How Much Will Kevin Gausman Earn in Arbitration?

Have you ever been denied a raise? Have you ever had your employer list all the reasons why you don't deserve one? This is the frustrating situation Kevin Gausman is in. He asked the Orioles for $3.55M, but the Orioles countered with $3.15M. The two sides couldn't agree on an amount by last Friday's deadline so the Orioles, apparently operating under the file-and-trial policy, will see Gausman in court.

A separation of $400k isn't a lot, not when Dellin Betances and the Yankees are $2M apart. But to Gausman, it's real money, about an extra year of salary at the MLB minimum of $535k. Plus, his filing is 12.6% above the Orioles'. How many of us can go out and get a 12.6% raise?

From the Orioles' point of view, $400k may seem trivial, but as shown by the Yovani Gallardo trade, they're seeking savings wherever they can get it. The team is taking Caleb Joseph to court over $300k, a lesser amount.

I decided to examine Gausman's arbitration case. Will he receive $3.55M or will he have to settle for $3.15M? The arbitration panel must pick either the Orioles' offer or Gausman's. They can't split the difference.

Methodology

I'll use only IP, ERA, wins, and W-L% to examine Gausman's case. While you and I may look at information like fastball velocity, K-BB%, and DRA to better understand a pitcher's worth, teams and agents present more traditional stats to arbitrators. According to Ben Nicholson-Smith at MLB Trade Rumors:

Teams and agents don't want to risk alienating arbitrators with wOBA, xFIP or UZR, so they stick to the basics. Wins don't necessarily indicate how effective a pitcher has been, but they will impact how much he gets paid. Innings pitched, ERA, RBI, runs, homers and doubles figure in, along with other back-of-the-baseball-card stats like batting average, on-base percentage and slugging percentage.

Comparable Pitchers

Both sides will compare Gausman to other players. This year five first-year Super-Two starting pitchers have avoided arbitration. Including Gausman, they are:

Name	Age	IP	ERA	W	L	W-L%	Arb-1 Salary ($M)
Matt Shoemaker	29	436.10	3.76	32	27	0.542	3.25
Danny Salazar	26	484.10	3.72	33	27	0.550	3.40
Jacob deGrom	28	479.10	2.74	30	22	0.577	4.05
James Paxton	27	286.00	3.43	18	15	0.545	2.35
Trevor Bauer	25	552.10	4.42	30	32	0.484	3.55
Kevin Gausman	25	451.60	3.99	23	31	0.426	?

Coincidentally or not, Bauer's Arb-1 salary of $3.55M is exactly what Gausman filed for. Can Gausman claim he's Bauer's equal?

I don't think so, at least, not in the arbitrator's eyes. While Bauer's ERA is noticeably higher than Gausman's, Bauer's pitched 100 more innings and has not only more wins but a higher W-L%.

This comparison alone may sink Gausman's chances. His agent must argue that Gausman's ERA advantage makes up for the difference in IP, W, and W-L%. That's a valid argument to make; I think all available data shows Gausman is the superior pitcher. But MLB arbitrators don't consider all data, and 100 IP is a huge hill to climb. I don't think Gausman's agent can do it.

We can remove two more more pitchers from the list of comparables:

• Jacob deGrom has an NL Rookie of the Year award and a seventh-place Cy Young finish to his name, not to mention a sub-3 ERA and and a superlative .577 W-L%. Gausman has no such bonafides.
• James Paxton has a similar number of wins as Gausman but over 150 fewer innings pitched. Paxton has hit the DL in each of the past three seasons and has had mixed results when on the mound. If Gausman's agent uses Paxton -- who earned $2.35M in arbitration -- as a point of comparison, Gausman should switch agencies.

We're left with Danny Salazar and Matt Shoemaker. Each have better ERA's than Gausman. They each have about 10 more wins and a much higher W-L% than he does. Salazar's pitched about 30 more innings than Gausman; Shoemaker, about 15 fewer.

Unfortunately for Gausman, Salazar earned $3.4M, quite close to $3.55M. If Gausman can't claim he's equal to Salazar, the arbitrator has no incentive to award Gausman more money than Salazar. The story with Shoemaker, who earned $3.25M, is similar. Gausman has only a 15 IP advantage on Shoemaker but is inferior in every other way. The arbitrator has no incentive to pick the amount that's above Shoemaker's salary.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence that the arbitrators likely will see, I expect the them to rule in favor of the Orioles and pay Gausman $3.15M. Gausman's a better pitcher than Trevor Bauer, but Bauer's outperformed Gausman in the metrics arbitrators typically see. Hopefully Gausman and his teammates will excel in 2017 and give Goose a more productive second trip through arbitration.

Chris Tillman: What Would a Contract Extension Look Like?

Many Orioles starting pitchers have come and gone during the Orioles' run of success since 2012. Remember Scott Feldman? Freddy Garcia? Heck, remember Zach Britton and Jake Arrieta? Starters, all.

None have Chris Tillman's tenure. Essentially a throw-in in the Erik Bedard/Adam Jones trade, Tillman's become a rotation mainstay. He hasn't always been great; hell, he hasn't always been good. But he is a serviceable enough starting pitcher and has always been worth putting on the mound.

So it's weird to think 2017 could be Tillman's last year in an Orioles uniform. He's a free agent after the season ends, and while he certainly deserves to shop himself around, I think he and the Orioles can find common ground on a contract extension.

The Orioles have an incentive to offer one. Tillman can leave after 2017, but much of their core -- Manny Machado, Adam Jones, and Zach Britton to name a few -- will be around for one last hurrah in 2018. Should the Orioles attempt to compete that year as well, Tillman will help. And after 2018, the team needs pitchers. They have only Kevin Gausman and Logan Verrett, plus question marks in Dylan Bundy, Tyler Wilson, and Mike Wright.

Tillman has an incentive to listen. He's not an ace, so a down 2017 would hurt his value. He's a little old to be hitting the free-agent market as a starting pitcher. Players want to contend and the current Orioles core can do that. I don't know whether he likes playing for Baltimore, but I can't imagine he's so unhappy he would reject an extension out-of-hand. Plus, shoulder injuries can take whole careers with them; Tillman spent time on the DL with bursitis in August.

An agreement might be tough. Tillman's not some ramen-eating rookie who'll take a wildly below-market extension just to set him up for life. He already is: MLB Trade Rumors projects he'll make $10.6M in 2017, which will push his career earnings over $23M.

Performance-wise, Orioles fans know the deal. Tillman is entering his third and final year of arbitration at age 29, which is post-peak for most pitchers. He profiles as starting pitching depth at 1-2 fWAR per year but can reach above-average if his BABIP or LOB% are under control. He hasn't shown he can consistently control either, though. He has remained durable except for the bursitis.

