Free Agency Is Still Broken

The free agent market has never been a good place for baseball teams to find talent. Back in 2014, I wrote an article discussing how the free agent market will break your heart because of the high bust rate of even top free agents. Since that article, it seems that things have gotten worse.

The dataset I use doesn't do a good job tracking option years. It's probable I'm missing a few players that had an option. There were 144 total players signed to a free agent deal worth at least $3 million that covered 2016.  Of these 144 players, 45 contributed either zero or negative WAR to their teams (31%). Another 61 contributed between zero and two WAR of value (42%). Only 38 contributed 2+ WAR (27%). As a result, one free agent WAR cost $8.6M in 2016. In total, these 144 players contributed 186.9 WAR (1.3 WAR per player).

The Detroit Tigers were the huge losers in 2016. They spent $115M on Justin Upton, Victor Martinez, Jordan Zimmermann, Mike Pelfrey, Anibal Sanchez, Mark Lowe and Prince Fielder. One caveat of this is that Prince Fielder was traded to the Rangers in 2013, and so Detroit wasn’t fully on the hook for his 2016 salary. If we include Fielder on this list as a player that the Tigers signed as a free agent to a deal that covers 2016, then they received -1.5 fWAR in return. If we exclude him, then they received .3 fWAR. Regardless, nothing will change the fact that they spent a significant amount of cash on players that were worth roughly the same as replacement level players.

The Orioles spent roughly $70-$75M to sign Chris Davis, Matt Wieters, Pedro Alvarez, Darren O’Day, Yovani Gallardo and Ubaldo Jimenez. In return, the Orioles received 6.2 fWAR - $12 million per WAR. This was only slightly worse than average, and illustrates how teams need to spend a significant amount of money in free agency just to get a slight advantage.

The primary exception to this rule in 2016 is the Cubs, who signed Jon Lester, Dexter Fowler, Jack Lackey, Ben Zobrist, Jason Hammel, David Ross, Jason Heyward and Edwin Jackson to free agent contracts covering 2016. Heyward and Jackson were largely busts, but the other five were huge successes. As a result, the Cubs received 26 fWAR from free agents while just spending $117M. Each free agent WAR cost the Cubs $4.5M, suggesting that free agency can be an excellent option for teams if they can hit on multiple players. Their luck largely ran out in 2017 when Lester, Lackey, Zobrist, and Zobrist fell back to earth and their combined horde of free agents signed for the 2017 season only contributed 6 fWAR at a cost of $96 million.

If the numbers for 2016 look bad, then the numbers for 2017 are catastrophic. There were 165 total players signed to a free agent deal worth at least $3 million that covered 2017. Of these players, 53 (32%) produced negative WAR and another 21 (13%) produced zero WAR. 58 (35%) more produced between 0 and 2 WAR exclusive while only 33 (20%) produced 2 or more WAR. As a result, one free agent WAR cost $14M in 2017 and these players contributed 128 WAR (.78 WAR per player).

Detroit again was a big loser, as they spent a fortune on Jason Upton, Mark Lowe, Jordan Zimmermann, Anibal Sanchez, Mike Pelfrey and Victor Martinez and received 2 WAR on their investment. On the bright side, things would have looked even worse if they didn’t trade Fielder to the Rangers previously. It’s worth noting that Detroit appears to have significantly cut payroll for 2018 and is presumably trying to rebuild their team without having to rely as heavily on free agents. The Angels also did pretty badly as their two main free agent splashes, Josh Hamilton and Albert Pujols ended up costing roughly $55M for -2 WAR.

The Dodgers, however, had significant success as they hit on Justin Turner, Kenley Jansen and Rich Hill. Worth noting is that all three of these players were originally Dodgers that ended up resigning with the club in free agency. In other words, they were known quantities and perhaps more akin to extensions than the average signing. As a result, the Dodgers paid $105M for roughly 16 WAR or an excellent price of just $6.5M per win.

The Orioles spent $73M in the free agent market and ended up receiving 1.1 fWAR for their efforts, resulting in a $/WAR of $66.1M. It turns out that their signings of Castillo, O’Day, Davis, Gallardo, Jimenez and Trumbo did not work out well for them – or anyone else for that matter. Just think, the Orioles could have signed Scherzer and Greinke for the amount of cash they spent on those six players and have money left over. Then again, it is well known how risky it is to spend money on starting pitching in free agency.

Minnesota was one of the most successful clubs. They signed three free agents whose contract covered 2017; Ervin Santana, Jason Castro and Ricky Nolasco. Santana ended up being one of the best pitchers in the majors, while Castro was an average catcher and Nolasco was traded to the Angels. Even including Nolasco in this analysis, free agents signed by the Twins produced 8.6 WAR at a cost of just $34 million.  If we exclude Nolasco, then they produced 7.3 WAR at a cost of just over $20 million, as the Twins were able to earn a wildcard spot in the playoffs. 

Organizations simply can’t build a winning team out of free agency. There simply isn’t enough free agent talent available unless a team is able to hit on three or four of the best players. Even in that case, the cost is still prohibitive for all but large market clubs. Instead, teams need to build their foundation with team-controlled players. Teams need to be able to accurately assess their talent and determine which players can help their team over the long run and should receive long extensions.

