Reviewing Joe Jordan's Drafts (Second through Fifth Rounds)

Rounds two through five often offer a bevy of talent that was slated for first round consideration, but dropped due to poor performance during the season.  This gives a scouting director a great deal more leeway in choosing where he feels there is the greatest value.  I think these are the rounds where you see what he actually thinks.  It is where draft boards begin to greatly diverge and where many a casual observer grows restless as his or her team repeatedly passes over individuals deemed as having superior talent by the board devised by the writers at Baseball America.  Sometimes players are passed over due to signability issues, but also because the scouting directors prefer others.  It is even more difficult to assess success in these rounds because there are so few individuals who will ever play in a meaningful fashion in the Majors.

Below we will once again compare Joe Jordan's selections to those selected in the following three selections.

2005
Joe Jordan was up against a collection of scouting directors from the Cleveland Indians, Florida Marlins (from where Jordan had been hired), Chicago White Sox, and the New York Yankees (ChiSox's 2nd round pick).  Of these groups, the Marlins and Indians, to some extent, were the more respected groups at this time.  Only three really notable picks in rounds two through five for all of these teams.  Those would be the Orioles' Nolan Reimold, the White Sox's Chris Getz, and the Marlins' Gaby Sanchez.  That qualifies as average for this year.

2006
Based on the round, the Orioles were up against the Giants, Diamondbacks, Rangers, Nationals, Brewers, or Padres.  The four most notable players in this grouping of sixteen selections were the Padres' Wade LeBlanc, the Rangers' (now Orioles') Chris Davis, the Orioles' Ryan Adams, and the Orioles' Zach Britton. If all the team had to claim was Ryan Adams, this would be an average showing.  Britton's selection makes this above average.  Imagine how good this draft would look if the team had selected someone other than Billy Rowell in the first round.

2007
With the Flanagan and Duquette investment in relief pitchers, Jordan was without a second or third round pick in exchange for signing Jaime Walker and Danys Baez.  The others teams involved were the Nationals, Brewers, and Rockies.  Jordan came out of those two picks with Jake Arrieta who profiles as a solid bullpen arm or a mid to back end rotation arm.  The only other player taken of consequence is the Brewers Caleb Grindl who is looking more and more like a quad-A guy, but there is still hope for him.  With Prince Fielder heading to other pastures, Grindl will likely be given more opportunities at the MLB level.  As such, at worst you can say that Jordan was average, but it appears he once again scored a decently valuable MLB piece as he did the prior year.

2008-2011
Where the first three years look average to above average, it is these next four years that are more questionable and more difficult to measure.  The 2008 draft has some interesting players in Xavier Avery, LJ Hoes, and Greg Miclat.  None of them appear exceptional talents.  Likewise, the non-Orioles selections include guys like Anthony Gose and Brandon Crawford.  Perhaps the most valuable piece is Zach Stewart who likely is more reliever than starter.  Likewise, the 2009 draft has some interesting names such as the perpetually injured Tyler Townsend as well as players like Mychal Jones and Chris Dominguez.  However, the Giants' selection of Brandon Belt blows everyone else away.  Nothing looks particularly interesting to me from the 2010 draft and the 2011 draft is a bit too difficult to get a current read on (though I love Dillon Howard).

Conclusion
During this time I count four interesting pieces: Zach Britton, Brandon Belt, Zach Stewart, and Chris Dominguez.  I hesitate including Jake Arrieta in that grouping.  Joe Jordan actually performs about averagely.  As many things that may be wrong about the Orioles in general, it does not seem Jordan is a major issue here.  He has not done anything remarkable, but that is a good record to have.

Brian Matusz has had a better season than Roy Halladay

Matusz' third year in Baltimore has been relatively an unmitigated disaster.  He came to camp without proper conditioning.  Some tinkering with his mechanics reduced his velocity that already teeters on MLB quality without his typical perfect command, placement, and consistency.  He next suffered a freak injury and has been shelled ever since he returned.  Even his bouts in Norfolk have not been as clean and effective as he should be. 