Even though I'm proposing an extension, I doubt one will happen. Tillman will be 29 this year. Since 2010 only one right-handed starting pitcher aged 28-30 has signed away his first few free agent years: Ricky Nolasco with the Marlins in 2010.

This lack of comps means either teams don't want to risk extending starting pitchers who weren't good enough at ages 25-27, or such pitchers have high opinions of themselves and seek free agency at all costs. Likely it's some combination of both: teams may offer conservative extensions hoping they can land the pitcher but he's been waiting for free agency so long, and he's already post-peak, that he wants to get all the money he can.

But for giggles, let's work out what an extension might look like.

Extension Length

A three-year extension feels right to me. This would replace Tillman's last year of arbitration and buy out his first two free agent years -- the first of which the Orioles hope to contend, the second of which the team might punt, meaning Tillman could be trade bait.

Three years matches not only the Orioles' situation, but also the extension Nolasco took in 2010. Younger pitchers, better pitchers, and left-handed pitchers have gotten four or even five years in an extension. Tillman doesn't fall into any of those categories.

Extension Amount

With a length of three years, let's start the negotiations at $34M. I used Tom Tango's WARcels formula to estimate Tillman will be worth 4 wins during the next three years:

• 2017: 1.6 fWAR
• 2018: 1.2 fWAR
• 2019: 0.8 fWAR 

That's 3.6 fWAR, but I rounded up to be generous. The formula is an estimate only, but an informed one, and it allows for a starting point. For what it's worth, Steamer projects 1.4 fWAR next year.

At $8.5M per win today, 4 wins is worth $34M. That feels like a good starting point. It's in line with market prices and raises Tillman's AAV to $11.3M. He saves face by not taking a pay cut and the Orioles keep their contention window open a bit longer. Tillman stays on the team through age 31.

Nolasco got $26.5M, but in today's money that's really $30M. Add in WAR inflation at 5% per year and his deal is worth about 3/$39M today. Since Nolasco was a better pitcher (he had two four-win seasons prior to signing) and was a year younger than Tillman is, his extra $5M makes sense.

Tillman's Choice

Let's say the Orioles offer 3/$34M today. If you're Tillman, would you take it?

Consider why you should reject the deal:

• You can afford to shop around. You're set to clear $23M in career earnings before hitting free agency. 
• You're a durable innings-eater with a long track record of average performance and an All-Star appearance.
• You have that vaunted 'postseason experience' teams seem to crave.
• You have a hint of that 'veteran clubhouse presence' everyone likes.
• You have an awesome curveball.

Now consider why you would accept it:

• You protect against a down year in 2017 that would hurt your free-agent stock.
• Even with a regular year, you don't profile well in next year's free-agent pitching class.
• You triple your guaranteed earnings (assuming a salary of $10.6M in 2017).
• You remain on a contender for two years.

If the Orioles want Tillman badly enough for 2018, he'll have leverage to hold out for more money or a fourth year. In this case, the offer might increase to 3/$40M. I doubt Dan Duquette would give a fourth year. That would put Tillman in Justin Verlander / Adam Wainwright territory; each got five years at age 30 and 31 respectively. Tillman would be a year younger then them but nowhere near as talented. Josh Beckett, also much better pitcher, also got a four-year contract at age 30.

Remember: I'm talking about an extension, not a free-agent contract. Assuming 2017 goes well, Tillman could get more on the open market: maybe 3/$45M or even 4/$52M. But he's not on the open market now. From the player's perspective, an extension involves lowering your asking price in exchange for guaranteed employment.

If you're the Orioles, what would you do?

If you're Chris Tillman, how would you respond?

Win These 3 Bar Bets About the 2016 Orioles Season

I rarely make bar bets, mostly because I don't go to bars or bet that often. But from popular culture I understand bar bets are a thing that people do. I suspect that for Orioles fans this offseason, bar bets are something we would do if only we had a bet to make. After all, there's no live baseball and when the team is mostly tinkering around the edges, leaving little news to discuss. What better way to pass the time than to make bets about the Orioles while hanging out in bars?

In this spirit, I present three bar bets you can win when discussing the Orioles' 2016 season at your local watering hole (or remote watering hole, if you're traveling for the holidays). All are team records they set this year. Use them to get a free Natty Boh when the night is young but you're out of money.

Most players with 30+ HR in a season (3)

Recent Orioles teams have favored the long ball, but until 2016, no Orioles team saw three players hit at least 30 dingers in a season. This year Mark Trumbo (47), Chris Davis (38), and Manny Machado (37) helped the team set this record.

Here are the previous record-holding seasons, where two players hit 30+ four-baggers:

• 2015: Davis, Machado
• 2013: Davis, Adam Jones
• 2012: Davis, Jones
• 2011: J.J. Hardy, Mark Reynolds
• 1996: Brady Anderson, Rafael Palmeiro
• 1987: Eddie Murray, Larry Sheets
• 1969: Boog Powell, Frank Robinson
• 1966: Boog Powell, Frank Robinson

Davis and Machado should repeat next year. Will Trumbo return and do it again? Even if he doesn't come back, Jonathan Schoop could take his spot. The young second baseman swings out of his shoes on seemingly every pitch and knocked 25 last year.

If Trumbo does come back, the Orioles could set a new team record with four players hitting (pardon the pun) the mark. And don't discount Jones, who hit 29 last year. If he stays healthy he could make it five.

This year, Boston (David Ortiz, Mookie Betts, and Hanley Ramirez) and Seattle (Robinson Cano, Nelson Cruz, and Kyle Seager) also had three players with 30+ dingers. The most any team has had is four players. The last team to do this was the 2009 Phillies with Ryan Howard, Raul Ibanez, Chase Utley, and Jayson Werth.

Most consecutive wins to start the season (7)

The 2016 Orioles season ended in disappointing fashion, so it's easy to forget that the year started well. The Orioles won their first seven games, the longest such streak in team history.

A 3-2 walk-off win over the Twins on Opening Day set the tone for the streak. After a weird off day, the Orioles won the next two games by a score of 4-2. Series win in hand, they headed to Tampa Bay for a two-game set with the Rays and won both contests.

The Orioles returned to Baltimore where they squeaked out a 9-7 win against the Red Sox in the home opener. The next day they pushed their winning streak to seven games before losing the last game of the series to Boston, dropping them to 7-1 on the young season.

Before this year, the next-longest season-opening winning streak was in 1970, when the team won five straight to start the year. If you stretch your definition of the Orioles to include the St. Louis Browns, then the 1944 Browns have the franchise record with nine straight wins to open that season. Expanding the scope to all baseball since 1913, the 1982 Braves and 1987 Brewers share the major-league record with 13 straight wins to start those seasons.

