Gerrit Cole Trade: Wins Over Dreams

I found it rather remarkable how so many in the media and secondary baseball blogs railed against the Pirates' pieces arriving from dealing Gerrit Cole.  The argument was that Gerrit Cole is a good, but not great pitcher and that the Pirates only got spare parts.  In turn, they allegedly had a deal with the Yankees on the table that would have given them Clint Frazier and a couple spare parts.  Here at the Depot, we rarely look at the dealings of other teams so explicitly, but this may prove to be a useful discussion given the current state of the Orioles and the likelihood that we might see some significant pieces being dealt at some point this season.

For this discussion, I have little interest in what Gerrit Cole is worth.  Instead, I am interested in comparing the two deals.  The Astros handed the Pirates Joe Musgrove, Michael Feliz, Colin Moran, and Justin Martin.  This will be compared against the Yankees deal with Frazier and two spare parts.  We will assume the spare parts in the Yankees' deal are one pitching and one position prospect.

Now, prospect writers tend to be biased.  They love the big splash.  They like to be able to say lofty thing and extol on plus tools.  That is certainly a generality, but conversation about mid-level pieces does not get you much unless there is a loud tool in there to dream on.  Moran and Martin does not have any fancy tools.  Musgrove and Feliz do, but also have significant time in the majors to tarnish that shine.  It is a dull package.

From the Yankees side, it is a bit more splashy.  Clint Frazier, whose last year and a half has actually dimmed his value, is a once sterling prospect.  Before the 2017 season, he was around 20th across the boards on the top 100 MLB prospects lists.  However, it should be noted that the backend of 2016 was a struggle at AAA and 2017 AAA was hitting on level.  His time in the Majors, enough to cause his rookie status to expire, was also fairly uninspiring.  In this exercise, we will assume that his youth saves him from any of this and that he still rates on par with a positional prospect around 20th overall instead of indications that point toward these struggles as indicative of a prospect who should be around the 50th to 60th rank.

Looking at Bust Rates, Frazier is pegged as a 20-40 position prospect.  Fringe prospect probabilities were assessed using original methodology of Victor Wang in conjunction to the Perez study linked.  Feliz was treated as a fringe pitching prospect.  Moran and Martin were treated as fringe positional prospects.  Musgrove's outcomes are based on projection modeling.

	Bust		Bust
Clint Frazier	68%	Joe Musgrove	65%
Fringe A Position	89%	Michael Feliz	93%
Fringe B Pitching	93%	Colin Moran	89%
		Justin Martin	89%
All crap out	54%		46%

That does not seem like much of a difference.  The Pirates stand to have a 13% better chance of avoiding a complete bust situation.  However, the chances of receiving an exceptional prospect (>2.5 WAR/yr) is 27% for the Yankees package vs. 21% for the Pirates package (29% less).  I would even offer that the bust rate is too high for Musgrove who looked at times as if he was a fairly top notch bullpen arm.

Regardless, the difference in outcomes is not that much.  The Astros' deal offered the Pirates fits where they lack organizational depth plus a great probability that at least one player will be a solid MLB pro.  The Yankees deal offered a much better profile for a superstar player (ignoring the last 20 months of Clint Frazier's play), but at a position where the Pirates currently have some measure of MLB solutions.  What the Pirates needed was pitching and infield.  This move will likely better set up the Pirates to win as opposed to taking a chance on a superstar player.

Orioles Offseason Update: Adam Jones Is Arguing With Fans

There's not a whole lot going on in Birdland. The Orioles will probably sign at least one starting pitcher eventually, but for now, things are still quiet. So far, the team's biggest move is trading for outfielder Jaycob Brugman, who has 162 career plate appearances, and their most notable free agent signing is Michael Kelly, who has yet to appear in the major leagues. Making moves just to make moves is not the key to success, but hopefully it's revealed soon that Dan Duquette has something up his sleeve.

Yesterday, something not transaction related caught fans' attention. And that something would be Adam Jones jumping into the Twitter replies of a MASN article about him and responding to fans who were criticizing him.

Hahaha your job should do that to you also. I’m sure you’re worth it buddy

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) January 15, 2018

Nice

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) January 15, 2018

Thx for thinking for me. But you’re wrong

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) January 15, 2018

Nice. I’m loving this support man.

