our FIP results are almost right on point.  This projection performance does not alone prove or disprove that this projection has much utility.  However, it does seem to give a decent ballpark estimate of performance.  With this in mind, we look forward.

RHP Masahiro Tanaka

After a rather quiet offseason last year, another player is making noise about flying east and testing his mettle.  That player is RHP Masahiro Tanaka.  Tanaka was the NPB pitcher of the year in 2011 and, after an undefeated 2013 season, may win the award again this year.  Other winners of this award include Uehara, Darvish, Matsuzaka, and Hisashi Iwakuma.  On the other hand, winners have also included Kenshin Kawakami.  Below is his year by year performance.

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	W	L	W-L%	ERA	GS	CG	SHO	IP	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	SO/9
2007	18	Rakuten	JPPL	11	7	.611	3.82	28	4	1	186.1	8.8	0.8	3.3	9.5
2008	19	Rakuten	JPPL	9	7	.563	3.49	24	5	2	172.2	8.9	0.5	2.8	8.3
2009	20	Rakuten	JPPL	15	6	.714	2.33	24	6	3	189.2	8.1	0.6	2.0	8.1
2010	21	Rakuten	JPPL	11	6	.647	2.50	20	8	1	155.0	9.2	0.5	1.9	6.9
2011	22	Rakuten	JPPL	19	5	.792	1.27	27	14	6	226.1	6.8	0.3	1.1	9.6
2012	23	Rakuten	JPPL	10	4	.714	1.87	22	8	3	173.0	8.3	0.2	1.0	8.8
2013	24	Rakuten	JPPL	20	0	1.000	1.24	23	7	2	181.0	7.1	0.3	1.3	7.7
7 Seasons				95	35	.731	2.32	168	52	18	1284.0	8.1	0.5	1.9	8.5

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/6/2013.

Tanaka has become a more accurate pitcher than Darvish, but does not strike out as many players.  Looking at his past three season, our projection model suggests this range of outcomes:

per 200 IP	K	BB	HR	FIP	WAR
15th	177	80	18	3.79	2.3
50th	183	68	12	3.15	3.5
85th	210	48	8	2.34	5.5

This is a rosier projection than the one that was generated for Darvish.  Why?  Walks.  This model projects Tanaka to be much more capable of command than Darvish.  So much more that Tanaka is able to make up for his lack of strikeouts.  How could this make sense?  Two seamers and splitters.

Looking at the data from his games and the scouty report issued by Baseball America's Ben Badler, this is what it looks like to me.  Tanaka uses a 4 seamer, 2 seamer, slider, and splitter.  His 4-seamer can ramp up to the mid-90s, but has little movement on it.  In the majors, it might be a show me pitch that could set up his splitter, but it would be a pitch that he could pay dearly for.  His 2-seamer hovers around 90 and is a plus pitch.  His slider is a pitch that I have heard mixed reviews on.  Badler reported it as him hearing that it is capable of being a plus pitch.  I have not heard anything as shining as that.  The splitter though will be something to marvel at.  It comes in around the high 80s.  I'd expect his curveball and changeup to disappear if he comes state-side.

Conclusion
 
Among MLB squads, the Orioles' current composition relies heavily on the splitter. In fact, at 4.1% the Orioles are the team with the third most thrown splitters.  Only the Red Sox and Cubs threw more splitters.  Here is a top five:

	Splitters
Red Sox	5.9%
Cubs	4.2%
Orioles	4.1%
Cardinals	3.4%
Reds	3.0%

I am not certain if there is any organizational tendency to focus on pitchers with splitters.  If there is, then Tanaka would be someone to focus on.  I would very much encourage the team to figure out what the contract numbers might shake out to be.  A player who is worth at least 60 MM and at most 140 MM is a player that is likely worth having.  The Orioles have not been mentioned as a likely destination.  The Red Sox have been the team I have heard being interested time and time again.  The Mariners have also been given some press, but they are always attached to Japanese players due to their ownership's close connection to Japanese interests.

I'd offer a total package (any posting fees + salary) up to 120 MM.  It may be a bit of a risk given that much of Tanaka's game seems situated around inducing poor contact, but I think it is a risk worth taking.
 

A second look at Yu Darvish

A few weeks back we looked at how to translate Yu Darvish's performance in the Japanese Player's League to Major League Baseball.  That projection system put Darvish as being capable of throwing an FIP of 2.82 in a league average environment.  That is rather exceptional and seemed unrealistic.  Instead, after looking at the limited data I had at hand...I suggested that he looked more like a 3.50 FIP pitcher.  A couple issue with the translation is that it was based on three data points and those three data points were awfully successful data points with greater weight being given to the pitchers who threw more innings.  In other words, there was a bit of a survivor bias.

To make a different and potential better system, I compared that model's prediction to the actual performance of six recent transitions from JPL to MLB: Hiroki Kuroda. Dice-K, Kenshin Kawakami, Colby Lewis, Koji Uehara, and Ryota Igarashi.  These six pitchers were given equal weight in the translation.  Last time, I present the coefficients as values to divide.  This time to make things less confusing in the future, these values are to be multiplied by the JPL numbers.