Most batter strikeouts in a three-game series (52)

While facing the Astros in Houston from May 24th-26th, Orioles batters whiffed 52 times. That set not only a team record but also (ugh) a major-league record.

In the first game, every man who stepped to the plate struck out at least once. Three batters had a hat trick: Davis, Trumbo, and Pedro Alvarez. Three batters struck out twice: Jones, Matt Wieters, and Ryan Flaherty. Machado, Joey Rickard, and Caleb Joseph struck out once. The only Orioles position player to not strike out was Nolan Reimold, and that's only because he appeared only as a pinch runner. The team totaled 19 K's; every Astros pitcher that day struck an Oriole out.

Game 2 was more of the same: 18 K's for the Orioles. Every batter struck out at least once except Hyun Soo Kim, who had three hits and walked once. Alvarez had another had trick, as did Jones. Astros starter Collin McHugh punched out 10 Birds in 5.1 innings. Each reliever notched at least one K.

By Game 3 the Orioles adjusted their approach and struck out only 15 times. Again, every Orioles batter except one (Alvarez) struck out at least once. Davis matched Alvarez with his second hat trick in the series, and Schoop joined in with one as well. Astros starter Lance McCullers, who owns a ridiculous curveball, bested rotation-mate McHugh by whiffing 10 batters in 5 innings. I watched this game with a friend who's an Astros fan and basically buried my head in the sofa cushions the whole time.

So there you have it, friends: three records the Orioles set for themselves as a team this year. Use these fun facts to swindle inebriated bar patrons or just to have some fun during the Hot Stove season. Either way it'll be more fun than discussing which Rule 5 pickup is going to end up being a full-time player for the team this year.

Inspiration for this post provided by the December 16th paper from the Baseball Records Committee of the Society For American Baseball Research (SABR). All data from Baseball Reference.

Examining the Orioles' Offensive Woes in 2016's Second Half

If you watched Orioles baseball in the first half of 2016, you were likely screaming at the TV in joy. Despite its pitching woes, the team's offense stomped opponents into the ground with a 112 wRC+, second-highest in baseball. The sky seemed the limit as the team finished the first half at 51-36, eight games over .500.

If you watched Orioles baseball in the second half of 2016, you were likely screaming at the TV in frustration. The team's vaunted offense curled up in a ball and died, managing a paltry 88 wRC+, 5th-worst in baseball. The team still finished seven games over .500, but that felt like a failure given the optimism of the first half.

Second-half you had reason to be upset. Looking at regular players only, Baltimore's wRC+ dropped over 20 percentage points between halves, the third-largest drop in the sport:

Out of 574 MLB regulars, five Orioles ranked in the 25% largest offensive drops. That's a distinction you don't want to achieve. The following table shows these players, their second half offensive change, and where that change ranks out of 574 regulars:

Name	wRC+ Change, 1st Half to 2nd Half	MLB Rank (Percentile)
Jonathan Schoop	-58	4
Mark Trumbo	-46	10
Manny Machado	-39	16
Hyun-Soo Kim	-37	17
Chris Davis	-28	24
Adam Jones	-20	33
Matt Wieters	-10	44
J.J. Hardy	+11	66
Pedro Alvarez	+24	79

Only two Orioles regulars improved their batting line: the somewhat unlikely duo of J.J. Hardy and Pedro Alvarez. The rest turned in some real stinkers at the plate.

Jonathan Schoop led the team's decline, and nearly led all of MLB, with a 58 point wRC+ drop, worse than 96% of major leaguers. His offense cratered from a sparkling 124 wRC+ in the first half to an abysmal 66 after the All Star Break.

Some of us saw this coming. In June, Elie Waitzer predicted Schoop's .348 BABIP would fall and it did, all the way down to a measly .255. His core plate discipline skills, which aren't good to begin with, also deteriorated. His walk rate dropped 1.1 percentage points while his strikeout rate rose by 2.1 points. Finally, his power dimmed. His ISO declined from a robust .206 to a more-average .166. 

Mark Trumbo followed behind Schoop with a 46-point drop in wRC+, worse than 90% of regular major leaguers. His BABIP dropped even more sharply, from a high-but-reasonable .327 to an unplayable .216. His ISO dropped about 40 points from an immortal .294 to a very-dangerous .256. But unlike Schoop, Trumbo's plate discipline got better. His walk rate rose 1.7 points while his strikeout rate dropped 2.1 points. He may simply have been unlucky.

Manny Machado's slump ranks next-highest, but Matt Kremnitzer covered his swoon already, so I'll turn to Hyun-Soo Kim. Kim's splits aren't very reliable; despite hitting well, he played only 95 games. He also suffered a hamstring injury right before the first half ended.

But still, his wRC+ dropped 37 points in the second half, worse than 83% of his peers. Although his walk rate remained at 10.4%, his strikeout rate rose more than 4 points to 16.8%. Continuing on a theme, his BABIP dropped from an absurd .370 to a more reasonable .320. That'll stunt anyone's offense.

Of course, not all wRC+ drops are created equal. The following chart shows how Machado, Trumbo, and Kim fell from much loftier heights than Schoop:

So fret not, Orioles fans. The offensive struggles you felt in the second half were real. You aren't going crazy; at least, not in this sense. Here's hoping the team can reach and sustain a higher offensive output in 2017.

Blueprint For The 2017 Orioles (Option 4): Aiming For The Wild Card

Next year's Orioles will be fascinating. The team is in win-now mode, as evidenced by the 2014 J.J. Hardy extension, the mammoth contract to Chris Davis, the large commitment to Darren O'Day, and the forfeiture of several draft picks over the past few years. These players were retained to complement a solid core: perennial MVP candidate Manny Machado, exceptionally talented relievers Brad Brach and Zach Britton, and face-of-the-franchise Adam Jones.

The challenge: make the playoffs for $160 million. That's difficult given the large commitments already on staff. The 2016 team opened the season with a $147 million payroll. And although next year a few free agents will come off the books, Britton and Machado will earn over $11 million each, according to MLB Trade Rumors' arbitration estimator. Brad Brach's salary will jump to nearly $3 million. Jonathan Schoop and Kevin Gausman will also see their first arbitration salaries, estimated at $3.4 million for the former and $3.9 million for the latter. I'm happy for these guys; they've played well and earned the money. But that leaves the team in a bind.

With the team looking to contend yet again but with payroll already high, what moves should the Orioles make this offseason?

