18 December 2015

Orioles Are Reportedly Only Interested In Spending $100 Million-Plus On Chris Davis

It's hard for fans not to get caught up in the entertainment of free agency and the thought of plugging in one or two top free agents into their favorite team's lineup. Unfortunately, it's time to come back to reality, because it doesn't appear the Orioles will be doing anything of the sort.

Dan Connolly of The Baltimore Sun wrote last night that the team's $150 million offer "was earmarked for [Chris] Davis only." Here's more:
There was hope among the fan base that if the Orioles didn't agree to a deal with Davis, that money would be shifted toward a player like [Justin] Upton.

But according to an industry source, managing partner Peter Angelos stepped out of his comfort zone to make the club-record offer because of what Davis has meant to the franchise and community since coming here as part of a trade from Texas in 2011. It was, in part, a reward for his past successes as well as an admission that Davis' prodigious power — he has homered more over the last four seasons than any other player — is a rare commodity.
None of the above is shocking, and a large segment of the fan base would be delighted if Davis were to return at any cost. But you rarely, if ever, want to see "reward for past successes" as a driving force to re-sign a player. That's precisely what many were afraid of when it came to potentially overpaying for Nick Markakis. And that's also what leads to fanciful and misguided pieces of writing like this.

So surprising is the wrong word to describe this latest chapter in the O's offseason, but maybe perplexing isn't. The Orioles have a clear need for at least one talented, high-ceiling player. Obviously they routinely look for ways to avoid risk, and one way to do that is to not spend big in the free agent market.

But that's not what the Orioles are saying; they're saying that they'll (or that Angelos will) only spend that type of money this offseason on Davis. Simply put, that is baffling. Either you completely stay away from these mega-deals because you think they're too high-risk or you don't. Making the exception for Davis only -- maybe the fifth- or sixth-best free agent this offseason -- is just bizarre.

The Orioles clearly prefer to spend big on their own players, who they are much more familiar with. That's why Adam Jones, whose extension was viewed as a smart move for both Jones and the team at the time (and still looks excellent), has the team's largest contract. The Orioles typically avoid the cream of the crop in free agency. But when the Orioles have demonstrated they have the money to spend and a player like Upton seems to possess less risk than Davis, it shouldn't matter that he's never played for the Orioles.

If most fans were being honest with themselves, they most likely figured some type of report like this was coming. And it makes earlier mentions that the Orioles could be even a remote possibility for David Price's services even more laughable.

17 December 2015

With Hyun-soo Kim On Board, What Should The Orioles Do Now?

As Jon discussed last night, the Orioles have reached an agreement (pending the O's physical and all the hyperbole surrounding it) with Korean outfielder Hyun-soo Kim. Jon also correctly noted that Kim's two-year, $7 million deal doesn't limit the team from pursuing a more expensive free agent. And the Orioles continue to be active in that market.

The O's are justifiably playing hardball with Chris Davis and Scott Boras. Whether their previous offer of seven years and around $150 million is off the table for good, the O's will remain, at the very least, a potential landing spot for Davis until they move on with a big signing or a few noteworthy ones. The Orioles can't and shouldn't wait around for Davis. And you could logically argue anyway (which we've certainly done) that a massive deal for a 30-year-old first baseman is both exorbitant and a poor use of resources for a mid-market team with several holes to fill. But home runs are thrilling, and the O's lineup could still use a big bat.

The O's realistically could get by with using Mark Trumbo primarily at first base and then acquiring a first baseman in the future or using Trumbo as a bridge to a 2017 that features Christian Walker and/or Trey Mancini. That might not be the best strategy, but it's a possibility.

For now, there are plenty of free agent options -- not necessarily at first base, but overall. The Orioles could still use a corner outfielder, a starting pitcher, and a designated hitter. The best of the outfield market includes: Yoenis Cespedes, Justin Upton, Alex Gordon, Dexter Fowler, and Denard Span. Austin Jackson, Gerardo Parra, Marlon Byrd, Will Venable, Shane Victorino, Alejandro De Aza, Steve Pearce, Alex Rios, and some others are also still out there.

