12 November 2011

Free Agents - Shortstop

This is the fourth of a series of posts on free agents.

C | 1B | 2B | 3B | SS | LF | CF | RF | DH | SP | RHRP | LHRP

Reyes is the jewel of the SS Market
For the sake of completeness, we will look at shortstop.

For the purpose of this post, we are using the following groupings:
Elite: Greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Good: 3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Above Average: 2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA
Average: 1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA
Poor Starter: 0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA
Backup: Below 0.75 WAR / 600 PA
No one below a projected 0.75 WAR should be offered anything more than a minor league contract with an invite to training camp.  The values were calculated by weighting performance of the past three seasons normalized each year to 600 PA.  This ranking does not consider injury status which will likely affect some players.

Elite (greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Jose Reyes (4.7)
It looks as if the Mets will not be resigning Reyes.  Whoever signs him should have premium performance at short for several years.

Good (3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
J.J. Hardy (4.2)
If Hardy could actually get to the plate 600 times, he would projects as a 4.2 WAR player.  He could be the most valuable player on the team.

Above Average (2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Jamey Carroll (3.2)
Carroll's ability to get on base along with his ability to play shortstop adequately makes him a potential option here.  However, tweeners like Carroll always teeter on being completely unable to competently play shortstop.
Nick Punto (3.1)
Punto's ability to rank high here is a primarily due to his offensive performance last year.  I doubt his ability to truly give above average performance at this position.
Jimmy Rollins (2.8)
Rollins' offensive has taken a hard turn downward, but he still plays a decent shortstop.  The low baseline for short keeps Rollins in the conversation as an above average shortstop.  His past performance though may encourage a team to pay him more than he is worth.
Clint Barmes (2.6)
Barmes can play SS solidly and show some power.  He could potentially be a decent starter.

Average (1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Rafael Furcal (2.4)
This projection does not adequately account for his injury issues.  I would value him far less than this.
Ramon Santiago (2.2)
The Tigers do not see him as a starter, but the numbers suggest otherwise.  He could be a cheap and effective option for a team who needs to fill a hole at short.
Jerry Hairston Jr (2.0)
Hairston cannot defend the position well, but his bat carries him.
Edgar Renteria (1.8)
Renteria is on the downside of his career.  He will likely put up performance below this measure.

Poor Starter (0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Alex Gonzalez (1.5)
Gonzalez has had one good season and two awful ones.  One is more probable than the other.
Robert Andino (1.2)
Andino does not field well enough or hit well enough.
Ronny Cedeno (1.0)
Cedeno is a utility infielder, no more.

The Rest (less than 0.75 WAR / 600 PA)
John MacDonald (0.7), Orlando Cabrera (0.7), Craig Counsell (0.4), Yuniesky Betancourt (0.2), Jack Wilson (0.0), and Cesar Izturis (-0.3).

10 November 2011

Evaluating the front office: Channel your inner Rumsfeld

"[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know. ”

— Former United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld



As Andy MacPhail ends his tenure as President of Baseball Operations in Baltimore, and Dan Duqette takes over the front office reigns, a poll of the dwindling Orioles fanbase would reveal no shortage of opinions on both MacPhail's performance and the pros and cons of Duqette's selection as his replacement. Skim through an Orioles message board and you are sure to find a laundry list of misteps taken by MacPhail in his shaping of the organization and declarations as to what steps Duquette will be taking to point the O's in the right direction. This should not be a surprise, as the bloggers and message boarders have been vocal for the last month with strong opinions on "the right man for the job", despite the fact that 99% of these bloviators are not even sure what differentiates the various candidates (or current GMs, for that matter). The critiques do not stop at the top.

Scouting directors? Your draft classes are lambasted by fans before the second day of selections has been completed, and you can expect numerous blogs to explain just how good or bad a job you did by the end of the week (after reading-up on the draftees from the same three or four sources). Also, MLBDraftExperts.wordpress.com will explain to you why you never pick a high school pitcher between picks 6 and 22, and why you just "don't get it" when it comes to overslot spending.

Minor League development staff? God help you if your team's prospects do not show up on the right internet rankings (and there are a lot of them these days). Such a shortcoming will make it clear to all that you do not know how to do your job, and are incapable of developing true impact Major League talent.

Managers? Ignore the horde of Twitter users wring their collective hands over a stolen base attempt, pitching change or (gasp!) a post game comment that Player B was "clutch" for you this evening. Yes, apparently you are one of the least informed baseball minds around and have no business discussing baseball, let alone managing a Major League team. But that doesn't mean you should have to have that pointed out to you by @FutureGM, @MLBProspectGuru or @KingofDaBronx.

Players? You should not ignore Twitter. If you check-in during the game you will be instantly informed as to what is wrong with your swing/pitching mechanics by numerous experts who have all been studying the finer points of swing and pitching mechanics for several years via YouTube, MiLB.tv, fuzzy animated GIFs and some "scouting" articles from various internet hotspots. In fact, after striking out, your first move probably should not be a convo with your hitting coach or teammates, or a trip to the video equipment in the office just down the tunnel. It should be to your smart phone -- consider downloading the TweetDeck app.

The reverse is true as well. Get the right endorsement from the right sportswriter (usually someone who uses "WAR" and "xFIP" -- though not necessarily providing the proper context while doing so) and you will have an army of internet experts championing you on their blogs and podcasts. Once hired, you will be showered with the sort of whole-hearted adulation that can only sprout from a place of naivety. Is it important that Sportswriter's endorsement came, at least in part, because, well, you were one of the nice front office folk who would chat regularly with him and occasionally swap some info? Shrug.

