Showing posts with label 2013 Season. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2013 Season. Show all posts

26 August 2013

Weak Wrist or Batting Approach? Markakis' Brownout

Sunday was memorable.  The Orioles won 10-3 and moved to two games out in the race for the second Wild Card.  The field is collapsing with five teams within six games of each other for both Wild Cards as well.  Tampa, Oakland or maybe Texas, Cleveland, Baltimore, and even the Yankees are making noise.  However, all of this was known before Sunday's game.  What was not known was that Nick Markakis was going to hit not one, but two extra base hits.  That those hits would be a double and a home run.  It was his first double (and extra base hit) since July 19th.  It was his first home run since June 24th.  This proven veteran was doing so poorly that the past ten days have seen Buck place Nick in the fifth, sixth, and seven places in the lineup.

As you can probably expect from that lead paragraph, it has been a difficult season for Markakis, but it was not always this way.  On January 22, 2009, even the fans most hardened by the yearly experience of Orioles teams with scant talent and poor performance had hope.  Hope's name was Nick Markakis.  The eternally labeled as stingy owner Peter Angelos signed off on Hope with a six year and 66 MM contract which was 10 grand less than I had suggested the year before.  There was much to be excited about.  Going into 2009, Nick Markakis finished his age 24 season showing strong power, good speed, a knack for hitting doubles that some thought might begin to transform into home runs, and spectacular defense in right field.
Markakis' Career Up to His Extension
Year Age PA 2B HR SB BA OBP SLG OPS+ RField rWAR
2006 22 542 25 16 2 .291 .351 .448 106 5 2.5
2007 23 710 43 23 18 .300 .362 .485 121 4 4.2
2008 24 697 48 20 10 .306 .406 .491 136 22 7.5
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/14/2013.

To put his 2008 season in a league-wide context, Markakis' 7.5 rWAR was the best in the AL.  In all of baseball, only Albert Pujols, Chase Utley, Tim Lincecum, and Mark Teixeira had higher marks.  The team finished 68-93, which is likely why the best performance in 2008 in the AL went without any consideration for an MVP vote.  Nary a one.  So, Markakis was often considered a neat pick for those who thought he would help define the game over his prime years.

Earlier in 2008, ESPN's (at the time) Rob Neyer prognosticated that Markakis would be the best right fielder in the game over the 2008 to 2012 period.  That now sounds rather spectacular that anyone could have considered Markakis to have been all that special.  I think that is the conventional wisdom about Baltimore on a player we all thought would be so great.  He began to first lose the home run power in his bat and then his doubles evaporated.  Along with that, so did his outfield range and, likely related, his arm.  However, I think there are some similarities between him and the "Switch Hitting Jesus" Matt Wieters.  The problem being that by having too great of expectations can lead on to undervalue what a player winds up doing.  So, Neyer's 5 year period?
Jose Bautista 21.5 rWAR
Shin-Soo Choo 20.1
Nick Markakis 17.0
Ichiro Suzuki 16.1
Hunter Pence 16.1
Neyer appears right, but I would also contend the local conventional wisdom carries some truth as well.  If you subtract that 7.5 rWAR 2008 season, Markakis comes in at 9.5 rWAR, which is good for 15th best.  During the first four years of his extension (2009-2012), that 9.5 rWAR was worth about 42.75 MM (or 33.2 MM if you are a fWAR devotee) while he was paid 33.05 MM.  In reality, the contract had through 2012 been fair when you consider that up to 2011 were seasons that would have fallen under arbitration (read as below market value).  Markakis had not become the player many thought he would become (or even remain) in 2009, but he was a sufficient complementary piece on the team.  Of course, when locking down young players long term a team really is not looking to be fair.  The goal is to get surplus value out of the arrangement in exchange for financial security for the player.

2013 has brought the remainder of his extension (runs through next season with an option for 2015) more in doubt in terms of his value to the ball club as his offense has set off for new personal lows.  Our own Matt Kremnitzer has considered Markakis' Power Outage and Continued Offensive Struggles and Fangraph's Matt Klaussen recently explored the Stunted Power.  With so much electronic ink being expended with a fluttering if key strokes, it may lead one to think that there simply is not much left to explore.  Those people are probably correct, but I want to take a deeper look into Nick Markakis, the lead off hitter, and see whether he contrasts much with Nick Markakis, the third spot hitter.

