Jon Jay is not your Huckleberry

The off season has been a peculiar place for some and not for others.  If we use BORAS as an expectation of market value, then the top tier players have generally found the contract we thought would be offered.  However, role players discovered their market drastically undercut.

This included a player like Jon Jay.  BORAS version one saw Jay as a 1/9.2 contract player while BORAS 2.0 envisioned him more as a 2/17.6.  Instead, he signed a 1/3 deal with another 1.5 MM in potential add-ons.  That is a significant underperformance from BORAS's perspective.  However, the way this off season has gone it is not surprising to see a player who is neither loved by scouts or analytics to have a hard time finding a home.  However, you might have gotten a different impression in the press.

MASN's Roch Kubatko gently wrote about Jay as the one who got away.  He noted how the Orioles tried to sign Jay before they agreed to terms with Colby Rasmus, but at that point Jay was asking for numbers similar to BORAS's suggestion.  Roch laments:

Jay is a better contact hitter than Rasmus, offers plus speed and defense and is a popular teammate. He always made sense to me as an ideal fit. But certainly not at his initial price.

Taking it much further than Roch, Baltimore Baseball's Dan Connolly decided that Jon Jay was the hill to die on.  He noted that Jay was "a perfect fit" (though somehow not a "difference maker") and that "...the Orioles fumbled this one."

He concludes that Jay was a player the Orioles "desperately needed".

So these are Jon Jay's last three seasons:

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
30	STL	245	.210	.306	.257	-0.2	0.3
31	SDP	374	.291	.339	.389	1.1	1.2
32	CHC	433	.296	.374	.375	1.1	1.6

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

From those numbers, you get a good idea of what Jay is, a role player.  He is not a star.  At some level, it seems peculiar how much teeth gnashing there has been for him.  It reminds me of the Arrested Development joke about how mesmerizing George Michael makes his girlfriend out to be, but how everyone else is a bit confused.

I truly am confused why a fringe roster candidate like Jay is generating such adoration.  Let us go through the pieces a bit.

Plus Speed

Jay does not have plus speed.  Statcast can measure sprint speeds of players.  Generally, an average baserunner, regardless of position, can attain a speed of 27 ft/s.  Statcast has kept data for three years with MLB presenting the average data.  During that time, Jay has put up max sprint speeds of 26.9 ft/s (2015), 26.6 ft/s (2016), and 26.6 ft/s (2015).  His 2016 26.6 ft/s mark was the second slowest speed for a centerfielder out of 58 players.  A tenth faster than the slowest, Mark Canha, and three tenths slower than the next centerfielder, Joc Pederson.  At left field, he would be tied as 46th fastest with Ryan Braun.  In right field, he would be tied for 45th with Carlos Gonzalez.  Whether we are talking about all players in baseball or the considerably faster subset of outfielders, Jay does not appear to possess plus speed.

Plus Outfield Defense

Defense is a tricky thing to measure, but it basically comes with a pretty steady conclusion for Jay.  Over his career, UZR has found Jay to be a below average corner outfielder (13.4 runs/150), but an average center fielder (1.5 runs/150).  However, his last two seasons have suggested that his play in centerfeld may be a minus or at best below average (-6.9 runs/150).  DRS sees him as a poor centerfielder and an average corner outfielder.  Statcast derived metrics had him as 2% worse than average in 2016 and again in 2017, that comes out to about a -7 runs/150 (they report does not break down differences at other positions).  To balance that out, I asked a scout and his response was that Jay earned that reputation early in his career, but that he is not the same guy he was then.

Great OBP

When Dan Duquette arrived in Baltimore, he noted how important on base percentage was and used that as a rationale behind signing Matt Antonelli to a MLB deal.  Since then, the Orioles have paid no attention to on base percentage and created one of the best teams in baseball from 2012-2016 on the back of prodigious power.  Still, this is a familiar drum that is beat whenever someone wishes to try to make a point.

In this case, that context is paired with Jay's .374 on base percentage, which was accomplished with reasonable batting average and walk rates.  That performance is not paired with what he did before or his age.  When you have more sophisticated approaches looking at what all that means with respect to future performance, the optimism should fade.  ZiPS sees Jay as a .338 OBP, which is .002 higher than what Steamer projects.  PECOTA pegs him as a .335 OBP mark.

