Examining the Orioles' Offensive Woes in 2016's Second Half

If you watched Orioles baseball in the first half of 2016, you were likely screaming at the TV in joy. Despite its pitching woes, the team's offense stomped opponents into the ground with a 112 wRC+, second-highest in baseball. The sky seemed the limit as the team finished the first half at 51-36, eight games over .500.

If you watched Orioles baseball in the second half of 2016, you were likely screaming at the TV in frustration. The team's vaunted offense curled up in a ball and died, managing a paltry 88 wRC+, 5th-worst in baseball. The team still finished seven games over .500, but that felt like a failure given the optimism of the first half.

Second-half you had reason to be upset. Looking at regular players only, Baltimore's wRC+ dropped over 20 percentage points between halves, the third-largest drop in the sport:

Out of 574 MLB regulars, five Orioles ranked in the 25% largest offensive drops. That's a distinction you don't want to achieve. The following table shows these players, their second half offensive change, and where that change ranks out of 574 regulars:

Name	wRC+ Change, 1st Half to 2nd Half	MLB Rank (Percentile)
Jonathan Schoop	-58	4
Mark Trumbo	-46	10
Manny Machado	-39	16
Hyun-Soo Kim	-37	17
Chris Davis	-28	24
Adam Jones	-20	33
Matt Wieters	-10	44
J.J. Hardy	+11	66
Pedro Alvarez	+24	79

Only two Orioles regulars improved their batting line: the somewhat unlikely duo of J.J. Hardy and Pedro Alvarez. The rest turned in some real stinkers at the plate.

Jonathan Schoop led the team's decline, and nearly led all of MLB, with a 58 point wRC+ drop, worse than 96% of major leaguers. His offense cratered from a sparkling 124 wRC+ in the first half to an abysmal 66 after the All Star Break.

Some of us saw this coming. In June, Elie Waitzer predicted Schoop's .348 BABIP would fall and it did, all the way down to a measly .255. His core plate discipline skills, which aren't good to begin with, also deteriorated. His walk rate dropped 1.1 percentage points while his strikeout rate rose by 2.1 points. Finally, his power dimmed. His ISO declined from a robust .206 to a more-average .166. 

Mark Trumbo followed behind Schoop with a 46-point drop in wRC+, worse than 90% of regular major leaguers. His BABIP dropped even more sharply, from a high-but-reasonable .327 to an unplayable .216. His ISO dropped about 40 points from an immortal .294 to a very-dangerous .256. But unlike Schoop, Trumbo's plate discipline got better. His walk rate rose 1.7 points while his strikeout rate dropped 2.1 points. He may simply have been unlucky.

Manny Machado's slump ranks next-highest, but Matt Kremnitzer covered his swoon already, so I'll turn to Hyun-Soo Kim. Kim's splits aren't very reliable; despite hitting well, he played only 95 games. He also suffered a hamstring injury right before the first half ended.

But still, his wRC+ dropped 37 points in the second half, worse than 83% of his peers. Although his walk rate remained at 10.4%, his strikeout rate rose more than 4 points to 16.8%. Continuing on a theme, his BABIP dropped from an absurd .370 to a more reasonable .320. That'll stunt anyone's offense.

Of course, not all wRC+ drops are created equal. The following chart shows how Machado, Trumbo, and Kim fell from much loftier heights than Schoop:

So fret not, Orioles fans. The offensive struggles you felt in the second half were real. You aren't going crazy; at least, not in this sense. Here's hoping the team can reach and sustain a higher offensive output in 2017.

Cup of jO's: Is Hyun Soo Kim Really A Platoon Hitter?

This past season there was a wealth of intrigue regarding the true talent level of Hyun Soo Kim and why he had been used in the way that Buck used him.  From the Depot's perspective, it was a season marked by bemusement.  Kim's Spring looked awful, but really what was the alternative? Some tried to get comfortable with the idea of Xavier Avery, but we knew who he was and he proceeded to show who he was in Norfolk.  Kim slowly established himself over the course of the first two months, but Joey Baseball Rickard somehow was favored for his baseballness even though Kim was quietly outperforming him.  That emerged into a forced platoon relationship between those two players, which worked as Rickard was becoming more entrenched as having issues with right handed pitching.  What was not established is why exactly would anyone think Hyun Soo Kim actually needs a platoon partner.