Qualifying Offers

The most pressing question is to whom, if anyone, the Orioles should make a qualifying offer. MLBTR estimates the QO at a princely $17.2 million. That sounds like a lot but it isn't; with the price of a free-agent win coming in at around $8.5 million, the QO is the going rate for an average (two-win) player. The draft pick element adds another wrinkle, but I'll ignore it here. It's safe to say the Orioles don't care much about those right now, and I agree they shouldn't. I'll ignore that element of their decision.

Offer the QO to Wieters; I think he'll decline it. The new QO represents only an 8.8% raise to him, and Wieters stands out as a good catcher in this year's free-agent market. He will want to test the waters for his age-31 season. He can get a multi-year deal that will exceed the value of the QO. Take the draft pick his rejection will bring.

Don't offer the QO to Trumbo. It's a tempting 87% raise for him, and I think he'll take that sure thing over testing free agency. Enough teams have passed on Trumbo that he and his agent should view him as a marginal player, and enough players have been screwed by rejecting the QO that Trumbo will accept it. Given I don't think Trumbo has another two-win season in him, his acceptance will stick the Orioles with Trumbo at an above-market rate, which they can't afford.

Ditto with Pedro Alvarez: don't make him an offer. The QO represents a 190% raise from his $5.95 million salary. He'd take it in a heartbeat. As with Trumbo, I doubt Alvarez will crack the two-win mark next year.

Good-bye to Wieters, Trumbo, and Alvarez. It was nice knowing you (Wieters especially).

Infield

With the departure of Wieters and Alvarez, the team is down a catcher and a DH. It's time for Caleb Joseph to take the lead with the tools of ignorance. Abysmal 2016 aside, he makes contact at an average rate and has exhibited a roughly league-average ISO before. His defense is also better than Wieters'. Oh, he'll also make about $1 million next year.

As his backup, I'd sign Nick Hundley for 1 year and $4 million. Hundley has cut down on his strikeout rate and increased his walk rate since leaving the Orioles. He also continues to hit for a bit of power, showing a .180 ISO last year. As a result he can put up a wRC+ in the 80's. Not great, but then again he's not making Buster Posey money.

Or, if you want Hundley starting and Joseph backing up, that's fine too. I don't have a strong preference. If you want to swap Hank Conger with Nick Hundley, I'm fine with that too. I would prefer Jason Castro; his excellent framing skills will help paper over the crack in the sidewalk that is the Orioles' starting rotation. But he's too rich for this team's blood.

As for DH, I'd like to give Christian Walker a shot. There's no money available for anyone else. Walker's played the outfield before, so I have him over Trey Mancini. But if you show me a video of Trey Mancini playing left field in Little League, then fine, he can start for the team. Finally, let's keep Ryan Flaherty and his utility-ness at his estimated $1.7 million salary.  

Infield total: Davis, Schoop, Machado, Joseph, Hardy, Hundley, Flaherty, and Walker for $58.81 million.

Outfield

Trumbo's departure means the team needs a starting right fielder. As I did last year, I implore the team to focus on defense. Teams like the Mets can get away with a bad outfield defense because Syndergaard, deGrom, and Harvey strike a lot of guys out. The Orioles are in the opposite situation; low strikeout totals mean more balls in play.

The Orioles will also need to mix and match in the outfield moreso than in previous years. Jones is big for a center fielder (6'3", 220 lbs). Center fielders with this body type (Vernon Wells, Andruw Jones) moved to a corner by age 32; Jones will be 31 this year. He'll need more days of rest than last year, whether that means DH'ing, riding the bench day-to-day, or spending time on the DL.

With these needs in mind I'd sign Peter Bourjos to a one-year deal at $7.7 million. Bourjos isn't much of a hitter, but he has some excellent defensive seasons on his resume. He's also a good baserunner and extremely fast, meaning he can spell Jones in center and score from second in high-leverage spots. The team will hope he catches BABIP lightning in a bottle en route to a two-win season. As a bonus, Bourjos should not cost the team a draft pick.

The piggy bank is nearly empty, so let's bring back Michael Bourn and Drew Stubbs on deals at the league minimum plus incentives. They provide speed on the bases, defense in the outfield, pinch-running opportunities, and hit from opposite sides of the plate. Stubbs can platoon with Kim in left as well, if need be. Good-bye to Joey Rickard; you never learned to control the strike zone and your defense left a lot to be desired.

Outfield total: Jones, Kim, Bourjos, Bourn, and Stubbs for $28.74 million.

Rotation

No moves on this front. My starting rotation consists of Gausman, Tillman, Miley, Jimenez, and Gallardo in that order. Gausman had himself an under-the-radar three-win season last year; tellingly, he started the Wild Card-clinching game on the final day of the season. Tillman is who he is at this point. Miley is also an average pitcher who suffered horrendous HR/FB and BABIP luck with the Orioles. Would you believe his xFIP with the team was a sparkling 3.34? I predict the same fans who turned on him in August 2016 will sing his praises by August 2017.

These guys are, shockingly enough, not a bad one-two-three. But the same can't be said about the last two guys. I put Jimenez in front of Gallardo because the former at least gets ground balls and can strike batters out. He's also proven he can adjust his mechanics should he struggle too much. Gallardo's K-BB% last year was a pathetic 4.6%. Enough said.

No one will take them in a trade. I would DFA/release them but that wouldn't solve the salary problem. I'd stick them in the bullpen except they'd be useful only as mop-up men. Oh well. At least both will be gone after this season. Would you believe this is the last year of Jimenez's contract? That snuck up on me.

Rotation total: Gausman, Tillman, Miley, Jimenez, and Gallardo for $47.92 million.

Bullpen

The aforementioned rotation means Dylan Bundy starts the year in the bullpen again. With Jimenez and Gallardo in the rotation though, Bundy should see plenty of action as a long reliever. By the end of the year, if the team is in contention, he may replace the latter entirely.

In addition to long relief, Bundy can spot start. Very few teams make it through the year needing only five starting pitchers. That's why Tyler Wilson is in the pen as well. He provides a similar, if less effective, option as Bundy. I chose Wilson over Mike Wright because Wilson walks fewer batters. Throwing 95 MPH isn't so great if you don't know where the ball's going.

O'Day, Givens, Brach, O'Day, and Britton return. I hope Givens works on his change-up this offseason so lefties don't smack him around the park so much. Donnie Hart also gets the call as a much-needed lefty.

I've heard some chatter about trading Britton. That would be a mistake. The Orioles are in urgent, red-light-flashing, sirens-blaring, win-right-the-hell-now mode. The starting rotation will not dominate the opposition and the offense is boom-or-bust. The team needs to be as sure as possible that any mid-to-late inning leads stay that way. Britton provides this assurance.

