Dan Duquette's Trades in 20/20 (2013)

The last post covered Duquette's deals during the 2012 season and found that five of his seven deals were simply parts with minimal value dealt for other parts with minimal value.  The two deals that differed were very much in his favor: (1) Jeremy Guthrie for Jason Hammel and Matt Lindstrom and (2) Matt Lindstrom for Joe Saunders.  Five pushes and two pluses are a track record that any first year General Manager would enjoy having.

In this post, we progress to the 2012 season and see how things shake out.

November 20, 2012
INF Robert Andino for OF Trayvon Robinson

This was one of those deals where each team wants to check out an uninspiring piece the other team owns to fill a place of organizational need.  Andino's four years in baseball hate some highlights, such as a game winning hit that knock the Red Sox out of the 2011 playoffs, but largely was a long trial that showed that Andino was a Norfolk shuttle type of player who had no options.  Seattle gave Trayvon Robinson two extended shots in a pretty meager outfield, but his free swinging and marginal defense were poor fits in SafeCo (and likely everywhere else).  So, the clubs exchanged pieces they were quite willing to simply release.

Robinson wound up playing well in Bowie last season and was then granted free agency status where he quickly returned to his first club, the Los Angelos Dodgers.  Andino had a miserable stint with the Mariners and is now organizational filler for the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles didn't give up much in Andino or probably get much in Robinson.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR, Push

November 30, 2012
RHP Jhondaniel Medina for INF Yamaico Navarro

Second base has been a sore subject for the Orioles ever since Brian Roberts's extension became an albatross of medical calamities.  Each season, some hope was placed on Roberts to fulfill his annual 10 MM salary with some useful play at second, but age and conclusions can be cruel.  To provide a bit of a cushion the Orioles tried to use players like Robert Andino and Ryan Flaherty in 2012 to varying success.  They now looked for a new collection of second basemen to provide a safety net for Roberts.

Navarro was an interesting prospect who was continually not living up to expectations and frustrating clubs with his behavior.  However, it was clear to see there was talent there and that keeps a guy employed.  After a season in Pittsburgh where he dominated AAA and was dominated in the Majors, the Pirates saw him as a commodity they no longer saw as part of their future.  They were willing to ship him to the Orioles for a hard throwing pitcher in rookie ball named Medina.  It was a commodity that most teams have in spades, a hard throwing pitcher in the low minors.  However, it is a commodity that the Orioles largely lack.  That said, these guys rarely pan out, so losing one is not a big loss.  Though, having no stable full of hard throwing relief arms in the low minors is an issue, but that article is for another day.

What happened?  Navarro appeared in a couple games for the Orioles while performing well in AAA.  He is now toiling in the Yankees system.  Medina has moved up to HiA ball where his stuff plays well against the hitters, but he has little clue where his pitches are going.  He does not look destined for the big league club yet.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles find themselves with a player who used to be an interesting prospect and has failed multiple times at the major league level, but gives them more options for filling second base.  The Pirates get more flexibility in their 40 man roster by dealing a guy two other teams had given up on in the past two seasons along with acquiring an slightly interesting, but certainly not unique, arm.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR; Push

April 10, 2013
RHP Luis Ayala for LHP Chris Jones

Luis Ayala is one of the pitchers who seems to always find himself gainfully employed as the third or fourth righthander out of the pen or as someone who is earning some money in AAA, waiting for a spot to open up.  After a strong 2012 season where he prevented his own baserunners from scoring, but not others, he was a someone extra arm in the pen for the 2013 squad.  The Braves, however, needed another decent and cheap arm in the pen.  They offered a talented and erratic southpaw reliever by the name of Chris Jones.

Ayala proceeded to produce well for the Braves, making the Orioles kind of wish that Pedro Strop was dealt instead and led to more dealing that now looks somewhat poor now to make up for a lack of right handed bullpen depth.  Jones has been strong in AAA and is on target this year to throw more innings in season than he ever has.  Ayala returned to the Orioles this year, but was released and was most recently throwing for the Blue Jays in their minor league system.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment was made.
Conclusion: -0.4bWAR; Arguably the Braves benefited.

April 28, 2013
RHP Rob Delaney for C Chris Snyder

This was a deal done simply for depth and a chance to see if a player could regain former glow at a position of need while dealing out a player who did not fit the organization.  That sentence could be written for the Orioles' side as well as the Angels'.  Delaney was a smart right handed pitcher who succeeded everywhere in the minors except AAA where his stuff came across as average.  Two short stints in the Majors were largely full of trouble.  Chris Snyder used to be the future of the Diamondbacks organization with a profile of being an exceptional offense first talent.  However, by the time the Angels got him, the Diamondbacks, Pirates, Astros, and Nationals had given up on him.