Hyun Soo Kim's 2016 Handed Splits

Split	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
vs RHP	323	.321	.393	.446	.839
vs LHP	22	.000	.227	.000	.227

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/20/2016.

Kim's splits in the majors look terrible.  He was hitless in 22 plate appearances with four walks.  That said, what are 22 PA?  Why limit him to those appearances to begin with.  Certainly, it has nothing to do with Spring Training because then he could hit no one.  Well, what about his splits in Korea?

Hyun Soo Kim's 2014/2015 KBO Splits

Metric	2014-L	2014-R	2015-L	2015-R
PA	182	345	190	425
BB-K	22-17	31-28	27-16	72-44
AVG	.374	.296	.331	.327
OBP	.456	.365	.421	.449
SLG	.497	.485	.510	.564

That actually looks pretty even.  Kim sacrifices power a little bit to increase contact when facing southpaws, but it all looks exceptional.  Well, what does the new KANG model think?

Against left handed pitching in the KBO, the KANG model thinks Kim should slash 278/333/408.
Against right handed pitching in the KBO, the KANG model thinks Kim should slash 276/342/468.

His season against right handed pitching in the Majors in general was well predicted by KANG, but not amongst the components.  Kim's hit tool wound up being louder and his power tool was quieter.  If that held true for hitting against left handers, then we would expect him to be more of singles hitter without the gap power he showed with righthanders.  That would probably make him a very unusual hitter if he was actually successful against lefties.  He would be a not-too-fast singles slapping corner outfielder who would notch a decent walk rate, which looks like late stage Markakis.

In the end, if you have a hitter like Joey Rickard who can hit left handers well and a full time right fielder, then it makes sense to platoon with Kim.  However, moving forward, the Orioles should consider that Kim can potentially be a full time player and should experience a greater share of southpaws.  The proof will be in the pudding and the Orioles are still at the grocery store making assumptions from the box.

(Thanks to Sung Min Kim of Today's Knuckleball for providing me with Kim's splits data in the KBO.)

When To Worry About Hyun Soo Kim...Not Any Time Soon

Kim's First Spring Training Hit Orioles Hangout

This spring, Hyun Soo Kim is 1-24 with only three strikeouts (the one hit being an infield single).  That is rather impressive to get out so often on a batted ball.  I have yet to see him play, so I do not know about the quality of the batted balls.  However, it seems that they might mostly be rather weak contact.  This might cause some concern for people who were expecting him to play a major role in left field this season, but how valid is that worry?

Last year, Matt Wieters was coming off his arm injury and was 0-23 with a walk.  That performance did not appear to reflect his performance during the season.  Wieters was certainly still getting back to playing form and was unable to catch consistently at that point, so maybe the comparison is not exactly apt.  That said, Kim is adjusting to a new league, a new culture, and even a new Spring Training setup that is condensed from the Korean three-month norm to that American standard of about 33 days.  Some might remember last year when Jung Ho Kang also had a long acclimation period that was as bleak as Kim's current experience.

We can try to discern something by taking a quantitative approach.  Looking only at MLB season production, Russell Carlton found that the only indicator that might be useful with less than 100 PA (which no one ever achieves in Spring Training) is strikeout rate.  Nothing else reflects season numbers beyond that metric.  I would argue though that when we see Kim not performing, we are not trying to discern what his seasonal average will be.  What we are trying to figure out is more of an up-down conclusion.  Will Kim be good or not?

As a quick first look, I looked at all of the players with rookie status in 2014/2015 and compared their performance in Spring Training against their performance during the regular season.  Very simply, I bucketed the 60 players into three groups with ascending Spring Training slugging percentage. 