Now that Jason Heyward has been signed, action on the rest of the outfield market should start heating up. Cespedes, Upton, or Gordon would be tremendous fits for most teams. Of those three, the O's have been linked most to Upton and have been described as an admirer of Gordon. Does Kim's signing slam the door on players like Span or Parra? Span could still make some sense and is a proven top-of-the-order bat, but he also has a medical history that typically scares the Orioles off. With other corner outfield options on the roster including Nolan Reimold, Dariel Alvarez, L.J. Hoes, Henry Urrutia, and Joey Rickard, clearly the O's could use another outfielder. And it's most likely an overreaction, but seeing Trumbo listed as an outfielder on the team website's roster is maybe somewhat disconcerting.

The Orioles also need a starting pitcher, unless you're confident, for some reason, in a potential rotation of Chris Tillman, Kevin Gausman, Ubaldo Jimenez, Miguel Gonzalez, and Mike Wright/Tyler Wilson/Vance Worley. Remaining options include: Yovani Gallardo, Scott Kazmir, Mike Leake, Wei-Yin Chen, and Ian Kennedy. Mat Latos, Mark Buehrle, and Doug Fister are also available.

The Chen ship has sailed, leaving Kazmir as probably the option (of the expensive group, at least) that makes the most sense. Not only is he left-handed, but he's not tied to any draft pick compensation since he was acquired by the Astros in a trade last summer. Still, the market is picking up for his services, and the O's may also be wary of his injury concerns. As discussed numerous times, the Orioles do not like handing out long-term deals to pitchers (even though they've done so recently with Jimenez and Darren O'Day). But I wouldn't count on that as something they're going to start doing routinely.

Roch Kubatko mentioned last night that the Orioles "are still interested in getting another left-handed hitting outfielder," so pairing someone like Span with Kazmir would likely appease the fan base. Trading for Trumbo, re-signing O'Day, and signing Kim/Span/Kazmir (or something similar) would represent a busy and interesting offseason. But that still wouldn't address the team's DH issues; the money might not be there to add someone like Pedro Alvarez or another decent bat if the O's make a bold move or two. That's been a concern all along: whether the Orioles are willing to shell out the funds to upgrade a number of positions. That's also a big reason why the Orioles are also scouring the trade market.

One looming question is whether this offseason turns into a bunch of Kim-like signings. I like the Kim move, so that's not necessarily a terrible thing. But while the cost is low, the ceiling isn't high. So will the O's pursue a bunch of mid-level signings or trades and try to upgrade in a number of areas instead of making a major signing? That may depend on what you consider "mid-level." Either way, that could be a better option than sending over a dump truck full of money to Davis. Rational decisions aren't always popular ones.

16 December 2015

Orioles Sign Hyun-soo Kim, Pending Physical

As of this evening, Hyun-soo Kim boarded a flight from Seoul to Dulles.  Word leaked that he will meet with Orioles officials, undergo a physical, and sign a contract with an AAV greater than Byung-ho Park.  The Orioles have been quite vocal about their pursuit of a left-handed hitting corner outfielder.  Kim fits the bill and the 3.5 AAV cost is low enough that it does not greatly impede the club in moving forward with additional signings.  In other words, Kim does not prevent the club from signing Chris Davis, Justin Upton, or Alex Gordon.

If one wishes to engage in hyperbole, then we can puts comps on each of the major Korean position players in the world of MLB.  Kim would be Ty Cobb to Park's Ruth and Jung-ho Kang's Honus Wagner.  Kang can hit well, but is not so regarded with his glove.  Park hits the ball a mile.  Kim is considered an artist with the bat with defense that likely shows average and an arm that shows less.  While some may optimistically see a prime Nate McLouth in him, the more likely projection would perhaps be something near Melky Cabrera or perhaps Nick Markakis.  A player who can get the bat on the ball, but the contact may not be incredibly meaningful and he does not have the wheels to exploit long line drives.  He'll likely show gap to gap power, pulling in 10-15 home runs a year.

