Should The Orioles Have Two Full-Time Platoons In The Outfield?

One of the biggest question marks facing the 2017 Orioles is their corner outfield situation. While the team has multiple options for each spot, only Seth Smith and the injured Michael Bourn have ever had more than 400 plate appearances in a season. Mark Trumbo played in 96 games in the outfield in 2016, bit it is likely he ends up as the full-time designated hitter in 2017.

The Orioles do have Smith and Hyun Soo Kim penciled in as starters, but there's a problem:  They are simply not good against left handed pitching.  In his career, Smith has hit .202/.282/.312 with a .268 wOBA and a 60 wRC+ in 558 career plate appearances against lefties.  Indeed, the deal for Smith actually precipitated the current problem, because it should have been clear to everyone that Smith was a platoon-only player from the outset.

Kim, in obviously much less time (only 23 PA in 2016), has never had a major league hit against against a left handed pitcher.  In Kim's case, there's something of a chicken/egg situation: was Kim unable to hit lefties because he can't hit lefties or did the Orioles not give him enough of a chance to prove his ability to hit lefties?  Kim was productive in the Korean Baseball Organization against left handed pitching in his career, so there is certainly reason to think that he could see a significant improvement (not hard to do when you don't get a hit in an entire season!) against lefties in 2017.  A platoon situation for both corner outfield spots, then, seems like a distinct possibility.

In certain circumstances, platoons can be very effective.   In 2012, the Oakland A's tried this strategy in 2012 to great success, and the Hardball Times estimated that teams that use platoons extensively can squeeze an extra win out of their season.  Baseball Reference has an interesting tool that shows the percentage of at-bats per team in which the team has the platoon advantage.  The Indians led the way last season with a 70% platoon advantage, while the Orioles finished well below league average with just a 48% platoon advantage (read another way, a 52% platoon disadvantage).  Given this, it makes sense for the O's to try and make their platoon disadvantages into a strength by combining Kim and Smith with right handed hitters that can mash lefties.

Unfortunately, there are a couple problems with this set up.  First, it's not clear that the guys who could platoon with Kim and Smith actually can mash lefties.  Joey Rickard is an obvious platoon candidate after putting up an outstanding .861 OPS in limited time against lefties last season.  Rickard, however, is dealing with coming back from injury and dramatic second half offensive decline.  Craig Gentry has been a league average hitter against left handers in his career and is a good defensive player, but he has fewer than 100 plate appearances in the last two years total.  Of the two Rule 5 picks in camp, only Anthony Santander bats from the right side (he's a switch hitter), but he comes with multiple health and effectiveness questions.  Mark Trumbo might be an obvious platoon candidate given his experience playing the outfield last season, but he had an atrocious .608 OPS against lefties in 2016 and a somewhat middling .787 for his career, not to mention his well below average defensive work in the outfield last season.

Second, platoons are potentially a drain on the finite resource of roster spots.  One platoon can certainly make sense: if Rickard were to put up even an .800 OPS against lefties this year and he started 1/3 of the games with Smith starting the other 2/3, the Orioles could have an All Star caliber aggregate performance in right field, in addition to allowing Rickard to spell Jones and Kim as well. The problem, however, comes from the fact that if Kim also needs a full-time platoon partner, there are four players for two spots.  Add in Caleb Joseph and Ryan Flaherty and that's the entire bench. For a team that is fairly obsessed with roster flexibility despite the odd obsession with keeping a Rule 5 pick every season (another potential barrier here), this leaves Buck Showalter with a pretty restrictive bench.  Rickard's minor league option helps, but he also may be the best overall platoon candidate on the 40 man roster.

The way forward, at least to start the season, might be rolling the dice with Trumbo as an occasional platoon partner in right and hoping that Kim can handle most of the plate appearances in left.  This would give the team flexibility to start Rickard in the minors and give Gentry and some combination of Trey Mancini and a Rule 5 pick a chance to show what they can do.  With the news that Michael Bourn is likely out until the end of April, though, the O's may not want to go into the season with only one above average defensive outfielder.  Santander's shoulder injury may allow the O's to place him on the 60 day DL, but that simply kicks the can down the road.