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) January 15, 2018

Indeed. Just love seeing the folks that want me out. Like someone is on my tail. But okie dokie. Imma keep my mouth shut now and just play. They will miss the character. We still boys pic.twitter.com/yLGfPVMWKj

— 10 (@SimplyAJ10) January 15, 2018

Jones has never been one to bite his tongue, so it's not surprising to see him defend himself. It's also not the first time he's gotten into it with fans. Some people might not like it or find it awkward or pointless; I find it entertaining.

Some interesting comments by Jones have popped up this offseason. He hasn't shied away from talking about 2018 being the last year on his deal, and he's also been, let's say, questioning of the team's direction. Maybe he is simply frustrated with this offseason. Maybe he knows he won't be offered an extension to his liking and that he'll be leaving Baltimore soon. Maybe he's bored. Or maybe all of the above. Who knows for sure?

Jones isn't the same player as earlier in his career, but how could he be? Still, it would be nice if the O's could figure out a way to keep him around by shifting him to a corner outfield spot. There's a lot of factors at play, and perhaps Jones hopes to cash in one more time for a big payday. If that's the case, he probably won't be with the O's in 2019.

If you think things were sentimental when J.J. Hardy left, just wait for the potential Jones departure.

After 2018, Duquette Will Likely Be the Third Winningest GM in Orioles History

Effectively, the Orioles have installed thirteen different "General Managers". That number pops up to fourteen if we so choose to count the Mike Flanagan/Jim Bettie design as its own separate entity.  Below is the ranking of General Managers by total wins.

	Years	Wins	Losses	Pct
Hank Peters	1976-1987	1036	845	.551
Lee MacPhail	1959-1965	612	506	.547
Roland Hemond	1988-1995	592	634	.483
Harry Dalton	1966-1971	582	383	.603
Dan Duquette	2012-2017	519	453	.534
Frank Cashen	1972-1975	358	279	.562
Mike Flanagan	2003-2007	293	355	.452
Paul Richards	1955-1958	276	337	.450
Andy MacPhail	2008-2011	267	380	.413
Pat Gillick	1996-1998	265	221	.545
Syd Thrift	2000-2002	204	281	.421
Frank Wren	1999	78	84	.481
Art Ehlers	1954	54	100	.351

Currently, Duquette sits fifth all time for total wins (6th if you wish to look at winning percentage, 4th as games played as general manager).  He is 63 wins behind Harry Dalton and 73 behind Roland Hemond.  It would take a pretty catastrophic season for him to remain in fifth and it is like that 2018 will end with him sitting in third.  With a playoff season or an extension, Duquette would pass MacPhail for second place in the next year to year and a half.  As it is he is about four to five to seven years away from Hank Peters.

Needless to say, Duquette has overseen one of the more successful periods in the history of the Orioles franchise.  He has succeeded under the ownership of Peter Angelos where other respectable executives like Roland Hemond, Frank Wren, Jim Beattie, and Andy Macphail have failed.  Maybe he is not the answer long term, but it is remarkable how successful he has been in a job that few people thought it was possible to be successful in.

As Duquette enters his final contract year, many have called for him to be sent off into the sunset.  This is a rather common thought even though we know he is a wanted commodity as evidenced by the Blue Jays' interest a few years back.  Areas in which he is dinged include a lack of international amateur spending, which is something that no Orioles GM has done since Pat Gillick.  That makes it seem like a franchise issue instead of a GM issue.  He is hit for diddly daddling in the free agent market, but studies have indicated how waited out the market gets you a better price point.  While the Orioles have spent lavishly, much of that spend has been caught up in arbitration contracts and the owner's contract proclivities (see: Chris Davis).

The main area of weakness for Duquette has been him gutting the minors.  He was willing to get rid of fringe prospects, which has put the club in a starting pitching depth crunch the past couple years as a few of their starters fell apart.  The minors in general came in from being buoyed by several high draft picks and little depth to one of simply little depth as the club became more competitive and Duquette felt free to sign free agents that resulted in the loss of draft picks.  However, the club, even though restricted predominantly to the domestic market, has done well to find talent deeper in the draft on the position side.  It has made what was a glaring issue into something that is now more or less sub-par.

As it stands, I still think Duquette has not shown a talent at rebuilding a franchise and it feels like the franchise is on the threshold of a rebuild.  That said, he has had lots of success here and elsewhere under a wide range of limitations.  He has also shown to be successful with the Orioles, which is something no one had been able to do in the 15 years before his tenure.

With all of that in mind, I think the wisest move for this franchise would be to extend Duquette for another five years and see how well he can restock the cabinet.