But, first, let me run off in a tangent about the injuries Markakis suffered in 2012.  For many, the injuries he sustained in May and in September  In May that season, Nick landed poorly on a slide, breaking the hammate bone, and potentially causing damage to the flexor tendon.  The bone heals pretty quickly, but it can take a long while for a player's flexor tendon to fully heal.  This can be an issue because the flexor tendon in the wrist is incredibly important in transferring energy from the player into the bat.  Decrease that energy transfer and you stop seeing batted balls clear the fence.  This potential loss of power was certainly a concern when the injury happened.  However, Markakis' power did not decrease by much.  His ISO pre-injury was .196 and it only dropped to .154 after the injury, which is not much different than his .152 career mark.  All in all, it appears the hammate bone injury is probably a poor explanation for his current decrease in power.

After scorching July and August with his transition to the top of the lineup, an early September game against CC Sabathia and the Yankees resulted in a broken thumb from a high inside fastball.  The injury ended Markakis' season and was largely shrugged over during the off season.  However, there is a chance that the injury has had more of a lasting impact than had been presumed.  Outside of the training room (and sometimes in the training room depending on how forthcoming the player is), we tend to have little clue about nagging injuries.

One thing we do know about this season is zero.  As in, Markakis has had zero extra base hits in 458 pitches thrown toward the low and straddling the outside corner of the plate.  Last year, he hit three doubles low and away in a 100 fewer pitches.  Low and away has never been much of a place for Markakis to generate much power, but he had tended to be able to put away strikes in that location over into left field for a chance at a double.  Markakis' ISO map basically gives you a good blueprint of areas to avoid when pitching to him.


As you can see, the key places to avoid have been high-inside, low-inside, and high-outside.  Here is the numerical output put into nine sectors.


Inside Middle Outside
High .179 .049 .128
Middle .156 .031 .113
Low .154 .089 .000
The power in the lower inside part of his swing drifts slightly up into the middle section, but it appears that a well placed pitch might be able to weave inside and stand to be an acceptable change of pace in pitch location.  That said, what is troubling is that Markakis has shown meager power in the middle of the plate.  Typically, you expect all hitters to crush fat ones down the pipe, but that seems to be Nick's second least powerful place to make contact.  Seven of Nick's nine home runs have come low and inside.  High-inside and high-outside are locations where he is more inclined to have his power manifest in doubles.

Last year was different.  In a shortened season, he had one of his best years at the plate.  2013 pales in comparison.  As you can see below, Markakis was dangerous almost throughout the entire strike zone.


The difference between the two graphs is stunning.  While he has significantly gained power on high-inside pitches upping last year's .034 ISO to .179.  Everything else has decreased.  The table below shows how Markakis' ISO has changed this year:


Inside Middle Outside
High +.145 -.135 -.122
Middle -.108 -.204 -.004
Low -.150 -.111 -.041
The collapse in his power low-inside and the entirety of the middle of the plate is disheartening.  Pitches down the middle are not being punished and he is seeing a low more pitches down as well as low and away.  Additionally, Markakis is swinging at pitches high-inside nearly 10% more often, perhaps looking to cheat on those incoming pitches.  What we may be seeing is an injury issue layered with a change in approach caused by that injury issue.

Another possibility is that Markakis's vast change in power production is related to Markakis seeing time batting first.  The idea being that his role at the top of the order is to get on base as opposed to hitting the ball far.  Below are listed the ISO for 2012 and 2013 according to batting position.


2012 2013
1st .154 .046
3rd .196 .107
Now, Markakis likes to say that batting leadoff does not affect his approach.  However, that does not appear to be the case with his leadoff hitting trailing in ISO about 50 points in each season.  Additionally (and more important to this post), is that it does nothing to explain the power decrease as it has left him in both batting positions.

However, I have doubts that his power outage has anything to do with the initial thumb injury as well.  Nick had 12 doubles and seven home runs in April and May combined.  Numbers that tower over what he has been able to do in the three months that followed.  This is also seen clearly in ISO.


ISO
April .098
May .190
June .076
July .021
August .047
My best guess is that late May or early June, Nick was injured.  I cannot find anything in the print media that indicates an injury occurred.  The only note I found was his bereavement leave for his maternal grandmother.  I think we all would prefer to not conjecture on her passing and focus on possibilities of physiological injuries.