Teams that aren’t in huge markets should go into the free agent market only sparingly and only when they’re really comfortable about a player’s future performance.  Most free agents only contribute a minimal amount at a significantly high cost. From an owner’s perspective, it has to be tempting to just pocket $70 million in profits rather than spending the cash on free agents that will likely do little to help a team going forward.

This means it does make sense to devote a significant part of payroll to one or two players if a team is sure that they’re good (cough cough Machado). Most free agents contribute minimal production, so spending money to keep elite talents in the fold while focusing internally to fill out a roster makes sense. Realistically, small and middle market teams don’t have an opportunity to have many elite talents at once.

This is extremely relevant to the 2018 Orioles. The Orioles should realize it’s highly unlikely that they’ll be able to add significant talent to their club via free agency, so they need to be able to gauge whether their current team has enough talent to win. Since they don’t, it makes sense to look into which of their current players should be considered part of their future core and which players should be traded as part of a rebuild.

Baseball teams today only win if they’re able to develop team controlled young talent, that’s supported by extended home-grown elite talent and a few smart free agent signings. This means that teams can only be successful if they can gauge their own talent and determine which players they should keep and which should be traded based on the situation of their organization. Have the Orioles learned this lesson?

What Are The Orioles Doing?

The Orioles always march to the beat of their own drum. During the offseason, that means plenty of interest but not much action, a lot of waiting, and, of course, Rule 5 draft picks. But with Buck Showalter, Dan Duquette, Manny Machado, Adam Jones, Zach Britton, Brad Brach, and others heading into what could be their final seasons in Baltimore, there's more urgency than usual.

That's why, at least in theory, it made sense that the Orioles were rejecting any notions of rebuilding and would instead gear up for one final run. So let's see what they've done so far to reload:

• Acquired OF Jaycob Brugman from the A's for RHP Jake Bray
• Selected 3 pitchers in the Rule 5 draft
• Signed RHP Michael Kelly to a major league deal

The O's have also signed a bunch of players to minor league deals, but that's it. Meanwhile, they missed out on starting pitchers like Tyler Chatwood, Doug Fister, Miles Mikolas, and Mike Fiers; have essentially deemed upgrades like Alex Cobb and maybe Lance Lynn as "too costly" while Yu Darvish and Jake Arrieta are certainly out of their price range; wavered on not fielding offers for Machado and Britton but have failed to complete any deals; recently lost Britton for a chunk of the season to a ruptured Achilles tendon; and have to figure out whether Machado plays shortstop or third base if they keep him.

Maybe the only positive developments for the O's this offseason are Kevin Gausman changing his number to honor Roy Halladay and them telling off intolerant people on Twitter.

Should the Orioles push all their chips in and go for it? Should they rebuild? You probably have strong opinions on whether the O's should do one of those things, and you could defend those stances. What you can't defend is the team simply refusing to do either one and continuing to punt on nearly every major decision while only improving the team in the tiniest ways. Under Duquette, the O's have always worked the fringes to improve the team's depth. But depth doesn't matter as much when you have gaping holes in the starting rotation.

Maybe the O's are just laying in the weeds and getting ready to strike. Maybe that means not conveniently using how poorly the Ubaldo Jimenez signing went and adding one of Cobb or Lynn and then another starter or two. Maybe they'd even consider a strong upgrade in the outfield like Lorenzo Cain! It's not like the O's don't have some freed-up money to spend. And that's not even including when MLB owners receive $50-plus million in 2018 from the sale of BAMTech.

But no, that's almost certainly not going to happen. The Orioles are going to do something because they have to, but it's not going to be anything meaningful. If they do go for it, that'll just mean relying on the talent they already have while hoping for bounce-back seasons from Chris Davis, Mark Trumbo, and others. If that sounds depressing, it kind of is. At least the Orioles have some players who are fun to watch.

Manny Machado's Best Defensive Plays

In case you haven't heard, Manny Machado may be on his way out of Baltimore soon. Or, you know, maybe not. The latest reports indicate the Orioles plan to hold on to him for a while longer. Still, it's a near certainty that he'll be playing in another city in 2019, so all of this is just delaying the inevitable and showcasing the O's disarray.

When Machado departs, what will you remember most about his time with the Orioles? There's a lot to appreciate. But while he's had some monster performances and clutch moments with the bat, what I'll remember most about his days with the O's are his skills with the glove.

Machado has made some truly ridiculous plays. When watching the replays, many of them still look impossible. I'm not sure how that much range, agility, awareness, and arm strength can be combined into one package.

It's sad that Machado's days with the O's are coming to an end, but let's try and keep things positive (at least for now). Here are some of Machado's best plays at third base. Enjoy!

Ranging play vs. the Yankees, where he bobbles the ball and then throws across his body:

Machado's fake throw to catch the runner at third:

Machado's range and feed to Schoop here are crazy:

I like the double play above better, but this has more style:

Diving stop and throw vs. Blue Jays:

Barehanded play vs. the Yankees. Covers a ton of ground:

Machado ranges left, then throws out Trout:

Double play vs. Rockies:

Wonderful catch and avoids tarp vs. Twins:

Ranging play in World Baseball Classic:

Don't see one of your favorites included above? Link to it in the comments. There are so many tremendous plays that it's easy to lose sight of a few. I think I'll miss the Machado/Schoop double plays the most. What about you?