How Can The Orioles Win You Over?

Let's just be honest: A lot of fans aren't very happy with the Orioles right now. It isn't hard to come up with some reasons why:

• The O's haven't handled the Manny Machado situation gracefully. 
• Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette have expiring deals, so the team's future is even more uncertain.
• They haven't done anything yet in free agency and only have two starting pitchers you can count on (or one if you're not a huge Kevin Gausman fan). 
• Every reliever is apparently an option to move into the rotation.
• The front office is unwilling to rebuild and Dan Duquette talks instead of retooling the roster, but they're seemingly content to follow the same strategies as previous offseasons. 

There's more, but you get the point.

So starting today, what can the Orioles do to win you over? It's getting there, but it's not too late. This is a hypothetical, but be reasonable. The O's are not going to sign the most expensive free agents like Yu Darvish, Jake Arrieta, and J.D. Martinez. Also, they're almost certainly not going to extend Machado. Sorry.

Maybe some of you would be happy if the O's signed Alex Cobb or Lance Lynn, and then another lesser starter like Jason Vargas or Andrew Cashner. That would at least give the appearance that the O's are taking next season's chances seriously by giving Dylan Bundy and Gausman some help.

If you want the O's to rebuild instead, maybe moving Machado for a package of prospects would be a good start. Perhaps that's followed by cleaning house, with Jonathan Schoop, Brad Brach, Adam Jones, and any other trade piece being moved before the season, or perhaps at the trade deadline.

Or maybe you just want something to feel good about. That might mean an extension for Schoop. Or maybe you just want some appearance of a direction or plan. Both are understandable. Let's get through this frustrating offseason together. What do you want to see happen?

Extending Jonathan Schoop... Or Not

When one asks who pray tell is the face of the franchise, you hear a few names.  You hear Adam Jones, Manny Machado, Zach Britton, or maybe Buck Showalter.  Some who wish for some solace in the wake of Machado's expected exit some time in the next year, wish for Jonathan Schoop to be extended and take the reins.  As it is, the contract-based face of the franchise in the coming years is pretty much Chris Davis.  With his deal ending after the 2022 season (assuming he plays that long), his deal spans three years longer than Darren O'Day and Mark Trumbo whose deals end after the 2019 season.  To be it another way, Trey Mancini's last arbitration year is scheduled to be the same as Chris Davis' last contractural year.  But, wait, what about Jonathan Schoop?  That is presumably what this article is about.

On the surface, there are concerns that maybe Jonathan Schoop is not interested in an extension.  In 2016, he signed a deal with Fantex where the company paid him 4.91 MM up front and in return Schoop gives Fantex 10% of his earnings.  That deal increased his 2016 pay from 0.52 MM to 5.43 MM.  In 2017, Schoop paid 0.35 MM to Fantex.  In 2018, he is expected to hand over 0.91 MM.  Fantex has already recouped about a quarter of their initial investment.  What this means is that with Schoop's wages being garnished, he may well wish to explore every option to maximize his value.  Rarely does a player ever take a homegrown discount and this is certainly a scenario where there is little reason to expect that and, instead, we should expect a full market value deal if any extension will be reached.

This also complicates matters because a full market extension within the context of today is one that pegs Jonathan Schoop as a second baseman.  It is true with the development of shifting that range has decreased greatly as a skill requirement for playing up the middle.  Schoop, who is fairly slow for a second baseman, has been able to get away with subpar range by sitting further back than most second basemen and being heavily positioned.  His strong arm helps make it work for him to sit so deep.

However, the recent years have shown issues that cause some concern.  In the minors and his first stint in the Majors, it was fairly obvious that he was inadequate as a third baseman.  He first step was terrible and he had difficulty getting down to the ground.  It is difficult to play the position if you are a step late and have trouble getting down on balls on the side.  Those issues were less impacting at second base.  He has lost athleticism these past few seasons, which was expected.  The problem is that he is showing further issues with his first step and getting down on the ball even at second base, sitting so deep.  This has changed a conversation from where does Schoop fit in his 30s on the field to one where it is plausible that he might need to find a home off second base sooner than that.

As you know, it is hard to find a powerful bat capable of playing second base.  That is one aspect that makes Schoop so valuable.  When you take that bat and place it at third base, right field, or, God forbid, first base, that offensive ability no longer stands above the pack, but begins to look rather ordinary next to others in that positional cohort.  Schoop will be looking at his maximum value and would likely choose to prove himself as a viable second baseman than to accept a lesser deal based on him playing a different position down the road.