It is commonly accepted that there is more information available to the public today than ever before. As a result, each year fans are presented with new statistical metrics for evaluating player performance, opinion pieces from internet sportswriters ranging from one-person shops to mega-corporations like MLB or ESPN, and more video and photographs than any one person could possibly know what to do with. Formerly-niche outfits such as Baseball America and Baseball Prospectus have ramped-up their coverage of Minor League prospects and stat-heavy analysis, respectively, which in turn has continued to spur more focused interest among the most zealous of baseball fans -- not coincidentally, these are the fans most likely to be Tweeting, blogging, message boarding and otherwise opining on baseball matters out there in the ether.

So what? More information is always a good thing, right? Maybe si; maybe no. You can never have too much GOOD information. But without a proper filter, you run the risk of too much static in your data pool for it to be of any practical utility. Further, the presence of "information" across the web-scape has given the illusion to many that they have the evidence they need to reach conclusions about nearly every aspect of professional baseball. This includes in-game management, prospect rankings, player critiques at the Major League and Minor League (and even college/high school) levels, front office administration, draft strategy and execution, and the like. The reality is that most writers/message boarders do not have the RIGHT information to form strong opinions about many of these things -- this is particularly true when it comes to the front office.

Mr. MacPhail and Mr. Jordan were dinged left and right by bloggers by the end of their tenure in Baltimore. That can of worms need not be opened again, but it may be useful to look at the first week under Mr. Duquette to try and get a point across. The comments most frequently circulating the web regarding Mr. Duquette indicate that the internet experts consider him to be the right man to rejuvenate Baltimore's efforts in Latin America and to fix the player development system in order to provide a steady flow of Minor League talent to the Major League club. The evidence? Well, he signed a number of international free agents with Montreal back in the early-90s (including Vlad Guerrero) and there are a number of draft picks made under his watch in Boston that turned into Major Leaguers with some value (including Kevin Youkilis, Freddy Sanchez, David Eckstein, Justin Duchscherer, Carl Pavano, Adam Everett and Kelly Shoppach -- list compiled by "FrobbY", a message board poster at Orioles Hangout).

Setting aside the fact that the list is not as impressive as it is made out to be in the message board convos, what is known about this list? Channeling your inner-Rumsfeld you can quickly determine what this list tells you, and what it does not tell you. Then, you can figure out whether the info tells enough to act as a foundation for an opinion on the matter as a whole.

Things we know: These are players Boston brought into their system during Dan Duqette's term as General Manager. There is positive "WAR" value with this collection that is comparable or better than certain other GMs during that same time span. Baltimore has not been as successful (measured by WAR) in graduating Minor League talent to their Major League club over the last 14 years. The players listed had to be developed in some form in order to make the jump from draft day to their Major League careers.

Known unknowns (things that we know we do not know): What was Boston's process for identifying amateur talent at the time (division of responsibilities between area scouts, bird dogs, regional supervisors, cross-checkers, scouting director, general manager)? What role did Mr. Duquette (as general manager) play in creating the process used by Boston? To what extent did Mr. Duquette drive the decision to draft players in lower round (for example, one organization in particular operates such that the scouting director is the driving force in player selection, and he gives a lot of weight to the opinion of area scouts when it comes to lower round picks, as those scouts have seen more of the players in question than has the cross-checkers or scouting director)? Would Boston's process under Mr. Duquette still be effective in today's game? Would the Minor League player development process still be effective in today's game? What has changed? Of the "newer" philosophies relating to player (and particularly pitcher) maintenance, does Mr. Duquette subscribe to certain innings limits, pitch counts, focus on one defensive position versus two, and the like? Heck, what are ANY of Mr. Duquette's detailed thoughts on these issues? Who will his scouting director be? Who will his Head of Minor League Development be?

Unknown unknowns (things we do not know we do not know): Did you know that different organizations use different scout sheets and place different weight on different player attributes? Did you know some organizations literally chart every pitch of every game at large showcases/tournaments at the high school level? Did you know some organizations go out of their way to get specific video of players they are sitting on? Did you know some organizations have no formal process for charting games and no policy for recording video of players? Did you know that many, if not most, of the draft boards (preference lists) for Major League clubs do not look exactly like Baseball America's or Keith Law's? Did you know the approach to developing players varies across organizations to an incredible degree? Did you know that some organizations do not even have a uniform approach across levels for teaching the game?

If you are a savvy baseball fan you may know most or all of the "Unknown unknowns" listed above. Believe that the list of things the typical, or even knowledgeable, fan does not know is pages longer.

Taking your knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns into account, what does the list of drafted players tell you about Mr. Duquette and his prospects for success in restoring Baltimore's draft/sign/develop system? If you are honest, it does not tell you much. In fact, anyone extrapolating any significant positive or negative vibes from the hiring at this point is likely doing so to fit a narrative they have already subscribed to. Maybe it is a desire to be optimistic about their team, particularly in a dark time in the franchise's history. Maybe it's a desire to be pessimistic about an organization that has jaded a majority of its fanbase. Maybe a prospect hound loves the idea of having an exciting system and wants to believe Mr. Duquette is potentially the key to creating such a system in Baltimore. And probably the most common impetus for many bloggers and message boarders, maybe an internet "expert" just likes to have a strong opinion and to appear in the know, regardless of topic.

This blog entry (self aware) is not intended to be a lash out against other bloggers, message boarders, sports writers or, more generally, sports fans. It is simply a call for all of us to take a step back and think about what evidence we really have when we decide to shoot out our opinions over the internet. Think about what you know, think about what you know you do not know, consider the existence of other info you might not know exists, and proceed with some thought and responsibility. Sports are meant to be fun, to spark conversations -- to excite. Drying up all sports talk because the participants are not 100% certain of their views is not the goal. You do not have to be 100% certain of anything before you share a thought.

When your thought involves mudslinging against front office execs, such as Mr. MacPhail, Mr. Jordan, and maybe even Mr. Duquette a year or two from now, however, you may want to get as close to that 100% as possible before hurling your insults. That, or curb the vitriol just a bit. At some point the internet put fans under the impression that running a baseball team is easy. It isn't, and the "fixes" for a troubled organization such as Baltimore are not nearly as obvious as they appear.