This deal also wound up being a lot of nothing.  Delaney struggled to finish his year and is no longer with any organization.  Chris Snyder played in nine games for the Orioles and held his own, but it was nothing special.  He retired after the season.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Chris Snyder has operated long under the guise of being an offensive catcher.  He does have a little pop, but that was more present his first few years in the league.  Since 2009 though, he has had issues with power, contact, or both.  This, combined with slightly below average skills behind the plate and you wind up with a veteran playing in AAA without a MLB contract.  You can say that Snyder is no worse than Teagarden, which is largely true.  Both are essentially replacement level players.  Exposito caused concerns because his offensive calling card simply has not shown up and his defense is worse than Teagarden’s or Snyder’s.  For the Orioles to only have to give up a fringe MiL relief pitcher, it was a good move.  You should expect Snyder to be DFA’d upon Teagarden’s return.
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 2, 2013
RHP Jake Arrieta, RHP Pedro Strop, and international money for RHP Scott Feldman, C Steve Clevenger

As July opened up, the Orioles were clearly in trouble.  Their starting pitching was a bit in shambles.  This was particularly true with Jason Hammel's regression and the imploding of Jake Arrieta whenever he took the mound.  The bullpen was also on shaky ground with Pedro Strop looking more like his Rangers' enigmatic self as opposed to the often dominating form he showed for the Orioles in 2012.  Yes, the talent was there, but they were not productively using it and the team was seeing their playoff opportunity fade.

On the Cubs' side, Scott Feldman was emerging with one of the better pitching performances in the National League.  With a 3.46 ERA, he looked to some to be a decent option as a front end or middle rotation starter on a playoff club.  It was a performance that was not wholly unexpected, but one that certainly was not especially exceptional.  Still, h appeared to be one of the shining arms available on the market.

What happened is that the Cubs wound up running away with this deal.  The international money helped them avoid penalties for their amateur spending.  Strop has put in very good 2013 and 2014 campaigns.  Arrieta has emerged as a good starter who could a no hitter when the moment strikes him.  For the Orioles, Scott Feldman produced below average production for the rest of the season and Clevenger has performed at a replacement player level.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This deal is about the Orioles giving up on a good international prospect or two along with two pitchers full of promise and irritation in exchange for more catcher fodder and a backend rotation arm.  It is an improvement as it means no more Freddy Garcia, but not a great one that will change the fortune of this club.  They would be better off using Strop in mopup duty and giving Arrieta more time to sort himself out whether it being in Baltimore or in Norfolk.
Conclusion: -4.2 bWAR; Cubs

July 12, 2013
INF Russ Canzler for RHP Tim Alderson

There is not much to say about this trade.  Canzler was a bit redundant in the Orioles organization with the club already employing marginal right handed bats without much fielding acumen in Steve Pearce and Danny Valencia.  The Pirates however wanted more depth there in case they needed a bat for their bench.  Alderson was more or less a decent organizational bullpen arm.  The Orioles had been shuttling pitchers through Norfolk trying to catch lightning in a bottle ever since saying goodbye to Pedro Strop and maybe something would click with Alderson.

Neither player played in the Majors for the other club.  Canzler is currently being a professional hitter with the Phillies on their AAA squad while Alderson has struggled greatly this year in Norfolk before being given his release.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment.
Conclusion: 0 bWAR; Push

July 23, 2013
INF Nick Delmonico for RHP Francisco Rodriguez

Salt was in the wound.  The Orioles dealt out Strop as part of the package for Scott Feldman.  At this point, Feldman was struggling and Strop had found his form again.  More so, the Orioles had trouble with their bullpen options.  Their fourth right handed option was largely Jairo Ascencio and that was not working out well.  Meanwhile, the postseason hopes of the Brewers fanbase had been dashed and the club was looking to deal out pieces.  Francisco Rodriguez was enjoying a stellar two months after being promoted to the Majors just before his opt out clause would go into effect.  He had had a rough go of it the year before with the Brewers and had issues with violence toward teammates and his family.  That said, he was effectively performing at a low cost and that is what baseball teams like to see.

Delmonico has been a bit shaky with the Brewers and has yet to escape HiA ball.  He is not bad, but the odds grow longer each day of him being a meaningful big leaguer.  Rodriguez wound up being wholely less than average for the Orioles, giving up the long ball a bit too often.  He did not meaningfully impact the Orioles', which was to be expected because they were simply upgrading their fourth righthander in the pen.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Delmonico does not need to be a meaningful prospect to have value.  I’d suggest that his ability to augment a trade package is probably worth more than him being traded straight up for a reliever who at best makes the 2013 Orioles a +1 win team.  It is difficult to ever know what is possible in trades and it is an illness in the brain that us followers of the game tend to want to believe in an abundance of trade opportunities, but I do think that a package of Delmonico plus one would likely bring back to the Orioles a player of greater importance than Rodriguez.  Of course, this contention is somewhat unfair.  It is difficult for the addition of Rodriguez to stand up against a comparison of something that does not exist.  The vagueness of the unknown is certainly a draw for many to embrace and questioning Oriole front office authority has been a talent that has been thoroughly developed over the past decade and a half.  That said, I maintain that the health of the franchise is better served when second tier prospects are stacked instead of being doled out one at a time. 
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 31, 2013
Josh Hader, LJ Hoes and competitive draft pick for Bud Norris

The Orioles at this point were still in a discussion for the playoffs and still needed rotation help.  Feldman was a sure starter every five days, but had not been putting the team in a position to win.  The Astros were an awful team and had an expensive player in Bud Norris who was also in his arbitration years.  He had broken out somewhat to be considered a mid-rotation arm on a playoff team.  Their original asking price of a top 25 prospect was steadily depreciating as the deadline neared.  The Orioles offered MLB filler in LJ Hoes, a highly valued competitive draft pick, and a low probability, high upside arm in Josh Hader.