So what does a Jonathan Schoop deal look like?  MLBTR expects an arbitration value of 9.1 MM.  Our own method (assuming an expectation of 3 WAR and a second year arbitration rate of 34% market rate) comes up with 8.2 MM, but lets just say 9 MM.  His last year, we expect 10.6 MM, but let us be generous and peg him for 11 MM.  BORAS, as of this moment, see Schoop on the free market as a player who would see five years for a total of 83 MM (actually 82.7 MM, but we are using roundish numbers).  With arbitration dampening his value, the actual extension would be around 71 MM.

That said, the BORAS model sees that Schoop does not have a long track record.  For Schoop, he will likely want to bet on himself and that likely means so will the Orioles if they wish to extend him.  BORAS sees Schoop, if he continues to perform at the same level as last year, earning a five year contract after the 2019 season that is worth 94 MM.  In this scenario, the extension would be the 20 MM for the arbitration years and then that deal, so seven years at 114 MM.

The final scenario is if Schoop has all the confidence in the world and thinks as he enters his age 26 and 27 seasons that his performance will rise even higher.  If we accept a full one WAR increase, then we are saying that Schoop turns from the 4 WAR" player he was last year and into a "5 WAR" player.  BORAS would think that would yield Schoop a five year deal worth 113 MM after 2019.  The extension in this case would be a seven year deal worth 133 MM.  The five year deal arrangement would be around 5/86.

So that is the range of options that we might expect if Schoop becomes the new contract-based face of the organization.  Five year deals would range from 71 to 86 MM and seven year deal would range from 114 to 133 MM.  These are major cost outlays and it makes one wonder if the Orioles are dedicated to fielding competitive teams in the years to come.  If they are, then Schoop makes sense (if you believe he can be a four to five WAR player at whatever position he ends up at ).  If not, then the surplus value in his near term arbitration-base deals could set the club up with getting a decent prospect return to try to prime the next competitive window for the club.

Making Faulty Comparisons Doesn't Improve Mark Trumbo's Contract

Hey, I get it. This Orioles offseason seems to be making all of us crazy. No one knows exactly what the O's are doing, and some of us are on edge.

Still, it shouldn't lead to write-ups like this defense of Mark Trumbo and his contract:

Let us not forget that initially it was believed Trumbo might land a five-year deal in the $65-$80 million range. That didn’t happen. Likely because Trumbo was viewed as a defensive downgrade by most teams and that power wasn’t in as high demand as usual.

He signed last January for a three-year, $37.5 million deal. It seemed reasonable then.

And, frankly, it’s reasonable now.

He’s owed basically $26 million over the next two years and if he splits the difference between his two seasons and hits 35 homers and drives in 87 runs in 2018 and 2019 that’s worth the investment.

Consider that this offseason, the Philadelphia Phillies gave Carlos Santana, who is three months younger than Trumbo, a three-year, $60 million deal.

Like Trumbo, Santana is a career .249 hitter who had 23 homers last year. Yes, he’s considered an above-average defensive first baseman nowadays and draws a ton of walks (a .365 career OBP), but I think it’s hard to argue he’s worth nearly twice what Trumbo is.

Trumbo doesn’t get compared to Santana, though. Orioles fans prefer to link him up with Davis, and moan about the wasted money on those two.

Go read the whole thing if you want to take in the larger, though obvious, point that Chris Davis and Trumbo have very different contracts. These two players seem to get lumped in because they're powerful but lumbering 1B/DH types. No, Trumbo's contract is not killing the Orioles, but it's not helping either - and that's because the Orioles invested in a 1B/DH who isn't an effective DH (and is a terrible outfielder) when first base is occupied by Davis.

As noted, Trumbo being owed $26 million the next two seasons isn't great, but it's not crushing. It would be better if the O's could play him at first base. He's movable, but the O's would either have to include money in a potential deal (not their style) or take on a bigger contract (not likely, but possible).

Anyway, all of that about Trumbo's situation has been hashed out already. The Manny Machado saga has seemingly pushed everything to the back burner, so it's not like getting Trumbo out of town is a huge priority. But it's something that could help the Orioles. And when discussing that, it's important to be clear about what Trumbo's value is. And guess what? He's not close to the same player that Carlos Santana is.