Whatever is the issue, it appears that things are not getting better and hopes lie more in the offseason.  Lately, he has been working to earn walks more as he seems to be changing his approach.  The hope being that he can raise his on base percentage high enough to be helpful at the plate.  With a .299 OBP in August at the plate, it has not been a smashing success.  However, perhaps we can pretend that Sunday is the start of a new Markakis.  A Markakis that we are more fond to recall, one that we saw last year.  The one who wound up getting a contract back in 2009.

05 August 2013

Should the Orioles Extend the New Nate McLouth?

gif by Steph Diorio / video: http://youtu.be/XMzCNO2wlWM
Last year, Jeremy Strain wrote an article for the Depot that generated a great deal of discussion between him, myself, Daniel Moroz, and the passengers (yes, lets see how well this term I just made up for followers of the Depot sticks...get it, Depot, trains, passengers, nevermind).  To paraphrase, Jeremy thought that Nate McLouth's performance for the Orioles last season in 55 games (268/342/435) was more indicative of his future performance due to him being fully healthy and surmising that he was unhappy to be in Atlanta.  I and, largely, Daniel, countered that it would be unfair to ignore his poor performances in Atlanta and Pittsburgh in predicting the future because there was nothing we could point toward to show that his talent level had increased.  One of the many ideas the passengers put forward was that the real question was how do we resolve left field when the team is unlikely to pay much for an outfielder to which I thought Nate Schierholtz would have been a solid replacement.

Anyway, I think how things settled as the offseason dragged on actually wound up where we thought it was appropriate (except with Schierholtz signing with the Cubs for 2.25 MM and still under arbitration).  The Orioles dragged their heels on Nate McLouth with no one else willing to make much of a play on him.  With trade options dwindling and asking prices undesirable, the team decided to resign him for 2 MM with some understanding expressed to him that the left field position would be up for grabs against Nolan Reimold, Ryan Flaherty, L.J. Hoes, and whoever else they could find (i.e., Steve Pearce, Chris Dickerson, Conor Jackson).  The move was largely interpreted as uninspiring and signified the difficulty the front office had in finding a big bat, which is what they were trying to acquire.

What has happened though was largely unseen.  McLouth has not produced the .250 BA/20HR/25 SB guy Jeremy predicted.  He has actually surpassed that average and matched the stolen bases, but likely will not meet that power amount.  I don't really like using those numbers to measure a player because they are some of the weaker metrics for correlations to actual performance.  Daniel, in a rebuttal post, expressed some of the numbers that mean more to me and largely to predictive approaches.  To try to put them on equal footing...I think under Jeremy's approach the split would be something like 250/330/450 while I saw something more like 250/330/400 with a large number of games being sat out due to left handed starting pitching with which he has historically failed at hitting (111 wRC+ vs RHP, 76 wRC+ vs LHP).

So what has happened?

Nate McLouth Playing for Baltimore
Year Age PA BA OBP SLG OPS+ bWAR
2012 30 236 .268 .342 .435 111 1.0
2013 31 413 .287 .355 .425 113 2.4
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/3/2013.

What has impressed me most about Nate McLouth's season is that he is not the player in the same vein as what he was doing earlier in his career and what is more similar to what Jeremy was projecting (mind you, Jeremy's projection is much closer to reality than mine or Daniel's so don't take that as a pile on).  Where he has found success has been his approach at the plate, which is the same approach he seems to have taken last year.  The approach is one where he covers more of the plate and produces solid line drives as opposed to deep fly balls.  He has cut down his fly ball percentage from about the mid to upper 40% range to upper 30% this year.  That massive change is reflected in his home run ability.  Simply put, a true line drive will result in a homerun only one percent of the time, so by reducing fly balls you should see a great reduction in home runs.  He has gone from someone who would hit a home run every 25 at bats in Pittsburgh to someone who hits one every 50 at bats in Baltimore.  Those fly balls have largely been translated into line drives.  His line drives are sitting at 26.5% whereas they were in the mid teens during his prolific Pittsburgh days. 

I also think a great deal of his success has been his ability to cover more of the plate with his new approach, particularly against southpaws.  In the past, McLouth's susceptibility to left handed pitching made him more suited for being a platoon outfielder and someone who would need a pinch hitter late in games if the opposing manager would send in a left handed pitcher to face him.  This was also problematic because what manager would pinch hit an All Star centerfielder late in the game?  Not many.

