How the Orioles win the AL East in 2018

The Orioles could win the the AL East this year.  They could.  I am not kidding.  Such an outcome is one I would not expect.  It is an outcome that I would find shocking, but there is a path.  If you pay attention to projection models incorporated into season models (pick one, any one, they all are about as accurate as any other), then you may know the club is generally seen as a mid 70s win team.  Such a club matches or exceeds 90 wins almost 10% of the time.  In other words, it is not uncommon.

However, 90 wins is nice, but not a guaranty of much of anything with an AL East that looks to have two monsters in the Yankees and Red Sox.  What would be a safe number would be around 95 wins.  That leads us to this idea, what would a scenario look like where the Orioles win 95 games.  That may sound unrealistic, but projection models disagree.  There is a chance.  That chance would require an even push by several Orioles in a more positive direction or a couple big breakouts to shoulder the load.  In this post, I will take the slight push approach.  Chance shown for each player is the probability for a player doing at least that well, so they could actually do better.

Catcher

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
C	Chance Sisco	256	0.8	0.8	0
	Caleb Joseph	320	0.8	1.6	0.8
	The Rest	64	0.1	0.1	0

Chance: 50%

Fangraphs sees both Joseph and Sisco as competent catchers.  The Orioles off season long search to displace Sisco from the roster is not coming up as a good idea in the models.  Here, though, I decided not to push anyone's performance in the positive direction.  Everyone sticks to their 50th percentile projection.  The group does improve by 0.8 WAR.  Why?  Well, they do not consider pitch framing in their estimates and Joseph is routinely an excellent pitch framer, so the gain here is simply recognizing Joseph's total value.

First Base

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
1B	Chris Davis	476	1.4	1.9	0.5
	Trey Mancini	189	0.3	0.5	0.2
	Mark Trumbo	35	0.1	0.2	0.1

Chance: 40% (Davis), 40% (Mancini), 50% (Trumbo)

I nudged each player here.  Davis' 0.5 WAR improvement comes from the idea that perhaps now that his core is healthy again that his first step comes back, improving his defensive play.  Mancini's bump of 0.2 is based on the assumption that last year's level of offensive performance is real.  Trumbo's bump comes from him bouncing back and performing slightly better at first base.  If you are counting, we are now at 78.5 wins.

Second base

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
2B	Jonathan Schoop	644	3	5	2
	Engelb Vielma	56	-0.1	-0.1	0

Chance: 10%

The model seems to think that Schoop is in for a regression to his career line.  We are going to say last year's performance was not only real, but also add another win for expected modest growth in talent.

Shortstop

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
SS	Manny Machado	644	5.3	7.3	2
	Engelb Vielma	56	-0.1	-0.1	0

Chance: 20%

For Machado, we are throwing in there a 7.3 WAR which would just barely be the highest WAR of his career.  This assumption is the assumption that Machado is actually one of the best players in baseball, which may not well be true.  In this scenario, he is.  And, we are up to 82.5 wins.

Third Base

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
3B	Tim Beckham	644	1.9	3.4	1.5
	Danny Valencia	35	0.1	0.1	0
	Engelb Vielma	21	-0.1	-0.1	0

Chance: 20%

The projection for Beckham is that his offensive talent level will regress.  Instead, we decided that the average of his entire 2017 is his true talent level.  So, that bumps him up 1.5 wins.

Left Field

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
LF	Trey Mancini	385	1	1.6	0.6
	Joey Rickard	140	-0.1	0	0.1
	Austin Hays	105	0.1	0.2	0.1
	Anthony Santander	70	0.1	0.1	0.0

Chance: 40% (Mancini), 70% (Hays) 

In left field, the benefit comes from the aforementioned Trey Mancini replicating his 2017 season. In addition, the assumption here is that Rickard will reduce his playing time and Hays will see more with a plus arm.  The club is now at 84.8 wins.