So, is a mid to high .330s OBP a great performance? Last year's league average was .329 OBP.  That is on par with the performance by the Mets' Ruben Tejada or the Phillies' Cesar Hernandez last year.  It would have been 61st out of 141.  If Jay would have qualified with enough plate appearances, he would have been 14th in the league.  That would have placed him a point behind Yunel Escobar, who is still a free agent.  For some reason, I do not hear a lot about him.  Anyway, I think you cannot simply ignore his 2015 and 2016 seasons, so I think it would be a stretch to expect him to be able to perform similar to his 2017 season.  A lot of teams probably think this given how difficult it was for him to find a deal and how many would kill to have a .370 OBP player.

What Drawbacks?

There is an idea that in order for a player to be serviceable in the majors, he must be able to adequately do everything.  The worst contact hitters still have a high skill for contact.  The least powerful can still rap a ball over the fence.  The slowest runner can still likely beat anyone in a sprint outside of Texas Roadhouse.  What this means though is that there is a likely floor for most skills.  Chris Davis exemplifies this.  His contact rate appears to be near a threshold that renders the rest of his profile useless.  It does not matter how powerful he is or how head smart on the basepaths he is, if he does not get enough contact then he does not justify the rest of the package.

Jay is sitting there as well.  His bat profiles as a bat that is about 20% worse than league average, which means his bat projects to be worse than any positional average.  His power challenges for the worst in baseball.  He hits maybe one or two home runs a year and he shows no gap power.  He does not make up for this with savvy baserunning with only eight stolen bases over the past three years.  His walk rate is below average.  His strikeout rate is above average.  He is slow for an outfielder.  His arm is below average.  As he ages, the chances that one or more of these skills erodes further makes one truly wonder if he could still play in the majors.  It says something with scouts and analytics both go, "eh".

This is not to say he is without worth.  He can play all three outfield positions, at least adequately.  He gets on base.  Jay simply just does not do much when he does those things.  He is a frozen pizza.  He is not really what you want, but is close enough on all accounts to be palatable enough.  So, setting Jay as a hill to die on certainly feels weird.

How about Colby Rasmus?

Of course, this goes back to Colby Rasmus because the Orioles signed him as opposed to Jay.  Now, much has been made of Rasmus leaving the Rays last year.  He has been fit into the boxes of being weird, deserting his team, not getting along with others, but those have largely been overblown.  Certainly, he is a peculiar fellow in a sport where community is defined by adherence as opposed to acceptance.  Still, he is a player that teams have wanted.  Since La Russa and Rasmus fell apart, the Jays wanted him.  The Astros wanted him.  The Orioles wanted him.  The Rays wanted him.  A lot of teams have wanted him.  Time and again, he shows weird flourishes and has repeatedly chosen a better personal fit than a better contract.

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
28	HOU	485	.238	.314	.475	.2.6	3.0
29	HOU	417	.206	.286	.355	2.2	1.4
30	TBR	129	.281	.318	.579	1.2	1.1

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

Assuming his hip is OK, what we see immediately above is that Rasmus has had both an uneven last three years, but generally a much better three years than Jay.  While, Rasmus' OBP would appear to be much lower than Jay's, the other aspects of his game cover for that, such as his fringe plus plus power where Jay's is minus minus.

Speed-wise, Rasmus is faster than Jay.  Rasmus recorded a 27.6 ft/s rate last year, but was above 28 the previous two seasons.  Defensive metrics have adored Rasmus over this period.  DRS has seen him as a plus plus defender over the past three seasons (~15 runs/150).  DRS has viewed him as a plus defender (~10 runs/150).  Statcast has pegged him as average (0 runs above average).

So, the great issue is one between Jay's above average OBP against Rasmus' power and defense.  It does not look like a difficult decision for me between the two.

So what does all this mean?

I have no idea.  I am unsure why anyone was so fixated on Jay.  Likewise, I am unsure why anyone would be fixated on Rasmus.  What I think is clear is that Rasmus is a better player and potentially can be a game-changing force. To a higher viewpoint, the major issue here is why did Jay become the last hurrah?  This team is situating itself as a mid-70s win team.  The addition of Jay does not shake that much.  Whether you give the team an allowance for low spending or not, Jay simply does not push the needle.  If there is a hill to die on, it might be Alex Cobb or maybe the GM position or maybe the Manny Machado extension.  Jon Jay?