Adam Jones: So What Would An Extension Look Like?

Recently, Adam Jones reminded the Orioles fan base of something.

One year left also.

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) December 19, 2017

This left me with the question about what exactly would an Adam Jones deal look like and whether it would even be a good idea.  People age and all good things come to an end, but Jones still looks like a capable player.  Last year, in the second half of the season, Jones slashed 307/343/502.  That was some prime time Adam Jones action.

To try to look at the angles, I employed the newer version of BORAS to see what his 2019 contract would look like.  I also used a comp model to project his 2019-2023 seasons (ages 33-37).  With the often leaked front office perspective that Jones is a true RF now, I also modeled out what happens when a center fielder moves to right field.  Finally, I assumed that the 2018 season had already played and Jones performed on par with what ZiPS projects him to do.

BORAS 2.0
As you know, the BORAS model looks at a players recent past and compares it with recent contracts to determine how many years a player will sign for as well as what yearly salary the player will take on.  For Jones' 2018 season, we will assume his ZiPS projection is accurate and go from there.  BORAS suggests his age 33 and 34 season would be covered in a 2/23 deal if he is a free agent a year from now.

Given Jones' recent contract and how a two year extension is really not all that much of an extension, I would advise him to not sign that deal if I was his agent.  It would be a shock if he was not able to secure one year deal for each of those off seasons, so I would suggest him to bet on himself and go bigger.  But, what does BORAS think the benefit or cost is to wing it on a one year basis?

Yeah, that is an ugly, bare-bones graph.  The horizontal axis is what Jones might do in 2018 using WAR as an encapsulating statistic for what goes into the model.  The left is AAV and the right is years.  Jones probably needs something north of a "3 WAR" season to get more than two years.

Comp model
We have used comp models before.  Basically what we try to do here is take a player's most recent performance and find similar players who play similar positions.  When we did this for some players, like Manny Machado, it was effectively impossible to find enough players at that age who offensively performed similarly.  For Jones, it is a bit easier, but he is such a unique centerfielder that we needed to consider corner outfielders in the methodology to have a large enough sample size.

Who is in Jones' age 33-37 comp model?
Al Martin, Rondell White, George Bell, Jose Guillen, Mike Morse, Eric Byrnes, Jacque Jones, Cody Ross, Glenallen Hill, and Nelson Cruz.

Admittedly, it is a weird group.  Nelson Cruz and Rondell White do not look like twins, but the process looking at the entire population has delivered good comps in the past.  What we find in this group (Cruz' age 37 year is projected) is that only Cruz makes it to the end.  Most of the players end their career before the midway point of their age 35 season.  To account for those lost seasons, we project their performance, but it identifies uncertainty in the population as we travel further down the path of age.

Moving From CF to RF
A second consideration that needs to be made is that based on the leaks coming out of the warehouse (it might well be the only leak) is that the club no longer views Jones as a competent centerfielder, seeing him true defensive position as a rightfielder.  The old rule of thumb was that moving from center to a corner outfield position was worth an increase of about five runs in defensive ability, which covers about half of the -10 run positional adjustment from center field to right field.

Trying to be more exact or at least more defined, I decided to run a series of regression models for arm, error, and range values.  However, none of the models came out as significant.  All hovered around the 0.1 value.  If those were useful, it would suggest that Jones, a -4 run ZIPS value in center, would translate over to a +2 run rightfielder largely on the strength of increase range performance.

I then decided to do a batch model by looking at fielders from 2015-2017 who played at least 200 innings in right field and left field in a single season.  I then batched these by Statcast sprint speed in three groups: greater than 28.5 ft/s, 27.5-28.5 ft/s, and less than 27.5. Jones would fall into the final center fielder speed category as his 27.2 mark was one of the slowest in MLB last year for that position.

Anyway, what I found is that the fast group actually sees a reduction in range value of -5 runs.  This likely has to do with reduced opportunity in right field.  If you have stellar speed and can use it to expand your range, then a tight foul territory reduces that usefulness.  That reduction though is slightly reduced from improved throwing and error prevention, which results in an overall loss of -2 runs for that speedy group when converting over to right field.

The mid-level speed and lowest speed groups both appear to benefit similarly overall.  The mid-level group sees slightly more improvement in range and slightly less improvement in arm than the slowest group.  However, they both come in around a 5 run improvement.  This would suggest that sliding Jones over to right field would make him a +1 run right fielder.  Part of me wonders if this might be an underadjustment because Jones has shown in the past that he is far batter at moving toward left field than he is at moving toward right field.  Add in that route running and you could imagine him being a +5 run, but for this exercise, we will assume he performs like the population performed and that he is a +1 RF.

All Together Now
Incorporating the conversion into the comp model, what we get below is the projection for Adam Jones' next five years assuming he logs 550 PA each year.