Center Field

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
CF	Adam Jones	630	2	2.6	0.6
	Joey Rickard	35	0	0	0
	Austin Hays	35	0.1	0.1	0

Chance: 30%

Jones' isn't dead, yet. He feels happy.  Assuming his play in centerfield remains adequate and his bat leans more toward his second half high without actually duplicating it, we could potentially see something like his 2015 season (without the defense).  That would add a little bit to the pot.

Right Field

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
RF	Colby Rasmus	410	1.2	2.2	1
	Danny Valencia	210	0.1	0.1	0
	Joey Rickard	35	0	0	0
	Austin Hays	21	0	1	1
	Anthony Santander	14	0	0	0

Chance: 30% (Rasmus), 50% (Hays)

Projection models still like Rasmus' potential to reach back and deliver something similar to his 2015 season with the Astros.  His offensive demolition last year with the Rays is a bit more unlikely.  The rest of the pickup here is due to Hays spelling Valencia.  If Hays meets his mark and has a plus arm, he could deliver a win over 200 plus plate appearances.

Designated Hitter

		Projection		Change
		PA	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
DH	Mark Trumbo	539	0.6	1.6	1
	Chris Davis	112	0.2	0.2	0
	Trey Mancini	28	0	0	0
	Danny Valencia	21	0	0	0

Chance: 10% (Trumbo)

The model thinks there is about a 10% chance that Trumbo can perform a smidge below his 2016 career year.  This does not consider that he appears to not do well when playing as designated hitter.  Anyway, this gets us to 86.5 wins.

Starting Pitchers

		Projection		Change
		IP	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
SP	Kevin Gausman	177	2.6	3.1	0.5
	Dylan Bundy	177	2.1	3.1	1
	Andrew Cashner	138	0.7	2.2	1.5
	Chris Tillman	122	0.4	1.9	1.5
	Gabriel Ynoa	111	0.4	2.4	2
	The Rest	215	1	1	0

Chance: 15% (Gausman), 20% (Bundy), 10% (Cashner), 5% (Tillman)

A number of assumptions are being made here.  One, Gausman is assumed that he will match his career high performance.  Two, Bundy is assumed to meet last year's performance and add a half a win.  Three, Cashner is pushed to producing a normal year for himself.  Four, Tillman slides back to his 2012-2016 performances.  Five, well, the Orioles sign Alex Cobb.

Relief Pitchers

		Projection		Change
		IP	WAR	WAR	WAR diff
RP	Brad Brach	65	1.2	1.7	0.5
	Darren O'Day	65	1	1	0
	Mychal Givens	65	0.9	1.4	0.5
	Richard Bleier	45	0.2	0.2	0
	Zach Britton	40	0.5	1.5	1
	The Rest	240	0.1	0.1	0

Chance: 10% (Brach), 20% (Givens), 15% (Britton)

The bullpen hopes lie in the Orioles hitting their stride on their fearsome three: Brach, Givens, and Britton.  The likelihood of this seems about as good (or bad) as the starting pitching predicament.

Conclusion

And there you have it. If about 15-20 players hit their upper quartile projection, the Orioles will be expected to win about 95 of their games. That is the optimistic push of the finger. Of course, we have been talking about the chances of all of this happening. That would be less than a 0.000000001 chance of 95 games being won.

Are The Orioles Done?

The top group of available starting pitchers is now down to just one: Alex Cobb. Jake Arrieta is heading to the Phillies on a three-year deal, and Lance Lynn signed a one-year, $12 million deal with the Twins. While Arrieta is still going to make a lot of money, he's getting significantly less than what was anticipated.

Lynn, meanwhile, joins some good, mid-tier players who recently decided to accept one-year contracts. Carlos Gonzalez signed for $8 million. Jonathan Lucroy, Mike Moustakas, and Logan Morrison signed for $6.5 million each (which is weird). And yesterday, Neil Walker signed for $5 million.

Lynn isn't the only notable starting pitcher to sign a one-year deal this offseason. Here are some others:

• Jaime Garcia, $10 million
• CC Sabathia, $10 million
• Michael Fiers, $6 million
• Doug Fister, $4 million
• Miguel Gonzalez, $4.75 million
• Francisco Liriano, $4 million
• Chris Tillman, $3 million
• Anibal Sanchez, $2.5 million (released after the Twins signed Lynn)
• Yovani Gallardo, $2 million

There are more, and a lot of minor league signings, obviously, but this list will work. Out of everyone noted above, the O's signed one player: Tillman. This despite having interest in nearly all of them (except for maybe Lucroy, Morrison, and Gallardo). 