I guess Santana is relevant because he just signed that deal listed above, so let's break a few things down about the "... it’s hard to argue [Santana's] worth nearly twice what Trumbo is" line. Let's look at the past five seasons for both Santana and Trumbo:

Carlos Santana, 2013-2017: 15 fWAR, 14.7 bWAR
Mark Trumbo, 2013-2017: 3.2 fWAR, 3.6 bWAR

In that span, Trumbo has had two negative-WAR seasons and zero years above 3 WAR. Santana has had zero negative-WAR seasons and three years of 3 WAR or better.

Don't care about wins above replacement? Santana had a wRC+ of 117 or higher in four of the last five years (high of 132, low of 107). That also includes an OBP of .357 or better in each season. Trumbo had a wRC+ of 107, 90, 107, 125, and 80, respectively. In three of the five years, he posted a sub-.300 OBP, and his high in OBP was .316 in 2016.

You don't even need to include defense to see just how much better Santana is than Trumbo. That doesn't make Trumbo horrible, necessarily, and clearly the O's figured they'd get production closer to the 2016 version of Trumbo than the 2017 one.

Steamer projects 2.6 fWAR for Santana and 0.6 fWAR for Trumbo. FanGraphs' Depth Charts projections have 2.8 fWAR for Santana and 0.9 fWAR for Trumbo. There are more, but you get the idea. By a fair analysis, Santana is worth at least twice what Trumbo is, and it's closer to 3-4 times. Looking at batting average and home run totals is an outdated way to do things, and a far superior OBP means a lot.

Considering how bad Trumbo was last year, he'll need to do more than just split the difference between his 2016 and 2017 seasons. He needs to be much closer to the 2016 version. While not impossible, how confident are you that that'll happen?

Trade for Jacoby Ellsbury and Make the Yankees a Champion

The Yankees have some relative holes in their roster.  Not many, but when you want to ensure a World Series as much as possible, you want to try to cover those holes up.  The club has some uninspiring play in their infield and they have shown a desire, rather unique to the Yankees, that they would like to make Jordan Montgomery their sixth pitcher as opposed to their fifth one.  Combine that with a 2018 payroll of 162 MM and a desire to spend less than the 35 MM allotted under the luxury tax, they are in a very minor bind.  In 2019, about 20 MM will come off the board after consideration for arbitration, so it might be a long term issue to some extent.  If they truly want Manny Machado in 2018, they will need to shoulder his expected salary of 17.2 MM.  Beyond 2018, if they succeed in their rumored desire for him, then they may well need 40 MM a year.

This payroll crunch can be vastly simplified for the club if they do one thing: trade Jacoby Ellsbury.  Ellsbury has been passed by with Aaron Hicks establishing himself in centerfield.  Ellsbury, who has three years and 63 MM remaining with an additional 5 MM to buy out a fourth season, is effectively a very expensive Jarrod Dyson.  Ellsbury is a strong platoon bat from the strong side who should be sat as often as possible when a leflty appears on the mound.  His defense is still strong (though no longer exceptional) and he would immediately become the Orioles fastest player on the roster even as he enters his age 34 season.  His likely output would be in the 1 to 2 WAR range, which is a useful role playing starter.

For the Orioles, Ellsbury would help bridge a gap from an Adam Jones centerfield to, well, an Ellsbury one until his deal runs out.  Jarrod Dyson would also fit here and his expected pay around 8-12 MM a year provides one measure to show Ellsbury's break even point.  One benefit with Ellsbury over Dyson is that Ellsbury is a bit more respected in the game and it may be that a veteran like Jones would be more amiable to let another established veteran like Ellsbury take over instead of career platoon player Dyson.  But maybe not.  Anyway, there is a need and Ellsbury could fit.

Specifically, Ellsbury has 68.4 MM coming to him.  BORAS thinks his value would be worth a two year deal for a total of 19.4 MM this off season.  If his decline adheres to my projection, then that third season would have a future market value of one year and 8.3 MM.  This give a total value of 27.7 MM with a worth of -40.7 MM.  Earlier I noted that Manny Machado was worth somewhere in the neighborhood of 40-60 MM for 2018.  Let us be kind and peg his value and Elsbury inclusion to totaling 100 MM in assets for the Yankees to send back to the Orioles.

The Gleyber Torres Scenario
The jewel in the Yankees minor league crown is Gleyber Torres.  He would be the ideal prize if the Orioles would deal Machado over to the Yankees.  He is largely seen as Machado-light and is arguably the best prospect in baseball.  That gives him a value about 72 MM, a value that would only be possible if the Orioles took on Ellsbury's contract.

