Did Jonathan Schoop Make a Subtle Adjustment in the Postseason?

The rookie season for Orioles second baseman Jonathan Schoop was somewhat of a mixed bag.  With what is likely the strongest arm at second base in all of baseball, he excelled defensively, finishing with 10 Defensive Runs Saved (4^th best among qualified second basemen) and leading the position in double play runs.  With J.J. Hardy signing an extension, virtually eliminating Manny Machado’s return to shortstop, Schoop’s defensive play at second base is a welcome sign for the team, as third base (Schoop’s other potential position) appears to be occupied for the foreseeable future.  While his defense was a welcome surprise, his offensive output left a lot to be desired.

Earlier in the season, I had some fun with the Play Index to see how many other teams allowed similarly anemic bats to keep making trips to the plate (the list wasn’t long).  That article was posted on September 19, and statistically speaking, things didn’t turn around for Schoop at the plate over the final two weeks of the season.  Here’s a look at how Schoop compared to the major league average production at second base in 2014.

Other than his ISO, there is not a lot to like in that table.  Schoop’s wRC+ of 65 was the 2014’s worst for second basemen with at least 450 PA’s.  The abysmal batting line of Schoop’s 2014 season is mainly a function of three things: below average contact rates, well below average plate discipline, and a desire to pull the ball.

A typical Jonathan Schoop strikeout in 2014

The site of Schoop swinging and missing at breaking balls well outside of the strikezone was quite common for Orioles fans in 2014.  It’s no surprise that his landing page at Brooks Baseball contains the phrases, “aggressive approach” and an “above average likelihood to swing and miss” against all pitch types and “a very poor eye” against breaking pitches.  Brooks Baseball determines this by using Pitch F/X data and statistics called “Strikezone Discrimination (d’)” and “Plate Approach (c)”.  While it was frustrating watching Schoop during the regular season, he appeared to show improvement during the playoffs.  It’s an incredibly small sample size, but he had a 12.5% walk rate during the playoffs (3 walks in 24 PA’s), compared to a 2.7% walk rate during the regular season (13 walks in 481 PA’s).

When I was first looking into the idea of this post, I had thought I remembered an unusual amount of restraint from Schoop on breaking balls from right-handed pitchers out of the zone.  Perhaps the 3 walks and one of his “good takes” on breaking pitches stuck in my mind.  Looking at the 2014 Strikezone Discrimination chart at Brooks Baseball initially seemed to verify that belief.

2014 Strikezone Discrimination of Jonathan Schoop by month

However, after digging a little bit more, I realized that the sample size for my hypothesis was not only ridiculously small (right handers threw 19 breaking balls to him in the playoffs), but he also offered at more breaking balls that were out of the zone than he took, making it probable that the increased walk rate was just small sample variation.

Breaking balls swung at by Schoop in 2014 postseason

So even though there doesn’t seem to be even a small improvement in his recognition skills with respect to breaking balls from right-handed pitchers (again, VERY small sample size), there was another aspect of Schoop’s approach at the plate in the playoffs that may suggest an improvement, or at the very least an adjustment on his part.

As a power hitting second baseman with good bat speed, it shouldn’t be a surprise that Jonathan Schoop does a lot of damage against pitches thrown on the inner half of the plate.  Pitchers know this too, and it’s why they have generally pitched to the outside portion of the plate against him so far in his young career.

However, despite being pitched to the outside corner, Schoop typically will pull the ball, rather than going with the pitch and hitting it to the opposite field.  As you’re probably aware, trying to pull an outside pitch is usually a good way to make outs.  Below is a figure showing his hit distribution throughout the 2014 season.

2014 regular season spray chart

Despite pitchers attacking him on the outside of the plate, 51.2% of the balls Jonathan Schoop put into play were pulled to the left side of the field.  This isn’t necessarily uncommon, especially for a young player.  However, as young players continue to get experience, they start making adjustments based on how they’re pitched to.  And in the playoffs, it appears as if Schoop may have made an adjustment.