The Orioles needed (and still need) starting rotation help. They could use another left-handed bat -- like Walker's! And the O's are well-known bargain hunters. And yet, despite their needs, the O's didn't pounce on any of these pitchers except for Tillman. They also must not have tried hard enough for Walker, who signed with the Yankees.

As with most things O's related, there are more questions than answers. Why isn't there more payroll room? Are the O's really doing all they can to win now? How can they rely on Mike Wright or a Rule 5 pick and say they're trying to win? How does adding Andrew Cashner, Tillman, and Colby Rasmus qualify as reloading?

It's not surprising that some pitchers would choose another club's one-year deal over the Orioles'. The American League East can be daunting, and someone like Tillman had limited options to fall back on, unlike Lynn. Still, Garcia joined the AL East anyway. I wonder how the Blue Jays did that!

Here we are yet again. The Orioles limit themselves in free agency by focusing on pitchers on short-term deals, and then it's a huge surprise when their offers, which many times include lower amounts and more deferred money, are spurned. (Tillman's deal even includes deferred money for "some earned performance bonuses," per Cot's.)

The Orioles refuse to spend big on starters and won't spend much internationally to supplement their farm system, so they have to rely on short-term deals, trades, and the draft (and Rule 5 draft). The O's didn't make any trades, and no other draft pick can really help them at this moment unless Hunter Harvey flourishes if he's rushed to the majors or Nestor Cortes quickly puts it all together. That's why it was fortunate that many pitchers received affordable, short-term contracts this offseason. That meant more chances and less risk.

Cobb is out there and would make a lot of sense for the O's, but Cashner may still wind up as the team's big-ticket item this offseason. Maybe you're not sold on Garcia, Fiers, Fister, and Miguel Gonzalez. Maybe you don't like Walker or don't think he'd be a fit on the O's this year. But the O's had interest in all of them for the right price -- and then they all signed for less than many thought.

What is the right price for the Orioles? What is a significant enough discount? Why not spend more to improve the rotation or bench and improve this year's chances? Even if they added Cobb or Lynn, the 2018 payroll would still be well below that of 2017.

The O's might not be done this offseason, but it seems like it. Cobb is no savior, but he'd assist an underwhelming rotation. If the O's have been waiting to act, this is a good time to nab a useful player. If they don't, well, then they'll have even more explaining to do for a truly bizarre offseason.

Chris Lee - Who Knows Best?

Joe Reisel's Archives

Chris Lee - Baseball America's #10 Orioles prospect. Photo courtesy Norfolk Tides / Scott Sears.

If we thought about baseball before the 2017 season the way we did in 1985, most Orioles fans would have regarded Chris Lee as a top pitching prospect. He was left-handed, 6'3" tall (well, he is left-handed and 6'3"right now, too), weighed 180 lbs, and had an above-average sinking fastball and an occasionally-plus slider. More importantly, he had made 14 starts (between 2015 and 2016) at AA Bowie, pitching 89 innings with a 3.02 ERA. He had missed the last three months of the 2016 season with a strained shoulder, but he was considered recovered.

However, baseball fans have become more sophisticated. Beneath the superficially attractive AA statistics were a truly terrible pair of numbers - a 33-45 walk-strikeout ratio and a strikeout rate of 4.53 strikeouts per nine innings. These numbers are well below average, and I - like many other more statistically-oriented fans and analysts - questioned the thinking of prospect raters such as Baseball America, who ranked Lee as one of the top ten prospects in the Orioles system.