Bucket	sOBP	StDev	sSLG	St Dev
1	.300	.034	.382	.069
2	.312	.032	.410	.062
3	.312	.033	.406	.059

Traditional standard of significance (0.05) was not met, but Buckets 2 and 3 were far more similar than Bucket 1 was with either 2 or 3.  In other words, Bucket 1 gives the incredibly noisy appearance of being different than Buckets 2 or 3.  However, if you look at even five or six of the players in Bucket 1, that vague difference will in no way give any suggestion that there are differences.  I would say that this initial test informs us that there is not a great reason to think there are differences, but further investigation should be considered.

I next tried to see how important the Spring Training data was for predicting actual results in conjunction with a projection model (i.e., ZIPS).  The result there was that Spring Training data account for less than 2% of the final performance.  For players with slugging below .400 during Spring Training, the contribution to the model rose up to 4%.  In other words, trust ZIPS. That model has Kim at 272/338/424.  If Kim goes 0-60, then this model would adjust him down to 270/335/420.

Keep in mind that this is a pretty rough cut to answer the question.  Players that were awful and simply were assigned to the minors are not included here.  The players within this population were seen as meaningful enough to stay in the majors for a considerable amount of time.  That likely results in a survivor bias.  That said, we see similar effects for players who greatly excelled in Spring Training.  If we were to think that Spring Training provides enough meaningful events to discern how poorly one might do, then we should probably be able to discern how well someone might do.  I could not establish that with this data.

Guest Post: Joe Sheehan On Why The Orioles Should Sign Dexter Fowler

The following post is from Joe Sheehan, who runs a subscription-only email newsletter that covers all of baseball. Joe was a founding member of Baseball Prospectus and has contributed to Sports Illustrated, ESPN.com, and many other publications while being a guest on MLB Network's "Clubhouse Confidential" and numerous radio programs around the country.

On January 27th he dedicated an entire post to the Orioles, explaining that although the team has spent a lot of money this winter it still needs to do more to compete. The post is reprinted here with his permission.

The Tigers have committed hundreds of millions of dollars to Justin Upton, Jordan Zimmermann and others to improve upon a core that probably wasn't good enough to win.

The Orioles have committed hundreds of millions of dollars to Chris Davis and Darren O'Day merely to maintain a core that probably isn't good enough to win.

2B Schoop (R)
3B Machado (R)
CF Jones (R)
1B Davis (L)
C Wieters (S)
DH Trumbo (R)
LF Reimold (R)
RF Flaherty (L)
SS Hardy (R)
IF Paredes (S)
LF Kim (L)
C Joseph (R)
OF Navarro (L)

SP Tillman (R)
SP Gausman (R)
SP Jimenez (R)
SP Gonzalez (R)
SP Wright (R)

RP Britton (L)
RP O'Day (R)
RP Matusz (L)
RP Brach (R)
RP McFarland (L)
RP Roe (R)
RP Garcia (R)

The Orioles have done little to improve upon the team that was 81-81 last season. They spent to retain Davis and O'Day, and they watched Matt Wieters accept a qualifying offer. They return nine of their top ten players by PA and 12 of their top 14 by innings pitched -- losing Steven Pearce, Wei-Yin Chen and Bud Norris. Their most significant additions have been Mark Trumbo, the kind of low-OBP slugger they already had in spades, and Hyeon-Soo Kim, who I might call the Shin-Soo Choo of the Korean Baseball Organization. There's no imminent help from the farm; the Orioles' top two prospects, Hunter Harvey and Dylan Bundy, threw 22 pro innings last year. Christian Walker has been buried by Trumbo and the return of Davis.

By their actions, the Orioles seem to believe that they're the 96-66 team of 2014, rather than the .500 team of last year. From 2012-14, the Orioles won 93, 85 and 96 games, but only one of those teams, the 2014 version, was actually very good:

"Bird" Pun Here

                RS   RA  Diff

2015   81-81   713  693   +20

2014   96-66   705  593  +112

2013   85-77   745  709   +36

2012   93-69   712  705    +7

That 2014 team featured a lot of great performances by players who are no longer here. Nelson Cruz hit 40 homers. Steven Pearce had a 930 OPS. Nick Markakis was second among regulars with a .342 OBP. Chen is now gone as well. Adam Jones, Manny Machado, Chris Tillman and Zach Britton have demonstrated that they're collectively strong enough to be the core of a deep team but not a shallow one. Last year, Machado made the leap, Davis hit 47 homers, Jonathan Schoop had a strong half-season, and the Orioles were still an 81-win team. They needed to do more than rack the balls again. At least so far, they haven't.