Trading Britton would also lead to ... what? Prospects? Those aren't valuable to the Orioles right now. They're all-in for the present. Another corner outfielder? $11 million doesn't buy what Britton gives you: total dominance in the highest-possible leverage situations in baseball.

No, it's best to keep Britton, scratch out a one- or two-run lead, and let the familiar Orioles bullpen put a sleeper hold on the opposition. You look at trading him towards the midpoint of the 2018 season if the Orioles aren't in a good spot then. Plenty of teams will need a rent-a-reliever. Just look at what Chicago gave up for Aroldis Chapman this year.

P.S. I non-tendered Vance Worley and T.J. McFarland.

Bullpen total: Bundy, Hart, Wilson, Givens, Brach, Britton, and O'Day for $24.63 million.

25-man total: $160.1 million.

Conclusion

This exercise was incredibly difficult, but the Orioles now have a reasonably competent 25-man roster that exceeds the budget by only $100,000. That seems good, although it could escalate if Bourn and/or Stubbs hit their incentives. By that time though payroll will be inflated anyway, assuming the team adds a bit of money to push for the playoffs. If Peter Angelos is going to fire me over 100 grand, well, I'm fine with that. I tried! Get Chris Davis to write you a check. He can afford it.

It's reasonable to think the team will contend again this year. In the dual Wild Card era, fielding a true-talent 81-81 team keeps you in contention to the final weeks of the season. Gain 5-6 wins in the standings with some well-timed hits with runners in scoring position (or well timed run prevention), and you vault into legitimate Wild Card contention.

These outcomes are entirely within reach for the 2017 Orioles.

1,000 Words about Dylan Bundy

What Happened To Brian Matusz?

Here's what’s crazy about the Brian Matusz situation: he was good last year. Legitimately good. Just last year! Against 206 batters, split nearly evenly between righties and lefties, he had a solid 71 ERA-, 85 FIP-, and 98 xFIP-. His K-BB rate was an excellent 17.5%, nearly 30% better than a league-average reliever.

But he couldn’t find it again in 2016. Against 35 batters he put up an ERA- of 290, FIP-, of 303, and xFIP- of 248. That’s while striking out a paltry 2.9% (just one batter!) and walking an astounding 20%. On top of that, he surrendered three HR in six innings, with two coming in the same game.

It's just six innings, but -- what the hell happened?

Matusz stopped throwing strikes. Hitters waited him out, taking their walks, and crushed what he gave them, refusing to strike out. The speed with which hitters caught up to him, and the severity with which they tagged him, is odd to me. Matusz was never stellar but he was never this bad.

His Zone% plummeted:

Hitters didn't chase like they did in 2015. In particular, they spat on his fastball and slider, which he'd used as strikeout pitches:

In 2015, these two pitches accounted for 50 strikeouts and 12 walks of 206 batters, amounting to a 24.2% K rate and 5.8% walk rate.

In 2016, these pitches accounted for one strikeout and seven walks of 35 batters, for terrible 2.8% strikeout and 20% walk rates.

When they did get a pitch to their liking, batters didn’t miss. Opponents' Z-Contact% jumped from 67.2% to 75.8%.

Hitters connected with his fastball and change-up more often:

When they connected, they did more damage:

These weren't fluke hits. Exit velocity shows Matusz's fastball, and to some extent his change-up, were very hittable:

Whew. That's a pretty ugly story. The speed and magnitude of hitters' adjustment to Matusz astounds me. Was it bad luck? Poor sequencing? It wasn't velocity; his fastball was down about 0.80 MPH, which isn't good, but that drop isn't enough to explain the graphs above. And his other pitches were flat or even up. His horizontal release points separated out a bit compared to last year, but again, could those fractions of an inch really make that much of a difference?

The first graph tells the story to me: Matusz lost his command. He couldn't locate his fastball like he used to in order to put hitters away. That, and perhaps some pitch-tipping (or amazing advance scouting) led to hitters laying off the heater and the slider because they were ahead in the count. Thus the high walk rate and increased damage on pitches in the zone.

Finally, his HR/FB rate of 30% indicates some bad luck. Matusz had been keeping the ball on the ground better than ever before; his GB/FB rate of 1.10 was the highest of his career. That's what you want to see from a pitcher who's not striking out a lot of batters.

He'll be back in the majors. Matusz is left-handed, 29 years old, and making reasonable money. He's one season removed from a good year and his struggles came on so rapidly and sharply that other teams may see them as a fluke. Besides, his stinker of a 2016 is only six innings.

Plus, he's coming from the Orioles. Some team is bound to look at him and think they can do what the Cubs did to Jake Arrieta. Neither the Orioles nor the Braves need him, but there are 28 more teams who might.

Fare thee well, Brian Matusz. You never lived up to your promise as the number four overall pick, but you were a good reliever for a few years and you deserve a tip of the cap from this fanbase.

Why Chris Davis Is Not A Rally-Killer

 

Photo by Keith Allison

During last week’s Camden Highball podcast, I made the following statement (paraphrased):

I love you, Chris Davis. But I don’t want you batting in the bottom of the 9th when the team is down by two and there are two runners on base. One-third of the time you’re going to strike out (not advance the runner). These little moments are going to add up during the year.

Prior to recording the podcast I’d thought a lot about the relationship between swinging strike rate and WPA. My gut told me a high-strikeout player like Davis would hurt the team by failing to advance runners in close games.

It seemed true. It felt true. So I said it out loud.

After I listened to the recording, an embarrassed flush spread to my cheeks. Here I am, writing on a sabermetrics web site, and I just used my gut to make a statement. Ugh! We all say foolish things, but not many of us get the chance to say foolish things that strangers on the Internet hear and that live for eternity on Dropbox. I managed to do both at once.

In order to feel less foolish, I had to atone for my sins. Isn't that what this whole sabermetrics thing is about, backing up your beliefs with evidence? So I said "gut, I'm sorry, but I need to fact check you." My gut responded favorably, but that's probably because I'd just eaten a peanut butter creme Oreo.

I examined the relationship between a player's swinging strike rate and the following metrics:

• Win Probability Added: Measures how much a player added to their team’s chance to win during the course of a season, taking into account both the leverages (inning, score, runners on base, number of outs) in which they batted and how well they did in the plate appearance.
• Win Probability Added / Leverage Index (WPA/LI): WPA without the leverage component. Unlike WPA, WPA/LI doesn't punish players for appearing in lots of low-leverage situations, nor does it reward players to bat in a lot of high-leverage situations. Players can't control the leverage of the situations in which they bat.

I sampled non-pitchers from 2010-2015 who averaged at least 50 PA per season. This low threshold avoided survivor bias by looking at not only starters, but also role players and those who were injured.