Why would the Yankees do it?  Torres is a great prospect, but he is not really a need.  They have suitable backup options at second, third, and short.  If Machado is the long term solution at short, then the Yankees would potentially be wasting Torres' value by pushing him around the diamond.  Dealing him out for one season (and potentially no more) of Machado would be a relatively insane thing to do for a lesser revenue club, but the Yankees position does make Torres movable.

To make up the rest of the package, you could argue that Chance Adams and Justus Sheffield would fit well.  Replacing Sheffield or Adams with Miguel Andujar could work and New York might see replacing Andujar easier than finding more starting pitching depth.  Some are very high on Sheffield, so his inclusion might be a bit more pie in the sky.  With Andujar, the Yankees could probably slide in someone like Todd Frazier.

The final deal would probably be Machado for Ellsbury, Torres, Adams, and Andujar.  It would give the Orioles four 2018 players.  It would remake half of their infield, provide a starting pitcher, and kick the can on a major issue in the outfield for a few years.

The non-Gleyber Torres Scenario
This would be a far higher quantity of players going back to the Orioles.  The Machado replacement would be Miguel Andujar, who has a value of about 20 MM.  Chance Adams and Justus Sheffield are two arms that the Orioles would love in the organization and are worth about 20 MM each.  Domingo Acevedo would be a strong target.  The righthander can raise his fastball to triple digits, but has had some injury issues in the past that might be related to overuse.  He could be a strong solution to Brad Brach leaving after 2018.  A 20 MM value on him might be a bit too much, but a 100 mph fastball holding its own somewhat at AAA as a starter is a nice item to have.  Finally, Nick Solak who is a relatively non-descript second base prospect who just seems to perform.  His tools are rather unimpressive, but he performs. That is a good piece.

This monster of a deal would be Machado for Ellsbury, Andujar, Adams, Sheffield, Acevedo, and Solak.  It would provide the Orioles with potentially five 2018 MLB pieces and Solak who would be a depth solution in case Jonathan Schoop departs at some point.

Conclusion
It would be frankly surprising to see the Orioles take on money to get a better deal.  That said, these deals are largely them handing over one player who would be paid 17.2 MM and getting back a multitude of MLB players for about 24 MM.  Spending 7 MM on three or four addition starters is a pretty cheap deal.  Keep in mind that only Gleyber Torres has a decent expected success rate.  The others are far less likely.  Also keep in mind that by taking Ellsbury off their hands, the Orioles set up the Yankees payroll to more easily reconfigure itself to make big runs at the Machado, Bryce Harper, Clayton Kershaw free agent season of 2018/2019 without difficult luxury tax challenges.

It is a tough call to make.

***Edit: One more thing to add, based on Perez' prospect outcome work and a couple things behind the scenes, we can expect the Torres package to deliver roughly one player (1.05) who average 2 WAR or better per season over his first six season from those three prospects.  In the second package, the likelihood is 0.87 players with 2 WAR or better.

Peter Angelos is Not Cheap

If one frequents Twitter for long enough, you hear a common refrain that takes many different forms.  Boil it down and it is a resounding "Peter Angelos is too cheap to spend any money".  This mantra is said often.  You tend to get it coupled with the idea that the Orioles are a sleeping giant (which I think is properly credited to Peter Gammons during the Flanny/Beattie years), which ignores how power and money have largely left the confines of Baltimore to other locations either by migrating down to DC, migration/buyouts to other areas of the country, or simply mainstays of Baltimore economy drying up.  A very complex issue is expressed very simply and Baltimore's presence as a top tier American city is something many Marylanders believe to their very core regardless of inconvenient facts like market size, corporate presence, population, etc.

To try to nail down the facts a bit, we could lean on Forbes and assume their estimates for payroll and revenue are fairly accurate.  If you accept that, then the Orioles have the ninth lowest revenue in MLB.  That is something that MLB itself would largely agree with as the Orioles quality for special compensation in the form of draft picks and revenue sharing because they are categorized as a low revenue club.  To those who might scoff at that, in what interest is it in MLB to make the Orioles look better off than they actually are.  Other teams would want that compensation.  MLB might well would prefer the Orioles to look better so that the tangled issues with MASN might untangle a little easier.

