Is Dylan Bundy Being Mishandled?

Recently there has been some discussion on how the Orioles are handling Dylan Bundy.  Baseball Prospectus' podcast Up and In discussed it, Keith Law mentioned it on Baseball Today, and Steve Melewski has responded peculiarly as he seems to derisively mention that Law has a podcast (Does Melewski have podcast want?). 

My personal thought on it is that I found the supposed Orioles perspective as half way defensible.  I disagree with Keith Law in that I think it can be argued that with Bundy's inning limit, which is also defensible, that it is good to ease into 5-whatever inning starts as the season progresses.  I do agree with him that Delmarva is simply too low of a level. 

Melewski mentioned that the staggered process of giving Bundy a few starts in Delmarva, a few more in Bowie, and then getting him to Bowie was in part:

... getting acclimated to the pro game, the bus rides, new teammates and many other things away from the field. To me, letting him settle in to his surroundings and ease into the games makes sense.

This is just a silly statement to me.  If you want a guy to settle into being a pro, then do you (A) shuttle him around through three affiliates over the summer or (B) keep him basically sitting in one affiliate all year?  If you want a guy to have stability, don't you want him to have the same teammates and coaches to give him some stability over the season?  It is not like he is working on skills to socialize and develop support structures on a rung by rung move. 

This whole discussion does beg the question: how have other elite high school pitchers been handled over the past few years?

2011
Dylan Bundy
6'1 195
20yo in 2012
Bundy is starting out in A ball in Delmarva.  Melewski wrote in the above article that this will be the Orioles' plan:

Three starts at three innings, for a total of nine.
Three starts at four innings, for a total of 12.
Around 10 starts at five innings, for a total of 50.
That leaves around 50-60 innings for his last eight or so starts beginning around mid July.

That will result in about 120-130 innings pitched at Delmarva, HiA Frederick, and maybe some time in Bowie.

Archie Bradley
6'4 225
20yo in 2012
Bradley has an amazing fastball and curveball that has resulted in a lot of swing and misses.  His has a changeup in progress and has spent less time pitching than other prospects because he was also a quarterback in high school.  I do not know what the long term plan is for Bradley this season, but they are letting him make full starts and he has been dominant.  They may keep him in low A to work on the change up, but I think they could promote him right now.

2010
Jameson Taillon
6'6 225
20yo in 2011
The Pirates were criticized a bit last year for their handling of Taillon.  The team is notorious for putting their pitchers through a strict fastball diet their first year in order to work on fastball command.  As elite a selection Taillon was, it appears they did the same with him.  He spent the entire season at A ball West Virginia and was about 30% better than league average. 

This year in HiA Bradenton, he has been eliciting a miss rate of 62%.

2009 
Zack Wheeler
6'4 185
20yo in 2010
Wheeler also started out in A ball Augusta and put in 58.2 innings.  This was largely the result of a fingernail injury that kept him off the mound.  In 2011, he spent the entire season at HiA and put in 115 IP.

Jacob Turner
6'5 210
19yo in 2010
Turner split his first full season as a pro divided relatively equally between A ball West Michigan and HiA Lakeland.  In 2011, he moved through AA and AAA to hit the MLB level.

Tyler Matzek
6'3 210
20yo in 2010
Majority opinion had Matzek as the top high school pitcher in the draft back in 2009 and he slipped due to his perceived asking price.  The Rockies started him out in A ball Asheville where he showed he had amazing swing and miss stuff, but that he had difficulty hitting the strike zone.  Add in some issues with the Rockies tinkering his mechanics and he has had a rough couple years.  In 2012, he is making another run at HiA ball and is still experiencing issues getting strikes.

Conclusion
Every single elite high school pitcher wound up throwing at A ball to begin their first full season.  Some teams (e.g., Pirates) were conservative and left the player there while other teams (e.g., Tigers) pushed their guy to HiA.  None of the four pitchers from the 2009 and 2010 draft classes made it to AA.

There is a thought that Bundy is so polished that he should not be treated like other high school pitchers.  If you look at the pitchers drafted before him; first selection Gerrit Cole is at HiA, Danny Hultzen is at AA, and Trevor Bauer is at AA.  I think you could make the argument that Bundy would be better challenged at HiA.  That said, although I think having him throw at Delmarva is wasting an opportunity for him to pitch against higher competition and have more stability off the field over the course of a season...it is doubtful to have any long standing effect on him one way or the other.
 

All or Nothing: Oriole Long Balls

The Orioles are sitting here today, 16 games into the season, with a 9-7 record (still above .500 - w00!). They have hit 23 home runs already (lead by Adam Jones, Matt Wieters, and Nolan Reimold with 5 each), which is the third most in the majors (behind the Yankees' 27 and the Rangers' 26) and puts them on pace for 230 on the season. Despite the power display, the O's have scored just 68 runs - their 4.25 runs per game is barely above the Major League average, and a quarter of a run below the AL average. That is, well, not so great.

The Birds have scored just under 3* runs per home run they've hit. That is not only lower than average (not surprisingly), but easily the worst in baseball - the Yankees would need to have their next 6 runs all come on solo home runs to pass the O's. They've gone deep 18 times in their 9 wins (scoring 5.4 runs per game), and only 5 times in their 7 losses (and never more than once a game, 2.7 runs on average).