2014 postseason spray chart

Pitchers didn’t change their strategy against Schoop in the postseason, but based on the figure to the left, it’s possible that Schoop changed his.  Instead of trying to pull the ball, it appears as if he was more willing to take the pitch up the middle and to the opposite field.  Theoretically, if this is something he can continue to do, pitchers should adjust and work more inside, giving Schoop more opportunities to show off his power.

Of course, it’s tough (i.e., impossible) to definitively draw a conclusion from 7 playoff games and claim that Schoop made a deliberate adjustment in his approach at the plate.  But whether taking the ball to the opposite field was a conscious decision or not, it’s still a good sign.  Schoop was rushed through the minor league system (and to the majors as well), and hasn’t really experienced success with the bat since 2011, when he split time between Delmarva and Frederick.  I’ve previously stated that I’m a big fan of Schoop, but I think a little more time in AAA could be beneficial for him (although unlikely to happen).  Despite his struggles with the bat during the 2014 season, Schoop is still very young, and Steamer projects his wRC+ to improve by 12 points in 2015.   And if the adjustment he made during the postseason was genuine, the chances he takes that step forward becomes that much more realistic.

The Puzzle of Steve Lombardozzi

At least to many casual fans, the 2014 Orioles' handling of infielder Steve Lombardozzi was inexplicable. The Orioles acquired Lombardozzi near the end of spring training from the Tigers, who had themselves acquired him from Washington in the Doug Fister trade. Lombardozzi had been a useful utility infielder for the Nationals in 2012 and 2013, with over 300 plate appearances in each season, and the Orioles acquired him as another insurance policy in case Jonathan Schoop struggled. Lombardozzi made the Orioles' opening-day roster and spent the first month of the season with them, batting .288. Nevertheless, Lombardozzi was optioned to Norfolk when Manny Machado came off the disabled list. He was recalled on May 24 and optioned back the very next day, not to be recalled again, even though Schoop did struggle and Manny Machado's suffered another season-ending injury. He wasn't promoted even after September 1, when the active rosters expanded. Then, this off-season Lombardozzi was removed from the 40-man roster.

That does look strange - you have an infielder with some significant major-league experience who had been playing well; you have problems with your infield even though the team is playing well; later, one of your infielders goes down with a season-ending injury, yet you don't call up that first infielder. Instead, you promote another infielder with a .159 career major-league batting average and then acquire another infielder with a .233 career batting average. Finally, on the last weekend of the season you promote a third other infielder. Clearly, the Orioles didn't believe in Steve Lombardozzi - confirmed in December when they outrighted him to Norfolk to make room for a pair of Rule 5 draft selections.

Many fans were puzzled when Lombardozzi was sent down, and many remained puzzled when he was kept at Norfolk for the rest of the season. One part of the answer to the puzzle is that Lombardozzi, despite decent batting averages, isn't much of an offensive player. In 829 major-league plate appearances, he has a .266 batting average - but with only 28 career walks, his on-base percentage is just .297, and with only 43 extra-base hits, his slugging percentage is just .341, leaving him with a career OPS+ of 74. And while his minor-league batting record is better, he still didn't draw walks (200 walks in nearly 2300 plate appearances.) But while that may explain why Lombardozzi didn't supplant Jonathan Schoop as the regular second baseman (although his career OPS+ is better than Schoop's 2014 OPS+) or even Ryan Flaherty as the primary backup infielder (Flaherty is a better hitter than Lombardozzi, although not by much), it doesn't really explain why Lombardozzi wasn't recalled when Manny Machado was injured. Especially if he was a good defensive player.

There's an assumption that if a player, especially an infielder, can stay in the major leagues for two seasons despite being a below-average hitter, he must be an outstanding defensive player. Steve Lombardozzi has been primarily a second baseman, although after being sent to Norfolk he played some at shortstop, third base, and the outfield, most likely to make him a better bench player. But the Orioles biggest need was at second base, and Lombardozzi would have been most useful at second base, so I thought I'd look at his defensive performance at Norfolk to see if he was actually an outstanding defensive second baseman. If he wasn't, then that might explain why the Orioles didn't promote him.