Danger at the Ballpark

As a child, my understanding of ballpark injuries was the scene at the end of Field of Dreams where the young girl chokes on a hot dog.  Baseball still felt like a secure and safe environment where the only harm comes from freakish occurrences.  That changed in Little League when our man-child, Skip, went behind the dugout to get a few extra swings in for hope in launching the ball over the pond and maybe even all the way to the Random House factory beyond.  Another player on the team, Chad, walked behind the dugout for some reason or another.  All I remember is a thud and a tooth skittering under the wall and ricocheting off my cleat.  Still, the danger of actual baseball seemed largely confined to where the players were.

I feel foolish to admit it, but the danger posed in the stands beyond choking on hotdogs was something that really only came to mind in 2006 when Jay Gibbons hit a line drive into the stands where it hit his wife, bruising her ribs.  At the time he said in an article that did not really take the incident seriously:

Long before the matter became personal, Gibbons had asked team
officials to do something about making it safer to sit in the seats
behind the plate. He contended that the 20-foot screen just doesn't
offer enough protection from hard-hit foul balls.
"It's something you think about every day here. Obviously, it's
something I've talked about [to] deaf ears," said Gibbons,
Baltimore's designated hitter and player representative. "I've got
players coming to me every day saying that one of their family
members got hit or almost got hit. I had an usher take one for my
wife the other day."

He ended the interview with the statement, "It's either come to the game and play Russian Roulette with your 3-year-old or stay home".

At that point I realized how unhinged the baseball industry is in protecting their spectators.  The protective special duty rule, the Baseball Rule, was established in 1914 and says that a team is protected from any liability if it offers protection for the area it deems to be most dangerous.  While all other industries have modernized their concepts of consumer liability, baseball has not and many legislatures have protected baseball from any changes in the application of the Baseball Rule.

This year every MLB team will have extended netting to protect fans.  This was initiated by the gruesome foul ball injury on a little girl at Yankee Stadium.  Somehow this injury sustained the attention of the media and sports industry.  This event did something that previous terrible injuries and death of children and adults did not do, make MLB take minimal actions in protecting their fans.  It is stunning it took so long.  Teams encourage families to buy these dangerous seats.  Teams encourage fans to engage in what happens on the scoreboard, with mascots, with attendants, and still expects them to be fully attentive to the game.  This includes the fan taking on blame for instances where it would be impossible for fans to be able to react in time.

This issue was so well known that MLBPA in the last three negotiations has asked for more fan protection.  The owners dismissed this out of hand and, admittedly, the players moved onto their own more self important issues.

What I am saying here is that the issue is that fans, like me, greatly ignore or underestimate the issue, owners largely do not care at all about the issue, and players care enough to note it but do not make it a core issue.  With the increase it screening, we should expect a decrease in incident rate from 1 in 28,751 fans having significant medical intervention performed at stadiums each year (which is likely under reporting because some incidents immediately seek care outside of the stadium grounds or hours to days later) because the baseball rule still does not adequately protect fans from dangers, such as maple bats splintering that are able to pass through the netting gauge size.  MLB is still playing Russian Roulette.  

This leads us to a book that came out last year Danger at the Ballpark.  The book is a sober overview of the issue.  It covers the early history of spectator injuries, the creation and implementation of the Baseball Rule, and goes through several case studies where teams and the league fought hard to retain the rule to prevent any notion of liability.  The book notes how fans have had their lives altered with chronic pain management, loss of eyes, and the loss of the loved one.  It is a hard read.

The book lacks Jay Gibbons' incident and his words, but it collects the words of many professional baseball players from interviews over the years noting how dangerous it is to sit near the field without protection and how fans are not trained to adequately recognize the danger or protect themselves from that danger.

Fan safety at games has been an issue I have been trumpeting since the day Gibbons, but this book really puts together the evidence and intellectual underpinnings of why MLB needs to change.  If you want to hone up on that rationale or challenge yourself if you have a different opinion, this book will do its best to push you to recognize the danger at the ballpark.

_____

Danger at the Ballpark

Jack Herskowitz

Trimark Press 

What's Next For Trey Mancini?

There's a lot to like about Trey Mancini. Mancini never made any top-100 lists on his climb up the Orioles' minor league system, but he hit at every stop along the way. The big question mark: Would it stick when he reached the majors? So far, it has.