In the end, the O's essentially brought this upon themselves.  Unless they trust Kim to take a big step forward against lefties this season, the outfield construction simply doesn't make a lot of sense. It's certainly not out of the realm of possibility that increased reps against lefties would allow Kim to become more comfortable with them, similar to his ascension overall last year, but it's a pretty big gamble to take given Seth Smith's long history of awfulness against lefties.  The O's can stand to dramatically improve their platoon splits, and in some ways the pieces are there to do it, but it will require a fairly radical commitment that few teams make.  

The Orioles Need An Outfielder, But It Probably Won't Be The One You Want

Here's something that won't come as a surprise to any Orioles fan: the team needs to add an outfielder. And as the Orioles are wont to do, they're expressing interest in a wide group of players.

MLB's General Manager meetings recently took place in Arizona, and that means plenty of hot stove rumors were dished out. Free agent wise, the O's are apparently fond of Ian Desmond and most recently Josh Reddick. How about a trade? The names of Ender Inciarte and Brett Gardner were floated. Less specifically, the Orioles covet a left-handed-hitting outfielder. 

There are lots of other outfielders out there, too: Yoenis Cespedes, Dexter Fowler, Jose Bautista, Carlos Gomez, Michael Saunders, Jon Jay, Brandon Moss, and more. In the near future, the O's could express some level of interest in any of those players. And most of them would present a significant upgrade in either left or right field. Some of them are better with their bat; some are better with their glove. But none of them are as bad with the glove as Mark Trumbo (and maybe even Hyun Soo Kim).

You could argue that the Orioles don't have a single strong defensive corner outfielder on their roster. Advanced numbers certainly weren't kind to Kim and Joey Rickard last year. There's probably still some hope out there that Rickard could progress to "decent" if or when he receives more playing time. He has the early reputation of being thought of as better than he really is, thanks in part to 1) some positive spin coaches and overly excited scouts fed beat reporters, and 2) that he's fast and has made a couple of flashy catches.

If you want to go deeper -- that the Orioles don't have a single really good defensive outfielder, period -- then that's fine. There will always be a group of fans calling for Adam Jones to move to a corner outfield spot. At some point he should, and he will. But that's far from the Orioles' biggest need right now. Adding someone with a more competent glove than Trumbo (no difficult feat) is clearly on Dan Duquette's to-do list.

Lots of outfielders are on the Orioles' radar. More names will be floated, and the O's will leave no stone unturned. You should know the drill by now. Just don't be surprised if the outfield addition ends up being Michael Bourn. Considering the likely lack of payroll flexibility and the other holes on the roster to fill, maybe it should be. But that's not nearly as exciting as a Cespedes or Fowler rumor. 

A Closer Look At Joey Rickard's Defense

If there's anything surprising about Joey Rickard so far, it's been that his bat has been decent but his glove has been underwhelming. At the very least, Rickard was supposed to provide a decent outfield glove as a fourth outfielder type. Instead, he's been installed as the team's everyday left fielder and leadoff hitter.

Right now, Rickard has a wRC+ of 99. The league average left fielder also has a wRC+ of 99. However, the average leadoff hitter has a wRC+ of 109. I've been critical of Rickard offensively and still don't quite understand why he's being used the way he is, but at the plate, he's been fine for now. Getting league average offensive output from Joey Rickard is perfectly acceptable. And it's not surprising or a knock on him at all that he's in the bottom half of leadoff hitters in terms of production. He has not been a disaster there by any means, but he hasn't been great. So it's a little strange that he has such a stranglehold on the leadoff spot in the lineup.

Still, in terms of wins above replacement, Rickard rates negatively. The driving force there by Fangraphs' and Baseball-Reference's versions of WAR (currently -0.3 in both) is his poor early defensive ratings (and a tiny slice is that he has done some bad things on the basepaths). Rickard has spent a decent amount of time in all three outfield positions, and he's amassed a UZR of -6.5 (UZR/150 of -33.9) and a DRS of -6. Now, it's tough to state definitively what exactly a full season's worth of defensive metrics actually means, let alone about 250 innings. So who's is to say that Rickard can't improve, or isn't at least close to average?

