Showing posts with label Inside Edge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Inside Edge. Show all posts

27 November 2015

What To Know About L.J. Hoes

Click here for Ryan Romano's archives.

The Orioles made another low-end move on Wednesday, bringing back L.J. Hoes in exchange for cash considerations. When Baltimore shipped the outfielder away two-odd years ago (in the Bud Norris trade), he had a total of four major-league plate appearances to his name, along with 2,770 in the minors. Since then, he's gone to the dish 333 times in the show and 577 throughout the levels below that. Now that Hoes has returned to their area code, what can fans of the Birds expect from him? Let's dissect his production to this point.

He's shown (probably) acceptable defensive range...

Jon's reaction to one aspect of the deal lined up with my initial thoughts:


This certainly passes the smell test. Lough — whom Hoes would presumably replace as the fourth outfielder — has this and this on his resume, plays that Hoes can't hope to match. Or can he?

Across his 753.2-inning career, Hoes has cost his teams 6.1 runs by UZR, which translates to 9.7 runs for every 1,200 innings. On the flipside, he's saved his teams four runs by DRS, equaling 6.4 per 1,200 frames. That amounts to a difference of more than sixteen runs — one and a half wins of value per year. Certainly, the latter mark can't compare to Lough's lifetime 22.4 DRS/1200, but Hoes still looks like an adequate defender in the eyes of this metric.

When I see such a disparity as this, I usually turn to FanGraphs' Inside Edge Fielding data. This comes from the judgment of scouts, who (in theory) can help to bridge these gaps. For Hoes, they paint a somewhat inconsistent picture:

Player 0% 1-10% 10-40% 40-60% 60-90% 90-100%
Hoes 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 66.7% 100.0% 98.7%
MLB 0.0% 6.3% 30.7% 55.0% 82.7% 99.3%

In terms of "routine" plays — the most common and thus important variety — Hoes has struggled. Although a difference of 0.6 percentage points might look insignificant, it matters immensely: Among fielders with 750 innings over the past four seasons, that 98.7 percent figure ranks 166th, in the 9th percentile. He's paired that ineptitude on easy balls with a total failure to catch the "remote" ones, a distinction he shares with 74 others players in that sample.

Elsewhere, however, Hoes has held his own. His capacity to convert "unlikely" balls into outs places 25th, while he finishes 58th with regards to "even" ones. And he has yet to botch a "likely" opportunity, which ties him for first with ten other fielders. The samples of these pale in comparison to that of the routine plays, but this still appears to give him some credit. In essence, Hoes has done poorly at the extremes and well in the middle.

We should also observe the other variable in play here — quantity. Hoes hasn't seen an even distribution of plays:

Player # 0% # 1-10% # 10-40% # 40-60% # 60-90% # 90-100%
Hoes 23.0% 1.7% 3.5% 1.3% 4.8% 65.7%
MLB 18.9% 2.6% 1.9% 1.9% 3.6% 71.1%

Most of Hoes's chances have occurred on the more trying end of the spectrum, which may have harmed his numbers. Given a pitching staff that has maximized weak contact as of late, he could improve his output.

On a per-600 plate appearance basis, Steamer thinks Hoes will lose 4.2 runs defensively in 2016. That projection comes from UZR, though, which takes the pessimistic view. Personally, I think Hoes's talent lies in the middle of the two extremes — going forward, he should be an average-ish fielder. (Argument to moderation, schmargument to moderation.) As a defender, he can't hope to touch Lough, but he deserves some respect.

...in addition to a (seemingly) insufficient arm.

But not all of the UZR-DRS difference stems from range, the element of fielding that Inside Edge gauges. The two pillars of defense have differed regarding Hoes's arm as well:

Metric Arm Runs Arm Runs/1200 Range Runs Range Runs/1200 Error Runs Error Runs/1200
UZR -4.1 -6.5 -1.9 -3.0 -0.1 -0.2
DRS  0 0.0 5 8.0 -1 -1.6

This is a tricky area to parse — in most all cases, UZR and DRS evaluate outfield arms equivalently. Does Hoes possess a limp noodle, or a satisfactorily firm one?