Original System Coefficients
K - 0.93
BB - 1.81
HR - 1.24

New System Coefficients
K - 0.98
BB - 2.6
HR - 1.93

15th Percentile Coefficients
K - 0.83
BB - 3.34
HR - 2.53

85th Percentile Coefficients
K - 1.13
BB - 1.83
HR - 1.33

One of the improvements here is that we now have a range that covers 70% of the possible outcomes.  Here is what Darvish's projections look like now over 200 IP:

15th percentile - 177 K, 137 BB, 15 HR, 4.49 FIP
50th percentile - 209 K, 106 BB, 12 HR, 3.47 FIP
85th percentile - 240 K, 75 BB, 8 HR, 2.43 FIP

If Darvish maintains this performance over five years, these are the following WARs and associated values he would be worth:

15th percentile - 5.9 WAR, 29.5 MM
50th percentile - 13.9 WAR, 69.5 MM
85th percentile - 24 WAR, 120 MM

It appears that my first approximation of Darvish's value may have been a bit bullish.  It was based on an aggressive projection and an aggressive assumption on contract inflation (about 10% as opposed to my normal 5% assumption).  That said, it was a pretty decent approximation of value given that I did not think long about it.  Now, I would say the a more reasonable approximation would be some a mix of 70 MM between the posting fee and a five year deal.

What will make it worth Yu Darvish's time?

Darvish made 6.6 MM last year for the Nippon Ham Fighters.  If he does not agree to a contract after this year or next, Darvish would be a free agent after the 2013 season.  If he was to stay in Japan, he could see 13 MM over the next two years and then come across the Pacific as a free agent.  If he maintains his play, he should be worth about 15 MM in the open market.  Over five years, he could earn 58 MM.  If I was his agent, I would be floating 12 MM per year as what to expect in order to sign a contract, but be willing to accept something as low as 45 MM.  There has to be some concern about getting injured in the next couple years.

Suggested move to get Darvish:
30 MM posting fee / 5 years, 40 MM

Likely move to get Darvish:
50 MM posting fee / 5 years, 50 MM

O's Targeting Other Japanese Pitchers?

Wei-Yin Chen in '08 Olympics

I was told the other day that the Orioles are more interested in three Japanese starting pitchers who are not named Yu Darvish and do not need to be posted.  I was not told the names of these players, but I think it is fair to assume they are the following: Hisashi Iwakuma (RHSP, Rakuten Golden Eagles), Wei-Yin Chen (LHSP, Chunichi Dragons), and Tsuyoshi Wada (LHSP, Softbank Hawks). 

Hishashi Iwakuma (31 years old)
You may remember Hisashi Iwakuma's name.  He was posted last year by the Golden Eagles and the Oakland Athletics won the right to negotiate with him for the conditional amount of 18 MM.  The Athletics failed to sign him after allegedly offering him a three year deal worth 10 MM total with the agreement that they could not use arbitration with him at the end of the deal.  Unsurprisingly, Iwakuma who had made 4 MM in 2010 as a member of the Golden Eagles did not see the point in locking himself in a multi-year contract at that amount.  By staying in Japan, he signed a one year deal at 4 MM, which was more than what the A's offered.  He now is able to enter the MLB market as a free agent without the restrictions imposed by the slotting system.

Iwakuma throws five pitches in the JPL: four seamer, two seamer, split finger, slider, and curve.  In 2010, his four seamer sat around 90-91 mph.  In 2011, he saw it lose some speed which might be connected to shoulder issues he suffered this past year.  Toward the end of the season, he was up in the high 80s.  His two-seamer is a typical shuuto in that there is not much difference in velocity between it and the four seamer.  I figure that will disappear stateside.  His split finger actually looked like a very good pitch last year, but has been less useful to him in 2011.  He throws it around 83 mph this year and the difference in speed between that pitch and his four seamer has narrowed.  I think that is why is now less useful.  Iwakuma's slider comes in the high 70s now and his curve in the low 70s.  Both look very hittable.

My guess is that a stateside Iwakuma will be a below average high eighties fastball, an above average split finger in the low eighties, and an average high 70s slider with a mix of a few curves.  This is likely to be someone who would be hit pretty hard as a starter.  Prior to his injury, he looked like a potential 4 or maybe 3 slot pitcher.  He has lost about 4-5 mph on that fastball and it completely changes the outlook on him.  I think he might be best suited as a relief pitcher where he might be able to get back into the 90s with his four seamer and may be able to live primarily off the four seamer and his split finger.  The more he has to depend on his other offerings, the more trouble he is likely to have.

The projection system I developed for Yu Darvish actually is very kind to Iwakuma.  In large part I think this is due to him probably being a different pitcher in years prior to 2011.  Over 200 IP, it projects Iwakuma to throw 137 strikeouts while giving up 77 walks and 17 home runs.  This would be good enough for a 4.12 FIP.  I think the current version of Iwakuma with his reduced velocity would be more of a 5.00 to 5.50 FIP pitcher.  If someone thinks he can regain his arm strength back, I could see someone putting down a 2 year, 10 MM deal on the table.  He might be able to get 3 MM on a one year deal as a relief pitcher.  The latter would probably result in him staying in Japan.

