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In my previous post, I noted that the value of pitching prospects
has improved over the past sixteen years. As a follow up, I thought it might be
useful to look into some of the potential reasons for this and determine
whether pitching prospects have improved or if Baseball America has gotten
better at identifying top prospects. One approach to do this is by comparing
rookies ranked by Baseball America to rookies that are not ranked by Baseball
America and measure how the performance of each of these groups (ranked vs. unranked) stacks up over time.
This study, like the last, was built upon the methodology of Scott McKinney's work. The population for this study included all rookies from 1990-2006
that had at least one season with either 100 PAs or 25 innings pitched. Total Wins Above Replacement (WAR) over their cost controlled years was calculated for each player. For
these rookies, if in their first year they didn’t have 100 Plate Appearances or
25 Innings Pitched, then that season was omitted. If they
did not meet one of those criteria in their second year also, then I omitted
both seasons from any calculations. In order to determine the value of a given
rookie, the following criteria was used:
Avg WAR Qualitative
Assignment
Under .50
|
Very poor
|
Bust
|
|
0.50-1.49
|
Below Average
|
||
1.5-2.49
|
Average
|
||
2.5-3.49
|
Good
|
Success
|
|
3.5-4.49
|
Very good
|
||
4.5 or higher
|
Great
|
Superior
|
|
Each rookie that met the given criteria was split into groups
by year (1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2002 and 2003-2006), whether they were
position or pitching prospects and whether they were ranked.
Offensive prospects were the first ones considered. The following table shows their success rate.
Year
|
Top 100
|
<.5
|
.5-1.49
|
1.5-2.49
|
2.5-3.49
|
3.5-4.49
|
>4.5
|
Success
|
1990-1993
|
N
|
197
|
38
|
10
|
3
|
3
|
0
|
6.4%
|
1990-1993
|
Y
|
41
|
25
|
19
|
16
|
4
|
6
|
40.5%
|
1994-1997
|
N
|
138
|
28
|
9
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
7.8%
|
1994-1997
|
Y
|
35
|
20
|
15
|
7
|
5
|
6
|
37.5%
|
1998-2002
|
N
|
167
|
46
|
17
|
4
|
1
|
0
|
9.4%
|
1998-2002
|
Y
|
62
|
24
|
19
|
16
|
2
|
4
|
32.3%
|
2003-2006
|
N
|
145
|
31
|
9
|
12
|
1
|
0
|
11.1%
|
2003-2006
|
Y
|
30
|
25
|
18
|
11
|
8
|
6
|
43.9%
|
This table shows results similar to those that one would
expect. The majority of successful position rookies were ranked by Baseball
America. There was not a single period
of time in which there were more successful unranked offensive prospects than
ranked offensive prospects even though there are overwhelmingly more unranked players than ranked ones. This shows an aptitude in Baseball America being able to identify notable prospects as opposed to the process being a crap shoot. Interestingly, the percentage of successful unranked
prospects nearly doubled in 1998-2006 from the 1990-2007 numbers.
One way to determine whether this is significant or not is
by running a t-test on the data for offensive prospects that aren’t ranked
during each period of time. A t-test is used to determine whether two sets of
data are significantly different from each other by calculating a t-value. A
t-value is the probability that the sets of data are not statistically
different. A low t-value signifies that the data is statistically different
while a high t-value signifies that any difference in the data is due to
randomness. If one were to find a t-value of .05 than it would mean that there
is a 5% chance of the differences between the two sets of data being random
variations. This level of confidence is general accepted in most fields. Although you will see importance given to lower thresholds if certain types of data are well founded as being highly variable. For the purpose of this study, the methodology implemented will be more conservative and stick to the generally accepted .05 level to determine if two data sets are significantly different.
The result of the t-test indicates that for offensive
prospects that the data in 1990-1993 and 2003-2006 is .10, which, according to our methodology, would not be considered statistically significant. In other words, Baseball America performed as well with their rankings of offensive prospects for both time periods. However, there does appear to be a trend of improvement between these time periods, so it is worth monitoring in
the future to see if it does become more different and, thus, significant.
The number of unranked prospects who are considered to have
produced superior results (worth 2.5 WAR or more per season) increase to 13 in
2003-2006 from an average of 5-6 in 1990-2002. A t-test on the data shows that
this is a significant change at the 95% level and therefore more superior
baseball prospects are being unranked by Baseball America. This suggests that
Baseball America is missing several superior baseball prospects in
2003-2006 than they had in the past.
We can look at pitching prospects using the same framework.