So, when an apparently-healthy Chris Lee was assigned to the Norfolk Tides for the 2017 season and put in their starting rotation, I was hoping to see him. To be honest, I was hoping his performance would reflect his strikeout and walk numbers as opposed to his ERA. I admit that I dream of knowing more about baseball than some of the professionals. So I hoped that Chris Lee's 2017 performance would justify my thinking that he wasn't much of a prospect. I emphasize that I had and have nothing against Chris Lee either personally or professionally; the negative effects on his career would just be collateral damage in a clash between my opinion and expert opinion. And, his overall performance in 2017 was almost everything I was hoping for - a 5.17 ERA; 54 walks and 144 hits allowed in 116 innings; only 6.42 strikeouts per nine innings.

(All data relating to Chris Lee's performance come from either baseballamerica.com, milb.com, or from my own calculations from my own scoresheets.)

But there was something peculiar. I saw six of Chris Lee's 2017 games - four (the first four below) starts and 2 relief appearances. And the Chris Lee I saw was a lot better than the overall Chris Lee:

Date	Opponent	IP	H	R	ER	BB	K
April 26 (G1)	Buffalo	6	5	0	0	1	4
May 19	Charlotte	6	4	1	1	3	6
June 3	Rochester	5	8	5	4	1	5
June 30	Durham	6	2	0	0	3	1
July 27	SWB	4	1	1	0	3	2
August 22	Charlotte	2 2/3	4	2	2	2	1

SWB: Scranton/Wilkes-Barre

That's 29 2/3 innings with a 2.12 ERA. His 13/19 strikeout--walk ratio isn't good, nor is his 5.76 strikeouts per nine innings. On the other hand, instead of allowing 11.14 hits per nine innings, in these games he allowed 7.28. It's not a huge sample size - but it does represent over 25% of his season's innings. The games were played at Harbor Park, well-known as a pitcher's park. He did face two of the less-potent offenses in the International League (Buffalo and Rochester), as well as Charlotte (a middle-of-the-pack offense boosted by its hitter-friendly home park) - but also faced the best and third-best offenses in the league. On the whole, other than Harbor Park, there's no obvious reason why Chris Lee was so much better in the games I saw than overall.

Basically, there are three logical explanations - either the four very good games I saw Chris Lee pitch are extreme outliers and in every other game he was poor; or he had a few really terrible starts that inflated his statistics; or some combination of the two.

Looking at his game log for the 2107 season, there are five really terrible performances that skew the rest of his season:

Date	Opponent	IP	H	R	ER	BB	K
April 8	At Charlotte	3 1/3	9	8	8	2	1
May 24	At Toledo	2	7	6	4	1	1
May 29	At Columbus	2 2/3	6	8	8	2	2
June 25	At Gwinnett	3 1/3	9	8	7	2	2
July 5	At Gwinnett	4 1/3	9	7	7	4	1

Those five games - in which he posted a 19.53 ERA - obviously had a major impact on his overall performance. If we throw out the four outstanding games I saw personally (April 26, May 19, June 30, and July 27) and these five terrible games, his performance was 71 innings with a 3.17 ERA. I have to conclude that the Chris Lee I saw is representative of what he's capable of - his 2017 season was overly influenced by five terrible games.

When evaluating Chris Lee, we shouldn't throw those five games out - that's part of what he did. Nor should we ignore his other negatives; his relatively poor control and strikeout rates. But, in 2017, I was watching Chris Lee, expecting a train wreck. If Chris Lee will return to Norfolk for 2018, I'll be interested in seeing him again - but this time expecting someone who, even if not a major-league pitcher, a pitcher who will help my AAA team win a few games.

Jon Jay is not your Huckleberry

The off season has been a peculiar place for some and not for others.  If we use BORAS as an expectation of market value, then the top tier players have generally found the contract we thought would be offered.  However, role players discovered their market drastically undercut.

This included a player like Jon Jay.  BORAS version one saw Jay as a 1/9.2 contract player while BORAS 2.0 envisioned him more as a 2/17.6.  Instead, he signed a 1/3 deal with another 1.5 MM in potential add-ons.  That is a significant underperformance from BORAS's perspective.  However, the way this off season has gone it is not surprising to see a player who is neither loved by scouts or analytics to have a hard time finding a home.  However, you might have gotten a different impression in the press.

