What Should You Think Of The Chris Davis Deal?

Chris Davis is going to re-sign with the Orioles, and he'll be playing in Baltimore for the foreseeable future. In a few ways, that's a very good thing. He's talented at what he does. He's one of the premier power hitters in the game. He's popular among fans. And he's well liked by teammates, who clearly want him back.

If you want to just stop there, that's fine. This doesn't have to be complicated. Watching sports is supposed to be fun, and the Orioles (on offense, at least) should be enjoyable to watch for the next few years (and maybe longer). But we do our best to dig a little deeper here, and you probably wouldn't be reading this if we didn't.

I've been trying to figure out what's bothering me most about the Orioles' decision to re-sign Davis. It's not the enormous amount of money, which seemed comical at first but is at least less bad after the reported amount of deferred money. Jon discussed Davis's contract in detail on Saturday, and you should give it a read.

It's not that Davis turns 30 soon and plays first base, and it's extremely risky to hand out such a lucrative contract to those types of players. That's not stating anything new.

It's not that the Orioles have spent a lot of money and, for now at least, seem very similar to last year's team.

It's not even that the Orioles seemed to bid against themselves to get the deal done, with no clear competitor in the market for Davis's services. It's tough to see that $161 million figure and wonder which other team was willing to come close to that offer.

All of those things matter. But I have more of an issue with Peter Angelos willing to spend a huge sum of money for one player -- only to reel in Davis. If Davis were far and away the best player on the market, maybe that would be easier to defend. But he wasn't. There was nothing hidden about the priority to keep Davis at seemingly whatever cost; Dan Connolly, formerly of The Baltimore Sun, was on top of this a month ago. Angelos inserted himself in the negotiations with Scott Boras early on, demonstrating the level of seriousness in keeping Davis in an O's uniform.

Jeff Sullivan of FanGraphs expanded on this topic in his analysis of the Davis deal. Here's a section of his excellent post:

The idea presented: the money budgeted for Chris Davis wasn’t being budgeted for just anyone. Angelos has a particular fondness for Davis, and a particular appreciation of everything he’s done. It’s not quite that Davis is being paid right out of Angelos’ pocket, from a completely separate budget, but there are hints that the Orioles’ payroll might go higher with Davis than it would’ve without Davis. If that’s in any way true, then it has to also be a factor, because it means the Orioles would spend more on a team with Davis than they would on a team with, say, Yoenis Cespedes. Again, if that’s true, it would mean Davis is getting money that wouldn’t have been put elsewhere.

Sullivan later hits on a point that gets to exactly what has been eating at me: "...as a fan it could be frustrating to think about this situation because you’d want the same amount of money to be available regardless." And that option evidently was not available here, regardless of whatever offer the Orioles had extended to Yoenis Cespedes. You couldn't pick between Justin Upton, Cespedes, and Davis, because Upton and Cespedes were never real options for similar money (barring a tremendous discount or a bizarre short-term deal). It's better to have Davis than none of the three.

If the Orioles didn't have a particular amount of money set aside, and whatever else Angelos was willing to give to Davis was just icing on the cake, then maybe this is all easier to swallow. It seems likely that Connolly was right all along that the Orioles (Angelos, really) did not want to go above $100 million for any other player. But it's unsettling both because we'll never know for sure, and that also maybe isn't the best way to go about things.

Overpaying for sentimental reasons and past performance isn't a great pattern to follow, though willing to go above and beyond for a skilled player is a positive (especially if that extra money would not have been available for anyone else). The best use of all funds would be to use them in a way to build the best possible team, but that option likely was not on the table.

Do you really care about Angelos losing money on the Davis deal if it starts to go south in a hurry? Would you rather him just pocket that extra money? Probably not. But if this contract affects the likelihood of Manny Machado signing an extension, it will look much worse. This is the type of contract that can hamstring a team. That concern is real.