Using the data I have (from 2009 to the first half of 2012), McLouth would swing and miss against lefties 17.7% of the time.  In 2013 (up to August 3rd), that number is 14.8%, a decrease of 16%. He is swinging about 43% of the time, which is an increase from 41%.  In other words, he is swinging more and getting more contact from the left side.  Increasing that coverage has turned him into a full time player.

McLouth's Splits
I Split BB% SO% BA OBP SLG wRC+
vs RHP Career 10.7 16.3 .262 .348 .445 111
vs RHP 2013 9.3 11.5 .298 .364 .429 118
vs LHP Career 7.2 18.1 .226 .305 .353 78
vs LHP 2013 6.6 15.4 .250 .318 .413 101
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/3/2013 with BB%, SO%, and wRC+ taken from Fangraphs.

McLouth still walks a decent amount of the time even though he has dropped slightly below average (but not to a significant degree with respect to the league).  However, that is buttressed by his increased batting average through increased meaningful contact.  That increase in getting on base more than makes up for the decrease in isolated power; highest in 2008 with a .221 mark, it now resides at .138.  That decrease in power might be concerning to you.  However it should be noted that if McLouth continues on his current pace that his fWAR and bWAR should be 3.2 and 3.5, respectively.  His career high marks for those two are 3.5 and 2.5, respectively.  That should impart two things: (1) Nate McLouth is having a career year and (2) getting on base, otherwise known as not getting out, is far more important than hitting for power.

In the end, I think all of us evaluating McLouth missed a major thing: he is no longer Nate McLouth.  He is the New Nate McLouth.  Jeremy suspected that a return to health would bring back his Pittsburgh halcyon days.  Daniel and I thought that it was presumptuous to ignore poor performances.  What we shared in our misjudgement was being able to identify what exactly it was that he was doing differently to enjoy success in the latter half of 2012.  This apparently was missed by all of baseball as his performance should have been worth much more than 2 MM in the open market.  He should have gotten a contract similar to what Melky Cabrera had received.

In the end, it is nice to be wrong when being wrong means things are right between the lines at Camden Yards.  However, how do the events from this season impart upon my thoughts on extending Nate McLouth?  Not much really.  I would suggest that a fair open market price on McLouth this offseason would be about 2 years and 16 MM, which is what Melky Cabrera signed when he agreed to play for the Blue Jays.  I assume that by the end of the year, McLouth will have produced about 4 bWAR over a little less than a year and a half in Baltimore.  If you project that over a full season, then McLouth would be expected to be worth about 3 bWAR a year or about 15MM.  Injury likelihood probably drops it down to about 10MM a year, which then probably get dropped further due to an uneven history and lack of power.

At a contract similar to Cabrera's, I feel uneasy inking McLouth.  Thirty one year old enjoying career seasons is not exactly the kind of commodity I like getting behind.  I think McLouth's skills play for a fringe first division team, but only if he is not one of the major offensive players you are relying on.  In other words, he is a complementary piece and I would hesitate making such a player the third or fourth highest paid player on the team.  Of course, if McLouth is not lining up in left field, who is?

With L.J. Hoes now an Astro and Nolan Reimold losing another year, internal options appear scarce.  The free agent market for the 2014 season has a few outfielders that are interesting enough to consider trying to shift them over to left field.  Those would be Jacoby Ellsbury, Shin-Soo Choo, and Hunter Pence.  At this moment, it appears all three of them will be bid on hard by their current teams.  They also will probably earn considerably more than McLouth.  They would be players who would be leaned on hard for their offensive acumen.  Second tier players would include Mike Morse, David Murphy, Ryan Raburn, Coco Crisp (who is an older version of what Nate McLouth currently is), Marlon Byrd, Corey Hart, and Nate McLouth.

Perhaps Nate McLouth is the best choice here.


25 April 2013

Strikezone Analysis for April 22 - 24: Blue Jays at Orioles

The Toronto at Baltimore series saw some of the more consistently called strikezones on the season, with every game rating above average for Rzone accuracy. The average Rzone accuracy rate coming into this series stood at 86.80%, but for the series, hit a robust 88.56%.

Overall, the Orioles benefited on 35 "bad" calls, while the Blue Jays benefited on 23. This was the most favorably called series the O's have seen so far this year. That being said, the Orioles are still at a net loss on the season and based upon the current trend for away games, this upcoming west coast trip may not rectify that. This is probably also attributable to a few things: 1. Jake Arrieta didn't pitch this series, 2. Chris Tillman had his best start of the season. 3. As bad as Josh Stinson was, his issue was home runs, not poor control.

