Closing in Camden: Who Gets the Ninth Inning in 2014?

As the proverbial paint continues to dry on the deal that sent AL saves leader Jim Johnson to the Oakland Athletics for second baseman Jemile Weeks, there were a number of knee jerk reactions to the deal, with most of them revolving how 'empty' the back-to-back 50+ save seasons Johnson had really were. True value of the save statistic notwithstanding, the swap was a curious one for Baltimore, with many questioning whether the return on Johnson was a bit lacking in talent and that Oakland General Manager Billy Beane perhaps got the best of his Baltimore counterpart. While Weeks has not panned out as many had projected when he was drafted in the first round of the 2008 MLB draft, a bigger, more pressing question looms for the Orioles.

Who closes?

The pitcher who comes in for the ninth inning in the post-Johnson era does have some sizable shoes to fill; yet, the need to keep the chain of 50 save seasons alive isn't necessarily the ultimate goal for the new closer. Consistent outings and an ability to get both lefties and righties out while keeping the ball in the park will be crucial mission requirements, with an upgrade from Johnson's paltry 7.17 K/9 rate in 2013 being desirable perk from the new closer.

As we have outlined previously here at Camden Depot, the Orioles bullpen heading into 2014 has some decent talent already in place from both the left and right side -- here's what the 2013 bullpen looked like, sorted by RE24 and a minimum of 10 innings pitched in relief:

Name	IP	K/9	BB/9	HR/9	BABIP	FIP	xFIP	WAR	RE24	SD	MD
Tommy Hunter	86.1	7.09	1.46	1.15	0.249	3.68	3.63	0.7	17.4	22	10
Darren O'Day	62	8.56	2.18	1.02	0.248	3.58	3.59	0.7	9.67	26	10
Brian Matusz	51	8.82	2.82	0.53	0.292	2.91	3.59	1	7.93	15	8
Jim Johnson	70.1	7.17	2.30	0.64	0.327	3.45	3.38	0.9	7.20	40	12
Josh Stinson	11.1	7.15	1.59	0.00	0.179	2.25	3.22	0.2	5.06	3	1
Kevin Gausman	23	11.35	2.74	0.39	0.296	2.00	2.33	0.6	4.99	5	4
Troy Patton	56	6.75	2.57	1.29	0.295	4.42	4.10	0	1.69	8	9
Steve Johnson	11.2	13.11	6.94	1.54	0.227	4.68	3.97	0	1.37	1	0
Francisco Rodriguez	22	11.45	2.05	2.05	0.351	4.28	2.31	0	-0.72	4	1
T.J. McFarland	72	6.75	3.38	0.88	0.304	3.94	3.75	0.3	-0.96	8	8

Already we can see where some of the nay-saying regarding Johnson's place in the pecking order of top flight closers comes from; three pitchers in the O's bullpen had a higher RE24, with each of those three notching fewer meltdown outings (MD) than Johnson's 12 last year. With it, two of the three had better strikeout rates than Johnson, a stat that many feel prevented him from being a truly elite closer.

So what of these three current Orioles? Does one or a combination of Tommy Hunter, Darren O'Day, or Brian Matusz have the stuff to shutdown the ninth?

In a word, no, at least not in a long term role; the next table explains why:

Name	OPS, LHB	OPS, RHB	L-R OPS Diff
Matusz	0.502	0.747	-0.245
Hunter	0.857	0.344	0.513
O'Day	0.922	0.443	0.479
Johnson	0.740	0.653	0.087

As we can see each of the three has fairly significant lefty-righty splits -- here we use OPS to display the splits -- which is something that your prototypical closer will not express in such a dramatic fashion. Here, I have included Johnson's splits as a reference; as you can see while Johnson's strikeout rates were less than stellar for a closer, his ability to adeptly mix his sinker/curve combo along with the occasional change up against both sides of the plate did much to make up for the lack of swings and misses and kept him on the mound regardless of hitter handedness. The aforementioned trio of Hunter, Matusz, and O'Day all are above average against same handed hitters, but struggle to get opposite handed hitters out consistently. In the case of O'Day, this situation arises from his submarine pitching style, while for Matusz and Hunter, the lack of a consistent third pitch that moves away from the opposite handed hitter creates much of the disparity in their splits. As such, each would be best fit in setup roles or carefully selected closing roles where the opposing lineup does not have the ability to pinch hit for opposite handed batters or lacks switch hitters; this environment is also ripe for a closer by committee set up for manager Buck Showalter in 2014. While he does have a history of shutting down the ninth, Francisco Rodriguez is firmly planted in the twilight of his career, with his repertoire best suited for middle inning relief roles.

Looking beyond the current roster, the ability to pick up a proven closer on the free agent market has diminished drastically in the last few days, with the likes of Joe Nathan, LaTroy Hawkins, Brian Wilson being signed; Grant Balfour and Fernando Rodney appear to be the only legitimate, somewhat reliable options remaining on the free agent market that doesn't carry with them questions regarding their ability to fill the role or their medical history. As such, the Orioles could be bigger players on the trade market for the remainder of the offseason, given the slim pickings of the free agent market.