Then again, maybe Machado will be one of Angelos's guys, and he'll be willing to go above and beyond for him, too. At least in that case, he'll be making an exception for one of the very best players in the game. But let's not get ahead of ourselves or anything. Let's instead start with hoping that the 2014 version of Davis doesn't resurface anytime soon.

The Money Is There. Where Is It?

As we settle into the final stages of free agent acquisition, the market begins to stabilize. First of all, several top tier talents remain available. To be elite and available in January is not an unusual thing. Ask Max Scherzer or Prince Fielder. However, to have as many perceived elite talents out there for hire is indeed unusual. According to STEAMER, Chris Davis, Howie Kendrick, Yoenis Cespedes, Justin Upton, Wei-Yin Chen, and Ian Kennedy are all present and stand to be worth more than two wins for 2016. Six players stand to make about 18 MM apiece (a total of 108 MM for 2016). That is a great deal of talent to change the outlook of the league without mentioning mid-range talents like Ian Desmond, Yovani Gallardo, and others. In all, STEAMER project 54.4 loose wins remaining, a value of about 380 MM. Complicating the matter is that many teams in search of talent have spent a great deal of money, which might have caused the market to constrict significantly.

Of course, available talent though does not equal available money. If there are 12 apples whose intrinsic value is a dollar while only six dollars are available in the market, then those apples will likely sell for less than they are worth. We do not know how much money each franchise has, but we can guess. To arrive at a reasonable answer for this, payrolls from 2013, 2014, and 2015 were assessed for change over time. This change could then be used to estimate what might be the overall pool of money available for 2016. Estimated current total payroll for 2016 is $3,747,200, which is a 1.01% increase over last year. Should we expect more?

	Payroll	%
2013	3150500
2014	3396200	7.80%
2015	3709800	9.23%
p2016	4025875	8.52%

If that 8.52% increase happens, then we have about 280 MM in open spending available. With overall talent at 380 MM, it looks like it might shape up to be an incredible buyer's market, which was something we thought Dan Duquette would be angling for this offseason. Also, the rumors about players considering one-year deals, punting a season, and then resetting for the 2016/17 offseason make a bit more sense. It must have someone like Chris Davis thinking twice about rejecting the 7/154 offer he had on the table or why he is refusing that offer if it is indeed still there.

Using the generic 8.52% increase over 2015 payroll marks might help us understand who exactly is in play for major talent. To note, this is generic because we are not considering whether 2015 was an abnormality in excess or under payment. Additionally, we do not know if resources are being redirected for immediate play or to support future franchises fortunes. Off the bat though, we have several teams that appear to be out of the game: Toronto (13.5 MM above 2015 + 8.52% payroll), Cleveland (22.5 MM), Angels (24 MM), Oakland 13.4 MM), Arizona (28.5 MM), Chicago (37.9 MM), St. Louis (4.1 MM), and New York Mets (1.3 MM). These eight teams seem, at a glance, out of the running for any of the top-tier talent.

What are the team needs of the 22 other clubs based on STEAMER projections?
(x denotes minor need as defined by 25th to 50th percentile; X denotes major need as defined by 1st to 25th percentile):

Team	C	1	2	3	S	LF	CF	RF	SP
NYY								x
Baltimore		x	X		x	X		X	X
Tampa	X	X						x
Boston	x			x		x
Kansas City			X		X			x	X
Twins	x	X		x	x		x	x	x
Chicago AL			x		X	X	x	X
Detroit	x			X	x	X	X		X
Texas	x	x				x	X
Houston	X	X		x		x
Seattle		x			x	x	X
Colorado	x	X	X		x	x	X	x	x
San Diego	x	x	X	X	X	X	X	x
San Francisco						x
LAD			x
Cincinatti	x		x	x		X	x	X	x
Milwaukee		X	X	X		x	x		X
Pittsburgh		X			X
Philadelphia	X	X	X		x	X	X	X	X
Atlanta	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Miami	X	X		x	X				X
Washington	x	x					X

The data provided by STEAMER is slightly dated. For instance, it is difficult to portray Washington as having a great need in center field when they have just acquired Ben Revere. However, the data is nearly up to date and gives us a good indication of roughly where clubs are at the moment (as of Alex Gordon's re-signing).