But I don't think it's unfair to say that while he's made a few nice plays in the field, Rickard has not come as advertised with the glove. In his time in the minors, Rickard logged more than 1,000 innings each in center field and right field. In left field, he logged more than 500. So he's had a lot of experience. Still, playing competent defense at the major league level is an entirely different animal.

All right, so let's get to some examples. Here's one of Rickard's first tough chances on the season. Take a look:

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You'll notice a few things. First, it was a nice effort, so that's something. The ball was just out of his grasp, and it would have looked pretty nice were he to have made the play. You'll also notice that Rickard didn't take the best route to the ball, and that also it maybe wasn't the best decision to dive and take a chance. Yes, of course it's easy to say that after the fact. But that's what happens with split-second decisions. Flashy plays always look impressive, but sometimes just keeping the ball in front and avoiding mistakes is the job of an outfielder. We'll revisit Rickard's route-taking and decision making.

A day later, Rickard had a semi-tough chance on a ball in front of him:

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I think even Rickard would tell you that he should have caught that ball. But wait, the play isn't over.

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Rickard stayed with the play, gathered the ball, and rifled it home to nab the runner. Nice throw.

Here was a pivotal play in a tie game:

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Rickard struggled with the transfer and ended up double-pumping before unleashing a throw too late to catch the runner at home. Maybe it's a bit unfair to be too harsh on this play; the weather was wet, and that didn't make things easy. But Adam Eaton was just rounding third when Rickard scooped up the ball, and it wasn't like the throw was coming from deep in the outfield.

Here was a decent play by Rickard on a line drive to right-center:

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One thing to pay attention to on hits to the outfield is how quickly a fielder reacts to a ball, particularly a line drive. When the camera shifts to the outfield after a hit, you can tell if a fielder is slow to react and/or gets a bad read. If the fielder is already off and moving -- in the right direction -- then that's a great sign. In the play above, Rickard is already moving. The ball carries a bit more than Rickard anticipates, so he has to jump at the last second to snag the ball. Maybe he got a little lucky, but that ball was also roped.

In a late-game play against the Yankees, Rickard misplayed a carom off the wall in right field:

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There's not much to say here, as it seems like he just missed the ball. But these little things add up.

Among the GIFs in this post, here is what I think is Rickard's second-best play:

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He reacts to the ball off the bat relatively quickly, though he doesn't take a direct route to the ball. Again, line drives are tricky. But even though he hasn't had a bunch of difficult chances yet, less than ideal routes to the ball will make it hard for Rickard to truly utilize his speed and run down tough chances.

But here's my favorite play from Rickard so far:

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Plays like that make me think there's still time for Rickard to show he can be a competent outfielder. Considering how he was described when the Orioles selected him in the Rule 5 draft, I expected Rickard to be a little more polished in terms of reads and routes. But he is a rookie, and he at least won't be asked to play center field unless Adam Jones gets hurt again. Besides, Rickard's arm is OK, but it plays much better in left field.

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I think the Orioles are still trying to figure out what they have in Rickard. If I had to guess, I would say he'll regress a bit with the bat and improve with the glove. I'm more than happy to be wrong that he shouldn't be playing every day, especially as the team's leadoff hitter. Still, at 20-12, the O's are in no position to panic or really change anything. That's probably not what Hyun Soo Kim or Nolan Reimold want to hear.

Regarding Rickard's outfield defense, it's evident that speed is not everything. Clearly being fleet of foot helps an outfielder, but reading the ball off the bat and taking an efficient route to a fly ball or line drive is more important. It's also key to pick and choose the right spots to lay out for a ball. These are things a rookie may learn, but there's no guarantee of that, either.

The Challenge Of Quantifying Outfield Defense

A few weeks ago, a commentator asked whether the Orioles should consider having Wieters play in the outfield. Jon asked for predictions of Wieters defensive ability as an outfielder via twitter and 54% of respondents thought he’d have a -50 UZR/150. While the Orioles' aren't going to use Wieters in the outfield, this discussion piqued my interest because that is a large amount of runs for a corner outfielder to concede.

UZR seems to suggest that such an outcome is reasonable. Hanley Ramirez was terrible defensively last year in LF and had a -30 UZR/150. Manny Ramirez had a few years where he had a -30 UZR/150 in LF. Unlike these players, Wieters has no experience playing in a corner outfield position and could very possibly struggle to make even simple defensive plays. If the worst corner outfielders are worth -30 runs, then Wieters could be worth -50 runs.