When Mancini first appeared, at the end of the 2016 season, he homered in his second at-bat. A couple days later, in his second start at DH, he homered again. He did the same thing two days later, in his third start -- three starts, five hits, three homers. Not bad. He only got one more chance to start in 2016, but he made his first, brief act in the major leagues memorable.

Mancini made the club to start the 2017 season, and he won the battle over Hyun Soo Kim for regular work in left field. It helped that he tied a major league mark by homering seven times in his first 12 career games. Mancini also saw an extended stretch at first base in June and early July while Chris Davis was on the disabled list.

At the end of the year, Mancini stepped to the plate 586 times and posted a slash line of .293/.338/.488 and a wRC+ of 117. By Baseball-Reference's version of wins above replacement, he was worth 2.2 wins. By FanGraphs' version, he was worth 1.8 wins. That performance helped Mancini finish third in the American League Rookie of the Year voting, behind Aaron Judge and Andrew Benintendi. That's pretty good company.

Mancini deserves some credit for not being a complete disaster in the outfield. With Davis and Mark Trumbo on the roster and clogging the 1B/DH spots when they're healthy, Mancini has nowhere to fit on the roster unless he's playing in the outfield. That was a challenge, because he exclusively played first base in the minors. To my untrained scouting eye, Mancini looked somewhere between below average and average in left field in 2017. He doesn't have a strong arm and didn't always get the best jumps on batted balls, but he typically made the routine plays.

By Defensive Runs Saved, Mancini finished -1 in his 729 innings in left field. He fared worse in Ultimate Zone Rating, with a UZR/150 of -7.3. Neither of these numbers is far from definitive, and the more innings Mancini plays, the more it'll reveal about his true outfield abilities. Still, his ceiling as an outfielder is basically "he's fine," so most of his value will have to come from his bat.

Fortunately, Mancini did hit. Among all qualified left fielders last season (meaning players who played some left field), Mancini's 117 wRC+ was ninth best. He didn't hit that well while actually playing left field, but the important thing is that he hit well, period:

as LF: 101 wRC+ (343 PA)
as 1B: 152 wRC+ (157 PA)
as DH: 116 wRC+ (73 PA)

Let's look a little more in-depth into Mancini's hitting. In 2017, he was pretty fortunate on balls in play falling in for hits. His .352 BABIP was 12th best in the majors among qualified hitters, which is pretty high for someone who isn't a fast runner and who didn't hit the ball extremely hard. Mancini's percentage of hard-hit balls, 34.1%, tied for 68th in the majors. The average exit velocity on his batted balls was 88.6 mph (t-106th, min. 30 batted balls). For a power hitter type, Mancini also hit the ball on the ground more than half of the time (51%, 16th highest in the majors). Since ground balls are more likely to fall in for hits than balls hit in the air, that may partially explain the high BABIP.

Still, maybe what's more important for Mancini is how he continues to adjust to how pitchers attacked him in the second half of the season. Pitchers didn't change much from month to month in the types of pitches they threw to Mancini, but they did change the location. (Camden Chat noticed this as well last June.)

In the first half, pitchers were not afraid to challenge Mancini in the middle of the zone:

In the second half, that changed:

It's not a drastic change, but there are more pitches down and away and less in the middle and up. Combined with this change and some worse luck on balls in play, Mancini was not as successful in the second half:

1st half: 135 wRC+, .385 BABIP, 36.7 Hard%, 15.4 Soft%
2nd half: 101 wRC+, .325 BABIP, 31.8 Hard%, 23.2 Soft%

While Mancini made worse contact, one positive is that he walked about the same (5.7 BB% vs. 5.6) while striking out less (26.4 K% vs. 21.2).

So, to which of those versions is Mancini closer? The Orioles and Mancini clearly hope it's the first one, and that Mancini has another gear. Mancini is not going to become some wizard with the glove, so any gains are almost certainly going to have to come from the offensive end.

Mancini knows he must keep improving and adjusting. During a spring training interview, Mancini answered a question from Jim Palmer on what he worked on during the offseason. Mancini said:

"I think I had a lot of wasted movement in my swing last year. So in the offseason, I focused on keeping my head in the same place, which is back more, and still having a forward movement with my step. But I try to keep my head in the same spot and I tried to eliminate the leg kick. I thought it was a little unnecessary and kind of made my head move a little. So those are two kind of minor things that I tried to fine-tune this offseason."