Below is how his career has gone in the KBO:

YearAgeTmPA2BHRBBSOBAOBPSLG
200618Doosan10000.000.000.000
200719Doosan3531952646.273.335.398
200820Doosan5573498040.357.454.509
200921Doosan57231238059.357.448.589
201022Doosan56529247864.317.414.531
201123Doosan56125137163.301.392.444
201224Doosan4911774650.291.358.382
201325Doosan51023166271.302.382.470
201426Doosan52826175345.322.396.488
201527Doosan630262810163.326.438.541
All Levels (10 Seasons)4768230142597501.318.406.488
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/16/2015.

You may remember that I put together a model to project MLB performance from players who have made the transition either from MLB to KBO or vice versa.  The pool was restricted to the last couple years as the league has become a bastion of high octane offense, so it consists of Kang and 11 Westward bound transitions.  That is not the most robust of populations to draw a model from, but it was interesting that walk rate and home run rate were significantly projected while nothing else was.  This gives us considerable certainty when entertaining how well Byung-ho Park will do, but it leaves us scratching our heads a bit with Kim because so much of his game depends on secondary power.

KANG projection for Hyun-soo Kim:

PA 2b HR BB SO AVG OBP SLG WAR
Hyun-soo Kim 576 21 12 53 68 .253 .322 .363 1.5

For 3.5 MM, that looks actually quite amazing.  The Orioles would be getting three times their investment.  However, keep in mind that a 1.5 WAR LF is a below average LF, which is about five times the value the club got out of its left fielders in about a 100 fewer at-bats.  It is not the flashiest move, but it does improve the club if you think KANG is a useful projection tool.  As I mentioned, KANG does very well with home runs and walks, but not much else.  Strikeouts are ranging toward being significant.  That is it.  A player like Kim has made the most out of singles and doubles and that simply is not accounted for in the model.  To poke and cause a little more doubt, KANG thinks Ah-seop Son is a monster and no one even bothered to place a bid on him.

From a scouting angle, it depends on who you talk to.  I have talked to three front office folks and Kim ranged from AAA outfielder to passing left fielder.  Those would be 35-45 grades.  My acquaintances who follow Korean baseball think the world of Kim.  At the very least, it will be interesting to see how it all plays out.  

Updating The 2016 Orioles

The other day, a commentator asked the following:
“I'd like to see someone here do a dual comparison of say Upton/Trumbo vs. Davis/Pearce or Davis/Parra or even Davis/Markakis and see how it grades out. I bet Upton/Trumbo is not too bad especially if Trumbo can bring 25-30 HR.”
This request is definitely doable using Steamer projections. However, a few changes need to be made to this question. First, the Orioles already have Trumbo on their roster and therefore shouldn’t be considered an addition. Second, I question whether the Orioles will spend more than $130 to $135 million on payroll and therefore think that adding Davis and Markakis would break their budget. This results in five possible permutations. One is that the Orioles add only Davis, that they add Upton, that they add Pedro Alvarez and Parra, that they add Markakis and Pearce and that they add Alvarez and Pearce.

Before the off-season started, the 2016 Orioles’ were projected to score about 661 runs if they didn’t add any players. Since then, the Orioles have added Matt Wieters, Mark Trumbo, L.J Hoes and Joey Rickard while losing Steve Clevenger and therefore have improved their offense.  My rudimentary model, which uses Steamer projections for performance and plate appearances, suggests that the Orioles have improved from scoring 662 runs to 699 runs. The Orioles scored 713 runs in 2015 and therefore have mostly replaced their offensive production.  This is how the baseline has changed.