Based on the evidence here, I'd say the latter. Hoes has notched four assists in his 753.2 innings, whereas an average defender would accumulate around five in that span. Plus, scorers have charged him with two throwing errors during his major-league tenure, so he owns an unsightly assist-error ratio of two flat — a far cry from the league average of 7.2 since 2012.

Not only has Hoes neglected to gun down baserunners, they've taken the extra base far too often. Hoes has held opponents on 48.1 percent of his chances, which falls short of the 51.5 percent MLB standard. In particular, he's had trouble with throws home, where runners have scored 60 percent of the time; this contrasts with their 45.9 percent rate of advancement to third base. Hoes has struggled in both the flashy and mundane elements of throwing, as UZR has stated.

I should note that this combination — respectable range to go along with an unthreatening arm — diverges from the scouting reports on Hoes. Back in his farmhand days, he earned a 50 arm grade and a 45 overall defense grade from the Depot's Nick Faleris, indicating decent throws and subpar field coverage. With that said, and I don't mean this to disparage Nick in any way, the numbers here testify differently. While Hoes may have had that potential at the time, I'll go with the major-league achievements.

His batting average hasn't translated to the show...

Enough defense — let's move to the more exciting side of the ball. In the minors, Hoes hasn't displayed anything resembling power, with a career ISO of .094. Rather, he's survived offensively with his ability to reach base, doing so at a lifetime clip of .368. Part of that has come from a 10.7 percent walk rate (which I'll discuss momentarily), but a .287 batting average has contributed to it the most.

To gain hits that frequently, a hitter has to avoid strikeouts and have valuable balls in play. Hoes has done both in the minors, posting a 14.7 percent strikeout rate and .335 BABIP. Neither of those have made the jump to the majors, where's he's gone down on strikes 20.5 percent of the time and seen 28.9 percent of his balls in play go for hits. As the result, his major-league batting average sits at an uninspiring .237.

We'll start with the strikeouts. 19.4 percent of Hoes's pitches at the major-league level have been called strikes, which tops the mean of 17.5 percent. That, and an average swinging-strike rate of 10.6 percent, have allowed pitchers to punch him out with gusto.

Primarily, Hoes hasn't offered at pitches on the outer part of the strike zone:


The opposition has generally targeted him away, which makes for an unhealthy combination. Although Hoes has demonstrated a reasonable amount of aggression on pitches closer to him, he's simply laid off too many on the outer part of the plate.

In terms of whiffs, we see an interesting trend:

 

Hoes has actually done fairly well within the strike zone, where his 6.6 percent whiff rate trails the MLB average of 8.0 percent. By contrast, he's flailed at pitches outside the strike zone, swinging and missing at 13.5 percent of such pitches — higher than the 11.1 percent standard his peers have established.

Because most of his contact has occurred on hittable pitches, Hoes should have a lot of hard-hit balls on his ledger, right? After all, the BABIP for pitches inside the zone greatly exceeds that for pitches outside it. Sadly, Hoes has a meager 20.9 percent rate of hard contact, a level that even Everth Cabrera can top. That's doomed him to a mediocre BABIP, which along with his high strikeout rate has kept his batting average down.

Hoes's batted-ball profile doesn't disqualify him from success. He's tallied a 19.8 percent line-drive rate, about an average level, to accompany a sky-high 58.8 percent ground-ball rate. That's the sort of line you'd want from a hitter who lacks power — he should keep the ball low, to maximize his chances of getting a hit. And Hoes has even distributed his grounders pretty evenly, with a 42.0 percent pull rate (the major-league average is 53.3 percent) that prevents the shift from becoming a factor. He just hasn't stung the ball often enough to keep his head above water.

Should Hoes learn to swing at pitches on the outside, and swing with more authority, perhaps he'll cut down on his strikeouts and increase his BABIP. Of course, we could make similar statements for every player in this mold — if Henry Urrutia can develop his power, if Dariel Alvarez can start to take walks, if Christian Walker can make enough contact, then they'll become legitimate major-league contributors. Until then, they, like Hoes, will function as quad-A roster depth.

...and neither have his walks.