First Base
The Orioles offered Chris Davis 7/154, BORAS model projected 5/110, and the Comp model thinks 5/91 makes sense. Regardless, he is a near 20 MM first baseman (even though the actual Boras is trying to sell him as an outfield option). Teams with great need at first base include Tampa Bay, Minnesota, Houston, Colorado, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Miami. Of those, it is difficult to see Tampa or Pittsburgh putting out the money from a payroll perspective. Meanwhile, entrenched veterans exist in Minnesota (Joe Mauer), Milwaukee (the newly signed Chris Carter), and Philadelphia (Ryan Howard with Darin Ruf and Maikel Franco making future noise). This leaves us with Houston and Miami as the most sensible destinations. A team that really values Davis, like the Orioles, seemingly has pretty much these two clubs as primary competitors. My guess is that Houston would be reluctant to meet Baltimore's price and may well be waiting on the Orioles to make a move elsewhere and then swoop in with a low offer to Davis. Houston right now looks weak only at catcher and first base, so Davis makes a great deal of sense. Miami? Who knows? They could have something up their sleeve. That said, Miami also has weakness at catcher, shortstop, and starting pitcher. As it stands, Miami likely only has payroll to acquire one elite player.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Houston, Miami

Second Base
The second base market has been a bit quiet since Ben Zobrist signed, and Howie Kendrick is Mr. Incognito. A solid second baseman, but someone who has not been heard of much this offseason. Based on the clubs with cash and STEAMER, the weakest clubs appear to be Baltimore, Kansas City, Colorado, San Diego, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. That hurts for Kendrick. Baltimore appears to be quite happy to see how Jonathan Schoop develops. Kansas City has fringe options in Omar Infante and Christian Colon and appears to be largely disinterested in the infield market. They could be a landing place for a one-year bid. Colorado has larger troubles and appears content with D.J. LeMahieu to continue on. San Diego could be a spot when the dust clears. They have a number of weaknesses and should be looking at player to fall off to the floor. Milwaukee likes Scooter Gennett, the Phillies are in no place to compete and are working with Cesar Hernandez, and the Braves likewise have too many holes and a promising 2B in Jace Peterson. With all of that said, it looks like the Royals and, moreso, the Padres are the two openings. Both appear to be one-year deal scenarios, but the Padres could commit longer.
Likely Destinations: Kansas City, San Diego

Corner Outfield
The big paydays predicted for Yoenis Cespedes and Justin Upton have lost some of their shininess. The list here is not exactly as long as one might think: Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit, San Diego, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. To mention previous points, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Atlanta appear to be dedicated to rebuilding and signing a player descending from peak value seems doubtful. If there is cash to burn, there is an extreme scenario where one of these clubs signs a Qualifying Offer player, hands over a second-round pick as their first-round picks are protected, and either moves up with a compensation pick or deals said player at the trade deadline. A move up in draft selection looks like a waste of money spent, but a deal for prospects could help jump-start the rebuild a little and make it worth sinking 10 MM for half a season.

More realistically, these two players will wind up in Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit, or San Diego. After San Diego pushed their budget far, plopping down 20 MM for one of these guys might be too much, too soon. They have not been attached in the papers with an elite free agent, so it might well be that they are in the sub-15 MM market (such as Ian Desmond). For the others, they have each been mentioned in passing with either/both Cespedes and Upton. Baltimore may find themselves in a situation where it is difficult to choose because they could finalize deals with Cespedes, Upton, or Davis and only have Houston, Chicago (AL), and Detroit as primary competition. Perhaps Baltimore is the domino. It makes sense now that Alex Gordon re-signed with Kansas City because this market could wind up looking bad for someone.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Chicago (AL), Detroit

Starting Pitching
This is another area where the market is not as great as it might appear for Wei-Yin Chen and Ian Kennedy. Of course, it always seems like an unknown team will launch themselves into the void to secure a stronger pitching rotation (again see Max Scherzer), but how often might that happen? As it stands, we have Baltimore, Kansas City, Detroit, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Miami. It is hard to see Milwaukee, Philadelphia, or Atlanta stepping into this negotiation. As they are all in rebuilding mode, starting pitchers tend to be poor options for those clubs. Starting pitchers primarily provide value their first season (~90% give more than 100 IP), but break down in the years following (~50% give more than 100 IP in year two or three or etc. afterward).