I have gathered the scoresheets for 56 2014 Norfolk Tides games, a total of 493 innings. That works out to roughly 39% of the Tides' defensive innings. In those games, six players played second base - alphabetically, Alexi Casilla, Ivan DeJesus, Lombardozzi, Johnny Paredes, Cord Phelps, and Jemile Weeks. I will be comparing Lombardozzi's defensive performance - the manner of which will be described below - to the others. The data is not complete and the conclusions drawn are not going to be 100% reliable. The data may also be biased if certain players played more often behind certain pitchers or against certain teams. But it's safe to say that if Lombardozzi is not better than the average Tides second baseman even in this number of games, it's unlikely that studying more games would show him to be an outstanding defensive second baseman. Or, at least, if I claimed that Lombardozzi was an outstanding second baseman and these 56 games didn't show that, I'd better be prepared to explain why the selected games don't reflect Lombardozzi's skill.

This analysis focuses on the plays that in my opinion reflect a second baseman's defensive skill while ignoring those which do not. The plays which reflect a second baseman's skill are ground balls fielded, pop flies and line drives caught, double-play pivots, and errors. I'm not looking at putouts registered as the result of force plays or tag plays because I don't think they indicate a skill. While it's possible that there's a skill in snagging a poor throw while keeping a foot on the base, the number of such plays is insignificant compared to the number of routine force plays. And while there is unquestionably a skill involved in applying a tag, it's doubtful that that skill affects would-be tag plays as much as the location of the throw or the runner's ability to avoid the tag.

The table below reflects the results of each of the second basemen listed above. The data includes the total number of defensive innings and the number of each type of play per nine innings. Steve Lombardozzi played 126 defensive innings at second base, successfully fielded 2.286 ground balls per nine innings, caught 0.857 pop flies per nine innings, etc.

Player	Innings	Grounders	Pop Flies	Line Drives	Double Plays	Errors
Lombardozzi	126	2.286	0.857	0.143	0.357	0.143
Non-Lomb	367	2.256	0.540	0.123	0.319	0.049
Phelps	123	2.415	0.512	0.146	0.293	0.000
Weeks	115	2.426	0.783	0.157	0.235	0.157
Casilla	81	2.111	0.333	0.000	0.333	0.000
DeJesus	39	1.385	0.462	0.231	0.462	0.000
Paredes	9	3.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
TOTALS	493	2.264	0.621	0.128	0.329	0.073

Lombardozzi was better than the other Tides second basemen in all categories except errors. However, he wasn't much better than the other Tides second basemen, except in catching pop flies. I don't see any evidence that Lombardozzi was an outstanding defensive second baseman, and consequently it's hard to argue that the Orioles blundered in not recalling Lombardozzi or that they did him an injustice. From this information, he seems to be a no-hit, adequate-field utility infielder.

O's Offense Isn't as Bad as You Might Think

There's been discussion lately about who the Orioles should rely on to hit in the leadoff spot now that Nick Markakis is gone. At the moment, the most likely option, at least against right-handed pitching, is Alejandro De Aza. But against left-handed pitching? Perhaps Steve Pearce or Manny Machado. David Lough could get another shot at some point mainly because he's fast.  Or maybe the club's leadoff man (Nori Aoki?) isn't yet on the roster.

But whatever Buck Showalter decides to do lineup order wise won't have a large effect on how the O's offense performs as a whole. Lineup construction doesn't matter all that much over the course of an entire season -- at least to the extent that many fans argue about it. (I'm also guilty of this at times.) Every run counts, but lineup order doesn't affect run expectancy much. So, sure, the leadoff spot is somewhat of a question mark, but what that really means is that on-base percentage and speed, to a lesser extent, are areas of concern. Last season, the Orioles were tied for 17th in OBP (.311), and they'll obviously be without the services of Nelson Cruz and Markakis going forward. They also weren't a base-stealing team at all; in fact, they were last in the majors in steals (44), 12 behind the Giants.

Still, even without Cruz and Markakis, the Orioles have a starting lineup of mostly average to above average hitters. Assuming a healthy team, the only potentially disastrous spot could be Jonathan Schoop at second base, but Schoop is also just 23 and could take a step or two forward next season. There's no guarantee that he will improve just because he's young and has a full season under his belt, but it would also be difficult for him to perform much worse. Last year, the average major league second baseman had a 88 wRC+; it's not unreasonable for Schoop to get there.