In part, this is because Steamer believes that Machado will have 672 PAs and Adam Jones will have 654 PAs. Machado has over 700 PAs when healthy while Jones broke 680 PAs each year from 2012-2014 while having 581 in 2015 suggesting that both of these projections are feasible. If either of these players misses significant time, then the Orioles expected production will be inflated. In addition, I think that Steamer is awfully optimistic for players like Hoes (.262/.330/.358), Urrutia (.277/.319/.404), Alvarez (.273/.301/.423), Walker (.254/.311/.426), and Rickard (.256/.324/.350).

Steamer projects Chris Davis to have a .236/.329/.466 line, have 630 PAs and be worth 2.4 fWAR. In 2015, Chris Davis had a .262/.361/.562 line. Needless to say, if Steamer is accurate about Davis’ performance, then he will be a huge disappointment. In such a case, using him at 1B and Trumbo at DH as opposed to using players like Paredes, Walker or Mancini at DH will result in the Orioles being projected to score 720 runs or seven more than last year.

I’m far more bullish on Chris Davis then Steamer and project him to have a .264/.345/.524 line which would be slightly worse than his 2015 numbers but in the same ballpark. If so, the club would be projected to score 736 runs in 2016. This is how the Orioles depth chart looks if they add Davis.



Steamer projects Justin Upton to have a .260/.343/.467 line over 638 PAs and be worth 3 fWAR. Upton would presumably be the Orioles’ left fielder and would be a probable offensive upgrade from guys like Reimold, Rickard, Hoes, Urrutia and Alvarez. This lineup is expected to score 728 runs in 2016. Here's how the lineup looks.



Given the Orioles large number of weaknesses, one might think that adding multiple players could possibly help the team more than adding one great player. Steamer projects Nick Markakis to have a .269/.340/.369 line in 655 PAs and for Steve Pearce to have a .252/.324/.446 line in 377 PAs. If Steamer is correct, then trading for Markakis would be a mistake as he’d be a slight offensive upgrade over L.J Hoes and would cost considerably more money. Steamer appears to be a fan of Steve Pearce given the amount of cash that he’ll receive. This lineup is projected to produce 715 runs in 2016 and looks like this.



Steamer projects Pedro Alvarez to have a .243/.322/.466 line and for Gerardo Parra to have a .267/.315/.394 line. Steamer is justifiably bearish on Gerardo Parra and feels like he’d be a minimal upgrade over Nolan Reimold (albeit more likely to stay healthy) and worse than Henry Urrutia. As a result, this lineup would be expected to score 714 runs in 2016.


Alvarez and Pearce are the best players in these groupings with the exception of the expensive players like Davis or Upton. If the Orioles added Alvarez and Pearce, they’d be expected to score 720 runs in 2016 or about the same amount of runs as Steamer would predict the Orioles to score with Chris Davis.



The current Orioles prediction that they will score 699 runs is enough to put their offense in the middle of the pact (7th in the AL). Adding Upton or Davis would put the Orioles around 5th in majors based on previous year or that the Orioles should have an average to above-average offense. Then again, I also think that Steamer is highly optimistic on a number of the Orioles outfield options.

If Steamer was slightly optimistic when it came to the hitting, it’s even more so when it comes to the pitching. Steamer thinks that potential starters like Tyler Wilson, Dylan Bundy, Mike Wright, Vance Worley and Parker Bridwell can maintain ERAs below 5 as well as projecting minor league depth relievers like Oliver Drake, Chris Jones, Andrew Triggs, Tim Berry and Edgar Olmos of being above replacement level. That’s certainly possible, but I would be surprised if a few of those pitchers don’t get completely shelled next year ala Norris and Wright in 2015 or Hammel, Arrieta, Britton, Gausman and Garcia in 2013 or Arrieta, Britton, Matusz and Hunter in 2012. The Orioles currently only have four starting-caliber starters and will likely suffer due to a severe lack of depth.