We'll wrap up with the other facet of Hoes's minor-league game, arguably his calling card: bases on balls. In an organization allergic to plate discipline, his ability to work a free pass set him apart. Why, then, has he only done so in 6.8 percent of his major-league plate appearances?

Hoes has certainly been selective against major-league pitching: He's swung at just 23.8 percent of pitches outside the strike zone. However, they've thrown 52.6 percent of their pitches inside those confines; the resulting expected strike rate of 63.8 percent matches his actual 63.4 percent clip. While a discerning eye can get you pretty far, at some point you have to make pitchers fear you enough to pitch around you.

Still, that level of play should lend itself to a solid walk rate; after all, 64 percent of all pitches in baseball go for strikes. Hoes's problem has been situational aggression — he's taken far fewer balls when they matter the most:

Player 0-Ball Strike% 1-Ball Strike% 2-Ball Strike% 3-Ball Strike%
Hoes 59.3% 61.3% 70.8% 78.3%
MLB 58.0% 63.9% 69.5% 73.3%
(Averages here from 2008-2014, via Chris Teeter.)

Hoes has mirrored the leaguewide number for every count except three balls. He'll work his way to the brink of a free pass, then swing away, blowing any shot at one.

This tendency obviously has something to do with Hoes's poor batting average. Since he struggles to hit, he presses, his nerves taking over and wrecking his approach. If he ever implements the aforementioned changes, which should improve his batting average, he'll probably regain his composure and start to take walks. The former premise is something of a stretch, though, meaning the latter is too.

***

This poll, from a few hours after the deal to bring back Hoes, accurately sums up the feelings of Birdland regarding the move:


At the time, I voted for Lough (I have my reasons). I don't know, looking back, that I would change that decision. While Hoes has a glorious name and a possibly tolerable glove, his bat just won't suffice on a club that wants to contend. With his 26th birthday coming in March, he has probably passed the point at which he could make the leap. The Orioles should look elsewhere for their fourth outfielder.

13 November 2015

Did Manny Machado Deserve His Gold Glove?

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On Tuesday, the Orioles saw something good come out of 2015. Manny Machado, who had made a triumphant return from knee surgery, won his second Gold Glove for his work at third base. Anyone who has seen him make plays such as these over his time in Baltimore knows that he fields his position incredibly. But did he truly lead the entire American League? The answer to that is kind of tricky.

By the standard (for sabermetricians) fielding metrics, Machado certainly had an outstanding campaign. He racked up 14 Defensive Runs Saved, to go along with 8.4 runs by Ultimate Zone Rating. While those marks couldn't match up to the ones his sensational 2013 season, they still drew the envy of almost everyone in the Junior Circuit. Almost — but not all.

Adrian Beltre, who finished in the top three behind Machado in the final voting, has always excelled at the hot corner. For his career, his play there has netted him four Gold Gloves. He hasn't acquired one since 2012, however, and despite struggling in 2013 and 2014, he regained his superiority this year — at Machado's expense. With 18 DRS and 11.4 UZR, Beltre led all qualifying third baseman in the AL; Machado had to settle for second and third, respectively (Josh Donaldson narrowly beat him in UZR).

These statistics have error bars, so a difference of decimal points — such as the one between Donaldson and Machado — shouldn't lead to any bold proclamations. That doesn't apply to Beltre and Machado, who have a four-run gap by DRS and a three-run gap by UZR. When both of the widely used defensive systems come to an agreement like this, it's hard to argue otherwise.

With that said, Machado's case doesn't end there. In addition to the aforementioned statistics, FanGraphs puts out Inside Edge Fielding data. It relies on scouts, rather than stringers, to take a more subjective look at the plays on the field. They grade all plays into six categories, each with a rough percentage range of the player making it: "impossible" (0%*), "remote" (1-10%), "unlikely" (10-40%), "even" (40-60%), "likely" (60-90%), and "routine" (90-100%).

*In the four years for which these numbers exist, no player has made an impossible play. 

