Velocity Lost: Mike Wright's September Fastball

As the season began, we knew that it would be the final seasons for Wei-Yin Chen and Bud Norris in an Orioles uniform.  Ultimately, their departure would resolve the issue of having six starting pitchers, but would introduce the need for a fifth starter.  That fifth starter conversation began with internal candidates, such as Zach Davies, Dylan Bundy, and Mike Wright.  Davies was dealt at the deadline for an over-his-head Gerardo Parra.  Bundy suffered elephant arm or something, which resulted in another period of downtime for the long heralded prospect.  Wright has remained somewhat healthy and has been a general disappointment.

To those who follow the Major League club, Mike Wright was a non-entity before the season.  To those who read prospect rankings, he was a deep second tier prospect who profiled as a backend arm or, perhaps, as a middle reliever.  Where Davies had several average pitches and control, Wright had a fastball that occasionally came in loud and not much else.  Control and acceptable secondary pitches eluded him.  Spring training changed that.

In the wake of the ludicrous stories of the second arrival of Branden Kline, a rumble was heard from scouts about Mike Wright.  It was communicated to me that Wright was impressing opposing scouts immensely during his outings.  I was told that his fastball no longer sat around 92, but had bumped up to 96 with some movement.  That increase in quality in turn helped his slider and changeup play even though they were not appreciably better pitches in a vacuum.  The consensus of a few people from different organizations was that he was not a top of the rotation pitcher, but he was now seen as a first division starter prospect.  Wright was someone who other teams would be highly interested in after being told no to Bundy or Hunter Harvey.

In May, injuries and poor performances brought Wright up to Baltimore and into the starting rotation.  His game plan appeared similar to what he was doing during Spring Training, come in hard with a four seam fastball nearly three quarters of the time.  Mix in a few sliders and changeups to keep hitters honest.  It did not work.  Wright's fastball lost three to four miles per hour.  That may not sound like a lot, but one mile per hour is worth about 0.25 to 0.30 in how many runs are scored off a pitcher.  If the pitcher is simply throwing the ball without much movement or mixing pitches effectively, then he can turn from a good pitcher to someone relegated to AAA.

After a few decent starts pounding the strike zone, Wright lost his luster and was hammered in June.  He tried to compensate for batters waiting on the fastball by throwing more changeups and sliders, but that did not resolve his troubles.  A .457 wOBA in June sent him back to Norfolk.  He would not return to Baltimore as a starter until September.  Wright was now someone who was perceived as more valuable to the Orioles than any other club.  Outside the organization, he was seen more or less as a meaningful secondary piece, not much more.  To the Orioles, he was someone who they were very reluctant to let go.

With September and its expanded roster, the Orioles sent for a healthy Mike Wright to close the year out with the club. 

     9-05 4 IP   5.90 FIP  95.9 FB
     9-11 5 IP   8.75 FIP  93.7 FB
     9-16 5 IP 12.15 FIP  93.0 FB

In three starts, Wright has seen things going from bad to worse.  Even as poor as that first start was, there was hope as he flashed the potential that people saw in the spring: a lively fastball.  However, that hope evaporated in his next started as his average fastball velocity not only dipped below 95 mph, but only topped that mark a handful of time.  Last night?  He did not record a single pitch at or above 95 mph.

Also interesting is that his pitch mix has also significantly changed from his previous starting venture with the Orioles.  In May, his mix was roughly 70% 4S / 15% SL / 15% CH.  This month, he has introduced a two seamer, so his mix is now 45% 4S / 25% 2S / 20% SL / 10% CH.  The new use of a two seamer is quite interesting as it is a seeming acknowledgement that perhaps his other pitches are not effective swing and miss pitches.  A two seamer would let him to some degree permit some contact. 

Additionally, as Wright has settled in with a slider, a two seamer is a more natural complementary fastball than a four seamer is.  The reason, I am told, is that an effective slider requires a lower arm slot than what would be most effective for a four seam fastball.  I have not gone in depth with Wright to determine what would be best for him and do not exactly trust myself at that level of mechanical detail.  Assuming all that is true, the introduction of a two seamer may well be showing the club's intention to transition him into a starting pitcher who does not solely rely on a blistering fastball.

That said, the club could always go backwards and raise the arm to generate more velocity if they decide to convert him into a reliever.  A high 90s fastball with a fringe changeup and a fringe slider will work once through a lineup.  For now though, it certainly seems like the club is planning to give Wright a shot at the rotation next Spring.  However, there is a lot of time between then and now.