For now, the role of closer appears to be of the committee persuasion, with a trio of capable arms able to to handle shared duties, but hampered by the reality of their splits keeping them from consistent outings in the ninth inning. That being said, a plethora of talented arms who have adeptly filled the closer role but have found themselves on the outside looking in -- or at least pitching the eighth -- on their current squads, but could be attractive trade targets for the O's to keep an eye on. Pitchers such as Drew Storen, Mark Melancon, and Ryan Cook qualify as pitchers with closer pasts or potential that could be had for the right price or prospect. Whatever transpires for the Orioles as they prepare for 2014, the role of the closer will remain one watermarked by its fluidity and volatility in spite of it being a high profile position.

Making the Orioles a Champion in 2014: Right Handed Relievers

This post is part of the Making the Orioles a Champion in 2014 Series.  Below you will find links to the other articles.  We will do our best to make sure the links go live with each new update.

C | 1B | 2B (1, 2) | 3B | SS | LF | CF | RF | DH | Bench | SP (1, 2) | RHRP | LHRP | Conclusion

Courtesy of masnsports.com

Looking Back

Despite the nearly 50/50 split of team pitching fWAR between them and the lefthanders, the right side of the Baltimore Orioles bullpen enjoys the lion's share of accolades for their pitching prowess. Whether it's Jim Johnson leading the American League in saves (50) for the second year in a row or finishing second in the AL among relievers with 40 shutdown appearances, Tommy Hunter amassing the second most innings for an AL reliever (86.1 IP) or ranking 10th in the AL for holds (21) on a fastball that averaged 96 miles per hour -- good for sixth-best along AL relievers) -- or the steady stream of outs generated by submariner Darren O'Day, the right side of the 'pen grabs headlines and narratives for their conspicuous methods of productivity.

At first glance, the right side of the bullpen doesn't appear to share too many similarities with its lefthanded brethren. Paced by the bowling ball sinker of Jim Johnson and the pure high-90's heat of Tommy Hunter, the Oriole righties display more dominant 'stuff' as compared to the lefties, who generally use location and change of speeds to do their job.

As we did for the lefties, let's look at how the righties went about generating their fWAR, broadly; again, we are limiting our evaluations to pitchers who threw at least 20 innings and rank their seasons by fair run average:

Name	G	IP	ERA	FIP	xFIP	RE24	FRA	fWAR
Jim Johnson	74	70.1	2.94	3.45	3.38	7.2	4.12	0.9
Francisco Rodriguez	23	22	4.5	4.28	2.31	-0.72	4.14	0.0
Darren O'Day	68	62	2.18	3.58	3.59	9.67	4.19	0.7
Tommy Hunter	68	86.1	2.81	3.68	3.63	17.40	4.20	0.7
Kevin Gausman	15	23	3.52	2	2.33	4.99	4.75	0.6
Pedro Strop*	29	22.1	7.25	5.51	4.1	-15.21	6.98	-0.3

*Traded to CHC 7/2/2013

Looking at FRA, we find that, Pedro Strop notwithstanding, the righties of the 'pen performed admirably, living in 'good, occasionally great' territory; however, when using Value Added (RE24), we find that Hunter was a top-10 AL reliever, coming in with the sixth highest RE24 for 2013. Comparing FIPs to xFIPs and ERAs, we also see that, aside from midseason acquisition Francisco Rodriguez, the righties of the bullpen performed as expected, with Hunter having a modicum of luck or defensive talent helping him out throughout the season (ERA < FIP).

Let's now discuss lefty/righty splits:

Lefty splits:

Name	IP	AVG	wOBA	BABIP
Francisco Rodriguez	12.1	0.213	0.282	0.296
Jim Johnson	36	0.275	0.324	0.324
Kevin Gausman	23.2	0.263	0.347	0.313
Tommy Hunter	42	0.294	0.369	0.300
Pedro Strop	9	0.300	0.384	0.379
Darren O'Day	20	0.298	0.394	0.328

Name	LOB%	LD%	GB%	FB%	HR/FB
Francisco Rodriguez	98.0%	26.9%	57.7%	15.4%	50.0%
Jim Johnson	79.5%	19.8%	56.8%	23.4%	11.5%
Kevin Gausman	56.0%	28.8%	36.4%	34.8%	21.7%
Tommy Hunter	79.3%	22.7%	35.5%	41.8%	18.6%
Pedro Strop	48.2%	28.6%	53.6%	17.9%	20.0%
Darren O'Day	88.5%	24.2%	35.5%	40.3%	20.0%

While his results are skewed by a small sample size, we see that K-Rod fared reasonably well against lefties, with only a couple of long balls really sullying an otherwise stellar showing against lefties. Another surprising and encouraging sign comes from O'Day, who does well against lefties in spite of his submarine arm angle; a batting average against slightly under .300 that is slightly buoyed by a relatively high BABIP shows that while he is best suited for same side match ups, he is able to get the occasional lefty out, usually via the fly ball out. Looking back at his use of O'Day, we do see manager Buck Showalter using O'Day a little more generously than managers typically use their submariners. Johnson's lefty splits are no real surprise, showing his sinker/curve offering to be suitable for getting lefties out without much issue. Hunter historically suffers from poor splits, with his propensity to have problems against lefties exemplified in 2013 by his inflated wOBA against lefties this last season, showing similar trends as O'Day.