On the other hand, there are a limited number of balls hit to corner outfielders in a game and most of them are either easy or impossible plays. According to Inside Edge Data, only 40 to 50 balls hit at corner outfielders per season are even in question. A defensive outfielder would need to consistently botch the easiest plays that require minimal range to be worth 50 runs below average. Even a slow professional baseball player would be challenged to perform that poorly.

For context, Chris Davis’ offense was ranked at only 40 runs above average and Machado’s offense was ranked at 30 runs above average meaning that having Wieters in the outfield would have the same impact as replacing Machado's offense with a league average third baseman.

Furthermore, Machado is an excellent fielder and is only about 10 runs above average defensively at third base.  Simmons is an excellent shortstop and is usually 20 runs above average defensively. If UZR values the worst corner outfielders as worth -30 runs defensively, does this mean that there's a problem with UZR? It seems difficult to see how an experienced corner outfielder could cost his team that many runs.

Fangraphs argues that WAR works because there is a strong correlation between a team’s total WAR and their actual record. Glenn Dupaul from the Hardball Times argues that if WAR does a correct job at explaining where wins come from, the linear regression equation should have an intercept equal to roughly replacement level (47.7 wins) while each WAR should be worth roughly one win.

When I did this test with data from 2002-2015, the resulting formula returned had an intercept of 47.6 wins with each WAR being worth 1.00093 wins. When I split WAR into pitching and position WAR, the resulting formula was 46.84+.89*Position WAR+1.20*Pitching WAR which has interesting implications when thinking about this article. In any event, there can no debate about whether WAR works even if it could potentially be improved.

This is relevant because UZR is part of the WAR formula. One way to determine whether UZR works is by breaking WAR up into its components and seeing whether UZR is a significant factor for predicting teams’ total wins. I did such a test using a stepwise regression and found that it is significant. It was the third most important factor behind pitching and hitting although considerably less important than either of the other two. This implies that UZRs’ efficacy is limited, but still better than nothing.

The next question is whether UZR works for each position and specifically LF or RF. For this test, I input each teams’ defense score at each position (in order to replicate this it’s necessary to grab the data from the Fielding Tab rather than the Batting Tab at Fangraphs) for each team and season.  For most positions, UZR is helpful. Surprisingly, first base defense seems to have the highest correlation with wins (which possibly implies something about how defense is measured at other positions), while third base and center field data are also helpful. Data from shortstops, catchers, left fielders and right fielders are less helpful but still add some certainty. Surprisingly, second base defense as measured by UZR doesn’t add predictive power to the model.

The last question is which aspects of UZR are relevant for each position. Just because one aspect of UZR is relevant for a given position doesn’t mean that all of the aspects are relevant. In order to test this, I used each teams’ range, error, arm and double play range for each position to see which ones can be used to model wins. None of these factors apply to catchers and therefore this method can’t measure their performance.

My results suggested that range is relevant for first basemen, third basemen, center fielders, shortstops, extremely minimally for second basemen and has no relevance for corner outfielders. This is problematic because range is the largest component to UZR and therefore suggests that defense values for three positions are valued improperly and in a format that doesn't help us predict team wins.

Likewise, errors are only relevant for third basemen and shortstops. The average team’s left fielders have 5.2 errors over a season. The 75th percentile is 7 errors while the 25th percentile is 3 errors. Right fielders average 5.75 errors over an entire season with the 75th percentile having 7 errors and the 25th percentile having 4 errors. Even if an outfield error costs a team .8 runs, that still means errors from left fielders cost most teams about three runs a season and about two runs for right fielders.  Similar stories can be told for center fielders (average=4.8, 75th percentile = 6, 25th percentile = 3), first base (average = 10, 75th percentile = 13, 25th percentile = 7) and second base (average = 13, 75th percentile = 16, 25th percentile = 10).

The only statistic that is relevant for corner outfielders is arm strength. This would work for a player like Wieters as he’d likely struggle with range and errors but has a strong arm. It also means that teams are right if they discount UZR range values for corner outfielders and players like Heyward could be overvalued due to possibly overvalued defensive ratings.