This is not a sophomore slump, it is a third year flop.  Neither truly exist.  However, the former is waxed upon far more often because it is simply more common to pull off a single good year and then never be any much good thereafter.  Think about all the players who have had one solid year in the midst of a career of mediocrity or worse.  True, it can be an issue of a 'book' being written on a guy and batteries being well prepared and disciplined with the batter never have the ability to do anything to counter that approach.  It may also be true that fate smiled kindly for an extended amount of time.  Those things are much more easily accomplished over the course of successive seasons.  It is far more difficult to have two promising seasons followed by a pitifully, miserable one.

This brings us to the inexplicable title and, soon, the meat of this post.  If the season ended today, Brian Matusz' third year as a pro would in fact have resulted in a better stat line than Roy Halladay's third year as a pro.  However, it cannot be ignored how truly awful their feats have been, respectively (Matusz now and Halladay then).  I researched just how many players have logged at a minimum Matusz' innings pitched (43) and his ERA (9.84).  Besides Halladay, have there been other instances where a pitcher has done worse than Matusz in as many or more innings pitched?  Yes.  Three others in fact.

Steve Blass - 1972 Pittsburgh Pirates
This is a famous example.  Whenever you hear about a pitcher losing all control, Steve Blass' name comes up.  Blass entered into the 1972 season as one of the major pieces of the Pirates starting rotation.  Over the previous five years, Blass had turn in three seasons that were of ace or second slot quality for a first division team.  In 1972, that all went to pot.  Blass, for the times, had never be a great control artist and hovered around three walks per nine innings.  That sky rocketed up to over eight per nine.  The Pirates, remembering how very good of a pitcher he was, let him try to work it out.  They had a lot depending on him and no readily apparent successor that could give them what he used to give.  That wishful thinking led Blass to start 18 games and relieve in five, amounting to 88.2 IP.  His ERA settled in at 9.85 before the Pirates decided to go in a different direction.  He lasted one game the next season, walking 7 over 5 innings, and never appeared in the Majors again.

Micah Bowie - 1999 Atlanta Braves and Chicago Cubs
Bowie is a case of another pitcher whose team had sunk in a good deal of interest.  He came up through the Braves system as a name to keep track of, but not exactly a top tier prospect.  Bowie, along with Bruce Chen, became part of Atlanta's interesting collection of successful minor league arms that simply did not have the pure stuff to make it at the big league level.  However, this was not entirely realized then and the Braves mystique often led many teams to overvalue players groomed in Atlanta's system.  Bowie made his debut as a reliever in late July for the Braves and gave them three relatively inconsistent appearances.  Presumably, this was an audition for other teams to gauge hime for inclusion in a trade at the deadline, something that just does not happen anymore.  The Cubs were intrigued by what they saw and sent over Terry Mulholland for a package that included Bowie.  Not worrying about any possibility of the playoffs and having sent away a somewhat valuable trade piece, the Cubs ran out Bowie to show how well he could pitch in the Bigs.  With quite a large amount of rope, he proceeded to show the Cubs that what was not hittable in AAA was incredibly hittable in the big leagues and that it was hit hard.  Bowie gave up over fourteen hits per nine innings along with nearly two home runs per nine.  With his stuff not playing up to the competition, he worked on the corners with ineffective control and walked six every nine innings.  The Cubs were disheartened and had other arms with more promise (or hope) to evaluate.  He logged 51 innings and notched a 10.24 ERA.  Bowie bounced around the minors for the next few years with periodic success with the Athletics and Nationals in small stints, but these were fleeting and he would be hit hard with longer exposure.