Courtesy of csnbaltimore.com

Righty splits:

Name	IP	AVG	wOBA	BABIP
Tommy Hunter	44.1	0.140	0.162	0.189
Darren O'Day	42	0.154	0.206	0.200
Jim Johnson	34.1	0.266	0.292	0.330
Kevin Gausman	24	0.280	0.335	0.343
Pedro Strop	13.1	0.204	0.364	0.216
Francisco Rodriguez	9.2	0.349	0.490	0.400

Name	LOB%	LD%	GB%	FB%	HR/FB
Tommy Hunter	86.7%	18.2%	43.6%	38.2%	0.0%
Darren O'Day	89.7%	20.8%	37.6%	41.6%	4.8%
Jim Johnson	78.2%	21.3%	59.6%	19.1%	11.1%
Kevin Gausman	71.9%	21.5%	47.7%	30.8%	15.0%
Pedro Strop	73.0%	27.8%	44.4%	27.8%	30.0%
Francisco Rodriguez	72.5%	28.1%	34.4%	37.5%	25.0%

Right away, we can see how effective and nasty Hunter is on righty hitters; no home runs to go with a minuscule batting average against and wOBA all led credence to Hunter's top-10 RE24 showing for relievers. We also see the similarities between both Hunter and O'Day shine through, with O'Day also showing himself to be a tough at bat for righthanded hitters. Again, we also see the Swiss Army knife style of pitching coming from Johnson's repertoire and a big reason why he excels in the closer's role -- regardless of batter handedness, he has a way to get them out. As effective as K-Rod was against lefties, sans the homer runs, he is ineffective against righties, showing the largest swing in stats when comparing and contrasting effects of batter handedness.


Moving Forward

Much like the southpaws, there aren't too many things to fix on the right side of the bullpen when looking to 2014. While each of the big three -- Johnson, Hunter, and O'Day -- displays a particular weakness that could use shoring up, each of them are effective enough to remain in their given roles for next year without it grossly impacting the team.

For Johnson, a potential key to an improved 2014 will depend on his curve ball and in particular, the location of the pitch. While it still pairs exceptionally well with his two-seam/sinker as a change of speed and change of eye plane, 2013 saw him leave it up in the zone a little more than he did in 2012:

In response, hitters did a little more damage against it:

Year	AVG	BABIP	SLG
2012	0.143	0.263	0.200
2013	0.182	0.462	0.242

Overall, Johnson appears to be in decent shape for 2014, and with a little more snap and location to his curve, can improve upon a successful 2013 campaign.

For Hunter, room for improvement lies in his ability to effectively and consistently get lefties out; while he probably won't do it with the flair and panache he does it against righties, his ultimate fate and success depend upon him to develop a wrinkle against lefties. Looking at his repertoire against both lefties and righties, it appears he uses his change up -- easily his least effective pitch per his PITCHf/x pitch linear weights -- exclusively against lefties and is one that hitters have fared well against, in the form of a .624 batting average against and 1.500 slugging percentage. Hunter might find more effectiveness against lefties by scrapping the change and utilizing his curve ball -- hit at a .265 batting average and .588 SLG clip by lefties -- more against lefties, essentially becoming a three pitch pitcher against lefthanders. Given his success with a three pitch repertoire against righties, the idea that less is more might prove fruitful for Hunter in 2014.

The outlook for O'Day is tied to his health. After suffering from some hand issues later in 2013 that ended up being carpal tunnel syndrome, it appears that with an offseason of rest and possibly a cortisone injection, the submariner will be fine for the start of spring training. Beyond the hand issue, given O'Day's submarine mechanics, an increased propensity for hip and back issues arising from the delivery are possible issues that the medical staff could be on the look out for as the season progresses. Injury predilections aside, O'Day's success with his mechanics and ability to get the occasional opposite handed hitter out on occasion bodes well for him to continue to be an effective reliever for the Orioles in a number of roles and situations, primarily against right handers.

Other Options

One glaring omission from the discussion of the 2013 bullpen has been Kevin Gausman and for good reason -- he won't be in the 'pen for 2014. However, this segues well into a potential Gausman replacement for the spot starter/long inning guy that the Orioles are intimately familiar with: Jason Hammel.

Spending most of September in the bullpen after returning from a flexor mass strain in his pitching elbow last year, Hammel did show the ability to come out of the bullpen and pitch effectively. He is no stranger to relief appearances, having logged close to 100 innings in relief as a major leaguer, most of them coming earlier in his career with the Tampa Bay Rays. After a couple of seasons that saw him off to encouraging starts only to scuffle down the stretch while starting, combined with the logjam of starters at the major league level and on the free agent market along with the development of Gausman as the starter the team has always envisioned him to be, Hammel is behind the eight ball with respect to any hopes of starting in Baltimore. While he will garner a modicum of interest on the free agent market as a starter, the quality of free agent starters might put him in a place where a team friendly deal as a reliever might be conducive to his return to the squad in 2014.

Other internal options that could log time in the bullpen also include starter types such as knuckleballer Eddie Gamboa and swingman Steve Johnson, who will look to fill the spot start/long man role with the like of Hammel and lefty T.J. McFarland.