Steamer projects the Orioles to allow 647 earned runs in 2016. Presuming that the Orioles allow 35 unearned runs, it would mean that the Orioles would allow 682 runs total or eleven runs less than last year.  It further suggests that the Orioles are currently an 83 win team and should be expected to win between 84 and 87 games based on which hypothetical scenario they follow.  This is enough to be competitive and possibly enough to win a playoff spot if the Orioles upgrade their team at the trade deadline.

I would expect the Orioles’ pitching prospects to do considerably worse than Steamer thinks. I expect them to allow an extra 30 runs more for a team total of 712 runs unless they add another starter to avoid relying so heavily on unproven prospects. This would mean that the Orioles should currently be expected to win 80 games and these possible additions would put them in the 81-83 win range.

It seems likely that the Orioles will compete for a playoff spot the entire season long. The Orioles bullpen is especially strong which likely means that they’ll give up fewer runs in important situations (when Britton, O’Day and Givens are pitching) and more runs in less important situations (when Wright and Wilson are pitching) making it more likely that they could steal a playoff spot. However, it also seems more likely than not that this club will fall just short of clinching a playoff spot regardless of whether they make a big signing. This team has talent, but needs one elite player, another good player and an average player in order to feel more comfortable about their chances of making the playoffs. Such a team would probably force the Orioles to spend $150M. Can their payroll go that high?

All in all, none of these scenarios are significantly different and they all leave the Orioles in a situation where they’re good enough to make it to the playoffs if random variation goes their way. They’ll just need to hope that a few players can outperform their projections.

15 December 2015

Solving RF In Baltimore: Nick Markakis (Mostly)

A year ago, you might recall from the Twitters that I was slightly displeased with how the Orioles said goodbye to Nick Markakis.  With his horrific 2013 and a respectably meager 2014, the 31-year-old right fielder was not a player I considered worthwhile to extend a long-term contract.  His eroding power, loss of range in the field, and progression toward a true platoon player was a concern.  My irritation though was that I thought he was worth a Qualifying Offer.  That might look more risky now than it did then, but I thought the club let a draft pick slip through its fingers.

Now, with 2015 behind us, I could see how Markakis could be a useful addition to the 2016 club.  Yes, his power collapsed to an ugly .080 ISO, the worst of his career.  Yes, his BABIP was slightly and curiously high.  Yes, his walk rate was slightly and curiously high.  Yes, he probably needs to be convinced that he should be sitting against many starting southpaws.  Why yes, he has noticeable limitations.  I would argue though that what we see mostly in Baltimore is what Markakis is no longer as opposed to what he is.

That is, Markakis is a strong, contact oriented left-handed platoon bat who over the past two seasons has shown he is quite capable of playing right field on par or slightly below.  He appears to be a 1.5 WAR player if largely limited to right-handed starters and with his ability to put balls in play could be quite useful as a late inning replacement if a right hander follows a starting left hander.  If we consult our contract model BORAS, it suggests that a free agent Nick Markakis would be worth a two-year contract at 17 MM whereas he currently has three years and 31.5 MM remaining, which could be considered somewhat reasonable (for those interested, it thinks a 2/22 deal would have been appropriate last year).   Finally, as mentioned in a Baltimore Sun piece, the front office apparently thinks Markakis brought many intangibles that were missing during the 2015 season.

What does the comp model think?
Nick is a peculiar player who does not enjoy many high level comps when going though the numbers of corner outfielders during their age 29 through 31 seasons.  The best fits I could find were these six: Barney McCoskey, Peanuts Lowrey, Mickey Hatcher, Manny Mota, Phil Cavarretta, and Orlando Palmeiro.  It is an odd collection of players.  None of them really enjoyed the level of opportunity that Markakis did and none showed the level of power that Markakis once did.

Here is the 50th percentile projection based on this grouping:

PA AVG OBP SLG
2016 409 .278 .350 .369
2017 288 .282 .346 .375
2018 304 .286 .344 .376

There are a couple interesting items.  The grouping of players largely are individuals who were never full-time players, so that might impact the projections a bit.  The rate stats are also peculiar.  They suggest that Markakis might lean more on contact and see his walk rate deteriorate.  His power is projection to stay around an ISO of .090.