Norris would up pitching rather poorly for the Orioles in 2013 and has really been only been somewhat average this year with some disconcerting peripherals.  For the Astros, Hoes has been a useful stand-in as an outfielder and the competitive draft pick helped buffer the team's misplay of not signing major pieces of their draft.  That said, the low probability high upside arm of Josh Hader has been all upside this summer.  Some scouts are thinking he has established himself as a top 100 pitching prospect.  Maybe that is a worthwhile cost for being able to employ Bud Norris, but it would be possible to imagine that Hader might be off limits in a deal now.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This is a team in need of a push and the play of Norris is unlikely to be much better than what a random collection of arms from Norfolk could produce.  You could argue that these moves are for stability and to shore up against potential injuries in the stretch run.  I would argue that would make sense for a team that sat slightly comfortably in first place. That team is not the Orioles.  Maybe that is the new inefficiency and Duquette figured it out before everyone else.  To me, it looks like a Dutch boy sticking a finger in the dike when doing nothing probably has the same result.
Conclusion: 0.6 bWAR; Push

August 30, 2013
OF Xavier Avery for UTL Mike Morse

The Orioles had about a 1 in 7 chance to make the playoffs as August drew to a close.  They were in need of a pick-me-up to improve their chances, but that was a hard thing to find past the unrestricted trade deadline.  They now had to sort through various broken and overpaid pieces to find something.  That thing was Mike Morse, a player who had made a living off of one good year.  At that point in time, he was terrible with the Mariners as he had a known leg injury that sidelined him, but was hiding a wrist injury.  The Orioles held a speedy potential fourth outfielder piece in Xavier Avery that the Mariners could use in their cavernous park.

Morse wound up hurt the Orioles' chances by about a game.  It was a poor move to make and giving him time to show how bad he would be ate into the ability of other right handers on the club who had already shown they could hit.  Avery had a decent time finishing the year in Tacoma, was designated for assignment without anyone claiming him, and now has been on a month long tear at Tacoma.  Interestingly enough, he has actually been mentioned in trade rumors as a complimentary piece in the Mariners' attempts to get into the playoffs.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: I think this is a meh deal, but that it was a marginally bad deal in a greater context.  Right handed hitting opportunities were available for cheaper in terms of money and prospects than what the Orioles wound up paying.  They gave up on a marginal prospect (of which they have very few in their system) in exchange for a player who does not seem to be an upgrade over what they already have.  I am not a fan of movement for the sake of movement.  I understand that with the team's playoff chances so low that a bet was a good idea to make.  I simply do not see Morse as the bet I would like to make.
Conclusion: -0.4 bWAR; Push, but -0.4 bWAR is awful in less than a month's play.

Final Tally
-3.8 bWAR

Costing your team four wins is pretty awful, but that margin would not have gotten the club into the playoffs.  It was good to see Duquette move pieces around and try too make things work, but the team basically got Bud Norris for Josh Hader, Pedro Strop, Jake Arrieta, a first round pick, a decent international amateur prospect, and maybe even a more emergent Xavier Avery.  That is quite a difference from the previous season when Duquette squeezed blood from stones.  Of course, 20/20 hindsight makes it easy to see that these moves hurt the Orioles and that the team perhaps could have figured out another way to spell Bud Norris' 0.3 bWAR in 2014.  That said, at the Depot, I certainly was not in favor of any of these deals.  They seemed like deck chair shuffling to me and that has been borne out to be true.

One thing that has amazed me was how much the success of Duquette's first season has created this halo of him in many a fan's eyes.  Yes, it is difficult and I have no idea if a year is a proper sample size to judge how successful a general manager is, but with a sunny 2012 and a stormy 2013 on the trade front it appears that Duquette might be more run of the mill.

BABIP, or Why Some People Might Make the Wrong Statistical Conclusion

Note: Most of this article was written in early September, so the information on Morse may not be especially important.  However, my desire to finally complete this post is to address something broader about statistical analysis and Morse is a good example to use in this instance.

Wander around the internets or, perhaps, spend time (a lot of time) at the ball park and you may hear about how certain hitters have been lucky or unlucky.  The comments could be as specific as how line drives are being hit straight at the third baseman, less specific by mentioning BABIP, or even less specific by indicating how performance marks in general are not up to peak career marks.  What I want to comment on is the conversation right in the middle: BABIP.