O's hitters listed by career wRC+ (with 2014 position average in brackets):

Chris Davis (115) [109]
Steve Pearce (110) [100]
Adam Jones (109) [103]
Manny Machado (104) [100]
Alejandro De Aza (99) [103]
Delmon Young (98) [106]
Matt Wieters (98) [93]
J.J. Hardy (95) [87]
Jonathan Schoop (67) [88]

The Pearce figure is for right field. De Aza's is for left. Young's is for designated hitter.

So, to clarify, the above figures include career wRC+ vs. 2014 MLB player averages. It's far from a perfect comparison. But, except for Schoop, the O's have average or slightly above average options at every position. De Aza and Young are both lower, but they also represent platoon options for Showalter. They aren't full-time players. De Aza has a career 103 wRC+ vs. right-handed pitching, while Young has a career wRC+ of 114 against left-handers.

The O's have been linked to free agents Colby Rasmus (103 wRC+) and Aoki (106 wRC+). Either player would make sense, though Rasmus is five years younger, is in the prime of his career, is seemingly willing to sign a one-year deal, and is likely the superior defender.

The main concern for the Orioles in 2015 is health. Wieters and Machado are coming off season-ending injuries, and in all likelihood they will need both to stay healthy and contribute to have a shot at making the playoffs. The O's already didn't have superstar talent on the roster, and while they should be able to get by without Markakis, they didn't adequately replace Cruz's bat in the lineup. Showalter and Duquette are likely counting on Wieters and Machado to produce, Pearce to play a bigger role (with not necessarily the same high level of production), and a bounce-back campaign from Davis.

Considering the team's defensive talent and pitching staff that has mostly stayed intact, if the Orioles finish close to 2014's team offensively, they'll be ecstatic. That probably won't happen, but Machado and Wieters possess the ability to perform extremely well. So does Davis, as he showed in 2013. All three of those players underwhelmed or got hurt last season. If the Orioles stay in the postseason chase over the summer, they could always trade for a bat then.

Photo via Keith Allison

Why CSN-Mid Atlantic Can't Be Compared to MASN

One question that comes up when discussing the MASN dispute is that Comcast SportsNet Mid-Atlantic (CSN-MA) was able to charge the highest fee of any RSN in 2013 at $4.33 per subscriber while earning $36.1 million in advertising fees and earned $4.60 per subscriber in 2014. Meanwhile, MASN received only $2.28 a month per subscriber in 2013 and I believe $2.42 in 2014. Given that MASN has more valuable programming than CSN-MA but receives less money people wonder whether this means that MASN is undercharging for its product.

To answer this question, it’s necessary to understand CSN-MA’s financial situation. As shown in the link above, CSN-MA was projected to be in roughly 4.5 million homes in 2013 and therefore earned at least $235 million in subscriber fees and another $36 million in advertising fees or roughly $270 million total. SNL Kagan projected that CSN MA earned $222 million in revenue in 2011 and $260 million in revenue in 2012 so the information in the link above is probably slightly understating their revenue.

Their expenses are considerably less than $250 to $300 million. The Capitals and Wizards currently earn about $30 million total in rights fees. I haven't seen an article discussing their other expenses but if they have the same amount of other expenses as MASN then that costs CSN-MA another $50 million and therefore have about $80 million total in expenses.

If that’s the case then CSN-MA earns about $190 million in profit and has a profit margin of 70%. Meanwhile, MLB is claiming that MASN shouldn’t earn a profit margin of 33% despite the fact that CSN-MA very probably has a profit margin that is twice as high. Either CSN-MA is overcharging its customers and therefore shouldn’t be used as an example to show that MASN is mismanaged or CSN-MA is charging its customers a fair amount and therefore MASN should be entitled to a profit margin well over 30% similar to CSN-MA. Ultimately, CSN-MA is charging its customers a large rate but that money doesn't go to media rights fees. Rather that money goes straight into Comcast's pocket.