Chris Davis Abandons His Platoon

Over on MASN, Matt Kremnitzer provides Camden Depot's latest contribution with a piece describing the marvelous success Chris Davis has seen against left-handed pitchers. In a vacuum, this might not seem all that impressive because Davis has emerged as an elite hitting first baseman. You tend to expect elite hitters to hit well off anyone, but what is remarkable here is that his wRC+ is almost equivalent no matter the handedness of his opposition. That is interesting.

In general, all hitters fare worse against same-sided pitching. Left-handed batters tend to do worse same sided than right-handed batters. This platoon hitting is something that almost to a rule continues through a batter's entire career. To my knowledge, nothing has improved upon Dan Fox's work at Baseball Prospectus (he is now with the Pirates alongside former Camden Depoter Stuart Wallace and, friend of the Camden Depot Highball podcast, Andrew Gibson). Briefly, the age curves for same and against handed hitting are equal except against handed hitting maintains a performance advantage throughout the entire career of a player.

Of course, these are averages, which are usually to describe the population of players as opposed to individual players. Unfortunately, I must be more anecdotal instead of purely quantitative and note that I am unaware of players correcting a platoon split without them being in their teens or shortly out of their teens or if the player completely overhauls his swing. 

What influences this platoon performance? What comes to mind first is that breaking balls move away from the batter, which means that they occupy the hitting range for a more brief period of time. That brevity creates the challenge, which may be further expounded by poor pitch recognition, poor batting approach, or less desirable batting mechanics. When a young player improves, it often is a result of fixing a swing or learning how to approach plate appearances. For an older player, these corrections have often already been employed without success.

It makes me wonder if the new performance (in an albeit small sample size) informs us about a new talent level for Davis or is a warning sign that he is more a 2012 Chris Davis. Read Matt's column for more nuance.

Which Offseason Path Will The Orioles Take?

By now, you know who the Orioles' impending free agents are. And thanks to a disappointing, hard-to-watch second half, it's a topic most fans have turned their attention to instead of the nearly impossible task of this team competing for a playoff spot.

Some may be clinging to the idea that the Orioles will spend a huge sum of money this offseason to replace (or keep some of) their free agents. They'll spend, but not as much as many hope. The Orioles are a mid-market team, and they spend like a mid-market team. All fans want their teams to spend more and acquire skilled players who can hit the ball farther and throw the ball harder. And yes, we get it; it's not your money, after all (which is a foolish argument). Fans can't control how much an owner spends, and it's fine to not be OK with that and to want more. But the best hope is for a team to spend wisely; spending more helps, but it does not guarantee success.

As Jon noted a couple months ago, the Orioles do not have the cheap talent in their minor league system to replace those who leave; they barely spend in the international market; and many of their team-controlled players will see their salaries rise the next few years. Popular or not, the Orioles have stuck to a budget, and there's no reason to think they won't do so going forward (no, not even the MASN court decision).

Heading into next season, the O's could be in the market for one or two starting pitchers, one or two corner outfielders, a first baseman, a backup catcher, a designated hitter, and a couple relievers. That's a lot of positions to fill. Do you have faith in Mike Wright or Tyler Wilson? What about Dariel Alvarez, Henry Urrutia, or Christian Walker? Depending on the amount of money Dan Duquette has to work with, he may not have many options other than leaning on some of the team's unproven, low-ceiling minor leaguers. Since his arrival, Duquette has thrived on bringing in an assortment of fringe players and then seeing what Buck Showalter can do with them (I'm sure you're familiar with the chicken salad expression). That strategy exceeded all expectations -- until this season. Most of the team's marginal major leaguers played that way, and even some of the club's functional players struggled from the get-go (Alejandro De Aza, Bud Norris, Steve Pearce).

The Orioles are going to lose multiple, significant pieces, and they must find a way to add talent to a core of Manny Machado, Adam Jones, and Jonathan Schoop. Can they figure out a strategy to do that without exceeding Jones's contract (the largest in O's franchise history) or Ubaldo Jimenez's deal (the most money the team has ever paid a free agent pitcher)? It's possible, but it won't be easy. Even if they hand out a hefty contract, the rest of the spending will be limited.