As it stands, Baltimore, Kansas City, Detroit, and Miami are the primary players one might think based on the above methodology. We know Baltimore is in the market and has been circling Gallardo. Ian Kennedy makes a great deal of sense for them as well, but it makes one wonder if they can fit two 20 MM players on their roster. Kansas City appears to have pieced together a rotation, but would like to push Danny Duffy or Kris Medlen to a sixth starter role. It is questionable whether they are planning on any more splurges after Gordon. Detroit and Miami are options. Detroit is being pushed in a few ways, but I doubt they want anyone significant after signing Jordan Zimmermann. That leaves Miami who has been the most noticeable in their quest to secure Chen.
Likely Destinations: Baltimore, Miami

Slightly Informed Projections
So where will everyone go? My choice yet is for everyone to find a need that meets their interests. Here we go.

Chris Davis, Houston Astros
The Astros have one big need and that is first base. This fit seems to make a great deal of sense and might well happen. Davis has been a major target of Peter Angelos, but after a while someone saying no to 154 MM gets frustrating.

Howie Kendrick, San Diego Padres
I do not know whether this would be a one-year deal (which I think would make more teams interested) or a multi-year deal. One might think ownership would be concerned after devoting so much money to older players last offseason.

Yoenis Cespedes, Baltimore Orioles
Justin Upton makes more sense for the Orioles with his youth, but his youth makes it likely a player option or two would be involved. Those things apparently make Dan Duquette mad. Cespedes is old enough where opt outs stop making as much sense. Cespedes also has a much better arm and range than Upton, fitting in more with the Orioles' defensive goals. The Orioles may also like that Cespedes will not cost them a draft pick for signing him.

Justin Upton, Chicago White Sox
While there has been no mention of Upton to the White Sox, this seems to make sense once Baltimore settles in on Cespedes. The White Sox are probably more willing to offer a player option. Detroit, in my opinion, will rest on their laurels as their payroll is nearing luxury tax levels.

Wei-Yin Chen, Miami Marlins
The Marlins have cash, have been highly associated with Chen, and he seems to be a great fit for them. I would also assume that Chen, who lives outside the United States, would not be all that bothered if Miami went and traded him elsewhere after a couple seasons.

Ian Kennedy, Kansas City Royals
This scenario has the Royals coming in unexpectedly to beef up their rotation with a short-term deal for Kennedy. If Orioles secure Upton over Cespedes, then I think they will be more willing to let go of a second-round pick to ink Kennedy to a deal in a similar vein to Ubaldo Jimenez'.

At the end of the day, a lot can happen. The Yankees may think they need to tighten up right field. Boston might determine they can spin some players around and get a proven left fielder. Rangers ownership could do a 180 on their stance about not significantly raising payroll. Regardless, all of these should be answered in the next four weeks.

A Plea To The Orioles: Move On From Chris Davis And Sign Justin Upton

The Orioles have expressed interest in dozens of players this offseason, but they have yet to land one of the top free agents despite having the money available to nab one. It's clear that the Orioles, and primarily Peter Angelos, would prefer for Chris Davis to return. He's a fan favorite and a familiar face, after all. Angelos's involvement in the negotiations with Scott Boras demonstrates their high level of interest, and their early offer of around $150 million over seven years (which more or less seems to be a standing offer) is more than fair -- and possibly an overpay.

But Davis is a Boras client, and Boras usually gets what he wants. He's going to keep banging the Davis/corner outfielder drum in an effort to drive up his price, and it'll be interesting to see who signs first among Davis, Yoenis Cespedes, and Justin Upton. Those are the three remaining big bats, and the Orioles desperately need one.