09 November 2011

Free Agents - Second Base

This is the third of a series of posts on free agents.

C | 1B | 2B | 3B | SS | LF | CF | RF | DH | SP | RHRP | LHRP

It is with sadness that I must say that I have no expectation that Brian Roberts will ever be a meaningful part of the Baltimore Orioles on the field.  Effort must be given to replace him at second.  In this post, we will look at available free agent options and who the Orioles have internally.

For the purpose of this post, we are using the following groupings:
Elite: Greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Good: 3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Above Average: 2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA
Average: 1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA
Poor Starter: 0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA
Backup: Below 0.75 WAR / 600 PA
Jamey Carroll might be a good target.
No one below a projected 0.75 WAR should be offered anything more than a minor league contract with an invite to training camp.  The values were calculated by weighting performance of the past three seasons normalized each year to 600 PA.  This ranking does not consider injury status which will likely affect some players.

Good (3.5 - 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Kelly Johnson (3.5)
I have thought well of Johnson for a while, but no one seems to think of him as a good player.  I might be missing something.

Above Average (2.5 - 3.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Jamey Carroll (3.2)
Carroll is another second baseman who has flown under that radar.  He provides very good defense and simply gets on base.  He is not flashy whatsoever, but he does the little things well.
Nick Punto (3.2)
Punto has always had an amazing glove.  It gives him a great deal of value.  Much of his projection here has to do with his hitting performance this past season.  I think the projection is overly inflated.  I think he is a good example of using projection as a rough number that needs to be used with other tools.  Statistics alone, or any tool alone, is not a good way to make decisions.  That said, a metric rating a player higher than you expected sometimes gives you pause and reconsider the players' worth.  Personally, I think he very good year at the plate last year does not accurately portray his true talent level and skews the projection.
Jerry Hairston Jr. (2.6)
Hairston has a decent bat and he can still provide above average defense at second.  He has recently been used as a super-sub, but he really belongs at second.

Average (1.5 - 2.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Clint Barmes (2.2)
Barmes provides some power and excellent defense at second.  It made little sense for the Astros making him untouchable during the deadline, but he can produce.
Mark Ellis (2.1)
During the summer, Ellis was rumored as a player the Orioles were scouting thoroughly with plans of signing him in the off season.  Hopefully, it would be cheap if they do engage because he will be 35 and coming off a poor season.
Aaron Hill (1.8)
After two underwhelming seasons, Hill bounced back last year.  It looked like a last hurrah to me.

Below Average (0.75 - 1.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Adam Kennedy (1.2)
His projection is due almost entirely to his 2009 season.  Not a good indication.
Willie Bloomquist (1.1)
Bloomquist is a more athletic version of Cuddyer with a much lesser bat.  He plays several positions and none of them well.
Robert Andino (0.9)
Andino's value here may be below his true talent level after his solid performance last year.
Ryan Adams (0.8)
The bats plays at second, the glove does not.

The Rest (less than 0.75 WAR / 600 PA)
Craig Counsell (0.5), Aaron Miles (0.3), Jose Lopez (0.2), Felipe Lopez (0.2), Orlando Cabrera (-0.3), Bill Hall (-0.5), Alex Cora (-0.7), and Cesar Izturis (-1.9).

07 November 2011

Free Agents - Third Base

This is the fourth of a series of posts on free agents.

C | 1B | 2B | 3B | SS | LF | CF | RF | DH | SP | RHRP | LHRP

Nick Punto might be an option.
If Mark Reynolds is vacating the hot corner, the team will need to replace him.  In this post, we will look at available free agent options and who the Orioles have internally.

For the purpose of this post, we are using the following groupings:
Elite: Greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Good: 3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Above Average: 2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA
Average: 1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA
Poor Starter: 0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA
Backup: Below 0.75 WAR / 600 PA
No one below a projected 0.75 WAR should be offered anything more than a minor league contract with an invite to training camp.  The values were calculated by weighting performance of the past three seasons normalized each year to 600 PA.  This ranking does not consider injury status which will likely affect some players.

Good (3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Nick Punto (4.2)
This projection surprised me.  Defensively, Punto looks very good at third.  Just as with second base, his 2011 year at the plate also inflated his value.  Otherwise, he would be sitting around a WAR of 2.
Aramis Ramirez (4.2)
Ramirez' bat still looks strong.  At 34, he has a high probability of a precipitous decline offensively and he has never been a good defender at third.  He is likely to be the most sought after third baseman on the market.

Above Average (2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Casey Blake (3.4)
Blake's shoulder injury and his age puts 2012 into question.  When healthy, he is a solid option at third base.
Wilson Betemit (3.0)
Betemit is a poor defender at third base, but he has put together two good campaigns at the plate these last couple seasons.
Mark Reynolds (2.9)
If Reynolds is merely bad defensively at third base instead of being gut wrenchingly awful, then he would be very good option there.

Average (1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Kevin Kouzmanoff (1.7)
Kouzmanoff was always more glove than bat, but his offense has progressively disappeared over the past couple seasons.

Poor Starter (0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Robert Andino (1.4)
Andino's defense plays better at third base than second base.  Still, Andino at third means you have exceptional offense elsewhere on the team.
Eric Chavez (1.3)
A bad back might prevent Chavez to get anywhere near 600 PA.
Jerry Hairston Jr. (1.1)
Hairston is passable at third due to his bat.  His glove is awful.

The Rest (less than 0.75 WAR / 600 PA)
Jose Lopez (0.7), Andy LaRoche (0.7), Craig Counsell (0.5), Greg Dobbs (0.4), Mark DeRosa (0.3), Omar Vizquel (0.2), Felipe Lopez (0.2), Chris Davis (0.0), Jorge Cantu (-0.9), and Josh Bell (-3.0).

06 November 2011

Come on down, Dan Duquette!