Proj 550 PA	AVG	OBP	SLG	xWAR
2019	.254	.304	.418	1.4
2020	.251	.303	.426	1.5
2021	.251	.305	.433	1.6
2022	.235	.289	.401	0.6
2023	.228	.28	.397	0.3

What it suggests is that players like Jones maintain a level of performance through their age 35 seasons and then collapse.  Of course, that collapse is largely due to the projection given to all the players whose careers ended mid age 35 season or before.

If we assume that Jones is more like the players within the group who had longer careers, then we would wind up with this projection.

Proj 550 PA	AVG	OBP	SLG	xWAR
2019	.281	.335	.476	3.1
2020	.272	.326	.472	2.8
2021	.269	.323	.479	2.8
2022	.250	.307	.443	1.8
2023	.232	.286	.414	0.7

Well, we still see that major drop off even when the population has more players who were able to go deeper into their careers.  That age 36 season (2022) looks like a considerable wall.

Conclusion and Comparisons

The comp model thinks Jones is worth about 2/20 or 3/32.  BORAS 2.0 thinks the extension should be 2/23.  For BORAS to think that Jones should get a three year deal, he would need to give a 3 WAR kind of season and then would be looking at a 3/41 deal.  All of that is in the neighborhood of market value and expected performance value.

For the Orioles, the issue is a bit more complicated.  The signings of Chris Davis and Mark Trumbo along with the plethora of corner outfielders in the minors makes Jones, although a franchise important figure, not exactly occupying a position of need in the future.  In terms of a team player, he still is one of the more important players in the clubhouse, so you could fathom extending him and dealing out of the club's strength or finding a new home for someone like Mark Trumbo to push Trey Mancini into a more natural position at DH and sliding Austin Hays to left field.

Could that be done?  Can you wipe Trumbo's salary off the books?  Does Jones give you a better shot of winning instead of relying on players like D.J. Stewart and Ryan Mountcastle coming through in the near term?  Does Jones relieve pressure on a hitter like Mountcastle and lets him mature a bit longer before being called up?

In the end, I could see Jones being handed a 3/36 extension and it turning out OK.  An athletic and relatively healthy player his entire career, he probably is more alike the players in the top end of the comp model.  He certainly is not a Nelson Cruz (few are), but you can see a number of attributes that will like age well and a 1.5 player over his age 33-35 season is a useful player and looks better than previous comp models on guys like Denard Span.

Time to Waive Zach Britton?

The Orioles were dealt a major blow yesterday.  While working out, Zach Britton ruptured his Achilles tendon, which requires six months of rehabilitation and probably an extended stay in the minors.  The Orioles are looking at their prized closer being gone maybe until August and, not only that, he will be a 12.2 MM hole in their payroll.

Last summer, Britton dealt with injuries that undermined his season and his trade value.  The Orioles banked on him rebounding and either delivering great performances down the stretch or at least rebuilding his trade value.  All that now is lost.  No one can blame the club for this unpredictable turn of events, but it does complicate their situation.  With Britton now coming back so late, what is the club to do.

Option 1
You keep Britton.  You rehabilitate him.  You hope he rebounds and either is a shot in the arm for a competitive Orioles team, a useful August trade piece, or a QO candidate that scores you a draft pick in 2019.

Option 2
You release Britton.  Britton is entitled to a quarter of his arbitration salary.  With a projection of 12.2 MM, that comes to 3.05 MM.  That gives the club an extra 9 MM to do whatever it pleases to do with that newfound cash.  Britton would probably not re-sign with the club.  He would probably sign a deal for five or so MM with the Cubs, Yankees, Astros, or Dodgers.  A club that would bet on him being ready down the line.

For me, option 2 is the way to go.  His appearance for a couple months at the end of the season is not enough of a boost for me to think his inclusion on the roster is worth it.  The 9 MM could be better allocated elsewhere.

Your thoughts?

Avoiding A Machado Deal With The Yankees Won't Help The Orioles

In nearly every new development in the ongoing Manny Machado trade saga, there's usually a mention of how the Orioles are unlikely to trade him to the Yankees. That improbability is attributed to Peter Angelos's apparent unwillingness to make a significant trade with New York, and that he's wary of dealing with any team that could then flip Machado to the Yankees themselves.

It doesn't seem that many reporters expect that Angelos and his "trusted confidants" would approve such a deal, but it's at least possible: 

Even though [Dan] Duquette has said he will not rule out negotiating with the Yankees or Boston Red Sox, the idea of dealing a player of Machado’s profile to the Yankees would be a hard sell to Angelos, though it seems more likely now that he could be convinced if the Orioles receive the right return, according to a source.

Let's just make things clear: The Orioles should absolutely be open to dealing with the Yankees. As Eduardo Encina details above, the Yankees have some intriguing trade pieces that should interest the Orioles.

One of the big question marks hanging over the Machado ordeal is why the O's stopped approaching Machado's agent to try and get a deal done. In September, when it was reported that the O's had no interest in trading Machado, Jon Heyman noted this:

Of course, that doesn’t preclude a trade at next year’s trading deadline. The Orioles are said by sources to have come “within $8 million or $9 million” of locking him up a couple years back, though one person familiar with those talks said the offer was for “well below $100 million,” and that person suggested he didn’t believe the sides were especially close to a deal. However, it seems Machado’s side might have made some sort of counteroffer to stay, or at least provided parameters, since sources are suggesting the gap ($8 million to $9 million) existed.