The Orioles need a rational plan, and they need to execute it flawlessly. They could blow the whole thing up and bring in a bunch of new players, but that's unlikely. It's more realistic that they'll reshuffle the deck by plugging a few holes, making a minor trade or two, and inking one or two notable players. But there isn't one path to success, and the club's unconventional tendencies have played a vital part in their winning ways. Do you trust Duquette to thrive under these different circumstances? A surplus of spare parts won't be enough this time.

August Rundown Of MASN Articles

Here is the collection of Camden Depot contributions written for MASNsports.com in August:

What's gone wrong for Travis Snider? I was more than fine with the Travis Snider trade, but it clearly did not work out. Snider was given plenty of opportunities to perform this season, but his offensive numbers steadily dipped. Like many of the Orioles' other corner outfielders, he was eventually designated for assignment.

O's likely forced to hold steady during Miguel Gonzalez's rough stretch: An underperforming starting rotation has been one of the O's major downfalls. Gonzalez was fine in the first half, but he was terrible in the second portion of the season before landing on the disabled list with right shoulder tendinitis. For the time being, he seems to have avoided a serious injury, which is great considering he's likely penciled in for an O's rotation spot next year. But Gonzalez has been a much-discussed topic on Camden Depot lately, and it's perfectly fine to worry about him next season and beyond.

Schoop is giving O's a bat they sorely need: Jonathan Schoop has been one of the O's few bright spots this season. If he sticks at second base, plays adequate defense, and continues to hit for power, he should be a pretty valuable player.

Investigating Caleb Joseph's offensive improvement: Since this post, Caleb Joseph has taken a bit of a step back offensively (from a 105 wRC+ to 95 wRC+), but that's still fine for a good defensive catcher who has a low salary. Joseph figures to be the O's main catching option next season. The main question figures to be whether Steve Clevenger will be his backup or not.

As always, thanks for reading.

Can Britton Start In 2016?

One of our commentators recently asked whether Zach Britton could be a potential 2016 rotation option. In his argument for why this could be possible, he made the following point:

Britton's success hinges more on control (2.0 BB/9) of a primary pitch that moves like crazy. Higher velocity likely decreases the movement, if anything, and lower velocity certainly wouldn't impact the movement.

If this is correct then this would strengthen the case for making Britton a starter because while he'd need a third pitch he would already have two plus pitches. The way I see it, his slider already serves as a pitch that can be used to strike batters out so he'd need to resurrect his four-seam fastball to become a starter. However, this all depends on whether the success of Britton's sinker does depend on its velocity.

Using data from ESPN's Stats and Information Portal, it is possible to view the results of Britton's sinker as a reliever when its velocity was below 94 mph, between 94.01 to 95 mph, 95.01 to 96 mph and above 96.01. 

When Britton throws a sinker less than 95 mph as the last pitch of an at-bat then the result is a strikeout roughly 12.5% of the time. When he throws the sinker between 95 and 96 mph as the last pitch of an at-bat then the result is a strikeout 22.6% of the time. When he throws it faster than 96 mph as the last pitch of an at-bat, then the result is a strikeout 30.3% of the time. The faster he throws his sinker, the more likely it results in strike #3. This partially explains why batters’ wOBA is lower against his sinker when he throws it faster than 96 mph than when he throws it lower than that. The differences appear to be somewhat drastic as shown by this chart.

However, the main difference becomes clear when looking at the results of balls put into play. Britton has thrown 85 sinkers faster than 96 mph that were put into play and has allowed only 2 extra base hits (2 doubles). This is primarily because 71 of the 85 (83.5%) balls put into play have been either ground balls or bunts. He’s allowed 5 flyballs and only one of those resulted in a hit (a double). In contrast, when Britton throws his sinker at speeds lower than 96, he’s allowed 13 total fly balls in 210 balls put into play in which batters have hit 5 home runs and 2 doubles.

As a result, batters are averaging a .264 wOBA and .024 ISO when putting sinkers faster than 96 mph into play and averaging a .291 wOBA and a .093 ISO when putting sinkers slower than 96 mph into play. Simply put, batters are unable to do much damage even against mistakes faster than 96 mph while they simply punish mistakes slower than 96 mph. This chart shows his results at different speeds on balls put into play.