MASN's Roch Kubatko gently wrote about Jay as the one who got away.  He noted how the Orioles tried to sign Jay before they agreed to terms with Colby Rasmus, but at that point Jay was asking for numbers similar to BORAS's suggestion.  Roch laments:

Jay is a better contact hitter than Rasmus, offers plus speed and defense and is a popular teammate. He always made sense to me as an ideal fit. But certainly not at his initial price.

Taking it much further than Roch, Baltimore Baseball's Dan Connolly decided that Jon Jay was the hill to die on.  He noted that Jay was "a perfect fit" (though somehow not a "difference maker") and that "...the Orioles fumbled this one."

He concludes that Jay was a player the Orioles "desperately needed".

So these are Jon Jay's last three seasons:

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	Avg	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
30	STL	245	.210	.306	.257	-0.2	0.3
31	SDP	374	.291	.339	.389	1.1	1.2
32	CHC	433	.296	.374	.375	1.1	1.6

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

From those numbers, you get a good idea of what Jay is, a role player.  He is not a star.  At some level, it seems peculiar how much teeth gnashing there has been for him.  It reminds me of the Arrested Development joke about how mesmerizing George Michael makes his girlfriend out to be, but how everyone else is a bit confused.

I truly am confused why a fringe roster candidate like Jay is generating such adoration.  Let us go through the pieces a bit.

Plus Speed

Jay does not have plus speed.  Statcast can measure sprint speeds of players.  Generally, an average baserunner, regardless of position, can attain a speed of 27 ft/s.  Statcast has kept data for three years with MLB presenting the average data.  During that time, Jay has put up max sprint speeds of 26.9 ft/s (2015), 26.6 ft/s (2016), and 26.6 ft/s (2015).  His 2016 26.6 ft/s mark was the second slowest speed for a centerfielder out of 58 players.  A tenth faster than the slowest, Mark Canha, and three tenths slower than the next centerfielder, Joc Pederson.  At left field, he would be tied as 46th fastest with Ryan Braun.  In right field, he would be tied for 45th with Carlos Gonzalez.  Whether we are talking about all players in baseball or the considerably faster subset of outfielders, Jay does not appear to possess plus speed.

Plus Outfield Defense

Defense is a tricky thing to measure, but it basically comes with a pretty steady conclusion for Jay.  Over his career, UZR has found Jay to be a below average corner outfielder (13.4 runs/150), but an average center fielder (1.5 runs/150).  However, his last two seasons have suggested that his play in centerfeld may be a minus or at best below average (-6.9 runs/150).  DRS sees him as a poor centerfielder and an average corner outfielder.  Statcast derived metrics had him as 2% worse than average in 2016 and again in 2017, that comes out to about a -7 runs/150 (they report does not break down differences at other positions).  To balance that out, I asked a scout and his response was that Jay earned that reputation early in his career, but that he is not the same guy he was then.

Great OBP

When Dan Duquette arrived in Baltimore, he noted how important on base percentage was and used that as a rationale behind signing Matt Antonelli to a MLB deal.  Since then, the Orioles have paid no attention to on base percentage and created one of the best teams in baseball from 2012-2016 on the back of prodigious power.  Still, this is a familiar drum that is beat whenever someone wishes to try to make a point.

In this case, that context is paired with Jay's .374 on base percentage, which was accomplished with reasonable batting average and walk rates.  That performance is not paired with what he did before or his age.  When you have more sophisticated approaches looking at what all that means with respect to future performance, the optimism should fade.  ZiPS sees Jay as a .338 OBP, which is .002 higher than what Steamer projects.  PECOTA pegs him as a .335 OBP mark.

So, is a mid to high .330s OBP a great performance? Last year's league average was .329 OBP.  That is on par with the performance by the Mets' Ruben Tejada or the Phillies' Cesar Hernandez last year.  It would have been 61st out of 141.  If Jay would have qualified with enough plate appearances, he would have been 14th in the league.  That would have placed him a point behind Yunel Escobar, who is still a free agent.  For some reason, I do not hear a lot about him.  Anyway, I think you cannot simply ignore his 2015 and 2016 seasons, so I think it would be a stretch to expect him to be able to perform similar to his 2017 season.  A lot of teams probably think this given how difficult it was for him to find a deal and how many would kill to have a .370 OBP player.