The bottom line is that it is hard for us to accurately measure corner outfield defense and therefore can't determine how much damage a bad defensive outfielder inflicts on his team.

Outfield Reinforcements Won't Be Coming From the Minors

The play of Baltimore’s corner outfielders has been a hot topic lately. Last week, our own Matt Kremnitzer wrote about their struggles in an article for MASN, while Matt Perez followed that up with a piece that looked at potentially swapping Bud Norris and Tommy Hunter for the Red Sox's Shane Victorino. Yes, the non-Adam Jones outfielders currently on the Orioles roster are not performing, both offensively and defensively. Here’s how they stack up against the rest of the league in terms of wRC+ and DRS.

OK, so they actually haven’t been playing bad defense, it just seems like it after seeing Delmon Young, Alejandro De Aza, and Travis Snider out there on a regular basis. Matt Perez’s suggestion to trade for Victorino is certainly an interesting one. And while we’re almost 2 months into the 2015 season, it’s probably a little too early to expect any sort of trade that would bring back a major upgrade to the ballclub in one of the outfield corners. Furthermore, despite rumblings that Chris Parmelee may be called up from AAA to provide some offense in the outfield, an upgrade is unlikely to be found in the Orioles minor league system. Let’s take a look at what’s available.

Outfielders on the 40-Man Roster

All of them are actually already on the major league roster. I could end this section right there, but that would be lazy. Just because a player isn’t listed as an outfielder on the 40-man roster doesn’t mean that he can’t play the outfield. However, even taking that broader view, that still doesn’t leave the team with many options. Other than the obvious candidates, there is Jimmy Paredes and Henry Urrutia. We know that Paredes can hit (at least he has this year), but he’s only logged just over 400 innings in the outfield during his major league career, producing -4 DRS (-7.7 UZR/150). As for Urrutia, I don’t think Baltimore views him as an outfield option anymore (on the 40-man roster, he’s listed as a DH).

Outfielders Not on the 40-Man Roster

The table below shows how the options at Norfolk are performing so far in 2015.

As you can see, no one is exactly lighting the world on fire down there, except for maybe Parmelee, and he’s not even listed as an outfielder on the Orioles website. As Matt Kremnitzer noted, it’s not as if Parmelee would even be an upgrade, as he owns a career 97 wRC+ in the major leagues (901 PAs) and has been -7 DRS in just over 1,050 innings in the outfield.

Let’s take a look at how the outfielders in Bowie are hitting.

The stat lines of these players look slightly better, but they’re also another level further from the major leagues. Quincy Latimore is a former Pirates prospect who is now 26 years old and has never played above AA. Glynn Davis is having a promising season, but he is only in his first full year of AA, and is not considered a prospect (MLB.com left him off their top 30 list prior to the season). The best of this bunch is Mike Yastrzemski, who was ranked the 10th best prospect in the Orioles system before the season by both Baseball Prospectus and MLB.com (Baseball America had him 9th and he didn’t make the cut on Keith Law’s list). Still, both MLB.com and BP see Yastrzemski as a slightly below average player at his peak, so it’s unlikely he’d be a difference maker, especially in 2015.

Purchasing the contract of one of the players not on the 40-man roster shouldn’t be an obstacle. But if that’s the route the team decides to take, they’ll need to clear a spot to make room for Matt Wieters when he comes off the 60-day disabled list (he’s currently rehabbing in Bowie). At that point, they’ll risk losing whoever they remove from the 40-man roster to any of the other 29 teams on waivers.

With no help down in the minors and the trade market still in its earliest stages of development, the Orioles best option in the corner outfield positions may be to just stand pat. The return of Jonathan Schoop and/or Ryan Flaherty should allow Steve Pearce to return to an outfield position, where hopefully his batted ball luck will regress in the positive direction, providing some much needed production. Sometimes the best course of action one can take is to wait.

Should the Orioles Trade for Jay Bruce?

With both Markakis and Cruz going elsewhere in free agency, it should come as no surprise that the Orioles have made outfield their top priority.  A month ago I recommended that the Orioles attempt to trade or non-tender De Aza and sign Aoki and that's still a possibility. But recently people have suggested that the Orioles try to trade for Jay Bruce. The Toronto Sun claims that the Reds would be willing to trade him for a few inexpensive major league players. Would Jay Bruce be a good option for this Orioles club?