* Last year the teams who "got the least" out of their homers were the Braves and... the Orioles (3.71 R/HR).

Obviously teams win more when they score more, and home runs should lead to more runs overall, but the gist of it is the offense is home run dependent, and when they don't go deep there are some struggles. With runners in scoring position, the team has just a .682 OPS (with only 3 home runs in 128 PA) - compared to .732 in general (and teams tend to hit better than normal with RISP) - and they've done a poor job of turning base-runners into points on the scoreboard.

Overall, the Orioles are hitting .244/.301/.430 - that's a bit below average (95 wRC+). And that line is partially carried by the home runs, which means that if other things don't pick up as the team's power drops off - a 15% home run to flyball ratio is not going to be sustainable (no team has maintained that for a full season since the '05 Reds) - the offensive production could be a bit ugly. So far this season they haven't walked much (6.5% walk rate is 4th worst in baseball), have struck out a fair bit (22.1% K rate is 2nd worst), and have a slightly below BABIP (.281).

It still very early. The offense is likely to improve, and has a good chance of being above average on the season. As long as things continue on as they've been going though, it'll be a bit of a schizophrenic* team to watch - one day they'll hit 3 homers and win 6-4, and the next they'll be kept in the yard and lose 4-1.

* Commonly incorrect usage noted.

Arrivals and Departures: 4/23/12

Sorry, this has been overdue for a couple months.  We should be firing on all cylinders from here on out.

Orioles' 40 man roster and options.  You can find more information on options here (e.g., what they are, how they are used).

• March 11, 2012 - Dylan Bundy and Ryan Adams optioned.
• March 15, 2012 - Oliver Drake and Joe Mahoney optioned.
• March 26, 2012 - Brad Bergesen, Jason Berken, Zach Phillips, Chris Tillman,  and Matt Antonelli are optioned.
• March 29, 2012 - LHP Dana Eveland was designated for assignment in conjunction with the Orioles claiming INF Zelous Wheeler off waivers from the Milwaukee Brewers.  Eveland was not claimed and accepted assignment to Norfolk.
• April 3, 2012 - RHP Alfredo Simon was designated for assignment and was claimed by the Cincinnati Reds.  OF Jai Miller was designated for assignment and passed on to Norfolk.  These two moves opened 40 man roster spots for 1B Nick Johnson and C Ronny Paulino.
• April 17, 2012 - Orioles claimed C Luis Exposito off waivers from the Boston Red Sox and designated 3B Josh Bell who subsequently was dealt to the Arizona Diamondbacks for a player to be named later who is not expected to be anyone significant.

40 Man Roster

Pitchers

Jake Arrieta 3/3

Luis Ayala 0/3

signed as free agent; no options

Brad Bergesen 0/3

#1: 4/20/2010

#2: 4/9/2011

#3: 3/26/2012

Jason Berken 1/3 (serving his second one)

#1: 5/20/2011
#2: 3/26/2012

Zach Britton 3/3

Dylan Bundy 3/4

Four options as he was signed to a MLB deal when drafted
#1: 3/11/2012

Wei-Yin Chen 3/3

May be unable to use options due to contract, unsure

Oliver Drake 2/3 (serving first option)

#1: 3/15/2012

Kevin Greg

Signed as free agent; no options

Jason Hammel 0/3

Tampa used all of his options a long time ago.

Tommy Hunter 0/3

#1: 8/16/2008
#2: 4/1/2009
#3: 4/28/2010

Jim Johnson 0/3

#1: 3/12/2006
#2: 3/12/2007
#3: 5/1/2010

Matt Lindstrom

No longer qualifies

Brian Matusz 2/4

#1: 3/14/2009
#2: 6/30/2011

Darren O'Day 1/3

#1: 5/13/2008
#2: 7/14/2011

Troy Patton 0/3

#1: 3/14/2009
#2: 3/15/2010
#3: 3/11/2011

Zach Phillips 0/3 (serving last one)

#1: 3/17/2010
#2: 3/12/2011
#3: 3/26/2012

Pedro Strop 0/3

 All used prior to joining team

Chris Tillman 0/3 (serving last one)

#1: 3/17/2010
#2: 5/29/2011
#3: 3/26/2012

Tsuyoshi Wada 3/3

Unsure if options can be used.

Catchers
Luis Exposito 1/3 (serving second one)

#1: 3/17/2011
#2: 3/23/2012

Ronny Paulino

No longer qualifies for options.