The general idea of a player being unlucky with with respect to Batting Average of Ball In Play (BABIP) is based on the population trend that the value is consistent.  That is if a component of the population is hitting 50 points over their average, they tend to revert back to their average.  Mike Morse's career BABIP is .333 while his current season BABIP is .267.  If Morse has suffered a simple fluke in the distribution of his batted bats (like most players most of the time) then we should expect that he will revert back to a .333 BABIP in the future.

That expectation dismisses his current performance of 226/283/410 and suggests he should be more in line with 280/340/480.  Having hits drop in, as you can see, can greatly increase a player's worth.  However, we need to remember that this assumption is based on the measure of a population as compared to the measure of individuals.  In other words, a forest might look incredibly healthy from afar, but up close you see that a couple trees are dying.  It is a matter of resolution.

In general, it is fine to say that given such a broad resolution that it is plausible to expect a player like Mike Morse to bounce back from such an uncharacteristic BABIP.  If this is as far as you go, then you might forget what actually impacts changes in BABIP.

The three major components of BABIP are:

1) Defense - Although the unbalanced schedule makes for the possibility of BABIP to be team specific due to differences in stadium design (e.g., Fenway) or general differences in defensive aptitude, usually it all washes out.  Defenses are very similar to each other and there is enough overlap between schedules that a batter essentially faces a league average defense over the course of a season.

2) Random Variation - For no good reason that we have been able to discern, sometimes a player tends to hit more balls in defensible territory than normal.  There seems to be little ability for a hitter to deftly place a ball to an empty spot on the field.  Think of the crazy shifts that are employed today and how no MLB hitter can exploit them with any regularity.

3) Talent - Talent is a combination of foot speed, batted ball type, as well as just how those batted balls travel.

Below is a good video that briefly reexplains what I just noted:

I do want to drill a little deeper on the talent portion of BABIP.  Why?  Because that is what changes in practice.  These chances in BABIP occur because players get stronger, more experienced, and refine their approaches.  Players can also age, adversely affecting their production, and get injured.  I compact them down to three things:

1) Foot speed - as a population, players tend to see a decrease in BABIP over the course of their careers as they lose speed.  This effects grounders almost exclusively and this trend tends to be very small due to how good defense is in the Majors unless a physiologically catastrophic event occurs to the player.

2) Batted Ball Type - again, as a population, balls that are grounders become hits 23% of the time, line drives fall in 69% of the time, and fly balls are wonderful for the hitter 13% of the time.  A player who tend to have more line drives than fly balls will tend to have a higher BABIP.  If something about the player changes the types of batted balls he hits, then that BABIP will change as well.

3) Types of Batted Ball Type - As we all know, a fly ball is not a fly ball is not a fly ball.  We tend to think of a Chris Davis moon shot flyball differently as opposed to a Nick Markakis fly ball.  Within grounders, line drives, and fly balls we get a lot of variety within those classifications.  Those differences can mean a great deal with respect to how well a player will perform.  Soft liners are easily to turn into outs than hard liners.  Shallow flies tend to be caught more often than deep flies (and we are not even considering how deep flies can turn into home runs).

Now, let us use Mike Morse as a vehicle for this discussion.  Below is a table indicating his previous performance.  His 2013 time with the Orioles is not included because I find performance after a trade to be not important with respect to making a trade because that portion is unknown.  Later we will revisit what he did for the Orioles.

Year	Age	Tm	PA	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+	BABIP
2005	23	SEA	258	10	1	3	18	50	.278	.349	.370	97	.341
2006	24	SEA	48	5	0	0	3	7	.372	.396	.488	131	.421
2007	25	SEA	20	2	0	0	1	4	.444	.500	.556	184	.571
2008	26	SEA	11	1	0	0	1	4	.222	.364	.333	91	.400
2009	27	WSN	55	3	0	3	3	16	.250	.291	.481	101	.303
2010	28	WSN	293	12	2	15	22	64	.289	.352	.519	133	.330
2011	29	WSN	575	36	0	31	36	126	.303	.360	.550	147	.344
2012	30	WSN	430	17	1	18	16	97	.291	.321	.470	112	.339
2013	31	SEA	307	13	0	13	20	80	.226	.283	.410	98	.267

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 9/1/2013.

A good exercise is now to run through the different variables because upon looking at his .267 BABIP so far in 2013, we would think that he has been incredibly unlucky.  Why?  Because the greater population of baseball players tend to perform at their established career BABIP.  In other words, we should expect Morse to have a BABIP of about .330 to .340 if what has transgressed so far this season is due to random variation (aka balls finding gloves).

However, has his talent level changed?  If it has, then we would expect the BABIP to not be random and instead be a characteristic of that player.

Foot speed

Although Morse began his MLB career as a shortstop, foot speed was never a quality he enjoyed.  He may be slower, particularly with his quad injury that forced him on the disabled list in June through almost all of July.  That said, running out ground balls was simply not a major part of his game.  True, a loss of speed will negatively affect his performance somewhat as a loss in footspeed would result in a slight alteration in singles and doubles, but probably nothing profound.  His game is not a singles game and we do not see a great increase in hitting singles from would-be doubles.  I severely doubt foot speed has caused his BABIP to drop.