Britton’s sinker also becomes harder to make contact with when he throws it faster. When he throws it faster than 96 mph, batters swing and miss 18% of the time. When he throws it slower than 96 mph, batters swing and miss 12% of the time.  Britton has a 23% called strike rate when he throws his sinker slower than 94 mph compared to a roughly 16% rate when he throws it faster than 94 mph. As the chart below shows, the data suggests that the benefit Britton gains from increased control and being able to throw more strikes by throwing slower is neutralized by the benefits Britton gains by throwing faster and making it harder to make contact with this pitch. Once one takes into account the fact that Britton gives up weaker contact when throwing the ball faster, it seems clear that Britton does benefit from his high velocity and that using him as a starter would weaken this advantage.

That stated, the results from this pitch thrown at even lower speeds are definitely acceptable. As a starter, opposing batters had a wOBA of .321 against his sinker while they only have a wOBA of .288 against it as a reliever. If his sinker can remain as effective as a starter as it as a reliever then it seems reasonable to presume that he would have two good pitches.

The real question is whether he could throw a third pitch and what impact that would have on his current arsenal. When he was used as a starter, he used four pitches: a four-seam fastball, a change up, a sinker and a slider. Since he’s currently throwing the sinker and slider, it would make sense to presume that he would try to add a four-seam fastball or a changeup. The problem is that there are a few relievers that rely primarily on a sinker, but most starters throw a four-seam fastball relatively often. Not only would he have to reintroduce that fastball to his arsenal but he’d have to throw it often. Presuming he’d be able to do that is awfully risky.

I don’t think the Orioles would consider using Britton as a starter. Even if they did, I don’t think he’d be an ace. And certainly the Orioles have seen teams attempt to convert relievers like Bard, Feliz and Ogando to starters and seen how that ruined their careers. Britton will probably be an elite reliever as long as he doesn’t lose velocity on his sinker. It is perhaps disappointing to see a top prospect top out as a reliever but relievers have value also and something is certainly better than nothing. 

On Mychal Givens And The O's 2016 Bullpen

Mychal Givens hasn't accumulated many major-league innings so far, but in his 17+ innings of work, he's been outstanding. In fact, he's currently accomplishing something that only five other pitchers are doing this season:

Rk	Player	ERA	IP	SO9 ▾	BB9	Year	Age	Tm	SV	FIP	ERA+
1	Kenley Jansen	2.27	39.2	14.75	1.13	2015	27	LAD	28	1.95	166
2	Jake McGee	2.57	35.0	12.34	1.80	2015	28	TBR	6	2.19	153
3	David Robertson	2.60	52.0	12.29	1.90	2015	30	CHW	27	2.10	147
4	Sergio Romo	3.20	45.0	12.20	1.80	2015	32	SFG	2	1.67	117
5	Yimi Garcia	3.55	45.2	11.43	1.77	2015	24	LAD	1	3.24	106
6	Mychal Givens	1.53	17.2	11.21	1.02	2015	25	BAL	0	1.72	271

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used
Generated 9/4/2015.

That's a Baseball-Reference Play Index table of relief pitchers this season who have thrown more than 17 innings, have a strikeout rate of at least 11 per nine innings, and have walked fewer than two batters per nine.

I don't know a whole lot about Yimi Garcia, but this isn't the worst group of pitchers to be associated with. Kenley Jansen is making $7.4 million this season. Jake McGee: $3.5 million. David Robertson: $10 million (first year of a four-year, $46 million deal). Sergio Romo: $5 million (and $8 million in 2016). Givens, if he's able to stick, will be making the major-league minimum for the next few seasons. Salary isn't the most ideal way to determine the best players, but this group consists of good to very good relievers who are getting paid well for their work.

Of course, we haven't seen much from Givens. I even rigged that table with a low innings amount qualification just to make sure Givens was included.

After struggling in the minors in 2014, Givens clearly made adjustments and dominated Double-A hitters at Bowie earlier this year. In 57 1/3 innings, Givens posted a 1.73 ERA with a K/9 of 12.4 and a BB/9 of 2.5. He also allowed just one home run. Still, minor-league stats don't always translate. So far, they have.

Building a strong bullpen isn't easy, but the Orioles have assembled some excellent ones under Buck Showalter and Dan Duquette. The best reliever in that span has been Darren O'Day, who should command a hefty raise as a free agent. But even if O'Day walks, the O's could still possess the right parts to piece together an effective bullpen. Zach Britton is superb, but Brad Brach, Brian Matusz (if he's tendered a contract), Givens, and some combination of Chaz Roe, Oliver Drake, Jason Garcia, T.J. McFarland, Steve Johnson, some others (eventually Mike Wright?), and perhaps a free agent could still be good -- especially if Givens excels.