Duquette at a Sabermetrics Seminar in 2011
Dan Duquette will be named the Orioles successor to Andy MacPhail as the head of all baseball operations for the team.  It has been a rough bumpy road.  Jerry DiPoto interviewed and quickly signed on to be the Angels General Manager.  Tony Lacava was offered a position and then declined.  DeJon Watson removed his named from consideration, which probably was not all that important as the Orioles appeared not to like what he had to say in his interview anyway.  Next, several potential candidates turned down interviews ranging from Andrew Freidman to Allard Baird.  It was not a good month for the team who essentially knew back in July that MacPhail was not returning.

Duquette has a tough assignment ahead of him.  He certainly knows a lot of folks, but he is dealing with a rather public shunning of Peter Angelos by many baseball professionals and that many teams have settled the market for scouts and managers.  That leaves the team in a bit of a lurch and may translate into a rather rough off season and, potentially, 2012 draft.  Even though I think the public piling on of professionals and media was a bit much, it is not like it was not deserved.  To some extent, maybe almost completely, it was a justified response to what has seemed like one of the worst episodes in hiring a GM.  Mind you, the worst episode was back in 2005 when Theo Epstein escaped Fenway Park in a Gorilla costume and the Red Sox interviewed five people (including Jim Beattie) before giving Epstein what he wanted.

Duquette has a rather uneven past.  As a director of player development and as a GM for the Montreal Expos, he oversaw that franchise turning into a power house through international signings and player development.  He took the rudderless Red Sox and rearranged them to consistently make the playoffs as well as create the foundation for Theo Epstein to succeed in 2004 with a World Series win.  He also had a rather unfortunate public spat with Roger Clemens and was known for being a bit too blunt at times when giving interviews with the media.  As far as he took the Red Sox, his teams were often a bit limited as well.  He signed players like Jose Canseco and dealt for players like Carl Everett.  The teams had awful clubhouse chemistry (as was reported) and that was associated with the team's collapses.

After being fired, Duquette has not had a lot of interaction with Major League baseball.  He quickly began to work in collegiate player development.  He was involved in owning the Dukes, a summer collegiate team from 2003 to 2009.  He also worked to establish the Israel Baseball League in 2007, which folded due to financial reasons after the season ended.  Also in 2007, he was a finalist to be the Pittsburgh Pirates CEO/President (it eventually went to Frank Coonally).  He is also a frequent guest during seminars about sabermetrics.

What does it all mean?

I am not sure.  Duquette is known to understand the value of international signings and player development.  He was big on that during his Montreal years.  With the Red Sox, he spent more time working on the free agent market.  He also showed during his time there an understanding of sabermetrics that was at most a step or two behind Billy Beane, but a good five to seven years in front of him in understanding the value of foreign players.

04 November 2011

Free Agents - First Base

This is the second of a series of posts on free agents.

C | 1B | 2B | 3B | SS | LF | CF | RF | DH | SP | RHRP | LHRP


David Ortiz might be a good value at first base.
Another area for improvement for the Orioles would be to upgrade at first base.  In these listings, I have also included several internal options in addition to free agents.  For the purpose of this post, we are using the following groupings:
Elite: Greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Good: 3.5 to 4.5 WAR / 600 PA
Above Average: 2.5 to 3.5 WAR / 600 PA
Average: 1.5 to 2.5 WAR / 600 PA
Poor Starter: 0.75 to 1.5 WAR / 600 PA
Backup: Below 0.75 WAR / 600 PA
No one below a projected 0.75 WAR should be offered anything more than a minor league contract with an invite to training camp.  The values were calculated by weighting performance of the past three seasons normalized each year to 600 PA.  This ranking does not consider injury status which will likely affect some players.

Elite (greater than 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Albert Pujols (6.9)
Pujols is arguably the best player in the game and is likely to pull in an 8 year, 200 MM deal.  This is likely to be beyond what the Orioles could afford.  In the near term, his presence can completely change a team with his elite offense and good defense.
Prince Fielder (5.7)
We mentioned earlier that Fielder is likely to be the better deal of the two.  He does not have Pujols profile, but he is a decent bet to give back value on his contract.  There are some concerns about his body type as people remember Mo Vaughn, but David Ortiz has aged somewhat well.

Good (3.5 - 4.5 WAR / 600 PA)
David Ortiz (3.5)
Speaking of David Ortiz, this might seem a little peculiar.  Ortiz is not a first baseman, but he does have a solid bat.  If we assume he costs a team 15 runs as a first base man, he still projects as being worth 3.5 WAR / 600 PA.  At 36 years old, he certainly is a candidate to see his performance collapse.

Above Average (2.5 - 3.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Derrek Lee (2.9)
The Orioles were quite underwhelmed with Lee's performance last year.  However, in Pittsburgh his offense blew up and he finished the year strong.  He could reward someone who takes a chance on him.
Carlos Pena (2.8)
Pena seems to be underrated by many.  He has a solid bat and is a solid defender at first base.  Chicago will probably look in a different direction for first base this year.  A team might be able to sign him to a short term deal for under 10 MM.
Nick Markakis (2.6)
Markakis played first a few times last year and, according to this system, is currently the Orioles' best option at first base.  However, he is more valuable in right field.

Average (1.5 - 2.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Michael Cuddyer (2.2)
Cuddyer can play several positions while playing none of them particularly well.  That versatility is valuable, but it appears to me that he is somewhat overvalued for his versatility.
Mark Reynolds (2.1)
If Reynolds is truly a -30 run defender at third, then he has to move off the hot corner.  If he is more in line with his career line of -10, then he probably should head back to third base.  He would provide decent production here, but he would not be special.
Luke Scott (1.9)
Scott's year last year caused his value to take a dive.  If last year was the result of several injuries that do not affect his 2012 season, then he could potentially be the best option at first.
Eric Hinske (1.7)
Hinske followed two solid seasons with a poor one last year.  It is always difficult to expect a bounce back season from a 34 year old who is better utilized as a platoon player.
Casey Kotchman (1.6)
How much do you believe in Kotchman's awful 2010 season?  How much do you believe in his outstanding 2011 season?  A good bit of his worth is also tied up into his glove.