The free agent market for righthanded relievers is similar to the one seen for lefties -- old and injured, but with a few familiar faces. While the Orioles would do well do stand pat with what the current roster provides on top of what is down on the farm, a couple of names on the free agent market do stand out as potentially cheap, incentive laden signings who are looking to bounce back after injuries -- Jesse Crain, Ryan Madson, and Kyle McClellan. Crain, whose 2013 season was one of the more productive ones seen from a non-closing reliever in recent years, will look to return from a shoulder strain that kept him off the mound for the entire second half of the year. He could provide an additional power arm for the seventh and eight innings alongside Hunter, but without the severe left/right splits. Madson, recovering from Tommy John surgery, has had previous experience as a closer an set up man. McClellan, who pitched less than 10 innings in the bigs last year, is a favorite of general manager Dan Duquette and would be a low cost, low risk signing that could get reps in Class AAA Norfolk before joining the club. While McClellan in recent seasons has shown a propensity to give up the occasional homer, both Crain and Madson post career sub-1.0 HR/9 stats, with Crain also enjoying some success in limited innings as a visitor to Camden Yards.

What to Do in 2014

Much like their lefty counterparts, the right side of the bullpen doesn't suffer from too many holes. Should Hunter prove to be too susceptible to the big inning arising from his left/right splits, Johnson again leave too many pitches up in the zone, or O'Day fall victim to injury of ineffectiveness, there are enough arms in the minors and on the free agent market for a low cost solution to be pursued to fill the gaps. Overall, the right side of the Baltimore bullpen is well rounded as they stand. With keeping Hammel as a reliever or signing the likes of Crain or Madson to take the spots left by Gausman's move to the starting rotation and the unlikely return of Rodriguez, the right side of the pen has the potential to be even stronger in 2014.


All data courtesy of FanGraphs and Brooks Baseball. 

Courtesy of arcamax.com

 

Orioles' Pitchers Have a Home Run Problem

The Orioles offense is fourth in runs scored. Their team defense, led particularly by a strong left side of the infield, is very good. The Orioles' team pitching, though, is not good. They're 24th in baseball in ERA (4.25). They're also 27th in groundball percentage (42.2%), 24th in strikeouts per nine innings (7.15), and middle of the pack (tied for 14th) in walks per nine innings (2.93). But this team's biggest issue is the pitching staff's inability to keep the ball in the ballpark. (And no, the O's are not "too reliant on the longball." I keep reading about this team's issues with runners in scoring position, and maybe that's been a struggle the past few weeks. But here's the 2013 MLB average batting line with runners in scoring position: .255/.336/.389. As for the 2013 Orioles? .267/.329/.439. That's a seven-point drop-off in on-base percentage but 50 more points of slugging. I'd say that's a worthwhile trade-off.)

Overall, the Orioles have hit 194 home runs -- 25 more than the second place team, the Blue Jays. But the O's pitching staff has allowed nearly as many (184), which is the most in baseball by three (the Astros have allowed 184). The Yankees, with 155 homers allowed (ranked 23rd), are the next closest team in that department that is actually still in playoff contention.

As you'd likely guess, the O's have the worst HR/FB ratio in baseball (13.2%), but they're also tied for fifth in overall fly ball percentage (36%). Those are not positive qualities for a team doing half of its pitching in Camden Yards.

Here are the O's top five in home runs allowed:

1. Chris Tillman (29)
2. Miguel Gonzalez (22)
3. Jason Hammel (20)
4. Freddy Garcia (16)
5. Wei-Yin Chen (13)

Chen, Tillman, and Gonzalez, though not fantastic, have been three of the O's best pitchers this season. But Hammel -- and especially Garcia -- have not.

Let's also go back to the team's HR/FB leaders (for a slightly more advanced look instead of a counting stat). I'm removing Luis Ayala (2 IP), Jairo Asencio (2.1 IP), and Josh Stinson (9.1 IP) from this discussion. So by HR/FB, here's the new "leaderboard":

1. Francisco Rodriguez (41.7%)
2. Pedro Strop (26.7%)
3. Freddy Garcia (24.6%)
4. Kevin Gausman (20%)
5. Chris Tillman (14.4%)

First, a qualifier. Besides Tillman (179.1 IP), the other four names above haven't pitched that many innings (18.2 for Rodriguez, 22.1 for Strop, 53 for Garcia, and 40 for Gausman). Strop was a disaster for the Orioles this season, but he's with the Chicago Cubs now and is actually pitching well. He'll do that -- for a while, at least.

Rodriguez has allowed five home runs since he was acquired by the Orioles, and four of them came in his first four appearances with the team. Overall, he has a fantastic K/9 (13.02) and BB/9 (1.45), but mostly because of those early home runs his ERA is OK (3.86) but not great. The O's were looking for better than OK numbers when they traded for Rodriguez, but that's what can happen in a small sample when dealing for a non-elite reliever, especially for just a portion of a season.

It's sort of amazing that the Orioles allowed Garcia to throw more than 50 innings despite how poorly he pitched, but the Orioles were in a bind in May/June because of injuries to Chen and Gonzalez. It's worth noting that Garcia, who's now throwing a handful of September innings for the Braves, has the second highest HR/FB rate of all pitchers this season who've thrown at least 50 innings. He should be thankful that Clayton Richard of the Padres (25.5%) was so terrible.