Word is that Angelos, especially conservative when it comes to medical records (they’ve rejected several potential acquisitions in the past), was leery about Machado’s history of knee injuries at the time. Machado has shown he’s plenty healthy since, of course.

That's likely what Encina is referring to here: "The Orioles haven’t engaged extension talks with Machado in three years, last attempting them when he was returning from the second of his two knee reconstructions in 2014. They’ve had little more than a fleeting conversation since."

So what changed between now and then? Maybe that process soured the relationship between Machado and the Orioles. Maybe an extension was never that close. Or maybe Machado really does want to leave for a bigger market or doesn't think the O's can build a consistent World Series contender. We don't know these things yet, but I'll imagine we will one day.

For now, a couple things appear to be true. First, the Orioles are not going to sign Machado to an extension. That means after the upcoming season, he can sign with any team he wants. There's nothing the Orioles can do to stop that.

Second, the Orioles are not doing all they can to compete in 2018. Duquette talked about reloading, but the O's aren't doing that in any convincing way. They're just doing their own version of reloading, which apparently means not paying what it takes to upgrade an awful starting rotation and looking for any kind of overlooked value that can be had at a bargain.

The Orioles can control where they send Machado for the next season, and that's it. They could either hold on to Machado for the time being, or they can choose to take the best possible mix of major league ready talent and prospects -- which could come from the Yankees -- or to send him somewhere else, for a possible lesser return, out of spite. Think of how desperate the O's are for young, cost-controlled talent, and then think of them using this trade to stick it to the Yankees when they could simply sign Machado in a year.

The Yankees are going to be good. Their roster is loaded. It was already loaded before they traded for Giancarlo Stanton (which also seemed to set off an immediate shift in the O's strategy with Machado). The Yankees are set up to be very good for a long time, with or without Machado.

Maybe the Yankees sign Machado this offseason, or maybe they go in some other direction. But however good they end up being, the O's need to do everything possible to improve their own situation. If that means the best trade package from the Yankees is on the table, then so be it.

If you have no faith in that happening, I can't blame you. I don't really either. But until the options are gone, the possibility still exists that the O's could do the best possible things to set them up for future success. With the O's staring down another extended stretch of futility, I'll at least hold on to that hope for now.

With or Without Manny, Orioles Should Sign Todd Frazier

While the Manny Machado trade rumblings are generating a rather large seismic response in the press, it does tend to neglect one aspect: the Orioles need a third baseman.  If the Orioles trade Machado, the club is without a third baseman.  Jonathan Schoop's poor range, need to set up deep due to a lethargic first step, and his difficulty getting down on the ball all indicate that his clumsy play at third years ago most likely will not have gotten any better.  Meanwhile Tim Beckham really profiles better at shortstop (*whispers* or the outfield).  This leaves a hole at third base.  If Machado stays, his desire to be a shortstop is something the Orioles will likely encourage, which also leaves third base open.  So what should the Orioles do? Sign Todd Frazier right now.

Standard Batting

Year	Age	PA	HR	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+	bWAR
2011	25	121	6	.232	.289	.438	94	0.8
2012	26	465	19	.273	.331	.498	118	2.2
2013	27	600	19	.234	.314	.407	98	2.9
2014	28	660	29	.273	.336	.459	121	5.3
2015	29	678	35	.255	.309	.498	117	4.0
2016	30	666	40	.225	.302	.464	107	3.4
2017	31	576	27	.213	.344	.428	105	3.4

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/18/2017.

While those numbers in the last three years look problematic with a down trending batting average, slight decrease in ISO, and peculiar jump up in OBP, it should be noted that Frazier has remained rather healthy through his career and is somewhat athletic.  He rates as having mid level speed for a third baseman (sprint scores: 26.1 (2015), 26.2 (2016), 26.5 (2017); on par with Seth Smith and Mark Trumbo) for a third baseman, but routinely stole about 15 bases a year during his peak seasons.  In other words, while several important indicators suggest a potential breakdown, they do not fit well with other indicators.

What does our comp model say?  The comp model looks back over history and sees ten comparative Age 29-31 seasons.  It is not a great group because Frazier is up near the top in terms of offensive output, but he is still within the dataset...so...at least we are not extrapolating outside of the set.  One players bests Frazier's bat: Gorman Thomas.  Thomas quickly fell off the face of the earth for his age 32 and 33 seasons before rebounding into an age 34 last hurrah.  The others in the batch include Lee May, Joe Carter, Raul Mondesi, Rob Deer, Brandon Moss, Andruw Jones, Tony Armas, Dick Stuart, and Steve Balboni.  It is a rather motley crew that looks incredibly different from each other outside their ability to not get on base much, crush the ball, and strikeout a lot.

Average Production

	HR	AVG	OBP	SLG	xWAR
2018	22	.234	.300	.428	2.5
2019	14	.220	.295	.417	1.4
2020	16	.227	.297	.416	1.7

The model is not overflowing with praise and sees some significant reduction in playing time for 2019 and 2020 (less than 400 PA).  Regardless, that production level is worth about 39 MM and is solid for a BORAS 2.0 deal at 3/37.7 MM.  That kind of production would be a considerable drop from Machado, but would provide the club with a solid role player starting at third base.