Poor Starter (0.75 - 1.5 WAR / 600 PA)
Russell Branyan (1.4)
Branyan had a poor season last year and is also a bit of a platoon player.  I would not be too sold on him.
Lyle Overbay (1.3)
Overbay has been on a downward trend the last few years.
Brad Hawpe (1.2)
Hawpe is not the guy he used to be.  His performance has collapsed.
Juan Rivera (1.2)
Rivera has some value for a team who wants a contact oriented power bat off the bench.  Beyond that, I don't see much value here.
Nolan Reimold (0.8)
Reimold's 2010 hurts his value here.  If you believe in what he did last year, then he looks like a 1.7 WAR player at first base.  He could be passable, but you need to get more production out of other positions if this is to be a first division team.


The Rest (less than 0.75 WAR)
Mark Kotsay (0.7), Ross Gload (0.4), Xavier Nady (-0.2), Chris Davis (-0.3), and Jorge Cantu (-1.3).

Conclusion
If the Orioles are to go big then putting money down on Fielder makes more sense to me than Pujols for the reasons I spelled out in a previous post.  If the next tier of talent is considered, I would target a one or two year deal for Pena or Ortiz.  Beyond that, I would place Mark Reynolds at first base.

03 November 2011

Prince over Pujols?

As I mentioned in a previous post, it seems that signing Prince Fielder would mark for a remarkable improvement for the Orioles assuming a place other than third base could be found for Mark Reynolds.  Cost was not considered for the most part in that evaluation.  A couple weeks ago, I posted what appeared to be an indication that teams have been paying players on average 76% of their weighted WAR worth from the previous three seasons.  Using that method, Prince Fielder would cost about 18.8 MM per year.  If that is the case, how many years would it make sense to go with Fielder at that price?  What if he is about to demand more?  At what point do you turn away?  Making matters bit more interesting is a recent article that questions how Prince's physique will factor into his age-dependent performance.  Also, what about Albert Pujols?

Performance
The following graph showing predicted performance measure for both Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder with an additional projection of Prince Fielder with consideration for his body shape (from the FanGraphs post mentioned above).  Roughly put, players tend to peak around age 28 in their performance and plateau with a slight downward direction until about age 32.  Around age 32, they tend to decrease about 0.5 WAR per year until about 38 where the decrease is more like 1 WAR per year decrease.  There are certainly exceptions, but the population of players tends to go in that direction.  The FanGraphs body type prediction puts Fielder in a more extreme decline where he starts seeing a 1 WAR decline per year about 7 years earlier than the general population.  It should also be mentioned that, rather arguably, I have decided to ignore defensive performance at first base.  It could be argued that Pujols is worth about 5 to 10 runs more each year than Fielder.  However, I think the difference will be smaller with aging.  I think in about 5 years, neither will be suitable for the field.

A couple interesting things I find about these projections:
  • After ten years, Albert Pujols cumulative production appears equivalent to an average aging Prince Fielder.  Keep in mind, Pujols is five years older and is not seen as being able to play in the Majors ten years from now.
  • The body shape dependent aging Prince Fielder is done after eight seasons with a eighth one being a 1 WAR season.  He likely will be in the majors the following year (year nine), but should not be useful.
  • Again, differences in fielding are not taken into consideration here.  You could argue that there would actually be a 5-8 WAR difference between the two at the end of the contract.  It depends how you perceive their defense and how they will age affect their performance in the field.
How much is their performance worth?
In the following graph, I have taken the performance detailed in the section above and compared it with predicted contract inflation.  In other words, how much would it take a team to purchase the level of production Pujols or Fielder would provide if said team had to buy it each year in the free agent market.  I am assuming that a win is worth 5 MM this off season and that contracts will inflate 5% each year.


A couple points to take from this graph:
  • Pujols will be worth 200 MM over nine years and then be at or below replacement level.  An average aging Fielder will be worth 205 MM.
  • Over ten years, Fielders and Pujols production may have been predicted as equal, but Fielder is producing in the final year with a higher cost per win.  For this reason, he winds up with a greater overall predicted monetary value.
  • Fielder's accelerated aging curve flat lines him at 170 MM from eight years out onward.
Cost Savings: Predicted Worth vs Predicted Cost
Assuming that the previous few years contracts hold true in a 24% devaluing of weighted WAR production from the previous three seasons, we are looking at Fielder being worth about 18.8 MM per year and Albert Pujols worth 24.9 MM per year.  This yields the following graph on Cost Savings.

  • Albert Pujols at 25 MM would make sense through seven years.
  • An average aging Prince Fielder would make sense at 18.8 MM through ten years and would wind up breaking even after eleven years.
  • An advanced-aging Prince Fielder would make sense at 18.8 MM through nine years.
What if they receive greater per year deals?
Albert Pujols
The three scenarios I look at for Albert Pujols were his 25 MM predicted value, a 27.5 MM value (equivalent to Alex Rodriguez), and him hitting the 30 MM mark.

Where Pujols makes sense at 25 MM for seven years, a small shift to 27.5 MM cuts that down to a five year deal.  At no point is Pujols projected as a good value at 30 MM.  Due to players needing big money, Pujols may 'need' a big number like 200 MM.  In that case, the best deal out there would be eight years for 200 MM.  Perhaps you tack on an evergreen clause at the end at 25-30 MM per year if he hits certain performance marks in year seven and eight of this proposed contract.  Reaching that 200 MM level results in poor contract at anything above 25 MM.

Prince Fielder
The three scenarios I chose for Prince are 20 MM (simply because it is a benchmark numbers and 18.8 is not), 22.5 MM (it surpasses what Adrian Gonzalez is making and is equal to Mark Teixeira), and 25 MM (it is equal to Ryan Howard's silly contract extension).