According to various reports, the Orioles have at least shown interest in all three of the above names. Davis is the favorite, with Cespedes recently gaining some steam because he is not tied to draft pick compensation. Still, despite the team-friendly four-year, $72 million deal Alex Gordon recently signed with the Royals, Upton and Cespedes are in prime position to cash in; the question is when they'll do it and for how much. (The recent report of teams hoping Upton would accept a one-year deal seems like complete nonsense.) And if both players receive deals that are close to $100 million, which they should, then maybe the Orioles will look elsewhere.

But they shouldn't. The Orioles shouldn't spend $150 million (or more) for a first baseman who will be 30 when the season starts. And Upton isn't a significantly better option than Cespedes, who is a very good player and would fit in nicely on the Orioles. But it would be difficult to pass on the consistence of Upton, who's not a superstar but is unquestionably an outstanding talent.

At 28, Upton is a year and a half younger than Davis, and he's two years younger than Cespedes. In his last seven seasons, he's played in at least 133 games every year. In his two worst offensive seasons (2010 and 2012), he still hit 9 percent better than league average. He has a career 121 wRC+, is anywhere from an average to a decent defender in the corner outfield (0 UZR/150, 20 DRS), and is above average on the basepaths. His on-base skills (career .352 OBP) should also be valued.

He most likely doesn't have the ceiling of Davis or Cespedes, who have gone on fantastic runs in recent seasons. But Upton also seems to present the wisest investment and is less susceptible to a collapse.

There would be a cost of losing a draft pick (14th overall) to sign Upton. Would you rather have Upton and a pick in the 30s or Davis and the 14th pick? That would depend on the exact contract amounts that get handed out and also which model you use to evaluate how much each draft slot is worth. I'd take Upton and the compensation pick.

Huge fans of Davis would be sad to see him go. But if the Orioles are still pursuing a starting pitcher, perhaps Yovani Gallardo or Ian Kennedy, who would also force the team to sacrifice a pick, then it makes sense to double down and sign two qualifying offer players instead of just one because of the reduced price. That's exactly what the Orioles did when they signed Nelson Cruz and Ubaldo Jimenez, and it was smart.

Sure, it would cost two draft picks, but the Orioles would also get two back when Davis and Wei-Yin Chen sign elsewhere. The Orioles should be looking to get/keep as many draft picks as possible (they aren't), but they also have a clear need to improve the major league club's overall talent.

Maybe the money isn't there to sign both Upton and Gallardo/Kennedy, but the argument for Upton over Davis stands. Davis is still a great fit for the Orioles, and of the three options above, his return is the most likely thing to happen. But Upton has his share of supporters, and many fans would be thrilled if the Orioles opted for him instead.

If the Orioles could sign only one, who would you want?

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) January 8, 2016

Of course that poll is for fun and does not represent the entire fan base. But some in the O's organization agree. According to a recent ESPN Insider post by Buster Olney, "there is strong sentiment within the organization for owner Peter Angelos to either reduce any future offer to Davis from the $150 million dangled in the past to reflect the falling market prices, or to simply move on from Davis and target others in the high volume of available players."

It sure seems strange that the Orioles are in the position of offering top money for a free agent, which is what many fans want and frequently complain about, when it could be for the wrong guy or the funds could used better if allocated differently. The Orioles are still Davis's primary suitor, but they just can't sit and wait forever. With Mark Trumbo, they are covered at first base for next season, if needed. And with Christian Walker and Trey Mancini in the minors, plus another offseason to plan, they should be able to fill first base adequately without needing to spend exorbitant money.

Maybe the Orioles will switch gears. Or maybe their big contract offer is truly available for Davis and no one else. If that's true, it's hard to argue that the Orioles and Angelos aren't interested in rewarding a popular player for past accomplishments instead of going after a younger and less risky talent. At the very least, that's worrisome.

How Much Is A Player Opt Out Worth?