The Orioles have had a consistent approach under Buck Showalter: position players that hit homers and play defense; deep bullpens that get ground balls; starting pitching that mostly stays out of the way. Recent Orioles teams have had low OBPs, high SLGs and short-sequence offenses. They're first in homers in MLB the last four years, with 52 more than second-place Toronto; they're third in SLG behind the Rockies (Coors Field) and Tigers. They're first in isolated power. They're eighth in runs…and just 22nd in OBP.

Now, the Orioles can say they've addressed that by signing Kim, and maybe that works. Kim isn't likely to hit near the top of the lineup, though, and that's what they really need to find. They still have playing time available in the outfield, where Nolan Reimold, Ryan Flaherty and Trumbo are all too prominent on the depth chart. It's hard to identify a leadoff hitter on this roster, which is how you end up with a guy with a .306 OBP slotted there. The Orioles seem very reluctant to give up their #1 pick, as they should be, but it may be time to go get Dexter Fowler.

Fowler would become the Orioles' best leadoff hitter since Brian Roberts. He would slot nicely in right field, as he's a 30-year-old outfielder whose numbers in center haven't been great. He's not going to be very expensive -- maybe 3/45 in a market that priced Alex Gordon at 4/72. Mostly, he'd be a reliable OBP guy for a team whose #2-#4 hitters might very well hit 100 homers and slug .520. Fowler could score 120 runs batting in front of Machado, Davis and Jones.

I don't want to minimize the importance of that #1 pick. As a player, Fowler is a lot closer to Daniel Murphy than he is to David Price, and I recently skewered the Nationals for their decision to give up a #1 for Murphy. Consider those two organizations for a moment, though. Or take the Mets, with their success in drafting and developing prospects. There's a lot of homegrown talent in Baltimore, but of late, their core player-development competence seems to be breaking highly-talented pitchers. There's an argument that a #1 pick has less value to them than it does to a team better able to shepherd young men from amateurs to Orioles.

There's also the importance of this year and next to the Orioles. Wieters is a free agent after this season. Tillman and Kim are free agents after 2017; Jones and Machado after 2018. Davis will be around for a while, but he's at his peak. The Orioles are at the back end of the cycle that began in 2012. This team, the Adam Jones Orioles, won't be around much longer, and the Orioles' farm system isn't going to be replenishing the major-league team for a few years. The tension between wins now and wins later is always present, but for the Orioles, there's a strong argument that the wins Fowler brings now -- pushing the Orioles towards 90 wins -- will have more value than the wins a #1 pick will bring in 2019-21 when the Orioles project to be bad.

As far as the Davis contract is concerned, it's surprisingly reasonable because of the deferred money. A listed 7/161 turns out to be more like 7/127.5 in value, an AAV of $18 million a year. Davis is an impossible player to project -- he's wrapped two huge years around one as a replacement-level player -- but he would need to return about 14 wins in seven years to be worth the money, just two per season. $18 million is Jayson Werth money, it's less than what Choo and Carl Crawford got. The seven years may not work out so well for the Orioles, but the overall investment is low enough to make even that manageable. If this were 5/127.5, it would look different but be a lesser deal.

Just bringing back the core of a .500 team isn't enough, though. The Orioles can't look at 2014's 96 wins and assume that with better health, better luck and some development, they'll be that good again. There were key performances on that 2014 team by players who are no longer here, and their absences were a big part of why 2015 went south. For the Orioles to press the Red Sox and Blue Jays, they need another piece, and Fowler is that piece: he fills a lineup and a roster hole, and the OBP skills he brings mesh beautifully with the Orioles' high-SLG, high-ISO team. It's hard to give up a #1, but it's even harder to spend $120 million on an 83-win team.

I encourage you to subscribe to Joe's newsletter, which is $29.95 for a full year or $16.95 for six months. I've been a subscriber since the beginning and can't recommend it enough. As you can see here, his pieces are thought-provoking and insightful and his analysis pulls no punches. He is on Twitter at @joe_sheehan.