Watching O'Day pitch is phenomenal, and he's been a stabling force in the bullpen. But the Orioles are not going to be able to re-sign all of their impending free agents, and spending a large chunk of money on the bullpen may not be the smartest thing for a mid-market team with a seemingly inflexible budget.

I don't know if the O's will re-sign O'Day or not. But I do know Givens will be in the mix for a sizable role in the bullpen next year. From what he's shown, that seems like a very good thing.

Has Gonzo's Luck Finally Run Out?

Over the past few weeks, writers for this blog have written a lot about Miguel Gonzalez (there is no truth to the rumor that this blog will be renamed Gonzalez Depot). Earlier in the year, I wrote that Gonzo was successful because he somehow found a way to get batters to hit the ball straight at fielders and I questioned whether that would continue. Now that it’s been a few months, I figured it makes sense to check and see whether that happened.

This first chart (data harvested via ESPN Stats and Information) shows Gonzo’s performance from the start of the year until June 10 (I’ll call this the first half of the sample for brevity) and then his performance for June 10 until September 2^nd (the second half). It shows that he has a slightly worse K-BB% and that he’s given up two more home runs in the second half of the sample compared to the first half of the sample. But his main problem appears to be that his BABIP increased from .236 in the first half to .350 in the second half.

The problem becomes even clearer when looking at these numbers based on whether there the bases were empty, there was a man on first base or whether there was a runner in scoring position.  Gonzo was able to reduce the percent of home runs allowed with RISP in the second half of the season compared to the first half as well as improve his K-BB%. But his OPS in those situations increased from .760 to 1.083 probably because his BABIP increased from .088 to .422. All of his numbers are worse in the second half with the bases empty against left-handed batters in the second half and so it’s no surprise they’re hammering him. Earlier this season he was successful because he was able to limit damage with runners on base but that’s not happening anymore.

The explanation isn’t that he’s giving up harder contact or more line drives. This chart shows that he’s given up roughly the same proportion of contact in the first half and the second half.  The problem is that opposing batters have been more successful regardless of what type of contact they’ve made.

This next chart shows that Gonzo has allowed more line drives with runners in scoring position and fewer fly balls. However, batters have finally started having some success with ground balls in the second half and are having far more success hitting line drives with runners in scoring position in the second half.

When looking at his pitch data, it seems clear that his fastball has been hit harder in the second half then in the first half. In part, this is because opposing batters had a BABIP of .208 against his fastball in the first half but a BABIP of .350 in the second half. What’s interesting is that in the first half, opposing batters had a BABIP of .205 and a wOBA of .248 against fastballs slower than 90.8 miles per hour while having a BABIP of .193 and a wOBA of .323 against fastballs between 90.8 and 95 miles per hour. In other words, he was successful when his fastball wasn’t effective.

In the second half of the season, batters have absolutely killed fastballs that were slower than 90.8 mph with a BABIP of .462 and a wOBA of .626 and have been slightly weaker against fastballs that were faster than 90.8 mph (BABIP of .321 and a wOBA of .418).

This seems to suggest that Gonzo’s problem is that his luck has run out. Earlier in the year, he was able to get batters out when throwing slow fastballs. When batters were able to make contact (most of the time), the ball went straight to fielders. In the second half of the season, balls have simply been hit away from fielders.

It makes sense that batters would crush slow fastballs so it seems that Gonzo was extremely fortunate that he wasn't drilled earlier in the season. Going forward, he was probably lucky earlier in the season and probably unlucky in the second half of the season. I would think that Gonzo's true performance is somewhere in the middle. The problem is that being somewhere in the middle of these two extremes will result in an ERA in the high 4's and will probably mean that he won't be successful. This suggests that Gonzo needs to find a new method to outperform his projections or else he’ll be in trouble come 2016.

Have We Seen The Last Of MiGo In An Orioles Uniform? (Updated)

Update:
https://twitter.com/masnRoch/status/638858545514053632
Of course, MiGo having only inflammation is great news and news that we hope is accurate.  We can certainly still remember that MRIs can be hard to read and the Orioles have had pitchers originally noted as suffering from inflammation who wound up getting Tommy John (i.e., Dylan Bundy).  That said, this article is still a pretty decent thought piece and provides some useful summary of Tommy John surgery.