At 20 MM per year, Fielder holds that value cumulatively through ten years of service while his aging counterpart keeps that value through eight years.  At 22.5 MM per year, he holds value through eight years with average decline and seven through advanced decline.  At 25 MM per year, he holds that value through six years no matter his aging curve.  With this knowledge, I see three potential contracts:
  • 8 years, 160 MM with a buyout of 10 MM on a 2 years, 60 MM extension,
  • 7 years, 160 MM with a buyout of 10 MM on a 2 years, 60 MM extension, or
  • 6 years, 150 MM with a buyout of 10 MM on a 2 years, 60 MM extension.
I would prefer those contracts in that order for Fielder.  I think you have to recognize that he does have a body type that is likely not to age well.  Some players, like David Ortiz, do manage to sustain performance, so if you are really in need of Fielder I could see an additional one or two million per year or an additional year or two on length.

Conclusion
If the Orioles are trying to win now, I could see it making sense to sign either Pujols or Fielder.  If the answer is right this very minute then Pujols makes sense, but if the win now window is over the next five years then Fielder makes more sense.  I do think the difference between the two is not as great over the long run as people think because of the significant age difference between the two.  When it is all said and done, Pujols will have the much better career, but they look somewhat similar in terms of production over the next ten years.

I think it is almost interesting to keep in mind the contract projection of 8 years and 200 MM for Pujols and 8 years and 150 MM for Fielder.  If those hold true, Fielder will be save his team 20-30 MM in terms of production while Pujols will cost his team 6 MM.  The resulting question is how much does that 26-36 MM difference mean to wins and losses.  From a free agent point of view, that might mean five wins total over those eight years.  If that money is instead used for signing amateur talent, it might be worth about ten to fifteen wins over those eight years.

02 November 2011

Orioles Year in Review and 2012: Outfield and Designated Hitter

Perennially neglected Nolan Reimold
In the previous review piece we identified defense at third base being a black whole in the infield.  A few days ago, we noted that the Orioles' OF defense in terms of range was a great hindrance to the team.  In our prediction here we think that the team is not 4 games below average bad, but more like 2 games below average.  That would still rate as one of the worst defensive outfields in the AL.

Left Field: Nolan Reimold (2.0 predicted 2012 WAR) and Matt Angle (-0.1)
First Third  >3.5 fWAR (Yankees, Rays)
Middle Third  1.6 - 3.5 fWAR (Red Sox)
Bottom Third  <1.6 fWAR (Orioles, Blue Jays)

Here at Camden Depot, we have always believed in Nolan Reimold as being capable of average to above average play.  He has good athleticism and plus power potential that could transition into a solid option in left field.  In 2011, the O's chose to start with Luke Scott and Felix Pie in left field.  Scott used to be adequate in left field.  He never had much range, but he took good route, had soft hands, and knew where to throw with an accurate average-strength arm.  Add that average defense to an above average bat and you have a solid player.  The streaky Scott was consistently bad at the plate and finally fell below what would be adequate range in left field.  He had a horrible year.  Pie wound up earning more time in left than he really deserved.  All of the positives in defense and potential with his bat evaporated in 2011 with Pie earning -2.1 fWAR.  Reimold was the only positive producer in left with a 1.5 fWAR, but often appeared to be place in LF begrudgingly by Buck.  The O's have never seemed to like Reimold.  It would be surprising to me if they do not, again, try to prevent him from earning any significant time in the field.  As a team, the Orioles were ranked 29th in left field production with a -1.2 fWAR.

For 2012, we have Reimold and Matt Angle as being the bearers of opportunity here.  I think the O's will have Angle in left as a fourth outfielder in 2012, but Reimold is likely to be iffy as the front office plans for next year.  

A 1.9 fWAR would ranked as 19th overall for LF in 2011.


Center Field: Adam Jones (2.4 predicted 2012 WAR) and Matt Angle (0.1)
First Third  >4.8 fWAR (Red Sox, Yankees)
Middle Third  2.7 - 4.8 fWAR (Orioles, Rays)
Bottom Third  <2.7 fWAR (Blue Jays)

For 2011, centerfield was nothing special for the Orioles.  I think it is clear that Adam Jones is good, but he is not a star.  It s easy to remember Jones' big hits.  He has plus power for a centerfielder, but his on base percentage is rather unimpressive.  Jones' poor ability to earn walks (4.7% which is about half of what an average player earns) counters his impressive bat.  It is also easy to remember Jones chasing down a fly ball, stealing a home run, or his strong accurate arm.  It is so impressive that MLB managers were polled by Baseball America in 2011 and they declared that Jones is one of the best defensive centerfielders in the game.  Now, defensive metrics are not perfect, but when every metric consistently tells you the same thing about Jones (that he is a below average defensive outfielder) then it just might be that the conventional wisdom is incorrect.  Over his career, he ranks as an average CF on the road and as a below average CF at Camden Yards.  It is our opinion that Jones could be a good left fielder (assuming the bat holds or improves) or an average centerfielder (for a couple years).  Angle is a solid defender, but he has no bat.  All of the players in centerfield in 2011 gave the team a 2.9 fWAR, which ranked as 20th overall in MLB.

In 2012, we think things will be slightly worse.  Our model prediction is that Jones will be a 320 OBP and 440 SLG hitter.  Basically, he will get on base about the same and show slightly less power.  We also think that Jones' defense will not be as poor as UZR and other metrics suggested this year.  We denoted him simply as a -5 run player in center field.  Angle's defense will hold out well in center, but his bat renders him a replacement level player.  Together we see them as a 2.5 WAR duo, which makes this a potential third tier pairing.

A 2.5 fWAR would rank as 23rd overall for CF in 2011. 