What Drawbacks?

There is an idea that in order for a player to be serviceable in the majors, he must be able to adequately do everything.  The worst contact hitters still have a high skill for contact.  The least powerful can still rap a ball over the fence.  The slowest runner can still likely beat anyone in a sprint outside of Texas Roadhouse.  What this means though is that there is a likely floor for most skills.  Chris Davis exemplifies this.  His contact rate appears to be near a threshold that renders the rest of his profile useless.  It does not matter how powerful he is or how head smart on the basepaths he is, if he does not get enough contact then he does not justify the rest of the package.

Jay is sitting there as well.  His bat profiles as a bat that is about 20% worse than league average, which means his bat projects to be worse than any positional average.  His power challenges for the worst in baseball.  He hits maybe one or two home runs a year and he shows no gap power.  He does not make up for this with savvy baserunning with only eight stolen bases over the past three years.  His walk rate is below average.  His strikeout rate is above average.  He is slow for an outfielder.  His arm is below average.  As he ages, the chances that one or more of these skills erodes further makes one truly wonder if he could still play in the majors.  It says something with scouts and analytics both go, "eh".

This is not to say he is without worth.  He can play all three outfield positions, at least adequately.  He gets on base.  Jay simply just does not do much when he does those things.  He is a frozen pizza.  He is not really what you want, but is close enough on all accounts to be palatable enough.  So, setting Jay as a hill to die on certainly feels weird.

How about Colby Rasmus?

Of course, this goes back to Colby Rasmus because the Orioles signed him as opposed to Jay.  Now, much has been made of Rasmus leaving the Rays last year.  He has been fit into the boxes of being weird, deserting his team, not getting along with others, but those have largely been overblown.  Certainly, he is a peculiar fellow in a sport where community is defined by adherence as opposed to acceptance.  Still, he is a player that teams have wanted.  Since La Russa and Rasmus fell apart, the Jays wanted him.  The Astros wanted him.  The Orioles wanted him.  The Rays wanted him.  A lot of teams have wanted him.  Time and again, he shows weird flourishes and has repeatedly chosen a better personal fit than a better contract.

Standard Batting

Age	Tm	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	bWAR	fWAR
28	HOU	485	.238	.314	.475	.2.6	3.0
29	HOU	417	.206	.286	.355	2.2	1.4
30	TBR	129	.281	.318	.579	1.2	1.1

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/8/2018.

Assuming his hip is OK, what we see immediately above is that Rasmus has had both an uneven last three years, but generally a much better three years than Jay.  While, Rasmus' OBP would appear to be much lower than Jay's, the other aspects of his game cover for that, such as his fringe plus plus power where Jay's is minus minus.

Speed-wise, Rasmus is faster than Jay.  Rasmus recorded a 27.6 ft/s rate last year, but was above 28 the previous two seasons.  Defensive metrics have adored Rasmus over this period.  DRS has seen him as a plus plus defender over the past three seasons (~15 runs/150).  DRS has viewed him as a plus defender (~10 runs/150).  Statcast has pegged him as average (0 runs above average).

So, the great issue is one between Jay's above average OBP against Rasmus' power and defense.  It does not look like a difficult decision for me between the two.

So what does all this mean?

I have no idea.  I am unsure why anyone was so fixated on Jay.  Likewise, I am unsure why anyone would be fixated on Rasmus.  What I think is clear is that Rasmus is a better player and potentially can be a game-changing force. To a higher viewpoint, the major issue here is why did Jay become the last hurrah?  This team is situating itself as a mid-70s win team.  The addition of Jay does not shake that much.  Whether you give the team an allowance for low spending or not, Jay simply does not push the needle.  If there is a hill to die on, it might be Alex Cobb or maybe the GM position or maybe the Manny Machado extension.  Jon Jay?