My hypothesis: players with high swinging-strike rates will have a lower WPA than players with low or average swinging strike rates. For context, Davis’ swinging strike rate of 15.48% ranks 20th-highest out of 1,607 players in this sample.

Unfortunately for my gut, the research shows swinging strike rate doesn't correlate well to either WPA or WPA/LI:

Swinging strike rate explains only 0.07% of the variance in WPA, or about 0.002 wins per year. That's a tiny number of wins.

The relationship isn't much stronger when you remove leverage from the equation. The r^2 between swinging strike rate explains only 0.0198 wins of WPA/LI per year. No one will notice this change in a player's WAR.

But r^2 isn't everything. The regression lines slope upward, indicating that as swinging strike rate increases, WPA and WPA/LI also increase. If you followed this model you'd want a player to swing and miss as much as possible, because the model says their WPA would be very high. But no one wants a batter to swing and miss ever, let alone "as much as possible".

That's why the plots look different if you focus on players with medium-to-high swinging strike rates:

The r^2 values remain weak. More importantly, these trend lines slope downward. Now the model says: if you swing and miss a lot, you're starting from a deeper hole than your peers who make more contact. You can still make a positive contribution, but you'll have a harder time doing so. There's the logical sense we are looking for.

A 2nd-degree polynomial fit of the original data shows this effect better:

While Chris Davis' swinging strike rate doesn't explain his WPA or WPA/LI, he should be careful going forward. If he swings and misses much more than he does now, he'll have a harder time contributing to the team.

Fortunately, Davis is a more complete player than just swinging and missing. He possesses tremendous power and mixes in a pretty good walk rate. These factors boost his wOBA, which correlates much better with WPA and WPA/LI:

The r^2 between wOBA and WPA is 0.64 (2.1 wins), and between wOBA and WPA/LI it's a whopping 0.82 (2.3 wins). Overall offensive prowess, as measured by wOBA, explains variance in WPA and WPA/LI much better than than swinging strike rate does.

These relationships hold up well for hitters in Davis' class:

In both cases, the regression models make logical sense. Have a high wOBA and you'll contribute wins to your team. Chris Davis should have a high wOBA. All is right with the universe.

I'm sorry, Chris Davis. I take back what I said. I won't grimace in frustration anymore when I see you bat in a high-leverage spot. I'll remind myself that you're a very talented baseball player who whacks the ball all over the yard, no matter the game situation.

But please don't swing and miss any more than you already do.

Ubaldo Jimenez's Adjustments Keyed An Improved 2015

Ubaldo Jimenez’s 2015 season was markedly better than his 2014 one. Year-over-year he lowered his walk rate by 5.3 percentage points while increasing his strikeout rate by 0.2 percentage points. His ground ball rate also shot up by 7.8 percentage points. As a result, even while his HR/FB rose 2.1 percentage points his ERA-, FIP- and xFIP- all dropped by 23%.

photo by Keith Allison under CC BY-SA 2.0 license

Jimenez himself credits the success to working with Ramon Martinez (brother of Pedro). The Orioles hired Martinez in March and he, along with pitching coach Dave Wallace and bullpen coach Dom Chiti, helped Jimenez address his complicated mechanics. Said Ubaldo:

[Martinez is] a smart guy. He knows how to be a good teacher. He learned from Dave, so they have a good chemistry. If you don't learn with them, you're not going to learn with anybody else. 

Along the way to these improvements, Jimenez did something he’d never done before. In 2015 he posted the highest O-Swing% of his career: 27.4% according to PITCH f/x. His previous high was 27.1%, which he achieved when he was still averaging 96 MPH with the Rockies in 2009. He is a far cry from that pitcher today. With a fastball that averages only 90 MPH today, Jimenez is still learning to pitch with a diminished repertoire.

A high O-Swing% is very good for a pitcher. When a batter swings at a pitch outside of the zone, he cannot walk. Second, he has a reduced chance of making contact. Last year the league O-Contact rate was 62.9% compared with an 87.1% Z-Contact rate. Finally, if a batter does make contact, its impact is reduced. Last year the average batted ball out of the strike zone left the bat at 83 MPH, compared to 91 MPH when the batted ball was in the zone.

Indeed an examination of the 1,283 pitcher-seasons since 2007 shows that as a pitcher’s O-Swing% increases, his xFIP goes in the other direction:

All of this is just to show that a career-high O-Swing% for Jimenez is a good thing, just like it is for any pitcher.

How did he get there? The following table breaks down his O-Swing changes by pitch:

While Jimenez’s O-Swing% was up across the board, the charge was led by his split-fingered fastball. The following graph tells part of the story, that hitters swung at the pitch much more often than last year:

Unfortunately for hitters, Jimenez’s splitter is out of the zone more than ⅔ of the time. So if a hitter swings at it, that means he's been fooled.

What led to this improvement? First, Jimenez threw the pitch more than a mile per hour harder than he did in 2014:

Gaining an entire mile per hour is a significant change. Jimenez also tightened up his release point, which perhaps had two effects: helping him land his pitches in the same spot, and hiding the splitter better. The following images show his fastballs’ release points in 2014 and then in 2015:

In 2015 the release points for his fastballs overlap much more. There still is about an inch and a half of variance, but if you're a hitter looking at Jimenez’s arm angle to decide what pitch is coming, you’ll now have a tougher time guessing. Given that you most likely have two strikes on you anyway, so you have to protect, you're going to have a harder time making solid contact.

In fact, Jimenez made his release point more consistent across the board:

Overall he reduced the variance in his vertical release by a whopping 50%. That is a nice improvement in his ability to fool hitters. It probably makes up for the fact that the variance in his horizontal release point actually grew by a third of an inch.

As a result of throwing it from a lower slot, the splitter appeared to drop more:

This increase in vertical drop, combined with the increased velocity and more consistent release point, made the splitter a more effective pitch in 2015. Although hitters’ BA against the pitch increased from 0.175 to 0.224, their ISO against it dropped from 0.138 to 0.129.

Now far removed from his flamethrowing days, Jimenez continues to grapple with being a sinker/slider pitcher who relies on deception rather than heat. 2014 wasn't his year but 2015 was a step in the right direction. He showed that, even after ten years in the big leagues, he can adapt and adjust to new circumstances. That’s good because Orioles fans have at least two more years of watching his funky delivery every fifth start.

All data from FanGraphs, Baseball Savant, and Brooks Baseball.

Guest Post: Joe Sheehan On Why The Orioles Should Sign Dexter Fowler

The following post is from Joe Sheehan, who runs a subscription-only email newsletter that covers all of baseball. Joe was a founding member of Baseball Prospectus and has contributed to Sports Illustrated, ESPN.com, and many other publications while being a guest on MLB Network's "Clubhouse Confidential" and numerous radio programs around the country.