The Inside Edge data flips the script — here, Machado came out ahead of Beltre:

Name 1-10% 10-40% 40-60% 60-90% 90-100% AL 1-10% AL 10-40% AL 40-60% AL 60-90% AL 90-100%
Manny Machado 9.1% 41.2% 57.1% 74.8% 96.9% 3.4% 25.3% 49.1% 72.9% 96.5%
Adrian Beltre 5.6% 12.9% 46.7% 74.3% 96.0% 3.4% 25.3% 49.1% 72.9% 96.5%

In the most trying times, Machado clearly reigned supreme; Beltre closed the gap a bit for the easier plays, but the disparity remains. Although both cleared the league averages in almost every regard, Machado did so to a greater extent than Beltre did.

Plus, Machado didn't receive as much help from his pitching staff, who gave him more hard-hit balls than Beltre's did:

Player # 0% # 1-10% # 10-40% # 40-60% # 60-90% # 90-100% AL # 0% AL # 1-10% AL # 10-40% AL # 40-60% AL # 60-90% AL # 90-100%
Manny Machado 2.4% 6.6% 3.4% 2.8% 9.6% 75.1% 1.7% 5.7% 3.4% 3.8% 8.4% 76.9%
Adrian Beltre 1.2% 4.4% 2.5% 3.7% 8.5% 79.7% 1.7% 5.7% 3.4% 3.8% 8.4% 76.9%

Overall, 8.1% of Machado's plays fell on the difficult side of the spectrum, compared to 12.5% for Beltre. So not only did Machado cruise through the biggest challenges, he encountered far more of them. In terms of both quantity and quality, the Inside Edge Fielding data comes down pretty firmly on Machado's side.

It would seem that this question boils down to the defining conflict of baseball's modern age: statistics versus scouts. Do we trust the systems that theoretically track every play objectively, but which don't take into account confounding variables like starting position? Or do we trust the scouts who can better gauge the nuance of a play, but who carry their own human biases? While I don't have an easy answer, I know what might mediate the discord.

Most baseball analysts (like me) use solely DRS and UZR to appraise defensive value. Those two don't act alone, though: Fielding Runs Above Average, from Baseball Prospectus, also measures players' glovework. FRAA uses a different formula, looking at plays made rather than basing its analysis on zones. Many other potentially influential factors — the ballpark and the base/out state, among others — also make their way into FRAA, whereas DRS and UZR (to my knowledge) ignore many of these.

FRAA agreed with DRS and UZR, insofar as it thinks very highly of both Machado and Beltre. However, it diverged from the narrative those two have established, in a major way. According to FRAA, Machado gave the Orioles 20.3 runs, and Beltre cost the Rangers 2.6 runs. By the (theoretically) most advanced publicly available defensive metric, Machado demolished Beltre by a 24-run margin.

Maybe you want to split the difference: Since Beltre wins in DRS and UZR and Machado wins in FRAA, they should tie in the end. But the duo didn't have a wide gap in the former two, and they certainly had one for the latter. As August Fagerstrom observed at FanGraphs, a weighted average here still puts Machado ahead.

Even if Beltre had taken home the Gold Glove, few people outside of Maryland would disagree with it. At age 36, he succeeded as much as ever; even if he decided to retire right now, his resume would surely transport him to the Hall of Fame. Machado nevertheless warranted the award, providing the best third base defense in the AL for the second time in three seasons. Keeping this up for several more years could earn him a ticket to Cooperstown as well.

03 July 2014

Revisiting the Inside Edge Data

Earlier this year Fangraphs began sharing some Inside Edge fielding data with the public and at that time wrote this article. I didn't think much about it since then so I was a bit surprised to see some interesting Inside Edge data when doing research for my previous post discussing Manny Machado. The table below shows Manny Machado's Inside Edge fielding data results for 2012, 2013 and 2014. The data in this table and all other tables are accurate as of June 16th 2014.




Manny Machado has played 1000 fewer innings in 2014 than he did in 2013 but has seen more impossible plays this year than last year and only one fewer remote play. This made me wonder whether this is a league-wide trend or something unique only to Manny.

What I did was download all the Inside Edge data from Fangraphs from 2012 to 2014 and determined the sum number of plays made in each category by position and year to see whether there are any differences. In order to insure that I was comparing apples to apples I included two rows for 2014. The first row has the current 2014 data while the second row projects the full season data provided that there are 43,500 innings in the 2014 season. Since some games go into extra innings and others are short due to range each season has a different amount of innings played.