Roy Halladay - 2000 Toronto Blue Jays
Halladay was coming off a very promising 1999 and the Jays had high hopes for him in their rotation.  The 2000 campaign did not go as anticipated, the 23 year old compiled a 10.64 ERA and was hit hard in 67.2 innings.  He was demoted to the Jays' AAA team in Syracuse and was wholly ineffective at that level as well.  This is a pattern that we have seen with the former two and we will see with the next example.  The only way you are going to have a pitcher log this many innings and throw so poorly is if there is considerable investment by management.  Halladay earned a great deal of credit on his earlier success and it took a while before the Jays' brain trust decided that the rust was just not going to come off.  Halladay simply was not a good pitcher.  In turn, he strove to get better and worked with Mel Queen to revamp his delivery.  The conclusion was that Halladay was throwing a flat mid 90s fastball that was easily picked up out of the hand.  Their attempted solution was to lower the arm angle, reduce speed, and use more deception in the delivery.  He was then given half a season in the minors to more consistency utilize his new mechanics.  When he returned in mid-2001, he showed up with a different delivery and a ball that had a lot more movement on it.  He quickly proved himself to be successful with his reimagined pitching mechanics and returned to the Majors for good in the middle of the season. 

Aaron Myette - 2002 Texas Rangers
Myette has a similar story to that of Bowie in that both were considered quite valuable prospects.  Myette in fact garnered two top 100 rankings from Baseball America while he was in the Chicago White Sox system.  A shaky 2000 erased that ranking for the 2001 list and he was shipped off to Texas in a deal for Royce Clayton with the Rangers hoping that he would get back that glamour.  The Rangers were not in the hunt, enabling them to give Myette an extended look with the big league club.  It did not go well.  He started the next season in the minors and once again did well at AAA.  They promoted him and gave him another extended look.  Myette threw 48.1 innings with a 10.06 ERA.  He proved to be incredibly httable and the Rangers lost patience.  His career afterward included short stints with the Indians and Reds; nothing more.

Conclusion
One in four.  If you want to take a generalized perspective here, Matusz might stand a one in four chance in redeeming himself.  However, each scenario presents a situation that is different from Matusz.  Bowie and Myette were highly invested prospects whose organizations wanted badly for them to succeed.  However, neither of them had the success that Matusz showed before this season.  Blass also is different as he suffered Steve Blass syndrome and was incapable of throwing a strike.  Roy Halladay was a hard thrower who had to learn how to pitch.  Matusz might be the other way.  He is a pitcher who needs to throw harder.  I am not sure if he is capable of that or if he can further improve the command of his pitches.

The take home should be that if you are someone who has written him off, you should not.  His stuff has flashed with success before.  He has the skill.  The key is whether he can harness that skill, regaining a couple needed miles per hour, or developing new ways to cope with newfound struggle.

More Info on Replacing MacPhail

Tony Lacava

Yesterday, Ken Rosenthal reported on who Angelos might replace as Andy MacPhail's replacement.  I've noticed over the years that Rosenthal's stellar reporting on Baltimore's future has become more and more hit or miss.  I think many of his connections from his days in town are no longer tight with the team.  That said, I do think his reporting should be noted.  In his column, he cited the Marlins' Dan Jennings and the Jays' Tony LaCava.  Both would be fine choices.  I have written earlier on Jennings in this column.  Specifically, I wrote:

Jennings has been rumored for GM positions for about ten years now.  Last year he was a finalist in the Mets opening before losing out to Sandy Alderson.  Jennings is known as being skilled at scouting and would probably complement Buck Showalter quite well.  As a long time Florida employee, he is also well aware of Joe Jordan.  If the Orioles want more continuity along with revamping the organization to be more efficient, Jennings might be that guy and Jordan might be a great help to him.  The weakness here though is that this leaves no one in the front office in control who has experience running the day-to-day operations of the team.  Buck would need someone who is well skilled to be able to turn deals that Buck cannot do while sitting in the dugout.  I do think Jennings would be an interesting choice.