Are things different? You decide. The first GIF here is from a Mancini home run from last August:

And here's a Mancini bomb during spring training:

The differences aren't that noticeable. Mancini's leg kick does seem a little more understated, and his head seems to move less. He also appears to be standing a little less upright now. But it's not like Mancini said he was going to overhaul his swing, and he didn't need to. Anything different here is minor.

In 18 spring training plate appearances, Mancini is slashing .333/.444/.733. It's probably better that Mancini is hitting well now than struggling, but it's unknown whether any of the minor changes above will lead to improvement during the regular season. Pitchers are going to keep looking for new ways to attack Mancini, and he'll need to come up with solutions. He seems up to the challenge.

Stats via FanGraphs, Baseball-Reference, Baseball Savant, and Brooks Baseball. Photo via Keith Allison.

Orioles Could Use Neil Walker

When the Orioles picked up Danny Valencia and Pedro Alvarez, the common refrain amongst observers of the Orioles was just where exactly would Valencia fit.  The idea for some would be that if Mark Trumbo would magically disappear that Valencia and Alvarez could form a formidable one-two designated hitter punch.  For instance, Valencia can punish southpaws fairly well (136 wRC+ for career) while Alvarez hits right handers at a 117 wRC+ career clip.  As a fringe, righty hitting designated hitter, it is not incredibly surprising how little interest Pedro Alvarez generates from other MLB clubs as well as how little he played last year.  What is surprising is that Valencia, a poor fielder who only really hits left handers, has seen extensive playing time the past two seasons. 

While Valencia is a poor fielder, he can fill in first, second, third, and corner outfield positions in a pinch.  That is a terrible solution long term, but if your starter needs a breather or you need time to find a serviceable alternative when a starter goes down, then Valencia helps provide a barely adequate solution.  Alvarez, on the other hand, can hold a bat.  He used to play third base, but saw his athleticism vanish in Pittsburgh.  He has attempted to play first base, but he lacked the footwork and touch.  Last year was an experiment in the outfield and was something we just don't want to discuss.  Whereas Valencia can be a solution in a pinch, Alvarez simply does not offer that.

So, the question is whether or not the club can improve upon what it has in Alvarez.  This rather unseemly off-season has provided the Orioles with a potential option.  That option would be in the vein of Valencia.  A player who can perform in the field to a varying degree and provide value as a left handed option in the lineup or off the bench.  His name is Neil Walker.

This might be a surprise.  Last year, Neil Walker played under a qualifying offer, making 17.2 MM.  This year, it is the beginning of March and he remains a free agent.  Walker's market appears to be dwindling as fewer teams have any true need for a second baseman or even a third baseman.  This might make Walker more open to spending the 2018 season in a bit of flux, position-wise. 

Now, Neil Walker is not a good utility defender.  He has performed slightly below average at second base and slightly below average at third base.  In fact, he has spent more time as a catcher (168 games) in his professional career than he has in the outfield (0 games).  He is a switch hitter, but is really only proficient as a left handed hitter with a 122 wRC+ line.  In other words, his offensive value is similar to Alvarez', but he can actually be used in the field.

Neil Walker's Last Five

Year	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+
2013	.251	.339	.418	114
2014	.271	.342	.467	126
2015	.269	.328	.427	106
2016	.282	.347	.476	121
2017	.265	.362	.439	111

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/5/2018.

Last year, the Orioles' player with the highest on base percentage who met qualified status was Jonathan Schoop along with Trey Mancini with a .338 mark.  Walker's .362 was much higher.  Over the past five years, his worst performance was a .328 offering that would have  settled in behind those two, but be ahead of Adam Jones' .322 mark.  Needless to say, Walker does something repeatedly in the most recent past that no one else on the club seems to be doing regularly, getting on base.

Walker could be used as a leadoff man in a similar fashion as Seth Smith.  In fact, he basically is Seth Smith.  Both run about the same (~26.5 ft/s).  Both get on base around the same rate.  Both have similar power production.  Neither are considered special defenders.  Walker though can play at more restrictive positions.  Walker is also three years younger.  It is why BORAS projected Smith as a non-roster invite while Walker was put at a 2/22 value.  Walker will not see that money, it seems, as this offseason appears to have marked a point where the value of players is now somehow different.