The data is somewhat unwieldy. In order to make things simpler it makes sense to start with the results divided into infielders and outfielders by year.


Infielders have already had more impossible chances in 2014 then they did in 2012 or 2013. At the current pace there will be three times as many impossible plays in 2014 then there were in 2012 or 2013. Infielders are on pace to also have more remote and unlikely plays in 2014 than in either 2012 or 2013. Infielders are on pace to have only 2000 more chances in 2014 than in either 2012 or 2013.

Outfielders are on pace to have far fewer impossible chances in 2014 than they did in 2012 or 2013. They are on pace to have more remote, unlikely, even and likely chances and fewer certain chances than they did in 2012 or 2013. Outfielders should be expected to have 4,000 fewer chances in 2014 than they did in 2012 or 2013. This indicates that infielders are fielding more plays at the expense of outfielders.

The results from 2012 and 2013 are relatively similar to each other. This makes it all the more curious that the 2014 results look so different.

Here’s how the years stack up without considering position.



There are roughly the same amount of total plays from 2012 to 2014. There are far fewer impossible and certain plays in 2014 then there were in 2012/2013 and more remote and unlikely plays in 2014 then there were in 2012/2013. These trends are consistent by year and position. If someone wants to see the chart for each position and year they can access it here.

One reason that may explain these trends could be conversion rates. If fielders are successfully fielding more remote chances then that could indicate that more tough remote chances are being considered impossible while more tough unlikely chances are being considered remote. This could potentially explain why impossible and remote chances have seen an increase. Likewise a decrease in certain chances could be explained by an increase in certain chance conversion.

Here’s a chart by position and year:


These results do not back up my theory. They indicate that fewer remote chances have been successfully fielded by infielders and that there certainly isn’t an increase in the success rate for outfielders. Players are successfully converting the same amount of certain chances in 2014 as they did in 2012 and 2013.

Fangraphs claims that a remote chance should be converted between 1-10% of the time, an unlikely chance should be converted 11-40% of the time, an even chance should be converted 41-60% of the time, an likely chance should be converted 61-90% of the time and a certain chance should be converted 91-100% of the time.

Given that this is the case it is curious to see that at many infield positions there were entire seasons where even chances were converted more than 60% of the time. Centerfielders consistently convert between 13-15% of all remote chances. Pitchers also convert between 10-20% of remote chances as well as 60-70% of all even chances. This suggests that there is bias or possible error in the dataset. It could also suggest that fielders are getting better over time and that difficult plays are being converted more routinely.

If we look at the conversion data via infield/outfield and years then it looks like this.



In 2013, outfielders converted more than 10% of all remote chances.

Infielders are converting considerably fewer remote chances in 2014 than they did in 2012/2013 while converting more even chances. There is no difference in the conversion rates for outfielders.

I admit to being perplexed by these results. The 2014 data seems to have considerable differences from the 2012 and 2013 data. It appears that the data for Manny Machado is not an aberration. It is perhaps possible that as the season progresses there will be more certain chances, fewer impossible and remote chances for infielders and more impossible chances for outfielders.

I wonder if Inside Edge hasn’t changed its guidelines to make infielders responsible for more of the outfield. I would expect many balls hit between the infield and outfield to be impossible for either fielder to defend and could possibly explain why there are many more infield impossible chances while there are fewer outfield impossible chances. This is just speculation.

There also appears to be some bias in the ratings. It is relatively simple to use a computer program to determine the likelihood of an event happening. It is far more complicated to have a person give you an accurate percentage. One of the strengths of using a zone-based system to quantify defense is that it minimizes human estimation. A computer formula will return a consistent result each time while even the best trained human eyes may disagree about the difficulty of a play. The fact that there's bias may explain why UZR had a larger year-to-year correlation than the Inside Edge data.

It appears that there are differences between the 2012/2013 and 2014 data. Until they are resolved it may not make sense to compare historical Inside Edge results to current Inside Edge results.