Change in Batted Ball Type

Another possibility would be that a leg injury could impact his mechanics and result in him creating a different proportion of fly balls.  The table below shows his batted ball types over the past nine seasons.  Again, I am not considering his time in Baltimore.

Apparently, the table failed to load properly when posting.  I will have to wait until tonight to correct it.  Until then, feel free to go over to Fangraphs here and see how similar his distribution is to his prime years to date.

From that table, nothing appears to be out of the ordinary.  It also appears that from this there is no great reason why we should suspect his poor hitting performance with respect to his BABIP is not a product of a change in batted ball percentages.

Types of Batted Ball Type

One thing that concerned me about Morse was that leg injuries can greatly impact power transfer from a player's lower half into the bat.  If that transfer is off, then swings become all arms, which greatly reduces the distance of those balls.  Even when you see a guy like Chris Davis flip a bat into the stands with only his arms, you can still see a portion of his power is coming up through his legs.  Below is a table showing Morse's average distance for his line drives and home runs.  These numbers are somewhat difficult to find on your own, so I decided to include his few Baltimore data points here.  To be clear here are the three designations for 2013: (a) Seattle before leg injury, (b) Seattle after leg injury, and (c) Baltimore.

	Line Drive (n)	Fly Ball (n)
2011	266 ft (72)	316 ft (141)
2012	249 ft (59)	309 ft (81)
2013a	276 ft (31)	302 ft (54)
2013b	230 ft (12)	298 ft (16)
2013c	189 ft (3)	269 ft (4)

When I look at the data above, I see potential red flags.  Looking at 2011, 2012, and 2013a, we see some variation in Line Drive distance, which I believe is normally highly variable.  That does not concern me.  What does concern me is the decrease in Fly Ball distance, which I think is a more stable number (again, though, I have not studied this, so this is a bit anecdotal).  I think his early season numbers this year were inflated due to solid line drive contact.  The decrease in his fly ball percentage makes this difficult.  For every 10 feet you lose in your average fly ball distance, the player experiences about a 20% decrease in home runs.  Now, I would not write him off completely long term, but I would be concerned that he might be a player who will flame out early even if he is healthy.

That said, the long term prognosis is not what we have interest in with Morse as a trade candidate.  As a trade candidate, we have more of a concern with respect to how well he performed after coming off the disabled list.  Now, 12 ground balls and 16 fly balls are a very, very small sample size (I assume, I do not know how many batted ball events are needed to stabilize one of these numbers, but I assume this is an accurate statement), but a drop of 46 ft in line drives and his fly balls falling below 300 ft were big concerns of mine.  That suggests to me that even though he was healthy enough to play baseball, he likely was not healthy enough to be Mike Morse and that is a significant issue.  That drop was a major reason why I panned the Avery for Morse deal.  The distance is an illustration that even though his BABIP is low in comparison to his career line, his current BABIP might be completely founded in a change in ability due to his leg injury.

Population vs Individual

This is a major issue for some who are new to baseball statistics and projections.  A good rule of thumb is to expect players to behave like the population of players behave.  This really is true about any population model.  It makes sense for drug trials and it makes sense for ecosystem assessments.  You will often be right more often if you make this assumption.  However, if you are able to assess a single individual, you may have some ability to tease apart the causes for a change in behavior.  For instance, your patient not doing well in the trial may have a secondary issue that causes him to respond differently to the drug.  Or perhaps, your pristine habitat does not act like other pristine habitats because someone is dumping all of their excess paint into the stream.  In Mike Morse's case, it should not have been expected of him to bounce back perhaps because there was an underlying cause (leg injury) and evidence (lack of batted ball distance) that suggested there were real issue there.

In other words, one should not be fundamentalist when it comes to assigning population responses to an individual.  It has been shown consistently that players suffer from variability in their performance.  Much of that wobbles back and forth each year as a result of chance, but there are also real issues that can cause a player to deviate from the expected path.  It is important to recognize these things.  Luck is not all.

How Has Mike Morse performed for the Orioles?

In 27 plate appearances, Morse has three singles and a walk.  He has a slash line of 115/148/115 and a OPS+ of -27.  His offense has been worth -4.1 runs, roughly meaning that in those 27 appearances he was responsible for about half of a loss in comparison to a replacement level player.  He saw 49 innings in the outfield and was credited for -7.5 runs when extrapolated out to a full season.  In other words, he played poor defense.  In a general sense, he has done nothing to improve the team and he cost the team a million dollars.  As you know, money is not a thing that is spent wildly in Baltimore, so losing a million hurts a little bit.  Add that to the loss of a genuine 4th/5th outfielder with options in Xavier Avery and the deal looks slightly worse.  Twenty three year old toolsy, poor skilled outfielders are not exactly a dime a dozen, but they are probably close.  Avery certainly has value and a scant chance at become something more like a second division starter.  With the paucity of talent in the Orioles upper minors, it does potentially hurt a little to give up on Avery's slight promise and his certain versatility.