What this might mean is provide the Orioles with an opportunity.  Walker gives the club a strong platoon option at designated hitter.  He also can be used as depth for third base or second base.  As such, he checks more boxes than Alvarez does.  In addition to that, a multi-year deal could also provide the Orioles with a respectable cover for 2019 if Manny Machado leaves.  Walker can fill in at second or third with Tim Beckham and Schoop shifting around.

In other words, perhaps 2018 would see Neil Walker as the Orioles poor man's version of prime Ben Zobrist.  And, perhaps, in 2019 he offers a baseline solution to what certainly appears will be a need.

Crystal Ball: Year 1 Post Angelos

This off season and spring training has been a slow one for baseball and the Baltimore Orioles.  It appears that MLB at large decided to do what the Orioles have been doing under Dan Duquette: wait out the market.  Waiting out the market, particularly when so many others are waiting out the market, brings on the anxiety and a rush for explanation.  Adding to that unease, is that the Orioles currently stand about 30 to 40 MM under where their payroll sat last year.

There were reasons though to think that a constriction of payroll was coming.  One, the Orioles did not make the post-season and did not get to taste the extra revenue that brings.  Two, MASN ratings decreased (26% decrease from 2016) and, we believe, that cable rates were renegotiated with providers this past off season.  Three, the club was already highly leveraging their revenue to the extent that it was unique.  Four, I had some peripheral interactions that led me to think that the club was perhaps reorganizing allocation of assets for sale of the franchise.

That last point has had the most travel with people discussing it.  The Angelos ownership group gives some giddiness with the thought that a major player will come in, buy the team, increase payroll, and the club will win out.  I personally think the assumptions at play there are a bit too optimistic.  When one looks at payroll leverage, the average club invests 46% of their revenue into their payroll.  Mets, Indians, and Giants are good examples of teams with vastly different revenues who all settle in there.  Half of baseball falls within about ten percent of that rate.

Last year, the Marlins were leveraged 58% into payroll, which was fourth most.  After the roster exodus, the club now sits at 42%.  While the meager revenue stream in Miami (compared to MLB in general) makes that 86 MM payroll look lean, it actually is a common carrying amount of leverage.  Some point to the Red Sox after John Henry bought the club.  His first payroll saw a decrease from 65% payroll leverage to 54% leverage (which was league average at that point in time).

Really the only team that has bounced that trend was the cash flushed Magic Johnson et al. purchase of the cash poor and inept McCourt ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers where they more than doubled payroll.  One would argue that there are major differences there.  One, the Dodgers had an absurdly wonderful new television deal coming into play and, two, did not have the crippling debt that the McCourts had.

While the Orioles have not been a stranger to debt, running into some accounting troubles a few years back, they are thought not to be struggling under the debts accrued by the club.  However, there are concerns that a re-consolidation purchase under John Angelos would be the best case scenario and, yet, still have major issues with respect to buying out the partners that would be leaving and needing replacements.  Any new group would likely be met with a hard purchase from the Angelos group and that being coupled with an uncertain value for MASN (due to arbitration and court issues) and a market that is somewhat undermined with the presence of the bigger and more cash flushed DC metropolitan area being controlled by the Nationals.

What is going for the team is that the local fan base is heavily engaged in the club with the team often finding itself in the top ten, if not top five, in tv ratings.  That is somewhat lessened by the small media market when that rating figure is translated into actual households.  In the end, a strong argument can be made that the Orioles are a small market team and that argument is validated by how MLB views the Orioles within revenue sharing.

What direction this all points us in is that the Orioles, when ownership transitions, will likely see a reduction in payroll.  Last year the Orioles leveraged their revenue around 65% (2nd overall).  With the reduction in payroll this year, that figure now sits at 53% (7th overall).  There is some indication that the club will make one more signing and could well wind up around 57%.  Anyway, if we assume that the team will drop down to a league average payroll, we are looked at a figure of around 114 MM.

To get to 114 MM in 2019, it will actually be quite easy.  The team stands now at 134 MM.  The departures of Adam Jones and Manny Machado would take the payroll down to 101 MM.  Zach Britton would be another significant departure of 12 MM.  Get rid of those free agents and others (e.g., Brad Brach, Chris Tillman) and figure in potential arbitration raises, you get a potential payroll of about 94 to 110 MM for 2019.

I think it would be reasonable to think that a sale this year or in the off-season would result in a freezing of the roster for 2019.  2020 would then present the likely scenario for what the new ownership group would be able to afford.  History would dictate something in the neighborhood of 105-125 MM, which is slightly below where the club is now.