As for Gausman, he has not pitched particularly well and when he gets hit, he has tended to get hit hard, but his strikeout and walk numbers are decent and he's still just 22 years old. Considering how the O's have moved him from the rotation (in the minors and majors), to the bullpen, and back to the rotation in the minors, and then back to the bullpen, I tend to give him more slack than some of the team's other pitchers. But if he continues to struggle again next year, when he's possibly in the team's rotation to start the season, then there will be something more to talk about.

And then there's Tillman, who's thrown nearly 180 innings, more than double his previous career high of 86 last season. His ERA is a bit higher than last season, and the increases in home runs and walks are a mild concern. But he's also striking out more batters than he ever has (7.68 K/9) and seemingly living up to the hype he received when he was acquired in the Adam Jones trade. Even if Tillman is not an ace, that's OK -- and he's doing a pretty good job of making sure the expectations of the cavalry weren't completely unjustified. (For more on Tillman and home runs, read Nate's piece from a couple months ago.)

How Valuable Is Francisco Rodriguez in the Orioles' Bullpen?

A version of this article appears at Baltimore Sports and Life.

I wrote a version of this article a few days ago for Baltimore Sports and Life.  However, I wanted to share it here as well as my writing here will see an uptick over the upcoming playoff run for the Orioles.  So, with some moderate excitement, I am back in a deadline deal sort of way.

Tommy Hunter / credit: Keith Allison

Is there really anything more to say about the Orioles' acquisition of Francisco Rodriguez?  I certainly think so and it does not have to do with the pall cast over the deal with the known and alleged incidents of violence that are attached to the team's new relief pitcher.  No, I do not wish to discuss my perspective Rodriguez pleading guilty to attempted assault to avoid jail time when he attacked his at-the-time fiance’s father or about the time he attacked Mets’ bullpen coach during a game or the allegations of repeated abuse that the prosecution came up with or about the Milwaukee abuse case that was dropped when his at-the-time girlfriend (who was allegedly attacked) and the sole alleged witness (a housekeeper) went back to Venezuela and were no longer around for the trial.

What I want to discuss is how this deal rates as a baseball acquisition.  To what extent does Rodriguez improve this team.  What are best case scenarios in a general sense using simple numbers to see how big a deal acquiring Rodriguez was for the success of the team.  To do with, I want to assume the following:

1. With 58 games left, there are about 25 innings left for the 7th inning righty, 8th inning righty, and middle relief / junk inning righty.
2. Francisco Rodriguez is a 3.00 ERA pitcher (let’s assume he is really solid down the stretch).
3. Tommy Hunter and Darren O’Day are 4.00 ERA pitchers (let’s assume they struggle down the stretch to the point that they are underperforming their current ERAs of 2.80 and 2.20, respectively).
4. Jairo Asencio and whoever are 6.00 ERA pitchers (this is likely a pessimistic view as to what the default 4th righty in the pen could do).

So, here is what we get without Rodriguez using the above assumptions.

		IP	ERA	Runs
7th	Tommy Hunter	25	4.00	11
8th	Darren O’Day	25	4.00	11
Junk	Jairo et al.	25	6.00	17
				39

This is what happens with Francisco Rodriguez as the 8th inning righty, again, according to the set assumptions:

		IP	ERA	Runs
7th	Darren O’Day	25	4.00	11
8th	Francisco Rodriguez	25	3.00	8
Junk	Tommy Hunter	25	4.00	11
				30

These two tables note that the acquistion of Rodriguez saves the team nine run.  That is roughly worth one win based on standard sabermetric practice (that number jumps around year to year).  However, is it adequate to simply look at those nine runs and assume it is worth a win.  Are runs more or less important are the end of the game or in situations where these pitchers pitch to the point where grouping it all together makes for unfair comparisons?

The Leverage Index suggests that maybe we need to drill down a bit further.  To those of you who do not know, the Leverage Index calculates how important a situation is in a game based on the number of outs, baserunners, men on base, and the score.  A neutral scenario would have a Leverage Index of one.  A consequential plate appearance would be greater than one.  Here are the Leverage Indices of Orioles relievers when they enter a game:

Pitcher	gmLI
Jim Johnson	1.81
Darren O’Day	1.42
Brian Matusz	1.15
Pedro Strop	1.12
Troy Patton	1.01
Tommy Hunter	0.95
Jairo Ascencio	0.89
Kevin Gausman	0.78
Steve Johnson	0.76
Luis Ayala	0.75
TJ McFarland	0.67
Alex Burnett	0.61

Those numbers pass the sniff test.  Johnson, O’Day, and Matusz are often placed in on the mound in tough situations.  Strop may seem like an outlier, but the team tried their best to keep him as a setup man and then 7th inning man until his performance found the team shipping him to the Cubs.  The point I am trying to make here is that even though the different between the two assumed righty sets above amount to 9 runs, 6 of those runs are saved in junk innings that normally would have gone to guys like Burnett, Johnson, Gausman, and, yes, Asencio.  Those scenarios were ones where the game was largely in the Orioles’ favor or their opponents’.  With that in mind, those runs given up in low leverage situations are not very meaningful because of the run differential in those game situations.