Depends.  That is the answer to the title.  Player opt outs (which used to be housed under the term player option) are not new and have always been a bit controversial.  The conventional wisdom is that the team carries all the risk.  If the player does well, he leaves.  If he does poorly, then he sucks at the teat of the poor club.  Of course, this is an amazingly simple way to look at the situation.  Player options, like team options, have cost and benefit associated with them and it helps to perhaps think a bit more on this.

The Player Perspective
For players, the option is about providing themselves a safety net for earnings to protect them against a collapse in their market value.  To that end, so does a  guaranteed year or more tacked on to the end of the deal.  What makes the player option so ideal for the player is that if he is able to improve upon his market value then he is able to option out and benefit from that increase in value.  Past examples of successful option outs include J.D. Drew, Alex Rodriguez, and Zack Greinke.  Past examples of successful option acceptance include Jorge De La Rosa, Brian Wilson, and Dan Haren.

To carry this forward with a concrete example, let's look at Justin Upton who our BORAS model pegged at a 5/85 deal.  From our past use of a comp model (which thinks the BORAS model is underpaying Upton by 28 MM), we had projected three general paths for him:

Year	Low	Mean	High
2016	3.0	3.4	3.7
2017	3.5	3.4	2.9
2018	2.7	2.7	2.5
2019	2.4	3.0	3.2
2020	0.5	2.2	3.6
2021	1.0	2.4	3.4
2022	-0.1	1.7	3.1
2023	-0.7	0.4	1.3
2024	-1.2	-0.4	0.2
2025	-1.8	-1.1	-0.5

That translated to these cumulative values:

Length	Low	Mean	High
1	21	24	26
2	47	49	48
3	68	70	67
4	88	94	92
5	92	113	123
6	101	135	153
7	100	151	182
8	93	155	195
9	81	151	197
10	61	139	191

Let us assume the general framework the player and club is considered is a 7/151 contract, which happens to be the Mean expected value during this time frame.  So the question is where on each of these generalized track would Upton want the ability to reenter the free agent market?  Can he find a sweet spot that would enable him to make his true value or even more?  That largely depends on what the team might consider in its interest.

The Team Perspective
From the team perspective, the issue is about not being saddled with responsibility for the worst case scenario.  Again, we will use the three tracks to consider where it makes sense for the club to agree to an option out.  From our perspective, this is done by considering the probability of value in the Mean and Best cases evening out with the losses potentially accrued.  With a 7/151 contract, the worst track results in a loss of 51.9 MM.  There are no points along the way for the club to come close to that value.  The greatest probable gain is 30.2 MM after the final season of the contract.

Are there any lengths of contract where it would work?  Yes, roughly.  A 4/85 deal could have an opt out any year of that deal.  A 5/106 deal would make sense to allow an opt out after four seasons.

How much less would Upton need to lower his annual earning in order to have an option out make sense with a seven year contract? 
7/142; option after six years
7/137; option after five years
7/134; option after four years
7/127; option after three years
7/124; option after two years
7/116; option after one year

Bringing the Two Sides Together
Let us say that the starting point is a 7/151 contract.  How much should Upton expect to make over the remainder of his career?  Depending on his performance, BORAS (adjusted to make it think 7/151 is the expected deal) thinks he will earn somewhere between 155 and 230 MM over the course of his career with a 7/151 deal.  With the suggested salary structure and Upton's projected career marks, there are really only two points at which he might expect to benefit from an opt out: after Year 1 where if he excels he stands to sign another seven year contract with a 1 MM AAV raise or after year 6 where he stand to make a million less (20.6 MM), but have that converted into a four year deal.  The first option increases his total potential earnings to 233 MM, a 3 MM increase.  The second path puts him in line for a 236 MM payday, a 6 MM increase.

When you put it all together, the deal that makes most sense for the club and for Upton together would be a seven year deal with a player option for that seventh year.  The first year option would simply be cost prohibitive.  For the seventh year option, Upton has that 6 MM buffer which would put the break even point at 145 MM.  One might think there is wiggle room in there for both sides.  For the club, it matters little and for Upton it might make him feel more comfortable in having a say over when he chooses to go into free agency.