I do think Jordan and Jennings would make a good team, but seven years have passed between them and the word is that Jordan will not seek a continuation of his service with Baltimore.  I have had my disagreements with how Jordan chooses to spend his money, but am wholly sincere when I say that I find him to be an average to above average scouting director.  Jennings knows his scouting though and would find someone suitable to work with him in forging a solid front office built on a strong foundation of amateur assessment.  Of course, this group will need to figure out what the developmental hangups are in this organization.

The second person mentioned, Tony LaCava, was not mentioned before in this blog.  LaCava would be a great pick up.  He has been toiling with the Blue Jays for several seasons and had been retained by Alex Anthopoulos.  He has been a runner up for several positions including the Seattle Mariners, Washington Nationals, and Pittsburgh Pirates.  LaCava is someone who everyone seems to know in baseball.  This also may be a problem.  LaCava might be a MacPhail without track record of relative success.  Like MacPhail, everyone seems to know LaCava and everyone seems to think he has a great baseball mind.  LaCava, now in his 50s, has been on the threshold of being a GM, so it makes one wonder why he continually is passed over.  The Orioles may also provide a situation where the best of the interview worn bunch may not be a ticket for the World Series.  LaCava may have been unjustly overlooked several times in his career (perhaps due to some lack of involvement in player development), but this Orioles' franchise in this division may need someone who is willing to think unconventionally.  Maybe LaCava is that person.  Maybe he is the guy who has had a heavy hand in transforming the Jays.  He just might be.  If he is, I think it would arguably be the best acquisition since Pat Gillick was inked.  However, I have my doubts.

That said, both of these candidates would give the Orioles General Managers who will likely be average to above average in performing their duties.  Neither would be an out and out mistake.  I recognize my own personal bias in wanting to find an untested genius, but it may be that these somewhat well-traveled careers have been voyaged by individuals who have incredibly creative minds to take the current relatively stable and somewhat under performing Baltimore Orioles and act in a successful, unconventional way.  It has been too long that other teams have mimicked the Rays and Jays or wished they had the revenue to mimic the BoSox or Yanks.  Let others wish they had the brain power of the Orioles or at least fail extraordinarily trying.

Review of Joe Jordan's Drafts (First Round Selections)

There has been uncertainty as to whether Joe Jordan would continue as the Orioles scouting director for the amateur draft.  His tenure began in 2004 under Flanagan's regime and he has overseen seven drafts for the Orioles.  During his time, the Orioles have not developed into a year in and year out top tier team with minor league talent.  His GMs often left him with lost picks and did not plan well to give him extra picks in the compensation rounds.  It is also difficult to separate responsibility between Jordan's scouting group and the organization's developmental staff.  It does appear as though the team has not done will with targeting or developing the right raw, toolsy position players and the team also appears to have a knack selecting or acquiring pitchers who quickly break down and/or lose velocity.  This all may be chance and the responsibility of development, but some aspect of it likely lies at Jordan's feet.  In this post, we will begin to assess how Jordan performed over the past seven years by focusing solely on the first round.

2005
Jordan walked into the organization from the Florida Marlins in November of 2004 under Mike Flanagan.  He was considered a well respected scout in the Marlins system who could not be promoted beyond his immediate boss Dan Jennings.  In his first draft, Jordan selected an offensive minded high school catcher named Brandon Snyder.  It was a somewhat controversial pick as Snyder was a slight reach, questionable as to whether could remain as a catcher, and he did not profile as an elite bat.  His bat has actually come along as well as can be respected.  He has a smooth solid swing and hits the ball hard.  He has a line drive swing with moderate power.  This would be considered a success if he was able to remain as a catcher, but shoulder injuries pushed him to first base where his offense does not profile him as a starter at the MLB level.  Only 24, he has spun his wheels in Norfolk the past two and a half seasons.  Snyder is unlikely to provide any significant value for the Orioles.