85th Percentile Production

	HR	AVG	OBP	SLG	xWAR
2018	25	.247	.306	.459	3.3
2019	23	.230	.300	.446	2.5
2020	22	.247	.315	.454	2.9

One thing that really comes to light is how certain players produced quite a bit with the bat in their age 34 seasons.  Gorman Thomas, Joe Carter, and Lee May all had good years at the plate, which drives the model on the higher end.  If Frazier fits this trajectory, then he would be worth 60.9 MM over the next three seasons, which is close to what the original version of BORAS agrees with.

15th Percentile Production

	HR	AVG	OBP	SLG	xWAR
2018	20	.220	.293	.395	1.8
2019	6	.195	.281	.337	0.2
2020	11	.197	.270	.356	0.4

The lower end scenario finds Frazier to be a perfectly fine player in his first season of the deal and then solely existing in the Majors as a third baseman who can field well.  He basically turns into our recent apparition of J.J. Hardy those last two seasons.  This projection is worth 16.8 MM, which would be a major loss.

Conclusion
Todd Frazier is not Manny Machado.  Over the past three seasons, Machado has had a wOBA of .355 which easily beats the .334 of Todd Frazier.  With the glove, one of Buck Showalter's big sticking point, he sure is close.  Over the last three seasons, Machado has had an 8.4 UZR/150.  Meanwhile, Frazier put up a 3.7 UZR/150, which is somewhere between Evan Longoria and Kris Bryant.  That helps shoulder the loss.

Good defense and an adequate right handed power bat is probably the best we can ask for.  Espically, if the ask is a 3/37.7 MM deal.

The Case for Holding onto Machado and Letting Him Walk

The Orioles do a wonderful job of ignoring multiple problems until they fly up and bite them on the butt.  While the club has done an amazing job taking MacPhail's core and supplementing them with the right players to build a very successful mini-dynasty (that holds only one trophy that was limited to AL East heroics), there have been many glaring issues that they have been unable to resolve.  Pitching depth has been an ever present concern, but that never made Duquette think twice about dealing it out even in the case of Andrew Miller when he really was not needed.  Corner outfield has been a place of need, but the club has done peculiar things such as bringing in Travis Snider at an amazing cost or putting Mark Trumbo out there.  We could go on and on, but we will get to the point of this post.

Manny Machado presented a terribly frustrating problem.  I went into some detail on this last January and noted that right then and there was the time to either extend Machado or trade him.  Neither of those things happened.  This offseason, it appears the Orioles are more aware that Machado is not remaining and something needs to be done about it.  While the interest in Machado is great, his 17.3 MM projected salary and his single remaining year of control have diminished his value.  Based on what I hear, the most any team has offered has been a single top 100 player and a couple lower tier players.

To put this into a more tangible framework, I will use the White Sox as an example here.  Keep in mind, that what I know has nothing to do with the White Sox, so do not take this as a definitive scoop.  A similar White Sox deal would be:

Alec Hansen, RHSP (fringe top 100 prospect, upper minors)
Carson Fulmer, RHSP (Rookie, major concerns)
Jake Burger, 3B (draftee, long road to go)

The above package would likely disappoint folks. To put it in Oriolese, It is like being offered Chorye Spoone, Radhames Liz, and Billy Rowell if it were 2008.  It would be in the neighborhood of a 40 MM value coming back.  That would be on point value for Machado, but not value that you would expect from a club that really, really, really loved. him.  As you can imagine, a package like that can easily go bust and may well not be all that different from what one could expect in a mid-season deal if the Orioles fall out of contention.

A mid-season deal presents some advantages and disadvantages.  On the advantage side, only about 9 MM of Manny's salary will come into play at that point.  While 10 teams right now have some interest in Manny, a lot of that interest in muted by that pricetag.  Halfway into the season and teams may have enough payroll space with ownership approval, have an unflattering contract to hand back, or the Orioles may be more willing to swallow some of the cost.

The cost angle is truly something to consider if you are running the franchise.  Based on the past twenty years, I have identified several "fire sales".  The first one on the board was the Marlins implosion after 1997's World Series and the most recent is the 2012 triumvirate of the Philles, Red Sox, and Marlins all letting their players depart in the winds.  Some other clubs in this data set include the 2000 Orioles, 2007 Twins, and 2011 Astros, just to give you a flavor.  On average, this group saw a decrease of 18% in attendance after trading out significant players the year before.  Best case scenario was that 2008 Twins team where no difference was observed, but most teams saw a drop in the twenties.

For the Orioles, their 2017 attendance was 2.028 million.  An 18% drop would take them to 1.663 million, or a loss of roughly 365,000 tickets.  Using the fan index, each lost ticket is worth around $46 in revenue.  In other words, if Manny Machado departs and the fan base sees this as a fire sale, then the Orioles are projected to lose 16.8 MM in revenue just from fan attendance.  This does not include the current renegotiation of partners with MASN where the loss of a major player like Machado might make those negotiations more contentious.  In other words, this could be a major loss the Orioles' bottom line, which can have long term implication on their ability to spend on future payrolls.