Wei-Yin Chen (27 years old)
Chen is a rather young to qualify as a free agent as he has finished his age 26 season.  He was paid 2.25 MM for Chunichi in 2011 and would be up for a significant raise in either side of the Pacific.  The lefty had been known for pitching in the low 90s and racking up strikeouts in Japan.  However, things seems to change in 2011.  Based on the information I have, it appears he has become a completely different pitcher.  His average velocity dropped from the low 90s into the high 80s and he wound up throwing 50 more innings this year.  This gives the appearance that he threw with less effort to go deeper into games.  With a new ball this year and power evaporating league-wide, it may have been a conscious effort on his part.  It concerns me slightly, but I have heard nothing of any injury.

Chen has a four seamer, two seamer, split finger, slider, and curve.  He primarily sticks to his four seamer, split finger, and slider.  He has similar offerings as Iwakuma, but has concentrated more on those three pitches than Iwakuma.  Chen also rarely throws his two seamer while Iwakuma has lately depended on it heavily.  The pre-2011 version of Chen threw around 91-92 mph often throwing mid 90s in the first couple innings and then dropping down to 88-90 after the third inning.  This season it stays and remains in the 88-90 range.  His split finger comes around in the mid 80s.  His slider used to be slightly faster than the split finger, but has appeared a tick slower this year.  Chin finished the season coming out of the bullpen for an important game.  He managed to add three mph to his fastball and stuck with his splitfinger with a couple sliders mixed in.

I think Chen has a better chance to stick as a starter than Iwakuma.  His decrease in velocity looks more like a conscious that will be quickly changed in the States.  At worst, I think his current repertoire will play as a below average to average starter.  As a relief pitcher, I think his increased velocity coming in from the left side could make him an incredibly valuable set up or left handed long reliever.  The projection system sees Chen in a negative light.  Over 200 IP, it projects him to strike out 150 while giving up 87 walks and 21 home runs for a 4.42 FIP.  That is five or maybe four slot pitcher in the Majors and could work well for a reliever.  I would be willing to give him a 2 year, 10 MM deal and see where it would lead while starting him out as a starter.  Of course, I would get my scouts to review him first. 

Tsuyoshi Wada (31 years old)
Wada will be entering his age 31 year in 2012 and has just made 4.35 MM for the Softbank Hawks.  He has been rather prolific at striking out batters and reminds me slightly of Koji Uehara in that he is a light tosser that relies on speed change and command to rack up Ks.  Like Uehara, he is also prone to giving up the occasional long ball.  I would not put him in the same caliber as Koji though.  I actually find it surprising if he can muster much more money out of American clubs than Japanese ones.

Wada lives off three pitches: a mid 80s fastball, a 80 mph changeup, and a 80 mph slider.  Based on the pitch f/x data, it looks like he works his fastball between 82 and 88 mph while coming in with a slider occasionally.  His changeup is a pitch he tosses in for good measure against righties.  Otherwise, you only see fastballs that vary widely in speed and his slider.  I imagine to be as successful as he is in Japan, he must utilize a pretty deceptive motion.

It will be difficult for Wada to be successful in the United States as a starter.  With his average velocity of 85 mph, he would have exceeded only four other starting pitchers last year: Livan Hernandez, Jeff Francis, Tim Wakefield, and RA Dickey.  Two of those guys are knuckleball pitchers.  No relievers throwing more than 50 IP would have used a lesser velocity.  However, when Wada has been used in relief he actually averages around 90 mph.  I think he could be a very useful middle reliever for someone.  As a starter, the system projects him over 200 IP with 128 strikeouts while giving up 77 walks and 16 home runs with a 4.55 FIP.

I cannot see Wada making more than five million on this side of the Pacific.  The receiving team would have to be overly optimistic about him being able to start.  I know we were fully behind acquiring Uehara here a few years back, but, even though he was right handed and showed similar speeds, he showed incredible command.  I just do not see that in Wada.  Wada's walk rate is more than twice was Uehara's was in Japan.  I just cannot see giving him more than what he made in Japan.

Conclusion
Compares to what they could earn in Japan, Wei-Yin Chen is the only pitcher who I think shows good value to the Orioles.  He has an outside chance of being a 4/5 slot pitcher working as a 90 mph left hander or he could come out from the bullpen with a little more heat.  His pitch f/x data just looks more like what I expect from MLB quality pitchers.  Iwakuma appears as if his shoulder is a problem.  I have severe reservations spending several million on someone who looks similar to several of our own right handers who were shuttled back and forth between Norfolk and Baltimore.  Wada looks interesting as a reliever, but I just cannot see matching what he makes in Japan in the US.  What works there does not necessarily work here.  It should be noted though that I have not evaluated these pitchers on video.  I have seen Iwakuma and Yada pitch, but have not really focused on them.