At first glance, Jay Bruce looks like he could help our offense. He was solid offensively from 2010-2013 with a wRC+ in the 117 to 124 range or about 20% above average. But in 2014 he had a horrendous year offensively with only a wRC+ of 79. Defense metrics indicate that his defense is about average. His sum UZR over the past three years is -.6. He is probably slightly below average although he did have a strong defensive season in 2013 when he was the Reds’ winner of the Wilson Defensive Player of the Year Award. Jay Bruce will be 28 years old at the start of the 2015 season and becomes a free agent after the 2016 season. A team that trades for him will receive two years of his prime at a total cost of $25 million.

It makes sense to take a more in depth look. Let’s start with his walk rate and strikeout rate. In 2010 and 2011, Bruce had a 10% walk rate. In 2012 and 2013, he had a walk rate over 9%. In 2014, his walk rate dropped to 8%. This seems to indicate that his walk rate is regressing over time. His unintentional walk rate shows a similar trend. From 2010-2012 he had about an 8.5% unintentional walk rate. In 2013 and 2014 he had an unintentional walk rate of 7.1%. This seems to indicate that his walk rate has really started to regress over the past two years. The only reason why his 2013 and 2014 walk numbers are different is because pitchers didn’t intentionally walk him as often in 2014 as they did in 2013. This is probably because he had a poor year in 2014. His strikeout rate tells the same story. From 2010-2012 his average K% was 24%. In 2013 and 2014 his average K% was about 27%. It seems that he's walking less and striking out more.

His plate discipline stats explain this trend. From 2010-2012 his swinging strike rate was nearly 12% but in 2013 and 2014 his swinging strike rate was about 13.8%. It is also worrisome that from 2010-2013 his O-Swing% was roughly 29% but in 2014 it was 33% while his Z-Swing% was 74% from 2010-2013 but only 69% in 2014. These statistics indicate that he’s not making contact as often as he once did and as a result his walk rate is decreasing while his strikeout rate is increasing. It’s possible that this is simply a two year fluke but it is a red flag.

The next thing to look at is his power. From 2010-2012 his FB% was roughly 45%. He had a 39.4% FB% in 2013 and a 34% FB% in 2014 while his HR/FB rate has stayed consistent over the entire sample. He did hit 30 HRs in 2013 but he also had 697 PAs. If we normalize his PAs to 600 from 2010 to 2014 then he would have hit 26 HRs in 2010, 29 in 2011, 32 in 2012, 26 in 2013 and 20 in 2014. Going forward, I expect him to be a 20-25 HR hitter instead of a 30 HR hitter. This may seem like a small loss of power but is definitely another red flag.

He doesn’t do particularly well when he hits balls into play either. From 2011 to 2014 he had a BABIP of .297, .283, .322 and .269. His 2013 number is the clear outlier and suggests that he was simply lucky that year. It also suggests that his BABIP is regressing as he gets older but that it was never very good to begin with. I would expect him to have a BABIP that’s certainly below .300 in 2015 and probably in the .270-.280 range.

If Jay Bruce had a more reasonable BABIP of .288 in 2013 then he would likely have 14 fewer hits of which 9 would be singles and 5 would be doubles. If so, his offensive line would have been .240/.308/.447 instead of .262/.329/.478. Steamer predicts him to hit .239/.313/.441 with a wRC+ of 106 and a BABIP of .285 in 2015.

Jay Bruce had a terrible 2014 and I expect him to have a better 2015. But I also think that there’s some regression in his performance and there are certainly a number of red flags. It's worth noting that Fake Teams came to the same conclusion. I see him putting up a .230/.300/.410 line with slightly below average defense. With 2 years and $25M remaining and given that he's still in his prime, Bruce may be worth his contract but wouldn't be worth a few major league pieces.

The Orioles need to add someone to make up for the losses of their outfield. But Jay Bruce has a number of warning flags and likely won't be as effective as he was in the past. It would be a mistake to give up anything of value in return for Jay Bruce.