With Hyun-soo Kim On Board, What Should The Orioles Do Now?

As Jon discussed last night, the Orioles have reached an agreement (pending the O's physical and all the hyperbole surrounding it) with Korean outfielder Hyun-soo Kim. Jon also correctly noted that Kim's two-year, $7 million deal doesn't limit the team from pursuing a more expensive free agent. And the Orioles continue to be active in that market.

The O's are justifiably playing hardball with Chris Davis and Scott Boras. Whether their previous offer of seven years and around $150 million is off the table for good, the O's will remain, at the very least, a potential landing spot for Davis until they move on with a big signing or a few noteworthy ones. The Orioles can't and shouldn't wait around for Davis. And you could logically argue anyway (which we've certainly done) that a massive deal for a 30-year-old first baseman is both exorbitant and a poor use of resources for a mid-market team with several holes to fill. But home runs are thrilling, and the O's lineup could still use a big bat.

The O's realistically could get by with using Mark Trumbo primarily at first base and then acquiring a first baseman in the future or using Trumbo as a bridge to a 2017 that features Christian Walker and/or Trey Mancini. That might not be the best strategy, but it's a possibility.

For now, there are plenty of free agent options -- not necessarily at first base, but overall. The Orioles could still use a corner outfielder, a starting pitcher, and a designated hitter. The best of the outfield market includes: Yoenis Cespedes, Justin Upton, Alex Gordon, Dexter Fowler, and Denard Span. Austin Jackson, Gerardo Parra, Marlon Byrd, Will Venable, Shane Victorino, Alejandro De Aza, Steve Pearce, Alex Rios, and some others are also still out there.

Now that Jason Heyward has been signed, action on the rest of the outfield market should start heating up. Cespedes, Upton, or Gordon would be tremendous fits for most teams. Of those three, the O's have been linked most to Upton and have been described as an admirer of Gordon. Does Kim's signing slam the door on players like Span or Parra? Span could still make some sense and is a proven top-of-the-order bat, but he also has a medical history that typically scares the Orioles off. With other corner outfield options on the roster including Nolan Reimold, Dariel Alvarez, L.J. Hoes, Henry Urrutia, and Joey Rickard, clearly the O's could use another outfielder. And it's most likely an overreaction, but seeing Trumbo listed as an outfielder on the team website's roster is maybe somewhat disconcerting.

The Orioles also need a starting pitcher, unless you're confident, for some reason, in a potential rotation of Chris Tillman, Kevin Gausman, Ubaldo Jimenez, Miguel Gonzalez, and Mike Wright/Tyler Wilson/Vance Worley. Remaining options include: Yovani Gallardo, Scott Kazmir, Mike Leake, Wei-Yin Chen, and Ian Kennedy. Mat Latos, Mark Buehrle, and Doug Fister are also available.

The Chen ship has sailed, leaving Kazmir as probably the option (of the expensive group, at least) that makes the most sense. Not only is he left-handed, but he's not tied to any draft pick compensation since he was acquired by the Astros in a trade last summer. Still, the market is picking up for his services, and the O's may also be wary of his injury concerns. As discussed numerous times, the Orioles do not like handing out long-term deals to pitchers (even though they've done so recently with Jimenez and Darren O'Day). But I wouldn't count on that as something they're going to start doing routinely.

Roch Kubatko mentioned last night that the Orioles "are still interested in getting another left-handed hitting outfielder," so pairing someone like Span with Kazmir would likely appease the fan base. Trading for Trumbo, re-signing O'Day, and signing Kim/Span/Kazmir (or something similar) would represent a busy and interesting offseason. But that still wouldn't address the team's DH issues; the money might not be there to add someone like Pedro Alvarez or another decent bat if the O's make a bold move or two. That's been a concern all along: whether the Orioles are willing to shell out the funds to upgrade a number of positions. That's also a big reason why the Orioles are also scouring the trade market.