What Happened to Xavier Avery? 

Avery logged 14 plate appearances over three games in AAA Tacoma.  He walked once, had a sacrifice hit, and had six hits, including a home run and a double.  He also managed a stolen base.  He started once at each outfield position.  For those three games, Avery was a wunderkind.  He was not added to the expanded roster in Seattle.  He is expected to be given a legitimate shot at the fourth outfield position with the club next year.  He is fully expected to log time at some point in Seattle next season.

Danny Valencia Is Doing His Best to Fix O's DH Problem

Photo: Keith Allison

For much of the 2013 season, the Orioles have had a designated hitter problem. Nolan Reimold got off to a slow start, never recovered, and needed another operation on his spine. Wilson Betemit, counted on to be the team's main weapon at DH against right-handed pitching, suffered a knee injury during spring training and did not return until late August. He went hitless in 10 at-bats, and he was designated for assignment yesterday. Other Dan Duquette-signed misfits have not fared much better. Steve Pearce, battling a wrist injury all season, has batted just .241/.328/.361 in 122 plate appearances. Chris Dickerson has hit .240/.269/.404 in 108 plate appearances, though he's basically just a defensive replacement. Henry Urrutia's minor league success has not translated to the majors (.276/.276/.310 in 58 plate appearances). Travis Ishikawa, unsurprisingly, wasn't the answer either. And Mike Morse, acquired at the end of August for Xavier Avery, has three hits (all singles) in 24 plate appearances without a walk. As of mid-July, O's designated hitters were batting a combined .197/.261/.382.

None of the above players should really be relied upon to consistently hit major league pitching, but then again you could say the same thing about Danny Valencia, who currently has a batting line of .317/.344/.618 in 128 plate appearances. Valencia, who started the year at Norfolk and has been shipped between Triple-A and the majors a couple times this season, now seems to be locked in as the team's primary DH -- and for good reason. He's been on fire since August, collecting 25 hits (and a walk) in 54 plate appearances. He has absolutely destroyed left-handed pitching this year, hitting a ridiculous .378/.400/.683 in 85 plate appearances. Even Chris Davis has to respect those numbers. In about half as many trips to the plate against righties, Valencia hasn't been efficient at reaching base (.233 OBP), but he has hit for power (.488 SLG). Without Betemit's injury and subsequent ineffectiveness, the two likely would have formed a decent right/lefty DH combination.

Mostly thanks to Valencia's tear, O's DHs are hitting a slightly less embarrassing .230/.287/.413. The on-base percentage is still too low, but the power is there. Maybe the O's can rectify that issue next season.

It probably goes without saying, though, but Valencia is not this good. His .348 BABIP is 53 points above his major league average of .295, and his HR/FB rate is nearly 20% (career rate around 9%). So he's due for some regression, certainly, but there's no reason why he can't continue to hit at an absurd level for just 13 more games, which is what the Orioles really need right now considering they are just two games back in the Wild Card race.

But beyond this season, Valencia still has some value as a lefty masher. And if he continues to not chase pitches out of the zone, which he's currently doing and is more in line with his impressive rookie campaign, he could at least be a competent DH/bench bat.

(Quick tangent: The Orioles are going to have some offseason lineup issues to address. Manny Machado certainly has plenty of upside, but you can't really say that about many other O's hitters. Davis is having an amazing season, but there's no guarantee he posts similar numbers going forward. Adam Jones is steady, and J.J. Hardy is having a nice rebound season. But Nate McLouth is a free agent after this season and likely will not be able to be retained for the previous low price of $2 million. Brian Roberts's deal finally comes off the books, but is Jonathan Schoop ready? And what about the offensive struggles of Matt Wieters and especially Nick Markakis? With those main parts, the O's still have the makings of a decent lineup, but relying on Davis, Machado, and Jones to do most of the heavy lifting may not be wise. Duquette and Buck Showalter may need to consider bringing in a new corner outfielder, second baseman, or another DH option -- or maybe all three.)

Grading the Addition of the Mariners' Mike Morse

Xavier Avery at Home | photo: Keith Allison

I think in order to be answer that question, we need to answer four other questions.  First, are the Orioles really a playoff contender?  Second, what does the team currently have that Mike Morse is replacing and does the difference impact the probability of this team being a contender?  Third, how valuable is Xavier Avery, the player the Orioles gave up?  Fourth, is Avery's value equal or lesser to what Morse brings to the team.  Now, none of these questions can be definitively answered in a quantitative way, but we certainly can nose around in a qualitative way.

1) Are the Orioles a playoff contender?

Sure.  According to Baseball Prospectus' Playoff Odds model, the team stands a one in seven shot in making the playoffs, which is far better than the Yankees' one in 25 chance.  To break apart the Orioles' chances, that have roughly a one percent chance to win the division, a two percent chance to take the first wild card, and a ten percent chance for the second wild card.