April 22, 2013: Toronto 1 - Baltimore 2

Umpire
Real
% of Total
% of Chances
Typical
% of Total
% of Chances
Correct Calls
148
87.57%

148
87.57%

Incorrect Calls
21
12.43%

21
12.43%

Balls Called Balls
106
62.72%
86.89%
92
54.44%
97.87%
Strikes Called Strikes
42
24.85%
89.36%
56
33.14%
74.67%
Strikes Called Balls
5
2.96%
10.64%
19
11.24%
25.33%
Balls Called Strikes
16
9.47%
13.11%
2
1.18%
2.13%
Borderline - Balls
19
11.24%
42.22%



Borderline - Strikes
26
15.38%
57.78%










Baltimore Orioles
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
52
57.78%
83.87%
43
47.78%
100.00%
Strike Called Strike
25
27.78%
89.29%
35
38.89%
74.47%
Strike Called Ball
3
3.33%
10.71%
12
13.33%
25.53%
Ball Called Strike
10
11.11%
16.13%
0
0.00%
0.00%
Borderline Pitches
45
31.03%




Borderline - Balls
11
42.31%




Borderline - Strikes
15
57.69%




Calls in Favor
12

7.10%
7

4.14%
Calls Against
9

5.33%
14

8.28%







Toronto Blue Jays
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
54
68.35%
90.00%
49
62.03%
96.08%
Strike Called Strike
17
21.52%
89.47%
21
26.58%
75.00%
Strike Called Ball
2
2.53%
10.53%
7
8.86%
25.00%
Ball Called Strike
6
7.59%
10.00%
2
2.53%
3.92%
Borderline Pitches
44
29.41%




Borderline - Balls
8
42.11%




Borderline - Strikes
11
57.89%




Calls in Favor
9

5.33%
14

8.28%
Calls Against
12

7.10%
7

4.14%

Barrett called a fairly consistent Rzone on the evening. His overall Strike called Ball rate was 10.64%, well below the season average of 16.87%. His Ball called Strike rate, 13.11%, was slightly higher than the season average of 11.23%.

As far as the Tzone was concerned, Barrett was more accurate than average, 87.57% to 85.80%. Balls were called balls at a 97.87% rate, indicating that while he was expanding beyond the Rzone, he wasn’t being completely irrational about it. It’s just that within the Tzone, but outside of the Rzone, he was wildly inconsistent, calling 76.92% of such pitches strikes for the Orioles, but just 44.44% for the Blue Jays. On borderline pitches, his strike rate was virtually identical for both teams, at 57.69% for the O’s and 57.89% for the Jays.

In Monday night's game, a classic Tzone pattern emerged. When you look at the chart, you can see what happened clearly.


The Orioles pitchers hammered LHB and the Blue Jays pitchers hammered RHB. On a night when the O’s trotted out 5 RHB(+ 2SHB) and the Jays trotted out 3 LHB(+2 SHB), the overall count should’ve favored the Jays. But when it came down to it, the O’s really pounded that outside corner (when they missed to a LHB, they missed low or away), while the Jays had far less control (when they missed to a RHB, the ball could be anywhere). Toronto also missed more pitches inside and high to a LHB, while the O’s were more consistently (but not perfectly) low and away to a RHB.

For the fifth time this season, the Orioles had a significant borderline pitch advantage. While borderline Rzone pitches were called at even rates for both teams at just under 58%, the Orioles had a very significant advantage in the percentage of T-R strikes (pitches in the Tzone, but outside the Rzone) at 76.92% to 44.44%.

April 23, 2013: Toronto 3 - Baltimore 4


Umpire
Real
% of Total
% of Chances
Typical
% of Total
% of Chances
Correct Calls
129
87.16%

117
79.05%

Incorrect Calls
19
12.84%

31
20.95%

Balls Called Balls
100
67.57%
93.46%
81
54.73%
100.00%
Strikes Called Strikes
29
19.59%
70.73%
36
24.32%
53.73%
Strikes Called Balls
12
8.11%
29.27%
31
20.95%
46.27%
Balls Called Strikes
7
4.73%
6.54%
0
0.00%
0.00%
Borderline - Balls
30
20.27%
71.43%