Colby Rasmus is a Perfectly Average Baseball Player

"Average" gets a bad rap in sports. Saying someone is average seems to imply that, actually, they are not just not good, they are bad. Being average means you don't do anything well, you're not exciting, and a team can, and should, have someone better. Being average, though, is far from being bad. In fact, one of the hallmarks of the Orioles run since 2012 was that the team avoided having bad players. They didn't have a ton of great players, necessarily, but the team was stocked with average to good talent that avoided having several spots on the field manned by below average scrubs.

This changed in 2017, as just six position players put up more than 1 fWAR, matching 2015 as the low mark since 2012. Not only did the Orioles not have a great deal of high end performances last season, they also had more low end performances than we are used to seeing.

Enter Colby Rasmus, left handed hitting outfielder, who signed a minor league deal prior to the start of Spring Training. Rasmus made headlines after walking away from the Tampa Bay Rays (and, at the time, baseball in general) last season, despite posting an outstanding 132 WRC+ in 37 games. Rasmus has had an odd career, going from one of the most highly touted prospects in baseball to being a bust and then becoming a solid regular before growing a crazy beard and quitting the game. The idea of him being a five tool player never quite came to pass, but Rasmus has had a pretty...well, average career.

Generally, 2 WAR is considered average. Rasmus has played nine seasons in the big leagues and has generated 19.7 fWAR. That's an (wait for it) average of 2.2 fWAR per year. WRC+ normalizes production and weights it to 100, with players being sorted based on how much better or worse they are than the average. Rasmus' career WRC+? 103. wOBA, or weighted on base average, is an attempt to measure overall value and the average player will have around a .320 mark. Colby Rasmus has a .324 wOBA in his career. How about defense? I know defensive stats have issues and shouldn't necessarily be relied upon fully, but Rasmus has a 2.9 UZR/150 games played mark in his career. An average player puts up between 0 and 5 UZR.

This is, honestly, kind of remarkable. Since 2009, the only players to have similar offensive stats and basically the same WAR output as Rasmus are Austin Jackson, Russell Martin, Denard Span, Carlos Gomez, Jhonny Peralta, and Yunel Escobar. I don't know about you, but if I was asked to name some average big league baseball players that would be a pretty comprehensive list. None of those players are great, though like Rasmus some have had great seasons, but in general they have been solid, more or less every day players over the past decade.

It's not often you see a player as average as Colby Rasmus. If he's not the Platonic ideal of averageness, he's certainly up there. And this, I think, is where the problem may lie. While being an average player isn't bad, Orioles fans were almost certainly hoping for something more. Not only that, Rasmus hasn't played a full slate of games since 2012 and is an obvious platoon candidate. Given the revolving corner outfield door since Nick Markakis left after the 2014 season, it seems more than a little underwhelming that the starting right fielder on Opening Day could well be Rasmus.

It's far from a lock that Rasmus even makes the team, of course. He's competing against multiple guys with similar skill sets, Austin Hays may force his way onto the roster, and there's every indication that the O's will keep at least two Rule 5 picks counting Anthony Santander. There's also the (lessening by the day) possibility that the team goes out and signs someone like Carlos Gonzalez. If Rasmus does make the team, however, there's a good chance he puts up some pretty average numbers, and that's just fine!

Leadoff Hitters In The Buck Showalter Era

Colby Rasmus has served as the Orioles' leadoff hitter a couple times in spring training, including in yesterday's matchup against the Cardinals. While it's unexpected that Rasmus ends up as the O's regular leadoff hitter against right-handed pitching during the season -- Buck Showalter has said he's trying to get Rasmus more at-bats right now, and it's not a guarantee that Rasmus makes the team just yet -- it's far from impossible.

Rasmus has a career 111 wRC+ against left-handed pitching, which is good but not great. He also has an on-base percentage of just .318 against southpaws, and that's not what teams want out of their leadoff hitters. Without going too deep, I'll just note that it's now both sound logic and generally accepted that one of the best hitters on a team should bat in the top lineup spot.