On January 27th he dedicated an entire post to the Orioles, explaining that although the team has spent a lot of money this winter it still needs to do more to compete. The post is reprinted here with his permission.

The Tigers have committed hundreds of millions of dollars to Justin Upton, Jordan Zimmermann and others to improve upon a core that probably wasn't good enough to win.

The Orioles have committed hundreds of millions of dollars to Chris Davis and Darren O'Day merely to maintain a core that probably isn't good enough to win.

2B Schoop (R)
3B Machado (R)
CF Jones (R)
1B Davis (L)
C Wieters (S)
DH Trumbo (R)
LF Reimold (R)
RF Flaherty (L)
SS Hardy (R)
IF Paredes (S)
LF Kim (L)
C Joseph (R)
OF Navarro (L)

SP Tillman (R)
SP Gausman (R)
SP Jimenez (R)
SP Gonzalez (R)
SP Wright (R)

RP Britton (L)
RP O'Day (R)
RP Matusz (L)
RP Brach (R)
RP McFarland (L)
RP Roe (R)
RP Garcia (R)

The Orioles have done little to improve upon the team that was 81-81 last season. They spent to retain Davis and O'Day, and they watched Matt Wieters accept a qualifying offer. They return nine of their top ten players by PA and 12 of their top 14 by innings pitched -- losing Steven Pearce, Wei-Yin Chen and Bud Norris. Their most significant additions have been Mark Trumbo, the kind of low-OBP slugger they already had in spades, and Hyeon-Soo Kim, who I might call the Shin-Soo Choo of the Korean Baseball Organization. There's no imminent help from the farm; the Orioles' top two prospects, Hunter Harvey and Dylan Bundy, threw 22 pro innings last year. Christian Walker has been buried by Trumbo and the return of Davis.

By their actions, the Orioles seem to believe that they're the 96-66 team of 2014, rather than the .500 team of last year. From 2012-14, the Orioles won 93, 85 and 96 games, but only one of those teams, the 2014 version, was actually very good:

"Bird" Pun Here

                RS   RA  Diff

2015   81-81   713  693   +20

2014   96-66   705  593  +112

2013   85-77   745  709   +36

2012   93-69   712  705    +7

That 2014 team featured a lot of great performances by players who are no longer here. Nelson Cruz hit 40 homers. Steven Pearce had a 930 OPS. Nick Markakis was second among regulars with a .342 OBP. Chen is now gone as well. Adam Jones, Manny Machado, Chris Tillman and Zach Britton have demonstrated that they're collectively strong enough to be the core of a deep team but not a shallow one. Last year, Machado made the leap, Davis hit 47 homers, Jonathan Schoop had a strong half-season, and the Orioles were still an 81-win team. They needed to do more than rack the balls again. At least so far, they haven't.

The Orioles have had a consistent approach under Buck Showalter: position players that hit homers and play defense; deep bullpens that get ground balls; starting pitching that mostly stays out of the way. Recent Orioles teams have had low OBPs, high SLGs and short-sequence offenses. They're first in homers in MLB the last four years, with 52 more than second-place Toronto; they're third in SLG behind the Rockies (Coors Field) and Tigers. They're first in isolated power. They're eighth in runs…and just 22nd in OBP.

Now, the Orioles can say they've addressed that by signing Kim, and maybe that works. Kim isn't likely to hit near the top of the lineup, though, and that's what they really need to find. They still have playing time available in the outfield, where Nolan Reimold, Ryan Flaherty and Trumbo are all too prominent on the depth chart. It's hard to identify a leadoff hitter on this roster, which is how you end up with a guy with a .306 OBP slotted there. The Orioles seem very reluctant to give up their #1 pick, as they should be, but it may be time to go get Dexter Fowler.

Fowler would become the Orioles' best leadoff hitter since Brian Roberts. He would slot nicely in right field, as he's a 30-year-old outfielder whose numbers in center haven't been great. He's not going to be very expensive -- maybe 3/45 in a market that priced Alex Gordon at 4/72. Mostly, he'd be a reliable OBP guy for a team whose #2-#4 hitters might very well hit 100 homers and slug .520. Fowler could score 120 runs batting in front of Machado, Davis and Jones.

I don't want to minimize the importance of that #1 pick. As a player, Fowler is a lot closer to Daniel Murphy than he is to David Price, and I recently skewered the Nationals for their decision to give up a #1 for Murphy. Consider those two organizations for a moment, though. Or take the Mets, with their success in drafting and developing prospects. There's a lot of homegrown talent in Baltimore, but of late, their core player-development competence seems to be breaking highly-talented pitchers. There's an argument that a #1 pick has less value to them than it does to a team better able to shepherd young men from amateurs to Orioles.

There's also the importance of this year and next to the Orioles. Wieters is a free agent after this season. Tillman and Kim are free agents after 2017; Jones and Machado after 2018. Davis will be around for a while, but he's at his peak. The Orioles are at the back end of the cycle that began in 2012. This team, the Adam Jones Orioles, won't be around much longer, and the Orioles' farm system isn't going to be replenishing the major-league team for a few years. The tension between wins now and wins later is always present, but for the Orioles, there's a strong argument that the wins Fowler brings now -- pushing the Orioles towards 90 wins -- will have more value than the wins a #1 pick will bring in 2019-21 when the Orioles project to be bad.

As far as the Davis contract is concerned, it's surprisingly reasonable because of the deferred money. A listed 7/161 turns out to be more like 7/127.5 in value, an AAV of $18 million a year. Davis is an impossible player to project -- he's wrapped two huge years around one as a replacement-level player -- but he would need to return about 14 wins in seven years to be worth the money, just two per season. $18 million is Jayson Werth money, it's less than what Choo and Carl Crawford got. The seven years may not work out so well for the Orioles, but the overall investment is low enough to make even that manageable. If this were 5/127.5, it would look different but be a lesser deal.

Just bringing back the core of a .500 team isn't enough, though. The Orioles can't look at 2014's 96 wins and assume that with better health, better luck and some development, they'll be that good again. There were key performances on that 2014 team by players who are no longer here, and their absences were a big part of why 2015 went south. For the Orioles to press the Red Sox and Blue Jays, they need another piece, and Fowler is that piece: he fills a lineup and a roster hole, and the OBP skills he brings mesh beautifully with the Orioles' high-SLG, high-ISO team. It's hard to give up a #1, but it's even harder to spend $120 million on an 83-win team.

I encourage you to subscribe to Joe's newsletter, which is $29.95 for a full year or $16.95 for six months. I've been a subscriber since the beginning and can't recommend it enough. As you can see here, his pieces are thought-provoking and insightful and his analysis pulls no punches. He is on Twitter at @joe_sheehan.