Here is the relevant playoff table:

Rk	Tm	W	L	W-L%	GB	GBsum	pythWL	Luck	vEast	vCent	vWest	last20	last30
1	TEX	78	55	.587	---	---	76-57	2	13-17	11-15	44-16	15-5	22-8
2	BOS	79	56	.585	---	---	81-54	-2	32-25	14-14	20-12	10-10	17-13
3	DET	78	56	.582	---	---	83-51	-5	16-13	36-22	14-16	10-10	19-11
4	TBR	75	57	.568	---	---	72-60	3	34-29	17-13	12-7	9-11	15-15
5	OAK	75	58	.564	---	---	74-59	1	14-15	16-11	32-25	11-9	15-15
6	BAL	71	61	.538	3.5	3.5	70-62	1	26-27	13-13	21-12	10-10	14-16
7	CLE	71	62	.534	4.0	4.5	70-63	1	10-20	31-26	21-8	9-11	16-14
8	NYY	70	63	.526	5.0	7.5	66-67	4	30-26	19-11	14-16	13-7	16-14
9	KCR	69	64	.519	6.0	11.5	71-62	-2	18-13	34-26	8-14	9-11	17-13

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/30/2013.

With a month to go, 3.5 games is not a big lead.  The general rule I have is weeks to go plus three games back sum.  At this point, the Orioles drop dead number for me would be nine games.  A week from now, eight games.  A week later, seven games.  So on and so forth until fall above that number.  With my little rule, the Royals are gone.  They simply need too many teams to play worse than they are.  Anyway, point being, yes, the Orioles are a playoff contender as we near September.

2. How much does Mike Morse improve the Orioles?

On January 16th, Mike Morse was worth a fair amount.  The Nationals were able to deal away an extra bat that no longer fit on the playing field and get in return a high second tier pitcher in A.J. Cole, a live arm in the pen with Ian Krol (a player the Depot has been slightly optimistic on back during his senior year where he sat a lot), and some organizational depth in Blake Treinen.  For a player who has no position and was coming off a lackluster season (after only really showing much promise for a season and a half prior to that), it was somewhat surprising.  Of course, no one expected him to do so poorly this season.

Year	Age	Tm	PA	2B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+
2005	23	SEA	258	10	3	18	50	.278	.349	.370	97
2006	24	SEA	48	5	0	3	7	.372	.396	.488	131
2007	25	SEA	20	2	0	1	4	.444	.500	.556	184
2008	26	SEA	11	1	0	1	4	.222	.364	.333	91
2009	27	WSN	55	3	3	3	16	.250	.291	.481	101
2010	28	WSN	293	12	15	22	64	.289	.352	.519	133
2011	29	WSN	575	36	31	36	126	.303	.360	.550	147
2012	30	WSN	430	17	18	16	97	.291	.321	.470	111
2013	31	SEA	307	13	13	20	80	.226	.283	.410	97

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/30/2013.

Morse has dealt with leg injuries this season and did do a tour on the disabled list with a strained quad.  On May 28th, the injury has become bad enough where the team sat him for a couple weeks.  He was slashing 254/321/468.  He proceeded to struggle in a handful of games in June until he was placed on the DL.  Upon returning, he has slashing in August to the tune of 179/225/328.

In other words, Morse has been really bad and he probably is playing injured.  The hope is that there is a chance that he will be injury free enough to provide value to the team.  There is some cause for hope.  He did produce poorly at SafeCo, which is known to be a pitcher's park (77 wRC+ at home vs. 101 wRC+ on the road).  Additionally, he performed much better against left handed pitching (110 wRC+ against southpaws and 79 wRC+ against righties).  It might not be entirely unfair to think that Morse could be a 120 to 130 wRC+ component of a platooned designated hitter arrangement with the newly arrived Wilson Betemit.

Of course, this solution assumes that both Betemit and Morse are healthy-ish and productive to competently handle their parts of the platoon split, but it is a decent bet to make when you are sitting only three games out of a playoff spot.  This also assumes that the team has nothing else available to fulfill this role.  However, yes, they do have someone: Danny Valencia.

Year	Age	Tm	PA	2B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+
2010	25	MIN	322	18	7	20	46	.311	.351	.448	119
2011	26	MIN	608	28	15	40	102	.246	.294	.383	86
2012	27	TOT	161	6	3	3	38	.188	.199	.299	34
2013	28	BAL	89	9	5	5	20	.274	.315	.560	131

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/30/2013.

Yes, Valencia is not a proven veteran like Mike Morse.  However, he has been on fire this year when the team lets him play against left handed pitching.  He has had a 157 wRC+ against righties, hitting them whenever the team somewhat haphazardly asks him to do it.  All in all, unless the team recognizes correctly that Morse is healthy and ready to turn it on, I have a hard time seeing this as an improvement on the roster.  If the long term plan is to keep Valencia on the bench as another right handed hitter, then I have trouble seeing how he can fit because he is pretty atrocious in the field as well.