With a 3/31.5 remainder left on his contract, I wanted to see how the projection would work out money-wise with respect to performance.  Additionally, I also compared each year if Markakis would have 500 plate appearances.  Wait, are you not setting 500 plate appearances as an arbitrary given that makes your point for you?  Well, no-ish. 

Typically, I keep to the number of plate appearances because it considers injury and effectiveness.  In the case of Markakis' comp group, I think it does those things poorly.  His comp group is largely made up of part-time players with half not surpassing the 1000 PA benchmark during the 29-31 age seasons.  Contact oriented corner outfielders with no power and no effective speed are rather difficult to find and, it appears, difficult to appreciate.  That lack of appreciation may have forced players into part time roles even though they were capable of handling larger responsibilities.  Therefore, I thought it fair to a more full season Markakis in order to estimate his true value.  I did not take it out to his customary 700 plate appearances because I thought that overestimated his health.

WAR $ WAR500 $500
2016 1.3 8.9 1.6 10.9
2017 0.9 6.6 1.5 11.4
2018 0.9 7.1 1.5 11.6
22.6 33.9

If we adhere to the projection model, then we will conclude that any deal would need about $9 million dollars going to the Orioles to offset the contract.  A third level player, like left hander Tim Berry who had a difficult 2015 with respect to performance and health, but who had been considered a potential back-end rotation breakout arm, would be thrown into the deal to make it palatable. However, if we focused on Markakis being a full-time player, we do not see much age in the near term.  As such, his contract is a 2 MM underpay.  This would mean a low second tier prospect like righthander David Hess or outfielder Dariel Alvarez.  The difference in cost depends largely on how the Braves view him (which is likely as a bit of a contractural albatross) and how many other clubs, like the Royals, find him valuable.

Bottom line, if Markakis could be protected against strong southpaws then this would appear to be a solid move.  A player like Nolan Reimold could pick up the other 200 plate appearance and deliver a 1 WAR, which would make right field fringe first division in terms of performance at a cost about 10 MM less than getting a true first division RF.  It may not be the flashiest proposed add-on, but he would provide value on the field and, supposedly, off of it as well.

Of course, taking on 10.5 MM in 2016 would bring the overall payroll to about 124.  That does not leave much room for a Justin Upton or Scott Kazmir.  In this case, it might be best to pair up Hess and Alvarez or maybe put in a more full-fledged prospect like Hunter Harvey along with international pool money in order for the Braves to kick in some money.  If the Orioles could get a 7 MM payment for 2016 in addition to giving up a million in international spending, then the club could be sitting effectively at 115 MM.  If they could slightly backload Upton's contract and then add a southpaw like Hector Santiago in a trade, then 2016's payroll should be able to snugly fit under 140 MM.  That amount, I think, is reasonable.  Plus, 2017 will see Mark Trumbo, Matt Wieters, and Brian Matusz gone with about 30 MM in salaries departing as well.

Would you welcome Nick back?


14 December 2015

Justin Upton Is A Safer Choice Than Chris Davis

A couple weeks back, I put together a comp model for Chris Davis with consideration for his skill set and late blooming performance.  The model suggested that Davis should be paid about 6/99 up to 8/190 if you really believed in his skills with respective to his historical comps.  It appears over the past week, that the Orioles were unable to get Davis to bite on a 7/150 contract and that the contract offered may have been pulled off the table with the club now focused on other targets.  One such target is Justin Upton.  In this post, I applied the same comp model approach.