Instead, the important runs in the optimistic scenario that was detailed earlier in this post would be the focused on the three runs that do not score thanks to 3.00 ERA Rodriguez on the mound instead of 4.00 ERA O’Day in the eighth inning, but we need to determine how valuable those runs might be.  As mentioned earlier as well, a general appreciation of what a run is worth (about 1/9th of a win) would suggest that having Rodriguez is worth about a third of a win due to those three runs saved.  However, runs scored in high leverage situations are likely to be worth a different amount than runs scored in less important situations

Here is the score differential of the July outings when O’Day entered the game:

	Dif	Runs
July 24th	0	1
July 21st	2	0
July 19th	2	0
July 13th	-4	0
July 11th	1	0
July 9th	-3	1
July 7th	1	0
July 5th	1	0
July 3rd	0	0

Five (or 56%) of his July outings were games where the differential in score was 0 runs or the Orioles being up by 1.  If that stays the same then of those 25 8th innings to come, 14 of them will be games where the score is tied or the team is holding on by one run.  That difference now is about 2 runs (slightly less) in what you could expect between a 3.00 pitcher and a 4.00 pitcher.  That suggests than maybe the value of a third of a run more important, might be lower than that.

However, assume that for 12 of those innings pitched, Rodriguez and O’Day would be the same pitcher, but for the other two innings Rodriguez would give up no runs and O’Day would give up a run in each performance.  Well, how does that impact win probability.

Visitor
Dif	Win Probability
1	85
0	48
-1	14
Home
Dif	Win Probability
1	89
0	63
-1	30

Why are the probabilities different?  It almost all comes down to the home team having two innings to score while the visitor having only one.  If we look at the worst case scenarios (as a vistor going +1 to 0; as a home team going 0 to -1), we have decreases in win probability of 37% and 33%.  In other words, not letting runs score in the worst cases possible detailed above means a 3.00 pitcher is worth about 0.7 wins more than a 4.00 pitcher.  In other words, the runs saved in the 8th inning in high leverage conditions are roughly twice as important than they are in general based on the assumptions I have made here.

Where we are left is that under ideal circumstances, it is probably safe to assume that the addition of Rodriguez will benefit the team with an extra game in the win column, at most.  More likely though, his impact will be far less felt.  Differences in runs saved in high leverage innings will likely be rather inconsequential and applying Hunter to even lower leverage innings will likely be even more inconsequential.

In the end, the team gave up a second tier prospect in Nicky Delmonico.  A position player who was 100th ranked in Baseball America’s top 100 prospects has a 1 in 3 chance of being a useful starter in baseball.  At best, Delmonico was just south of 150th and probably no worse the 200th.  More than likely he will never make a dent on a MLB roster.  Even more important, Delmonico would have had zero impact on the Orioles in 2013 when they are competing for a playoff spot.  In other words, one would be pressed to call him a meaningful prospect.

However, Delmonico does not need to be a meaningful prospect to have value.  I’d suggest that his ability to augment a trade package is probably worth more than him being traded straight up for a reliever who at best makes the 2013 Orioles a +1 win team.  It is difficult to ever know what is possible in trades and it is an illness in the brain that us followers of the game tend to want to believe in an abundance of trade opportunities, but I do think that a package of Delmonico plus one would likely bring back to the Orioles a player of greater importance than Rodriguez.  Of course, this contention is somewhat unfair.  It is difficult for the addition of Rodriguez to stand up against a comparison of something that does not exist.  The vagueness of the unknown is certainly a draw for many to embrace and questioning Oriole front office authority has been a talent that has been thoroughly developed over the past decade and a half.  That said, I maintain that the health of the franchise is better served when second tier prospects are stacked instead of being doled out one at a time.

Sunday Comics: Welcome, Frankie!

I'm not the biggest fan of his given that he gave me an awful lot of stress attacks during his time with the Mets, but it's always good to bolster up your bullpen if you're going for a postseason run.

He's fun to draw because of how low he wears his hat, though.

...of course, we had to give up Nick Delmonico for him, so it's a case of trading the future for making a run in the present, and those always give me mixed feelings. But that's something we can think about later if things don't work out for the Orioles this season.

Also, look, I'm on time this week! Take that, thyroid problems!

The Bagwell "Bungle"

On August 30, 1990, the Boston Red Sox acquired relief pitcher Larry Andersen from the Houston Astros in exchange for minor-league third baseman Jeff Bagwell. The Red Sox were in a tight race with Toronto for the American League Eastern Division championship. The bullpen supporting closer Jeff Reardon was not doing the job, and Andersen was pitching well for the last-place Astros. Andersen provided the deisred bullpen support, allowing only three runs in 22 September innings; and, the Red Sox held off the Blue Jays by two games. Andersen was declared a free agent; the Red Sox hoped to sign him but he signed with San Diego. Bagwell, at the time of the trade a 22-year-old AA third baseman, moved to first base the following spring and made the Astros. He won the 1991 National League Rookie of the Year award and went on to a career better than that of many Hall of Famers.

The relevance should be clear - on July 23, 2013, the Baltimore Orioles acquired relief pitcher Francisco Rodriguez from the Milwaukee Brewers in exchange for minor-league third baseman Nick Delmonico. Rodriguez will become a free agent at the end of this season. While it's possible that Rodriguez may be so happy with the Orioles that they'll have an advantage in re-signing him, tangibly they've acquired him for two months.