Right Field: Nick Markakis (3.2 predicted 2012 WAR) and Matt Angle (-0.1)
First Third  >4.1 fWAR (Blue Jays, Yankees)
Middle Third  2.4 - 4.1 fWAR (Rays)
Bottom Third  <2.4 fWAR (Orioles, Red Sox)

In 2011, the Orioles right fielders (basically just Nick) ranked as the 21st best right fielders in baseball with 2.2 WAR.  As we mentioned before, Camden Yards might underestimated Markakis' worth by about 5 runs.  With those added on, they would have ranked 19th.  What hurt most for the Orioles was that Markakis was stuck in a three month slump.  It was not until the second half when he began to show his old performance levels.

In 2012, we think that Markakis will bounce back and sustain the level of performance he showed in 2010 and the second half of 2011.  We see Markakis performing at a 360 OBP / 440 SLG level.  It is not a level that would be considered a first division right fielder, but it is solid performance for a second tier right fielder.  It is becoming more and more apparent that the Markakis we saw several years ago, the one in line to be the best right fielder in baseball, was not an accurate projection.  We will have to respect him as a good above average right fielder.

A 3.2 fWAR would rank as 17th overall for RF in 2011.


Designated Hitter: Luke Scott (2.6 predicted 2012 WAR), Chris Davis (0.1), and Nolan Reimold (0.3)
First Third  >1.8 fWAR (Red Sox)
Middle Third  1.0 - 1.8 fWAR (Rays, Blue Jays)
Bottom Third  <1.0 fWAR (Orioles, Yankees)

In 2011, the Orioles excited the fan base by signing Vladimir Guerrero to a 1 year deal worth 8 MM.  Shortly thereafter, Camden Depot was among several Orioles' blogs that were hammered by irate fans when we panned the move.  If I remember correctly, we projected Guerrero to be worth 0.9 WAR.  He wound up doing worse by achieving a 0.0 fWAR.  The Orioles essentially threw away 8 MM that could have gone to useful free agents or amateur talent.  As such, Vlad helped the team be the 13th best out of 14 American League teams for value produced by a DH.  The only AL team they beat were the Mariners (-0.2).

In 2012, the team probably is set.  Between Luke Scott (350 OPS / 500 SLG) and Nolan Reimold, the team is likely to get 3 WAR production.  There will be no reason whatsoever for the team to engage the free agent market paying big money.  The only argument I could see is letting Scott go to save money and pick up another lefty bat for 3 MM or so less. 

A 3.0 fWAR would rank as 3rd overall for DH in 2011.

Conclusion
2011 fWAR = 3.9 fWAR
2012 predicted fWAR = 11.5 fWAR

A target of 14.2 should be identified.

There needs to be more improvement somewhere along the line.  Left field might be the easiest area for improvement, but a major producer needs to found for there to be any sizable difference.

Next up . . . Starting pitchers . . . then relievers.

01 November 2011

The Problem with LaCava's Decision

Lots of things could have happened for Tony LaCava to decline signing with the Orioles.  Highly talented people sometimes don't take good jobs (see Rick Hahn or Billy Beane).  I think it might be presumptuous to say it had to do with limitations placed by Angelos on him.  Frankly, we do not know and it does not really matter.  If Angelos is a problem, he is a constant.  He will not change, so we must focus on the part of the team that can change.

So what is the problem with Tony LaCava's decision?

It resets the interview process with two days to free agency.  DeJon Watson and John Stockstill will not be given a fair shake by the press or the public as the best options.  Watson will likely be seen as the third choice and, perhaps unfairly, Stockstill might be seen as a placeholder.  In this light, the team has to interview at least two more people and that will set the clock back another week.  The organization was already going to go through some pains through transition and this delays that further.

At some point, it might actually be best for Buck to take a year off from the dugout and try being a General Manager.  I don't think that is best for the Orioles in the long run.  However, if they want to move quickly in free agency they need to start getting their plan in order.  That might mean continuity.

So again, the issue today is not that LaCava is not coming here.  There are several GM candidates in baseball who have as good potential as he does.  The issue is that the front office remains unsettled while everyone else is ready to enter the off season.

O's Targeting Other Japanese Pitchers?


Wei-Yin Chen in '08 Olympics
I was told the other day that the Orioles are more interested in three Japanese starting pitchers who are not named Yu Darvish and do not need to be posted.  I was not told the names of these players, but I think it is fair to assume they are the following: Hisashi Iwakuma (RHSP, Rakuten Golden Eagles), Wei-Yin Chen (LHSP, Chunichi Dragons), and Tsuyoshi Wada (LHSP, Softbank Hawks). 

Hishashi Iwakuma (31 years old)
You may remember Hisashi Iwakuma's name.  He was posted last year by the Golden Eagles and the Oakland Athletics won the right to negotiate with him for the conditional amount of 18 MM.  The Athletics failed to sign him after allegedly offering him a three year deal worth 10 MM total with the agreement that they could not use arbitration with him at the end of the deal.  Unsurprisingly, Iwakuma who had made 4 MM in 2010 as a member of the Golden Eagles did not see the point in locking himself in a multi-year contract at that amount.  By staying in Japan, he signed a one year deal at 4 MM, which was more than what the A's offered.  He now is able to enter the MLB market as a free agent without the restrictions imposed by the slotting system.

Iwakuma throws five pitches in the JPL: four seamer, two seamer, split finger, slider, and curve.  In 2010, his four seamer sat around 90-91 mph.  In 2011, he saw it lose some speed which might be connected to shoulder issues he suffered this past year.  Toward the end of the season, he was up in the high 80s.  His two-seamer is a typical shuuto in that there is not much difference in velocity between it and the four seamer.  I figure that will disappear stateside.  His split finger actually looked like a very good pitch last year, but has been less useful to him in 2011.  He throws it around 83 mph this year and the difference in speed between that pitch and his four seamer has narrowed.  I think that is why is now less useful.  Iwakuma's slider comes in the high 70s now and his curve in the low 70s.  Both look very hittable.