One looming question is whether this offseason turns into a bunch of Kim-like signings. I like the Kim move, so that's not necessarily a terrible thing. But while the cost is low, the ceiling isn't high. So will the O's pursue a bunch of mid-level signings or trades and try to upgrade in a number of areas instead of making a major signing? That may depend on what you consider "mid-level." Either way, that could be a better option than sending over a dump truck full of money to Davis. Rational decisions aren't always popular ones.

Orioles Sign Hyun-soo Kim, Pending Physical

As of this evening, Hyun-soo Kim boarded a flight from Seoul to Dulles.  Word leaked that he will meet with Orioles officials, undergo a physical, and sign a contract with an AAV greater than Byung-ho Park.  The Orioles have been quite vocal about their pursuit of a left-handed hitting corner outfielder.  Kim fits the bill and the 3.5 AAV cost is low enough that it does not greatly impede the club in moving forward with additional signings.  In other words, Kim does not prevent the club from signing Chris Davis, Justin Upton, or Alex Gordon.

If one wishes to engage in hyperbole, then we can puts comps on each of the major Korean position players in the world of MLB.  Kim would be Ty Cobb to Park's Ruth and Jung-ho Kang's Honus Wagner.  Kang can hit well, but is not so regarded with his glove.  Park hits the ball a mile.  Kim is considered an artist with the bat with defense that likely shows average and an arm that shows less.  While some may optimistically see a prime Nate McLouth in him, the more likely projection would perhaps be something near Melky Cabrera or perhaps Nick Markakis.  A player who can get the bat on the ball, but the contact may not be incredibly meaningful and he does not have the wheels to exploit long line drives.  He'll likely show gap to gap power, pulling in 10-15 home runs a year.

Below is how his career has gone in the KBO:

Year	Age	Tm	PA	2B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG
2006	18	Doosan	1	0	0	0	0	.000	.000	.000
2007	19	Doosan	353	19	5	26	46	.273	.335	.398
2008	20	Doosan	557	34	9	80	40	.357	.454	.509
2009	21	Doosan	572	31	23	80	59	.357	.448	.589
2010	22	Doosan	565	29	24	78	64	.317	.414	.531
2011	23	Doosan	561	25	13	71	63	.301	.392	.444
2012	24	Doosan	491	17	7	46	50	.291	.358	.382
2013	25	Doosan	510	23	16	62	71	.302	.382	.470
2014	26	Doosan	528	26	17	53	45	.322	.396	.488
2015	27	Doosan	630	26	28	101	63	.326	.438	.541
All Levels (10 Seasons)			4768	230	142	597	501	.318	.406	.488

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/16/2015.

You may remember that I put together a model to project MLB performance from players who have made the transition either from MLB to KBO or vice versa.  The pool was restricted to the last couple years as the league has become a bastion of high octane offense, so it consists of Kang and 11 Westward bound transitions.  That is not the most robust of populations to draw a model from, but it was interesting that walk rate and home run rate were significantly projected while nothing else was.  This gives us considerable certainty when entertaining how well Byung-ho Park will do, but it leaves us scratching our heads a bit with Kim because so much of his game depends on secondary power.

KANG projection for Hyun-soo Kim:

	PA	2b	HR	BB	SO	AVG	OBP	SLG	WAR
Hyun-soo Kim	576	21	12	53	68	.253	.322	.363	1.5

For 3.5 MM, that looks actually quite amazing.  The Orioles would be getting three times their investment.  However, keep in mind that a 1.5 WAR LF is a below average LF, which is about five times the value the club got out of its left fielders in about a 100 fewer at-bats.  It is not the flashiest move, but it does improve the club if you think KANG is a useful projection tool.  As I mentioned, KANG does very well with home runs and walks, but not much else.  Strikeouts are ranging toward being significant.  That is it.  A player like Kim has made the most out of singles and doubles and that simply is not accounted for in the model.  To poke and cause a little more doubt, KANG thinks Ah-seop Son is a monster and no one even bothered to place a bid on him.

From a scouting angle, it depends on who you talk to.  I have talked to three front office folks and Kim ranged from AAA outfielder to passing left fielder.  Those would be 35-45 grades.  My acquaintances who follow Korean baseball think the world of Kim.  At the very least, it will be interesting to see how it all plays out.