As of Tuesday evening, the Orioles were waiting on the results of the 31 year old Miguel Gonzalez' MRI on his shoulder.  He experienced soreness in his shoulder last weekend and that transitioned to pain in his elbow.  The greatest concern is whether he will need to go under the knife and have his second Tommy John surgery (his first was in 2009).  Surgery success and cost to retain him in the organization are the two biggest concerns.

The return rate after a player's first Tommy John surgery is likely somewhere in the low 80% area.  You will find studies ranging from 75 to 87%.  Younger pitchers tend to have a slightly higher rate of return (think 85%) while pitchers in their early thirties are a little lower (think 75%).  Of course, success rate is a variable term.  If we think of success as throwing a single pitch in the majors, then that number is accurate.  If you think of success as being good enough to say through 50 IP, then that rate falls to about 65%.  Slide to 100 IP, then you go down to 60%.  Age remains an important variable during this time.  A limitation is that relievers are in this bundle, so I think making general conclusions past 100 IP is highly problematic.

A second wrinkle is that this will be MiGo's second Tommy John surgery.  Again, the studies range a bit.  The return rate (measured by simply throwing an MLB pitch) ranges from 66% to 79%.  The major caveat here is that the number of pitchers with second Tommy John surgeries is quite low.  Additionally, the numbers are so few that age is difficult to control as a variable and it may well be the decreased amount of success might be more a product of that than recovery from a repeat surgery.  My educated guess would be that both play into a likely decreased rate of return, but it is difficult to tease them apart.  However, the "look" of the data makes it appear as much more of an age issue.

I would also like to note another positive is that it appears Miguel Gonzalez does not use tobacco products.  It is something that many people do not recognize as a potential confounder in recovery from many surgical procedures.  For Camden Depot writer and current Pittsburgh Pirates employee Stuart Wallace wrote in Beyond the Box Score

Although the research is thin, the data "lend credence to the idea that smokers might need more time to recover from Tommy John surgery and that perhaps those who suffer a second tear so soon after their first UCL injury might have enough of a history of smoking (or tobacco use in general) that would facilitate a medical staff to take a more conservative, more time appropriate course of rehabilitation in order to compensate for the deleterious effects of smoking on the repair mechanisms of the body."

Again, this concept has not been well evidenced, but it makes sense.  Anyway, it appears unlikely to affect Gonzalez as he has never publicly used tobacco products and likely does not do so in private.

The second issue is the time it takes for recovery from Tommy John and what cost that presents to the Orioles.  The optimistic view is that a return is 11 months away from the date of the surgery, but it can take longer.  That means if the Orioles retain Gonzalez, he could reappear in the Majors mid-August if everything goes right for the 31 year old.  That is optimistic and, I think, difficult to assess.  It is more likely to assume that he is a meaningful member of a MLB organization in 2017.  For the Orioles to retain him, he will likely require a two year investment (his remaining years under control before free agency) through arbitration, which likely would mean an investment of about 10 or 11 MM.

Considering age, a 31 year old pitcher stands roughly a 55% chance of returning to the Majors and putting in 100 or more innings.  Let us be polite and assume that those 100 innings are MLB average, that Gonzalez would be able to put in a full 2017 worth about 2.5 WAR.  In other words (again, we are being optimistic), there is a 55% chance that the Orioles would have a 2.5 WAR pitcher in 2017 for the price of 10 MM.  That is a value of 7.3 MM per win when considering probability and performance.

Is 7.3 MM per win a fair amount?  To answer that, we need to consider what the free agent market bears for wins.  With the Orioles' rather weak farm system, help will likely have to come from outside the organization.  He are the offseason costs of free agents for each upcoming season since 2012:

2012 - 6.5 MM / WAR
2013 - 7.4 MM / WAR
2014 - 7.6 MM / WAR
2015 - 8.0 MM / WAR

Those numbers are based on average, which is largely inflated by elite player contracts.  With Gonzalez being a mid-level pitcher, we need to provide a correction.  That is roughly 20%.  With that assumption, we see the following:

2012 - 5.2 MM / WAR
2013 - 5.9 MM / WAR
2014 - 6.1 MM / WAR
2015 - 6.4 MM / WAR

Our expectation would then follow that the cost per win in 2017 would be roughly 7 MM.

To summarize, if we are optimistic about Gonzalez' ability to perform at a MLB average level when he returns in 2017 then the club would be paying a slight premium for him.  I think there is certainly an argument that scarcity of pitching might make it useful to retain rights of Gonzalez through arbitration, but I find that wasteful for a club that truly needs to maximize its resources in order to compete. 