My guess is that a stateside Iwakuma will be a below average high eighties fastball, an above average split finger in the low eighties, and an average high 70s slider with a mix of a few curves.  This is likely to be someone who would be hit pretty hard as a starter.  Prior to his injury, he looked like a potential 4 or maybe 3 slot pitcher.  He has lost about 4-5 mph on that fastball and it completely changes the outlook on him.  I think he might be best suited as a relief pitcher where he might be able to get back into the 90s with his four seamer and may be able to live primarily off the four seamer and his split finger.  The more he has to depend on his other offerings, the more trouble he is likely to have.

The projection system I developed for Yu Darvish actually is very kind to Iwakuma.  In large part I think this is due to him probably being a different pitcher in years prior to 2011.  Over 200 IP, it projects Iwakuma to throw 137 strikeouts while giving up 77 walks and 17 home runs.  This would be good enough for a 4.12 FIP.  I think the current version of Iwakuma with his reduced velocity would be more of a 5.00 to 5.50 FIP pitcher.  If someone thinks he can regain his arm strength back, I could see someone putting down a 2 year, 10 MM deal on the table.  He might be able to get 3 MM on a one year deal as a relief pitcher.  The latter would probably result in him staying in Japan.

Wei-Yin Chen (27 years old)
Chen is a rather young to qualify as a free agent as he has finished his age 26 season.  He was paid 2.25 MM for Chunichi in 2011 and would be up for a significant raise in either side of the Pacific.  The lefty had been known for pitching in the low 90s and racking up strikeouts in Japan.  However, things seems to change in 2011.  Based on the information I have, it appears he has become a completely different pitcher.  His average velocity dropped from the low 90s into the high 80s and he wound up throwing 50 more innings this year.  This gives the appearance that he threw with less effort to go deeper into games.  With a new ball this year and power evaporating league-wide, it may have been a conscious effort on his part.  It concerns me slightly, but I have heard nothing of any injury.

Chen has a four seamer, two seamer, split finger, slider, and curve.  He primarily sticks to his four seamer, split finger, and slider.  He has similar offerings as Iwakuma, but has concentrated more on those three pitches than Iwakuma.  Chen also rarely throws his two seamer while Iwakuma has lately depended on it heavily.  The pre-2011 version of Chen threw around 91-92 mph often throwing mid 90s in the first couple innings and then dropping down to 88-90 after the third inning.  This season it stays and remains in the 88-90 range.  His split finger comes around in the mid 80s.  His slider used to be slightly faster than the split finger, but has appeared a tick slower this year.  Chin finished the season coming out of the bullpen for an important game.  He managed to add three mph to his fastball and stuck with his splitfinger with a couple sliders mixed in.

I think Chen has a better chance to stick as a starter than Iwakuma.  His decrease in velocity looks more like a conscious that will be quickly changed in the States.  At worst, I think his current repertoire will play as a below average to average starter.  As a relief pitcher, I think his increased velocity coming in from the left side could make him an incredibly valuable set up or left handed long reliever.  The projection system sees Chen in a negative light.  Over 200 IP, it projects him to strike out 150 while giving up 87 walks and 21 home runs for a 4.42 FIP.  That is five or maybe four slot pitcher in the Majors and could work well for a reliever.  I would be willing to give him a 2 year, 10 MM deal and see where it would lead while starting him out as a starter.  Of course, I would get my scouts to review him first. 

Tsuyoshi Wada (31 years old)
Wada will be entering his age 31 year in 2012 and has just made 4.35 MM for the Softbank Hawks.  He has been rather prolific at striking out batters and reminds me slightly of Koji Uehara in that he is a light tosser that relies on speed change and command to rack up Ks.  Like Uehara, he is also prone to giving up the occasional long ball.  I would not put him in the same caliber as Koji though.  I actually find it surprising if he can muster much more money out of American clubs than Japanese ones.

Wada lives off three pitches: a mid 80s fastball, a 80 mph changeup, and a 80 mph slider.  Based on the pitch f/x data, it looks like he works his fastball between 82 and 88 mph while coming in with a slider occasionally.  His changeup is a pitch he tosses in for good measure against righties.  Otherwise, you only see fastballs that vary widely in speed and his slider.  I imagine to be as successful as he is in Japan, he must utilize a pretty deceptive motion.

It will be difficult for Wada to be successful in the United States as a starter.  With his average velocity of 85 mph, he would have exceeded only four other starting pitchers last year: Livan Hernandez, Jeff Francis, Tim Wakefield, and RA Dickey.  Two of those guys are knuckleball pitchers.  No relievers throwing more than 50 IP would have used a lesser velocity.  However, when Wada has been used in relief he actually averages around 90 mph.  I think he could be a very useful middle reliever for someone.  As a starter, the system projects him over 200 IP with 128 strikeouts while giving up 77 walks and 16 home runs with a 4.55 FIP.

I cannot see Wada making more than five million on this side of the Pacific.  The receiving team would have to be overly optimistic about him being able to start.  I know we were fully behind acquiring Uehara here a few years back, but, even though he was right handed and showed similar speeds, he showed incredible command.  I just do not see that in Wada.  Wada's walk rate is more than twice was Uehara's was in Japan.  I just cannot see giving him more than what he made in Japan.

Conclusion
Compares to what they could earn in Japan, Wei-Yin Chen is the only pitcher who I think shows good value to the Orioles.  He has an outside chance of being a 4/5 slot pitcher working as a 90 mph left hander or he could come out from the bullpen with a little more heat.  His pitch f/x data just looks more like what I expect from MLB quality pitchers.  Iwakuma appears as if his shoulder is a problem.  I have severe reservations spending several million on someone who looks similar to several of our own right handers who were shuttled back and forth between Norfolk and Baltimore.  Wada looks interesting as a reliever, but I just cannot see matching what he makes in Japan in the US.  What works there does not necessarily work here.  It should be noted though that I have not evaluated these pitchers on video.  I have seen Iwakuma and Yada pitch, but have not really focused on them.