Still, Showalter has a tendency to do... interesting things with his lineups. He'll bat someone fast there, just because, or simply try something based on match-ups or feel. Here's a list from the Baseball-Reference Play Index that shows O's players from 2011-2017 (Showalter's full seasons in Baltimore) with 10 or more plate appearances in the leadoff spot:

Results

Rk	Player	Split	From	To	G	PA	AB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
1	Nick Markakis	Batting 1st	2012	2014	236	1086	982	.294	.353	.402	.755
2	Adam Jones	Batting 1st	2014	2017	135	610	563	.281	.320	.471	.791
3	Nate McLouth	Batting 1st	2012	2013	131	605	539	.262	.336	.399	.735
4	Manny Machado	Batting 1st	2013	2016	120	541	487	.296	.362	.497	.859
5	Brian Roberts	Batting 1st	2011	2013	73	330	301	.213	.266	.332	.598
6	J.J. Hardy	Batting 1st	2011	2017	66	294	277	.267	.294	.523	.817
7	Joey Rickard	Batting 1st	2016	2017	71	289	267	.240	.289	.345	.634
8	Seth Smith	Batting 1st	2017	2017	56	235	212	.264	.332	.448	.780
9	Robert Andino	Batting 1st	2011	2012	46	207	188	.218	.276	.298	.574
10	Tim Beckham	Batting 1st	2017	2017	41	194	181	.265	.314	.448	.762
11	Nolan Reimold	Batting 1st	2011	2016	49	190	172	.250	.321	.453	.775
12	Alejandro De Aza	Batting 1st	2014	2015	22	95	89	.258	.305	.449	.755
13	Endy Chavez	Batting 1st	2012	2012	24	92	87	.149	.178	.207	.385
14	Matt Angle	Batting 1st	2011	2011	18	78	63	.190	.320	.286	.606
15	Xavier Avery	Batting 1st	2012	2012	15	70	63	.254	.309	.349	.658
16	Felix Pie	Batting 1st	2011	2011	13	47	46	.217	.234	.239	.473
17	Craig Gentry	Batting 1st	2017	2017	26	35	30	.200	.286	.333	.619
18	Gerardo Parra	Batting 1st	2015	2015	7	32	31	.161	.188	.194	.381
19	David Lough	Batting 1st	2014	2015	12	29	26	.154	.241	.308	.549
20	Everth Cabrera	Batting 1st	2015	2015	5	25	23	.304	.320	.304	.624
21	Hyun Soo Kim	Batting 1st	2016	2017	8	21	17	.176	.333	.176	.510
22	Austin Hays	Batting 1st	2017	2017	5	21	20	.150	.190	.150	.340
23	Jonathan Schoop	Batting 1st	2014	2017	5	18	16	.063	.167	.063	.229
24	Ryan Flaherty	Batting 1st	2012	2017	11	17	17	.176	.176	.529	.706
25	Trey Mancini	Batting 1st	2017	2017	5	13	13	.385	.385	.846	1.231
Rk	Player	Split	From	To	G	PA	AB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
26	Jemile Weeks	Batting 1st	2014	2014	3	13	11	.273	.273	.455	.727
27	Steve Pearce	Batting 1st	2012	2016	5	12	9	.556	.667	1.222	1.889

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used
Generated 3/1/2018.

First, Endy Chavez! Felix Pie! Matt Angle! Xavier Avery! Everth Cabrera! Jemile Weeks! And second, don't forget that the 2011 Orioles were awful (69-93, -152 run differential) before things turned around suddenly in 2012.

It's easy to look back and laugh, but sometimes these decisions worked! In May of 2012, Ryan Flaherty led off a game against the Rangers with a home run. The next two batters, J.J. Hardy and Nick Markakis, also homered, as the O's became the first team to start a game with three straight homers since the Brewers in 2007. (The Diamondbacks also pulled off that feat against Max Scherzer, somehow, this past season.) That doesn't make it smart, necessarily, but it also shows some of the uninspiring options Showalter has had to choose from.

This isn't just a Showalter thing, of course; some teams occasionally use less than ideal options in the leadoff spot. Some teams just don't have high OBP players, while others do and at times choose to fill out the lineup card differently. But as teams become smarter, they're using better options in the first two spots in the lineup and refusing to put players there who make more outs.

Is Tim Beckham that guy for the Orioles? If he puts up anything close to the 130 wRC+ he posted after joining the O's last season, it'll be an easy decision to keep him there. But if he's not the guy, then who is? Perhaps Trey Mancini and his .338 OBP from last season? With so many high power, low OBP hitters filling the lineup, there just aren't that many good options. And that could open the door for Rasmus, or Alex Presley, or someone else.