Morse feels like a solution the same way Jim Thome felt like a solution.  A decent name of a player who has performed somewhat well in the recent past, but probably is no better than what the team currently has.  My thought is that Morse has just as much chance to be healthy and breakout as Valencia does to continue his tear of left handed pitching.

3. How valuable is Xavier Avery?

His minor league statistics to date:

Year	Age	Lev	PA	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG
2008	18	Rk	192	8	1	0	13	3	10	51	.280	.333	.337
2009	19	A	509	15	8	2	30	10	27	111	.262	.306	.340
2010	20	A+-AA	618	31	6	7	38	14	49	130	.271	.337	.386
2011	21	AA	626	31	2	4	36	14	49	156	.259	.324	.343
2012	22	AAA	458	13	5	8	22	7	51	106	.236	.330	.356
2013	23	AAA-AA	519	22	4	3	29	8	54	117	.259	.340	.345

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 8/30/2013.

Before the 2012 season, the Depot wrote this about Avery:

Xavier Avery remains an upside prospect with promise, despite completing his third full season with strikeouts in over 20% of his plate appearances. The reason for optimism is simple -- he continues to keep his head above water while being promoted by the O's and remaining one of the youngest players in the league, year-in and year-out. He will start 2012 at age 22, and could get a bump to Norfolk following a solid AFL campaign and provided he shows well in the Spring. A speed-first talent, Avery is among the fastest prospects in the system (along with Kyle Hudson and Glynn Davis -- all "80" runners on the 20/80 scouting scale). His heavy left/right split could spell a future as part of a platoon. If he can tighten-up his routes in center field, he should have easy value as a fourth outfielder. His ability to improve against lefties and to learn to more consistently ID off-speed will determine if he can become a regular at the highest level.

Ceiling: Average starting center fielder on first division team
Floor: Four-A
Projected: 4th or 5th outfielder on first division team

I still think that is a fairly accurate portrayal of Avery.  What I would change would be that I do not see him currently capable of being an average first division centerfielder.  I would downgrade that to starting second division.  The rest I would keep.  In the nearly two years since, his batting approach has improved greatly, but it still is not on par with average AAA hitting.  At age 23, he no longer is the youngest kid on the field most of the time.  In AA, where he is in the mid-age for high profile prospects, he hit very well.  Upon being promoted to AAA this year, he showed the same hit tool issues as he did the year prior.  Add that lack of contact to a dearth of power and it is difficult to see how his bat would provide much use now and only a slight chance of it being useful in the future.

However, he is the kind of player a team would like in its system.  He is a strong, athletic player.  He has 80 speed.  His routes are getter better.  He has shown a decent eye at the plate and has improved his hitting approach.  At 23, he has time and fourth outfielders that can play center field do not grow on trees.  It may be in the cavernous SafeCo that Avery will find himself.  A place where speed may have more value than having a decent bat.  It also leaves the Orioles with a void in that they have no option eligible fourth outfielder capable of filling in centerfield in a pinch as Avery and, before him, L.J. Hoes are now gone.

Again, this is not a huge loss.  It is a very minimal loss.  The value Avery provides is one of a pinch fourth outfielder with a very slight chance of him being a regular bench player.  We are talking about fractions of a win here.  If he somehow hits his ceiling, then we are discussing a player who might be worth a win or two annually for about three or four years.  These are small potatoes.  That said, as we know from before Adam Jones, centerfield is a difficult position to find someone to play there.

4. Did the Orioles get in return a benefit equal to what they gave away?

Probably.  They will likely get nothing and they likely traded nothing away.  In other words, the value that Avery presents to the Orioles now and in the future is a value that likely is quite replaceable.  It is also likely true that the value Morse offers is equivalent to what the team currently has available.  Add in that his presence on the team shaves 1 MM off next year's pay roll and it seems like there are a few paper cuts here.

In all, this move seems like a more expensive move with less probability of an offensive explosion as what could have been had with signing Mark Reynolds.  A few weeks back, I suggested that signing Reynolds would be an excellent cheap bet for him to explode offensively.  The idea being that Reynolds is a player who seems to be a feat or famine kind of hitter and, that at league minimum, it was a pretty cheap bet.  If he did nothing over the following three weeks, you could just cut him and go with what the team has.

Now, Morse has some reputation of being a streaky hitter, but not in the same class as Reynolds.  Additionally, Morse is awful at every defensive position while Reynolds can play first base in a below average way, which is worth something.  Morse is also more susceptible to platoon splits, meaning relief pitchers can adversely affect him more than Reynolds.  Finally, there is no more time for auditioning before the September roster deadline comes into play.

Conclusion

I think this is a meh deal, but that it was a marginally bad deal in a greater context.  Right handed hitting opportunities were available for cheaper in terms of money and prospects than what the Orioles wound up paying.  They gave up on a marginal prospect (of which they have very few in their system) in exchange for a player who does not seem to be an upgrade over what they already have.  I am not a fan of movement for the sake of movement.  I understand that with the team's playoff chances so low that a bet was a good idea to make.  I simply do not see Morse as the bet I would like to make.