Taylor Teagarden 0/3

 #1: 7/21/2008
#2: 4/7/2010
#3: 3/29/2011

Matt Wieters 3/3

Infield

Ryan Adams 1/3 (serving second one)

#1: 6/18/2011

#2: 3/11/2012

Robert Andino 0/3

#1: 3/25/2006

#2: 3/23/2007

#3: 5/25/2008

Matt Antonelli 0/3 (serving last one)

#1: 3/23/2009

#2: 3/28/2010

#3: 3/26/2012

Wilson Betemit

signed as free agent; no options

Chris Davis 0/3

#1: 7/6/2009
#2: 4/23/2010
#3: 3/29/2011

Ryan Flaherty 3/3

Rule 5 player; cannot be sent to minors in 2012

J.J. Hardy

No longer qualifies for options

Nick Johnson

No longer qualifies for options

Joe Mahoney 1/3 (serving second one)

#1: 3/14/2011
#2: 3/14/2012

Mark Reynolds

No longer qualifies for options

Brian Roberts

No longer qualifies for options

Zelous Wheeler 2/3 (serving first option)

#1: 3/29/2012

Outfield

Endy Chavez

Signed as free agent; no options

Adam Jones 1/3

#1: 7/14/2006
#2: 4/1/2007

Nick Markakis

No longer qualifies

Nolan Reimold

#1: 3/20/2009
#2: 5/12/2010
#3: 3/28/2011 

What does April's Pennant Mean?

The Orioles have been atop the AL East for much of April.  The Orioles' success has been largely due to the performances of Matt Wieters, Nolan Reimold, Adam Jones, Jake Arrieta, and Jason Hammel.  This is not exactly a new thing for the team.  Last year, the Orioles stayed above .500 for 11 games with 151 at or below that mark.  This year the team has been able to go 15 strong so far with their heads above water.  These games obviously are not meaningless.  They count in the record book, but with such low expectations coming into the season one has to wonder how meaningful they are.  Six of the eight wins so far have come against two of the least talented teams in the American League (i.e., Minnesota Twins, Chicago White Sox).  The other two have come against a very solid mid-level team (i.e., Toronto Blue Jays).  Games against teams with more elite expectations (i.e., New York Yankees, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim) have been highly contested.  The end result being that this has been a rather pleasant beginning to the year.

The difficulty is trying to figure out what these 15 games mean to the future.  As an analyst who is somewhat statistically inclined, this is the part of the year where I am a bit uncertain what I can actually write about.  I was discussing baseball with one of my friends at lunch on Friday in front of the Capitol and discussing how everything I have begun writing so far has not inspired me to finish any of the pieces.  She, a peripheral Red Sox fan who enjoys the Fenway experience, replied how it is nice people write critical pieces, but so little has actually happened and so much is left to occur.  In other words, the famed words: Small Sample Size.  SSS has been an often used and often overused term for those of us who engage statistics with more vigor than most.  This means often that in moments like this when our counting stats are minimal in power, we need to lean more on qualitative analysis.

But what does winning April mean?  The Orioles have a shot at it being one game behind the Yankees with a little over a week left to play.

To try to answer this question, I looked at all fourteen American League teams last year.  Specifically, I took their monthly winning percentages and ran some R2s comparing a single month's winning percentage against the average winning percentage of the other months.  By doing this, we can see to how each month's performance was able to relate to the final total.  

Month	R2
April	0.05
May	0.11
June	0.05
July	0.07
August	0.59
September	0.05

First off, we see there is an amazing correlation between a team's August record in 2011 and what that team's record was in every month excluding August.  Second, this is just one year with only 14 teams.  I think it is prudent not to automatically assume that August is the defining month.  It is also unfortunate that if it is the defining month then it makes the July trade deadline a bit murky.  Regardless, it appears that maybe April's record is not incredibly useful in predicting the final record for a team.

A secondary question can then emerge: how many games does it take to see how well a team will perform in the future?  To try to answer this, I used the same data and generated R2s comparing cumulative records against the remaining record.

Date	R2
May 1st	0.05
June 1st	0.16
July 1st	0.41
August 1st	0.18
September 1st	0.05

The story here is likely that the more games you play, the more certain you are of the true value of a team (measured as wins).  By that I mean, 81 games played gives you a decent idea of the true value of a team and 81 games left to play allows for that talent to represent what they are truly worth.  Having 130 games in the bag will help you know the value of a team even more, but with only 32 games left, you can have some interesting things happen that can skew a record.

Finally, I decided to run a quick regression comparing individuals months (April, May, June, and July) to a club's final record.

Month	Coefficient	P
April	0.39	0.006
May	0.30	0.02
June	0.25	0.03
July	0.16	0.07

Again, I caution against taking these numbers as anything definitive due to what I assume to be a small sample size.  I find it interesting that the coefficient (weighted value of a month's record related to the final total record) would be the most valuable and that the coefficients trend downward.  I would like to see this with a more robust data set.  Second, I also find it striking that the record for July did not meet the level of significance I set (P = 0.05).  I also wonder how a more robust data set would affect that.  It should also be noted that standard error here is roughly 0.1 for each month's coefficient, so that is a pretty wide range that leaves none of the months statistically significant in difference to each other.

Conclusion
I am not exactly sure what to conclude here other than me want to see what happens with a larger data set.  The first two exercises suggest that winning the April pennant has little bearing on what happens for the rest of the year.  The third exercise provides numbers for a convenient narrative that the beginning of the season appears to establish a perspective for the rest of the year.  That narrative would mean that if a team starts off poorly, then for some reason that performance will have an effect on the rest of the season more so than whatever is accomplished in May, June, or July.  Tempering that perspective is the relatively large standard error.