Dariel Alvarez - the Latest Advanced Cuban Oriole

Dariel Alvarez, most likely after having made contact with a pitch. Photo courtesy of Christopher McCain / Norfolk Tides.

The outfield defense of the 2014 Norfolk Tides was overall the worst I've seen. At least, I don't remember seeing any more consistently poor outfield defense, and I'm sure I would remember it. Certainly, some of the Tides' outfielders had some strengths - Julio Borbon and Quintin Berry had good range but poor throwing arms; Francisco Peguero had good tools and made some great plays but had apparent lapses in concentration. But the other Tides' outfielders included infielders-trying-to-play outfield like Steve Lombardozzi, Jemile Weeks, Cord Phelps, and Buck Britton; all of whom gave it their best shot but were playing out of position. Even worse were Henry Urrutia, who frankly looked as though he'd rather be the DH; Chris Marrero, who played the outfield like a 230-pound first baseman, and Xavier Paul, who (1) had to be seen to be believed but (2) was such a bad outfielder that he served as the DH instead of Chris Marrero.

When the Orioles promoted Dariel Alvarez from Bowie at the all-star break, then, it was a relief. Alvarez could track fly balls and catch them and could field ground-ball base hits consistently. But it was his throwing arm that wowed us. Francisco Peguero made his share of nice throws, but Alvarez impressed me with strong, accurate throws. He was stretched to play center field, which he did on occasion, but he was a very good defensive right fielder. However, very few major leaguers have built a substantial career just on being a good defensive right fielder; right fielders have to hit. The rest of this piece will explore Alvarez' offense, at least the 50 AAA plate appearances (out of his 183 AAA plate appearances) that I saw.

Dariel Alvarez was following the Henry Urrutia career path. Urrutia signed as a free agent out of Cuba at age 25 in 2012; Alvarez signed as free agent out of Cuba at age 24 in 2013 (he turned 25 in November, 2013.) Urrutia had problems getting able to play legally in the United States in 2012; Alvarez was able to play 22 games between the GCL Orioles, Frederick, and Bowie in 2013. Urrutia started 2013 at Bowie and was spectacular, hitting .365/.433/.550 in 52 games; he was promoted to Norfolk where he hit .316/.358/.430 in 29 games; he spent September with the Orioles and hit .276/.276/.310. Alvarez started 2014 at Bowie and was less spectacular than Urrutia but still good, hitting .309/.332/.487 in 91 games; he was promoted to Norfolk and hit .301/.328/.439 in 44 games. (Of course, Alvarez probably wishes he would get off the Urrutia career path right about now.)

You've probably noticed that Alvarez' on-base percentage isn't much higher than his batting average and consequently he doesn't draw many walks. That's true; combining his AA and AAA seasons he drew 21 walks in 564 plate appearances. He's an aggressive hitter, as the table below (showing the number of pitches he saw at each possible count) illustrates:

0-0	50
1-0	16
0-1	26
2-0	5
1-1	14
0-2	12
3-0	0
2-1	6
1-2	12
3-1	3
2-2	11
3-2	7

Alvarez saw only sixteen pitches with a three-ball count; and he put one of the first two pitches he saw into play 38% of the time (19 out of 50.) He's not someone who works the count to advantage.

The chart below, which details the result of each pitch Alvarez saw, is also revealing:

Ball	49
Taken Strike	21
Swinging Strike	15
Foul	32
In Play	44

Alvarez is a contact hitter. He didn't miss many of the pitches he swung at (15 of 91.) He didn't take many pitches, either - 70 taken pitches in 50 plate appearances. But, in general, the pitches he didn't swing at weren't strikes - 21 out of 70. Taken as a whole, it seems accurate to describe Dariel Alvarez as a player who knows the strike zone but wants to hit, not take a walk.

We have to re-adjust our expectations on offense; offense is declining and numbers which didn't project well three or four years ago project much better now. Alvarez looks like he could become a solid enough regular right fielder in the major leagues, with doubles power and good defense. The question, of course, is whether pitchers will exploit his aggressiveness or whether he can continue his production. If Alvarez can simply maintain his current production, he'll likely have a chance to be a major league right fielder; if he fails to do so, like Henry Urrutia in 2014, he'll likely have to settle for a good career as an AAA outfielder.