For Upton's model, I based the comp model on isolated power, walk rate, and home runs for players aged 25-27 who played left and/or right field from 1981-2004.  Those players were:

Player WAR/pos
Jesse Barfield 19.1
Shawn Green 13.4
Jermaine Dye 11.9
Magglio Ordonez 11.8
David Justice 11.6
Greg Vaughn 11.2
Jack Clark 10.9
Brad Wilkerson 9.6
Trot Nixon 9.1
Bobby Higginson 9
Ryan Klesko 6.8
Pat Burrell 6.7
Danny Tartabull 6.1
Kal Daniels 5.9
Rob Deer 5.5

This population was used to project from age 28 through age 37, a ten year period.  No one, to date, expects Justin Upton can earn a ten year deal, but I think projecting to that point gives us a fuller view of the potential player.  As you go through the list, you see a variety of player whose game was similar to Upton's.  Largely, power mixed in with a good deal of athleticism.  Of course, that combination can manifest in several ways.  It can produce someone like Rob Deer or someone like Jesse Barfield.  For your reference, Upton had a WAR of 10.3 during his last three seasons, which would drop him in right between Jack Clark and Brad Wilkerson.

Upton's projection adjusted to the current offensive environment:

Year
Age
PA
HR
AVG
OBP
SLG
WAR
$
2016
28
514
22
.269
.355
.483
3.4
24.1
2017
29
513
23
.259
.358
.476
3.4
25.0
2018
30
463
20
.252
.349
.462
2.7
20.6
2019
31
479
21
.262
.354
.472
3.0
24.3
2020
32
510
20
.249
.335
.438
2.2
19.1
2021
33
497
19
.250
.344
.439
2.4
21.6
2022
34
465
18
.242
.328
.425
1.7
15.8
2023
35
465
15
.219
.304
.373
0.4
4.2
2024
36
414
11
.205
.286
.342
-0.4
-3.8
2025
37
433
12
.190
.267
.321
-1.1
-11.7

 Coincidentally, Justin Upton's projected worth over seven years is 150.5 MM, which is effectively what the Orioles offered Chris Davis.  Personally, I would prefer to tailor that deal to six years and 134.7 MM.  That would likely be beneficial to both the club and Upton.  He would hit free agency after what should be a relatively solid age 33 campaign.  If pushed maybe a 6/130 deal with a 2/50 option (10 MM buyout).  Anyway, that is just rolling the numbers around.

Second question is what are the likely floors and ceilings?

Year
Low
Mean
High
2016
3.0
3.4
3.7
2017
3.5
3.4
2.9
2018
2.7
2.7
2.5
2019
2.4
3.0
3.2
2020
0.5
2.2
3.6
2021
1.0
2.4
3.4
2022
-0.1
1.7
3.1
2023
-0.7
0.4
1.3
2024
-1.2
-0.4
0.2
2025
-1.8
-1.1
-0.5

This table looks quite different from the Chris Davis table.  For Davis, the low end projection suggested that he would never be an average starting first baseman.  The low end for Upton is four years of solid play, plus the second highest WAR for these three populations.  Second, the mean projection has six above average years while Davis had four.  The high end projection for Davis delivered five above average seasons, while  Upton's goes to seven.  It is hard not to look at this table and scratch your head why Davis is being valued so greatly.  It could be because historical comps poorly describe what Davis is or it could be that conventional wisdom loves home runs and overlooks age and position constraints.

Finally, here is the value outlay:

Length
Low
Mean
High
1
21
24
26
2
47
49
48
3
68
70
67
4
88
94
92
5
92
113
123
6
101
135
153
7
100
151
182
8
93
155
195
9
81
151
197
10
61
139
191

Upton's floor is projected here to be worth about double what Davis' floor was worth.  The mean outlay appears to be on target for what the Orioles are willing to spend and is significantly above Davis' mean.  Davis and Upton essentially have the same high projection.  In other words, Davis and Upton both have the same ceiling value, but Upton is a much safer choice for getting value in return for the cost.

Now, comp models are not ideal.  Each player is a beautiful snowflake and this approach mashes them all into a snowball.  That said, I feel far more comfortable with Upton's comps than I am comfortable with Davis' comps.  To me, if the choice is between these two players, then the choice is rather clear.