All in all, this exercise proved not to be as thrilling as I was hoping it would be.  Even Upton's most optimistic likely career path did not show much reason for him to opt out.  I think the question is slightly more complex than what I show here.  There is value to having control over your own future and when you decide to look for employment elsewhere.  Some players enjoy that control and one would think there is value in it.  Would Upton think that having a four year opt out was worth 17 MM?  Maybe.  It is not an ungodly sum and maybe, just maybe, he is quite unique and performs at a much higher level justifying a larger pay day.  Or maybe it is worth 17 MM to be able to leaving flailing team in search for a more successful franchise.  That sort of thing, I cannot measure.

Orioles Are Reportedly Only Interested In Spending $100 Million-Plus On Chris Davis

It's hard for fans not to get caught up in the entertainment of free agency and the thought of plugging in one or two top free agents into their favorite team's lineup. Unfortunately, it's time to come back to reality, because it doesn't appear the Orioles will be doing anything of the sort.

Dan Connolly of The Baltimore Sun wrote last night that the team's $150 million offer "was earmarked for [Chris] Davis only." Here's more:

There was hope among the fan base that if the Orioles didn't agree to a deal with Davis, that money would be shifted toward a player like [Justin] Upton.

But according to an industry source, managing partner Peter Angelos stepped out of his comfort zone to make the club-record offer because of what Davis has meant to the franchise and community since coming here as part of a trade from Texas in 2011. It was, in part, a reward for his past successes as well as an admission that Davis' prodigious power — he has homered more over the last four seasons than any other player — is a rare commodity.

None of the above is shocking, and a large segment of the fan base would be delighted if Davis were to return at any cost. But you rarely, if ever, want to see "reward for past successes" as a driving force to re-sign a player. That's precisely what many were afraid of when it came to potentially overpaying for Nick Markakis. And that's also what leads to fanciful and misguided pieces of writing like this.

So surprising is the wrong word to describe this latest chapter in the O's offseason, but maybe perplexing isn't. The Orioles have a clear need for at least one talented, high-ceiling player. Obviously they routinely look for ways to avoid risk, and one way to do that is to not spend big in the free agent market.

But that's not what the Orioles are saying; they're saying that they'll (or that Angelos will) only spend that type of money this offseason on Davis. Simply put, that is baffling. Either you completely stay away from these mega-deals because you think they're too high-risk or you don't. Making the exception for Davis only -- maybe the fifth- or sixth-best free agent this offseason -- is just bizarre.

The Orioles clearly prefer to spend big on their own players, who they are much more familiar with. That's why Adam Jones, whose extension was viewed as a smart move for both Jones and the team at the time (and still looks excellent), has the team's largest contract. The Orioles typically avoid the cream of the crop in free agency. But when the Orioles have demonstrated they have the money to spend and a player like Upton seems to possess less risk than Davis, it shouldn't matter that he's never played for the Orioles.

If most fans were being honest with themselves, they most likely figured some type of report like this was coming. And it makes earlier mentions that the Orioles could be even a remote possibility for David Price's services even more laughable.

Justin Upton Is A Safer Choice Than Chris Davis

A couple weeks back, I put together a comp model for Chris Davis with consideration for his skill set and late blooming performance.  The model suggested that Davis should be paid about 6/99 up to 8/190 if you really believed in his skills with respective to his historical comps.  It appears over the past week, that the Orioles were unable to get Davis to bite on a 7/150 contract and that the contract offered may have been pulled off the table with the club now focused on other targets.  One such target is Justin Upton.  In this post, I applied the same comp model approach.