Anyway, a mid-season deal may only fetch the club a few B level prospects, which is what appears to be the current maximum offers if you believe the rumblings.  Or there may be a major push by a club who wants to shove themselves over the top and is willing to pay a boatload for Machado in a way that might be reminiscent of the Aroldis Chapman trade to the Cubs.  There certainly is that potential there.

The downsides are numerous as well.  If the Orioles are sniffing contention, ownership or the front office may be unwilling to throw in the towel.  Think of last year, if the Orioles came back from where they were at the deadline then it would have ranked as a truly historic achievement.  A major problem was that the fan base and maybe the front office saw that they were three games out and thought that was actually very close when, historically, it was not close at all.  That paralysis by appearance would be detrimental to the organization as they would be left with a Qualifying Offer placed on Manny and getting only a draft pick in return.  That draft pick compensation would be the same return if during the first half of the season Machado is lost for the year.

However, that draft pick compensation happens right after the first round, which is a value of around 13 MM.  How much is a pitching prospect like Hansen worth?  15 MM.  So the loss between dealing Machado now and letting him walk is Fulmer and Berger along with potentially losing 17 MM in revenue.  That, in all honesty, is beginning to look like a terrible deal.  Are Fulmer and Berger worth that 17 MM?  Yes, I think they are.   They are probably worth 5-10 MM more than that.  But, it is not much and that 17 MM in lost revenue in 2018?  Well, that may have future impact on club revenue more so than letting Machado walk away for 400 MM some place.

So what should the Orioles do?
Trade Machado last January.

A Quick Rebuild

It appears as though the Orioles are admitting what many have suspected for several years: Manny Machado will not be an Oriole long term. Indeed, the chatter during the Winter Meetings has begun to make it clear that, rather than sticking with their original plan to run it back for one more year in 2018, the team is considering a rebuild, with trade rumors concerning Machado, Zach Britton, and Brad Brach dominating the offseason headlines.

This is, sadly, the correct choice. Even with Machado, it seems unlikely that the Orioles were going to be legitimate contenders in 2018, and Machado could still command a good haul in prospects even as a rental. If Machado goes, there's not much reason to keep around guys like Britton, either, and as a result the Orioles could improve their farm system fairly dramatically in the course of one off season.

Total rebuilds are very much in fashion in MLB these days. Both the Cubs and Astros went through multiple miserable seasons before their young cores coalesced and won championships, and teams like the Yankees, Twins, and Padres are looking to follow in those footsteps. It seems logical, given the budgetary constraints under which the Orioles operate as well as the team's declining performance, that the Orioles would go this same route. Of course, Peter Angelos has long been opposed to a complete teardown, and before this week there was little indication that Dan Duquette would execute one.

Now, though, that calculus seems to have changed, but in a pretty interesting way. At the same time they are discussing trading one of the top 10 players in franchise history, there are also rumors that the Orioles are pursuing Royals starting pitcher Danny Duffy. This would, certainly, be an odd move to make under the circumstances, as you generally don't trade for a veteran starting pitcher in the middle of a rebuild. 

Of course, maybe they don't HAVE to tear it all down. In fact, an interesting path would be to punt on 2018 while gearing up for a big run in 2019 and beyond. Let's assume that Machado, Brach, and Britton are all dealt, and they bring back at least 1-2 MLB ready players along with higher upside prospects that aren't likely to be immediate contributors. The Orioles would certainly prefer that one of those players is a starting pitcher and if they somehow acquire Duffy, the 2018 rotation looks already a good deal better than 2017, with all the major components under team control until at least 2020.

You may have heard, but the 2018 free agent class is potentially the greatest ever, and even if the Orioles aren't competing for guys like Machado, Bryce Harper, and Clayton Kershaw, there are plenty of good to great players left over. If the team has a solid rotation in place and prospects like Austin Hays, Chance Sisco, and Ryan Mountcastle are ready to make a big impact, there's a real case to be made that adding a second tier, but still big name, player like Josh Donaldson or Charlie Blackmon and pairing him up with a Gio Gonzalez/Garett Richards/Patrick Corbin type could push the team into immediate contention. These players would obviously be very costly, but with over $30 million coming off the books in the form of Chris Tillman, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Wade Miley, the Orioles could save up and make a big splash next winter.

This would be somewhat predicated on the Orioles signing Jonathan Schoop to an extension, hopefully moving Mark Trumbo's contract, and determining what to do with Adam Jones, but given the improving farm system and the jolt it would receive by trading Machado et al., as well as much lower payroll commitments, this seems like a viable path. It will certainly be hard to watch Machado playing anywhere but Oriole Park, and there's no guarantee that the young players will progress enough to make this plan viable, but it certainly beats the alternative of Machado and Britton leaving in free agency and receiving only comp picks in return. Rebuilds are always painful, but maybe this pain wouldn't have to last more than one year.

The Orioles Can't Lose Machado And Contend

The Orioles have developed two potential hall of fame players, Mike Mussina and Manny Machado, over the past twenty years. Mike Mussina was the Orioles ace during their last playoff run in 1996-1997, and received over 50% of total votes for the hall of fame in last year’s voting. Manny Machado has been a star for the Orioles since 2012 and is just about ready to reach his prime years as a player.