Back in the 1930's, the Detroit Tigers had acquired future Hall-of-Fame lefthanded pitcher Carl Hubbell. For unknown reasons, the Tigers allowed Hubbell to be acquired by the New York Giants for, essentially, nothing. On the surface, that's a terrible blunder, but as it turned out it made very little difference in the big picture. For during Hubbell's Hall of Fame career, the Tigers were never in a pennant race that they didn't win anyway. So, at least based on that measure, the Tigers wouldn't have been any more successful with Hubbell than they were without him.

So, we have (1) an Orioles trade that is a parallel to an historical trade; (2) the historical trade worked about as well for both teams as they could have hoped; and (3) anecdotal evidence that a team can give away a Hall-of-Famer without affecting the number of championships it won. Given that, I thought it might be interesting to see what impact Jeff Bagwell might have had if he had stayed with the Red Sox - in how many more years would they have made the playoffs? That history might provide perspective on the impact of surrendering Nick Delmonico for Francisco Rodriguez.

Bagwell played with the Astros from 1991 through 2005; he only played 39 games with the Astros in 2005 and there was no postseason in 1994, so this analysis will look at 1991-1993 and 1995-2004. It helps that Andersen left the Red Sox as a free agent after the 1990 season, so we don't have to allow for his contributions. This analysis will also ignore any other moves that the Red Sox might or might not have made.

1991 Bagwell was the National League Rookie of the Year after moving to first base in spring training; he was worth about 4 games better than replacement.The Red Sox finished in second place in the American League East, seven games behind the Blue Jays. Even if Bagwell had played full-time with the Red Sox, which is doubtful, he probably would have been at best a 2-game improvement over the players the Red Sox did have. He wouldn't have gotten the Red Sox a championship.

1992 The Red Sox finished in last place. Bagwell wouldn't have made a major difference.

1993 The Red Sox finished in fifth place, fifteen games behind the Blue Jays. Again, Bagwell wouldn't have made a major difference.

1995 The Red Sox won the Eastern Division, so Bagwell wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason.

1996 The Red Sox finished third in their division, seven games back but only three games out of the wild card. Bagwell had a great season for the Astros, worth 7.5 WAR (according to baseball-reference.com), so they would have made the playoffs had they kept Bagwell. Maybe. The Red Sox' best offensive players were first baseman Mo Vaughn (5.6 WAR), designated hitter Jose Canseco (3.0 WAR in 96 games), and utility cornerman Reggie Jefferson (1.9 WAR in 122 games, 413 plate appearances.) It starts to get speculative here, but I'll say that if Bagwell had played all season, starting by taking all of Jefferson's playing time and the rest from Canseco, the Red Sox could have edged Baltimore for the wild card. It's not a sure thing.

1997 The Red Sox finished in fourth place, twenty games out and 18 games out of the wild card. Bagwell wasn't good enough to make up that dfference.

1998 The Red Sox finished in second place, twenty-two games behind the 114-win Yankees but good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell (1) wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason and (2) wasn't going to make them catch the Yankees.

1999 The Red Sox finished in second place, four games behind the Yankees but again good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason. In 1999, Bagwell did have a 7.4 WAR season, and the Red Sox DH spot wasn't real good, so it's possible that if they had Bagwell, they would have caught the Yankees for first place.

2000 The Red Sox finished in second place, 2.5 games behind the Yankees and six out of the wild card. Bagwell didn't have a great season (5.4 WAR) but that still would have been much better than the Sox got from Brian Daubach (0.2 WAR) in 142 games. I'll say it - the Andersen for Bagwell trade cost the Red Sox a postseason berth in 2000.

2001 The Red Sox finished in second place, 13.5 games behind the Yankees and 19.5 out of the wild card. Bagwell wasn't going to overcome that.

2002 The Red Sox finished in second place, 10.5 games behind the Yankees and six out of the wild card. And, they got less than nothing from their first basemen and desginated hitters. But by 2002, Bagwell was starting to decline; he produced only 3.7 WAR. It's possible, but very unlikely, that Bagwell could have made the difference and gotten the Red Sox into the playoffs.

2003 The Red Sox finished in second place, six games behind the Yankees but good enough to win the wild card. Bagwell produced 4.1 WAR; he wasn't necessary for them to make the postseason but wasn't by himself going to make them catch the Yankees.

2004 The Red Sox finished in second place, three games behind the Yankees. They were good enough to win the wild card and went on to win the World Series. It's hard to imagine Bagwell making the season any more successful.

Conclusions: Trading the full career of Jeff Bagwell for one month of Larry Andersen was a bad trade. It definitely cost the Red Sox the 2000 Eastern Division title. And it's conceivable, although improbable, that it cost them two other postseason berths and a division title (instead of a wild card.) The trade of Bagwell had less impact on Red Sox success than I would have thought.

Applying this to the Orioles trade of Nick Delmonico for Francisco Rodriguez, it seems very unlikely that the loss of Delmonico will make much of a difference to the Orioles. Even if Delmonico becomes a Hall of Famer, his absence probably won't cost the Orioles much. And, if Rodriguez pitches well, and the Orioles do make the postseason this year, it will likely have been worth it - Delmonico probably won't have more impact.