The following selection in that draft was Trevor Crowe by the Cleveland Indians.  Crowe has also experienced periods of success in the minors, a couple injuries, and an inability to transfer it to the Majors.  As a 27 year old, he appears unlikely to show anything new.  The White Sox then selected Lance Broadway whose progress slowed once he reached AAA.  He has now bounced to the Mets system and has shown no ability to succeed as a reliever in the Majors.  Jordan's old team, the Marlins, then took Chris Volstad.  Volstad, as a prospect, has been the most heralded and has seen the most success.  After a solid half season to begin his career, he has gone backwards with an ERA+ in the low 80s over 450 innings.  2005 was a difficult year for players taken at the Orioles selection and the three that followed.

2006
For those who have been frustrated by Jordan's tenure, Billy Rowell's name comes up often.  It should be remembered that Rowell was not a reach.  He was a decent athlete with an incredible arm and a bat capable of light tower displays of power.  The only fear was that as a New Jersey baseball player he had not had the reps or played against high level competition.  These two aspects can hurt a scout in evaluating a player and being sure what he sees is real.  Rowell showed good ability to hit and decent enough defense in rookie ball, but began to struggle as he began to see more advanced off speed pitches in Delmarva and Frederick.  He could still show off his light tower power in batting practice, but it could not transfer over to the game with pitchers actively trying to get him out.  At 22, he could not handle AA pitching at all in Bowie and finished his season with a few at bats in the Gulf Coast League where it had become apparent to all involved that he would not longer be with the Orioles' franchise in the future.

What makes this selection burn more than the Snyder pick is that the toolsy Rowell was selected just in front of Cy Young award winner Tim Lincecum, potential top tier pitcher Max Scherzer, and heralded Kasey Kiker.  Only Kiker has sputtered out after getting injured.  To provide context, Lincecum was avoided by many because of his thin frame and unconventional pitching mechanics.  Scherzer was avoided due to some concern with his mechanics, but a lot of concern over his price tag.  As it stands, Jordan was trumped here by two of the three teams.  His hands may have been tied due to financial considerations, but that is not readily apparent.  Again, it should be recognized that Rowell was not a reach.

2007
Jordan had Matt Wieters fall into his lap as the new defunct regime in Pittsburgh took Daniel Moskos the pick before.  There was some concern that Angelos would overrule the Orioles brain trust as he did in 2004 and not allow them to select a player with a large price tag.  However, they did.  More concern followed as Andy MacPhail was hired and indirectly shared sentiment that he would not have selected Wieters.  All that came to naught as a contract was inked and Wieters became one of the best catchers in baseball.  This selection was an unqualified success and Jordan should be congratulated for recognizing that money spent here was better than spreading it out in later rounds.

The following three picks have been a mixed bag.  Ross Detwiler (who many thought the Orioles would select) has been a high quality prospect, but has had his share of injury woes.  Matt LaPorta is a valuable commodity that has yet to effectively display his power potential.  Casey Weathers is an example as to why top draft picks should not be used for relief pitchers.  The upside was limited and he hurt his arm.  His career is now uncertain.  Three years in and Jordan's record has been a push--not bad or good.

2008
This draft was another strong draft for Jordan to select a quality prospect.  This was also the first year that MacPhail publicly announced that the team's philosophy would be to acquire pitching talent in the draft and sign hitters.  The reasoning behind it was that pitchers are less likely to come to Baltimore because wins would be scarce facing the stacked lineups of Boston and New York.  A perfect pitcher was available for the Orioles when Brian Matusz was available.  He was a polished lefty who had a wide range of offerings enabling him to pitch backwards.  Matusz quickly made his way through the minors, but has seen his career derail in 2011.  His velocity has decreased and, always prone to be hit hard, has been hit hard more often.  Only recently has this looked like a poor pick.  At the time, I thought it was the right one.  In fact, Matusz was also selected in our shadow draft.  Hopefully an off season will help correct whatever issue Matusz is dealing with whether it is proper conditioning or something else.