My suggestion would be to sign Gonzalez to an extension.  My preference would be to sign Gonzalez to a 2 year contract worth 10 MM with a 1 year option at 8 MM or a buyout of 2 MM.  This would enable the club to retain Gonzalez while promising him 12 MM and providing the club the opportunity to retain a potentially useful pitcher at a bargain rate of 8 MM.  I would presume wiggle room on the dollar amount of the option, but I would be largely fixed on 12 MM as the amount of money to dedicate to Gonzalez.  If that is unworkable, then I would non-tender him.

In the end though, I think it is preferred by all parties that the MRI comes back clean and Miguel is ready to go in 2016.

The Janish Shift

Paul Janish was recently added to the Orioles' active roster. Photo courtesy of Les Treagus/Norfolk Tides

In their recent series against the Norfolk Tides, the Columbus Clippers employed an extreme outfield shift against the Tides' #9 hitter, shortstop Paul Janish. Against Janish, the Clippers consistently positioned their right fielder further off the right-field line than I had seen any team position its right fielder against any hitter. The two photos below - because I took them myself, they look pretty amateurish - show where the location of the right fielder. He played between the "S" and the "t' in the State Farm advertisement in the first photo:

This isn't Columbus defending Paul Janish - it's the Tides warming up between innings.  

This picture tries to show that advertisement in relation to the entire field. It's that red-and-white blotch under the scoreboard. As you can see, that's quite a distance from the right-field line.

This picture of Harbor Park shows exactly how far off the right-field line Columbus played Paul Janish. 

While more and more teams are shifting their defenses against more and more batters, it seems to me that most of the shifting is done by infielders, with the outfield remaining pretty much straight away. And the stereotype of the extreme pull hitter is the hulking home-run hitter, which Paul Janish is not. It seemed strange to me and my co-workers in the press box that it would be Paul Janish against whom we saw the most extreme outfield shift.

Also, right fielders in Harbor Park generally play further off the right-field line than they do in other parks. There is a party deck in right field that shortens the distance down the foul line to 315 feet, and the fences quickly curve away from the deck to 375 feet in straight right-center. Right fielders can travel further to chase a ball hit down the line because the ball will not roll that far away from the infield. The downside is that such a positioning opens up the right field line for the batter.

Was Columbus on to something? Does it make sense for the right fielder to play that far off the line? In the games I have scored to date, both as the MLB Advanced Media Datacaster and for Baseball Info Solutions, Paul Janish had 127 plate appearances. The table below shows the first fielder for the balls Janish puts into play. The "Outs" column shows the number of balls put into play that result in outs; the "Hits" column the number of balls put into play that result in hits.

Position	Outs	Hits	Total	Percentage
Pitcher	1	0	1	.010
Catcher	2	0	2	.019
First Base	3	0	3	.029
Second Base	7	0	7	.068
Third Base	17	1	18	.175
Shortstop	15	2	17	.165
Left Field	13	10	23	.223
Center Field	13	7	20	.194
Right Field	6	6	12	.117
Totals	77	26	103
Walks:	9
Strikeouts:	15

My initial thought is that when Janish does put the ball in play, he does pull the ball. He hits more balls to the left fielder than to the right fielder, second baseman, and first baseman combined. 21.4% of the balls he puts into play were fielded by the first baseman, second baseman, or right fielder, the positions that would field the ball if Janish were going the other way.

While I'm sure that the information exists somewhere, I don't know whether Janish's distribution of balls put in play is typical of all players or whether he is an extreme pull hitter. If Janish is an extreme pull hitter, then kudos to the Cleveland Indians professional scouting department. Cleveland, the parent club of the Clippers, took the time to scout the International League and were observant enough to notice that Janish rarely hit to right field. And kudos to their AAA managerial staff, led by manager Chris Tremie, which had the courage to position their fielder in an unconventional way.

But also, if Janish is unusual in hitting the ball so infrequently to the opposite field, then there's something wrong with him. Janish hasn't been a successful offensive player; his career major-league OPS is .574 (in 434 games) and his AAA OPS is .650 (in 458 games). I think that it's likely that Janish would be a better offensive player if he "hit 'em where they ain't" more frequently. And Janish is a smart guy; he graduated from Rice University with a degree in economics. It's baffling that he hasn't realized that he would be more successful going the opposite way. If I were Janish, I'd spend an offseason working on hitting the ball the opposite way. It can't hurt his career.