Borderline - Strikes
12
8.11%
28.57%










Baltimore Orioles
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
50
67.57%
90.91%
38
51.35%
100.00%
Strike Called Strike
17
22.97%
89.47%
22
29.73%
61.11%
Strike Called Ball
2
2.70%
10.53%
14
18.92%
38.89%
Ball Called Strike
5
6.76%
9.09%
0
0.00%
0.00%
Borderline Pitches
45
32.37%




Borderline - Balls
15
68.18%




Borderline - Strikes
7
31.82%




Calls in Favor
15

10.14%
17

11.49%
Calls Against
4

2.70%
14

9.46%







Toronto Blue Jays
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
50
67.57%
96.15%
43
58.11%
100.00%
Strike Called Strike
12
16.22%
54.55%
14
18.92%
45.16%
Strike Called Ball
10
13.51%
45.45%
17
22.97%
54.84%
Ball Called Strike
2
2.70%
3.85%
0
0.00%
0.00%
Borderline Pitches
41
32.85%




Borderline - Balls
15
75.00%




Borderline - Strikes
5
25.00%




Calls in Favor
4

2.70%
14

9.46%
Calls Against
15

10.14%
17

11.49%

In a complete vacuum, I would feel guilty about the strikezone last night. I don’t have a frame of reference, but it really, really looks like the umpire had no idea what to do with Dickey’s knuckleball. For the Rzone, the Orioles had 9.09% (5) of balls called strikes and 10.53% (2) of strikes called balls. The Blue Jays, on the other hand, had just 3.85% (2) of balls called strikes and a whopping 45.45% (10) of strikes called balls. That 15 calls in favor (10.14% of all pitches) and 4 against (2.70%) for the Orioles was the third highest calls in favor rate, lowest calls against rate, and largest difference between call in favor and calls against (for any team) so far this season. The knuckle ball does strange things...

The Tzone was much, much more even. Neither team had a ball called a strike and the Orioles only had a slight 14 – 17 advantage (lower is better) in strikes called balls. The 79.05% Tzone correct rate was the second lowest of the year. The knuckleball does strange things...


On borderline pitches, Alfonso Marquez had the lowest called strike rate so far this season, at 28.57%. The Orioles got 31.82% strikes on borderline pitches to the Blue Jays’ 25.00%. The difference on T-R strikes was very significant, with the Orioles getting a 71.43% rate to the Blue Jays’ 22.22%. The knuckleball does strange things...

April 24, 2013: Toronto 6 - Baltimore 5

Umpire
Real
% of Total
% of Chances
Typical
% of Total
% of Chances
Correct Calls
172
90.53%

174
91.58%

Incorrect Calls
18
9.47%

16
8.42%

Balls Called Balls
121
63.68%
90.30%
112
58.95%
98.25%
Strikes Called Strikes
51
26.84%
91.07%
62
32.63%
81.58%
Strikes Called Balls
5
2.63%
8.93%
14
7.37%
18.42%
Balls Called Strikes
13
6.84%
9.70%
2
1.05%
1.75%
Borderline - Balls
14
7.37%
40.00%



Borderline - Strikes
21
11.05%
60.00%










Baltimore Orioles
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
52
57.14%
88.14%
45
49.45%
95.74%
Strike Called Strike
28
30.77%
87.50%
33
36.26%
75.00%
Strike Called Ball
4
4.40%
12.50%
11
12.09%
25.00%
Ball Called Strike
7
7.69%
11.86%
2
2.20%
4.26%
Borderline Pitches
38
23.17%




Borderline - Balls
5
35.71%




Borderline - Strikes
9
64.29%




Calls in Favor
8

4.21%
5

2.63%
Calls Against
10

5.26%
11

5.79%







Toronto Blue Jays
Real
% of Team
% of Chances
Typical
% of Team
% of Chances
Ball Called Ball
69
69.70%
92.00%
67
67.68%
100.00%
Strike Called Strike
23
23.23%
95.83%
29
29.29%
90.63%
Strike Called Ball
1
1.01%
4.17%
3
3.03%
9.38%
Ball Called Strike
6
6.06%
8.00%
0
0.00%
0.00%
Borderline Pitches
52
21.59%




Borderline - Balls
9
42.86%




Borderline - Strikes
12
57.14%




Calls in Favor
10

5.26%
11

5.79%
Calls Against
8

4.21%
5

2.63%

Overall, this was a very cleanly called game. Not only was it the second highest call accuracy rate on the season, but neither team was adversely affected by the few bad calls that did happen. The game ended rather poorly for the Orioles, but on the whole, it was their own pitching failures and not the strikezone.