Let me make something clear. For the analysis below, I’m looking only at production from 1997-2017. This means that I’m only looking at Cal Ripken’s production from 1997-2001, when he was 36, and not over his entire career. I’m not saying that Machado was the Orioles’ best player since 1997, but rather that from 2012-2017, he was more productive than Cal (or anyone else) from 1997-2001.

Machado has only been an Oriole for five and a half years, but he’s been one of the Orioles best players when measuring production over the past 21 seasons.  According to Fangraphs, he’s been worth 26 fWAR as an Oriole, and only trails Brian Roberts, Adam Jones and Melvin Mora in fWAR by an Oriole position player as an Oriole. Machado is just 3 fWAR off the lead (although Jones is only .1 fWAR off the lead, and will likely be the leader by the end of 2018 if not traded), but has roughly 58% of the plate appearances that the other three players have.

In other words, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to argue that Machado is on pace to be nearly twice as productive (when you consider that Machado can still get even better as he hits his prime) as the Orioles’ best position players over the past twenty years. The only Oriole over the past twenty years that has been as good as Machado according to Fangraphs has been Mike Mussina, who was worth 46.7 fWAR over nine and a half seasons. When he was 32, he left the Orioles in free agency to join the Yankees, and the Orioles didn’t make it back to the playoffs for a long time.

The Orioles have had many players that they’ve hoped would turn into elite talents. Remember hearing about Matt Wieters being “Mauer with Power” when he was a prospect? Wieters was a star player for a few years, but wasn’t the franchise changing player that people thought he might become. People were dreaming about Nick Markakis after his strong 2007 and 2008 seasons, but he was unable to remain elite and now should be seen as nothing more than a good but not great player.

The Orioles have developed a number of starting pitcher prospects who were legitimately hoped to become aces. Some have been successful starters for a time, like Gausman, Bundy and Tillman, but the one that truly became a top of the rotation pitcher was only successful as a Cub. The Orioles have been waiting a long time for an elite player like Machado.

The Orioles haven’t had as talented as a player as Machado since Mussina, and he’s still only 25 (turns 26 in July). In theory, if the Orioles were able to extend him, he could be the best player on the Orioles for the next ten years. A player like this doesn’t come around often in free agency and especially not when he’s just 26. So, of course, we’ve discovered this week that the Orioles don’t think that they’re able to extend Machado and are therefore looking to trade him.

It’s even more frustrating since the Orioles show they understand that free agency isn’t where they’re going to find excellent talent. Dan Duquette has noted that signing pitchers to four-year deals hasn’t worked out for the Orioles and doesn’t really work out for other teams either. The Orioles understand that trying to build their team with free agents is simply going to be expensive and disappointing. The problem is that if teams are not going to build their team with top free agents, then they need to use cash to extend their own talent. If the Orioles think they can’t win with Machado taking up a quarter or even a third of their payroll, then they’ll soon discover how difficult it is to win with Brian Roberts Jonathan Schoop as their best player.

Now look, if the Orioles can’t extend Manny then it makes sense to trade him instead of letting him leave for just a draft pick. The Orioles can’t force him to sign an extension if he wants to go elsewhere. So, if the Orioles want to put themselves in a position to receive draft picks in the top five each year for the next decade so they can find the next Machado, then they might as well start adding young talent now. But it might be awhile before they find a player as good as Mussina Machado that can lead them back to the playoffs.

If the Orioles trade Manny, then they need to do a complete rebuild. I have my issues with Fangraphs’ projected standings for 2018, but they have the Orioles as a 76 win team even with Machado. This does make sense as the Orioles currently only have two starting pitchers (but of course Jason Vargas is going to save the day) and neither of them are top of the rotation starters. The Orioles would still have a good second baseman in Schoop, but what else exactly? A decent but not great hitter in center field who is past his prime? A few potential bounce back sluggers who showed significant signs of decline last year?

The Os potentially have a strong bullpen, but Britton is a big question mark. And Givens struggles against lefties when he doesn’t allow a .212 BABIP against them. This team probably isn’t competing in 2018 unless everything goes right. After 2018, Britton, Brach and Jones become free agents. Does it make sense for the Orioles to spend big money to keep any of these players?

Furthermore, the Orioles only have Schoop under control for two more years and people question how long he’ll be able to stay at second. Is he a long-term building block if he has to be moved to right field or first base? Jones is at the point in his career where he’s too slow to play center field. His bat still is decent at a corner position, but realistically his days as a star are coming to an end. His leadership has some value, and he’s certainly important to Baltimore. How much does it make sense to pay for sentiment?

Gausman and Bundy are fine middle of the rotation starters. At their current salaries, they’re good bargains. But they’re going to be getting expensive. How likely is it that the Orioles will pay full price to keep them? Are these pitchers you want to build around? Britton is a potential elite reliever, but he’s also expensive and has health concerns. Who exactly is management going to decide to build around? Chris Davis? Caleb Joseph? I’m running out of names here.

Teams like the Orioles need to keep their young, talented players because they can’t just add new ones in free agency. Added to this is the fact that they just don’t have enough talent to compete with the Red Sox and Yankees if they lose Machado. If they’re unable to extend Machado, it’s time to go for a complete rebuild.