Anyway, below we have a list of clubs, payroll, and revenue.  It is ordered greatest to least in club's proportion of revenue dedicated to MLB payroll. 

Rank 2017	Team	2017 Payroll	Estimated Revenue	% MLB Payroll
1	Tigers	$200	$275	72.7
2	Orioles	$164	$253	64.9
3	Royals	$146	$246	59.3
4	Marlins	$120	$206	58.3
5	Rangers	$173	$298	58.1
6	Nationals	$165	$304	54.1
7	Mariners	$154	$289	53.4
8	Blue Jays	$144	$278	51.8
9	Rockies	$128	$248	51.6
10	Dodgers	$226	$462	48.8
11	Cardinals	$150	$310	48.5
12	Angels	$164	$350	46.9
13	Mets	$156	$332	46.9
14	Indians	$126	$271	46.4
15	Braves	$126	$275	45.9
16	Giants	$182	$428	42.4
17	Twins	$105	$249	42.1
18	Red Sox	$179	$434	41.2
19	Astros	$122	$299	40.9
20	Cubs	$177	$434	40.8
21	Reds	$93	$229	40.6
22	Athletics	$82	$216	37.8
23	W. Sox	$100	$269	37.2
24	Yankees	$195	$526	37.1
25	DBacks	$93	$253	36.8
26	Rays	$71	$205	34.8
27	Pirates	$92	$265	34.5
28	Phillies	$112	$325	34.4
29	Brewers	$61	$239	25.4
30	Padres	$61	$259	23.7

As you can see, and pretty much what we have said here at the Depot for awhile, the club's current philosophy is to highly leverage their operation into MLB pay.  As such, the Orioles devote the second highest percentage of revenue to MLB payroll.

At the very least, I think this helps show that there is uncertainty in saying that Angelos is cheap.  Indicators exist that the opposite might well be true.

Should Tanking Be Discouraged?

The 2016 World Series champion Chicago Cubs, built their foundation by tanking from 2010-2014. Despite being a large market club, they cut their payroll from $142 million in 2010 to $92 million in 2014. As a reward, they earned the opportunity to draft Javier Baez, Albert Almora, Kris Bryant and Kyle Schwarber.

The 2017 World Series champions, the Houston Astros, also built their foundation by tanking from 2011-2014. They went from a payroll of $103 million in 2009 to $26 million in 2013 and $72 million in 2015. For their reward, they earned the opportunity to draft George Springer, Carlos Correa and Alex Bregman.

The latest team to tank in order to save money and have the opportunity to stock up on high draft picks is the Philadelphia Phillies. Meanwhile, the Yankees and Dodgers have apparently both decided that they’d rather have their payroll under the luxury tax for 2018 instead of adding free agents that could help them compete.

In part, this is because teams are getting smarter. Dan LeBatard recently had an interview with Rob Manfred, in which Manfred stated that “The strategy that, apparently, the Marlins have adopted is one that is tried and true in baseball. I’m not saying it’s without pain. As a matter of fact, I think the fans in Houston endured some bad seasons. But it was a process that ultimately produced a winner, and that process is really dominant in terms of the thinking in our game right now, in terms, particularly, of smaller markets’ ability to win.” Craig Calcaterra translated this as meaning that “the Commissioner of Baseball is now on record as saying that teams should tank to win.” Teams realize that if they tank for a few years, they can build a foundation to compete in the future and make profits by cutting payroll costs.
 
If we use WAR to measure production, then most production comes from players under team control. According to my calculations, in both 2016 and 2017, about 410 WAR was produced by players with 0 -< 3 years of service (i.e anything less than 3 years). Another roughly 320 WAR was produced by players with 3-6 years of service (i.e 3 year up to 6 years exclusive). Only roughly 270 WAR was produced by players with 6+ years of service. Matt Swartz comes up with similar numbers for 2016.  For 2016, my final results differed from his by roughly $2-3 million in salary (out of $2.6 billion) and 12.4 fWAR (I use RA9-WAR to determine pitcher value while he likely uses WAR itself so slight discrepancies should be expected). These results are also in line with the results I found back in 2014. The vast majority of production comes from players that are under team control.