I was dismayed when I heard that the Orioles traded Delmonico for Rodriguez for the usual reasons - Delmonico could develop into a star, Rodriguez won't have much impact in twenty innings, even if he does pitch well in twenty innings, he wouldn't be that much better than what they could get for nothing. The more I listen to people, the more I look at the facts, I'm reluctantly becoming convinced that although the trade is a bad trade, it's a trade the Orioles should (and did) make.

O's Acquire Francisco Rodriguez, Get Marginally Better

Even if you're just a casual fan, you've likely heard by now that the Orioles acquired reliever Francisco Rodriguez from the Brewers in exchange for infield prospect Nick Delmonico. Heading into this season, Delmonico was ranked by Baseball America as the O's fourth best prospect (behind Jonathan Schoop but ahead of Eduardo Rodriguez). According to Baseball Prospectus, he was the O's sixth best prospect.

First, let's stop to note Rodriguez's previous off-field antics, which I'll briefly discuss (but won't have any effect on the breakdown of the trade below). In August 2010, he punched the father of his girlfriend after a game. He pleaded guilty to assault charges and received a sentence of 52 weeks of anger management. Then in September 2012, he was arrested for allegedly assaulting his new girlfriend. The case was dropped, though, because his girlfriend and the housekeeper, an eyewitness, went back to Venezuela. Some may have different opinions on whether or not such behavior matters when signing or acquiring a player, but facts are facts. Back to the analysis.

Rodriguez signed a minor league contract with the Brewers in mid-April, and he'll be a free agent after this season. He's also making a bit more than $2 million. So the O's are parting with Delmonico for a few months of Rodriguez's services. Rodriguez did start the year in the minors, pitching two innings each in single- and triple-A, and he was eventually promoted to the major leagues in mid-May.

In 24.2 innings with the Brewers, he had a 1.09 ERA and 10 saves (if you care about things like save totals). An ERA that low is obviously great in any situation, but it's misleading. His strikeouts are up and his walks are down from last season, which are both positives. But he's been lucky on balls in play (.250 BABIP vs. .276 for his career), his 99.1% strand rate is ridiculously high (the major league average is 73.2%), and his 28.3% ground ball rate would be the lowest of his career by nearly 10%. Again, we're dealing with a little more than 24 innings, and weird things can happen in such a tiny sample. But more hits are probably going to start dropping in against him, more runners are going to score instead of being left on the basepaths, and if his low HR/FB rate jumps any higher, he's going to see an increase in homers allowed, especially if his fly ball rate (50%) stays close to where it is. (Ed. note: Just wanted to clarify that last part. Because he's been giving up a lot of fly balls, any jump in his HR/FB rate would not be a good thing. I probably could have worded that better.)

So it's not surprising to note that Rodriguez is due for some regression, but he's still a useful bullpen piece that Buck Showalter gets to experiment with. Rodriguez should fit in nicely with Darren O'Day and Tommy Hunter to form a troika of right-handed relievers to pitch anytime in the sixth, seventh, and eighth innings in front of Jim Johnson. So that part is helpful.

But was that bullpen upgrade worth a mid-level prospect in Delmonico? That depends who you ask. Two writers I read regularly, Keith Law and Jonah Keri, differ on the topic. Law, who writes more from the scouting side of things, thinks the O's paid a "steep price" in the trade (Insider access required). Keri, though, believes the O's "didn't give up a ton" in parting with Delmonico, noting some of his weaknesses and then equating him to "something of a lottery ticket."

Some fans weren't happy when the O's traded for Scott Feldman because he's merely a decent but not great rotation option. But he's already thrown 26.2 innings for the O's (and has pitched better than his 4.73 ERA indicates) and has plenty of starts to go. Rodriguez, on the other hand, may not surpass that inning total by much, yet you could argue that the Brewers (with Delmonico) made out better than the Cubs (with Jake Arrieta and Pedro Strop).

In a way, it's hard not to admire Dan Duquette's gumption. When the Orioles have seemingly soured on a prospect or someone they've signed to a minor league contract, they're not afraid to cut ties with that player. Obviously shipping Delmonico to Milwaukee is different than losing someone like Jair Jurrjens or Jon Rauch, but the O's deemed Delmonico expendable and used him to shore up the bullpen.

I don't agree with the thinking that because the O's have Manny Machado and Chris Davis manning the corners that it's OK to part with any corner infield prospect. Why? Organizational depth is important. Players get hurt. And promising players, even ones viewed as expendable, can be traded in a package for more value in return. Feldman has been a nice pickup; hopefully Rodriguez pitches well, too. But if the Orioles are really "going for it," would it have been wiser for them to pool some of these mid-level assets in order to acquire a better player? That depends on the specifics of a potential deal, of course, but a front-line starter would look a whole lot better than Feldman or Jason Hammel right now.

Maybe that's a pipe dream, but I still think the Orioles could have done better in this situation. Shoring up the bullpen is perhaps the easiest thing on a major league roster to fix, but this trade didn't reflect that. Then again, if Delmonico never develops in the Brewers system, this trade probably won't matter that much.