Don't Worry About Chris Tillman's K-BB% Decline

Chris Tillman is the icing on the cake of the Erik Bedard-Adam Jones swap of 2008. If the team had gotten only Jones, the trade would’ve been a win. He has become the face of the franchise during the Orioles’ return from exile in baseball’s hinterlands. But Tillman has provided good value also. Although he struggled from 2009-2011, he pitched well from 2012-2014, breaking out alongside Jones, Manny Machado, Chris Davis, and others.

2015 was his worst full season yet. Hidden within the high ERA was the fact that the season concluded a three-year stretch where his K-BB% dropped each year, even when accounting for changes in league K and BB rates.

Here are his K-BB rates relative to the league, where 100 is average and higher is better:

• 2013: 114
• 2014: 78
• 2015: 61

This drop alarmed me. Strikeout and walk rates are among the most relevant predictors of a pitcher’s future success (in terms of run prevention). Accordingly, I wanted to understand whether this drop portended doom for the 6’5”, 210-pound righthander.

To check, I gathered all pitchers since 1955-2010 who met the following criteria:

• Starting at age 24, 25, or 26, experienced two consecutive year-over-year declines, relative to the league each year, in K-BB rate
• Did not miss a season in this three-year window.
• Pitched at least 150 innings each year.

120 pitchers met these criteria, 1.3% of pitchers in the 8,944-person sample. The names range from all-time greats to scrubs you’ve never heard of. For all 120 pitchers, I then looked up the following information:

• Their average number of innings pitched each season for the three seasons following the decline
• Their ERA- in these seasons.

In this study, the first metric is the best one to indicate how much value the Orioles might get out of Tillman in the next three years. A high innings total means a pitcher is both healthy and good. A low innings total would indicate the opposite, with the possibility that a starter got moved to the bullpen. The length of time is relevant because the Orioles control Tillman for the next three years as they go through salary arbitration.

We can look at this set of results in a variety of ways.

Largest and Smallest Three-Year Declines

The largest three-year K-BB decline happened to Mario Soto from 1982-1984. In those years his K-BB rate declined a whopping 248%. In the three years following his decline, he was demonstrably worse than league average, although not a bad pitcher, pitching 130 IP/year with an ERA- of 112.

The smallest decline happened to two pitchers: Mike Pelfrey from 2008-2010 and Jim Bouton from 1963-1965. Each declined by 9% relative to the league. Pelfrey, who recently signed with the Tigers, averaged 121 IP/year in the three years following his decline, even though his ERA- was a respectable 106. The reason for his low innings total was that Tommy John surgery that cost him most of the 2012 season. His K-BB total actually declined one more year in 2011.

Bouton averaged just 69 IP/year in the three years following his decline with an ERA- of 119. Okay, but not good. The first year after his decline was his last year as a starter; the next two years he was a reliever/spot-starter. (It must be said that in the fourth year after this decline, he signed with the expansion Seattle Pilots and wrote a famous book about the experience.)

Best and Worst Post-Decline Phases

When I say "best" here, I mean "highest average IP/year for the three seasons following the decline". As I said above, a high IP total is an indication the pitcher is performing well. The reason he's doing so is not important for this study.

The best post-decline phase has to be that of Jim Palmer. Yes, Tillman can take solace in the fact that the man who calls half his games also experienced a significant decline in K-BB rate. From 1972-1974 Palmer’s K-BB rate fell by an ugly 107%, finishing at a low of 1.9% in 1974. That wouldn’t play today, but in the mid-70’s that was okay, and Palmer was still getting outs. He continued to do so for the next three years, averaging a whopping 319 IP/year with an excellent ERA- of 70.

Another famous name comes in second place on this list. Steve Carlton’s relative K-BB rate declined 78% from 1969-1971. That didn’t hurt his career any, as over the next three years he averaged 310 IP/year  with an ERA- of 81.


The worst post-decline "career" is undoubtedly that of Noah Lowry, who declined 135% from 2005-2007 and didn't pitch at all after that. The thing is, he was a very good pitcher in 2007, putting up an ERA- of 88. He just suffered a string of injuries that forced him out of the game. Down in the cellar with him is Ricky Romero, whose K-BB rate declined 88% from 2010-2012 and who's thrown just 7.1 major league innings since.

Does K-BB% Decline Explain Variation in Post-Decline IP?
In addition to Palmer and Carlton, several other Hall of Famers show up on this list. Nolan Ryan, Don Drysdale, Dennis Eckersley, Sandy Koufax, Bert Blyleven, and Tom Glavine are all there. Other names you’d recognize are Orel Hersheiser, Dave Stieb, Dwight Gooden, Jon Lester, Andy Pettitte, James Shields, Kevin Brown, Josh Beckett, Carlos Zambrano, Tommy John, Tim Hudson, Cole Hamels, and Max Scherzer.

The presence of such names shows that you can be a good pitcher, even a great one, while experiencing a declining core skillset at a young age. A scatterplot shows conclusively that the magnitude of a pitcher’s K-BB rate decline explains none of the variance in how many innings he will average during the following three years:

Soto, way out by himself on the right side of the graph, probably skews the results, as does the man to his left (Mike Norris with a 203% decline from 1980-1982). If we examine pitchers whose K-BB rate declined between 43 and 63%, a range that places Tillman in the middle, do we get a different picture?

Nope. The relationship is just as non-existent even when looking at Tillman’s direct comparables.

These graphs show that K-BB rate declines happen to Hall-of-Famers, middle-tier innings-eaters, and scrubs alike. If you need further proof, here’s a histogram of post-decline ERA-:

50% of these pitchers have an ERA- of 103 or lower, with the average being 111. The Orioles would take this kind of performance from Tillman; it would certainly beat his 2015 ERA- of 121.

There is probably some survivor bias going on here. If you’re good enough to pitch 150 innings/year for three years starting at age 24, 25, or 26, you’re good enough to compensate for a K-BB rate decline. That, or perhaps strikeouts were never a big part of your game to begin with. Or you pitch to contact enough to limit the damage from walks. Or you're young enough that some team will give you a chance.

Tillman has shown some evidence of adjusting; as his K-BB rate has declined, he’s become more of a ground-ball pitcher in an effort to limit the damage:

This adjustment doesn’t mean that Tillman will be okay, but that indicators of his decline will have to come from somewhere else. The fact that his K-BB rate has declined means nothing for what the Orioles should expect out of him through 2018. Plenty of major-league pitchers have experienced what Tillman is going through and have been just fine. 

You can view the full list of K-BB decliners here.

All data for this post courtesy of FanGraphs.