For Upton's model, I based the comp model on isolated power, walk rate, and home runs for players aged 25-27 who played left and/or right field from 1981-2004.  Those players were:

Player	WAR/pos
Jesse Barfield	19.1
Shawn Green	13.4
Jermaine Dye	11.9
Magglio Ordonez	11.8
David Justice	11.6
Greg Vaughn	11.2
Jack Clark	10.9
Brad Wilkerson	9.6
Trot Nixon	9.1
Bobby Higginson	9
Ryan Klesko	6.8
Pat Burrell	6.7
Danny Tartabull	6.1
Kal Daniels	5.9
Rob Deer	5.5

This population was used to project from age 28 through age 37, a ten year period.  No one, to date, expects Justin Upton can earn a ten year deal, but I think projecting to that point gives us a fuller view of the potential player.  As you go through the list, you see a variety of player whose game was similar to Upton's.  Largely, power mixed in with a good deal of athleticism.  Of course, that combination can manifest in several ways.  It can produce someone like Rob Deer or someone like Jesse Barfield.  For your reference, Upton had a WAR of 10.3 during his last three seasons, which would drop him in right between Jack Clark and Brad Wilkerson.

Upton's projection adjusted to the current offensive environment:

Year	Age	PA	HR	AVG	OBP	SLG	WAR	$
2016	28	514	22	.269	.355	.483	3.4	24.1
2017	29	513	23	.259	.358	.476	3.4	25.0
2018	30	463	20	.252	.349	.462	2.7	20.6
2019	31	479	21	.262	.354	.472	3.0	24.3
2020	32	510	20	.249	.335	.438	2.2	19.1
2021	33	497	19	.250	.344	.439	2.4	21.6
2022	34	465	18	.242	.328	.425	1.7	15.8
2023	35	465	15	.219	.304	.373	0.4	4.2
2024	36	414	11	.205	.286	.342	-0.4	-3.8
2025	37	433	12	.190	.267	.321	-1.1	-11.7

 Coincidentally, Justin Upton's projected worth over seven years is 150.5 MM, which is effectively what the Orioles offered Chris Davis.  Personally, I would prefer to tailor that deal to six years and 134.7 MM.  That would likely be beneficial to both the club and Upton.  He would hit free agency after what should be a relatively solid age 33 campaign.  If pushed maybe a 6/130 deal with a 2/50 option (10 MM buyout).  Anyway, that is just rolling the numbers around.

Second question is what are the likely floors and ceilings?

Year	Low	Mean	High
2016	3.0	3.4	3.7
2017	3.5	3.4	2.9
2018	2.7	2.7	2.5
2019	2.4	3.0	3.2
2020	0.5	2.2	3.6
2021	1.0	2.4	3.4
2022	-0.1	1.7	3.1
2023	-0.7	0.4	1.3
2024	-1.2	-0.4	0.2
2025	-1.8	-1.1	-0.5

This table looks quite different from the Chris Davis table.  For Davis, the low end projection suggested that he would never be an average starting first baseman.  The low end for Upton is four years of solid play, plus the second highest WAR for these three populations.  Second, the mean projection has six above average years while Davis had four.  The high end projection for Davis delivered five above average seasons, while  Upton's goes to seven.  It is hard not to look at this table and scratch your head why Davis is being valued so greatly.  It could be because historical comps poorly describe what Davis is or it could be that conventional wisdom loves home runs and overlooks age and position constraints.

Finally, here is the value outlay:

Length	Low	Mean	High
1	21	24	26
2	47	49	48
3	68	70	67
4	88	94	92
5	92	113	123
6	101	135	153
7	100	151	182
8	93	155	195
9	81	151	197
10	61	139	191

Upton's floor is projected here to be worth about double what Davis' floor was worth.  The mean outlay appears to be on target for what the Orioles are willing to spend and is significantly above Davis' mean.  Davis and Upton essentially have the same high projection.  In other words, Davis and Upton both have the same ceiling value, but Upton is a much safer choice for getting value in return for the cost.

Now, comp models are not ideal.  Each player is a beautiful snowflake and this approach mashes them all into a snowball.  That said, I feel far more comfortable with Upton's comps than I am comfortable with Davis' comps.  To me, if the choice is between these two players, then the choice is rather clear.