Here is a table with the results:
Year Group
|
Top 100
|
<.5
|
.5-1.49
|
1.5-2.49
|
2.5-3.49
|
3.5-4.49
|
>4.5
|
Success
|
1990-1993
|
N
|
208
|
50
|
11
|
7
|
1
|
0
|
6.9%
|
1990-1993
|
Y
|
43
|
14
|
9
|
3
|
2
|
2
|
21.9%
|
1994-1997
|
N
|
186
|
39
|
11
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
5.9%
|
1994-1997
|
Y
|
45
|
22
|
12
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
20.2%
|
1998-2002
|
N
|
266
|
41
|
13
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
5.5%
|
1998-2002
|
Y
|
48
|
19
|
19
|
13
|
6
|
1
|
36.8%
|
2003-2006
|
N
|
215
|
50
|
6
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
3.3%
|
2003-2006
|
Y
|
41
|
21
|
11
|
10
|
5
|
1
|
30.3%
|
From 1998-2006 the percentage of successful ranked pitching
prospects is nearly twice as high as it was from 1990-1997. T-tests on both the
successful and superior ranked pitching prospects show that there is a
significant difference between the 1990-1997 data and the 1998-2006 data at the
99% confidence level. Baseball America is finding a larger number of strong
pitching prospects from 1998-2007 than they did in 1990-1997. Part of the
reason is because the number of strong pitching prospects has increased. From 1990-1997 there were only 66 total
successful pitching prospects and 23 superior prospects and from 1998-2006
there were 93 successful pitching prospects and 43 superior.
Unlike with position prospects, the percentage of successful
unranked pitching prospects has fallen from 6% to 3%. A t-test shows that the
difference between the 1990-1993 data and 2003-2006 data is significant at the
90% significance level. This possibly suggests that despite the increase of
successful pitching prospects the amount of unranked successful pitching
prospects is decreasing.
While a larger percentage of ranked position prospects from
1998-2006 were success than ranked pitching prospects, the difference between
the two has decreased. This is due to the improvement in pitching prospects.
In order to determine whether Baseball America has gotten
better or worse at predicting which prospects will be the best rookies, we can evaluate the top fifty rookies in a given period and see whether they were ranked. If
Baseball America is able to rank a larger percentage of the top rookies than
this would indicate that their rankings are more accurate and therefore more
meaningful. The following table measures offensive players.
Year
|
Top 100
|
Top Fifty Players
|
1990-1993
|
N
|
12
|
1990-1993
|
Y
|
38
|
1994-1997
|
N
|
17
|
1994-1997
|
Y
|
33
|
1998-2002
|
N
|
17
|
1998-2002
|
Y
|
33
|
2003-2006
|
N
|
14
|
2003-2006
|
Y
|
36
|
These results indicate that a similar amount of top fifty
rookies were correctly predicted by Baseball America from 1990-2006 with the
best period coming in 1990-1993.
Here is the table for pitching prospects.
Year Group
|
Top 100
|
Top Fifty Players
|
1990-1993
|
N
|
31
|
1990-1993
|
Y
|
19
|
1994-1997
|
N
|
23
|
1994-1997
|
Y
|
27
|
1998-2002
|
N
|
15
|
1998-2002
|
Y
|
35
|
2003-2006
|
N
|
19
|
2003-2006
|
Y
|
31
|
These results show that Baseball America better identified top fifty pitching players who were rookies from 1998-2006 than
they did from 1990-1997. Indeed, in 1990-1993 they identified less than
half of the top fifty pitchers. One of the reasons why the value of a Baseball
America top pitching prospect was limited is because they were unable to
identify the top pitchers. Now that Baseball America is more accurate, we can
see the actual value of a pitching prospect.
In addition, the value of a top fifty pitcher has increased
from 1998-2006 from the 1990-1997 numbers. This table shows the total value as well as
the average value for pitching prospects.
Year Group
|
Top Fifty Total Value
|
Top Fifty Average Value
|
1990-1993
|
614.3
|
2.05
|
1994-1997
|
558.5
|
1.86
|
1998-2002
|
796.3
|
2.65
|
2003-2006
|
698.0
|
2.33
|
The difference between pitchers who were rookies in
1998-2006 from those who were rookies in 1990-1997 is significant at the 99%
confidence level signified that their value increased from 1998-2006. That
stated, these rookies are still less valuable than offensive rookies. The values for offensive rookies can be found
here.
Year
|
Top Fifty Total Value
|
Top Fifty Average Value
|
1990-1993
|
943.4
|
3.14
|
1994-1997
|
845.1
|
2.82
|
1998-2002
|
846.7
|
2.82
|
2003-2006
|
963.7
|
3.21
|
In conclusion, both the value of a pitching rookie has
increased over time and Baseball America has improved its methods to better
determine which pitching prospects will become the best rookies and young stars.
While these factors do not make pitching prospects as valuable as hitting
prospects, it does lessen the gap and indicate that a top pitching prospect is
far more valuable than once thought.
It also seems that Baseball America was more accurate
determining the best offensive prospects in 1990-2002 then it was from
2003-2006. Certainly, Baseball America has predicted fewer superior prospects
than they once did. While the change appears to be minor at the moment, it will
be interesting to see if this trend continues in the future.
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