Buster Posey was taken next.  The Orioles shied away from him due to his excessive demands and that the team already had Matt Wieters in the fold.  In hindsight, drafting Posey and sticking him at third base probably would have been the smartest move, but it made since at the time given what we all knew not to select him.  Kyle Skipworth was selected by the Marlins and has had a great deal of trouble developing into something more.  Yonder Alonso went after him and is trying to wiggle into a Reds' lineup where he has no position and his hitting is essentially Ryan Howard light.  All in all, Jordan's work here has been a push.  I think it will be difficult to ever really fail him here.  Matusz undeniably has talent.

2009
This year was the year I began having doubts on the direction Joe Jordan was taking in the draft.  According to various reports, he was faced with a decision between Tyler Matzek, Zack Wheeler, and Matt Hobgood.  Hobgood was a pitcher with little projection, but great performance.  He was rushing up boards with a hard, heavy fastball and a hammer curve.  Jordan was also impressed with Hobgood's makeup.  Tyler Matzek was considered the consensus best player, but his demands and the manner in which he carried himself turned many teams off.  Zack Wheeler was in between it all in terms of potential and makeup.  In the end, Hobgood's character, allegedly, influenced the pick.  From that point onward, Matzek has been shaky, but appears to have lately resurrected his young career.  Zack Wheeler has been astounding and is now in the Mets organization arguably as their top pitching prospect.  Hobgood's character has not exactly transferred over to baseball.  He was not well developed in understanding how to take care of himself physically and then has suffered potentially serious shoulder issues.  Things do not look good for him.

Following his selection, the Giants took the aforementioned Zack Wheeler who has done nothing but succeed in the minors.  The next two picks were safe, polished selections in Mike Minor and Mike Leake.  Both have been useful to their MLB organizations, but more time is needed to get a better handle on how well they will pitch.  Regardless, all three of the following pitchers look vastly better than Hobgood has.  Also, all three were rated on average higher than Hobgood.  I think Jordan may have gotten carried away with a lackluster draft year and trying to look for something that stood out among the draftees.  Instead, he became overly enamored with an aspect of a player (e.g. makeup) that should almost never be the primary reason for selecting someone.  To be clear, much of this is conjecture rooted with a couple sources from the media and a few others with hearsay and a couple more from the horse's mouth.

2010
From my perspective, the 2010 draft was similar to the 2009 draft.  I thought there were two elite talents (Jameson Taillon, Bryce Harper) and a bunched group clearly below.  Most others disagreed and saw Manny Machado also in that group.  Jordan selected Machado and so far has shown that his choice was likely better than our own, Karsten Whitson (Whitson is doing quite well at Florida though).  There is only a season of data to lean on, but it is fair to say that Machado will be a top ten talent next year.  I still fear that he will be pushed to third, but many think he will maintain his ability to play shortstop.

The next three taken were Christian Colon, Drew Pomeranz, and Barrett Loux.  Loux was found to have some structural damage in his shoulder, but has looked good so far.  Drew Pomeranz was looking good and pulled back Ubaldo Jimenez for the Indians before getting hurt.  Christian Colon has looked like an an eventual Major Leaguer, but not exceptional.  As such, I think Joe Jordan did a solid job in last year's draft even with my doubts

2011
At this point, we do not know what this year has brought.  Dylan Bundy is certainly in the conversation for the most valuable player.  So were Bubba Starling and Anthony Rendon, the players taken after Bundy.  It is just too early.

Conclusion
In the seven years Joe Jordan has been leading the draft effort, he has taken a community defensible player every year except his first year in 2005 and in 2009.  Two out of seven years, Jordan went in a direction different from the mainstream.  Claims of signability and peculiar assessments just do not hold water for first round selections.  He appears as above average as a scouting director considering only these picks.

Next...rounds 2-5.