The free agent market has always been a disaster and teams are beginning to lose interest in squandering their money. Teams are still turning to the free agent market in the hopes of being able to add talent to help them win in the future. Individual free agents are receiving more now than in the past. Player salaries have increased from $2.1 billion in 2003 to $3.9 trillion in 2017, showing how players have profited over time. But players are receiving a lesser share of revenue now via salaries than they have in the past. Nathaniel Grow argued this point back in March 2015 when he noted that the players’ salary portion of revenue has dropped from 56% in 2002 to less than 40% in 2014. My own research suggests that for 2017, the players’ share of revenue via salary (as opposed to benefits) was only 38%.

MLB claims that it consistently pays over 50% of net revenue to players when taking the minor leagues, amateur signings, player benefits and major league signings into account. The CBA has since been changed to limit the amount of dollars that can be spent on international players. This claim by MLB also only uses net revenue as opposed to gross revenue from MLBAM.

The extension market doesn’t have much better results. In 2016, the cost of a win for a player with 6+ years of service time was nearly the same for extended players as for players signed in free agency. A large number of extended players were worthless (here’s looking at guys like Ryan Howard, Ryan Zimmerman and Matt Cain).

Teams have strict rules about how much they can spend in the minor league draft and on international amateur players. There are rules limiting how much teams need to pay players in the first six years of their careers. These rules help ensure that there’s significant competitive balance in baseball. However, they also ensure that teams are spending significant amounts of cash in some of the most inefficient ways possible. It further forces big market teams to subsidize spending for minor market teams so that they can also spend money in some of the most inefficient ways possible. This gives teams incentives to limit their spending.

The question is whether tanking is fundamentally good for baseball or any other sports. If so, then the MLB should be happy as more teams will eventually copy this pattern. If this isn’t a good thing, then the MLB and MLBPA should work together to fundamentally change how players to ensure that tanking becomes less valuable. 

There are a number of ways of doing this. Rewarding teams monetarily for making it to the playoffs is a good start. Increasing the minimum salary significantly reduces the savings a team earns from using all team controlled players. Changing the draft system so that the worst record in the league doesn’t necessarily get the first pick in the draft would help. A plan that incorporated these three ideas would help ensure that teams are disincentivized to tank and the proper players are rewarded appropriately.

Filling Out the Orioles Rotation with Bench Players

Yesterday, I posted this:

Last year, Chris Tillman, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Jeremy Hellickson threw 262 innings with an ERA of 7.45.

Since 1991, positional players have logged 284 innings with an ERA of 6.84.

— Camden Depot (@CamdenDepot) January 2, 2018

The brutality of that unholy trinity is put into a very cruel perspective in that the club would have been expected to have given up 17 fewer runs if they would have trotted out guys like Hyun Soo Kim,  Caleb Joseph, and Ruben Tejada onto the mound instead of roughly 30 MM spent on the arms above.  The club would have won about two more games.

So, what is the overall line of a position player pitching since 1991?

n = 181
284 IP
3.0 K/9
5.8 BB/9
6.84 ERA

However, the above might be a poor group to look at when considering what a pitching inclined bench could do.  What if we restricted the players to those who appeared in three or more games.  This might show players who are more capable:

n = 64
79.2 IP
3.3 K/9
5.2 BB/9
5.76 ERA

What is interesting about this group is that with a 5.76 ERA, they are basically replacement level.  If the Orioles had received replacement level pitching from those starters, then the club would have been expected to give up 58 fewer runs and would up with a 78-84 record instead of their 72-90.

Once you go to 4 games or more started, you are only left with nine players and an ERA of 5.74, so it may be difficult to discern ability once you hit that level.

One more angle to look: fastball velocity.
Moving from a professional pitcher to a professional hitter may be pretty disruptive to a batter.  How well do they adjust?

Active	IP	K/9	BB/9	ERA
>85	31	5.8	7.3	11.03
76-85	28	1.6	2.9	6.43
<76	20.1	0.4	2.2	9.3

What we seem to see here is that pitchers in the 76-85 MPH zone for their fastball seem to be significantly more productive than those who throw slower than that or faster.  It may be that the reduced speed is disruptive, but too much of a difference and the batter can adjust to it.

Now, if we stretch the math to find experienced pitchers (as represented above in the 3 GP or more group whose ERA was 77% of the overall group) who can throw in the 76-85 range, then we might expect a one inning average of a 4.95 ERA.  Maybe, but there is a lot of noise in there.

So let us say you can go once through the lineup with a league replacement reliever and then an ideal bench player, you have an ERA of 5.00 over five innings.  If you can do that with 50 starts, you see the 217 runs from that trio above drop to 146 runs, which is an improvement of 7 wins.

Jeez.