If that’s the case then why do providers agree to pay CSN-MA’s fee? Comcast Sports Net Mid Atlantic is owned 100% by Comcast. Comcast signed a deal with the city of Baltimore in 2004 that gave them what amounted to a monopoly until 2016 and therefore they control nearly 97% of all cable subscribers in the Baltimore DMA. Historically, Comcast also controls nearly 70% of all cable subscribers in the DC DMA. These are the two core DMAs for CSN Mid-Atlantic and therefore the areas where they receive most of their revenue. The primary provider that CSN-MA needs to convince to pay a huge subscriber fee is Comcast. If Comcast can force their customers to pay large amounts to view CSN-MA content then that means they receive large profits.

A recent dispute between Dish and Comcast explains why Dish and Direct TV agree to pay CSN-MA’s fee. It seems that Comcast negotiates with Dish and Direct TV for the rights for CSN-MA, CSN Chicago, CSN Bay Area and CSN California at the same time. If they don’t come to a deal than it isn't clear whether they can carry any of those four stations. This gives Comcast considerable leverage when negotiating deals with Dish and Direct TV. It's one thing to not carry a single station but it's quite another to not carry the sports stations for Chicago, San Francisco and Washington DC. In addition, it also gives Comcast room to maneuver.

For example, Comcast only controls between 20 to 30% of CSN Chicago. Suppose Comcast decided to give Dish and Direct TV a discount on CSN Chicago and asked for an inflated price for CSN-MA. This would have little impact on Dish and Direct TVs bottom line but would result in Comcast receiving an inflated profit. 

One could note that CSN Chicago charges a subscriber fee of $3.25 per month despite broadcasting the Bulls, Blackhawks, Cubs and White Sox while CSN Mid Atlantic charges a subscriber fee of $4.60 per month just to broadcast the Wizards and Capitals. This is interesting because the Blackhawks boasted a 4.33 average rating and an average of 153,000 viewers in 2014 and the Bulls had an average of over 100,000 viewers in 2014. The Cubs and White Sox didn’t do as well as they only averaged 49,000 and 33,000 viewers per game respectively in 2014. 

In comparison, the Capitals had a 1.39 average rating and an average of 34,000 viewers in 2014 while the Wizards had a 1.03 average rating and an average of 25,000 viewers in 2014. This means that more households watched the Blackhawks or Bulls last year than watched the Capitals and Wizards combined. The Cubs and White Sox weren't as popular as the Bulls or Blackhawks but they still were more popular than the Capitals and Wizards also. It would appear that CSN-MA's content is considerably less valuable than CSN Chicago's. Yet for some reason, CSN-Mid Atlantic has a larger monthly subscriber fee than CSN Chicago. It's probably just coincidence that if CSN Mid Atlantic cost $3.25 per month and CSN Chicago cost $4.60 per month that Comcast would lose around $50 million per year while Direct TV and Dish would see no change in their bottom line. 

The final major provider of CSN Mid Atlantic is Cox. Cox’s subscribers are primarily in Virginia and are in non-core areas. The way that RSNs work is that subscribers in core areas pay a larger subscriber fee than subscribers in non-core areas. After all, it's only reasonable that people living in DC are more likely to have interest in Wizard and Capital games than people living in Norfolk. Therefore, it's fair that they are charged more. The thing is that while newspapers have reported the average subscriber fee for all subscribers it isn't possible to know what the average subscriber fee is for core subscribers vs non-core subscribers. This means that it isn't possible to determine how much Cox subscribers are paying for CSN Mid Atlantic. It is possible that Cox’s subscribers are paying a reasonable rate and that Comcast is simply charging its subscribers in the core regions heavy fees.

The reason why there is such a discrepancy between the fees that CSN Mid Atlantic is able to charge its subscribers and the fees that MASN charges its subscribers is because Comcast has a dominant position in the DC/Maryland/Northern Virginia region. Therefore, they have an interest in increasing the fees that customers pay for CSN Mid Atlantic while decreasing the fees that customers pay for MASN. Since Comcast has a number of networks it allows them leverage to make deals with Direct TV and Dish in order to increase their profits. Therefore, it probably doesn’t make sense to say that MASN is mismanaged just because CSN-MA is able to charge large fees for less programming. All it means is that Comcast has the significant advantage of owning a network in a region where they have a dominant position in the market.